Legal implications of the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China under

International Law
Zheng Zhihua, Wu Jingnan

Editor's Note

In recent years, the study of the South China Sea by Bill Hayton, a BBC journalist and associate Fellow with the
Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, has gained international popularity. Hayton is very good at using
international media and international forums to disseminate his research. He is very often invited by media,
international studies institutions, as well as major research platforms on the South China Sea to preach his
version of “South China Sea Story”.

If Hayton's research on the South China Sea is objective, it would be helpful to promote peaceful resolution of the
South China Sea disputes. Unfortunately, Hayton's research has adopted an extreme Eurocentric perspective, with
a strong bias and lack of basic sympathy for the history of Asia, resulting in a very narrow and even diametrically
different interpretation of the history of the South China Sea, deepening the rift between China and its neighboring
countries. Mainly based on English newspapers in the first half of the twentieth century, Hayton’s research’s
cognitive dimension is very narrow, and the interpretation is deeply fragmented, which even violates some basic
historical common sense.

Moreover, Hayton does not have a comprehensive, comparative view of history. He likes to capture fragmented
information for over-interpretation, and neglects the whole picture. With regard to territorial and maritime
disputes, a relatively objective research conclusion can be reached only after weighing and comparing the
evidences given by all the States concerned.

This article and the following two articles try to re-examine Hayton‘s research on the history of South China Sea,
which is intended to reduce some prejudices and misunderstandings, and to promote a more balanced
understanding of the history of the South China Sea.

[Suggested citation: Zhihua Zheng, Jingnan Wu, “Legal implications of the Map of the South
China Sea Islands of China under International Law,” SCS Probing Initiative 13 July, 2020.]

Introduction
During the period Republic of China, Chinese publishers produced mainly three
formats of maps of the South China Sea. The first portrayed Pratas Island and the
Paracel Islands only, this type skipped the other islands in the South China Sea.
Examples of this type include the New Geographic Map of the Republic of China
compiled by Hu Jinjie and Cheng Fukai in 1914, [1] the New Chinese Situation Atlas
developed by Tu Sicong in 1927, [2] and China’s Model Atlas edited by Chen Duo in
1933. [3] The second type included Pratas Island, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield
Bank and the Nine Islets in the Spratly Islands. One example of this type is the
Newly-Made Chinese Atlas (with indexes) developed by Chen Duo in 1934. [4] The
third type included Pratas Island, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the
Spratly Islands in their entirety few examples of this type are; the Map of the South
1
China Sea Islands of China compiled by China’s Committee for the Examination for
the Land and Sea Maps in 1935, [5] the New Atlas of China’s Construction by Bai
Meichu in 1936, [6] the New Atlas of China’s Provinces and Cities by Su Jiarong in
1937, [7] the New Provincial Atlas of China edited by Ding Wenjiang, Weng Wenhao
and Zeng Shiying in 1939, [8] the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands
produced by the Department of Territorial Administration under the Ministry of the
Interior of the Republic of China in 1948, [9] and the New Provincial Atlas of China
(version 5 in the post-war era) edited by Ding Wenjiang, Weng Wenhao and Zeng
Shiying in 1948. [10] Among them, the two officially released by the government of
the Republic of China — the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands introduced
in 1948 and the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China in 1935 are the most
authoritative.
For years, academia has focused research on the Location Map of the South
China Sea Islands, however, the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China has
received little focus. Many even question the significance and value of the Map of the
South China Sea Islands of China. According to Li Woteng, the connection between
China and the islands in the South China Sea was very weak, let alone governance in
real sense. The maps were only used for territory expansion in political terms. [11]
The BBC Reporter Bill Hayton suggests that; “the committee did not have the
capacity to undertake its own surveys. Instead it undertook a table-top exercise,
analyzing maps produced by others and forming a consensus about names and
locations.” In the Table of Chinese and English Names for All of the Chinese Islands
and Reefs in the South China Sea, the names in Chinese were mostly translated or
transliterated from English, with many translation mistakes. [12] In the South China
Sea Arbitration, the Philippines questioned; “on what basis does China purport to
claim historic rights for an area over which it had so little involvement or connection
that most of the features had no Chinese names?” [13] The Philippines further stated:
“Contemporaneous archival research uncovered no historical basis for China’s claim
to possess sovereignty over any island in the South China Sea, even the northern
Paracel group, let alone historical rights in respect of the waters.” [14]

