In-service Inspection of Welds in

Atmospheric Ammonia Storage

Tanks
Traditional intrusive inspection of ammonia storage tanks requires decommissioning of the tank,
costly downtime and oxygen ingress inside the tank. This paper summarizes Yara’s non-intrusive
inspection process including the description of a novel technique for in-service inspection of double
wall ammonia storage tanks. This novel inspection technique consists in an inspection robot equipped
with ultrasonic probes. The robot is deployed through the manhole of the outer tank into the external
surface of the inner tank shell. Remotely controlled, it scans the inner tank welds looking for cracks.

Giuseppe Franceschini, Arie de Bruijne, Johan Thoelen, Vianney Amrhein, Olav Storkaas
Yara International

Ole Nørrekær Mortensen, Jens Erik Olsen

FORCE Technology

nular space between the outer and inner tank is

filled with ammonia vapour (Figure 1).
1. Introduction

I
nspection of atmospheric ammonia storage
tanks has always posed a challenge since in-
trusive inspection requires decommissioning
of the tank and it allows oxygen ingress in-
side the tank increasing the risk of Ammonia
Stress Corrosion Cracking (NH3-SCC).
Based on Risk Based Inspection (RBI) assess-
ment and critical crack size evaluation for the
definition of the acceptance criteria, Yara estab-
lished a specific inspection process for non-
intrusive inspection of single and double wall
ammonia storage tanks.
This paper summarizes Yara’s non-intrusive in-
spection process for in-service inspection of Figure 1. Double wall ammonia storage tank
double wall ammonia storage tanks designed as
“cup in a tank”. These tanks are designed with
an insulated outer steel tank and an open inner
steel tank holding the liquid ammonia. The an-

2014 83 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 2. Ammonia Stress Corrosion tion (dangerous operations like emptying
Cracking and filling up the tank are not required);
 Non-intrusive inspection may be carried
The damage mechanism that is a threat to the out more regularly than traditional inter-
mechanical integrity of an ammonia storage nal inspection.
tank is Ammonia Stress Corrosion Cracking
(NH3-SCC): liquid ammonia in the presence of
oxygen can cause stress corrosion cracking in
carbon steel.
Based on experiences from findings and exten-
sive international research work, the main con-
clusions concerning NH3-SCC in ammonia
tanks are:

 NH3-SCC initiation requires high residu-

al stress levels; Figure 2. Relationship between water and
 NH3-SCC initiation requires the pres- oxygen content of ammonia and the risk of SCC
ence of oxygen;
 The presence of water inhibits the for-
mation and growth of NH3-SCC;
 NH3-SCC depends on the water content
and the oxygen concentration as shown
in Figure 2;
 NH3-SCC is a general phenomenon that
can occur on all weld seam areas (Figure
3) driven by residual stress and envi-
ronmental conditions (oxygen and water
content).

It is also known that decommissioning and re-

commissioning are critical phases in the for-
mation of cracks due to the potential for in-
creased oxygen levels inside the tank. For this
reason the actual tendency is to inspect ammo-
nia storage tanks with non-intrusive inspection
technique with the following advantages:

 Non-intrusive inspection does not affect

the integrity of the tank (avoiding the
negative effect of opening the tank for
internal inspection, which causes ther-
mal stress and allows the ingress of oxy- Figure 3. Longitudinal and transversal
gen); NH3-SCC in ammonia storage tank welds
 Non-intrusive inspection is less hazard-
ous to carry out than the internal inspec-

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 84 2014

 3. Applicability of non-intrusive
inspection techniques
The guidelines [1] developed by European Ferti-
lizer Manufactures Association (EFMA, nowa-
days called Fertilizer Europe, FE) allow for non-
intrusive inspection of ammonia storage tanks.
However some details about how to perform it
are missing. FE guidelines give only qualitative
information about the applicability of non-
intrusive inspection techniques like the follow-
ing:
 The technique used for non-intrusive in-
spection must be sufficiently reliable and
sensitive to the detection of the type, size
and shape of cracks that are acceptably
below the calculated maximum tolerable
defect.
Based on the principles stated by FE (Risk
Based Inspection assessment and critical crack
size evaluation), Yara established a specific in-
spection process for non-intrusive inspection of
ammonia storage tanks. The process defines in
details all the steps of the inspection process it-
self, from the initial risk assessment up to the
definition of new, conservative and reasonable
inspection intervals.
9. Inspection execution
10. Inspection results evaluation
11. Determination of next inspection interval
The steps of the inspection process are de-
scribed more in detail in the next paragraphs.
3.1. Risk Based Inspection assessment
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) assessment is exe-
cuted according to Appendix 2 of EFMA Guide-
lines [1]. The detailed question list of the RBI
assessment covers the relevant parameters that
can affect failure probability and failure conse-
quences. The tank is ranked according to the
risk matrix reported in Figure 4: five levels of
risk areas are identified by different colours and
these risk areas are linked to different inspection
frequencies (Yara applies these inspection fre-
quencies only in case of traditional internal in-
spection).

