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[A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC. March 2, 2010.]

RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010 OF


ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM : p

Before us for consideration are the inter-related matters listed below.


a. The subpoena duces tecum (dated January 11, 2010 and received
by this Court on January 18, 2010), issued by the O ce of the
Ombudsman on the "Chief, O ce of the Administrative
Services or AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court,
Manila," for the submission to the O ce of the Ombudsman
of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last known forwarding
address of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and
former Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez . The subpoena
duces tecum was issued in relation with criminal complaint under (b)
below, pursuant to Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. The O ce of the Administrative
Services (OAS) referred the matter to us on January 21, 2010 with a
request for clearance to release the speci ed documents and
information.
b. Copy of the criminal complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano and
Evangeline Lozano-Endriano vs. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al. ,
OMB-C-C-09-0527-J, cited by the Ombudsman as basis for the
subpoena duces tecum it issued. We secured a copy of this criminal
complaint from the Ombudsman to determine the legality and
propriety of the subpoena duces tecum sought.
c. Order dated February 4, 2010 (which the Court received on
February 9, 2010), signed by Acting Director Maribeth
Taytaon-Padios of the O ce of the Ombudsman (with the
approval of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez),
dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action . The order was premised
on the Memorandum 1 issued on July 31, 2003 by Ombudsman
Simeon Marcelo who directed that all complaints against judges and
other members of the Judiciary be immediately dismissed and
referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. HCacDE

OUR RULING
I. The Subpoena Duces Tecum
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In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal order of February 4, 2010, any question
relating to the legality and propriety of the subpoena duces tecum the Ombudsman
issued has been rendered moot and academic. The subpoena duces tecum merely
drew its life and continued viability from the underlying criminal complaint, and the
complaint's dismissal — belated though it may be — cannot but have the effect of
rendering the need for the subpoena duces tecum academic.
As guide in the issuance of compulsory processes to Members of this Court,
past and present, in relation with complaints touching on the exercise of our judicial
functions, we deem it appropriate to discuss for the record the extent of the
Ombudsman's authority in these types of complaints.
In the appropriate case, the O ce of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue
subpoenas, including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses
and the production of documents and information relating to matters under its
investigation. 2 The grant of this authority, however, is not unlimited as the Ombudsman
must necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution and our laws, the
Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and
e cacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a
subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of reasonableness and
relevance. 3 For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the documents
themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the rst place, be one that
the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.
In the present case, the "matter" that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum was a criminal complaint led by the complainants Lozano for the alleged
violation by retired Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate
Justice Alicia Austria Martinez of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act).
A rst step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant
compulsory processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to
issue), is to consider the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court. This Court, by
constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is vested
solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual controversies,
but to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction had been committed in any branch or instrumentality of government. 4 As a
rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to
and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is nal. This constitutional scheme
cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that, under the
guise of imputing a misdeed on the Court and its Members, seeks to revive
and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court . Effectively,
such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by
constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question. TDCcAE

A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had the
occasion to rule on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. 3019 — the very same provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in
this case.
In the case of In re Wenceslao Laureta, 5 the client of Atty. Laureta led a
complaint with the Tanodbayan charging Members of the Supreme Court with violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having knowingly, deliberately and with
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bad faith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute. The Court unequivocally ruled
that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is
"unjust" should not prosper; the parties cannot "relitigate in another forum the nal
judgment of the Court," as to do so is to subordinate the Court in the exercise of its
judicial functions to another body. 6
The case In re Joaquin T. Borromeo 7 reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly
that (1) judgments of Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and
criminal complaints against a judge should not be turned into substitutes for appeal;
(3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) the absurdity of the situation
where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is
unjust. The Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecution of judges, as
follows:
That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this
impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking
account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that
there be a nal declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding
of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there
be also evidence of malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on
the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order.

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional
scheme, only this Court — not the Ombudsman — can declare a Supreme Court
judgment to be unjust.
In Alzua v. Arnalot , 8 the Court ruled that "judges of superior and general
jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages, and provided this
rationale for this ruling: Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this
freedom and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either
respectable or useful." The same rationale applies to the indiscriminate attribution of
criminal liability to judicial officials. ISTECA