2
 Map of the South China Sea Islands of China, 1935
The Map of the South China Sea Islands of China was the first officially
produced by the Government of the Republic of China that included the Spratly
Islands in China’s territory and clearly marked China’s territorial boundary in
the South China Sea. How do we evaluate its significance from an international
law perspective? [15] Considering relevant international legal practices, the weight
of a map as legal evidence for a State’s territorial claims is mainly determined by five
factors. First, whether the map can clearly show a State’s intention of sovereignty.
3
Second, whether the map is accurate. Third, whether the map in itself is neutral and
objective. Fourth, whether maps of the country are consistent over time. Fifth,
whether the map obtained recognition or acquiesce from the international community
or States concerned. [16] Within a legal context, how can we review any questions or
mistakes in the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China objectively and
comprehensively? This paper intends to review the significance of the Map of the
South China Sea Islands of China from an international law perspective. The
above-mentioned five factors, which influence a map’s potency as evidence, are
carefully considered, and further interpretations are made by following China’s
transformation from the Qing Empire to a modern nation-state. The intention is for
this study to inspire future in depth studies and address certain questions concerning
China’s map publication and cartography in this period.
1. The 1935 Map and China’s Sovereignty Intention
To show whether a map has probative force relating to a State’s territorial
claims, the most critical issue is to clarify whether the map reflects the will of the
State, particularly its territorial intent. In 1986, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) pointed out in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) that “maps
can still have no greater legal value than that of corroborative evidence…except when
the maps are in the category of a physical expression of the will of the State.” [17]
Then in 2002, the ICJ further noted in the case concerning the Sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) that, “…in some cases maps may
acquire such legal force [establishing territorial rights], but where this is so the legal
force does not arise solely from their intrinsic merits: it is because such maps fall into
the category of physical expressions of the will of the State or States concerned. This
is the case, for example, when maps are annexed to an official text of which they form
an integral part.” [18] In the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. U.S.A.), Judge
Max Huber stated that, “…only with the greatest caution can account be taken of
maps in deciding a question of sovereignty … anyhow, a map affords only an
indication – and that a very indirect one – and, except when annexed to a legal
instrument, has not the value of such an instrument, involving recognition or
abandonment of rights.” [19] Therefore, whether a map can reflect a country’s
sovereignty intention forms the basis of its probative value under international law.
It has been argued that The Land and Water Maps Review Committee was
producing territorial maps in 1935. Bill Hayton has contended that：
[I]t is not clear from the evidence available that the committee was actually asserting a
territorial claim to the Spratlys, even at this point – 1935. In April 1935, the second volume of the
Committee’s journal included a map with an ambiguous title, 中國南海各島嶼圖 , which may be
translated as ‘Map of China’s Islands in the South Sea’ but also ‘Map of Islands in the South
China Sea.’ It showed the locations of the islands with their new Chinese names. There was no
boundary line marked on the map and no indication about which features the committee
considered to be Chinese and which were not. It could be that they considered all the named islets,
rocks, reefs, and submerged banks to be Chinese, but the map makes no distinction between their

4
names and those of places that we can assume the committee did not regard as Chinese, such as
Manila. [20]

