Borders, The Good Friday Agreement and Brexit

UNIVERSITATEA BABEŞ-BOLYAI CLUJ-NAPOCA
FACULTATEA DE STUDII EUROPENE
LUCRARE DE LICENŢĂ
2020
UNIVERSITATEA BABEŞ-BOLYAI CLUJ-NAPOCA
FACULTATEA DE STUDII EUROPENE
Secţia
Borders, The Good Friday Agreement

and Brexit
Coordonator ştiinţific:
ştiinţific: Absolvent:
Herta Laura-Maria Pristoleanu Stefan-Andrei
Pristoleanu
Cluj-Napoca
2020
Declaraţie
Prin prezenta declar că Lucrarea de licenţă cu titlul Borders, The Good Friday Agreement
and Brexit este scrisă de mine şi nu a mai fost prezentată niciodată la o altă facultate sau
instituţie de învăţământ superior din ţară sau străinătate. De asemenea, declar că toate sursele
utilizate, inclusive cele de pe Internet, sunt indicate în lucrare, cu respectarea regulilor de evitare
a plagiatului:
− toate fragmentele de text reproduse exact, chiar şi în traducere proprie din altă limbă, sunt scrise
între ghilimele şi deţin referinţa precisă a sursei;
− reformularea în cuvinte proprii a textelor scrise de către alţi autori deţine referinţa precisă;
− rezumarea ideilor altor autori deţine referinţa precisă la textul original.
Cluj-Napoca, 22.06.2020
Absolvent: Pristoleanu Stefan Andrei
_________________________
(semnătura olograf)
Table of Contents
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2
I. Borders. ............................................................................................................................ 5
1.1: Borders throughout history ...................................................................................... 6
1.2. Contemporary functions of borders.......................................................................... 8
1.2.1. The United States – Mexico Border Wall ............................................................. 9
1.2.2. The European Union ........................................................................................... 10
1.2.3. The Great Firewall of China................................................................................ 12
1.2.4. Middle East and the ISIS Caliphate .................................................................... 15
1.3. The socio-constructivist interpretation of borders. ................................................ 17
II. Case Study: Sectarian violence in Ireland .................................................................... 20
2.1. Historical Context of Ireland – England and Protestant – Catholic Tensions ........ 21
2.2. Home Rule, The IRA and Independence ............................................................... 26
2.3.1. The Troubles: Noteworthy events. ..................................................................... 34
III. The Future of Ireland post-Brexit................................................................................ 40
3.1. The Good Friday Agreement and its Legacy ........................................................ 40
3.2. Public Opinion on Brexit in Northern Ireland ........................................................ 42
3.3. Effects of Brexit on the future of Northern Ireland’s stability and sectarian divides.
................................................................................................................................................... 45
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 46
Table of Figures
Figure 1.1 Map of the Roman Empire in 125 AD ……………………………………..……7

Figure 1.2 Map Showing Tribal Territories and Post-Westphalia Borders………..……8
Figure 1.3. Migrants scaling the Melilla border apprehended by the Spanish Guardia
Civil……………………………………………………………………………………….…...11
Figure 1.4. Islamic State territory and territory loss since 2015………………….….16
Figure 2.1 Ruined parts of Dublin in the aftermath of the Easter Rising…………….....29
Figure 2.2 Fires and destruction engulfed the Bogside………………………….…….…..35
Figure 2.3 The “Peace Wall” in northern Belfast……………………………………….…36
Introduction
This work is aims to explore our current understanding of borders – what they are, how they
impact communities and what they represent. Borders and border policies are for some an
element of national identity, a manifestation of foreign policy and ultimately a representation of
a state’s perceived role in the world. Therefore, decisions regarding a state’s border policies will
elicit reactions from the population at the local level and states on an international level.
Due to the political, social and economic effects of borders they ought to be approached
from a holistic perspective for a proper understanding of the underlying consequences.
Serving as the main motivation for approaching this topic is the fact that borders have
resurged as a hot-button political talking point, be it as a result of the 2015 refugee crisis which
started to strain the European Union’s insufficient immigration policy and played an important
role in the resurgence of populism, Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and subsequent
presidency where “building the wall” remains a personal goal of his and Brexit, where the Irish
border has been a topic of contention in the negotiation talks since the very beginning.
Borders have been around since the beginning of organized society, one way or another, and
will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. That alone makes them worth studying, but
borders mean so much more then that. For some, they are simply a geographic line, a formality
and it doesn’t impact their lives in any noticeable way. For others, it’s the opposite, with droves
of refugees stacked up against barbed wire fences and armed guards.
Due to the niche approach of this topic and the fact that Brexit is a recent and still
ongoing event, documentation on the subject is somewhat sparse for this specific theme. Taking
that into account, I considered it important to find literature for conceptual purposes and for
factual, historical data; adding to those various news articles and official publications from the
European Union, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom.
Works such as Robert C. Cottrell’s Northern Ireland and England – The Troubles (2005),
Peter Rose’s How The Troubles Came to Northern Ireland (2001), Wendy Laverick’s Racial and
Religious Hate Crime: The UK from 1945 to Brexit(2019) provide specific information with
regards to the chosen case study.
Others such as Alexander C. Diener’s Borders: A Very Short Introduction (2012); Teresa
Hayter’s Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls (2004), Mary Gilmartin’s
Borders, Mobility and Belonging in the Era of Brexit and Trump (2018) provide much-needed
theoretical groundwork for the subject at hand.
Besides these works and a handful of others I have also consulted a swathe of articles on
tackling the theme of borders, security and current events. Reports and articles published by
reputable news outlets have been utilized in various stages of analysis.
Due to the immense variety in themes that can be tackled when discussing borders, I decided
to relate most of the theoretical research to the case study of Ireland-Northern Ireland. Therefore,
these are the questions I thought valuable to pursue:
• Do borders around the world represent the same thing and serve the same functions?
• What caused the sectarian tensions that divide Catholics and Protestants which ultimately led to
“The Troubles?”
• What does the Irish border represent for sectarian violence?
• What would be the socio-economic impact of an Irish border post-Brexit?
• Is the Good Friday Peace in danger as a result of Brexit?
In the research process I have made use of the case study research method (pertaining to
the case of Ireland-Northern Ireland); secondary analysis (of the specific literature) and discourse
analysis of various statements and articles in establishing the narrative around Brexit.
As far as the structure of paper is concerned, it is laid out as follows:
Chapter I is centered around the concept of borders and the discourse that is built around
them; concluding with a socio-constructivist interpretation of borders. It describes the
differences and distinctions in the perception of borders throughout history and seeks to discover
the current understanding of borders today.
Chapter II focuses on the history of sectarian divide violence in Ireland; and seeks to
explore the many causes of sectarianism amongst the Irish. Then, by looking at the “The
Troubles” we observe a repeating cycle of sectarian conflict that carries on even today. The case
of Ireland serves as example for the impact arbitrary borders have to the identity of those they
separate.
Chapter III sets to look onwards towards the future, at the current state of the Ireland –
Northern Ireland border post-Brexit and the challenges a hard border could pose, as well as
tackling the vital Good Friday Agreement and whether or not it is in danger of breaking down as
result of the change in the state of affairs post-Brexit.
The conclusion seeks to reiterate the multi-faceted nature of borders and provide valid
takeaways about the role they play today. In closing, I will provide my personal opinion on the
matter.
I. Borders.
It’s impossible to escape the various forms of borders we encounter in our day to day
lives – an abundance of labels and delimitations. Borders, be they cultural, economic or political
are mainstays of mainstream media and a major point of contention in international conflicts;
due to their securitization and significant importance for controlling migration and trade policy.
Throughout the course of this chapter I will be arguing for the application of the socio-
constructivist interpretation of the notion of borders, as it allows us to reconcile both historical
and current idiosyncrasies which pertain to the function of borders. Presenting borders as
socially constructed allows us to discuss our interactions with them and the fact that they can be
altered or dismantled.
In order to provide a more accurate explanation a delimitation of what „borders” are is

necessary. To that end, the definition used throughout this work defines the primary function of
borders as „borders separate the social, political, economic, or cultural meanings of one
geographic space from another.”, further, „the institutional phenomenon of borders is most
commonly associated with the idea of territory” and territory being „a geographic area intended
to regulate the movement of people and engender certain norms of behavior.”1
A short overview of a few historical examples is required to provide a starting point for
the socio-constructivist interpretation which does not prescribe a rigid set of attributes to borders,
instead acknowledging the various factors that make up the relation between societeies and
borders.
1
Alexander C. Diener, Joshua Hagen, Borders A Very Short Introduction, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012, p.4
5
1.1: Borders throughout history
It is safe to assume that conventional borders have not existed as long as humans have –
in that sense, the earliest forms of societal organization, hunter-gatherers, built a sense of
community around the area they were situated in and territoriality manifested itself in different
ways. “Rather than wandering aimlessly, hunter-gatherer groups likely operated within relatively
stable local or regional foraging ranges”2.
The Veddah peoples of Sri Lanka marked and viciously protected specific territories – each
group of hunters was expected to be self-sufficient in the confines of its own hunting zone, with
trespassing being prohibited under most circumstances.
The !Kung bands of southern Africa had fairly vague borders delimitating their foraging
areas, often decided by natural landmarks and did not bother much with denying access to
strangers. For them, resources were not thought of as owned until the point of them being
gathered, and good were shared between members once acquired. Other bands could access
resources in neighboring areas, particularly in the case of bands with kinship ties. As such, visits
were common and often welcome, as long as the visiting group asked for permission and made
sure to share some of the harvested resources with the host band. Many Aboriginal groups in
Australia also exhibited similar systems of fluid borders and interaction.3
These systems of interaction manifested themselves simultaneously across the world –

resulting in a vast deal of factors and characteristics that varied from area to area. It would be
wrong to assume that hunter-gatherer groups were non-territorial due to the lack of what we
nowadays call borders, but these groups paid attention to notions of territory, membership, and
resources.
As agriculture developed, communities started to attach value to the land they were
cultivating, developing a sense of property and an attachment to the inhabited territory. The
transition from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle to a more farming-focused laid the grounds for
multiple innovations such as irrigation, writing, architecture and basic forms of government and
societal organization.
2
Alexander C. Diener, Joshua Hagen; Op. cit., p.19
3
Ibidem, p. 20
6
Taking a look at the map of the world during the time of the Roman Empire, it is
observable that the in the confines of the empire, regions were identified with some degree of
accuracy, named after the population that inhabited the regions before their conquest (Hispania,
Gallia, Dacia etc.).
Fig. 1.1 Map of the Roman Empire in 125 AD.
https://www.ancient.eu/image/269/map-of-the-roman-empire-in-125-ce/
Outside of the empire, most areas were only loosely defined, and city-states were the
only political units recognized with some accuracy; and making no mentions of the nomads.
This brings a worthwhile point to light: Applying our contemporary thinking about the
Roman Empire’s borders and compartmentalization results in an erroneous account of history is
erroneous because the Roman Empire, for instance, did not operate under the same framework of
knowledge of borders and did not employ the same understanding of territoriality as we do
nowadays. The map marks the conquered territory, yet that territory wasn’t enforced the same
way as it would be now; instead, garrisons of troops were stationed at the extremities of the
empire, where they encountered opposition.
7
1.2. Contemporary functions of borders
As illustrated by the previous subchapter, borders manifested themselves in different