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the o cial acts of Justices of the Supreme
Court, cannot prosper and should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members
of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their term, for they are not. The
Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their
removal from o ce if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 9 Only after
removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in
o ce and thereafter, and for their o cial acts that do not constitute impeachable
offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities therefor, are as de ned in the
above rulings.
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, speci cally grants the Ombudsman
the authority to investigate impeachable o cers, but only when such investigation is
warranted :
Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The O ce of the Ombudsman shall
have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in o ce allegedly
committed by o cials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of ling a
verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
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Conversely, if a complaint against an impeachable o cer is unwarranted for lack of
legal basis and for clear misapplication of law and jurisprudence, the Ombudsman
should spare these o cers from the harassment of an unjusti ed investigation. The
present criminal complaint against the retired Justices is one such case where an
investigation is not warranted, based as it is on the legal correctness of their o cial
acts, and the Ombudsman should have immediately recognized the criminal complaint
for what it is, instead of initially proceeding with its investigation and issuing a
subpoena duces tecum.
II. The Ombudsman's Dismissal
of the Criminal Complaint
As the Ombudsman's dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and
Evangeline Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al. , OMB-C-C-09-0527-J) clearly
implied, no complete dismissal took place as the matter was simply "referred to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action."
Although belatedly made, we cannot fault this Ombudsman action for the
reasons we have already discussed above. While both accused are now retired from the
service, the complaint against them still quali es for exclusive consideration by this
Court as the acts complained of spring from their judicial actions while they were with
the Court. From this perspective, we therefore pass upon the prima facie merits of the
complainants Lozano's criminal complaint. acIHDA

a. Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint


By its express terms, the criminal complaint stemmed from the participation of
the accused in the Resolution the First Division of this Court issued in Heirs of Antonio
Pael v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843. The retired Chief
Justice and retired Associate Justice allegedly committed the following unlawful acts:
1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA;
2) Stating in the Resolution that the "Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP
property," when the DENR Survey Report stated that the "UP title/property
overlaps the Chin-Mallari property;"

3) Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for
which five Justices voted.

By these acts the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally
accountable on the theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in ruling in the
cited cases, thereby causing "undue injury" to the parties to these cases.
After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez under
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. We fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the
discussions below.
a. Contrary to the complainants' position,
the Supreme Court has the power to review
the lower courts' findings of fact
The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or a rm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, nal judgments and orders of the lower courts. 1 0 It has the authority to
promulgate rules on practice, pleadings and admission to the bar, and suspend the
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operation of these rules in the interest of justice. 1 1 Jurisprudence holds, too, that the
Supreme Court may exercise these powers over the factual findings of the lower courts,
among other prerogatives, in the following instances: (1) when the ndings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd of impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the
ndings of fact are con icting; (6) when, in making its ndings, the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the ndings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the ndings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, and
(10) when the ndings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record. 1 2 Thus, contrary to the complainants Lozanos'
assertions in their complaint, the Supreme Court, in the proper cases, can and does
rule on factual submissions before it and even reverse the lower court's factual
findings when the circumstances call for this action. DAHCaI

b. Misuse of Constitutional Provisions


The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and misused
applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case against the retired Justices. We
refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of Article X, Section 2 (3) of the
1 9 7 3 Constitution which they claimed to be the governing rule that the retired
Justices should have followed in acting on the Pael case. This constitutional provision
states:
Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at least
ve Members, but if such required number is not obtained the case shall be
decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modi ed or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc. 1 3

For failure to act according to these terms, the complainants claim that the retired
Justices subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a majority of only three
members, the decision of the First Division unanimously approved by its full
membership of five members.
Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts and developments
in Pael and accordingly related these to the applicable constitutional provision ,
they would have discovered that Pael was decided in 2003 when the 1987
Constitution, not the 1973 Constitution , was the prevailing Charter. They then
would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and decided by Division
before the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section 4 (3), Article VIII of
this Constitution provides:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members . When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that
no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modi ed or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc." (Emphasis supplied.)

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This is the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this day. Thus, the
complainants' argument and basis for their criminal complaint — i.e., that in ruling on a
motion for reconsideration, all ve members of the Division should concur — is totally
wrong. HEITAD

c. The elements of the offense charged are


not sufficiently alleged in the complaint
A public official can violate Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 1 4 in two ways:
(1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference; 1 5 in either case, these
acts must be committed through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and
inexcusable negligence.
"Partiality" is de ned as a bias towards the disposition to see and report matters
as wished for, rather than as they are. "Bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment or
negligence but also a dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing, or a breach of duty
amounting to fraud. "Gross negligence," on the other hand, is characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences as far as other persons are concerned. 1 6
The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and circumstances
showing that the retired justices acted with partiality, bad faith or negligence. The act of
a judicial o cer in reviewing the ndings of fact in a decision and voting for its reversal
cannot by itself constitute a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in the
absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating a dishonest purpose, conscious
partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrong doing on his or her part. A complainant's mere
disagreement with the magistrate's own conclusions, to be sure, does not justify a
criminal charge under Section 3 (e) against the latter. In the absence of alleged and
proven particular acts of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, good faith and regularity are generally presumed in the performance of
official duties by public officers. 1 7
For the criminal complaint's fatal omissions and resultant failure to allege a
prima facie case, it rightfully deserves immediate dismissal.
III. The Complainants' Potential Liability
for Filing the Ombudsman Complaint
In light of the above conclusions and under the attendant circumstances of the
criminal complaints, we cannot avoid considering whether the complainants Lozano
acted properly as members of the Bar, as o cers of this Court, and as professionals
governed by norms of ethical behavior, in filing their complaint. HAEIac