It should be pointed out that The Land and Water Maps Review Committee,
which was established in June 7, 1933, was an official body composed of
representatives from the Ministry of the Navy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Education, Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and other institutions
under the initiation of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of China, with a
mission to review and determine the territories of the Republic of China. As was
stated, the Committee worked “…with a focus on compiling standard maps and
reviewing maps of all kinds” to prevent “the incorrect relay of erroneous information
due to intentional and unintentional reasons.” [21] Within its mandate, in the
identification of territorial boundaries, the Committee undoubtedly represented
China’s will. In this sense, the reviewed and approved Table of Chinese and English
Names for All of the Chinese Islands and Reefs in the South China Sea and the Map of
the South China Sea Islands of China is an official and authoritative manifestation
of China’s State Will.
The above two documents specified China’s territorial scope in the South
China Sea, encompassing Dongsha Island, the Xisha Islands, the Nansha Islands
(now the Zhongsha Islands), and the Tuansha Islands (now the Nansha Islands).
Furthermore, the title Map of the South China Sea Islands of China in itself spoke for
the intention to clarify China’s sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea,
providing a strong sense of political and sovereign intent. As to the ambiguity issue
proposed by Bill Hayton, if the title were to be interpreted from the Chinese language,
there would be no ambiguity at all; rather, it clearly states China’s claim of
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, on March 22, 1935,
the resolution of the 29th meeting of the Committee also clearly stated that Dongsha
Island, the Xisha Islands, the Nansha Islands and the Tuansha Islands must be
included when sketching maps of jurisdictions and territories. [22]
Additionally, the historical background of the map’s production should also be
discussed. The Map of the South China Sea Islands of China was made under the
situation which China faced, with the combined disruptions of internal revolution and
external invasion. At that time, France and Japan were meddling in the normal
peacetime status of the islands in the South China Sea. In those days, Civil Society
strongly criticized the Government of the Republic of China for being unresponsive
and ineffective in its response. Under these circumstances, the Government of the
Republic of China produced this map and others, in a bid to clarify China’s
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and thus respond to the unlawful
occupation of islands and reefs by these Foreign Powers. Bill Hayton acclaimed that
the absence of a boundary line made it impossible to distinguish Chinese maritime
features from those of neighboring countries. However, with additional observation, it
can be observed that the mapmakers had clearly noted “Philippines Islands(U.S.A.)”
“美领菲律宾群岛”on the Philippine Archipelago, “the British Commonwealth”(“英” )
on the Northern part of Borneo, “the Netherlands” (“荷”) on the Southern part of
5
Borneo, as well as “France”(“ 法 ”) signifying Vietnamese land in French
Indo-China. There was no distinct marking of this type for the South China Sea
islands, they were marked in the same way China had dealt with the Hainan Island
and the areas along the coastline of Guangdong — all default territories of China, thus
being consistent with the title “Map of the South China Sea Islands of China”.
In short, taking into full account the compiling body, the name of the map, the
historical background of mapmaking, it would not be difficult to determine that the
Map of the South China Sea Islands of China expressed the Chinese Government’s
intentions of Sovereignty for the South China Sea islands at that time.
2. Accuracy of the Map
The technical accuracy of a map is an important consideration for judging
the probative force of it as evidence. In the frontier dispute case between Burkina
Faso and the Republic of Mali, the Judge of the ICJ observed that “the actual weight
to be attributed to maps as evidence depends on a range of considerations, some of
which relate to the technical reliability of maps. … technical reliability had increased
considerably owing to the progress achieved by aerial and satellite photography since
the 1950s.” [23] In the Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), Judge Max Huber even
more clearly stated that, “the first condition required of maps that are to serve as
evidence on points of law is their geographical accuracy.” [24]
In regard to the accuracy of the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China,
Bill Hayton has also raised this question, “the Committee did not have the capacity
to undertake its own surveys. Instead it undertook a table-top exercise, analyzing
maps produced by others and forming a consensus about names and locations.” In the
Table of Chinese and English Names for All of the Chinese Islands and Reefs in the
South China Sea, “what is remarkable about these names is that all were translations
or transliterations of the names marked on British maps… I suspect that this map (a
1918 map entitled Asiatic Archipelago) also guided the committee’s choices about
which features to give Chinese names to. There are some errors in the committee’s list.
The committee also made mistakes in its translations.” [25]
Generally speaking, the more accuracy a map that is used to identify territorial
boundaries has, the more weight will be attributed to it as an evidence. Nevertheless,
we should bear in mind that the main purpose for a political map is to identify a
State’s position and its territorial claims. In particular, for areas that are not yet
delimited and thus subject to dispute, the accuracy of the map should be evaluated
according to its purpose and function. If a map can basically reflect a country’s
territorial claims in clarity, it should be deemed as accurate enough. According to the
award of Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), the ICJ pointed out that
“the importance of a map might not lie in the map itself, which theoretically might
even be inaccurate, but in the attitude towards it manifested – or action in respect of it
taken – by the Party concerned or its official representatives.” [26]