4. Yara’s non-intrusive inspection

process
Yara’s non-intrusive inspection process for
ammonia storage tanks is defined as following:

1. Risk Based Inspection assessment

2. Structural integrity calculation
3. Applicability of non-intrusive inspection
4. Inspection scope definition
5. NDT technique selection
6. Automated ultrasonic inspection system:
development
7. Automated ultrasonic inspection system:
validation Figure 4. EFMA Risk Matrix
8. Inspection preparation

2014 85 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 3.2. Structural integrity calculation
The purpose of structural integrity calculation is
to determine the maximum tolerable defect sizes
at relevant locations in the tank wall.
Assessment locations and defect orientations
considered in such calculations are defined in
Figure 5.

Figure 5. Crack locations and orientations

Calculation procedure is based on the Failure

Assessment Diagram (FAD) method (Figure 6).
BS7910 [2] is used for the calculation of maxi-
mum tolerable defect sizes. Tolerable surface
breaking as well as fully penetrating defect sizes
shall be calculated. The latter is included so that Figure 6. Crack-like flaw analysis using FAD
the likely failure mode (Leak Before Break or
Break Before Leak) can be predicted for the se-
lected defect locations.
In order to determine limiting flaw size, the
analysis is repeated (for all the five crack con-
figurations shown in Figure 5):

 Increasing the crack-like flaw dimen-

sions by a small increment;
 Determining if the new flaw size is in-
side of the FAD curve;
 Continuing to increment the flaw size
until the calculated assessment point is
on the FAD curve.
Figure 7. Limiting flaw size analysis
The resulting flaw size is defined as the maxi-
mum allowable defect size (Figure 7).