forms whilst achieving the same goal. Even though there were outliers such as the case of
uninhabited(unclaimed) land in Africa, or the curious case of nomadic tribes which for the most
part circumvented the issue of borders. The Peace of Westphalia however, marked a change in
thinking about borders. The concept of sovereignty of European nation-states with well-defined
and enforced borders led to the standardization of the notion of borders through the upholding of
their form and function by the major European powers which at the time were at the forefront of
international relations.
Fig. 1.2 Map Showing Tribal Territories and Post-Westphalia Borders
https://voxeu.org/article/long-run-effects-scramble-africa
The conquest and colonization of Africa marked a bitter twist in the use of borders. The
same European powers which drafted for themselves the provisions of sovereignty and statehood
were the same ones which carved Africa up and subjugated entire populations with no regard for
their sovereignty or previously undefined borders. As a necessary step in colonization, borders
were drawn up for the many tribes and communities and states were artificially drawn up.
Communities were separated, incompatible tribes were confined within the same borders and
previously unoccupied land now belonged to the colonial owners.
8
1.2.1. The United States – Mexico Border Wall
The U.S – Mexico border wall flared up as a hot-button issue ever since Donald Trump’s
presidential campaign for the 2016 election and his subsequent presidency. The border wall is
supposed to keep out “some of the roughest people you’ve ever seen”4 – and have Mexico pay
for it. Whilst on the surface it appears to be a juvenile-but-populist ambition which undoubtedly
helped gather conservative voter support for Trump5, it does offer insight into a perceived sense
of security the said border wall is supposed to offer. Thus, one of the current functions and
features of borders is to serve as political leverage as part of the populist narrative, when they are
meant to separate the “good” and the “bad”.6 Furthermore, once a border – or a need for one –
has been announced, it serves to arbitrarily reinforces a divide between the U.S and Mexico,
worsening both public opinion and chances for cooperation.
“Americans' views of U.S. relations with Mexico are at new lows with 72% of Americans
saying Mexico is an ally (27%) or a friend (45%) of the U.S., the lowest point in Gallup's nearly
20-year trend. Twenty-six percent say the country is an enemy (20%) or unfriendly (6%) toward
the U.S., the highest percentage historically.”
However, the wall has proved to be a bogus endeavor as only “93 miles had been built so far
during the Trump administration. At least 90 miles of that replaced existing structures” 7. Public
support for the wall has floundered too, a June 2019 Gallup poll showing that “sixty percent of
Americans oppose major new construction of walls along the U.S.-Mexico border”8, considering
its lack of progress and many political challenges that stood in the way of funding9.
4
Calvin Woodward, AP fact check: Trump’s bad-guy talk belies migrants’ reality, in “PBS News Hour
Weekend”, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-fact-check-trumps-bad-guy-talk-belies-migrants-reality ,
accesat 11 Iunie 2020
5
Pew Research Centre; An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on validated voters
https://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters/ ;
6
Donald J. Trump, Twitter, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1129336982319050752,
17.05.2019
7
Ted Hesson, Trump administration may not hit 2020 border wall goal, official says, in “Reuters”,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-border-idUSKBN1YL2FB, accesat 12 Iunie 2020
8
Gallup Polling, Solid Majority Still Opposes New Construction on Border
wall,https://news.gallup.com/poll/246455/solid-majority-opposes-new-construction-border-wall.aspx, accesat 12
Iunie 2020
9
Christina Alvarez,Federal judge blocks use of billions of dollars in Pentagon funds to build border wall,
CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/10/politics/federal-judge-military-construction-border/index.html, accesat 12
Iunie 2020
9
The case of the U.S – Mexico border wall serves to illustrate how propelling the issue of
borders into public discourse whilst playing into a populist narrative can have negative and long-
lasting knock-on effects
1.2.2. The European Union
The European Union and the project of unification under it has created a space with a unique
internal arrangement under which most conventional borders have been abolished for the sake of
personal freedom and a single, unified market.
As laid out in the preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); the Union is meant to
“to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their
peoples, by establishing an area of freedom, security and justice”10Furthermore, as defined in
Article 3.3 of the TEU, the Union “shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and
solidarity among Member States.”11
To achieve said goals, Titles II and III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union detail the framework for the free movement of goods, persons, capital, and services.12
Despite many bitter internal rows that have strained some Member States’ relationships at
the political level, the general population maintains a positive outlook on the state of the
European Union, with the 58% of the EU population being optimistic about the future of the
European Union.13
However, when observing the role and functions of the external border of the Union, the
external border is nothing else but conventional, with the tragic realities of thousands of migrants
being far-removed from the EU decision-making organisms over in Belgium or France.
10
Treaty on European Union; European Comission
11
Ibidem
12
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; European Comission
13
Standard Eurobarometer 89 Spring 2018 Report “Public opinion in the European Union”, pp. 175,
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/83546, accesat
10 Iunie 2020.
10
Every few months reports of several hundreds of migrants storming the Spain – Morocco
border in Melilla make the news,14 with injuries and deportations being a commonplace
occurrence. For migrants in Morocco looking towards the European Union as their destination,
they met by 5 layers of fences and barbed wire, border patrols, security cameras and ditches; in
stark contrast to the open nature of the internal European Union.
Fig. 1.3. Migrants scaling the Melilla border apprehended by the Spanish Guardia Civil
Sonya Dowsett, Spanish enclave offers glimpse of fortress Europe, Reuters,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-migrants-melilla/spanish-enclave-offers-glimpse-of-fortress-europe-
idUSKCN0RH1QO20150917
The refugee crisis of 2015 served as another reminder of the conventional, “hard” nature of
Europe’s external borders. According to data by the International Organization of Migration,
between January 2014 and October 2019, about 18,500 migrants wound up dead or missing in
Europe and the Mediterranean.15 Most data on migrant border deaths is not entirely reliable, as
more often than not state institutions do not release data on migrant border deaths. However, the
fact of the matter is unavoidable: Europe’s external borders are as conventional as any other hard
border.
14
Reuters, More than 100 migrants storm border of North African Spanish enclave,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-spain/more-than-100-migrants-storm-border-of-north-african-
spanish-enclave-idUSKCN1L71BP, accesat 14 Iunie 2020
15
Migration Data Portal, Migrants Deaths and Disappareances,
https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/migrant-deaths-and-disappearances, accesat 11 Iunie 2020
11
Although the European Union in its integration can be considered borderless, as far as
internal borders and the freedoms of movement are concerned, there exists an internal divide
between the Schengen Agreement countries and the non-Schengen ones. The Schengen Area is a
further evolution of the single market and its goals – represented chiefly by “the abolition of
16
internal border controls for all persons” and increased cooperation on police and judicial
matters, external border control harmonization and other administrative measures. Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Romania and Croatia are not part of the Schengen Area yet but are “due to join”.17
Joining the Schengen Area is conditioned on the integration of a Schengen “acquis” – a set
of values and legal framework requirements18 which arbitrarily divides the Schengen members
from the rest of EU Member States.
The European Union and its vast domains of political and economic interconnectivity serve
up many dichotomies between openness and hermeticism – from the goal of creating a “space of
freedom” to the many layers of fence and barbed wire protecting “fortress Europe” at the
outskirts of Melilla and the internal divide between Schengen and non-Schengen states; the
process of creating an open society is often flawed and imperfect but as far as the population of
the EU Member States is concerned, the views towards the freedom of movement are favorable.
According to an overview of Eurobarometer survey data between 2015 and 2017; “82.4 per cent
of respondents support and 13.1 per cent oppose free movement of citizens” 19Despite the many
flaws of European integration, the end-effect on the population is nonetheless a positive one.
1.2.3. The Great Firewall of China
Implemented in 2008, The “Golden Shield Project” or “The Great Firewall” is one of the
most prominent and aggressive internet censorship and security projects in active use. The
“Firewall” prevents Internet users in China from accessing a staggering number of foreign
16
Parlementul European, Free movement of persons
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/147/free-movement-of-persons, accesat 11 Iunie 2020
17
Ibidem
18
Comisia Europeana, Schengen Area, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen_en; accesat 12 Iunie 2020
19
Sofia Vasilopoulou, Liisa Talving, Opportunity or threat? How Europeans view freedom of movement,
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/11/16/opportunity-or-threat-how-europeans-view-freedom-of-movement/,
accesat pe 13 Iunie 2020
12
webpages for several reasons by blocking them completely.20The most popular examples of
blocked websites include social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube but also Wikipedia
or even the Google search engine itself. 21
However, in recent years, the censorship measures have intensified significantly, with
measures such as the blocking of “23 per cent of 215 accredited foreign news sites”22 as reported
by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, targeting the freedom of press.
Perhaps even more worryingly for internet freedom and anonymity in China, regulations
have been implemented that force companies to demand “users to register accounts after passing
real identity information authentication, and strictly implement real identity information filing
and periodic verification”23meaning that even with a pseudonym, social media posts can be
traced back to account owner’s real identity.
Adding to that, what content is not outright blocked is being intensely policed and censored.
The government-affiliated China Netcasting Services Association, which represents more than
600 members deemed topics such as drug addiction and homosexuality as not adhering to “core
socialist values”, requiring at least two auditors per online platform (website) to check all content
posted.24
The extent of the distortion of online content and censorship is immeasurable, but ever-
increasing. “The Great Firewall”, coupled with other state control and censorship measures,
effectively creates two simultaneous Internets – and two separate accounts of reality. Generally,
this has produced two categories of Internet users and citizens: On the one hand there are those
who know of sites like Google, Facebook, Wikipedia and such and lament the censorship and
lack of access to those webpages and decry the “lack of Internet freedom” but on the other hand
we have those that are ubiquitous to the existence of said sites and for whom the problem is non-
existent. “The reality is that both sides are deepening or expanding in their respective
directions.”25
20
Sonali Chandel, et. al., The Golden Shield Project of China: A Decade Later—An in-Depth Study of the
Great Firewall, CyberC; 2019, pp. 111;
21
Op. cit. pp. 112
22
Ibidem
23
Office of Central Cyberspace Affairs of China, http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-08/25/c_1121541536.htm,
24
Pei Li, Adam Jourdan, China's bloggers, filmmakers feel chill of internet crackdown, in “Reuters”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet-content-idUSKBN19O21X , accesat 14 Iunie 2020
25
Chandel, Sonali et al, Op. cit, pp. 114
13
A worrying effect of the degree of control is the fact that citizens are “blowing the whistle
on one another for uploading ‘harmful’ content” which has become a crucial part of the
country’s online governance, according to the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC).26
In 2018, as reported by CAC, more than 165 million reports of “harmful” content were filed
across China.
“The CAC even provides a list of subjects that the volunteer censors should look out for and
report. It includes: information that undermines national security or interests; incites the
subversion of state power, the socialist system or succession; promotes terrorism, extremism or
ethnic hatred; spreads violence, obscenity or pornography; disturbs economic or social orders;
violates other people’s reputation or privacy; or breaks the law or regulations in any other
way.”27
Concerning the Xinjiang region of China where reportedly more than 1 million Uighur
Muslims are being detained in “re-education” camps and being labeled “enemies of the state”28;
the CAC “harnessed the power of internet users ‘to discover and handle violent, terrorist and
extremist information’, and which in turn had made an ‘important contribution to maintaining
social stability’ “29In other words, regular citizens turned whistleblowers are actively aiding a
government crackdown on the Uighur Muslim minority whilst being paid for it.
The “Great Firewall of China” plays an active role in isolating the Chinese populace from
the rest of the world as far as free access to information is concerned, effectively creating a
separate official account of reality that facilitates obedience, not dissidence. China is not the only
country with limited or lack of outside access to the Internet; Iran running a sealed Intranet - a
network confined to the confines of Iran’s territory; or North Korea which operates on a closed
Local Area Network for its institutions30 but what differentiates China is the massive scale of
government involvement in censorship and control, and the active role Chinese citizens play in
policing the internet through whistleblowing.
26
Nectar Gan, China’s internet regulator praises whistle-blowers for keeping cyberspace free of ‘harmful’
content, in “South China Morning Post”, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3032647/chinas-
internet-regulator-praises-whistle-blowers-keeping; accesat 14 Iunie 2020
27
Ibidem
28
Redactia Deutsche Welle, 1 million Uighurs in Chinese 'internment camps,' UN hears
https://www.dw.com/en/1-million-uighurs-in-chinese-internment-camps-un-hears/a-45042596; accesat 14 Iunie
2020
29
Nectar Gan, Op. Cit.
30
Chandel, Sonali et al, Op. cit, pp.113
14
1.2.4. Middle East and the ISIS Caliphate
The tragic events of September 11th, 2001, kickstarted the “war on terror”, as coined by
George W. Bush; which would become an international military campaign centered on fighting
against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other extremist organizations. The “war on terror”
however, was to prove itself inefficient, financially expensive and with hefty human casualties.
“Since late 2001, the United States has appropriated and is obligated to spend an estimated
$6.4 Trillion through Fiscal Year 2020 in budgetary costs related to and caused by the post-9/11
wars—an estimated $5.4 Trillion in appropriations in current dollars and an additional minimum
of $1 Trillion for US obligations to care for the veterans of these wars through the next several
decades”31
Twelve years later, then United States President Barack Obama announced the end of the
“boundless ‘Global War on Terror’ ”32 yet al-Qaeda and the likes hadn’t been fully defeated,
instead redirecting attention to “a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific
networks of violent extremists that threaten America”33 . As that announcement came, however,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was consolidating a splinter cell of al-Qaeda which soon became the
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).
“In July 2014 he launched a lightning military campaign, seizing Iraq’s second largest city
Mosul and threatening Baghdad. Soon thereafter, he declared the territory under his control,
which stretched from Raqqa in north central Syria to the outskirts of Baghdad, a caliphate with
himself as caliph. In other words, he declared himself the head of the global Islamic community
and demanded fealty from it.”34Exploiting the state of disarray Syria was in at the time, Al-
Baghdadi managed to expand the self-proclaimed ISIL caliphate to include a sizeable chunk of
territory from both Iraq and Syria; with the peak of expansion happening in 2015.
31
Neta C. Crawford, United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars
Through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion, Brown University,
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/US%20Budgetary%20Costs%20of%20Wars%20
November%202019.pdf; accesat 15 Iunie 2020
32
Paul Shrinkman; Obama: “Global War on Terror´is over, U.S News; 23.05.2013;
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/23/obama-global-war-on-terror-is-over
33
Ibidem
34
James Gevlin, The Arab Uprising: What Everyone needs to Know, editia a II-a; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015, p. 138
15
Fig. 1.4. Islamic State territory and territory loss since 2015
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034
The ISIL caliphate followed a fundamentalist, Salafi jihadist doctrine of Sunni Islam. As
such, it “opposes the state system imposed by the Crusader-Zionist conspiracy on the Islamic
world. State boundaries are to be ignored, if not eliminated.”35 and as a caliphate, it claimed
religious, political, and military authority over all Muslims worldwide.36
The caliphate is a fascinating look into the dismantling of conventional borders through, in
this specific case, religious rule. Even though the Islamic State was ultimately defeated, for a few
years, mere thousands of troops were able to defy the borders drawn by the Sykes-Picot
agreement. In fulfilling its purpose, the Islamic State could exist anywhere de facto, as long as it
was waging jihad, its existence being derived from the fight against the oppressors of the Islamic
world. It managed to span across multiple states’ territories at its peak existing simultaneously
with the states it conquered the territories of. After its official “defeat”, small IS terror cells still
survive throughout the world, representing the impracticality of waging conventional war against
what could only be called a “holy war”.
35
Ibidem
36
Bill Roggio, ISIS announces formation of Caliphate, rebrands as ‘Islamic State’, in “Long War
Journal”, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/isis_announces_formation_of_ca.php, accesat 16 Iunie
2020
16
1.3. The socio-constructivist interpretation of borders.
The previously presented examples of borders show that borders serve different functions
throughout the world and their form and function can be altered by human behavior and political
willpower. These disparities of role and functions can be explained by applying the socio-
constructivist line of thinking.
According to constructivist thinking “territoriality results from historical contexts, practical