6
 It is true that the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China borrowed some
information from British maps. But it is noteworthy that at a time when aerial
photography and satellite remote sensing technologies were underdeveloped, it was a
rather common practice to complement each other's advantages instead of measuring
every feature on site. The accuracy of a map should be assessed against mapping
techniques at that time rather than modern technical standards and technological
conditions. [27] Maps are sketched to reflect a State’s position and territorial claims.
Any map that serves this purpose should be deemed accurate as it clearly portrays the
intent of the State that publishes it. The Map of the South China Sea Islands of
China can clearly reflect the Chinese Government’s position and territorial
claims of the islands in the South China Sea, which fully speaks for its sufficient
accuracy.
3. The Neutrality and Objectivity of the Map of the South China Sea Islands
of China
The significance of a map under international law also depends on its
producer’s neutrality, objectivity and authority. Generally speaking, maps
produced by independent mapping experts have greater weight as an evidence. On the
contrary, those produced under the direction of a single party have less significance.
In the case of Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), the ICJ pointed out
that “other considerations which determine the weight of maps as evidence relate to
the neutrality of their sources towards the dispute in question and the parties to that
dispute.” [28] In the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia),
Judge Oda also stated that “a map produced by a relevant government body may
sometimes indicate the government’s position concerning the territoriality or
sovereignty of a particular area or island. However, that fact alone is not
determinative of the legal status of the area or island in question. The boundary line
on such maps may be interpreted as representing the maximum claim of the country
concerned but does not necessarily justify that claim.” [29]
The Map of the South China Sea Islands of China produced in 1935 was a direct
response to the occupation and annexation of the islands in the South China Sea by
France and Japan during a period of conflict within Mainland China. From the
sovereign intention perspective, the map stated China’s state will and constituted
a countermeasure against France and Japan’s annexation activities. In the
meantime, the map confirmed the fact that the Chinese fishermen had been
utilizing for human habitation and economic life the islands in the South China
Sea for several thousand years. [30] Generally speaking, maps are always produced
by specific countries. Therefore, it is normal for a country, in particular a party to a
territorial dispute, to produce maps to reflect its sovereign intention. International
judicial practices have determined that a map should not be disqualified as evidence
of fact just because it is produced by one party to the dispute, but be assessed in
combination with all other factors, including all other relevant evidence. [31]
4. The Consistency of the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China
7
 The inconsistency of maps released at different times is likely to affect their
reliability, and at the same time go against the doctrine of estoppel . For example, in
the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), the ICJ stated that
“in the light of the uncertainty and inconsistency of the cartographic material
submitted to it, the Court considers itself unable to draw conclusions from the map
evidence produced in this case”[32]
A map should be consistent as otherwise, the true intention of the State cannot be
identified from it. Therefore, to prove a state’s consistency in its territorial claims,
international judicial institutions usually require that maps provided by the parties
concerned as evidence should be consistent with each other. [33] In the meanwhile,
considering the technical restrictions map creation has undergone over time, including
mapping standards and conditions as well as scientific technologies, the requirement
for map consistency is not absolute, but basic consistency should be maintained. [34]
Bill Hayton has stated that China gradually expanded its claims in the South
China Sea since early 1900s and finally established its maritime geobody. [35]
According to Li Woteng, “Before 1908, the islands in the South China Sea can be
found in no Chinese map. Between 1909 and 1917, the Paracel Islands and Pratas
Islands were gradually included in Chinese maps. Between 1917 and 1934, the
Paracel Islands and Pratas Island were included on Chinese maps as China’s
territories, but as shown in the maps, the Macclesfield Bank and the Spratlys Islands
were still not considered as being part of China. Since 1935, the Macclesfield Bank
and the Spratlys Islands started to be included into all Chinese maps and the
Scarborough Shoal was sketched out in most of the maps. After 1947, the government
of the Republic of China defined the boundary around the South China Sea with the
eleven-dash line. Since then, the South China Sea has been basically the same on
Chinese maps (except that the eleven-dash line was replaced by the nine-dash line
after the founding of the People’s Republic of China).” [36] Here, Li Woteng blurred
the distinction between official and private maps. Private maps have no legal effect in
international law unless verified by the State’s authorities. [37] The Map of the South
China Sea Islands of China published in April 1935 was the “first official map of the
South China Sea publicly released by the Government of the Republic of China.” [38]
The publication aimed to regulate and rectify the confusing and disorderly condition
of the map market in China at that time. In this sense, the differences contained in the
Map of the South China Sea Islands of China from the previous private maps has no
adverse impact on its legal effect.
Since the publication of the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China in
1935 to claim Pratas Island, the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the
Spratlys Islands as Chinese territories, although the national regime has shifted,
the Chinese Government has been consistent regarding its claim to these islands.
Also, as for Li Woteng and others’ accusation of the Government of the Republic of
China to be “expanding boundaries on the maps”, it holds no water at all. China was
in a weak state under the continual armed threat of the Colonial Powers. Therefore, it
would be a clearly absurdity for China to risk “expanding territories”. [39] At a time
8
when France and Japan nibbled or devoured islands in the South China Sea, and
China was in a state of conflict, the Committee mapped and released the Map of the
South China Sea Islands of China was only to defend its sovereign territory.
Essentially, the map aimed at safeguarding China’s legal rights by asserting the extent
of the country’s territories in the South China Sea.
5. Stakeholders’ Recognition or Acquiesce in the Map of the South China Sea
Islands of China
Whether a map is recognized or acquiesced by stakeholder countries, and
whether it reflects the international community’s overlapping consensus is a key
factor to assessing its legal implication. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary
Commission pointed out correctly that “a map per se may have little legal weight: but
if the map is cartographically satisfactory in relevant respects, it may, as the material
basis for, e.g., acquiescent behavior, be of great legal significance.” [40] It further
stated that “a map produced by an official government agency of a party, on a scale
sufficient to enable its portrayal of the disputed boundary area to be identifiable,
which is generally available for purchase or examination, whether in the country of
origin or elsewhere, and acted upon, or not reacted to, by the adversely affected party,
can be expected to have significant legal consequences.” [41] The 1935 Map of the
South China Sea Islands of China was in itself an outcome of China’s reaction to
France and Japan’s annexation. There was no evidence proving that the map had been
acknowledged or acquiesced by Japan, or France at that time. However, Both Japan
and France renounced potential rights to the islands and reefs in the South China Sea.
It should be noted, when the Location Map of the South China Sea Islands was
published in 1948 as a continuance to the 1935 map, the International Community, in
particular the neighboring stakeholder countries or their Colonial Masters, filed no
objection for a long period. [42] Yehuda Blum observed that:
[R]ecent instances of protests lodged against ‘map claims’ seem to indicate
that States do, in fact,‘keep a vigilant watch over the maps published by the civilized
nations’…On the whole, it seems to emerge that States will be imputed with
knowledge of each other’s domestic legislative activities and other acts done under
their authority, and that the plea of ignorance will be accepted only in the most
exceptional circumstances. States desirous of reserving their rights will therefore be
well advised to follow with a substantial amount of self-interested awareness the
official acts of other States and to raise an objection to them—through the legitimate
means recognized by international law—should they feel that their rights have been
affected, or are likely to be affected, by such acts. [43]
In the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), the
ICJ gave a clear interpretation of the unfavorable consequences that may result from a
State’s silence and lack of reaction, by pointing out: “It is clear that the circumstances
were such as called for some reaction, within a reasonable period, on the part of the
Siamese authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map or had any serious
question to raise in regard to it. They did not do so, either then or for many years, and
9
thereby must be held to have acquiesced. Qzri tacet consentire videtur si loqui
debuisset ac potuisset.” [44] Accordingly, we may presume that the stakeholder
countries have to a certain extent acknowledged or acquiesced in the Map of the South
China Sea Islands of China.