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 86 2014

 Eventually detected (and characterized) cracks
shall have dimensions less than the calculated
maximum allowable defect sizes (Table 1).
Calculated maximum allowable
defect sizes
Depth, a Length, 2c
Crack configuration
(mm) (mm)
A 12 487
B 11 20
C 11 20
D 10 176
E 11 82
Table 1. Maximum allowable defect sizes
Because there is a randomness or uncertainty
associated with several input variables, calcula-
tion of maximum allowable defect sizes should
be viewed probabilistically rather than deter-
ministically. In particular, for ammonia storage
tank application, the uncertainties associated
with the following variables have been consid-
ered:
 Material yield strength
 Material fracture toughness
 Estimate of residual stress
The Monte Carlo and FAD methods are well
suited to one another for the calculation of prob-
ability of failure (POF) associated with the max-
imum allowable defect sizes above estimated
(Table 1).
Figure 8 shows the results of a Monte Carlo
FAD analysis. Each Monte Carlo trial results in
a single assessment point. Uncertainty in the in-
put parameters (fracture toughness, residual
stress, and yield strength) lead to uncertainty in
the fracture ration, Kr, and in the load ratio, Lr:
uncertainty in the input parameters is reflected
in scatter of the assessment points. The POF is
then defined as the number of points that fall
outside of the FAD curve divided by the total
number of trials.
2014
POF
<10-5
<10-5
<10-5
<10-5
Figure 8. Monte Carlo FAD analysis
<10-5
Calculated maximum allowable defect sizes are
considered valid if the associated POF is less
than 10-5. If this condition is not satisfactory, the
analysis is repeated: maximum allowable defect
sizes are decreased until the target POF equal to
10-5 is obtained.
3.3. Applicability of non-intrusive inspection
According to FE Guidelines [1], non-intrusive
inspection of the tank can be considered if the
two of the following conditions are obtained:
 RBI assessment places the tank in the in-
spection frequency area of at least 10
years. In other words, the tank cannot be
in the High risk area (Figure 4);
 Structural integrity calculations conclude
that the maximum allowable defect sizes
are much higher than detectable defect
sizes.
If these two conditions are both satisfied, non-
intrusive inspection can be considered instead of
the traditional internal inspection of the tank.
87 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 3.4. Inspection scope definition
The scope, as defined in Step 1 of Table 2, is the
minimum scope of work for a non-intrusive in-
spection of an ammonia storage tank.
The final extent of the inspections depends on
the inspection findings: if defects, which cannot
be explained as insignificant fabrication imper-
fections, are not found in Step 1, this is suffi-
cient to consider the tank free from critical
cracks; in case defects are found in the Step 1,
further evaluations are made to define what to
do (§3.10).
Area Method
Shell plates: T-welds between courses 1,
UT Technique*
2 and 3
Shell plates: horizontal and vertical
UT Technique*
welds in and between courses 1, 2 and 3
Shell plates: T-welds between courses 3
and 4
UT Technique*
Shell plates: horizontal and vertical
UT Technique*
welds in and between courses 3 and 4
Roof, nozzles on the roof (for atmos-
Visual
pheric or CUI corrosion)
* UT Technique shall be validated by Yara (§3.7)
Table 2: Non-intrusive inspection scope
A map indicating the welds and the different
courses is used to identify the extent and loca-
tions of the inspection (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Non-intrusive inspection scope: map
AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
3.5. NDT technique selection
The potential damage mechanism is NH3-SCC.
The inspection technique must therefore be sen-
sitive to crack detection.
Further, the inspection technique must have the
ability to detect and determine the size of cracks
which can run both parallel and perpendicular to
the weld.
Since the potential cracks will appear on the op-
posite side (on the internal surface of the inner
tank shell) of the steel plate from where the in-
spection is carried out (from the external surface
of the inner tank shell), the ultrasound technique
Step 1 is chosen as it has a very high sensitivity to line-
40%
ar and planar defects.
Trials have been carried out on different test
plates together with simulations to evaluate dif-
10%
ferent ultrasound probes and probe setups. The
trials also included testing at -33°C which is the
10% temperature inside the tank.
The typical detection setup for weld inspection
5% consists of two sets of shear wave probes. One
set is perpendicular to the weld and the other
one is in a small skewed angle to the weld. The
100%
probes are placed on each side of the weld.
Figure 10 shows the setup with 70º shear wave
probes focused on the inner surface perpendicu-
lar to the weld.
Figure 10. Probe setup for detection of longitu-
dinal cracks
Time Of Flight Diffraction (TOFD) technique is
chosen for height sizing of cracks.
Figure 11 shows the setup with 70° probes fo-
cused on the inner surface.
Figure 11. TOFD probe setup for height sizing
88 2014
 3.6. Automated ultrasonic inspection system:
development
FORCE Technology developed the first auto-
mated ultrasonic inspection system P-scan in
1965. Since then, FORCE Technology devel-
oped and adapted this system to a lot of differ-
ent applications in production industry and for
maintenance inspection.
The development of the inspection system for
inspection of welds in the “cup” in “cup in a
tank” ammonia storage tanks required extensive
testing of all components to ensure they could
withstand ammonia atmosphere and low tem-
perature.
Ammonia is very aggressive towards copper,
which is very common component in electron-
ics. For this reason all parts were tested in an
ammonia chamber before they were approved
for use in the inspection system. Especially the
camera dome turned out to be a problem: sever-
al materials were tested and many became brit-
tle or white as shown in Figure 12.
brush for cleaning the surface before inspection,
two pan/tilt observation cameras and light.
The ultrasound probes are mounted on the bot-
tom side: four pulse-echo probes for detection
of longitudinal and transverse cracks and one set
of TOFD probes for height sizing.
Glycol mixture is fed through the umbilical ca-
ble for contact between probes and surface.
A deployment tool (Figure 14) was developed to
remotely control the deployment of the inspec-
tion robot through the manhole of the outer tank
into the external surface of the inner tank shell.
The deployment tool is mounted on the flange
of the outer tank and it is fitted with two remote
controlled hatches: one for sealing the tank and
one with a cable reel for the inspection robot.
The deployment tool is fitted with adapters for
different manhole flanges (24’’ flange being the
smallest).

