No. Case Title (GR no.

, Facts Issue Ruling ProvRem

Decision made by (en Doctrine
banc, etc), ponente) Involved

1 G.R. No. 214864, March Sometime in November
22, 2017 2000, PPA, through its
PHILIPPINE PORTS Pre-qualification, Bids
AUTHORITY (PPA) VS. and Awards Committee
NASIPIT INTEGRATED (PBAC) accepted bids
ARRASTRE AND for a 10-year contract to
STEVEDORING operate as the sole
SERVICES INC. (NIASSI) cargo handler at the port
of Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte (Nasipit Port).
Subsequently, PBAC
issued Resolution No.
005-2000
recommending that the
10-year cargo-handling
contract be awarded to
NIASSI as the winning
bidder.
However, instead of
formally executing a
written contract, NIASSI
Whether the ten- YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the term of the perfected contract has already expired. Doctrine: A
year period has PPA avers that its 10-year cargo-handling contract with NIASSI already expired on January 3, 2011, after the preliminary
already lapse of 10 years from the date when said contract was perfected. In turn, PPA concludes that it can no longer injunction is in the
prescribed be directed to formally execute another contract with NIASSI, since such a directive would unduly lengthen nature of an
despite the the term of the cargo-handling contract contrary to the intention of the parties. ancillary remedy
mandatory to preserve the
injuction. While the Court agrees with PPA’s submission that the perfected contract has already expired, the Court status quo during
clarifies that such expiration is not because of the mere lapse of 10 years reckoned from the date when the the pendency of
YES same was perfected. To hold as such would be to feign ignorance of the events that transpired thereafter, the main case. As
which led to the institution of this very Petition. a necessary
consequence,
It bears emphasizing that PPA assumed the management and operations of the cargo-handling services at matters resolved
Nasipit Port on two separate instances- first, by virtue of its letter dated December 6, 2004 revoking the last in injunction
extension of the HOA, and second, by virtue of the April 2005 RTC Order lifting the preliminary mandatory proceedings do
injunction granted in NIASSI’s favor. The IO-year term of the perfected contract must be deemed interrupted not, as a general
during the periods when PPA assumed management and control over NIASSI’s cargo-handling operations. rule, conclusively
Clearly, the 10-year term of the perfected contract had already expired, leaving the R TC with nothing to determine the
enforce. merits of the main
case or decide
controverted facts
Finally, it bears stressing that PPA issued the Notice of Award on December 21, 2000. To compel PPA to therein.67

requested PPA to issue formally execute a 10-year cargo-handling contract at this time on the basis of conditions prevailing nearly two Generally,
a Hold-Over Authority decades ago would certainly be unreasonable and iniquitous. findings made in
(HOA) in its favor, in view *Please see note below cells injunction
of CASCOR’s pending proceedings are
protest (CASCOR was subject to the
one of the bidders for the outcome of the
cargo handling contract main case which
at Nasipit Port - is usually tried
CASCOR protested subsequent to the
because 2 of the injunction
stockholders of NIASSI proceedings.
are legislators who, by
law, prohibited from
having any direct or
indirect financial interest
in any contract with the
government or any of its
agencies during the term
of their office). PPA
granted NIASSI’s
request and issued a
HOA dated August 1,
2001, effective until
October 31, 2001, “or
until [such time] a cargo
handling contract shall
have been awarded,
whichever comes first.”
Meanwhile, the Office of
the Government
Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) issued Opinion
No. 028, series of2002
on February 7, 2002
(OGCC Opinion) which
confirmed the authority
of PP A to bid out the
cargo-handling contract
and affirmed the validity
of the award in NIASSI’s
favor. Despite this, the
HOA was subsequently
extended several times
upon NIASSI’ s request.
The last extension of the
HOA appears to have
been issued on October
13, 2004, for a term of six
months.
However, barely two
months after the last
extension of the HOA,
PPA, through its
Assistant General
Manager for Operations,
Benjamin B. Cecilio
(Cecilio), issued a letter
dated December 6, 2004
revoking the extension.
In said letter, Cecilio
advised NIASSI that
PPA received numerous
complaints regarding the
poor quality of its
services due to the use
of inadequately
maintained equipment.
Cecilio further relayed
that PPA would take over
the cargo-handling
services at the Nasipit
Port beginning
December 10, 2004. As
a consequence, NIASSI
filed a petition for
injunction with Prayer for
the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction (WPI) with the
RTC which was
eventually granted on
March 18, 2005. This
WPI enabled NIASSI to
operate as the cargo
handler for 14 days. On
April 12, 2005, however,
the said WPI was
dissolved in view of
PPA’s motion for
reconsideration to the
issuance of the WPI in
favor of NIASSI. On
August 10, 2006, the CA
reinstated the WPI ruling
that the RTC’s
dissolution of the same is
tainted with grave abuse
of discretion since it did
not conduct any hearing
with respecto to PPA’s
motion for
reconsideration.
For its part, PPA argued,
among others, that
NIASSI was not entitled
to the issuance of the
injunctive writ because it
had no legal right to
continue providing
cargo-handling services
at Nasipit Port,
considering that PPA
 has no existing cargo-
handling contract with
NIASSI.PPA concludes
that it can no longer be
compelled to formally
execute a contract with
NIASSI upon finality of
the Amended Decision,
since the term of the
perfected contract
already expired on
January 3, 2011, 10
years after PPA received
notice of NIASSI’s
conformity to the Notice
of Award.The HOA and
its subsequent
extensions constituted
partial fulfillment thereof.

2 [ G.R. No. 196864, July 08, Spouses Dulnuan W/N the CA NO Reqs. for the
2015 ] obtained loans from committed grave issuance of a WPI
SPOUSES VICTOR P. Metropolitan Bank and and serious error (WPI and TRO) (1) there exists a
DULNUAN AND Trust Company in overlooking A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the clear and
JACQUELINE P. (Metrobank) the undisputed protection of substantive rights and interests. An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary unmistakable
DULNUAN, As a security for the loan fact that the injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the right to be
PETITIONERS, VS. obligations, the Spouses petition for the applicant to the relief demanded. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous protected;
METROPOLITAN BANK & Dulnuan executed a WPI was filed irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its (2) this right is
TRUST COMPANY, Real Estate Mortgage during the sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case is heard fully. directly
RESPONDENT. (REM) over a parcel of redemption threatened by an
land covered by TCT No. period and no (Status Quo. In case ma ask usab) act sought to be
46390 registered under bond had been enjoined;
their names and located posted to warrant The status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy. The (3) the invasion of
at La Trinidad, Benguet the issuance. status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case. A preliminary injunction should not the right is
with an area of 392 establish new relations between the parties, but merely maintain or re-establish the pre-existing relationship material and
square meters. between them. substantial; and
Spouses Dulnuan (4) there is an
incurred default and Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary urgent and
therefore the loan injunction. paramount
obligations became due necessity for the
and demandable. SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is writ to prevent
On 22 April 2008, established: serious and
Metrobank filed an irreparable
application for extra- damage.
judicial foreclosure (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
proceedings over the restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of
subject property before an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet. (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
After due notice and litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
publication, the
mortgaged property was (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
sold at a public auction suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
where Metrobank was subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
declared as the highest
bidder after tendering the Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that
bid of P6,189,000.00, as (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
shown in the Certificate (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
of Sale. (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
Before the expiration of
the one-year redemption The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of the right and its actual or threatened
period allowed by law, violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against the
Metrobank filed a right must be shown.
Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Possession (Were the spouses able to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of the WPI? No.)
On 30 September 2008,
the Spouses Dulnuan The court a quo cannot enjoin Metrobank, at the instance of the Spouses Dulnuan, from taking possession
instituted a Complaint of the subject property simply because the period of redemption has not yet expired. As the highest bidder
seeking the issuance of in the foreclosure sale upon whom a certificate sale was issued by the sheriff, Metrobank has the right to
a temporary restraining be placed in possession of the subject property even during the redemption period provided that the
order and preliminary necessary amount of bond is posted.
and final injunction and, It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
for the annulment of possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
extra-judicial foreclosure (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. The non-expiration of the
and real estate mortgage period of redemption shall not preclude the purchaser from taking possession of the property provided that
The complaint alleged the necessary is posted. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption
that the mortgage period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. In the
constituted over the case at bar, Metrobank manifested its willingness to post a bond but its application for the issuance of the writ
property is null and void of possession was unjustly denied by the RTC.
because at the time the
agreement was entered A pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of
on 18 October 2000, no possession.
contract of loan was yet Without prejudice to the final disposition of the annulment case, Metrobank is entitled to the writ of
executed by the parties. possession and cannot be barred from enjoying the property, possession being one of the essential attributes
In other words, there is of ownership.
no principal obligation
upon which the ancillary Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary
 contract of mortgage despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a
was attached to. positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

RTC issued issued a When the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore,
Temporary Restraining the issuance of injunctive writ is improper. Herein, the Spouses Dulnuan failed to show that they have
Order and set the clear and unmistakable right to the issuance of writ in question.
hearing for the issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in reversing the injunction issued by the RTC.
Injunction. The record shows that Metrobank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject realties
3 December 2008 RTC as a consequence of the Spouses Dulnuan’s default on their mortgage obligation. As the highest bidder at the
issued an Order foreclosure sale, Metrobank can exercise its right of possession over the subject realty, and the issuance of
enjoining Metrobank writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the bank from occupying the property in question, is erroneous.
from taking possession
of the subject property
until the final disposition
of the annulment of
mortgage case.
14 January 2011, the
Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision
reversing the questioned
Orders and declared that
the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction
is unjustified under the
circumstances.

3 G.R. No. Petitioner granted loan to Whether or not

170038 July 11, the respondent. The debt RTC is correct No. We find that the RTC abbreviated the proceedings and precipitately granted the respondents’ application SEC. 5.
2012 was secured by a real when it granted for injunctive relief. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling" of the parties’ respective Preliminary
CHINA BANKING estate mortgage. WPI to evidence to give it an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits. 35
injunction not
CORPORATION, However, respondent respondent? It failed to make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction since it did not granted without
Petitioner,vs.SPS. HARRY defaulted in paying the conduct any hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or TRO. The RTC notice; exception.
CIRIACO and ESTHER loan which prompted conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000 hearings on the respondents’ omnibus motion only – whether - No preliminary
CIRIACO, Respondents. petitioner to foreclose to admit the amended complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the respondents’ application for a writ of injunction shall be
the property mortgaged. preliminary injunction. granted without
BRION, J.: hearing and prior
Respondent filed a notice to the party
petition for injunction to or persons sought
enjoin petitioner from to be enjoined. If
consolidating the it shall appear
property. The petition from facts shown
by affidavits or by
the verified
was denied for being application that
moot and academic. great or
irreparable injury
On a separate date, would result to
respondents filed a the applicant
complaint with the RTC before the matter
of La Trinidad, Benguet, can be heard on
Branch 63, for notice, the court
Cancellation of to which the
Consolidation of application for
Ownership over a Real preliminary
Property, Specific injunction was
Performance, and made, may issue
Damages. They again
12 ex parte a
questioned the temporary
redemption price of the restraining order
foreclosed property. to be effective
only for a period
In response, petitioner of twenty (20)
filed its Answer with days from service
Compulsory on the party or
Counterclaim, denying person sought to
the allegations of the be enjoined,
respondents’ complaint. except as herein
provided. Within
The respondent, on the twenty-day
March 16, 2000, filed an period, the court
Omnibus Motion for must order said
Leave to Amend party or person to
Complaint and to Admit show cause at a
Attached Amended specified time
Complaint as well as and place, why
Motion for Hearing on the injunction
the Issuance of a Writ of should not be
Preliminary Injunction granted. The
and/or Temporary court shall also
Restraining Order determine, within
(TRO), with a notice of the same period,
hearing on the omnibus whether or not the
motion scheduled on preliminary
March 22, 2000.The injunction shall be
respondents sought to granted, and
amend the complaint to accordingly issue
allege further that fraud the
attended the
 consolidation of title in corresponding
the petitioner’s favor and order.
to include a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
and/or TRO to enjoin the
petitioner from disposing
of the foreclosed
property or taking
possession thereof.

RTC granted the motion

of the respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner
opposed the decision
and filed motion for
reconsideration. The
latter motion was denied
and granted the writ of
preliminary injunction
without hearing.

Aggrieved, the petitioner

then filed a Rule 65
petition for certiorari with
the CA, arguing that the
RTC gravely abused its
discretion in precipitately
granting the
respondents’ application
for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction
without any hearing.

