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Problem
Steve Selvin described a problem loosely based on the game show Let's Make a Deal in a letter to the American
Statistician in 1975 (Selvin 1975a). In a subsequent letter he dubbed it the "Monty Hall problem" (Selvin 1975b). In
1990 the problem was published in its most well-known form in a letter to Marilyn vos Savant's "Ask Marilyn"
column in Parade:
Suppose you're on a game show, and you're given the choice of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind
the others, goats. You pick a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what's behind the doors, opens another
door, say No. 3, which he knows has a goat. He then says to you, "Do you want to pick door No. 2?" Is it to
your advantage to switch your choice?
—Whitaker 1990
Monty Hall problem 2
Certain aspects of the host's behavior are not specified in this wording of the problem. For example it is not clear if
the host considers the position of the prize in deciding whether to open a particular door or is required to open a door
under all circumstances (Mueser and Granberg 1999). Almost all sources make the additional assumptions that the
car is initially equally likely to be behind each door, that the host must open a door showing a goat, and that he must
make the offer to switch. Many sources add to this the assumption that the host chooses at random which door to
open if both hide goats, often but not always meaning by that, at random with equal probabilities. The resulting set of
assumptions gives what is called "the standard problem" by many sources (Barbeau 2000:87). According to Krauss
and Wang (2003:10), even if these assumptions are not explicitly stated, people generally assume them to be the
case. A fully unambiguous, mathematically explicit version of the standard problem is:
Suppose you're on a game show and you're given the choice of three doors [and will win what is behind the
chosen door]. Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats [unwanted booby prizes]. The car and the
goats were placed randomly behind the doors before the show. The rules of the game show are as follows:
After you have chosen a door, the door remains closed for the time being. The game show host, Monty Hall,
who knows what is behind the doors, now has to open one of the two remaining doors, and the door he opens
must have a goat behind it. If both remaining doors have goats behind them, he chooses one [uniformly] at
random. After Monty Hall opens a door with a goat, he will ask you to decide whether you want to stay with
your first choice or to switch to the last remaining door. Imagine that you chose Door 1 and the host opens
Door 3, which has a goat. He then asks you "Do you want to switch to Door Number 2?" Is it to your
advantage to change your choice?
—Krauss and Wang 2003:10
Solutions
There are several approaches to solving the Monty Hall problem all giving the same result—that a player who swaps
has a 2/3 chance of winning the car. Most popular sources present solutions based on simple probabilistic reasoning.
A different approach to solving the problem, commonly used in mathematical sources, is to treat it as a conditional
probability problem.
Simple solutions
- Player's pick has a 1/3 chance while the other two doors have 1/3 chance each, for a
combined 2/3 chance. - Player's pick remains a 1/3 chance, while the other two doors
a combined 2/3 chance, 2/3 for the still unopened one and 0 for the one the host opened. The solution presented by
vos Savant in Parade (vos Savant 1990b) shows the three possible arrangements of one car and two goats behind
three doors and the result of switching or staying after initially picking Door 1 in each case:
Monty Hall problem 3
A player who stays with the initial choice wins in only one out of three of these equally likely possibilities, while a
player who switches wins in two out of three. The probability of winning by staying with the initial choice is
therefore 1/3, while the probability of winning by switching is 2/3.
An even simpler solution is to reason that switching loses if and only if the player initially picks the car, which
happens with probability 1/3, so switching must win with probability 2/3. (Carlton 2005).
Another way to understand the solution is to consider the two original unchosen doors together. Instead of one door
being opened and shown to be a losing door, an equivalent action is to combine the two unchosen doors into one
since the player cannot choose the opened door (Adams 1990; Devlin 2003; Williams 2004; Stibel et al., 2008).
As Cecil Adams puts it (Adams 1990), "Monty is saying in effect: you can keep your one door or you can have the
other two doors." The player therefore has the choice of either sticking with the original choice of door, or choosing
the sum of the contents of the two other doors, as the 2/3 chance of hiding the car has not been changed by the
opening of one of these doors.
As Keith Devlin says (Devlin 2003), "By opening his door, Monty is saying to the contestant 'There are two doors
you did not choose, and the probability that the prize is behind one of them is 2/3. I'll help you by using my
knowledge of where the prize is to open one of those two doors to show you that it does not hide the prize. You can
now take advantage of this additional information. Your choice of door A has a chance of 1 in 3 of being the winner.
I have not changed that. But by eliminating door C, I have shown you that the probability that door B hides the prize
is 2 in 3.'"