Figure 13. Exploded view of inspection robot

Figure 12. Parts after testing in ammonia
chamber

The inspection robot (Figure 13) is designed

with ultrasound processor, motor and camera
control contained in one unit which is powered
through an umbilical cable (the cable also con-
tains optical fibre for communication).
The inspection robot is pressurized with nitro-
gen to ensure that ammonia vapour does not in-
trude into any parts.
The inspection robot is fitted with powerful
permanent magnetic wheels (each having an at-
traction force of about 200kg), mechanical
Figure 14. Design of deployment system

2014 89 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

 3.7. Automated ultrasonic inspection system:  Preparation of ground foundation for
validation habitat (for inspection operators) instal-
lation;
An inspection procedure containing detailed de-  Preparation of the area around the tank
scription of ultrasound probes, inspection setup for the required inspection system
and evaluation of examination data has been es- equipment (platforms and scaffolding
tablished for the inspection system. around the habitat);
The examination procedure and inspection sys-
 Removal of insulation from the tank
tem has been validated by producing a number
manhole and preparation of manhole
of test plates with welds and artificial defects
nozzle (cleaning and grinding);
(machined notches).
 Installation (alignment and fixation with
The test plates were made in 9mm and 32mm
bolts) of transition flange with “O-ring”
thickness (wall thicknesses of the Yara tanks to
sealing;
be inspected).
The artificial defects were placed in the weld as  Installation of the habitat (Figure 16);
shown in the Figure 15.  Connection of oxygen analyser;
The artificial defects were placed in the centre  Preparation for the fire fighters who will
of the weld and in the heat affected zone. The work in the habitat (air bottles, water for
depth (height) ranged from 2mm to 5mm. washing the ammonia).
The validation was carried out by examining the
test plates with the inspection system under la-
boratory conditions.
All the artificial defects were detected as ex-
pected. Figure 15 shows an example of trans-
verse notches in a 32mm plate.

Figure 16. Habitat installation at Yara Rostock

3.9. Inspection execution

When all preparations have been carried out and
the storage tank is ready for inspection, a team
of specialists consisting of experienced NDT
Figure 15. Test plate technicians, mechanics and specially trained fire
fighters (with knowledge of working with toxic
3.8. Inspection preparation gases) gather at the Yara site.
The inspection requires a close cooperation be-
Before the inspection itself, several activities tween Yara site operation and maintenance per-
have to be executed: sonnel and the external technicians. Detailed
safe job analysis is carried out in order to ensure
a safe inspection.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 90 2014

 The inspection setup consists of:
 Habitat with controllable atmosphere
which is placed at the outer manhole of
the tank (Figure 16);
 Container with electronics and glycol
supply;
 Container with control room and small
machine for maintenance and repair of
the inspection system.
The fire fighters in chemical protection suits en-
ter the habitat. The habitat is flushed with nitro-
gen to reduce its oxygen content below 1%.
When the oxygen content is acceptable and the
pressure between the tank and the habitat is
aligned the hatch cover of the outer tank is re-
moved and a remote controlled hatch cover is
mounted (Figure 17).
Figure 17. Fire fighters at work in habitat re-
moving hatch cover
When the remote controlled hatch cover is
closed the fire fighters can exit from the habitat,
the atmosphere can be normalized and the rest
of the inspection system can be mounted by the
technicians. The habitat is then closed and
flushed with nitrogen.
When the oxygen level is acceptable and the
pressure is balanced, the remote controlled
hatch is opened and the inspection robot de-
ployed through the manhole of the outer tank in-
to the external surface of the inner tank shell.
2014
The other hatch cover with the cable reel is
closed and the inspection system is ready for
examination of the selected welds.
The examination is carried out according the in-
spection map prepared by Yara (Figure 9): typi-
cally, between 75 and 125 meters of welds are
inspected.
After the examination is completed a report is
issued with a list of the examined welds and the
inspection result.
The inspection robot performed the tank inspec-
tion as planned. However, due to the weight of
the robot, it was not possible to inspect the
welds on the plates thinner than 9mm (on the
top part of the tank): the magnetic attraction
force was not big enough to steer the robot.
3.10. Inspection results evaluation
Eventual inspection findings are compared
against structural integrity calculation results.
Repair and inspection follow-up strategies (Fig-
ure 18) are developed.
Case 1. Actual crack depth, a, and actual crack
length, 2c, (as characterized with non-intrusive
inspection technique) are checked against max-
imum allowable defect sizes calculated for a
target POF=10-5 (Table 1). If the relations be-
low are satisfied, the tank can be operated and
the next inspection interval is calculated accord-
ing to §3.11.
a < alim, POF10-5
2c < 2clim, POF10-5
Case 2. In case of inspection indications slightly
exceeding the acceptance criterion defined for
Case 1, the inspection scope is extended and the
structural integrity analysis is refined decreasing
the target POF to 10-4. If the relations below are
satisfied, the tank can be operated and the next
inspection interval is calculated according to
§3.11 but limiting it to a maximum of 1 year.
a < alim, POF10-4
2c < 2clim, POF10-4
91 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL
 Case 3. In case of inspection indications largely
exceeding the acceptance criterion defined for
Case 1, the tank is opened and full internal in-
spection is executed (wet fluorescent magnetic
particle). Fitness For Service (FFS) analysis for
grooves [3] is executed in order to determine
maximum allowable dimensions for eventually
grinded areas:
In order to calculate RL a model for NH3-SCC
growth rate is required. Based on results of
Kjeller Ammonia SCC Project, KASP, project
[4], the corrosion growth rate model showed in
Figure 19 has been selected.

