1

Personal Details

Principal Investigator Prof. A. Raghuramaraju Department of Philosophy,

University of Hyderabad
Paper Coordinator Prof. Raghunath Ghosh Department of Philosophy,
University of North Bengal
Content Writer Prof. Shakuntala Bora Department of Philosophy,
Gauhati University
Content Reviewer Prof. Pradeep Gokhale Central University of Tibetan Studies,
Sarnath
Language Editor Miss Abha Thapalyal Gandhi Publishing and Editorial Services
Adviser, Delhi

Description of Module

Subject Name: Philosophy

Paper Name: Epistemology II
Module Name/Title: Concepts of Pramā
Module ID 6.1
Prerequisites: A General Understanding of Schools of Indian Philosophy
Objectives: To give an outline of the general characteristics of Pramā as found
in the schools of Nyaya and Vedanta
Key Words: Jñāna , Pramā, Pramāṇa, Smṛti, anubhāva, yathartha,
ayathārtha,anadhigatavadhita, abādhitatva
 2

Concepts of Pramā

Introduction

The Sanskrit word Jñāna stands for all knowledge whether true or false. In Indian philosophy, valid
knowledge is specifically represented by the word Pramā. Different schools of Indian philosophy
present a variety of views regarding Pramā and depending on their definitions of valid knowledge,
recognize different kinds of valid knowledge. The Carvaka School recognizes only perception as valid.
The Bauddhas and the Vaisesikas recognize perception and inference as valid. The Samkhyas consider
testimony also as a source of valid knowledge in addition to the previous two. The Nyaya School admits
of four kinds of valid knowledge by considering comparison as valid. Prabhakara Mimamasa includes
postulation within the framework of valid knowledge. Advaita Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa consider
non-cognition also as valid knowledge.

The Nyaya View of Pramā

The Nayayikas take knowledge (Jñāna) in the sense of cognition of objects.1 According to the Nyaya,
cognition can be of the form ‘This is a jar’ or it can of the form ‘I know it is a jar’. This latter form of
cognition for the Nyaya is subsequent to the other. In the first stage, cognition is not self-luminous, i.e.,
it does not become the subject of internal perception. When one perceives a jar there is no precise
cognition that one is perceiving. It is in the subsequent state that one becomes aware that one is
perceiving. Cognition in the sense of knowledge is the immediate knowledge that becomes the subject
of consciousness (anuvyavasaya) having the form ‘I know’.

The Nayayikas make a distinction between two kinds of knowledge: memory or representational
knowledge (Smṛti) and apprehension or presentational knowledge (anubhāva). In memory or
representational knowledge, knowledge is born out mental impressions.2 The object of knowledge is
represented in the sense that it is from past knowledge. The object had been known and now when one
says one knows, one is actually having mental impressions of the object known. Presentational
knowledge or apprehension has been defined by the Nyaya as ‘knowledge different from that’.3 In other
words, the knowledge which is not memory or not born of mental impressions is what can be termed as
apprehension or presentational knowledge.

1
Tarka-samgraha, III, 16
2
Tarka-samgraha, III, 17
3
Tarka-samgraha, III, 18
 3

Knowledge in the sense of being apprehension is again further classified by the Nayayikas as valid
apprehension (yatharthaanubhāva) and erroneous or invalid apprehension (ayatharthaanubhāva). A
valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing attributes which it really possesses.4
If one apprehends an object as possessing certain attributes and if the object in reality possesses those
attributes, then the apprehension is said to be valid. If one apprehends an object as silver and the object
is silver, then the apprehension is valid. On the other hand, when one apprehends an object as possessing
certain attributes while the object does not possess them, then the apprehension is invalid. Nyaya gives
the example of silver in nacre as a case of invalid apprehension. When one apprehends a thing as silver,
but it is not silver, then it is a case of wrong apprehension.5

For the Nyaya valid presentational knowledge or knowledge which is valid apprehension is Pramā. In
other words, Pramā is characterized by truth and presentativenes.

First, Pramā has to be yathartha or true. Truth for the Nyaya is understood as faithfulness with which
the object is revealed. Thus Pramā or valid knowledge can be stated as that which informs us of the
existence of something in a place where it really exists, or which predicates of something that it has a
characteristic that is really possessed by it.6 To know a thing is to judge it as having such-and-such
characteristic. The judgement will be true if the thing really has the stated characteristic. And if the
thing does not have it, then the judgment will be false. However, it is to be kept in mind that for the
Nyaya to apprehend a thing as a jar, for example, it is not to be understood as apprehending ‘jarness’ in
the jar. But it is apprehension that ‘jarness’ is related to this object. According to the Nyaya, there is a
direct contact of knowledge with the object. And knowledge consists in judging an object as being
related to a certain attribute. If the object holds the asserted relation to the attribute, the judgment is
true, and if the object does not, then the judgment is false. This characteristic of Pramā excludes error
(bhrama) from being recognized as a kind of valid knowledge.