Aids to understanding
Simulation
The simulation, using the following procedure, can be repeated several times to simulate multiple rounds of the
game. One card is dealt face-down at random to the 'player', to represent the door the player picks initially. Then,
looking at the remaining two cards, at least one of which must be a red two, the 'host' discards a red two. If the card
remaining in the host's hand is the Ace of Spades, this is recorded as a round where the player would have won by
switching; if the host is holding a red two, the round is recorded as one where staying would have won.
By the law of large numbers, this experiment is likely to approximate the probability of winning, and running the
experiment over enough rounds should not only verify that the player does win by switching two times out of three,
but show why. After one card has been dealt to the player, it is already determined whether switching will win the
round for the player; and two times out of three the Ace of Spades is in the host's hand.
If this is not convincing, the simulation can be done with the entire deck, dealing one card to the player and keeping
the other 51 (Gardner 1959b; Adams 1990). In this variant the Ace of Spades goes to the host 51 times out of 52, and
Monty Hall problem 5
stays with the host no matter how many non-Ace cards are discarded.
Another simulation, suggested by vos Savant, employs the "host" hiding a penny, representing the car, under one of
three cups, representing the doors; or hiding a pea under one of three shells.
This analysis depends on the constraint in the explicit problem statement that the host chooses uniformly at random
which door to open after the player has initially selected the car (1/6 = 1/2 * 1/3). If the host's choice to open Door 3
was made with probability q instead of probability 1/2, then the conditional probability of winning by switching
becomes (1/3)/(1/3 + q * 1/3)). The extreme cases q=0, q=1 give conditional probabilities of 1 and 1/2 respectively;
q=1/2 gives 2/3. If q is unknown then the conditional probability is unknown too, but still it is always at least 1/2 and
on average, over the possible conditions, equal to the unconditional probability 2/3.
Car hidden behind Door 3 Car hidden behind Door 1 Car hidden behind Door 2
Host must open Door 2 Host randomly opens either goat door Host must open Door 3
If the host has opened Door 2, switching wins twice as often as staying If the host has opened Door 3, switching wins twice as often as staying
Mathematical formulation
The above solution may be formally proven using Bayes' theorem, similar to Gill, 2002, Henze, 1997, and many
others. Different authors use different formal notations, but the one below may be regarded as typical. Consider the
discrete random variables:
: the number of the door hiding the Car,
: the number of the door Selected by the player, and
: the number of the door opened by the Host.
As the host's placement of the car is random, all values of C are equally likely. The initial (unconditional) probability
of C is then
The player can then use Bayes' rule to compute the probability of finding the car behind any door, after the initial
selection and the host's opening of one. This is the conditional probability of C given H and S:
Thus, if the player initially selects Door 1, and the host opens Door 3, the probability of winning by switching is
Sources of confusion
When first presented with the Monty Hall problem an overwhelming majority of people assume that each door has
an equal probability and conclude that switching does not matter (Mueser and Granberg, 1999). Out of 228 subjects
in one study, only 13% chose to switch (Granberg and Brown, 1995:713). In her book The Power of Logical
Thinking, vos Savant (1996:15) quotes cognitive psychologist Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini as saying "... no other
statistical puzzle comes so close to fooling all the people all the time" and "that even Nobel physicists systematically
give the wrong answer, and that they insist on it, and they are ready to berate in print those who propose the right
answer." Interestingly, pigeons make mistakes and learn from mistakes, and experiments, Herbranson and Schroeder,
2010, show that they rapidly learn to always switch, unlike humans.
Most statements of the problem, notably the one in Parade Magazine, do not match the rules of the actual game
show (Krauss and Wang, 2003:9), and do not fully specify the host's behavior or that the car's location is randomly
selected (Granberg and Brown, 1995:712). Krauss and Wang (2003:10) conjecture that people make the standard
assumptions even if they are not explicitly stated. Although these issues are mathematically significant, even when
controlling for these factors nearly all people still think each of the two unopened doors has an equal probability and
conclude switching does not matter (Mueser and Granberg, 1999). This "equal probability" assumption is a deeply
rooted intuition (Falk 1992:202). People strongly tend to think probability is evenly distributed across as many
unknowns as are present, whether it is or not (Fox and Levav, 2004:637).
In addition to the "equal probability" intuition, a competing and deeply rooted intuition is that revealing information
that is already known does not affect probabilities. Although this is a true statement, it is not true that just knowing
the host can open one of the two unchosen doors to show a goat necessarily means that opening a specific door
cannot affect the probability that the car is behind the initially-chosen door. If the car is initially placed behind the
doors with equal probability and the host chooses uniformly at random between doors hiding a goat (as is the case in
the standard interpretation) this probability indeed remains unchanged, but if the host can choose non-randomly
between such doors then the specific door that the host opens reveals additional information. The host can always
open a door revealing a goat and (in the standard interpretation of the problem) the probability that the car is behind
the initially-chosen door does not change, but it is not because of the former that the latter is true. Solutions based on
the assertion that the host's actions cannot affect the probability that the car is behind the initially-chosen door are
very persuasive, but lead to the correct answer only if the problem is completely symmetrical with respect to both the
Monty Hall problem 8
initial car placement and how the host chooses between two goats (Falk 1992:207,213).