 3a. Crack like indications exceeding

Case 1 acceptance criterion but not ex-
ceeding the groove criterion are removed
by grinding without welding repair.
Tank can be then operated and the next
inspection interval is calculated accord-
ing to §3.11;
 3b. Crack like indications exceeding ac-
ceptance Case 1 criterion and exceeding
the groove criterion are removed by
grinding and repaired by welding. Tank
can be then operated and the next in-
spection interval is calculated according
to §3.11.

It is fundamental here to remember that, during

operation, for all the 4 Cases above described,
the operating procedures are strictly respected: a
minimum of 2000ppm of water in the liquid
ammonia is always guaranteed in order to inhib-
it NH3-SCC (Figure 2).
3.11. Determination of next inspection
interval
Non-intrusive inspection interval is based on the
Residual Life (RL) calculation.
RL is the time for a crack to develop from its
actual dimensions (as characterized with the
non-intrusive inspection) to the calculated max-
imum allowable defect sizes.
When the non-intrusive inspection doesn’t re-
veal any crack indication, RL is the time for a
crack to develop from the NDT technique detec-
tion limit (5mm) to the calculated maximum al-
lowable defect sizes.
Non-intrusive inspection interval is set equal to
RL/2 (Half Life).
Figure 18. Repair and inspection follow-up
strategy
The example in the Table 3 clarifies how to cal-
culate non-intrusive inspection interval and it
underlines the difference between the traditional
internal inspection intervals (based on EFMA
Risk Matrix) and the non-intrusive inspection
interval (based on RL calculation): in general,
inspection intervals based on the Yara approach
are shorter.
Yara believes that shorter intervals are correct
considering the lower confidence level of a non-
intrusive inspection compared to the traditional
internal inspection.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 92 2014

 Years eventually caused by NH3-SCC, can be found
18 and sized with high confidence.
16 The development and validation of an effective
14
non-intrusive inspection process allowed Yara
to avoid:
12
10
 The negative effect of opening the tank
8
causing ingress of oxygen and so in-
6
creasing the susceptibility to NH3-SCC;
4  Dangerous operations like emptying and
2 filling up the tank;
0 2c 
 Costly downtime.
0 5 10 15 20 25 (mm)

Figure 19. NH3-SCC growth rate model [4] To date seven ammonia storage tanks have been
successfully inspected with the inspection robot.
Yara Ammonia Storage Tank n° XXX
Based on inspection results, critical crack size
evaluation and NH3-SCC growth rate model,
EFMA Probability Of Failure (Figure 4) 29 Yara determined new inspection intervals that
EFMA Consequence Of Failure (Figure 4) 40 are shorter than the ones recommended by
EFMA Risk (Figure 4) Green, Low risk EFMA [1] for the traditional internal inspection
EFMA Inspection interval (Figure 4) 15-20 Years of the tank.
2clim (Table 1) 20mm
Non-intrusive inspection indications No 5. References
NDT technique detection limit 5mm
RL (Figure 19) 16 Years [1] Guidance for inspection of atmospheric
Yara non-intrusive inspection interval 8 years
refrigerated ammonia storage tanks,
2008, EFMA
Table 3. Inspection interval determination: Non-
[2] BS7910:2005, Guide to methods for as-
intrusive (Yara) Vs traditional internal (EFMA)
sessing the acceptability of flaws in me-
tallic structures
4. Conclusion [3] API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, JUNE 5, 2007
[4] Nyborg, R., Bruk, KASP modell for
Yara established a specific inspection process ammoniakk spennings korrosjon
for non-intrusive inspection of ammonia storage sprekkvekst, 1999, IFE
tanks based on Risk Based Inspection (RBI) as-
sessment and critical crack size evaluation.
On this basis Yara International asked FORCE
Technology to develop a robot for non-intrusive
inspection of inner tank welds in double wall
(cup in tank) ammonia storage tanks where the
inspection can be carried from the vapour filled
annular room between the inner and the outer
tank.
The technique was qualified by producing a
number of test plates with artificial defects. The
qualification proved that even small defects,

2014 93 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 94 2014