4 Petitioner: BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS., 1. Respondents Whether or not Yes Injunction
vs. Respondent: HON. Spouses Silverio et.al. the RTC erred in should not issue
JUDGE AGAPITO L. filed a case against BPI the issuance of 1. The RTC’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the except upon a
HONTANOSAS, JR., to seek the declaration of the writ of foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted. clear showing
REGIONAL TRIAL the nullity of the preliminary that the
COURT, BRANCH 16, promissory notes, real injunction. 2. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. applicant has a
CEBU CITY, SILVERIO estate and chattel right in esse to
BORBON, SPOUSES mortgages and a. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the be protected,
XERXES AND ERLINDA continuing surety performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of and that the acts
FACULTAD, AND XM agreement they had the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured sought to be
FACULTAD & executed in favor of the be unpaid. enjoined are
DEVELOPMENT petitioner. violative of such
CORPORATION b. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the right. A
2. They further sought mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’s allegations that they preliminary
Ponencia: FERNANDO, J. damages and attorney’s had not fully paid their obligation. injunction
fees, and applied for a should not
temporary restraining c. Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the determine the
order (TRO) or writ of impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been compelled merits of a case,
preliminary injunction to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements. or decide
to prevent the controverted
petitioner from 3. Injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until facts, for, being
foreclosing on the the rights of the parties can be settled. The respondents failed to prove that they would suffer an a preventive
mortgages against irreparable injury. Fear of potential loss of possession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution remedy, it only
their properties. did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of seeks to prevent
injunction. threatened
3. The complaint wrong, further
alleged that the 4. As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction – whether preliminary injury, and
respondents had or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. But there are extreme cases in which irreparable harm
obtained a loan from the exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including: or injustice until
petitioner, and had the rights of the
executed promissory a. When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional parties can be
notes binding rights of the accused; settled.
themselves solidarily.
and constituted real b. When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
estate mortgages on oppression or multiplicity of actions;
several parcels of land in
favor of the petitioner; c. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
and that they had been
made to sign a d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
continuing surety
agreement and a chattel e. When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
mortgage on their
Mitsubishi Pajero as f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
security.
g. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
4. The petitioner
required them to issue h. When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
postdated checks to
cover the loan under i. When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (
threat of foreclosing on
the mortgages.
j. When there is clearly no prima faciecase against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied.
5. Petitioner filed its
answer with affirmative
 defenses and k. However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 came
counterclaim, as well as under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of
its opposition to the preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation
issuance of the writ of of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted.
preliminary injunction,
contending that the DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
foreclosure of the MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling and setting aside the writ of preliminary
mortgages was within its injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City for being
legal right to do. devoid of factual and legal bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, in Cebu City to proceed with
dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
6. A motion to dismiss
was filed by Petitione,
but was denied. RTC
granted the application
for Preliminary
Injunction.

7. Petitioner appealed
to the CA. CA affirmed
the RTC decision.

5 ROSARIO E. Petitioner and Whether or not A Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the A Writ of
CAHAMBING, Petitioner respondent Victor the grant of existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount Preliminary
vs. VICTOR ESPINOSA Espinosa are siblings Preliminary necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that Injunction to
and JUANA ANG, and the children of Injuction was the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of issue, the
Respondent G.R. No. deceased spouses proper. action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the following
215807, SECOND Librado and Brigida prevention of multiplicity of suits. requisites must
DIVISION, January 25, Espinosa, the latter be present, to
2017, PERALTA, J. bequeathing their Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests in the wit: (1) the
properties, among sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of existence of a
(YES)
which is Lot B or Lot evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive clear and
354 with an area of determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be unmistakable
1,341 square meters, interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion. right that must
more or less, situated be protected,
in Maasin City, Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and and (2) an
Southern Leyte, to the whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is urgent and
said siblings in the exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion paramount
same deceased amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act necessity for
spouses' respective at all in contemplation of law. the writ to
Last Wills and prevent serious
Testaments which damage.
were duly probated. In this case, respondent court correctly found that private respondent Victor Espinosa had Indubitably, this
established a clear and unmistakable right to a commercial space heretofore occupied by Jhanel's Court has
Deceased Librado and Pharmacy. He had an existing Contract of Lease with the pharmacy up to December 2009. Without likewise
Brigida bequeathed prejudging the main case, it was established that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order stressed that
their respective shares dated April 16, 1998, Jhanel's Pharmacy was recognized as one of private respondent Victor the very
over Lot 354 to Espinosa's tenants. In fact, petitioner identified only Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, foundation of
respondent Victor Ariane's Gift Items and Julie's Bakeshop. the jurisdiction
Espinosa, however, to issue a writ
Brigida subsequently As such, pursuant to the status quo order, it is private respondent Victor Espinosa who must of injunction
revoked and cancelled continue to deal with Jhanel's Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the commercial space occupied by rests in the
her will, giving her Jhanel's Pharmacy must be deemed to be under the possession and control of private respondent existence of a
one-half (1/2) share Victor Espinosa as of the time of the issuance of the status quo order. cause of action
over Lot 354 to and in the
petitioner. Brigida The right of possession and control is a clear right already established by the circumstances probability of
Espinosa and obtaining at that time. Hence, petitioner's act of entering the premises of Jhanel's Pharmacy, irreparable
respondent Victor through her sons, is a material and substantial violation of private respondent Victor Espinosa's injury,
Espinosa, after the right, which act must be enjoined. inadequacy of
death of Librado pecuniary
Espinosa, entered into compensation,
an Extrajudicial and the
Partition of Real Estate prevention of
subdividing Lot 354 multiplicity of
into Lot 354-A, with an suits.
area of 503.5 square
meters adjudicated to Sine dubio, the
Brigida Espinosa, and grant or denial
Lot 354-B, with an area of a writ of
of 837.5 square preliminary
meters, adjudicated to injunction in a
respondent Victor pending case,
Espinosa, who rests in the
eventually obtained a sound
certificate of title in his discretion of the
name. petitioner filed a court taking
complaint against cognizance of
respondent Victor the case since
Espinosa and his the assessment
representative, and evaluation
respondent Juana of evidence
Ang, for, among towards that
others, the annulment end involve
of the Extrajudicial findings of facts
Partition of Real left to the said
Property which was court for its
docketed as Civil Case conclusive
No. R-2912. determination.
Hence, the
At the time of the filing exercise of
of the complaint, the judicial
same building had discretion by a
twelve (12) lessees, court in
four (4) of whom pay injunctive
rentals to petitioner, matters must
namely: Pacifica not be interfered
Agrivet Supplies, with except
Family Circle, Ariane's when there is
Gift Items, and Julie's grave abuse of
Bakeshop. Petitioner discretion.
alleged that
respondent Juana Ang Grave abuse of
prevailed upon discretion in the
Pacifica Agrivet issuance of
Supplies not to renew writs of
its lease contract with preliminary
petitioner but to enter injunction
into a contract of lease implies a
with respondent Victor capricious and
Espinosa instead. whimsical
exercise of
According to judgment that is
petitioner, respondent equivalent to
Juana Ang also lack of
threatened to do the jurisdiction, or
same thing with Julie's where the
Bakeshop. Clerk of power is
Court, acting as exercised in an
Commissioner, issued arbitrary or
an Order dated April despotic
16, 1998 directing the manner by
parties to maintain the reason of
status quo. passion,
respondent Victor prejudice or
Espinosa filed an personal
Application for the aversion
Issuance of a Writ of amounting to an
Preliminary Injunction evasion of
with Prayer for the positive duty or
Issuance of a to a virtual
Temporary Restraining refusal to
Order dated March 3, perform the
2009 against petitioner duty enjoined,
alleging that the latter or to act at all in
violated the status quo contemplation
ante order by allowing of law.
her sons to occupy the
space rented by
Jhanel's Pharmacy
which is one of
respondent Victor
Espinosa's tenants.
Respondent Victor
Espinosa, through his
attorney-in-fact,
private respondent
Juana Ang, alleged
that petitioner's sons
constructed a
connecting door
through the partition
separating their
cellular phone shop
from Jhanel's
Pharmacy and that the
contract of lease
between the latter and
respondent Victor
Espinosa is still
subsisting, hence, the
entry by petitioner's
sons into the
pharmacy's
commercial space
disturbed the status
quo ante.

Thereafter, the RTC,

on September 22,
2009, issued an Order
for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary
injunction, the
dispositive portion of
which reads as
follows: IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the
defendant's prayer for
the issuance of a writ
of preliminary
injunction is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, upon
defendant's filing,
within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof, of
the injunction bond in
the sum of fifty
thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00)
conditioned on
defendant's paying all
damages, the plaintiff
may sustain by reason
of this injunction in
case the Court should
finally decide that the
defendant is not
entitled thereto, let a
writ of preliminary
injunction issue
enjoining or
restraining the plaintiff
and all those claiming
rights under her from
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019
– UST FACULTY OF
CIVIL LAW 569
disturbing the
possession of the
defendant to the
leased premises or the
"status quo ante" until
after this case shall
have been decided on
the merits and/or until
further orders from
this Court. SO
ORDERED...

petitioner filed a
petition on certiorari
under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, with
the CA imputing grave
abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC
when it granted the
application for the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
filed by respondent
Victor Espinosa.
According to
petitioner,
respondents
themselves violated
the status quo ante
order when they
wrested the space
rented by Pacifica
Agrivet Supplies from
petitioner's control
and that there was no
compliance with the
requisites for the
issuance of the writ of
preliminary
injunction.

In particular, petitioner
avers the following
contentions: (1) the
damage claimed by
respondents is
quantifiable at
P12,000.00 per month,
hence, not irreparable;
(2) respondent, Victor
Espinosa is at best a
co-owner of the
subject property, while
respondent Juana Ang
is a stranger, and a co-
owner cannot exclude
another co-owner,
hence, respondent
Victor Espinosa's right
is not clear and
 unmistakable; (3) there
is no urgency involved
because the
application for
injunction was filed
more than one year
after the incident in
question; (4) contrary
to the conclusion of
the CA, the space
occupied by Jhanel's
Pharmacy was
voluntarily
surrendered to
petitioner by the
lessee; and (5) the CA
committed grave legal
errors when it failed to
correct the RTC's
issuance of the writ of
preliminary
injunction.

Respondents argue
that they did not have
sullied hands when
they applied for the
writ of preliminary
injunction. They also
point out that the
issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction
was strictly in
accordance with the
Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure.

6
ZUNECA Natrapharm, an all- Whether or not We hold that the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic given the RTC’s
PHARMACEUTICAL, Filipino pharmaceutical the present December 2, 2011 Decision on the merits of the case.
AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR company, manufactures petition had
VENUS ARAIN, M.D. DBA and sells a medicine with become moot Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and permanent injunction. Section 1, Rule 58
ZUNECA generic name and academic in provides for the definition of preliminary injunction:
PHARMACEUTICAL, “CITICOLINE” for heart view of the RTC
Petitioners, v. and stroke patients, and Decision on the SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any
NATRAPHARM, INC., marketed under the main case which stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a
Respondent. trademark “ZYNAPSE” ruled in favor of person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts,
obtained from the Natrapharm. in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
VILLARAMA, JR; J.; Intellectual Property
Office under Certificate
of Trademark
Registration No. 4-2007- On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent injunction in this wise:
005596 granted on
November 24, 2007. On
the other hand, as early
as 2001, and unknown to SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled
Natrapharm, Zuneca to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually
Pharmaceutical, restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming
ArramAnain and/or the preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
Venus Arain, had been
selling a medicine
imported from Pakistan,
an anti-convulsant under A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence
the generic name submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete
“CARBAMAZEPINE” for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction
under an unregistered pending the decision of the case on the merits. As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing
trademark, “ZYNAPS”, the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is
pronounced the same as commenced or terminated.
“ZYNAPSE”.
Natrapharm claims that By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, forms part of the
Zuneca is selling Zynaps judgment on the merits and it can only be properly ordered only on final judgment. A permanent injunction
in drugstores all over the may thus be granted after a trial or hearing on the merits of the case and a decree granting or refusing an
country where Zynapse injunction should not be entered until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing denials
is also sold, has serious is filed or where no answer is required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent to an answer.
and disfiguring side-
effects, and the sale of As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory order, cannot survive the main
the same in drugstores case of which it is an incident; because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after
may give rise to the decision in the main petition.
medicine switching.
When Natrapharm
issued a cease-and-
desist letter to Zuneca
pointing out its claims,
the latter refused to heed
its demand, pointing out
that it had been issued
by the Bureau of Food
and Drugs a Certificate
of Product Registration
as early as 2003, which
allowed them to sell
CARBAMAZEPINE
under the trademark
“ZYNAPS”. Natrapharm
then filed a complaint
against Zuneca for
trademark infringement
for violation of RA 8293
with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary
injunction, citing Section
122 of RA 8293 which
gives it exclusive right to
use the name
“ZYNAPSE” and to
exclude others. Zuneca
argued otherwise,
averring that it enjoyed
prior use of the brand
name “ZYNAPS” by
virtue of the Certificate of
Product Registration
issued by the BFAD in
2003. On March 12,
2008, the RTC denied
the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction,
citing the reasons when
it first ruled on the denial
of issuance of a
temporary restraining
order, that is, that
Zuneca had prior right
over the mark. The RTC
reasoned out that
Natrapharmcannot avail
of injunctive relief.
Though the holder of a
valid trademark, it may
not invoke ascendancy
or superiority of its CTR
(Certificate of Trademark
Registration) over the
CPR (certificate of
product registration), as
the latter is evidence of
Zuneca’s prior use.