According to Morgan et al. (1991) "The distinction between the conditional and unconditional situations here seems
to confound many." That is, they, and some others, interpret the usual wording of the problem statement as asking
about the conditional probability of winning given which door is opened by the host, as opposed to the overall or
unconditional probability. These are mathematically different questions and can have different answers depending on
how the host chooses which door to open when the player's initial choice is the car (Morgan et al., 1991; Gillman
1992). For example, if the host opens Door 3 whenever possible then the probability of winning by switching for
players initially choosing Door 1 is 2/3 overall, but only 1/2 if the host opens Door 3. In its usual form the problem
statement does not specify this detail of the host's behavior, nor make clear whether a conditional or an unconditional
answer is required, making the answer that switching wins the car with probability 2/3 equally vague. Many
commonly presented solutions address the unconditional probability, ignoring which door was chosen by the player
and which door opened by the host; Morgan et al. call these "false solutions" (1991). Others, such as Behrends
(2008), conclude that "One must consider the matter with care to see that both analyses are correct."
"Monty from Hell": The host offers the option to switch only when the Switching always yields a goat.
player's initial choice is the winning door (Tierney 1991).
"Angelic Monty": The host offers the option to switch only when the player Switching always wins the car.
has chosen incorrectly (Granberg 1996:185).
"Monty Fall" or "Ignorant Monty": The host does not know what lies Switching wins the car half of the time.
behind the doors, and opens one at random that happens not to reveal the
car (Granberg and Brown, 1995:712) (Rosenthal, 2008).
The host knows what lies behind the doors, and (before the player's choice) Switching wins the car half of the time.
chooses at random which goat to reveal. He offers the option to switch only
when the player's choice happens to differ from his.
The host always reveals a goat and always offers a switch. If he has a If the host opens the rightmost door, switching wins with probability
choice, he chooses the leftmost goat with probability p (which may depend 1/(1+q).
on the player's initial choice) and the rightmost door with probability
q=1−p. (Morgan et al. 1991) (Rosenthal, 2008).
The host acts as noted in the specific version of the problem. Switching wins the car two-thirds of the time.
(Special case of the above with p=q=½)
The host opens a door and makes the offer to switch 100% of the time if the Switching wins 1/2 the time at the Nash equilibrium.
contestant initially picked the car, and 50% the time if she didn't. (Mueser
and Granberg 1999)
Four-stage two-player game-theoretic (Gill, 2010, Gill, 2011). The player is Minimax solution (Nash equilibrium): car is first hidden uniformly at
playing against the show organisers (TV station) which includes the host. random and host later chooses uniform random door to open without
First stage: organizers choose a door (choice kept secret from player). revealing the car and different from player's door; player first chooses
Second stage: player makes a preliminary choice of door. Third stage: host uniform random door and later always switches to other closed door.
opens a door. Fourth stage: player makes a final choice. The player wants to With his strategy, the player has a win-chance of at least 2/3, however
win the car, the TV station wants to keep it. This is a zero-sum two-person the TV station plays; with the TV station's strategy, the TV station
game. By von Neumann's theorem from game theory, if we allow both will lose with probability at most 2/3, however the player plays. The
parties fully randomized strategies there exists a minimax solution or Nash fact that these two strategies match (at least 2/3, at most 2/3) proves
equilibrium (Mueser and Granberg 1999). that they form the minimax solution.
As previous, but now host has option not to open a door at all. Minimax solution (Nash equilibrium): car is first hidden uniformly at
random and host later never opens a door; player first chooses a door
uniformly at random and later never switches. Player's strategy
guarantees a win-chance of at least 1/3. TV station's strategy
guarantees a lose-chance of at most 1/3.
N doors
D. L. Ferguson (1975 in a letter to Selvin cited in Selvin 1975b) suggests an N door generalization of the original
problem in which the host opens p losing doors and then offers the player the opportunity to switch; in this variant
switching wins with probability (N−1)/[N(N−p−1)]. If the host opens even a single door the player is better off
switching, but the advantage approaches zero as N grows large (Granberg 1996:188). At the other extreme, if the
host opens all but one losing door the probability of winning by switching approaches 1.
Bapeswara Rao and Rao (1992) suggest a different N door version where the host opens a losing door different from
the player's current pick and gives the player an opportunity to switch after each door is opened until only two doors
remain. With four doors the optimal strategy is to pick once and switch only when two doors remain. With N doors
this strategy wins with probability (N−1)/N and is asserted to be optimal.