needs, and geopolitical contingencies[…] determinations of “us” and “them,” “insiders” and
“outsiders,” […] are not related to what we commonly identify as innate categories such as race
and ethnicity[…] but are formed through unequal power relations within and between social
systems. Territoriality thereby serves as a social mechanism for this control[...] in an effort to
regulate extraterritorial practices, such as entry and exit, and intraterritorial practices, such as
social hierarchies and governance.”37
It follows then, that borders are “manifestations of territoriality” and “provide a means to
assign things to particular spaces and regulate access into and/or out of specific areas.”38 Borders
are constructed by someone, for someone and tend to serve a specific purpose in altering the
relation with the target group; and they can be desirable or undesirable depending on the domain
they impact.
In the case of the U.S – Mexico border, it is used as a political wedge issue to split both
voters and the two parties in the legislative bodies, with the simple declaration of a need for a
border having knock-on effects on the population through the securitization of the issue of
borders. The side that pushes for the strengthening of the border wall sees it as “good”, because
it is supposed to combat drug cartels and illegal immigration. For prospective migrants on the
other hand, the increased militarization and tension at the border makes attempting to cross the
border into the U.S and away from the poor socio-economic conditions of their homelands ever-
more dangerous.
The European Union’s dismantling of most internal borders has led to prosperity and a
generally positive attitude towards both the Union itself and free movement, although both
internal divides such as those between Schengen and non-Schengen states still exist and
37
Alexander C. Diener, Joshua Hagen, Borders A Very Short Introduction, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012, p.6
38
Ibidem
17
externally, the EU’s border is as real of a border as any other. For the EU, barriers to trade and
free movement are considered undesirable, as they impede economic growth. In that sense, those
borders are being chipped away at year by year through integration. External borders, however,
are still considered very necessary, both in the physical realm and the economic realm. The hard
external border protects against the overburdening of the welfare systems in states receptive to
large amounts of migrants; whilst economically the common VAT applied when goods enter the
EU earns tax income for the Union.
The effectiveness of the informational barrier created by “The Great Firewall of China” has
increased the Chinese government’s control of society through censorship and informational
distortion to such degrees that there is now a divide between two narratives about China. Censors
are actively scrubbing away content “harmful” content whilst legislation creates monopolies for
Chinese replacements for popular websites such as Weibo or WeChat. On the one hand, those
impacted by repression and censorship decry the downfall of the freedom of expression, whilst
others work with the state apparatus in order to “blow the whistle” on the activities of repressed
minorities such as the Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang region.
The short-lived ISIL “worldwide caliphate” served as an attempt to unify the Muslim world
under a borderless yet certainly distinct state which even after its demise still maintains remnants
across the world. This kind of religious fundamentalist terrorist campaign wages a fight against
enemies of the faith worldwide, completely bypassing the notion of statehood. In a sense, ISIL
served as an “anti-state” – an idiosyncrasy among the rest of the states.
Borrowing from Alexander Wendt, the social-constructivist lens of analysis tells us that
borders are what states make of them;39 being the result of a long and continuous process of
human interaction and mutual learning, adaptable and adjustable according to requirements and
whilst in some cases they may represent a formality or a line on the map , each border comes
with a long history of differences and interaction.
One question is unanswered, however. What is the future of borders? Will they disappear
through peace and integration or will they remain as imposing and cherished as they are now?
39
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
International Organization 46, nr. 2, 1992, passim. Accesat 12 Iunie 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/2706858.
18
Throughout the course of the chapter we have already looked at a myriad of forms and
functions of borders – a dichotomy between “security” and “opportunity”. Across the world
countries and communities maintain different relations to and understandings of borders.
From an almost vacuum-tight North Korea to the economic openness but cultural hermeticism
of China or the interconnected and an ever-integrating European Union which abolished
conventional interstate barriers the only certain fact is the following:
Just as Donald Trump tweets repeatedly calling to build the wall on the U.S – Mexico
border,40 other leaders such as Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer sought the peaceful
reconciliation of France and Germany, and by signing the ECSC into effect kickstarted the
process of European integration that brought with it, in time, the creation of the European Union,
the dismantling of conventional borders and prosperity with the Member States. It is ultimately
merely a question of political willpower and deciding to create (or do away with) borders. Thus,
I can reasonably conclude this chapter by stating that borders will not completely disappear nor
will hard borders build a world of fortress-states; and even if conventional borders are done away
with, the effect of other divides will make itself felt.
40
Donald J. Trump, Twitter, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1088058726794387456,
23.01.2019
19
II. Case Study: Sectarian violence in Ireland
On the 12th of October, 1984, a bomb went off in the Brighton Grand Hotel, killing five
people and injuring 31. Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) member Patrick Magee planted
the bomb41, with the express intent of killing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet
members, which were all staying at the same hotel.
The IRA claimed responsibility and issued the following statement: ''Today we were
unlucky, remember we only have to be lucky once.”. 42 This event marked the first assassination
attempt on a Prime Minister since the end of the world wars.
That was just one notable event from the period in known as “The Troubles”, the three-
decade long conflict between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland. Nationalists were
comprised mostly of Catholics, fighting for a united Ireland; whilst the unionists were mainly
Protestant who identified as British and were loyal to the United Kingdom (hence also being
known as loyalists).
This case study seeks to highlight the underlying causes of the catholic-protestant;
nationalist-unionist divides that plague Northern Ireland and the relations between the Republic
of Ireland and The United Kingdom; in order to understand the significance of the Great Friday
Agreement and the role it plays in determining the future of both Irelands.
The “Troubles” is a conflict deeply rooted in the Irish people’s history of discrimination at
the hand of the English and their struggle for statehood. As such, before analyzing the conflict
itself, the historical context of Ireland’s divides must be explored.
41
Gareth Parry, Patrick Magee convicted of IRA terrorist attack, aparut in “The Guardian”, 10.06.1986,
https://www.theguardian.com/fromthearchive/story/0,,1235581,00.html , accesat 10 Iunie 2020
42
R. W. Apple Jr.; I.R.A. SAYS IT SET BOMB THAT RIPPED THATCHER'S HOTEL, aparut in “New
York Times”, 13.10.198;https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/13/world/ira-says-it-set-bomb-that-ripped-thatcher-s-
hotel.html , accesat 11 Iunie 2020
20
2.1. Historical Context of Ireland – England and Protestant – Catholic Tensions
This subchapter seeks to provide an adequate overview of the most important historical
moments that planted the deep roots of sectarian violence in Ireland and ultimately led to “The
Troubles”. In attempting to do so, Robert C. Cottrell’s Northern Ireland and England – The
Troubles compiles a chronological recounting of the many noteworthy events throughout the
history of Ireland; from which I have selected the most pertinent ones needed to provide the
sufficient context required for understanding the vast sources of Irish sectarianism. As the
majority of this subchapter relays historical events laid out as common knowledge, Robert C.
Cottrell’s book has been cited whenever it served as an inspiration for the commentary of these
events. Otherwise, I have attempted to provide other sources and citations for more specific
aspects of this subchapter.
The foundation of the English-Irish; catholic-protestant divide can be arguably traced as far
back as the fifth century C.E. (Common Era); when with the help of Saint Patrick the Irish begun
to convert to Christianity; introducing the Roman alphabet and Latin Scholarship. In time, as
Irish monasteries flourished, missionaries sought to spread the word of God throughout
Europe.43
In the 12th century, a conflict between Turlough O’Connor and the king of Leinster,
Diarmuid MacMurrough, ended with the outing of MacMurrough. However, MacMurrough
sought help from the Normans in order to recapture his throne; which succeeded. With the help
of Normans, MacMurrough reclaimed his kingdom in 1170 but subsequently died the next year,
being replaced by a Norman ruler, Richard Fitzgerald de Clare, known as “Strongbow”.
Feudalism was instituted in in Ireland by the new Norman lords – by the time of the 13th century
most of Ireland was under Norman control.
Concerned by the Normans adapting to the Irish ways of life and assimilating with the Irish
population, the English created the Statutes of Kilkenny – the first outright case of discrimination
against the Irish. It declared “that no alliance by marriage, gossipred, fostering of children,
concubinage or by amour, nor in any other manner, be hencefoth made betweeen the English and
Irish of one part, or of the other part; and that no Englishman, nor other person, being at peace,
43
Robert C. Cottrell, Op. Cit, p. 15
21
do give” .44 It also effectively barred admittance to English churches for any Irishmen. Few
ended up adhering to these Statutes, which were a crude attempt at sowing ethnic divides
amongst the Irish.
Another substantial attempt at control and interference in Irish affairs was the passing of
Poynings’ Law in 1494; giving all acts passed by England the full force of the law in Ireland and
also instituting the requirement of approval by the English of all legislature passed by the Irish
Parliament.
The defeat of an uprising led by the influential Fitzgerald clan by the English allowed King
Henry VIII (reign 1509-1547), who seceded from the Roman Catholic Church to gain command
of the Irish Church and proclaim himself King of Ireland, furthering English control of the Irish.
Henry VIII’s daughter, Elizabeth I consolidated English control of Ireland. She banned
Roman Catholics from holding religious service and executed several bishops and priests. The
resistance that followed lead to “mass bloodletting and famine.”45
The final uprising during Elizabeth’s rule took place in Ulster in 1595 and was orchestrated
by Hugh O’Neill of Tyrone; it ended in defeat at Kinsale in 1603 and thus marking the end of
Gaelic Ireland. O’Neill’s defeat enabled England to have a tight grip on Ireland.
With a free reign to exercise their full authority, the English undertook a concerted effort
during the seventeenth century “to transform the ethnic and religious makeup of the Northern
Counties” by bringing in “new settlers, many of them Scottish Presbyterians, into Londonderry,
where they confiscated the best land. These Protestant settlements were called plantations. Irish
Catholics, along with most Protestant residents, referred to the developing community as Derry,
which soon was ringed with great walls, constructed by English planters. […] helped to stave off
an assault by King James II of England, who was battling to regain his crown from a Dutch
challenger, William of Orange.”46
Charles I (1625-1649) further encroached on the rights of Catholic landowners who were
initially allowed to keep their properties as long as they paid their tax obligations; but he
eventually broke this arrangement when the threat of a Spanish incursion loomed. An Irish
44
Parlamentul Irlandei, Statutes of Kilkenny, articolul 2, p. 9; https://celt.ucc.ie//published/T300001-001/,
accesat pe 10 Iunie 2020
45
Robert C. Cottrell, Op. cit., p. 17
46
Ibidem, p. 21
22
rebellion against Charles I took place in 1641; the Irish fearing for Catholicism’s existence under
English rule. These events dramatically exacerbated the religious divide in Ireland, laying the
foundation for a “new Irish nationalism” through “common allegiance to Catholicism”47 The
rebellion resulted in sectarian killings and the destruction of churches with the Catholics enacting
vengeance on the Protestants.
Oliver Cromwell, organizer of a revolt that resulted in Charles’ death; decided in 1649 to
take a drastic approach in addressing the issue of the Irish which resulted in dire consequences.
He demanded that all property-owning Catholics be relocated to the barren region of Connacht.
This led to the starvation of thousands of Irishmen and as a result of the relocation about 70% of
Irelands best land wound up in the hands of Protestants, who kept control of it for another 300
years. This brutal decision resulted in the population of Ireland being afflicted by death, famine,
and plague.
With the Catholic rebellions being put down, the Protestant ruling class in England devised a
set of laws called the Penal Laws which were introduced in 1691 – creating the Protestant
Ascendancy – severely restricting the rights of Catholics yet again and was meant to solidify
Protestant rule over England and Ireland. Amongst the provisions of the Penal Laws48; it barred
foreign Catholic education, shunned Catholic religious beliefs, prevented Catholics from bearing
arms and owning horses valued at more than five pounds; deporting all Catholic clergy from
Ireland; and severely stifled their ability to rent, purchase or inherit land. As a result, by the turn
of the 18th century, Catholics had control of only 14% of the land in Ireland; and in Ulster
specifically, that amount was a measly 5%.
Sectarianism continued to beset Ireland throughout the 18th century – turning into a sort of
gang warfare. By the end of the 18th century, sectarian groups such as the Peep o’Day Boys or
the Defenders were organized; with the former being Protestant and the latter being Catholic.
Sectarian violence was commonplace, with the torching of a Catholic Church in Portadown by
the Peep o’Day Boys or the torture of the family of a Protestant teacher in Forkhill being just few
of the many that occurred. Tensions culminated with the Battle of the Diamond on the 12 th of
June 1795; which continued for several months culminating with an ambush on the 21st of
September when the Peep o’Days killed at least 30 members of the Defenders. This conflict gave
birth to a more radical anti-Catholic group called The Orange Order. In the fall of that same year,
47
Marcus Tanner, Ireland’s Holy Wars: The Struggle for a Nation’s Soul 1500–2000, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001, p. 40.
48
The Penal Laws
23