On petition for certiorari

to the CA, the latter
initially affirmed the RTC
order, but reversed itself
on motion for
reconsideration by
Natrapharm. Thus,
Zuneca elevated the
case to the Supreme
Court. In the meantime,
on December 2, 2011,
the RTC rendered a
decision on the main
case, ruling in favour of
Natrapaham. Because of
this development,
Natrapaham moved to
dismiss the petition
before the Supreme
Court, arguing that the
RTC Decision was a full
adjudication on the
merits of the main issue
of trademark
infringement. It
contended that the
present petition is moot
and academic, it only
involving an ancillary
writ. Zuneca believes
otherwise, since the RTC
decision had not yet
attained finality, thus the
present petition had not
been rendered moot.
7 G.R. No. 217617 The Issuance of
CARMELITA T. Elisio Borlongan, Jr (1) Is the (1) Yes. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent bank from continuing in the a TRO/WPI is
BORLONGAN, Petitioner, (Elisio) and his wife issuance of a possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject property, petitioner's right to be afforded not a
vs.BANCO DE ORO Carmelita own a property TRO/WPI proper due process will unceasingly be violated. prejudgment of
(formerly EQUITABLE located at Pasig City in the instant A writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that there exists a right to be the main case
PCI BANK), Respondent. (subject property). While case? protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an established right. Section
VELASCO, JR, J.: processing the papers 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, viz: For a court to
for the prospective sale (2) Was the decide on the
of the property, they service of Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction propriety of
discovered that the same summons may be granted when it is established: issuing a TRO
has become the subject proper? and/or a WPI, it
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
of an execution sale in a must only
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
civil case. The civil case inquire into the
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts either for a limited
was initiated by BDO for existence of two
period or perpetually;
a sum of money against things: (1) a
Tancho Corporation, the (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts clear and
principal debtor wherein complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or unmistakable
Carmelita was also (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to right that must
impleaded being a board do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the be protected;
of director of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending and (2) an
corporation and who to render the judgment ineffectual. urgent and
supposedly signed paramount
security agreements to Otherwise stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a necessity for
guarantee the WPI, it must only inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable the writ to
obligations of the right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ prevent serious
corporation. to prevent serious damage. damage.

The summons of all The issuance of a TRO/WPI is not a prejudgment of the main case. Petitioner has a clear and unmistakable
Summons
defendants was right that must be protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but her
should be
addressed to Tancho constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived of her property.
personally
Corporation located at served on a
Fumakilla Compound. (2) No. The performance of official duty was not regular. The essence of due process lies in the reasonable
defendant.
The records of the case opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense; she
When summons
showed that BDO must be properly served the summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and
cannot be
already foreclosed indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons
9

served
Fumakilla Compound as is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.10

personally
early as August 21, within a
2000, following Tancho’s As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons cannot be served
reasonable
failure to pay its personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by
period of time,
obligation. publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
substituted
Understandably, the by diligent inquiry." service may be
summons remained resorted to.
UNSERVED as “the It is, therefore, proper to state pursuant to the relevant sections of Rule 14 of the Service of
defendants are no longer Rules of Court provide that the hierarchy and rules in the service of summons are as summons by
holding office at the follows: publication can
compound” after a (1) Personal service; (Sec 6)
SINGLE ATTEMPT at
PERSONAL SERVICE.
The court then approved
the motion by BDO to
serve summons by
PUBLICATION. The
next year, BDO filed an
ex-parte Motion for the
attachment against the
defendants including
Carmelita which was
granted by the court. The
service of summons
against the subject
property was unserved
and so BDO caused the
publication of the alias
summons. And so the
case proceeded without
the participation of
Carmelita. When the
property was subject to
an auction, the property
was sold to BDO, who
was the highest bidder.
be resorted to
(2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be served within only if the
a reasonable time; and (sec. 7) defendant's
(3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts are unknown and "whereabouts
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. ( sec14) are unknown
and cannot be
Simply put, personal service of summons is the preferred mode. And, the rules on the ascertained by
service of summons other than by personal service may be used only as prescribed diligent
and only in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the impossibility of inquiry." The
prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to relevant
find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed before substituted sections of Rule
service may be availed. 14 of the Rules
of Court.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month) which eventually resulted
in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates.
The summons was served on the petitioner by publication. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the case do
not justify the resort. Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her
the summons before the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the residence
of the petitioner and her whereabouts.

Upon discovery of the

sale of the property,
Eliseo executed an
affidavit of adverse claim
and filed a complaint for
Annulment of Surety
Agreements, Notice of
Levy on Attachment,
Auction Sale and Other
Documents. He alleged
in his Complaint that the
subject property is a
family home that belongs
to the conjugal
partnership of gains he
established with his wife.
He further averred that
the alleged surety
 agreements upon which
the attachment of the
property was anchored
were signed by his wife
without his consent and
did not redound to
benefit their family. Thus,
he prayed that the surety
agreements and all other
documents and
processes, including the
ensuing attachment, levy
and execution sale,
based thereon be
nullified. Carmelita also
prayed for a TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

8
SPOUSES SILVESTRE On August 28,1997, the
O. PLAZA AND ELENA CA ruled that among the
Y. PLAZA v. Plaza siblings, namely:
GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, Aureliano, Emiliana,
ELEODORA VDA. DE Vidal, Marciano, and
MARTINEZ AND VICKY Barbara, Barbara was
SAYSON GOLOSENO. the owner of the subject
G.R. NO. 172909, agricultural land. The
MARCH 5, 2014 decision became final
and executory and
Barbara's successors,
respondents Guillermo
Lustiva, Eleodora Vda.
de Martinez and Vicky
Sayson Goloseno, have
continued occupying the
property.
On September 14, 1999,
Vidal's son and
daughter-in-law, the
petitioners, filed a Wherefore, the Court denies the petition.
Complaint for Injunction,
WON petitioners YES
failed to show
proof that they The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable rights to be protected by the writ; the present action has
are entitled to the been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main action
writ of
preliminary As the lower courts correctly found, Tuazon had no ownership to confer to the petitioners despite the latter's
injunction. reimbursement of Tuazon's purchase expenses. Because they were never owners of the property, the
petitioners failed to establish entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. "[T]o be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the complainant's right or title is doubtful
or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not
proper."
Likewise, upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC on August 8, 2013, the question of issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main action, the
question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it. A writ of preliminary
injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the determination of the
main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom
notwithstanding.
Damages, Attorney's
Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary
Restraining Order
against the respondents
and the City Government
of Butuan. They prayed
that the respondents be
enjoined from unlawfully
and illegally threatening
to take possession of the
subject property.
According to the
petitioners, they
acquired the land from
Virginia Tuazon in 1997;
Tuazon was the sole
bidder and winner in a
tax delinquency sale
conducted by the City of
Butuan on December 27,
1996.

In their answer, the

respondents pointed out
that they were never
delinquent in paying the
land taxes and were in
fact not aware that their
property had been
offered for public
auction. Moreover,
Tuazon, being a
government employee,
was disqualified to bid in
the public auction, as
stated in Section 89 of
the Local Government
Code of 1991. As
Tuazon's participation in
the sale was void, she
could have not
transferred ownership to
the petitioners. Equally
important, the petitioners
merely falsified the
property tax declaration
by inserting the name of
the petitioners' father,
making him appear as a
co-owner of the
auctioned land. Armed
with the falsified tax
declaration, the
petitioners, as heirs of
their father, fraudulently
redeemed the land from
Tuazon. Nonetheless,
there was nothing to
redeem as the land was
not sold. For these
irregularities, the
petitioners had no right
to the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining
Order prayed for against
them.

The RTC denied the

prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,
and ordered that the
possession and
occupation of the land be
returned to the
respondents. The RTC
found that the auction
sale was tainted with
irregularity as the bidder
was a government
employee disqualified in
accordance with Section
89 of the Local
Government Code of
1991. The petitioners are
not buyers in good faith
either. On the contrary,
 they were in bad faith for
having falsified the tax
declaration they
redeemed the property
with.

The CA affirmed the

RTC's ruling, found the
petitioners guilty of forum
shopping, dismissed the
case. Hence, petitioners
filed the present petition
for review on certiorari
with this Court to
challenge the CA rulings.

9 G.R. No. 206808-09, FACTS: ISSUE: Whether HELD: Yes. A writ of

September 07, 2016 or not the preliminary
In 2004, the President dismissal of A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment injunction is an
Gloria Macapagal- petitioners' or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely order granted at
LOCAL WATER Arroyo enacted principal action a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in any stage of an
UTILITIES Executive Order (E.O.) for certiorari, itself. The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action or
ADMINISTRATION No. 279, where all prohibition and action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.21 proceeding prior
EMPLOYEES concerned government mandamus filed Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to the judgment or
ASSOCIATION FOR agencies and with the RTC to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes final order,
PROGRESS (LEAP), instrumentalities of the resulted in the of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. requiring a party
MELANIO B. CUCHAPIN water supply and automatic or a court, agency
II, GREARDO* G. PERU, sewerage sector, which dissolution of the It is well settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve or a person to
ROLAND S. CABAHUG, includes, among others, ancillary writ of the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that refrain from a
GLORIA P. VELASQUEZ, the Local Water Utilities preliminary there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the particular act or
ERLINDA G. Administration (LWUA), injunction issued immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy acts. It is merely a
VILLANUEVA, TEODORO were directed to pursue by the same before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination provisional
M. REYNOSO, and implement reform court? of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. remedy, adjunct
FERNANDO L. objectives and policies. It to the main case
NICANDRO, JOSEPHINE particularly provided for subject to the
P. SIMENE, LAMBERTO the rationalization of Indubitably, in the present case, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the RTC based on its finding latter's outcome.
R. RIVERA, REYNALDO LWUA's organizational that there was a need to protect petitioners' rights to security of tenure during the pendency of the principal It is not a cause of
M. VIDA, and RUCTICO** structure and operations. action. After trial, however, the lower court found, among others, that, in questioning the constitutionality of action in itself.
B. TUTOL, Petitioners, v. E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421 as well as Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA Board of Trustees, petitioners failed The writ is
LOCAL WATER On April 13, 2005, to establish the existence of an actual case or controversy which is ripe for judicial determination. Thus, the provisional
UTILITIES President Arroyo issued RTC dismissed the principal action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. because it
ADMINISTRATION E.O. No. 4216 specifying constitutes a
(LWUA) and DEPA LWUA's core functions temporary
measure availed
 and providing for shifts in
PERALTA, J.: its policy direction,
functions, programs,
activities and strategies.
Cognizant of the effect of
the rationalization of the
functions of LWUA, the
E.O. gave LWUA
personnel the option to
either remain or retire, or
be separated from
government service.
Pursuant to the
provisions of E.O. No.
421, then LWUA
Administrator Lorenzo
Zamora came up with
Task Force 421 and its
Action Team, charged,
among others, with the
duty of preparing the
LWUA's staffing pattern
and the corresponding
plantilla positions therein
as directed by E.O. No.
421. The Action Team,
on the other hand, was
given the responsibility
of reporting to the Task
Force and assisting it in
the execution of its
duties and
responsibilities. Among
the appointed members
of the Action Team was
herein petitioner Melanio
Cuchapin II, who was
then the Chairperson of
petitioner LWUA
Employees' Association
for Progress (LEAP).
Subsequently, Task
Force 421 was able to
come up with a staffing
of during the
The principal action having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary pendency of the
injunction issued by the RTC is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the action and it is
appeal from the main case notwithstanding. In this regard, this Court's ruling in the case of Unionbank of the ancillary because
Philippines v. Court of Appeals is instructive, to wit: it is a mere
incident and is
x x x "a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction dependent upon
has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction," regardless of the result of the
whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom main action.
has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing Being an ancillary
an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a or auxiliary
temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. remedy, it is
available during
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. the pendency of
the action which
may be resorted
to by a litigant to
preserve and
protect certain
rights and
interests therein
pending rendition,
and for purposes
of the ultimate
effects, of a final
judgment in the
case.
pattern, consisting of 467
plantilla positions which
it submitted to the LWUA
Board of Trustees for
approval.

On April 18, 2006, the

LWUA Board of Trustees
issued Board Resolution
No. 69 which approved
the staffing pattern
proposed by Task Force
421. Thereafter, the
approved staffing pattern
was submitted to the
Department of Budget
and Management (DBM)
for review and approval.
DBM approved 447
plantilla positions out of
the 467 proposed
positions, twenty were
excluded.