Second, the Nyaya says that Pramā is apprehension or presentational (anubhāva) and not
representational. It is this characteristic that excludes memory from valid knowledge. Memory can be
true in the sense of faithfully representing the event or the action in its true characteristic. Still it is not
Pramā as it arises from a mental impression and is not due to the object presented. However, the Nyaya
does not say that in apprehension the object is presented. Rather the Nayayikas argue that apprehension
is that which is not due to mental impressions. Still it can be understood that as apprehension is not due
to mental impressions, it must be due to the object given or presented. Thus, it can be said that the object
of Pramā or valid knowledge should be such that it is presented and not represented.

4
Tarka-samgraha, III, 19
5
Tarka-samgraha, III, 20
6
Tarka-samgraha- tadvatitatprakarakahanubhavoyatharthah
 4

The Nyaya recognize four different kinds of instruments of valid knowledge or Pramāna: perception
(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (sabda). Corresponding to
these instruments the Nyaya distinguishes four different kinds of valid knowledge or Pramā: the
outcome of perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and testimony
(Śábda). Each Pramā leads to a kind of direct knowledge where there is presentation of an object as the
object truly is.

An analysis of Nyaya understanding of Pramā thus reveals that all valid knowledge involves three
elements. They are: the subject or (Pramātra), object of knowledge (prameya) and the means or
instrument of knowledge (Pramāna). First, knowledge being of the nature of ‘I know’ requires that
there is a subject who by cognizing something has knowledge. According to the Nayayikas, cognition
being of the nature of an attribute7 inheres in the subject. The subject is the substantive ground of all
cognitions. It is also the one which acts according to its likes or dislikes. In other words, the subject is
conceived as the intelligent being. Second, knowledge implies knowledge of something. To have
knowledge, the cognizer needs something or an object which is cognized. It is that towards which the
knowledge is directed. This object of knowledge, according to the Nyaya may be either existent or non-
existent. Objects that are non-existent can be accepted still as an object of knowledge for the Nyaya,
because the Nyaya accepts the reality of non-existence (abhaava)8.

However, knowledge of the non-existent is conditional on the knowledge of existent objects. One can
perceive the non-existence of a jar on the table in perceiving the table. But whether existent or non-
existent, there has to be an object if knowledge has to take place. Third, the cognizer cognizes the object
by some means or instrument. The means of knowledge is regarded by the Nyaya to be the special or
uncommon cause of valid knowledge.9 For the Nayayikas the causes which are causes of every effect
are common causes while causes that are specific for a specific effect are special causes. For example,
space, time, and destiny which are involved in all kinds of effects are common causes. Pramāna is
considered special because Pramāna is always accompanied by Pramā; again, it is with the help of
Pramāna that the subject arrives at valid knowledge; further, Pramāna is the last link in the chain of
conditions required to lead to valid knowledge. Moreover, kinds of valid knowledge are distinguished
on the basis of the kinds of Pramāna.

7
Tarka-samgraha, I, 4
8
Tarka-samgraha, I, 2
9
Tarka-samgraha, III, 23
 5

The Vedanta View of Pramā

Two alternative definitions can be found regarding Pramā in Vedanta. 10 Pramā can be defined as
‘knowledge which has for its object something that is not already known and uncontradicted’; it can
also be defined as ‘knowledge which has for its object something that is uncontradicted’. In the first
case Pramā has the characteristics of novelty and uncontradictedness (anadhigatavadhita). It means
that valid knowledge is both true and original, i.e., it gives us new knowledge. In the second definition,
valid knowledge is characterized only by truth or uncontradicted knowledge of objects (abadhitatva).

Regarding the characteristic of truth the Vedantins say that knowledge is always of the nature of truth.
For them, it is the very nature of knowledge that it reveals its object. There is no knowledge which does
not manifest the nature of some object. And if it manifests or reveals the nature of an object, then it
must be true. For, if it reveals, then it follows that it must be true. False knowledge, which is nothing
but knowledge falsified and thus being no knowledge at all, cannot reveal the nature of any object. If it
were not true it would not have been able to reveal the nature of an object. In other words, for the
Vedantins knowledge does not require the condition of faithfulness to the nature of an object to become
true. Unlike the Nayayikas, for the Vedantins, knowledge by virtue of being knowledge is true without
requiring any further conditions to make it true.

The Vedantins argue that faithfulness to reality or correspondence cannot be proof of truth. To know
that knowledge corresponds to the fact, one has to fall back upon checking the harmony of experiences.
One can come to know that the knowledge is faithful to reality when one finds that one’s knowledge
coheres with other experiences. This is bringing in coherence (samvada) to prove the truth of
knowledge. But coherence simply means that one’s knowledge coheres with the knowledge that is
acquired till the present; nothing can be asserted about whether it will or will not cohere with knowledge
that will be gathered henceforth. It is possible that a future experience falsifies what one considers as
knowledge at the present. Thus, to agree on coherence as the test of truth is not to say that knowledge
is absolutely free from error, but is to say that knowledge is uncontradicted. Again, the Vedantins argue
that the pragmatic test cannot prove truth.