the Order displaced thousands of Catholic families out of Armagh County, causing many
disgruntled Catholics to join the revolutionary and republican Society of United Irishmen.
The year 1782 marked an important year for Catholic rights, with the Irish parliament
gaining virtual independence and Ireland being regarded as a kingdom apart from England; with
which it continued to share a monarch. At the same time, the Irish politician and lawyer Henry
Grattan succeeded in achieving the repeal of most of the Penal Laws which had oppressed
Catholics for almost an entire century.
The French Revolution inspired the Irishmen as well, leading to the formation of the United
Irishmen in 1791, led by Theobald Wolfe Tone, a Protestant attorney from Dublin. This new
organization was particularly appealing to the Scottish Presbyterians in Ulster. Tone produced a
striking pamphlet called “An Argument on behalf of the Catholics of Ireland”, which proclaimed
that liberty would not exist in Ireland until “Irish of all denominations” 49
joined together to
oppose imperial rule. He called for the separation from England and the end of sectarian
animosity, uniting the “Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter” under the term “Irishman”. 50 This
was the first concerted attempt at the dismantling of the “arbitrary colonial boundaries that
England had crafted”51 for Ireland.
The war that ensued in 1793 between revolutionary France and Britain forced the United
Irishmen into hiding; the British authorities conducting brutal crackdowns in the hunt for rebels;
going so far as to trying to disarm the United Irishmen. In 1798, with the support of the Catholic
Church, Tone initiated an armed uprising that got swiftly vanquished by the British. Tone was
convicted of treason and supposed to hang for crimes, but he managed to commit suicide whilst
imprisoned, turning him into a martyr-figure for the Irish republicans.
As retribution for the rebellion, the British Prime Minister William Pitt worked to secure the
passage of the Act of Union in 1800; thus establishing the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland. This effectively abolished national borders and dissolved the Irish parliament, Ireland
instead having to send its representatives over to Westminster to take part in the British
parliament. Surprisingly, the British government decided to ban the Protestant Orange Order in
1825, which it considered was endangering public order.
49
50
Ibidem
51
Ibidem
24
As a result of Daniel O’Connell’s establishing of the Catholic Association in 1823 and his
subsequent election to Parliament due to his immense popularity in 1828 which propped the
British government to abandon the requirement that MPs take the Oath of Supremacy - marking
O’Connell as a political target. In a move that sought to dampen O’Connell’s popularity, Prime
Minister Robert Peel decided to enact reform in Ireland in order to reduce the discrimination
Catholics faced by establishing a number of non-denominal colleges.
The outbreak of famine in 1845 caused by a potato blight caused the death of a million
Irishmen and the emigration of another million to chiefly America, but also Britain, Canada and
Australia. Between 1845-1849 the population of Ireland dropped by about 20-25%.52 As a result
of the English government’s inaction in alleviating the plight of the starving poor; due to a belief
53
in laissez-faire economics dampened Catholic royalism and sowed further discontent across
the populace. (Catholics loyal to the British crown).
James Stephens and Thomas Clark Luby, both members of the Young Ireland movement
established the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB); a secret organization with backing in
Ireland and the United States as well; stemming from the many disgruntled Irish immigrants that
were forced to flee the country during the famine. IRB members were called Fenians, calling
back to the old Celtic name of Fianna, meaning fighter. Their proclamation of 1867 stated, “We
therefore declare that, unable longer to endure the curse of Monarchical government, we aim at
founding a Republic based on universal suffrage, which shall secure to all the intrinsic value of
their labour.”54 The IRB attempted an aborted rebellion in 1867 and also become the first Irish
republican group to plant bombs in England. They were soon after forced underground, but they
continued to influence other organizations such as the Land League.
The Irish National Land League was founded in 1879 by Michael Davitt, a former IRB
member who advocated for the nationalization of the land alongside Charles Stewart Parnell, a
Protestant landlord. Through boycotts the League managed to empower poor tenants. In time,
Parnell came take over de facto control of the League, campaigning for the passage of Land Acts
meant to deed property to tenants. He was a supporter of Home Rule – the establishment of a
dual-house legislature in Dublin whilst keeping Ireland in the United Kingdom.
52
Christine Keally, This Great Calamity, Dublin: Gil & Macmillan 1994, p. 357
53
Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845–1849, Londra: Penguin Group 1992, pp. 410-
410
54
Robert C. Cottrell, Op. cit. p. 24
25
A Home Rule bill was proposed by Prime Minister William Gladstone but it predictably
resulted in unanimous uproar from a revitalized Orange Order and the Ulster Protestants.
“Speaking on behalf of the proposed legislation and seeking to end all artificial borders
afflicting Ireland, Parnell informed the House of Commons, “We want the energy, the patriotism,
the talent, and works of every Irishman to make this great experiment ... successful....We want ...
all creeds and all classes in Ireland. We cannot look upon a single Irishman as not belonging to
us.”55
The bill was doomed to fail and as it did, sectarian battles flared up throughout Belfast and
the other northern communities, the violence yielding an abundance of deaths. The violence only
served to strengthen the resolve of the Ulster Protestants to oppose Home Rule. Parnell’s
political career was also at an end due to a smear caused by a sexual scandal – being replaced at
the head of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) he founded by John Redmond, who was also a
proponent of Home Rule; which still had the backing of John Redmond’s supporters, the
National Volunteers.
Throughout the myriad of the English attempts at subduing the Irish people, by outlawing
their religion, by stripping them of rights, by stealing their property and deporting them to barren
lands; even by letting more than a million die of famine and attempting to restrict their culture;
somehow Catholicism endured on and by the turn of the 20th century, Gaelic culture was starting
to seep back into Irish conscience – this time with a chance at political support as well –
upsetting the British leadership and Protestant populace.
2.2. Home Rule, The IRA and Independence
In the early 20th century, the struggle for Home Rule continued to be at the forefront of Irish
politics. At that time, a voice of political unity for the disheveled Irish nationalists was laying the
groundwork for establishing one of the most important political parties of modern Ireland – Sinn
Féin. Arthur Griffith was a proponent of the establishment of a separate autonomous Irish
parliament but with continued allegiance to same monarch as Britain; favoring such an approach
as it would constitute less of a dramatic change of affairs and would facilitate obtaining public
support.
55
Robert C. Cottrell, Op. cit., pp. 24-25
26
In July 1904, Griffith argued for the Irish MPs’ abstinence from participating at parliament
sessions in Westminster. Rather, they should gather in Dublin, boycotting the British
administration by founding their own courts and collecting tax locally. This idea is known as
absention.56
At that time, the IRB, which Griffith was a member of, opposed his ideals as they did not
address the anti-Catholic bias of the British crown. The republicans were not willing to support
someone who would keep Ireland under British control, instead opting for the path to Irish
autonomy.
However, Griffith’s ideas were much more acceptable to the general population, being more
politically viable as well, building an image for Sinn Féin as supporters of an Irish Ireland. Thus,
Sinn Féin was a movement that was also backed by a political agenda. In order to gather political
support and establish prominence, Sinn Féin welcomed many different viewpoints amongst its
ranks, not only those who were staunchly for an Irish republic. This lead however to many IRB
members who preferred a violent path to Irish independence infiltrating Sinn Féin.
David Lloyd George, with assistance from Winston Churchill, floated the proposal of
removing the Ulster counties from the Home Rule bill during a cabinet meeting in February
1912. John Redmond ended up agreeing with the proposal whilst Unionists completely opposed
it.
Following dissatisfaction with the Parliament’s deliberations on the Home Rule bill, Sir
Edward Carson, leader of the Irish Unionist Party alongside the Presbyterian MP James Craig,
who was a member of the Orange Order launched a campaign to mobilize the Ulster Protestants
in order to support a petition meant to oppose Home Rule. Their petition, which insisted that
“home rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as the whole of
Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous
to the unity of the Empire.”57 gathered about 500,000 signatures
The Unionists also started a paramilitary mobilization, forming the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) – an armed militia with more than 100,000 members by 1912 and within a short span of
time the UVF received 25,000 weapons, along with 3 million rounds of ammunition from
56
57
Thomas Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, p. 3.
27
outside Ireland.58 On the other side, the Irish Volunteer Force (IVF) was established which also
attempted to import weapons, although not with the degree of success the Unionists enjoyed.
The Home Rule bill was due to come into effect in 1914, however, the outbreak of World
War I halted its implementation. Not long after the start of the war, the IRB’s supreme council
decided that an insurrection must be attempted in Ireland before the end of the war. As such, they
began preparations for the insurrection. In an unfortunate turn of events, the British navy
intercepted a shipment on April 21st,1916, comprised of 20,000 Russian arms and a number of
German machine guns meant for the insurrectionaries. This event further shook the ranks of the
Volunteers, with doubts settling in which only served to empower the continuously stronger Sinn
Féin.
On April 24th, 1916, a contingent of 1,500 lightly armed IVF and Citizen Army members, of
those a considerable amount being unarmed, gathered up at Liberty Hall in Dublin. The leaders,
James Connolly and Padraig Pearse, were fully aware of the suicidal nature of the Easter
Uprising; although it served to provide a model for those willing to sacrifice their lives for the
sake of independence.
After the cancellation of other campaigns meant to take place throughout Ireland, the rebels
in Dublin were alone in their uprising but decided to capture vital sectors of Dublin, in the hopes
that important buildings would not be bombed by the British. The General Post Office was
chosen as headquarters, from which “a new flag, sporting green, white, and orange bars, now
flew, while Pearse and Connolly produced a “Declaration of the Republic.”; Pearse becoming
president of the Provisional Government and which read as follows:
“Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she
receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag
and strikes for her freedom....We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of
Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible.”59
Caught off-guard by the first wave of attacks, the British swiftly responded by redeploying
additional forces from outside Dublin and calling for reinforcements from England. Two days
later, on the 26th, the British troops outnumbered the insurgents 20 to 1; ultimately relying on
58
59
Tim Patrick Coogan, The IRA, New York: Palgrave, 2000, p. 20.
28
artillery setting areas of Dublin ablaze and instating a blockade which cut off access to food and
water to the city. On Saturday the 29th, Pearse and Connolly unconditionally surrendered
Fig. 2.1 Ruined parts of Dublin in the aftermath of the Easter Rising
https://www.rte.ie/centuryireland/index.php/articles/what-was-the-easter-rising
It was soon made obvious that the uprising gathered lackluster public support, many
viewing it as putting the prospects of obtaining Home Rule in danger. The British government
however, managed to transform the leaders of the Easter Rising into martyrs by ordering the
leaders to be court martialed and executed. The executions granted martyrdom to the leaders of
the uprising and generating a wave of support for the republican cause and with reports of
civilians being shot or wounded by the British during the uprising it only served to stir up more
anger in society.
The Easter Rising reaffirmed the division between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics
generally refused to condemn the rebels whilst Protestants fully sided with the British troops.
Acting in a timely fashion, cabinet member David Lloyd George called for the immediate
implementation of Home Rule in July 1916, with northeastern Ireland remaining under British
control; supported by the IPP but met with protests from the Unionists.
Once in place, special elections had to be arranged in early 1917 to determine the
political makeup of autonomous Ireland. Sinn Féin, boosted by infamous candidates such as
Eamon de Valera, won a sizeable number of seats. The young electorate was openly in support
29
of republican candidates, even ones such as de Valera who had been imprisoned for his
involvement in the Easter Uprising. At the same time, IRB figures such as Thomas Ashe or
Michael Collins were transforming the IRB, amassing support for a volunteer army meant to
help establish the republic. Thomas Ashe had died shortly after his arrest and ensuing hunger
strike, the republican cause gaining another martyr. Throughout 1917, the IRB took control of
Sinn Féin; with de Valera replacing Arthur Griffith as president and Michael Collins becoming
Director of Organization; with de Valera also assuming command of the Irish Volunteers.
The new direction of Sinn Féin was distinctly more radical than its previous iteration,
with a heavy reliance on the Volunteer force. A party manifesto declared Sinn Féin’s duty to
oppose any actions of England from subjugating Ireland; thereby abandoning their previous
acceptance of a dual monarchy, which drove a wedge between them and their closest political
allies, the IPP60. The southern parts of Ireland displayed fervent support for Sinn Féin, whilst the
northern parts were hostile to their aspirations for an Irish republic. In Ulster, the Catholic
Church chose to back the IPP over Sinn Féin, due to their less radical stances which led to some
highly contested electoral seats in the Northern Counties, Sinn Féin and IPP candidates oft
running against each other; weakening Sinn Féin’s political influence due to a series of losses in
the North.
This new, more radical direction enabled Sinn Féin to outgrow all the other political
movements in Ireland; by early 1918 it had amassed about 130,000 members; an impressive ratio
compared to the total population of less that 4.5 million. The northeastern communities still
mostly shunned Sinn Féin, but the party was gaining support nonetheless.
The General Election of December 1918 marked the moment when Sinn Féin gained