On October 18, 2006,

LWUA issued Office
Order, the immediate
implementation of the
following: (a) posting of
the DBM-approved
staffing pattern; (b)
finalization by the
Staffing Committee of
the staffing guidelines to
be submitted to the
Management and the
Board of Trustees for
approval; and (c)
finalization by the Task
Analysis Committee of
the job descriptions
under the rationalized
LWUA structure.
On October 19, 2006,
petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with
prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary
injunction with the RTC
of Quezon City. Alleging
that LWUA and DBM
acted with grave abuse
of discretion in adopting
and implementing the
reorganization plan of
LWUA, petitioners
prayed that LWUA and
DBM be restrained from
implementing the
following: (1) DBM-
approved staffing
pattern; (2) Resolution
No. 69 of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, and
(3) E.O. Nos. 279, 366
and 421, on the ground
that petitioners will suffer
injustice and sustain
irreparable injury as 233
LWUA employees face
immediate and outright
dismissal from service.

Respondents filed their

respective Oppositions
to the petitioners' prayer
for TRO and/or
preliminary injunction.

After hearing, the RTC

issued its assailed
Order7 granting
petitioners' prayer for the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
 and restraining the
respondents from
enforcing and effecting
the assailed questioned
DBM-Approved Staffing
Pattern.

LWUA and DBM then

filed separate special
civil actions for certiorari
with the CA questioning
the subject RTC Order
and Resolution. These
petitions were
subsequently
consolidated. On August
28, 2012, the CA granted
the petition and reversed
and set aside the RTC
decision.

Hence, this petition.

10 AGOO RICE MILL From October 1993 to WON ARMC is No.

CORPORATION October 1995, the entitled to an
(represented by its ARMC obtained from the injunctive In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that no agreement was forged between the ARMC and
President, Kam Biak Y. LBP a Term Loan for remedy? the LBP on the restructuring of the ARMC’s loans at the time the LBP filed an application to extra-judicially
Chan, Jr.), Petitioner. P2M and two Short-Term foreclose the ARMC’s mortgaged properties; the proposed loan restructuring was not approved by the LBP
vs. LAND BANK OF THE Loan Lines (STLL’s) because the ARMC failed to offer an additional collateral sufficient enough to cover its outstanding loan with
PHILIPPINES, amounting to a total of the bank.
Respondent. P15M. These loans were
G.R. No. secured by real and
173036 September 26, chattel mortgage over
2012 the ARMC’s four
commercial lots, "Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
including their certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for
improvements and its and as an incident in the main action."
rice mill machineries and
generator. For an injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must be present:
(1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
ARMC made several (2) the act against which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of such right.
partial payments to cover
the loans’ interests, but
found it difficult to fully
settle its loan obligations A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or
on time due to the one that is actual or existing. Such right must be clear and unmistakable, and not contingent, abstract
company’s financial or future rights, or one that may never arise.
liquidity problems
caused by the negative The ARMC filed a complaint for injunction against the LBP on the ground that the latter’s then impending
effect of the foreclosure of its mortgaged properties was in violation of its contractual and property rights, particularly the
government’s rice right of the ARMC to have its outstanding loan restructured by the LBP.
importation in 1996 on its
sales of rice and The ARMC alleged that the LBP acted in bad faith and in wanton disregard of its commitment to restructure
problems brought by the the former’s loans when it hastily filed for extrajudicial foreclosure while negotiations for the loan restructuring
El Niño phenomenon in were still on-going. The existence of the ARMC’s claimed right to the loan restructuring, however, was
the region’s rice not clearly established by the ARMC.
production.
Thus, the ARMC, then,
The ARMC, through its had no actual right to protect or to enforce against the LBP. It failed to satisfy the first
President Mr. Kam Biak requisite, i.e., the existence of a clear and unmistakable right for the issuance of an injunction.
Y. Chan, Jr., requested
the LBP for an extension
of time to pay its
obligations.

Still foreseeing its

inability to pay its
obligations on the
requested date, the
ARMC wrote the LBP for
the renewal of its loans,
particularly the ₱
15,000,000.00 STLLs.

The LBP allegedly

replied with the advice to
have the loans
restructured instead of
renewed.

The LBP informed the

ARMC that the bank’s
Domestic Banking Loan
Committee has agreed
to require an additional
collateral from the
ARMC; Otherwise, the
LBP would be forced to
pursue legal action.
In its letter, LBP wrote to
the ARMC regarding the
latter’s failure to comply
with the LBP’s required
offer of an additional
collateral or to pay its
due obligations. The LBP
informed the ARMC that
noncompliance would
result in the referral of
the matter to the bank’s
Legal Office for
appropriate action.

In default of payment,
LBP sent the ARMC a
Final Notice of Payment,
informing the ARMC that
it had filed, on the same
date, an application for
the extrajudicial
foreclosure of ARMC’s
mortgaged properties
with the Office of the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of San
Fernando City, La Union.

Consequently, the
ARMC,
thru its president, filed
with the RTC a complaint
for Injunction with
application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
and TRO.

The RTC, La Union,

issued a 72–hour
Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) directing
the Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff of La Union to
cease and desist from
proceeding with the
foreclosure sale. The
following day, the RTC
ordered the extension of
the TRO for seventeen
(17) days.

The RTC ordered the

proceedings suspended
in view of the parties’
manifestation to have the
case amicably settled.
The contemplated
settlement, however,
failed. Thus, the RTC
proceeded with the
hearing on the issuance
of the writ of preliminary
injunction.

In a decision, the RTC

found no merit in the
ARMC’s complaint for
injunction. Contrary to
the allegation that the
LBP reneged on its
commitment to
restructure the ARMC’s
loans, the RTC found
that the LBP never
agreed to the ARMC’s
proposed restructuring.

ARMC filed with the CA

application for the
issuance of Writ of
Prelim Injunction and
TRO to enjoin the
foreclosure sale but the
same was denied by the
CA. Motion for
reconsideration was filed
and the same was also
denied.
 Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

11 REPUBLIC OF THE The case at bar stems WON the Yes.

PHILIPPINES, from a complaint for issuance of Writ
represented by LT. GEN. damages (main case), of Preliminary The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is justified. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancilliary or
JOSE M. CALIMLIM, in his with prayer for the Injunction is preventive remedy that is resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
capacity as former Chief issuance of a writ of justified? purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is issued by the court to prevent threatened or
of the Intelligence preliminary injunction, continuous irremediable injury to the applicant before his claim can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
Service, et al, filed by private aim is to preserve the status quo ante until the merits of the case can be heard fully, upon the applicant’s
Petitioners, respondent Dante showing of two important conditions, viz.: (1) the right to be protected prima facie exists; and, (2) the acts
vs.HON. VICTORINO Legaspiagainst sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
EVANGELISTA, in his petitioners Gen. Jose M.
capacity as Presiding Calimlim, Ciriaco Reyes It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, mere prima facie
Judge, Regional Trial and Maj. David Diciano evidence is needed to establish the applicant’s rights or interests in the subject matter of the main
Court, Branch 223, before the Regional Trial action. It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his
Quezon City, and DANTE Court (RTC) of Quezon rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required
LEGASPI, represented by City. only to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
his attorney-in-fact, Paul
Gutierrez, Respondent. Private respondent Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of preliminary injunction may be
G.R. No. 156015. August Legaspi is the owner of a issued when it is established:
11, 2005 land located in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
and petitioner Calimlim, the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
representing the acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
Republic of the
Philippines, and as then (b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
head of the Intelligence would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
and the Presidential suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
Security Group. of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Petitioner Calimlim In the case at bar, we find that respondent judge had sufficient basis to issue the writ of preliminary injunction.
entered into a It was established, prima facie, that Legaspi has a right to peaceful possession of his land, pendente lite.
Memorandum of Legaspi had title to the subject land. It was likewise established that the diggings were conducted by petitioners
Agreement (MOA) with in the enclosed area of Legaspi’s land. Whether the land fenced by Gutierrez and claimed to be included in
one Ciriaco Reyes. The the land of Legaspi covered an area beyond that which is included in the title of Legaspi is a factual issue still
MOA granted Reyes a subject to litigation and proof by the parties in the main case for damages. It was necessary for the trial court
permit to hunt for to issue the writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the main case in order to preserve the rights
treasure in a land in and interests of private respondents Legaspi and Gutierrez.
Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. Reyes, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Orders of the trial court are AFFIRMED. The presiding judge of the
together with petitioners, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to proceed with dispatch in hearing the main case for damages.
started, digging,
tunneling and blasting
works on the said land of
Legaspi, and petitioner
Calimlim assigned about
80 military personnel to
guard the area and
encamp thereon to
intimidate Legaspi and
other occupants of the
area from going near the
subject land.

Legaspi executed a
special power of attorney
(SPA) appointing his
nephew, private
respondent Gutierrez
given the power to deal
with the treasure hunting
activities on Legaspi’s
land and to file charges
against those who may
enter it without the
latter’s authority.
Legaspi agreed to give
Gutierrez 40% of the
treasure that may be
found in the land.

Gutierrez then filed a

case for damages and
injunction against
petitioners for illegally
entering Legaspi’s land,
then Executive Judge
Perlita J. Tria Tirona
issued a 72-hour
temporary restraining
order (TRO) against
petitioners.

The case was

subsequently raffled to
the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 223, then
presided by public
respondent Judge
Victorino P. Evangelista.
Respondent judge
issued another 72-hour
TRO and a summary
hearing for its extension
was set.

Petitioners filed a Motion

to Dismiss contending:
first, there is no real
party-in-interest as the
SPA of Gutierrez to bring
the suit was already
revoked by Legaspi and,
second, Gutierrez failed
to establish that the
alleged armed men
guarding the area were
acting on orders of
petitioners. Petitioners
also filed a Motion for
Inhibition of the
respondent judge on the
ground of alleged
partiality in favor of
private respondent.

After due hearing, the

trial court granted private
respondent’s application
for a writ of preliminary
injunction based on its
findings that (1) the
diggings and blastings
appear to have been
made on the land of
Legaspi, hence, there is
an urgent need to
maintain the status quo
to prevent serious
damage to Legaspi’s
land; and, (2) the SPA
 granted to Gutierrez
continues to be valid.

On even date, the trial

court issued another
Order denying
petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and likewise
denied petitioners’
motion for inhibition.

On appeal, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial
court. Hence this
petition.

12 Case 12: G.R. No. FACTS: ISSUE: RULING In every

207938 Evy Construction 1)W/N petitioner 1) NO. application for
October 11, 2017 purchased a parcel of Evy Construction Injunction is defined as "a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from provisional
EVY CONSTRUCTION land (TCT No. 134890) and doing a certain act." It may be filed as a main action before the trial court or as a provisional remedy in the
32 33
injunctive relief,
AND DEVELOPMENT in Lipa, Batangas from Development main action.34
the applicant
CORPORATION, Linda N. Ang (Ang) and Corporation was The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which must establish
Petitioner Senen T. Uyan denied due cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, the actual and
vs. (Uyan).1âwphi1 They process when its in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, existing right
VALIANT ROLL executed a Deed of application for a may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which sought to be
FORMING SALES Absolute Sale, which writ of is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole protected. The
CORPORATION, was duly notarized. At preliminary object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted applicant must
Respondent the time of the sale, no injunction was at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or also establish the
lien or encumbrance was denied in the until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. (Bacolod City Water District v. urgency of a writ's
LEONEN, J.: annotated on the title, same proceeding Hon. Labayen) issuance to
except for a notice of as its application A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the prevent grave
adverse claim filed by for a temporary application for preliminary injunction [,] which cannot be issued ex parte." Otherwise stated, a trial court may
38
and irreparable
Ang.4
restraining order; issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter injury. Failure to
The Register of Deeds 2)W/N the trial is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and in-eparable injury." In this instance, a
39
do so will warrant
annotated a Notice of court committed summary hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary injunction, is required only to determine if the court's denial
Levy on Attachment on grave abuse of a 72-hour temporary restraining order should be extended. 40
of the application.
the title of the subject discretion in A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20 days H[i]f it shall appear from facts Moreover, the
property. This annotation
5
denying shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant application for the
was by virtue of the Writ petitioner Evy before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the
41
issuance of a writ
of Preliminary Construction and application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction during of preliminary
Attachment issued by Development this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired. Notably, the Rules do not require that
42
injunction may be
RTC San Fernando, Corporation's a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction be conducted during this period. denied in the
Parnpanga in a Civil same summary
Case No. 13442 - Valiant application for While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing in every application for
43
hearing as the
Roll Forming Sales injunctive relief. temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule 58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for the
Corporation v. Angeli application for preliminary injunction is granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall issuance of the
Lumber and Hardware, be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined." Inversely stated, an temporary
Inc., and Linda Ngo Ang. 6
application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that restraining order
Two (2) other of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. if the applicant
encumbrances were In this case, the November 9, 2009 hearing was denominated as a "hearing on the application for temporary fails to establish
also annotated on the restraining order and preliminary injunction." Petitioner's counsel was allowed to present its arguments and
44 45
requisites for the
title.
7
its witness but conceded that the issues before the trial court were legal in nature. Thus, the trial court
46 47
entitlement of the
Evy Construction resolved that there was no need to present the witness, which petitioner's counsel accepted without objection. writ.
registered the Deed of Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary injunction, considering that it
Absolute Sale with the accepted that its application would be submitted for decision without the presentation of its witness. The trial
Register of Deeds. New court did not find any need to conduct a further hearing on the application for preliminary injunction since
title (TCT No. 168590) petitioner was unable to substantiate its entitlement to a temporary restraining order. In any case, even if a
was issued in its name; separate hearing was granted, petitioner would have presented the same arguments and evidence in the
however, it contained the November 9, 2009 hearing. Thus, there can be no denial of due process if the party alleging it has already
annotation of the prior been granted an opportunity to be heard.
Notice of Levy on
Attachment, as well as a 2) NO.
Notice of
Attachment/Levy upon Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction "is an order granted at any stage of an action or
Realty and a Notice of proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from
Levy on Preliminary a particular act or acts" or an order "requir[ing] the performance of a particular act or acts." It is an ancillary
49

