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PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE
41
L. Soler, H. Sankey and P. Hoyningen-Huene, (eds.), Rethinking Scientific Change
and Theory Comparison: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities, 41–46.
© 2008 Springer.
42 PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE
What seems to be at issue here is roughly the following. The two parties, let’s call
them “naturalists” and “apioricists”, agree that there are features of the human mind
that give rise to the phenomenon of incommensurability. They may disagree about
some details of incommensurability, but this may be neglected here. The main differ-
ence between the two parties concerns how these features of the human mind can and
should be investigated. The difference between the two parties thus appears at first
sight epistemological and not ontological.1 The naturalists claim that only an empirical
investigation can disclose the existence and the nature of those features. In principle,
the aprioricists might claim that an empirical investigation of those features is either
impossible (because they are only reflectively accessible), or not necessary (because
there is a better way to access them), or misleading (because an empirical investigation
misrepresents the nature of those features), or useless (because their intended function
depends on their being determined a priori). Let us look at these possibilities in turn.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the aprioricists have identified, in an
a priori way, certain features of the mind that give rise to incommensurability under
appropriate conditions. First, is it plausible to assume that the naturalists can have
no cognitive access whatsoever to these features? However deep down in the human
mind these features may reside, they must have some observable effects, and it is a
reflective analysis of these effects that leads the apioricists to these features, in the
very best case in a secure, a priori way. However, the naturalist may be unaware of this
a priori possibility, or he may distrust it. Instead, on the basis of the observed effects,
he will form an empirical hypothesis about the features of the mind that are respon-
sible for these effects. Of course, this hypothesis can be a postulate of the existence
of just those features of the mind that the aprioricist has identified in an a priori way.
Therefore, it is implausible that the naturalist cannot have cognitive access to features
of the mind that are knowable a priori.
Second, is an empirical investigation of features of the mind that are knowable
a priori really unnecessary as an aprioricist may claim? Of course, the aprioricist is
right here. For instance, an empirical investigation of the sum of the angles of planar
triangles is indeed unnecessary because we have an absolutely watertight proof for
its being 180°. (However, should the slightest doubt creep into the supposed solidity
of our a priori reasoning, an additional empirical investigation may prove helpful.) In
defence of the naturalist, we may state that an empirical investigation of features of the
mind that are knowable a priori, is not harmful in itself – it is just unnecessary.
Third, is an empirical investigation of features of the mind that are knowable a
priori misleading because it misrepresents the nature of these features? The result of
the a priori investigation of those features is that they are necessary features of the
mind, perhaps constitutive for what a mind is, whereas the empirical investigation
resulting in the same features cannot state their necessity. Of course, it does make a
difference whether, for example, the equality of inertial mass and gravitational mass
1
I am saying “at first sight epistemological” because the different epistemological approaches are
founded in differences assigned to the objects of the approach, i.e., the pertinent features of the human
mind. For the naturalist, these features of the human mind are contingent properties of the mind (or, at
least, methodologically they should be treated as such) whereas for the aprioricist, they are necessary (or
essential) properties of the mind. On the relevance of this difference, see the third remark below.
COMMENTARY ON BIRD’S PAPER 43
2
It should be noted at this point that from a strictly Kantian point of view, Kuhn’s approach is neither
really Kantian nor can it be the last word. Kuhn applies his similarity and dissimilarity relations to
aspects of things, things, and constellations of things, and at least the aspects of things must somehow
be there and accessible to the epistemic subject before the similarity and dissimilarity relations can be
applied. Kuhn treats them as if they are simply given to the epistemic subject from outside, and he treats
time, space and causality in the same way (see Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, Sects. 2.1a and 3.2). This is,
of course, unacceptable from a strictly Kantian point of view. In his approach, Kuhn does not even touch
the main Kantian theme, namely the constitution of thinghood by means of genetically subject-sided
elements (the forms of intuition and Kant’s categories). Kuhn does not analyze the constitution of thing-
hood in terms of genetically subject-sided elements as Kant does, but asks, given thinghood, how are
different things, different classes of things, and different classes of situations constituted by means of
genetically subject-sided elements? It is thus somewhat misleading to write with respect to Kuhn, as Bird
does on p. 36: “If the structure and the form of intuition and the categories do not stay fixed, but may
change as our paradigms change, […]”. In a strictly Kantian view, Kuhn analyzes the effects of geneti-
cally subject-sided elements that come into play after Kant’s forms of intuitions and his categories have
done their work whose result is epistemically accessible thinghood. (I have discussed the dependence of
Kuhn’s theory upon the preceding availability of thinghood [wherever it may come from] and upon other
presuppositions in Hoyningen-Huene (1993, pp. 78–81) – For the sake of clarity, let me stress that I am
not endorsing Kant’s position at this point, but that I am only relating it to Kuhn’s position.