undisputed political control in Ireland, obtaining 73 out of 105 total seats; whilst the IPP took 6
and Unionists took 26; with 26 of the Unionists’ seats coming from Ulster. This election
polarized the two camps further, with Unionists demanding the separation of Ulster from the rest
of Ireland, whilst Sinn Féin was pushing for the creation of the republic even more so than
before; declaring that “any division in the country was artificially created and partitionist
feelings deliberatly fomented by the British.”61
60
61
Brian Feeney, Sinn Féin: A Hundred Turbulent Years, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press,
2003, p. 115
30
Soon after, on the 21st of January 1919; the Sinn Féin representatives which were not
currently imprisoned gathered in Dublin instead of taking their seats in Westminster; holding
their first Dail Eireann: the Irish parliament. There they issued a Declaration of Independence
which affirmed:
“We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right
which we will never tolerate, and we demand the evacuation of our country by the English
Garrison.”62
The Dail made de Valera, who escaped from prison and fled to the United States, president
of the Irish Republic and assembled a cabinet; setting Sinn Féin apart from the Dail, however. In
that very same day of January 21, 1919, members of the IVF attacked members of the Royal
Irish Constabulary in County Tipperary, killing two in the process. This marked the beginning of
a guerilla war known as the Irish War of Independence – the volunteers being the national
military force that renamed the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
By 1920 the war had intensified significantly, with now targeting and raiding police
barracks in an effort to defeat the morale of the British through attrition. The passage on May 3rd
of the Government of Ireland Act63 further complicated the situation: the Act placed six of the
Northern Counties (Antrim, Down, Armagh, Fermanagh, Derry and Tyrone) under the control of
a parliament situated in Dublin which answered to Westminster; this constituted a blow to the
morale of the nationalists never expected Tyrone and Fermanagh to be separated from a southern
Irish republic. The Act served to ensure that relgious and ethnic aspects were incorporated into
the territoriality these artificial barriers drew. Thomas Hennessey contends that Unionists readily
admitted they were devising “an arbitrary border” inside Ireland to safeguard “their interests.”64
Finally, on the 6th of December 1921, after another year of casualties from all sides and
increased uncertainty about the future of Ireland; Michael Collins signed under the immense
pressure the Anglo-Irish Treaty which marked the end of the War for Independence and
established the Irish Free State. Even so, the republicans had plenty reasons to be disappointed
by the outcome of the Agreement. Whilst Ireland attained statehood it tragically did so by
reinforcing the arbitrary borders partitioning Ireland and Northern Ireland; which meant their
62
Irish Declaration of Independence, 21 Ianuarie 1919
63
Parlamentul Regatului Unit al Marii Britanii, Government of Ireland Act, 1920, articolul 2.1
64
Robert C. Cottrell, Op. Cit, p. 44
31
main grievance remained unanswered, even made worse by codifying partition into law yet
again.
2.3. Leading up to The Troubles.
After the founding of the Irish Free State; chaos beset Ireland yet again in the form of a
civil war; the main two sides being those in favor of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and those against it.
The civil war was a bloodletting that weakened the Republican movement’s unity – leading to
the death of many key figures such as Michael Collins or Arthur Griffith, coupled with the
executions of many anti-Treaty IRA members and landed more than 12,000 Republicans in
prison. The decades following the Civil War were essential for the consolidation of the Irish Free
State and ultimately through the Republic of Ireland Act of 1948 officializing the name Republic
of Ireland and doing away with the remaining ties to the British monarchy.
Two decades later, the material conditions of Catholics in Ulster had improved
somewhat, but the opportunities of public employment were mostly still untenable for Catholics,
much to their dismay; determining the Catholics to create various organizations meant to fight
for equity. One of those organizations was the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ); founded in
1963 as a result of frustrations related to the uselessness of the Nationalist Party representatives
in Stormont who couldn’t advocate for Catholic issues. Thus, the CSJ started drawing attention
to the situation, demanding that the British government paid greater attention to the
discrimination in Northern Ireland.
Another actor in the struggle for civil rights was the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster
(CDU), backed by more than 100 MPs and lords; which appeared in 196565. It called for an
enquiry to investigate the governmental practices in Northern Ireland pertaining to employment,
housing, public appointments and religious discrimination.
The fight for civil rights in Northern Ireland increased tensions, but it was not sufficient
to cause outright conflict. Reverend Ian Paisley, who can only be described as an extreme
Unionist; had established his own Free Presbyterian Church, which was fervently anti-Catholic.
Furthermore, in 1966, he formed the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee (UCDC). The
UCDC set out to campaign against Prime Minister O’Neill on the grounds that his policies were
seen as a threat to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position. Soon after Paisley went on to help
65
Brendan Lynn, Martin Melaugh, A Chronology of Key Events in Irish History, University of Ulster,
Coleraine; https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch1800-1967.htm; accesat pe 16 Iunie 2020
32
establish the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV) which was to come under the control of the
UCDC.
At about the same time, the modern version of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was
formed. The UVF issued a statement in May 1966 containing the threat that, "known IRA men
will be executed mercilessly and without hesitation". 66
On 7 May 1966 the UVF carried out a petrol bomb attack on a Catholic owned bar in the
Shankill Road area of Belfast. The attackers missed their intended target and set fire to the home
of Matilda Gould (77), a Protestant civilian, who lived next door to the public house. Gould was
gravely wounded in the attack and died on 27 June 1966 as a resulted of her injuries.
On 27 May 1966 the UVF shot and mortally wounded John Scullion (28), a Catholic
civilian, in west Belfast. Scullion died from his injuries on 11 June 1966.
On 26 June 1966 the UVF shot three Catholic civilians in the Shankill area of Belfast.
One of those shot, Peter Ward (18), died at the scene and the two other men were seriously
injured. As results of these actions, on 28 June 1966 the Northern Ireland government declared
the UVF an illegal organization.
Even though the IRA was at this point dormant and insignificant, whilst Sinn Féin was
confined to irrelevance in Ulster; the Catholics caught a lucky break in the founding of the
Norther Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in January 1967. Amongst the most important
positions of NICRA, it advocated against abuses of power and for the protection of individual
rights. NICRA also campaigned for the abolishing of the Special Powers Act; which allowed for
unchecked brutality from the Constabulary; and for the abolishing of the “B Specials”67, the
auxiliary police troops whose behavior was unchecked. Of specific importance were the
NICRA’s calls in support of the “One Man, One Vote” principle, meant to end special voting
arrangement in Northern Ireland which barred some people from voting and gave corporations
special advantages in that regard; alongside with combating gerrymandering.
NICRA organized a number of rallies of which the rally for Derry that took place on
October 5th, 1968, drew considerable ire from the Protestants; and marchers ended up clashing
with the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The fighting spread out throughout Derry, with rubble,
firebombs and barricades painting the scene in the Bogside.
66
Ibidem
67
Robert C. Cottrell, Op. cit. p. 85
33
More demonstrations and counter-rallies took place until January 1969; when the RUC
blatantly took sides against the protestors by allowing Loyalist goons to assault the civil rights
marchers outside of Derry. On during the elections on April 17th, NICRA’s candidate, John
Hume, defeated the Nationalist Party’s leader Eddie McAteer. Shortly thereafter, rioting began in
Derry, with the RUC intervening in the Bogside. Protests became riots throughout all of
Northern Ireland; the IRA making its first moves in Belfast by conducting a number of
bombings.
2.3.1. The Troubles: Noteworthy events.
There is no clear consensus on the exact starting date for the Troubles. Events previously
described such as the formation of UVF in 1966, the civil rights march in October 1968 have
been determined as being the starting point; but for the purposes of this work I chose the Battle
of Bogside that took place on the 12th of August 1969 as a starting date. Considering the vast
amount of social unrest that took place in the 1960’s I consider the other popular interpretations
just as valid.
“Between the lunch with O’Neill and the Londonderry eruption of October 1968 the
government, as has been shown, had been continuously warned that without reform serious
sectarian violence was inevitable. Still the government did not act.”68Indeed, the continued
efforts of Prime Minister O’Neill to appeal to both sides of the divide by offering hollow
platitudes such as “If you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness, they will
live like Protestants, in spite of the authoritative nature of their Church.” 69
The Battle of Bogside lasted for more than 50 hours; with hundreds of tear gas canisters
being deployed by the RUC; tallying up more than 1000 casualties, but no one was killed.
On 6pm on August 14th, the British troops were deployed; marking the start of Operation
Banner. The RUC withdrew shortly afterwards and the Battle of Bogside was over; but with it
and the arrival of British troops; The Troubles started to their fullest extent.
68
Peter Rose, How the Troubles Came to Northern Ireland,, Londra: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 175
69
Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State; Londra: Pluto Press, 1976, p. 256
34
Fig 2.2 Fires and destruction engulfed the Bogside
https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/27653
Initially, as British Home Secretary James Callahan saw things, the British government
resorted to deploying troops because of Stormont’s failure to control the situation. As a result of
that statement, the Loyalists were angered, and more riots ensued. Not helping matters was the
fact that the Cameron Commission declared on September 12th that Catholics suffered both legal
and political discrimination, recognizing that both the RUC and the B Specials had committed
illegal acts. Another decision of Callahan, having the Army construct what became the so-called
“peace line”70 angered both sides of the conflict.
Loyalist were further infuriated by the conclusions of the “Hunt Report” delivered on the
12th of October; which called for the disbanding of the B Specials and the disarmament of the
RUC. Battles erupted yet again and the first RUC constable died at the hands of the Protestant
UVF.
Throughout 1969, the IRA had been almost completely uninvolved in the conflict, the
internal state of the IRA being one of disarray. However, by the end of the year, the IRA had
splintered into two factions. The Provisional IRA and the Provisional Sinn Féin continued the
militant lineage of the IRA, meanwhile the Official IRA and Official Sinn Fein pursued political
70
J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967–1992.
New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1993; p. 122.
35
ambitions. This split however, freed up those willing members of the IRA to enter the gauntlet
and get involved in the riots and battles.
The Catholic population’s opinion on the British Army slowly turned to hostility, whilst
the Provisional IRA started gathering support again through its campaign of guerilla warfare. It
launched a bombing campaign in Northern Ireland in October 1970, targeting commercial
centers. On the 6th of February 1971, Robert Harris became the first British soldier to die as a
result of the conflict, being shot and killed by a member of the Provisional’s Third Battalion.
Brian Faulkner served as the replacement for Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister Chichester-
Clark, who resigned after not being able to muster enough support for the deployment of
additional troops. Faulkner was a tough on the IRA and determined to make an example of them.
In August 1971, Operation Demetrius was launched by thousands of Army and security
personnel; rounding up more than 300 suspects without trial. The practice of internment without
trial angered the Catholics, as only Catholics had been picked up in Operation Demetrius71. This
led to the intensifying of the IRA’s brutality and tactics; now looking to shoot and kill troops,
policemen and members of the Ulster Defence Regiment.
Fig. 2.3 The “Peace Wall” in northern Belfast
https://mondediplo.com/2018/06/06northernireland
71
Martin Melaugh, Internment - Summary of Main Events, University of Ulster, Coleraine,
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/intern/sum.htm, accesat pe 16 Iunie 2020.
36
On January 30th, what began as an anti-interment rally in Derry ended up being known as
Bloody Sunday; another dark chapter in the long lineage of Irish tragedies. On that morning,
British paratroopers fired on the Catholic demonstrators protesting against the practice of
internment. In less than an hour, 30 men and one woman were shot, leaving 13 dead. What the
British meant to be a lesson backfired spectacularly, massively bolstering support for the IRA
and turning 1972 into the bloodiest year of the Troubles.
On March 24th, the British government under Edward Heath instated direct rule over
Northern Ireland; which made matters worse as far as sectarian violence is concerned. The
Loyalists viewed the closing of Stormont as the result of British restraint in combating the IRA;
whilst the Provisionals saw the events as a sign that Britain’s grip on Northern Ireland was
weakening as a result of their actions. This being the case, both sides fought with little to no
restraints or concerns for collateral damage.
The Provisionals stepped up their aggression by going after off-duty RUC officers,
employing more and more car bombs and deploying sniper squads to shoot British soldiers. The
Protestants turned to vigilantism, establishing death squads such as John White’s Shankill Road
gang in Belfast. They sought to “to terrorize the terrorist. It was one community attacking
another.”; as White acknowledged.72
London elaborated a plan to create a new assembly in Northern Ireland, with power sharing
as a feature. The Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973 created a Council of Ireland, strived
for cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic and attempted to tackle the
constitutional aspects of the Six Northern Counties. However, this Agreement was refuted by the
Unionists, who saw it as a takeover of Northern Irish affairs by the Republic.
The breakdown of the Sunningdale Agreement marked a political impasse which