Attachment. relief granted by the court where the main action or proceeding is pending. 50

Subsequently, RTC In order to be granted the writ, it must be established:

rendered a Decision in (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
Civil Case No. 13442 in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring perforn1ance of an
favor of Valiant Roll act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
Forming Sales (b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
Corporation (Valiant). A would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
Writ of Execution and a (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
Notice of Levy were suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
issued against the of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 51

subject property. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary event," being a ''strong arm of
Evy Construction filed a equity or a transcendent remedy." Thus, the power to issue the writ "should be exercised sparingly, with
52

Notice of Third-Party utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation." 53

Claim in Civil Case No. An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing substantial rights" or rights in esse.
54

13442, informing the Further, the applicant must show "that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an
court that it had already urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage." Thus, the writ will not issue to
55

filed with the sheriff an applicants whose rights are merely contingent or to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of
Affidavit of action.56

Title/Ownership, in In this case, the inevitable and the very issue of which between petitioner and respondent has the better right
accordance with Rule 57 over the property is yet to be resolved.
of the Rules of Court. 10
Respondent's attachment liens dated September 18, 2007, October 2, 2007, and November 8, 2007, if valid,
Valiant posted an may have been superior to whatever right petitioner may have acquired by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
Indemnity Bond of
₱745,700.00 to answer
for any damages that
Evy Construction may
suffer should execution
of the RTC Decision
proceed. 11
By virtue of the Writ of
Execution issued in Civil
Case No. 13442, the
Sheriff issued a Notice of
Sale on Execution of
Real Property of Ang's
properties, including the
subject property A damage.
Certificate of Sale was
eventually issued to
Valiant as the winning
bidder of the subject
property.
Evy Construction filed
with the RTC Lipa City,
Batangas its Complaint
for Quieting of
Title/Removal of Cloud,
Annulment of Execution
Sale and Certificate of
Sale, and Damages, with
application for temporary
restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction. 14
It prayed for the issuance
of a temporary
restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the
Register of Deeds from
compelling it to
surrender its copy of
TCT No. 168590 and
from annotating any
further transactions
relating to Civil Case No.
13442. 15
which was only registered on November 20, 2009. However, the validity of the liens and the validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale are factual matters that have yet to be resolved by the trial court. The trial court must
also determine whether or not respondent had prior knowledge of the sale.
Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination of petitioner's actual and existing right
over the property.1âwphi1 The grant of an injunctive writ could operate as a prejudgment of the main case.
Even assuming that there is already a final determination of petitioner's right over the property, petitioner still
failed to prove the urgent and paramount necessity to enjoin the Register of Deeds from making further
annotations on TCT No. 168590.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and irreparable damage to its reputation
as a real estate developer. Indeed, injunctive relief could be granted to prevent grave and irreparable damage
65
to a business entity's goodwill and business reputation. Injury is considered irreparable if "there is no standard
66
by which [its] amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy." The injury must be such that its pecuniary
67
value cannot be estimated, and thus, cannot fairly compensate for the loss. For this reason, the loss of
68
goodwill and business reputation, being unquantifiable, would be considered as grave and irreparable
However, in applications for provisional injunctive writs the applicant must also prove the urgency of the
application.1âwphi1The possibility of a grave and irreparable injury must be established, at least tentatively,
to justify the restraint of the act complained of. It is "[a]s the term itself suggests ... temporary, subject to the
74
final disposition of the principal action." Its sole objective is "to preserve the status quo until the merits can
75
be heard." 76
[T]he grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve
findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. (Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut)
The court's discretion is not interfered with unless there is a showing that the grant or denial was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. 82
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioner would still have sufficient relief
in its prayer for damages in its Complaint. In the event that the annotations on petitioner's title are found by
83
the trial court to be invalid, petitioner would have adequate relief in the removal of the annotations and in the
award of damages. Therefore, the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
Evy Construction
claimed that it would
suffer great and
irreparable injury if the
Register of Deeds were
restrained from
compelling it to
surrender the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT
No. 168590. It claimed
that potential investors
interested in developing
the property "[would]
back out of their
investment plans if there
[was a] cloud of doubt
hovering over the title on
the property." 16

RTC: issued an Order

denying the application
for the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order for having no legal
basis. Evy
Construction's MR was
likewise denied. Hence,
it filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court
18

of Appeals.
CA: held that Evy
Construction failed to
sufficiently establish its
right to the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order.; that Evy
Construction failed to
sufficiently establish that
it would suffer grave and
irreparable injury if
additional recording and
annotation of further
transactions, orders, or
processes relating to the
sale of the property to
Valiant were made on
the title. It observed that
the grounds raised
already touched on the
merits of its Complaint,
resolution of which would
amount to prejudgment
of the case; that Evy
Construction could still
sue for damages if the
trial court eventually
finds that the sale of the
property to Valiant was
invalid. It also reminded
Evy Construction that it
had the remedy of
proceeding against the
indemnity bond posted
by Valiant for any
damages it might suffer
as a result of the sale. 21

Evy Construction’s MR
was denied. Hence, this
Petition 23

Petitioner’s argument: It
was denied due process
when its application for
preliminary injunction
was denied in the same
summary proceeding as
the denial of its
application for a
temporary restraining
order; that it was entitled
to the injunctive writ
applied for since "real
estate development is an
industry built on trust and
public perception.''; that
the doubt cast by the
auction sale and its
annotation to the title
caused investors to
withdraw their
investments from
petitioner's housing
development project,
despite the expenses it
already incurred; that the
issuance of an injunctive
writ is necessary to
prevent further damage
since its "business
reputation and goodwill
as a real estate
developer, once
tarnished and sullied,
cannot be restored; that
respondent's indemnity
bond in the amount of
₱745,700.00 was not
only inadequate
compared to petitioner's
investment in the
property; it was
immaterial since it would
be insufficient to restore
buyer and investor
confidence in the project
or in petitioner's
competence and
reputation as a property
developer. 28

Respondent counters:
that the application for
preliminary injunction
was never actually set
for hearing or resolved
by the trial court; thus, it
was misleading for
petitioner to argue that it
was denied due process
by the trial court; that
petitioner failed to
establish the requisites
for the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order and that petitioner
still had adequate
remedies in the
indemnity bond; that
 petitioner already
touches on the merits of
its Complaint before the
trial court, which
effectively prejudges the
case.

13
G.R. No. Severino Whether or not The Petition is unmeritorious
182758 May 30, Listana (Listana) owned the LBP’s
2011 a 246.0561-hectare injunction bond In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., the Supreme Court reinstated the order of the RTC
parcel of land in may be to allow the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction pending the final determination of the just
LAND BANK OF THE Inlagadian, Casiguran, withdrawn. compensation case. An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the party or
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Sorsogon. Listana person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may
vs. HEIRS OF SEVERINO voluntarily sold the sustain by reason of the injunction. Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Court states:
LISTANA, Respondents. property to the
government, through the SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. — A preliminary
Department of Agrarian injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
Reform, under Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657. The xxxx
Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or proceeding
Board (DARAB) of is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the
Sorsogon commenced court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he
summary administrative may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should
proceedings to finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
determine the amount of a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
just compensation for the
property. The DARAB Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court ruled that neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
set the amount at jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge and declared that the warrant of arrest is invalid, the bond for the
P10,956,963.25 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction still subsist for any incidental damages that Listana may suffer in case that LBP
ordered petitioner Land is not entitled for the writ. As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the ₱5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for the
Bank of the Philippines damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the ₱10,956,963.25 just compensation set by the
(LBP) to pay Listana the DARAB. The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage due to the
same. injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it.

On 18 June
1999, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD)
issued a writ of execution
ordering Land Bank
Manager and Agrarian
Operations Center Head
Alex A. Lorayes
(Lorayes) to pay Listana.
Lorayes, however,
refused. Thus, on 2
September 1999,
Listana filed with the
PARAD a motion for
indirect contempt
against Lorayes.
Meanwhile, LBP filed
with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52 of
Sorsogon City, acting as
special agrarian court
(SAC), a petition for
judicial determination of
the amount of just
compensation for the
property.

The PARAD
granted Listana’s motion
for indirect contempt and
ordered the arrest of
Lorayes. LBP filed with
the RTC a petition for
injunction with
application for the
issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
enjoining PARAD from
implementing the
warrant of arrest against
Lorayes. The RTC
enjoined the PARAD
from implementing the
warrant of arrest
pending final
determination of the
amount of just
compensation for the
property. LBP posted a
₱5,644,773.02 cash
bond. Listana filed with
the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The
Court of Appeals set
aside the orders of the
RTC. The case reached
to the Supreme Court
(Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Listana,
Sr). The Supreme Court
set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals and
reinstated the decision of
the RTC enjoining the
PARAD from
implementing the
warrant of arrest pending
final determination of the
amount of just
compensation for the
property. The Supreme
Court ruled that neither
the PARAD nor the
DARAB have jurisdiction
to decide the contempt
charge filed Listana. The
issuance of a warrant of
arrest was
unconstitutional, being
that it is beyond the
power of the PARAD and
the DARAB.

Based on the
Supreme Court’s
decision, herein
respondent, LBP filed to
the RTC a motion to
withdraw the
₱5,644,773.02 cash
bond. The RTC denies
LBP’s motion and
argued that the cash
bond did not become
moot and academic
 upon the finality of the
Supreme Court’s
decision. This is so
because the underlying
reason for the posting of
the cash bond still
remains despite the
decision of the Supreme
Court upholding the
unconstitutionality of the
order of arrest issued by
PARAD. LBP filed a
motion for
reconsideration, which
was denied by the RTC.
When the case elevated
to the Court of Appeals,
the Court dismissed
LBP’s petition and
affirmed in toto the
RTC’s decision.

14
G.R. No. Between the Whether or not The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
190134 July 8,periods March 25, 1996 the CA, in
2015 to July 13, 2000, denying Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a temporary restraining order may be issued
petitioners executed petitioners’ only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by verified application that great or irreparable injury
SPOUSES ROGELIO and eleven (11) real estate application for a would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be hear. Thus:
SHIRLEY T. LIM, Agusan mortgages and chattel writ of
Institute of Technology, mortgage in favor of preliminary Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary
represented by DR. respondent First injunction, injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be
SHIRLEY T. LIM, Consolidated Bank committed grave enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by verified application that great or
President and as (hereafter private abuse of irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice,
Attorney-in-Fact of FELIX respondent bank), discretion the court which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a
A. CUENCA, MARY ANN through its branch in amounting to temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service
M. MALOLOT, and REY Butuan City. Private lack of on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-
ADONIS M. MEJORADA respondent bank jurisdiction. day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and
Petitioners, admitted that Agusan place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or
vs. Institute of Technology not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
HONORABLE COURT OF paid the aforementioned
APPEALS, TWENTY- loans except for the 7 , th
From the foregoing, it is clear that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there
SECOND DIVISION, 8 and 11 loans.
th th
exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Petitioners failed to
MINDANAO STATION; religiously pay said loans
SHERIFF ARCHIBALD C. as they became due and must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial, and that there is an urgent and
VERGA, and his demandable, hence, paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
DEPUTIES, Regional Trial private respondent bank
Court, Branch 33, Hall of was forced to file for an In the present case, we find that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’
Justice, Libertad, Butuan application for Extra- application for preliminary injunction and TRO. As aptly held by the CA, it neither appears from the facts shown
City; and FIRST judicial Foreclosure of by the TRO application that great or irreparable injury would result to petitioners before the matter can be
CONSOLIDATED BANK, Real Estate Mortgage heard, nor did they show any clear and positive right to be entitled to the protection of the ancillary relief of
Respondents. and Chattel Mortgage on TRO as they only claim that debts would have been paid had respondent bank not impose astronomical
December 28, 2000. interests on its loans.