COMMENTARY ON BIRD’S PAPER 45
us, albeit in a fallible way, from the phenomena to the purely object-sided, i.e., to the real
in an absolute (and ordinary) sense, at least approximately.
The contrast made to neo-Kantianism (and to Kant’s original position) that I just
invoked is realism, not naturalism, as compared to Bird’s contrast. It appears that
naturalism is not the proper contrast to neo-Kantianism, that it is somehow askew
to oppose these positions. However, this impression may seem to dissolve once one
realizes that most scientists are indeed realists in that they never doubt, at least not in
their professional life, the absolute reality of what they investigate. Of course, falling
bodies, water, animals, tectonic plates, the Moon, the brain, and so on are typically
conceptualized in science as being completely independent of our theorizing, and thus
as real in an absolute sense. This realist attitude is part and parcel of what Bird means
by “naturalism”, even if this is not entirely explicit in the present paper (but see, e.g.,
Bird, 2000, pp. 210–211, 266). However, one should remember that some natural
scientists, among them especially some quantum physicists, are non-realists in the
sense that they believe that even some of our most basic categories like thing, property
of a thing, etc. are not just out there (i.e., are purely object-sided) but are of our
making (i.e., have genetically subject-sided contributions).3 It is important to note that
for these physicists, non-realism is not a contingent philosophical addition to their
science, but rather a necessary consequence of it. I am aware of the fact that these
matters are highly controversial but at least they show that realism is not a view that is
conceptually and therefore necessarily linked to the scientific attitude. Thus we should
not treat realism as a necessary ingredient of naturalism.
So the real issue is not naturalism versus Neo-Kantianism, because non-
foundationalist forms of Neo-Kantianism are quite compatible with naturalism. The real
issue emerging from the incommensurability debate is the alternative between realism
and non-realism (of some Neo-Kantian flavour). Because non-realism is obviously
compatible with incommensurability (although one may dislike non-realism for other
reasons, among them perhaps its implausibility to common sense), it seems that the
following question is the crucial one. Assuming the phenomenon of incommensurability
in the history of science, and given that incommensurability contains world change
in some plausible, non-superficial interpretation (e.g., something like Bird’s), is then
some form of realism a plausible option? I have the impression that most realists do
not ask this question, but approach the problem differently. Their attitude is this: Given
my form of realism, how must I interpret incommensurability and its concomitant
world change such that they either disappear as merely metaphorical or superficial, or
that they come out as somehow real but that they don’t threaten realism. Of course, in
this way, realism will come away unscathed – but only because it has not been chal-
lenged. However, philosophically this is not an interesting result. Here is a different
attitude that may prove to be more fruitful. Let us investigate incommensurability and
world change in a non-presentist way, i.e., how they are experienced by acting scien-
tists in their historical settings. Let us use all scientific (or philosophical, if available)
means that help us in this investigation, especially psychology. Regarding the analysis
3
Einstein is also a case in point, although not for quantum-theoretical reasons. See Einstein (1949, esp.
pp. 673–674) and Rosenthal-Schneider (1949) for commentary and further references.
46 PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE
of world change, let us try not to presuppose philosophical positions like realism or
non-realism. Instead, let us reconstruct what the world views are before and after the
revolution. After consideration of several such cases of incommensurability, let us
ask the following question: Given that our epistemic position as analysts of scientific
change is not fundamentally different from the epistemic position of the scientific sub-
jects investigated, are these cases of world change compatible with a plausible realist
position? Speaking for myself, I may state that at least my confidence in any form of
realism is seriously undermined by this experience, and it is my impression that many
competent historians feel the same. Of course, these are not decisive arguments, but
this way of looking at the situation may open up a discussion in which many seem to
be too sure of their own position.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Eric Oberheim for bringing the references in note 3 to my attention and
for stylistic improvements.
BIBLIOGRAPHY