There are instances where a cognition which later turns out to be false may lead to a successful action.
The example given by the Vedantins is that of jewel that emits lustre. On seeing the lustre a person may
think it to be a jewel and accordingly plan to get it. On approaching the object he gets the jewel. But at
the same time he comes to see that what he thought of as the jewel was actually the lustre emitted by
the jewel and not the jewel itself. His cognition in this case was false but it led to a successful activity.

10
Vedanta-paribhasa
 6

As a result it can be said that the pragmatic test is no test for truth. One has to fall back upon truth as
uncontradictedness. Thus for the Vedantins knowledge must have the characteristic of being true and
the truth of knowledge consists in its uncontradictedness.11

Knowledge is alternatively defined as both uncontradicted and novel in nature. In that case novelty
becomes a mark of knowledge. According to this definition knowledge which does not add anything
new to our present stock of knowledge cannot be regarded as valid. Validity requires discovering of
new objects or new features of an already known object. Valid knowledge adds to what we already
know. Now the question that arises in this respect is whether continuous cognition of an object can be
called knowledge at all as subsequent moments of cognitions reveals the same object. It can be answered
by saying that continuous cognition of an object is also knowledge. The reason is that though the object
may feel not-new in subsequent moments of its cognitions, yet actually the object is new not only in the
first moment of cognition, but in all the subsequent moments as well. There may not be any change in
the spatial character of the object of cognition, but there is temporal change in the object of cognition
in each new moment of cognition. As such, the object cognized in each successive moment after the
first moment of cognition of the object is not the previous object but a new object cognized in each
moment. In moments of cognition the object is cognized as ‘present’ and the ‘present’ object is not the
‘past’ object cognized moments before. Therefore, each moment of cognition is cognition of a new
object and as such is novel. Thus continued cognition is valid knowledge.

The objection against continuous cognition as not being knowledge can also be answered in another
way: According to the tenets of Vedanta, in continuous cognition of an object there is no break in
knowledge. For example, in the continuous cognition of a jar there is the knowledge of the jar as the
mental mode (antaḥkaraṇa vrtti) that assumes the form of a jar does not change, till another mode
arises. Thus the continuous cognition is actually one and has one object throughout the duration.
Cognitions are differentiated or individuated on the basis of its objects and not on the basis of moments
of time. The cognition of a jar for a few seconds is one cognition while the cognition of a jar for a few
seconds and a flower for the next few seconds are two cognitions of the jar and the flower.

The two alternative definitions of valid knowledge leave the door open for considering or not
considering memory (Smṛti) as valid knowledge. If truth is considered as the only condition of validity
of knowledge, then memory can be viewed as valid. Memory being identical in content with the fact
which is being remembered is true. Memory being true representation is valid, but as it requires falling
back upon past experience, it cannot be considered as a separate source of knowledge. Nevertheless,

11
Vedanta-paribhasa- abadhitartha-visayakatva
 7

memory cannot be identified with illusion or doubt either. Firstly, it is true and secondly one believes
it to be true. However, if valid knowledge requires that it is characterized by novelty, memory does not
seem capable of being treated as valid. This is so because memory by virtue of revealing only that
object which has already been known cannot add anything new to the already existing body of
knowledge. It always tells something about things whose knowledge has already been acquired. Thus
memory is not valid knowledge if novelty is a criterion of validity.

The Vedantins seem to keep themselves aloof of the debate whether novelty is essential for validity.
They thus end up being neither in favour of accepting the validity of memory nor its invalidity.
However, memory can be argued to have newness. In memory one experiences past knowledge as such.
This knowledge of something as past is new which was not there when it was apprehended first. Thus
memory can be accepted as a new experience though it may not be given the status of a separate source
of knowledge, because it does not fulfill the required criterion of novelty.

On the basis of the required criteria of knowledge, the Vedantins accept six different sources of
knowledge. They are: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), testimony
(sabda), postulation (arthapatti) and non-cognition (anupalabdhi). Corresponding to the sources of
knowledge there are thus six different kinds of valid knowledge for the Vedanta.

Conclusion

The word Pramā stands for valid knowledge. However, the meaning of the term ‘valid knowledge’ does
not mean the same thing for different schools. For the Nyaya, valid knowledge is true apprehension
while for the Vedanta it is characterized by uncontradictedness and novelty. Furthermore, the number
of kinds of valid knowledge accepted by the two schools is also different. This can be attributed to their
advocacy of different metaphysics. Though Pramā or valid knowledge looks like a single term it cannot
be taken to stand for one kind of knowledge. Thus, to understand the meaning of the term Pramā or
valid knowledge, it needs to be understood as found in different schools.