In response,
petitioners filed an action
for revocation and
annulment of real estate
mortgage and chattel
mortgage with plea for
the issuance of a
temporary restraining
order and preliminary
injunction with the
Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Butuan City.
Petitioners alleged that
the contracts of
mortgage could not be
foreclosed because
Agusan Institute of
Technology had already
full paid its obligation
with private respondent
Bank if the latter did not
charge exorbitant and
excessive interests and
penalties in the
computation of all
payments made by the
former. Interesting to
note, however, that
despite petitioners’
claims regarding
overpayments of their
loan obligations, no
documentary evidence
was ever attached to
the complaint proving
that indeed there were
overpayments made
and when it were
actually made. After
proper hearing on
petitioners’ application
for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction,
the RTC issued the writ
ordering private
respondent Bank to
desist from foreclosing
the said contracts of
mortgage and the trial on
the merits ensue. On
December 28, 2007, the
RTC rendered a decision
lifting the writ of
preliminary injunction
and ruling in favor of
private respondent
Bank. Dissatisfied,
petitioners appealed to
the CA.

In a Resolution
dated July 2, 2009, the
CA denied petitioners’
appeal with prayer for
the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
The CA held that
injunction is an
extraordinary remedy to
be resorted to when
there is a pressing
necessity to avoid
injurious consequences
that cannot be remedied
under any standard
compensation. To be
entitled to an injunctive
writ, the applicants must
 show, inter alia, the
existence of a clear and
unmistakable right and
an urgent and
paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent
serious damages. The
CA held that is neither
appears from the facts
shown by the TRO
application that great or
irreparable injury would
result to petitioners
before the matter can be
hear, nor did petitioners
show any clear and
positive right to be
entitled to the protection
of the ancillary relief of
TRO. Petitioners filed a
motion for
reconsideration,
however, the same was
denied.

15
G.R. No. On [October 8, 2001], Whether or not No.
162716 September the Board of Directors of the Writ of
27, 2006 NAPOCOR issued Preliminary Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides thus:
Board Resolution No. Injunction
Honorable Secretary 2001-113 amending issued was "Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
EMILIA T. BONCODIN of Board Resolution No. proper. when it is established:
the Department of Budget 99-35 which granted the
and Management (DBM), Seniority in Position Pay. '(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
petitioner, Board Resolution No. consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
vs.NATIONAL POWER 99-35 granted a step requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
CORPORATION increment to all qualified '(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
EMPLOYEES NAPOCOR officials and during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
CONSOLIDATED UNION employees who have '(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
(NECU), respondent. been in their position for procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
ten (10) years effective applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
calendar year 1999. On judgment ineffectual.'"
the other hand, Board
Resolution No. 2001-113
reduced the ten (10) year
requirement to three (3)
years.
"On [November 12,
2001], then President of
NAPOCOR, Jesus
Alcordo, issued Circular
No. 2001-51 providing
for the implementing
rules and regulations of
Board Resolution No.
2001-113. On May 6,
2002, the NAPOCOR
Officer-in-Charge,
President and Chief
Executive Officer,
Roland Quilala, issued
Circular No. 2002-22
providing for additional
guidelines relative to the
implementation of the
step increment based on
length of service in the
position to qualified
NAPOCOR officials and
employees.
"On [November 26,
2001], petitioner
furnished a letter
addressed to Mr. Alcordo
informing the latter that
NAPOCOR's request for
clearance to implement
Joint CSC-DBM Circular
No. 1, s. 1990 which is
the basis of Board
Resolution No. 2001-113
cannot be given due
course for lack of legal
basis. In essence,
petitioner holds that the
grant of step increment
based on length of
To be entitled to a writ of injunction, a party must establish the following requisites: (a) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; (b) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 15
The question of whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued is addressed to the sound discretion
of the issuing court. The grant of the writ is conditioned on the existence of the movant's clear and positive
16
right, which should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy available only on the grounds
17
expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3 of Rule 58.
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." 18
Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ would constitute grave abuse
of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent, abstract or future rights whose existence is
19
doubtful or disputed. It cannot be grounded on the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual
20
existing right. Sans that proof, equity will not take cognizance of suits to establish title or lend its preventive
21
aid by injunction. 22
From the foregoing conflicting claims of the parties, it is obvious that the right claimed by respondent as its
basis for asking for injunctive relief is far from clear. The validity of the circulars and board resolution has been
put into serious question; more so, in the light of Napocor Board Resolution No. 2002-81, which was issued
precisely to rectify the previously issued resolution and circular. While respondent's claimed right is not
required to be conclusively established at this stage, it is nevertheless necessary to show -- at least tentatively
-- that it exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction as that raised by petitioner. In 31
our view, respondent has failed to comply with this requirement.
The enforcement of the suspension order and Resolution No. 2002-81 would effect the rollback of the salaries
of Napocor employees receiving more than the two-step increments. True, their enforcement would be
prejudicial to respondent members' interest, but merely showing this fact is not sufficient. It must also be
established that the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right that must be protected. Thus, a finding
that the applicant for preliminary injunction may suffer damage not capable of pecuniary estimation does not
suffice to support an injunction, when it appears that the right to be protected is unclear or is seriously
disputed. 3
As has been held, there is no vested right to salary increases. There must be a lawful decree or order
35
supporting an employee's claim.
In the present case, because the validity of their implementation was fundamentally assailed, the step
increments enjoyed by the Napocor employees could not have ripened into vested rights. In brief, it is seriously
contended that, because they were granted without the required DBM approval, no vested rights to the step
increments could have been acquired.
The terms and conditions of employment of government employees are governed by law. It is the legislature
36
and -- when properly given delegated power -- the administrative heads of government that fix the terms and
conditions of employment through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations. 37
While government instrumentalities and agencies are trying their best to alleviate the financial difficulties of
their employees, they can do so only within the limits of budgetary appropriations. The exercise of
management prerogative by government corporations are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to
them. Subject to state regulation in particular is a public utility like Napocor, its income, and the amount of
38
money available for its operating expenses including labor costs.
service is an additional
benefit under a different The respondent has not justified the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction by proving its clear and
name since NAPOCOR positive legal right to the step increments. The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the Resolutions of the
has already been trial court dated September 25, 2002 and October 29, 2002.
granting seniority pay
based on the length of
service as embodied in
the Collective
Negotiation Agreement
(CNA). In addition,
petitioner said that the
grant of step increment is
not applicable to the
salary plan of
NAPOCOR considering
its higher salary rates
[compared with that of
the existing government
pay plan]. Lastly,
petitioner told Mr.
Alcordo of the budget
implication of the grant of
said proposal which she
estimated to cost as high
as Eighty Four Million
Pesos
(P84,000,000.00).

"Based on the
petitioner's foregoing
letter, the Corporate
Auditor of NAPOCOR,
Norberto Cabibihan,
issued a Memorandum
[dated June 5, 2002] to
Roland Quilala,
NAPOCOR Officer-in-
Charge, enjoining him to
suspend/stop payment
of the step increment as
embodied in NPC
Circular No. 2001-51
dated [November 12,
2001], [effective July
2002]. He also requested
the suspension of the
implementation of NPC
Circular No. 2002-22
dated [May 6, 2002]. He
warned that succeeding
payments of the step
increment shall be
automatically
disallowed.

"On [June 21, 2002], Mr.

Quilala issued a
Memorandum enjoining
concerned officials to
suspend the processing
of the succeeding step
increment based on
length of service
resulting from the
application of Sections
2.2 (c) and 2.2 (d) of
Circular No. 2002-22.

"On [July 24, 2002], the

NAPOCOR Board of
Directors issued Board
Resolution No. 2002-81
revising the
implementation of the
Step Increment, the
pertinent portion of which
provides for:

'1) Pure seniority

benefits counted as one
(1) step increment for
every three (3) years of
service in the present
position, covering from
years 1994 up to 2001 or
two (2) steps increment
only;

'2) Rollback of basic

monthly salary for NPC
personnel who have
been recipients of the
step increase due to
length of service in their
present position in
excess of the two steps
increment granted in the
above paragraph to
qualified employees and
officials, and Corrective
Salary Adjustment
(CSA) effective
September 1, 2002; and

'3) No payback by the

NPC officials and
employees who were
granted salary
differentials covering the
period October 2001 up
to August 2002.
Approval of all this and
the above benefits will be
sought from the Office of
the President,
Malacañang, upon
assurance by the
Secretary of the
Department of Budget
and Management (DBM)
that a favorable
endorsement in support
thereof will be made, x x
x and are hereby
approved; x x x'

Believing that NPC

Circular Nos. 2001-51
and 2002-22 are within
the bounds of law and
that they have already
acquired a vested right in
it, [respondent National
Power Corporation
Employees
 Consolidated Union
(NECU) filed a Petition
for Prohibition with
Application for
TRO/Preliminary
Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City on [August
27, 2002].

"On [August 30, 2002],

public respondent
[Judge Percival Mandap
Lopez, of Branch 78,
Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City] issued an
Order granting private
respondent's prayer for
the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining
Order and setting the
hearing of the application
for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction
on [September 9, 2002].

The CA found no cogent

reason to disturb the
conclusions reached by
the lower court. Hence,
this Petition.

16 BENITO GOLDING,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. Golding (petitioner) Whether or not YES.
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, alleged that he was the the issuance of
SERAPIA BALATBAR owner of a piece or injunction against
and ESTEFANIA parcel of land and that the defendant
BALATBAT, defendants. Balatbat (the was proper The remedy by injunction is the proper remedy to prevent repeated trespass upon real property.
HIPOLITO BALATBAT, defendants) were
appellant. illegally and maliciously
Marcelino Lontok for interfering with the
appellant. petitioner’s possession The following facts are established:
of said land. The
petitioner prayed for both
a preliminary and
permanent 1) Record shows that the defendants had such notice
injunction. The
preliminary injunction 2) It is sufficient to say that he himself admitted that he had violated the terms of said injunction and attempted
was issued. Each of the to excuse by claiming to be the owner of such property
defendants was served
with the copy of the
complaint and the issued
preliminary injunction. Moreover, the court deemed it proper to make the following observations:

None of the 1) Injunction should not be granted to take property out of the possession and control of one party and
defendants answered to place it in the hands of another whose title has not been clearly established by law.
the petition within the
time fixed by law, thus 2) It should not be issued except upon condition that no other ordinary, speedy and adequate remedy
the petitioner presented is available to avoid or repair the damage done, or which may be done by a new violation of the plaintiff’s
a motion for a judgment rights.
by default, which was
granted. The case was 3) That an injunction, while it resemble the interdictal actions of the Spanish law, is wholly distinct
set down for hearing and therefrom
judgment was rendered
enjoining the defendants * accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's
their agents and possession of the property is illegal abinitio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where
representatives to desist the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess
in their acts of whatever – Javier v. Veridiano G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994 (NOT CITED IN THIS CASE)
character which
molested or tended to 4) The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ rests in the probability of irreparable
molest the plaintiff in the injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of the multiplicity of suits, and
peaceful enjoyment of where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be
the possession of his refused
property.
5) Injunctions to prevent trespass and the illegal interference with the possession of land should not
be granted, when the plaintiff's title is in dispute and has not been established at law, until the question of title
is settled in a proper proceeding brought for that purpose.
Later, plaintiff
presented an affidavit 6) There are cases, however, where an injunction may be granted in order to preserve the status quo
alleging that the of property until the title can be determined in a proper action. But even then it should not be granted ex parte.
defendant had The defendant should be given an opportunity to be heard.
maliciously and illegally
and by means of 7) The remedy by injunction is never the proper remedy to deprive a person of the possession of property. If
violence committed acts the person in possession is in possession illegally there exist other adequate, speedy and summary remedies
in violation of the terms — forcible entry and detainer and ejectment.
of said
injunction. Balatbat
 confessed that he was In the present action had the defendants appeared when they were cited so to do and alleged
guilty of violation of said and showed that they were in possession of the land in question as owners thereof, the action would
injunction but attempted have resolved itself into one of ejectment, and a motion properly presented and properly supported
to excuse his acts upon to dissolve the temporary injunction would have been denied. Of course, upon the theory of the
the theory that he was plaintiff, as presented in the record, that he was the owner of the land in question and in possession
the owner of the parcel of thereof — and that fact not having been denied — and that the defendants were mere trespassers
land. He was found thereon and were illegally and maliciously interfering and molesting the plaintiff in his quiet and
guilty and was imposed a peaceable enjoyment of the possession of his property, then injunction was the proper remedy for the
fine. purpose of preventing a repetition of said illegal acts.