characterized the decades until the Good Friday Agreement. Violence and attacks ensued.
72
Jack Holland, Hope against History: The Course of Conflict in Northern Ireland, New York; Henry Holt
and Company, 1999, p. 60
37
In Belfast on the 21st of July,1972, 22 bombs were planted by the Provisionals and, in the
resulting explosions, 9 people were killed and a further 130 seriously injured. The day became
known as 'Bloody Friday'. 73 A Chronology of the Conflict - 1974
On the 5th of October 1974, Provisionals planted bombs in two pubs in Guildford, Surrey,
England; killing five and injuring another 54. The specific pubs were they were often frequented
by off-duty British soldiers. 74
The Provisionals soon planted another set of bombs in two other pubs in Birmingham,
killing 21 civilians on the 21st of November 1974.75
During the annual Remembrance Day ceremony in Enniskillen, the Provisionals planted a
bomb at the War Memorial that killed 11 people and injured another 63. Gordon Wilson gave a
moving account of his daughter's death in media interviews but stated that he forgave her
killers.76
The Provisionals struck out against an Army barracks in Kent, England; the 22nd of
September, 1989, killing ten musicians who were part of the staff band of the Royal Marines.77
On the 18th of June 1994, 6 Catholic civilians were killed in a gun attack on a bar in
Loughinisland. The attack was carried out by the Ulster Volunteer Force.78
This recounting of attacks done by both sides serves to illustrate the sheer degree of violence
enacted throughout The Troubles; these events being a fraction of the daily reality that plagued
the Irish for almost 30 years; a comprehensive retelling of all the skirmishes and events being far
past the scope of this work.
73
Martin Melaugh, 'Bloody Friday', Belfast Friday 21 July 1972, University of Ulster, Coleraine,
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bfriday/events.htm, accesat pe 16 Iunie 2020.
74
Martin Melaugh, A Chronology of the Conflict - 1974, University of Ulster, Coleraine,
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch74.htm#17574, accesat pe 18 Iunie 2020.
75
Ibidem
76
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch87.htm#81187, accesat pe 18 Iunie 2020
77
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch89.htm#22989, accesat pe 18 Iunie 2020
78
Martin Melaugh, Fionnuala McKenna, Violence - Chronology of Major Violent Incidents, 1969-1998,
University of Ulster, Coleraine, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/violence/chronmaj.htm, accesat pe 18 Iunie 2020
38
Animated by new political leadership such as Gerry Adams and exhausted by the senseless
violence, the Provisionals announced on the 31st of August, 1994, that “in order to enhance the
democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success,” their leaders
were proclaiming “a complete cessation of military operations.” By mid-October, the Loyalist
paramilitaries responded to this unilateral action, calling a halt to “all operations
hostilities.”79which facilitated negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.
What this case study on the sectarian violence in Ireland and Northern Ireland served to
demonstrate are the deeply-rooted historical sources of sectarian discord between Catholics and
Protestants, Irish and English. As a result of hundreds of years of oppressive laws enacted by the
English crown, which inflicted numerous tragedies upon the Irish; the frailty of Irish political
representation and tumultuous path to independence; independence which unfortunately
reinforced the same arbitrary borders imposed upon the Irish throughout history, ample
precedents for a cycle of sectarian violence and hatred have been set.
The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland represents, just like the “peace line”
instated by the British Army; another physical manifestation of the arbitrary divides imposed
upon the Irish for centuries. As such, it stands for everything driving the sectarian divide by
being a reminder of the separation of the Irish at the hands of the English; defiantly standing in
the way of a united Ireland. In practical terms nowadays, it is nothing more than a line on a map,
but for the Irish it is the symbol of English cultural and political oppression.
79
39
III. The Future of Ireland post-Brexit.
The political process behind reaching the Good Friday agreement was arduous and required
the cooperation of both the political wings and the militants of both sides. Although peace was
eventually reached, small-scale skirmishes and fights more reminiscent of gang violence rather
than sectarian war continued. Officially, “The Troubles” were over, but, under the surface,
tensions were still high and with the vote on Brexit passing and the chance of another hard
border in Ireland being on the table; attitudes have changed.
3.1. The Good Friday Agreement and its Legacy
Key figures in mobilizing the peace process that lead to the Good Friday Agreement were
the leaders of Sinn Féin (SF) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP); Gerry Adams
and John Hume respectively.
On the 5th of March, 1989, Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin (SF), made a speech in
which he said that he sought a "non-armed political movement to work for self-determination" in
Ireland.80
Then, on the 3rd of November then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland gave a speech in
which “he admitted that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) could not be defeated militarily. He
also said that he could not rule out talks with Sinn Féin (SF) if there was an end to violence.”81
This event set the cogs of peace in motion; demonstrating a willingness to concede on the British
side.
A breakthrough occurred on the 1st of July 1992; “In a significant shift in approach the
Unionist parties agreed to talks with politicians from the Republic of Ireland under Strand Two
of the Brooke / Mayhew Talks.” The Strand Two tackled relations between Northern Ireland and
Ireland and opened the possibility for cooperation on the peace process.
80
Martin Melaugh, Irish Peace Process - Chronology of Events Leading to Peace Process (January 1988 -
April 1993), University of Ulster, Coleraine, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/pp8893.htm, accesat pe 17 Iunie
2020
81
Ibidem
40
On the 25th of September, 1993, “John Hume, then leader of the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP), and Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Féin (SF), issued a second joint
statement. The statement outlined the Hume/Adams Initiative which "aimed at the creation of a
peace process". The Hume/Adams Initiative has never been published. “82
Shortly thereafter, the “Irish Republican Army (IRA) issued a statement welcoming the
Hume/Adams Initiative.”83
In January 1994, “The broadcasting ban under section 31 of the Broadcasting Act was
lifted in the Republic of Ireland. This allowed Sinn Féin (SF) access to the Irish media.”84
By August of 1994, The Irish Republican Army (IRA) announced a "complete cessation
of military activities" in a statement to the media.85; providing a much needed breakthrough in
peace talks. Two years later, in June 1996, All-party negotiations began in Stormont.
Peace progress was hampered by various incidents and mishaps at the hands of both
Loyalists and the IRA, but, with great effort, on the 10th of April, “Good Friday”, the multi-party
talks at Stormont finally yielded the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement. Thus, a fragile peace,
but peace nonetheless, was attained.
The most important provisions of the Good Friday Agreement were the following86:
• The establishment of a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive.