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the powers
of this Court to suit their purposes; for these same purposes, they wrongly cited and
misapplied the provisions of the Constitution, not just any ordinary statute. As lawyers,
the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted with the fundamental law of the
land, and are charged with the duty to apply the constitutional provisions in light of their
prevailing jurisprudential interpretation. As law practitioners active in the legal and
political circles, the complainants can hardly be characterized as "unknowing" in their
misuse and misapplication of constitutional provisions. They should, at the very least,
know that the 1973 Constitution and its provisions have been superceded by the 1987
Constitution, and that they cannot assail — invoking the 1973 Constitution — the judicial
acts of members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution
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was in effect. Their misuse of the Constitution is made more reprehensible when the
overriding thrust of their criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973
provisions to falsely attribute malice and injustice to the Supreme Court and its
Members.
In our view, the complainants' errors do not belong to the genre of plain and
simple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain
disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute
serious misconduct that re ects on their tness for continued membership in the
Philippine Bar. At the very least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule 10.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment , or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved. (Emphasis provided.)

To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good faith, an
identical provision is found in Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Moreover,
lawyers are sworn to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. . ."
before they are even admitted to the Bar. All these the complainants appear to have
seriously violated.
In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano should be
heard, in relation with their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against retired
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez,
on why they should not be held accountable and accordingly penalized for violations of
their duties as members of the Bar and o cers of this Court, and of the ethics of the
legal profession.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, we DISMISS the criminal complaint
entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J for
utter lack of merit, and DECLARE as MOOT and ACADEMIC the question of
compliance with the subpoena duces tecum dated January 11, 2010 that the
Ombudsman issued against this Court. EcHTDI

We hereby ORDER the complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline
Lozano-Endriano to EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within a non-extendible
period of 15 days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be penalized as
members of the Bar and as o cers of this Court, for their open disregard of the plain
terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their misuse
and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions in their criminal complaint before
the O ce of the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et
al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J.
SO ORDERED .
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. The pertinent part of the Memorandum reads:
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Henceforth, on the basis of the foregoing, and in keeping with the spirit of the stated
doctrine, all criminal complaints against judged and other members of the Supreme
Court shall be immediately DISMISSED and REFERRED to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action. The dismissal shall not in any manner touch on the merits of the
complaint, and shall be made for the sole purpose of referring the same to the Supreme
Court. (emphasis found in the original.)
2. Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 reads:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The O ce of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Direct the o cer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations
as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating
to contracts or transactions entered into by his o ce involving the disbursement or use
of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section 13, Rule XI of the Constitution are similarly phrased:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following functions and duties:

xxx xxx xxx


(4) Direct the o cer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts
or transactions entered into by his o ce involving the disbursement or use of public
funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and information.
3. See: Sections 3 and 4, Rule 21, Rules of Court.
4. CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
5. 232 Phil. 353 (1987).
6. To quote the pertinent portions of Laureta, pp. 384-388:

As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court
hereby adopts in toto, "It is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the third
great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with nality all justiciable disputes public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" It is elementary that "(A)s
has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo v. Llorente (18 Phil. 257,
263[1911]) 'controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in
the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgment of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become nal at some de nite time xed by law
or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even
of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law,
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into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. . . ."
Respondents should have known that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code as to 'rendering knowingly unjust judgment' refer to an individual judge who does
so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who
would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper
appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either of the Court of Appeals and/or
the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no
application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its
Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a
member of the Supreme Court for o cial acts done by him in good faith and in regular
exercise of o cial duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine the very
independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. . . . .
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members acted
"with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high o ce to act upon their own independent consideration and
judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and
conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolution and to disregard utterly the
presumption of regular performance of o cial duty. To allow such collateral attack
would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.
Dissatis ed litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of
powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the nal
judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for
nal determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within judicial power to
determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
7. 311 Phil. 441, 509 (1995).
8. 21 Phil. 308, 326 (1912).

9. CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2.


10. CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5 (2).
11. Id., Section 5 (5).
12. Reyes v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009; Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
157851, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 83-84; Malison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
147776, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 109, 117; and Buenaventura v. Republic, G.R. No.
166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271, 282.
13. Part of the Criminal Complaint-A davit for Corrupt Practices, signed by Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano, received by the Ombudsman on
September 8, 2009, Ombudsman Records, pp. 1089-1189, 1090.
14. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public o cers . — In addition to acts or omissions of public
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officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx


(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted bene ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
o cial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to o cers and employees of
the o ces or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
15. Velasco v. Sandiganbayan, 492 Phil. 669, 677 (2005).
16. Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 721 (2003); and Mendoza-Arce v. O ce of the
Ombudsman, 430 Phil. 101, 115 (2002).
17. Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 722 (2003).

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