The remedy by injunction is the proper remedy to prevent repeated trespass upon real
property. But the trespass which will be enjoined must be of such a nature that an action for damages
On appeal, he alleged will not adequately compensate the loss occasioned thereby.
the following:

1) That he had not been

duly notified of the
injunction

2) That inasmuch as the

lower court had issued
the injunction; it is not
just for it to consider the
questions presented for
a violation of the same

3) That there was no

proof showing that the
defendant had violated
the terms of said
injunction

17
G.R. No. L-10572 Judgment appealed from Whether or not No. Definition of
Injunction
December 21, 1915 in this case perpetually the issuance of
restrains and prohibits the preliminary Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history of Injunctions, as
FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL the CIR (defendant) and injunction against the writ of injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as here defined, are
and STEWART TAIT, his deputies from the defendant is distinguished from the common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No of two kinds;
plaintiffs-appellees, vs. collecting and enforcing proper injunction issues as of course, but is granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate preliminary and
against the plaintiffs and final. The former
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, remedy at law. may be granted at
Collector of Internal their property the annual any time after the
Revenue, defendant- tax. It also enjoins the The mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is unconstitutional, does not commencement
appellant. defendant from authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further showing that there of the action and
destroying or removing before final
are special circumstances which bring the case under some well recognized head of equity jurisprudence, judgment, and the
 any sign, signboard,
Attorney-General billboard, the property of
Avanceña for appellant. the plaintiffs, for the
reason that such
Aitken and DeSelms for billboard is, or may be
appellees. offensive to the sight. It
decrees the cancellation
of the bond given by the
plaintiffs to secure the
issuance of the
preliminary injunction
granted as soon after the
commencement of this
action.
such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also that latter at the
termination of the
there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy at law. trial as the relief
or part of the relief
Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed prayed for (sec.
under this act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . ." This 162).
inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial boards. The
Any judge of the
inhibition was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective October 12, 1907. Supreme Court
Act No. 355 expressly makes the payment of the exactions claimed a condition precedent to a resort to the may grant a
courts by dissatisfied importers. preliminary
injunction in any
action pending in
Section 52 of Act No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction restraining the that court or in
collection of any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer who any Court of First
claims that he is unjustly assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him Instance.
by the Collector of Internal Revenue and by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been illegally
collected." A preliminary
injunction may
also be granted
The issuance of the preliminary injunction against the defendant is not proper by a judge of the
Court of First
Instance in
actions pending
in his district in
which he has
original
jurisdiction (sec.
163). But such
injunctions may
be granted only
when the
complaint shows
facts entitling the
plaintiff to the
relief demanded
(sec. 166), and
before a final or
permanent
injunction can be
granted, it must
appear upon the
trial of the action
that the plaintiff is
entitled to have
commission or
continuance of
the acts
complained of
perpetually
restrained (sec.
171). These
provisions
authorize the
institution in
Courts of First
Instance of what
are known as
"injunction suits,"
the sole object of
which is to obtain
the issuance of a
final injunction.
They also
authorize the
granting of
injunctions as
aiders in ordinary
civil actions.

We have defined
in Davesa vs.
Arbes (13 Phil.
Rep., 273), an
injunction to be
"A "special
remedy" adopted
in that code (Act
190) from
American
practice, and
originally
borrowed from
English legal
procedure, which
was there issued
by the authority
and under the
seal of a court of
equity, and
limited, as in
other cases where
equitable relief is
sought, to those
cases where there
is no "plain,
adequate, and
complete remedy
at law,"which will
not be granted
while the rights
between the
parties are
undetermined,
except in
extraordinary
cases where
material and
irreparable injury
will be
done,"which
cannot be
 compensated in
damages . . .

18 Facts: Issue: Ruling: ProvRem

G.R. NO. 147861 Whether or not No, it is not valid, and the preliminary injunction against PPA’s take over must be lifted. Doctrine:
November 18, 2005 In the late 1990's, then the issuance of a The requisites to
President Joseph E. Estrada justify an injunctive
writ of
issued a directive for the relief are: (a) the
PHILIPPINE PORTS modernization of the North preliminary existence of a right in
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, Harbor towards unification and injunction esse or the existence
v. PIER 8 ARRASTRE & rationalization of all facility against PPA's of a right to be
STEVE-DORING operators and service protected; and (b) the
takeover of port
providers. As the government
1 act against which
SERVICES, INC., agency vested with the services is valid. injunction is to be
Respondents. authority "to coordinate, directed as a violation
streamline, improve, and of such right. A
G.R. NO. 155252 optimize the planning, preliminary injunction
development, financing, is proper only when
construction, maintenance and the plaintiff appears to
PHILIPPINE PORTS operation of ports, port be entitled to the relief
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, facilities, port physical plants, demanded in his
v. THE COURT OF all equipment used in complaint.
APPEALS (FORMER connection with the operation
of a port" and "[t]o supervise,
2

Ninth Division) and PIER P.D. No. 1818

control, regulate, construct,
deprives the courts of
8 ARRASTRE & maintain, operate, and provide
jurisdiction to issue
STEVEDORING such facilities or services as
any preliminary
SERVICES, INC., are necessary in the ports
injunction or
vested in, or belonging to the
Respondents. temporary retraining
Authority," it fell upon the PPA
3
order on essential
to implement the presidential
government projects,
TINGA, J.: edict. However, the plan for
including arrastre and
modernization, which required
stevedoring
the North Harbor to be run by a
operations.
single entity, encountered
strong opposition including
resistance from North Harbor
port workers.

19
G.R. No. The petitioners enrolled Whether or not "To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must establish the following requisites:
207412 August 7, in the Master of Science the Writ of (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
2013 in Fisheries Biology at Preliminary complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
FLORD NICSON UP Visayas under a Injunction is writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of
CALAWAG, PETITIONER, scholarship from the proper in this an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
vs. Department of Science case. injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction [presents a fourth
UNIVERSITY OF THE and Technology- requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s
PHILIPPINES VISAYAS Philippine Council for right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
AND DEAN CARLOS C. Aquatic and Marine injunctive relief is improper."
6

Research and
BAYLON, Development. They The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the
RESPONDENTS. finished their first year of protection of a preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CA’s conclusion that the dean has the
x------------------- study with good grades, discretion to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had
----x and thus were eligible to no right for an automatic approval and composition of their thesis committees.
G.R. No. 207542 start their thesis in the The functions and duties of a college dean are outlined in the university’s Faculty Manual, which details the
MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE first semester of their rules and regulations governing the university’s administration. Section 11.8.2, paragraph b of the Faculty
MARIE F. NASALGA AND second year. The Manual enumerates the powers and responsibilities of a college dean, which include the power to approve
CHE CHE B. petitioners then enrolled the composition of a thesis committee, to wit:
SALCEPUEDES, in the thesis program, 11.8.2 Administration
PETITIONERS, drafted their tentative b. Dean/Director of UP System or UP Diliman-based Programs * The Dean/Director shall be responsible for
vs. thesis titles, and the planning and implementation of the graduate programs. In particular, the Dean/Director shall exercise
DR. CARLOS C. BA obtained the consent of the following powers and responsibilities based on the recommendations forwarded to him/her, through
YLON, DR. MINDA J. Dr. Rex Baleña to be channels:
FORMACI ON AND DR. their thesis adviser, as Approve the composition of the Thesis, Dissertation or Special Project** Committees and Master’s or
EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO well as the other faculty doctoral examination/oral defense panel for each student[.] (emphases and italics ours)
7

BE SUBSTITUTED BY members’ consent to By necessary implication, the dean’s power to approve includes the power to disapprove the composition of
8

ALFREDO E. PASCUAL, constitute their a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP System’s faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in
BEING THE NEW UP respective thesis approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Verily, the academic freedom accorded
PRESIDENT), committees. These to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and
UNIVERSITY OF THE details were enclosed in objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who
10

PHILIPPINES BOARD OF the letters the petitioners can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being
REGENTS, sent to Dean Baylon, their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as
11

RESPONDENTS. asking him to approve the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students.
the composition of their Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary
thesis committees. mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the
13

Upon receipt of the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen
petitioners’ letters, Dean has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
Baylon wrote a series of academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are
memos addressed to part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have
Professor Sanares, to comply with.
questioning the propriety
of the thesis topics with
the college’s graduate
degree program. He
subsequently
disapproved the
composition of the
petitioners’ thesis
committees and their
tentative thesis topics.
According to Dean
Baylon, the
petitioners’ thesis
titles connote a
historical and social
dimension study
which is not
appropriate for the
petitioners’ chosen
master’s degrees..
RTC’s Ruling
The petitioners thus filed
a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before
the RTC, asking it to
order Dean Baylon to
approve and constitute
the petitioners’ thesis
committees and approve
their thesis titles. RTC
issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory
injunction against Dean
Baylon, and order him to
perform such acts while
the suit was pending.
RTC granted the same.
CA’s Ruling
The CA reversed RTC’s
order, holding that the
petitioners had no clear
right to compel Dean
Baylon to approve the
composition of their
thesis committees as a
matter of course. The
CA held that the case
presents issues that are
purely academic in
character, which are
outside the court’s
jurisdiction. It also noted
that Dean Baylon has
been accommodating of
the petitioners, and that
the requirements he
imposed were meant to
assist them to formulate
a proper thesis title and
graduate on time.
Arguments of the
Petitioners:

v Calawag’s
right to
education, the
right to due
process, and
the right to
equal protection
under the law
were violated.
v Dean Baylon
violated his right
to due process
when he added
to and changed
the
requirements for
the constitution
of his thesis
committee,
without prior
publication of
the change in
rules.
v Calawag’s
right to equal
protection of the
law was
allegedly
violated
because only
students like
him, who chose
Dr. Baleña for
their thesis
adviser, were
subjected to the
additional
requirements
imposed by the
dean, while the
other students’
thesis
 committees
were formed
without these
impositions.
v The college
dean’s functions
are merely
administrative,
and, hence, the
CA erred in its
construction of
Article 51 of the
Graduate
Program
Manual of UP
Visayas, as well
as its
proclamation
that the college
dean has
supervisory
authority over
academic
matters in the
college.

20 Atoc vs. Camello IPI No. Clemente Atoc, herein Whether or not NO. The Court explained that administrative complaints against magistrates cannot be pursued
16-241-CA-J, November complainant, filed a an administrative simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or
29, 2016 complaint against the action against judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they
justices of the 22nd the CA justices is cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases not yet been
Division of the Court of the appropriate resolved with finality.
Appeals (Cagayan de remedy against
Oro City). The complaint the issuance of Here, it is evident that the parties aggrieved by the resolution can avail or may have already availed of other
stemmed from the cases WPI judicial remedies. Quite significant is the fact that the instant administrative complaint was filed by someone
of Mayor Oscar Moreno who is not a party or privy to the case. As correctly noted by the respondent justices in their Joint-Comment,
and Glenn C Banez Atoc did not even disclose the capacity in which he brings the present administrative complaint.
(OIC Treasurer with the
Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found

Moreno and Banez
guilty of grave
misconduct and violation
of RA No. 6713. The
 Ombudsman furnished a
copy of the said order to
the DILG. However,
Moreno and Banez
sought relief from the
CA and was able to
obtain a TRO then a
Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

Atoc, claiming that he

was aggrieved by the
CA’s decision to issue
the WPI filed an
administrative complaint
against the Justices
issuing such order. He
further alleged that the
justices be dismissed for
gross ignorance of the
law