• The establishment of a North/South Ministerial council meant to facilitate “consultation, co-
operation and action” in mutual areas of interest.
• The creation of a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference; meant to promote cooperation at
all levels between the two governments.
• The decommissioning of weapons held by paramilitary groups
• The normalization of security arrangements in Northern Ireland.
• "The mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community"
82
Martin Melaugh, Irish Peace Process - Chronology of Key Events (April 1993 – April 1998), University
of Ulster, Coleraine, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9398.htm, accesat pe 17 Iunie 2020
83
Ibidem
84
Ibidem
85
Ibidem
86
Guvernul Irlandei, Guvernul Regatului Unit, The Belfast Agreement
41
• Northern Ireland and Ireland can unite if the majority of the population of both the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland agree to do so.
• Recognition of the validity of both Irish and English identities in Northern Ireland – anyone born
in Northern Ireland is entitled to an Irish passport by the Agreement.
The Good Friday Agreement brought with it a general sense of peace, even though
uneasiness made its return every so often, with dissident groups continuing infrequent campaigns
of sectarian violence. The IRA, however, had decommissioned its weapons by September 2005.
3.2. Public Opinion on Brexit in Northern Ireland
The vote on the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum happened on the
23rd of June 2016 and ended with the result of the UK leaving the EU. 52% of the UK voted for
leave, however, not all members of the United Kingdom voted similarly.
Northern Ireland voted to remain with 55.8% of the vote compared to 44.2% for leave.87
This early assessment of Brexit was bound to be altered by the long and complicated negotiation
process and the difficulties tackling issues such as the Irish backstop would create.
The vote is not a perfect indicator of the degree of support for the European Union,
especially not for the inhabitants of Northern Ireland who under the Good Friday Agreement can
opt for an Irish passport; hence continued EU membership even after the hardest of “hard
Brexits”.
The findings of a 2017 work called “Bordering on Brexit: Views from Local Communities
in the Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland” are especially insightful in figuring
out the attitudes towards Brexit at the time of it taking place. It is also specifically noteworthy to
mention that all border regions voted for remaining in the EU; the northeastern regions
predominantly voted leave.88
Amongst key findings of the survey; the following are of note89:
87
BBC, EU Referndum Results, https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results; accesat pe 16
Iunie 2020
88
Ibidem
89
Katy Hayward, Bordering on Brexit: Views from Local Communities in the Central Border Region of
Ireland / Northern Ireland, Belfast: Centre for International Borders Research Queen’s University Belfast, 2017, pp.
12-16
42
• “The emotional and psychological (as well as social and political) significance of the border should not be
underestimated. As one respondent put it, ‘hardening the border is like opening a wound’.”
• “ For many respondents, the very term ‘border control’ is one that conjures images of a securitised border
and recalls deeply negative experiences and community tensions. “
• “Physical or material manifestations of border control would not only be targets for paramilitary activity
but would stand as a symbol of regression in cross-border and British-Irish relations.”
• “Above EU membership, most respondents credit the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement with
fundamentally changing their experience of crossing the border and facilitating cross-border
cooperation.”
• “Respondents suggest that the different high level political responses to Brexit – Unionist and
Nationalist, British and Irish – are beginning to have a ‘polarizing’ effect at a community level in
the Border Region.”
• “Remain voters and those in the southern border counties view Brexit as risking the
‘reimposition’ of a hard border as a consequence of British government policy. In contrast,
Leave voters are more likely to see imposition in the form of EU ‘red tape’ “
• “There are sharp differences in views about the significance of Brexit for the border. Leave
voters are less likely to fear a hard border – not because they don’t cross it or see the economic
value of an open border – because they are less likely to believe that negotiations will result in
such an outcome.”
• “There seems to be a paradox in the contemporary Irish border: crossing the border is both
unremarkable and extraordinary. In some ways it is non-existent, completely irrelevant;
however, in other ways it is ever-present and at the centre of politics, economics and peace”
The process of negotiation necessary to arrange the future relations between Ireland and
Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland and the UK and UK and the EU have gradually shifted public
opinion in time.
A study performed by Dr. Jamie Pow, published on the 30th of January 2019, offers some
key insights into the evolution of the public opinion on Brexit in Northern Ireland. The key
takeaways are:90
• There is growing support for the UK remaining in the EU. A cross-section survey conducted by the same
think tank in early 2018 found that support for Remain was up to 69%.
90
Dr. Jamie Pow, Brexit and public opinion: Northern Ireland, The UK in a Changing Europe, 2019,
https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-public-opinion-northern-ireland/#; accesat pe 18 Iunie 2020.
43
• Assuming the UK leaves the EU, a majority of supporters of all five of Northern Ireland’s main parties
prefer the softest possible exit; with the UK being a member of the customs union and single market.
• Many people support the key features of the Withdrawal Agreement; even if not the Agreement itself.
54% of respondents of a 2018 poll said that businesses and farming lobbies were right in backing the
Agreement. Furthermore, 65% think that a Northern Ireland closely aligned to the EU is beneficial; even
with the rest of the UK diverging.
• 55% of respondents say they would “probably” or “certainly” support a united Ireland in the event of a
no-deal Brexit; 48% if the UK leaves as per the Withdrawal Agreement and just 29% if the UK remains
in the EU.
It appears that the realities of what Brexit would entail for the daily lives of people living in Northern
Ireland, especially those in border communities, have started to settle in and move public opinion further
towards siding with remaining in the EU; even opening up a path for Irish unification if the conditions
allowed it.
However, the evolution of the Brexit process has exacerbated the nationalist / unionist divides in
Northern Ireland, as The Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey shows.91
“A post-Brexit opinion poll has found that those in the region deeming themselves neither unionist or
nationalist has fallen to 39%. […] As late as 2017, 50% surveyed said they were neither.”
“Just under 60% of Catholics in Northern Ireland now categorise themselves as nationalist compared
with 50% two years ago.[…] At the same time, the researchers from Queen’s University Belfast’s Ark
project found 67% of Protestants now classified themselves as unionist compared with 55% in 2018.”
Whilst support of the Good Friday Agreement and the sentiment towards is reassuring, the trend of
people reverting back to their nationalist / unionist trenches is more than worrisome and in points to the
fact that the stability and prosperity afforded by the Good Friday Agreement and the free movement
under the European Union drove the population away from the sectarian divides; yet as this stability is put
under question, people reflexively revert to their old position, as if bracing for the worst.
91
Henry McDonald, Brexit revives unionist and nationalist divide in Northern Ireland, The Guardian,
17.06.2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jun/17/brexit-unionist-nationalist-divide-northern-ireland-
survey-identity-political-allegiances; accesat pe 18 Iunie 2020.
44
3.3. Effects of Brexit on the future of Northern Ireland’s stability and sectarian
divides.
Under the agreed Brexit deal92, Northern Ireland is set apart from the rest of the UK as far as
customs and other EU rules are concerned; the deal giving the Assembly a vote on these matters.
However, that vote isn’t set to take place until four years pass after the end of the transitional
period which is currently still set to run the end of 2020; hence the vote would take place at the
end of 2024.
If the Assembly were to vote against these new arrangements, they would be phased out
after two years, during which period a “joint committee” would advise the UK and EU on what
to do to remedy the situation. If no deal is reached, some sort of hard border could re-emerge in
Ireland. However, if the Assembly accepts the continuing provisions with a simple majority, they
will apply for another four years. If the deal gets “cross-community” support the provisions will
apply for eight years.
Considering these provisions which dampen the negative effects of Brexit by delaying any
substantial hard border as long as possible we ought to hope for a smooth trade deal between the
UK and the European Union so as to not revert to the harmful World Trade Organization rules;
which would cancel out any sort of progress in preserving the Irish peace and prosperity.
The real damage I would argue, has already been done. The event of Brexit has started
another shift in public opinion and sectarian attitudes, as observed by the previous subchapter.
And even if the arrangements hold once, their continuation depends on the frail stability of
politics in Northern Ireland.
Thus, I would conclude this chapter by stating that Irish stability is locked in a race against
time. Attitudes of unity are being met with the re-establishment of dormant sectarian divides.
Fortunately, economic pragmatism shows that the Irish are generally aware of benefits of being
in the European Union and as such; one can only hope that the material conditions of Northern
Ireland’s population don’t degrade so far to lead to the disregard of the more than 20 years of
peace attained by the Good Friday Agreement.
92
BBC News, Brexit: What is in Boris Johnson's new deal with the EU? https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
50083026, 21.10.2019, accesat 18 Iunie 2020
45
Conclusions
The issue of borders is a difficult one to tackle. There is no certain academic consensus
on how borders should be evaluated and treated; nor about their role or functions. The
subjectivity of the experience of borders plays a very large part of that. As this work has tried to
show; the role, functions and impact of borders varies on a case-by-case basis.
The first chapter demonstrated how both historically and contemporarily, borders serve
different purposes and they are experienced by people in different ways. There are extremes, like
North Korea’s closed borders and society or the almost complete freedom of movement within
the EU for EU citizens; there are outliers such as the “Great Firewall of China” or the
“worldwide caliphate” established by ISIS – and there are thousands of borders throughout the
world.
Here, my findings were constrained due to my inexperience in tackling the subject and
the amount variety in approaches. Hence, I tried to concentrate on discovering a few valid points
about borders which could sustain the exploration of sectarian violence I’ve performed in the
next chapter. However, I feel that with a different approach, perhaps anthropological, the topics
of borders can be discussed ad infinitum.
The second chapter took a more objective approach in detailing the vast century-long
history of oppression in Ireland. I first started from “The Troubles” looking backwards in time,
however, I was quickly proven that that approach would yield a false set of results, as it
minimizes the focus on the historical oppression of the Irish. Therefore, I laid out a longer
account of Irish oppression and used “The Troubles” to reiterate the damages arbitrary borders
have caused – and their continuous existence.
Irish history requires a keen eye for nuance and detail – and should come packaged with
a hefty amount of English history as well; here I believe I have provided a sufficient amount of
historical context yet this issue could be tackled in a whole different way by looking at English
law and its relation to the Irish.
The third chapter is intended to open further discussions on policy regarding Ireland and
Northern Ireland, in the context of Brexit and keeping in mind the fragile peace the Good Friday
Agreement provided. Here I believe someone with the interest to do so could analyze public
reaction in Northern Ireland and correlate it with the negotiations concerning Brexit – and the
Irish backstop.
I tried to provide a baseline set of arguments that support the need to pay further attention
to the situation developing under the surface in Northern Ireland – be it for the sake of
preventing another sectarian conflict or just for understanding the importance of the Single
Market for the Irish.
I believe the correlation between arbitrary borders and sectarian violence in Ireland has
been sufficiently highlighted; and it provides a starting point for further research into many
domains. In describing the long history of arbitrary borders and divides imposed on the Irish by
the English, but also the tragic political construct of Independent Ireland that unwillingly
validated the same arbitrary borders I have provided an interesting glimpse into the sources of
sectarian violence in Ireland; and by paying attention to the post-peace attitudes in the context of
Brexit I believe these sources of sectarian tensions have yet to subside, as it is still an ongoing
phenomenon.
In closing, I’d wish to state the following. “The Troubles” are not over. The Good Friday
Peace is still holding, for now, but “The Troubles” were just another stop-gap in a long historical
cycle of sectarian violence and oppression. Until a democratic solution is reached that satisfies
both Protestants and Catholics, Unionists and Republicans; the same conflict will re-emerge
again and again. The seeds of conflict are still there in Ireland, due to almost a millennium of
oppression and division at the hands of the English.
I believe the future for peaceful, united Ireland is one in which Northern Ireland remains
a member of the European Union – aiding the peace process and breaking down physical borders
– in order to heal the scars of history.
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UNIVERSITATEA BABEŞ-BOLYAI CLUJ-NAPOCA