Monty Hall problem 10
Quantum version
A quantum version of the paradox illustrates some points about the relation between classical or non-quantum
information and quantum information, as encoded in the states of quantum mechanical systems. The formulation is
loosely based on Quantum game theory. The three doors are replaced by a quantum system allowing three
alternatives; opening a door and looking behind it is translated as making a particular measurement. The rules can be
stated in this language, and once again the choice for the player is to stick with the initial choice, or change to
another "orthogonal" option. The latter strategy turns out to double the chances, just as in the classical case.
However, if the show host has not randomized the position of the prize in a fully quantum mechanical way, the
player can do even better, and can sometimes even win the prize with certainty (Flitney and Abbott 2002, D'Ariano
et al. 2002).
In November 1990, an equally contentious discussion of vos Savant's article took place in Cecil Adams's column The
Straight Dope (Adams 1990). Adams initially answered, incorrectly, that the chances for the two remaining doors
must each be one in two. After a reader wrote in to correct the mathematics of Adams' analysis, Adams agreed that
mathematically, he had been wrong, but said that the Parade version left critical constraints unstated, and without
those constraints, the chances of winning by switching were not necessarily 2/3. Numerous readers, however, wrote
in to claim that Adams had been "right the first time" and that the correct chances were one in two.
The Parade column and its response received considerable attention in the press, including a front page story in the
New York Times (Tierney 1991) in which Monty Hall himself was interviewed. He appeared to understand the
problem, giving the reporter a demonstration with car keys and explaining how actual game play on Let's Make a
Deal differed from the rules of the puzzle.
Over 40 papers have been published about this problem in academic journals and the popular press (Mueser and
Granberg 1999). Barbeau 2000 contains a survey of the academic literature pertaining to the Monty Hall problem
and other closely related problems.
The problem continues to resurface outside of academia. The syndicated NPR program Car Talk featured it as one of
their weekly "Puzzlers," and the answer they featured was quite clearly explained as the correct one (Magliozzi and
Magliozzi, 1998). An account of the Hungarian mathematician Paul Erdős's first encounter of the problem can be
found in The Man Who Loved Only Numbers—like many others, he initially got it wrong. The problem is discussed,
from the perspective of a boy with Asperger syndrome, in The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time, a 2003
novel by Mark Haddon. The problem is also addressed in a lecture by the character Charlie Eppes in an episode of
the CBS drama NUMB3RS (Episode 1.13) and in Derren Brown's 2006 book Tricks Of The Mind. Penn Jillette
explained the Monty Hall Problem on the "Luck" episode of Bob Dylan's Theme Time Radio Hour radio series. The
Monty Hall problem appears in the film 21 (Bloch 2008). Economist M. Keith Chen identified a potential flaw in
hundreds of experiments related to cognitive dissonance that use an analysis with issues similar to those involved in
the Monty Hall problem (Tierney 2008). In 2009 a book-length discussion of the problem, its history, methods of
solution, and variations, was published by Oxford University Press (Rosenhouse 2009).
References
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with Door #1 or switch to #3?", (http://www.straightdope.com/classics/a3_189.html) The Straight Dope,
(November 2, 1990). Retrieved July 25, 2005.
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Mathematical Scientist 17(2): 89–94.
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Mathematics Journal 24(2): 149-154.
• Barbeau, Edward (2000). Mathematical Fallacies, Flaws and Flimflam. The Mathematical Association of
America. ISBN 0-88385-529-1.
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pg=PA48&dq=monty-hall+door-number). AMS Bookstore. p. 57. ISBN 9780821843482.
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0202120) (PDF). Los Alamos National Laboratory, (February 21, 2002). Retrieved January 15, 2007.
Monty Hall problem 12
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• Magliozzi, Tom; Magliozzi, Ray (1998). Haircut in Horse Town: & Other Great Car Talk Puzzlers. Diane Pub
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Monty Hall problem 13
External links
• The Game Show Problem (http://www.marilynvossavant.com/articles/gameshow.html)–the original question
and responses on Marilyn vos Savant's web site
• Monty Hall (http://www.dmoz.org/Science/Math/Recreations/Famous_Problems/Monty_Hall//) at the
Open Directory Project
• " Monty Hall Paradox (http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/MontyHallParadox/)" by Matthew R. McDougal,
The Wolfram Demonstrations Project (simulation)
• The Monty Hall Problem (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/science/08monty.html) at The New York
Times (simulation)
• The Door Keeper Game (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/548740/www/DoorKeeperGame/index.html) (simulation)
Article Sources and Contributors 15
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