21 G.R. No. 189026, Petitioner Philippine 1. Whether The fact that the interconnection agreement between Smart and PT&T involved access charges warrants a
November 09, 2016 Telegraph & Telephone or not NTC has more nuanced analysis, thus, requires NTC’s intervention.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH Corporation (PT&T) and jurisdiction - YES
TELEPHONE CORP., v. respondent Smart 2. Whether The first paragraph of Section 18 of RA 7925 mandates that any agreement pertaining to access charges
SMART Communications, Inc. or not RTC can must be submitted to the NTC for approval; in case the parties fail to agree, the matter shall be resolved by
COMMUNICATIONS, (Smart) entered into an validly issue a the NTC.
INC., Agreement for the TRO against
interconnection of their NTC - NO The NTC is certainly the approving authority on matters pertaining to either the access charge formula or
telecommunication revenue-sharing arrangement.
facilities. The
Agreement provided for
the interconnection of Conspicuously, neither Smart nor PT&T claims that the access charges in the Agreement have been
Smart's Cellular Mobile submitted to, much less approved, by the NTC.
Telephone System
(CMTS), Local The second paragraph of Section 18 enumerates the guidelines to be considered by the NTC before it
Exchange Carrier (LEC) approves the access charges. Thus, the NTC must be satisfied that the access charge formula is fair and
and Paging services reasonable
with PT&T's LEC
service. Starting 1999, The proceeding under Section 18 is quasi-judicial in nature. The NTC correctly treated the dispute as
however, PT&T had adversarial and gave both Smart and PT&T the opportunity to be heard.
difficulty meeting its
financial obligations to
Smart. Thus, the parties
amended the As for the Preliminary Injunction
Agreement, which
extended the payment
Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court where the action is pending may
period and allowed
grant the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. Generally, trial courts have the ancillary jurisdiction to
PT&T to settle its
issue writs of preliminary injunction in cases falling within its jurisdiction, including civil actions that are
obligations on
incapable of pecuniary estimation and claims for sum of money exceeding P400,000.00, among others.
installment basis. The
amended Agreement
also specified that Exceptions:
Smart's access charge 1. when Congress, in the exercise of its power to apportion jurisdiction, restricts the authority of regular
to PT&T would increase courts to issue injunctive reliefs. For example, the Labor Code prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in
from P1.00 to P2.00 cases involving or arising from labor disputes.
once PT&T's unpaid 2. Republic Act No. 897545 (RA 8975) provides that no court, other than the Supreme Court, may
balance reaches P4 issue provisional injunctive reliefs which would adversely affect the expeditious implementation and
Million and that PT&T's completion of government infrastructure projects.
access charge to Smart 3. courts could not interfere with the judgments, orders, or decrees of a court of concurrent or
would be reduced from coordinate jurisdiction. This rule of non-interference applies not only to courts of law having equal
P8.69 to P6.50. Upon rank but also to quasi-judicial agencies statutorily at par with such courts.
full payment, PT&T's
access charge would be The NTC was created pursuant to (EO 546). It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the Board of
further reduced to Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau and was placed under the administrative
P4.50. supervision of the Ministry of Public Works. Meanwhile, the Board of Communications previously exercised
the authority which originally pertained to the Public Service Commission (PSC).
On April 4, 2005, Smart
sent a letter informing Section 16 of EO 546 provides that, with respect to the NTC's quasi¬-judicial functions, its decisions shall be
PT&T that it increased appealable in the same manner as the decisions of the Board of Communications had been appealed. The
the access charge from rulings and decisions of the Board were, in turn, appealable in the same manner as the rulings and
P1.00 to P2.00 starting decisions of the PSC. Under Section 35 of the Public Service Act, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to
April 1, 2005 in review any order, ruling, or decision of the PSC. In Iloilo Commercial and Ice Company v. Public Service
accordance with the Commission, we categorically held that courts of first instance have no power to issue a restraining order
amended Agreement. directed to the PSC.
However, on September
2, 2005, PT&T sent a x x x In the absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to Courts of First Instance to grant injunctive relief
letter to Smart claiming against orders of the Public Service Commission, it would appear that no court, other than the Supreme
that the latter Court, possesses such jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would amount to a presumption of power in favor of
overcharged PT&T on one branch of the judiciary, as against another branch of equal rank.
outbound calls to
Smart's CMTS.5 PT&T The above ruling was modified by BP Blg. 129, granting the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all final
cited the NTC resolution judgments, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
in a separate dispute instrumentalities, boards or commission" except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
between Smart and Court in accordance with the Constitution and the Labor Code. In this regard, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
Digitel, where the NTC provides that an appeal from any award, judgment or resolution of or authorized by a quasi-judicial agency
ultimately disallowed the
access charges in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, including the NTC, shall be through a petition for review with the
imposed by Smart for Court of Appeals.
being discriminatory and
less favorable than In view of the legislative history of the NTC, it is clear that Congress intended NTC, in respect of its quasi-
terms offered to other judicial or adjudicatory functions, to be co-equal with regional trial courts. Hence, the RTC cannot interfere
public with the NTC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers without breaching the rule of non-interference with
telecommunication tribunals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. In this case, the NTC was already in the process of
entities (PTEs). resolving the issue of whether the access charges stipulated in the Agreement were fair and equitable
Accordingly, PT&T pursuant to its mandate under RA 7925 when the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
demanded a refund of Mediation conferences had been conducted and, failing to arrive at a settlement, the NTC had ordered the
P12,681,795.13 from parties to submit their respective pleadings. Simply put, the NTC had already assumed jurisdiction over the
Smart. issue involving access charges. Undeniably, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it restrained the NTC
from exercising its statutory authority over the dispute.
PT&T filed a complaint
with the NTC raising that
the access charges
imposed by Smart were
"discriminatory and not
in conformity with those
of other carriers."

NTC ordered Smart and

PT&T to attend
mediation conferences,
but the mediation failed,
the NTC directed them
to file their pleadings.
But before they could
submit, Smart filed a
complaint with the
Makati (RTC) against
PT&T alleging that
PT&T was in breach of
its contractual obligation
when it failed to pay its
outstanding debt and
denied its liability to
Smart.

Smart also asked the

RTC to issue a TRO
against the NTC and
PT&T, which the RTC
granted.
PT&T sought for the
dismissal of the civil
case for lack of
jurisdiction, non-
observance of the
doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, exhaustion
of administrative
remedies, litis pendentia
and res judicata. It also
prayed for the
restraining order be set
aside.

RTC issued a writ of

preliminary injunction in
favor of Smart. The RTC
reasoned that allowing
the NTC to proceed and
adjudicate access
charges would violate
Smart's contractual
rights.

PT&T petitioned with the

CA. The CA found that
the RTC had jurisdiction
over the case because it
involved an action for
specific performance,
i.e., PT&T's compliance
with the Agreement, and
is therefore incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
And insofar as the
dispute involved an
alleged breach of
contract, there was no
need to refer the matter
to the NTC because it
had no jurisdiction over
breach of contract
cases.
CA denied the MR,
PT&T then filed this
petition for review

For PT&T, NTC has

primary jurisdiction over
the determination of
access charges. PT&T
characterizes the NTC
case as one involving
the validity of
interconnection rates, as
opposed to one
involving purely a
breach of contract and
claim for damages
cognizable by the RTC.
PT&T adds that the writ
of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC
against NTC constitutes
interference with a co-
equal body.

For Smart, RTC has

jurisdiction as the
dispute was purely
contractual. It alleges
that NTC has no
jurisdiction over bilateral
interconnection
agreements voluntarily
negotiated and entered
into by PTEs.

Smart believes that its

complaint before the
RTC is one which is
incapable of pecuniary
estimation and,
accordingly, falls within
its jurisdiction. For
Smart, because it is
seeking to enforce the
Agreement, the regular
 courts, not the NTC,
have jurisdiction

22 BICOL MEDICAL Sometime in 1982, the Whether or not A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result of an impartial
CENTER VS. NOE B. Camarines Sur the Court of determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs
BOTOR - G.R. NO. Provincial Government Appeals erred in prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the
214073 donated about five (5) directing the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is given a latitude of
hectares of land to the Regional Trial discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially
Ministry of Health, now Court to issue a breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. Even if this is present, the trial
the Department of writ of court must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.
Health,[8] as evidenced preliminary Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be
by Transfer Certificate of injunction on the issued: when it is established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
Title (TCT) No. closure of Road of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
13693.The Training and Lot No. 3. requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission,
Teaching Hospital and continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
Road Lot No. 3 were injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
included in this to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
donation.The Training respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
and Teaching Hospital Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of
became the Bicol preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:
Medical Center (BMC) in The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) There is a
1995. BMC constructed material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
a steel gate along J. injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction
Miranda Avenue to of irreparable injury.
control the flow of vehicle In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with complete
and pedestrian traffic and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required "to give the court an idea
entering the hospital of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits."
premises. To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before the trial court the
1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map which both identified Road Lot
Dr. Nerva, BMC Chief I, No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of Camarines Sur. Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to
issued Hospital corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3.
Memorandum No. Respondents claimed that as members of the general public, they had every right to use Road Lot No. 3, a
0310,which ordered the public road. On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693,which covered a total land area of 53,890m2
rerouting of traffic inside within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with the Ministry of Health, now Department of Health, as the registered
the BMC Compound. owner. It is not disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693.
This rerouting scheme A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of
closed the steel gate for their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they sought to establish by proving the public
vehicles and pedestrians nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of title and the City Engineer's
along J. Miranda categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of [BMC] was not
Avenue, relocating it included in the list'' of city roads under Naga City's control.
from the eastern side of This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence
the hospital to the presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether petitioners' evidence, which had the
western side effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and respondents' assertions. The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate
 the nature of the ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
Atty. Noe Botor (Atty. temporary restraining order.
Botor) wrote to Naga City Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined and upon
Mayor John Bongat their due hearing. Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
(Mayor Bongat), asking Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety of the issuance of a
for the reopening or writ of preliminary injunction," giving the applicant an opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will
dismantling of the gate result if no writ is issued and allowing the opposing party to comment on the application
for being a public By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there was prima facie evidence to
nuisance. issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case was being heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Sangguniang To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties are
Panlungsod of Naga City given the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
passed a resolution Respondents were unable to present prima facie evidence of their clear and unmistakable right to use Road
authorizing Mayor Lot No. 3.
Bongat to dismantle the
gate. However, instead
of dismantling it, Mayor
Bongat filed a Verified
Petition with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against BMC.

Atty. Botor, Celjun F.

Yap, Ismael A. Albao,
Augusto S. Quilon,
Edgar F. Esplana II, and
Josefina F. Esplana
(Intervenors) were
allowed to intervene and
submit their complaint-
in-intervention.The
Regional Trial Court
denied Naga City's
application for injunctive
relief, ruling that Naga
City failed to prove a
clear and unmistakable
right to the writ prayed
for.
Only the Intervenors filed
a petition for certiorari
before the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals
granted the petition and
emphasized that only a
prima facie showing of
an applicant's right to the
writ is required in an
application for writ of
injunctive relief.

The Court of Appeals

denied the motions for
reconsideration filed by
BMC and the
Department of Health.
However, the Court of
Appeals emphasized
that the injunction was
not directed against the
construction of the
Cancer Center Building
but against the relocation
of the service road and
gate closure.

Petitioners BMC and the

Department of Health
filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners applied for a
temporary restraining
order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to
prevent the reopening of
the gate since doing so
would affect the
construction of the
Cancer Center Building.

The first Resolution

granted petitioners'
motion for extension to
file their petition. The
second Resolution
issued a temporary
restraining order
 enjoining the
implementation of the
Court of Appeals which
directed the Regional
Trial Court to issue a writ
of mandatory preliminary
injunction on the closure
of Road Lot No. 3.
Rule
58 NERWIN INDUSTRIES In 1999, the National
CORPORATION, Petitioner, Electrification
RA vs. Administration ("NEA")
PNOC-ENERGY published an invitation to
8975
DEVELOPMENT pre-qualify and to bid for a
CORPORATION, and ESTER contract (IPB No. 80) for the
R. GUERZON, Chairman, supply and delivery of about
Bids and Awards Committee, sixty thousand (60,000)
Respondents. pieces of woodpoles and
G.R. No. 167057 / April 11, twenty thousand (20,000)
2012 pieces of crossarms
BERSAMIN, J.: needed in the country’s
Rural Electrification Project.
In response to the said
invitation, bidders, such as
petitioner (Nerwin) were
required to submit their
application for eligibility
together with their technical
proposals. Nerwin qualified
as the lowest bidder. NEA
then conducted a pre-
award inspection of
Nerwin’s manufacturing
plants and facilities.
However, on December 19,
2000, NEA’s Board of
Directors passed a preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
resolution reducing by 50%
the material requirements.
Nerwin protested the said
50% reduction, alleging that
the same was a ploy to
accommodate a losing
bidder. On the other hand,
the losing bidders appeared
to have filed a complaint,
Whether or not the
petitioner’s The RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in
application for TRO issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining the bidding for the O-ILAW Project. This is expressly
and Writ of provided under sections (3) and (4) of RA 8975.
Preliminary
Injunction must be
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Mandatory
granted. Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
NO. subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private acting under the government
direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national
government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/ project of the national government as defined under Section 2
hereof;
(c) Commencement prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including
but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving
such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and
irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which
bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled to the relief sought.
In after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a
rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing
laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. – Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition
to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources
Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government.
The RTC failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government
infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. It thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this
Court’s various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects in
line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975.
citing alleged false or
falsified documents
submitted during the pre-
qualification stage which
led to the award of the IBP-
80 project to Nerwin.

In the interim, PNOC-

Energy Development
Corporation purporting to
be under the Department of
Energy, issued Requisition
No. FGJ 30904R1 (O-ILAW
Project) or an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for
wooden poles needed for
its Samar Rural
Electrification Project. Upon
learning of the issuance of
Requisition No. FGJ
30904R1, Nerwin filed a
civil action in the RTC in
Manila alleging that O-
ILAW Project was an
attempt to subject a portion
of the items covered by IPB
No. 80 to another bidding;
and praying that a TRO
issue to enjoin respondents’
proposed bidding for the
wooden poles.
Respondents sought the
dismissal arguing that
government infrastructure
projects by virtue of RA
8975 cannot be subjected
to TROs.

The RTC granted the

preliminary injunction. It
also denied the
Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration. Thence,
respondents commenced in
the Court of Appeals (CA) a
special civil action for
certiorari. Respondents
alleged that the RTC
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack
 or excess of jurisdiction in
holding that Nerwin had
been entitled to the
issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction
despite the express
prohibition from the law (RA
8975). The CA granted the
respondents’ petition.

Rule 58. Preliminary Injunction

*CASE 1-PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF THE PERIOD WHEN NIASSI OPERATED AS CARGO HANDLER AT NASIPIT PORT:

Period Duration Basis

January 3, 2001 to December 9, 2004 3 years, 11 months and 6 days Notice of Award

March 28, 2005 to April 11, 2005 14 days Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction

August 8, 2006 to December 3, 2014 8 years, 3 months and 26 days Reinstatement of Preliminary Injunction

Total 12 years, 3 months and 15 days