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Borders, The Good Friday Agreement

Absolvent: Pristoleanu Stefan Andrei

Figure 1.1 Map of the Roman Empire in 125 AD ……………………………………..……7

• What does the Irish border represent for sectarian violence?

• What would be the socio-economic impact of an Irish border post-Brexit?

• Is the Good Friday Peace in danger as a result of Brexit?

As far as the structure of paper is concerned, it is laid out as follows:

In order to provide a more accurate explanation a delimitation of what „borders” are is

These systems of interaction manifested themselves simultaneously across the world –

Fig. 1.1 Map of the Roman Empire in 125 AD.

As illustrated by the previous subchapter, borders manifested themselves in different

Fig. 1.2 Map Showing Tribal Territories and Post-Westphalia Borders

1.2.2. The European Union

Sonya Dowsett, Spanish enclave offers glimpse of fortress Europe, Reuters,

1.2.3. The Great Firewall of China

According to constructivist thinking “territoriality results from historical contexts, practical

2.2. Home Rule, The IRA and Independence

2.3. Leading up to The Troubles.

2.3.1. The Troubles: Noteworthy events.

Fig. 2.3 The “Peace Wall” in northern Belfast

The breakdown of the Sunningdale Agreement marked a political impasse which

3.1. The Good Friday Agreement and its Legacy

• The establishment of a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive.

3.2. Public Opinion on Brexit in Northern Ireland

Amongst key findings of the survey; the following are of note89:

1. Coogan, Tim Patrick, The IRA, New York: Palgrave, 2000

2.2. Articole în ziare, cotidiene, magazine etc.

III. Documente oficiale

38. Office of Central Cyberspace Affairs of China, 25.08.2017 http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017-

40. Statutes of Kilkenny, Parlamentul Irlandei, 1366; https://celt.ucc.ie//published/T300001-

41. The Good Friday Agreement; Belfast, 1998

42. Treaty on European Union; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

43. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

44. Irish Delcaration of Independence; Irlanda, 1919

IV.Alte surse on-line:

46. Comisia Europeana, Schengen Area, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-

47. Donald J. Trump, Twitter,

48. Donald J. Trump, Twitter,

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