1. Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board B. YES.

[G.R. No. 230642, 10 September 2019]

1. Enactment of education laws is an
FACTS: Petitioners assail (on grounds of
encroachment upon the rule-making power of the
Court concerning the practice of law, violation of
institutional academic freedom, and violation of a
law school aspirant’s right to education) the
constitutionality of the following:
 
1. R.A. No. 7662 (Legal Education Reform Act
of 1993), which created the Legal Education
Board; and
2. Legal Education Board’s (LEB) issuances
(LEBMO No. 7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEMC No. 18-2018, and related issuances)
establishing and implementing the
Philippine Law School Admission Test
(PhiLSAT)
 
ISSUES:  supervisory and regulatory competency of
A. Whether or not PhiLSAT is reasonably
related to the improvement of legal
education, and thus a valid exercise of
police power.
B. Whether or not the supervision and
regulation of legal education is a valid
exercise of police power.
 
HELD:  however, is not absolute.
A. YES.
2. Supervisory and regulatory exercise, not
To determine whether the PhiLSAT
constitutes a valid exercise of police power,
the same test of reasonableness (the
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
means) is employed.  be under the supervision of and subject to
Petitioners argue that there is no
reasonable relation between improving the
quality of legal education and regulating
access thereto. The Court does not agree.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve
the quality of legal education. It is
indubitable that the State has an interest in
prescribing regulations promoting education
and thereby protecting the common good.
Improvement of the quality of legal
education, thus, falls squarely within the
scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an
aptitude test, was the means to protect this
interest.
 
exercise of police power
The State as a “high responsibility for [the]
education of its citizens” and has an interest
in prescribing regulations to promote the
education, and consequently, the general
welfare of the people. The regulation or
administration of educational institutions,
especially on the tertiary level, is invested
with public interest. Thus, the enactment of
education laws, implementing rules and
regulations and issuances of government
agencies is an exercise of the State’s police
power.
As a professional educational program,
legal education properly falls within the
the State. The legislative history of the
Philippine legal educational system earlier
recounted evinces that the State, through
statutes enacted by the Congress and
administrative regulations issued by the
Executive, consistently exercises police
power over legal education.
The exercise of such police power,
control
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions plainly
provide that all educational institutions shall
regulation by the State. These reflect in
express terms the police power already
inherently possessed by the State. Making
express an already inherent power is not a
superfluous exercise, but is rather
consequential in case of conflict between
express powers. As elucidated in the case
of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities:
“In this connection we do not share the
belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)]
has added new power to what the State
inherently possesses by virtue of the police
power. An express power is necessarily
more extensive than a mere implied power.
For instance, if there is conflict between an
express individual right and the express
power to control private education it cannot
off-hand be said that the latter must yield to
the former - conflict of two express powers.
But if the power to control education is
merely implied from the police power, it is
feasible to uphold the express individual
right.”
xxx
The State’s supervisory and regulatory
power is an auxiliary power in relation to
educational institutions, be it a basic,
secondary or higher education. This must
necessarily be so since the right and duty to
educate, being part and parcel of youth-
rearing, do not inure to the State at the first
instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and
naturally to the parents, which right and duty
they surrender by delegation to the
educational institutions.
As held in SPARK vs. Quezon City, the right
and duty of parents to rear their children
being a natural and primary right connotes
the parents’ superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children. The
responsibility to educate lies with the
parents and guardians as an inherent right,
over which the State assumes a supportive
role. Withholding from the State the
unqualified power to control education also
serves a practical purpose - it allows for a
degree of flexibility and diversity essential to
the very reason of education to rear socially
responsible and morally upright youth and
to enable them, also, to come in contact
with challenging ideas. 
In this sense, when the Constitution gives
the State supervisory power, it is
understood that what it enjoys is a
supportive power, that is, the power of
oversight over all educational institutions. It
includes the authority to check, but not to
interfere.
In addition to supervision, educational
institutions are likewise made subject to
State regulation. Dispensing a regulatory
function means imposing requirements,
setting conditions, prescribing restrictions,
and ensuring compliance. In this regard, the
political departments are vested with ample
authority to set minimum standards to be
met by all educational institutions. x x x
Consequently, in no way should supervision
and regulation be equated to State control. 
3. Reasonable exercise
To be valid, the supervision and regulation
of legal education as an exercise of police
power must be reasonable and not
repugnant to the Constitution.
As held in Social Justice Society vs.
Atienza, Jr., the exercise of police power, in
order to be valid, must be compliant with
substantive due process:
“[T]he State, x x x may be considered as
having properly exercised [its] police power
only if the following requisites are met:
1. The interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class require its
exercise[;] and
2. The means employed are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
In short, there must be concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.”
In Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, the Court held
that:
“Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police
power is not without its own limitations. For
all its awesome consequences, it may not
be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good.”
Obviating any inference that the power to
regulate means the power to control, the
1987 Constitution added the word
“reasonable” before the phrase supervision
and regulation.
The import of the word “reasonable” was
elaborated in [the case of] Council of
Teachers, as follows:
 “When we speak of State supervision
and regulation, we refer to the external
governance of educational institutions,
particularly private educational institutions
as distinguished from the internal
governance by their respective board of
directors or trustees and their administrative
officials. Even without a provision on
external governance, the State would
still have the inherent right to regulate
educational institutions through the
exercise of its police power. We have
thought it advisable to restate the
supervisory and regulatory functions of the
State provided in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions with the addition of the word
“reasonable” because of an obiter dictum of
our Supreme Court in a decision in the case
of Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities vs. The Secretary of Education
and the Board of Textbooks in 1955.
regulation over education, can only impose
minimum regulations. 
At its most elementary, the power to
supervise and regulate shall not be
construed as stifling academic freedom in
institutions of higher learning. This must
necessarily be so since institutions of higher
learning are not mere walls within which to
teach; rather, it is a place where research,
experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges
are secured. Any form of State control, even
at its most benign and disguised as
regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the
academic freedom guaranteed to higher
educational institutions. In fact, this non-
intrusive relation between the State and
higher educational institutions is maintained
even when the Constitution itself prescribes
certain educational “thrusts” or “directions.”

xxx
PhilSAT as a pass or fail exam that will
The addition, therefore, of the word determine who may be admitted into law
‘reasonable’ is meant to underscore the schools for being violative of academic
sense of the committee, that when the
Constitution speaks of State supervision freedom.
and regulation, it does not in any way
mean control. We refer only to the power
of the State to provide regulations and to
see to it that these regulations are duly
followed and implemented. It does not
include the right to manage, dictate,
overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does
not include the right to dominate.”

The addition of the word “reasonable” did

not change the texture of police power that
the State exercises over the education. It
merely emphasized that State supervision
and regulation of legal education cannot
amount to control.

4. State’s supervisory and regulatory

power over legal education in relation to
academic freedom

The rule is that institutions of higher learning

enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself
(Section 5(2), Article XIV, 1987 Constitution)
who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught and who to admit, being part
of their academic freedom. The State, in the
exercise of its reasonable supervision and