Location Map of the South China Sea Islands,1948

10
 Conclusions
China has suffered great challenges and humiliation, inflicted by Colonial Powers
since the outbreak of the Opium Wars in the mid-19th century. Since 1864, China has
tried to learn and use the concept of Western International Law to defend its territorial
integrity. As Joseph Levenson put it: “The history of modern China is a journey from
Tianxia（all under heaven/天下） to a nation-state.” [45] “Tian Xia is a civilization
order concept based on the sharing of Chinese culture and ethical order.” [46] Under
the order of Tian Xia system, countries are not separated by concrete boundaries but
united by culture and moral appeal. The Western vocabulary of sovereignty,
nation-state and boundary is ill-suited for the traditional Chinese worldview.
The Map of the South China Sea Islands of China published in 1935 was
produced in the process of State transformation. It failed to fully reflect the history of
the Chinese people, in particular, the Chinese fishermen exploring, naming, using and
managing the islands of South China Sea, in acts that are described today as forming
the foundation of an economic and human life. It was also flawed in naming islands
and providing geographic information in detail suitable for navigational purposes.
Nevertheless, the 1935 map was the first of its kind that the Government of the
Republic of China officially published to define China’s territorial scope in the South
China Sea. It fully and clearly reflected China’s sovereignty intent and territorial
claims over the islands in the South China Sea. Even from the perspective of modern
International Law, China's claim on the Islands and Reefs in the South China Sea is
much earlier than that of its neighboring countries. In addition, considering the
development of mapping technologies at that time, the 1935 map was accurate when
compared to other territorial maps. The sovereignty claims on the islands in the South
China Sea portrayed by the 1935 map was inherited by other official maps such as the
Location Map of South China Sea Islands, which represents China’s consistent and
continuous claims over the islands in the South China Sea and also the long-term
acquiescence of neighboring countries.
The 1935 map has not only significant value in proving China’s territorial
sovereignty of the islands in the South China Sea, but also profound meaning as a
facilitator of China’s transition into a modern Nation- State, defining its geographical
boundaries and safeguarding China’s maritime rights and interests today.

Notes:
Dr. ZHENG Zhihua, associate Professor of Japan Research Center of Shanghai Jiaotong
University, and Head of East Asia Marine Policy Project. Wu Jingnan, LLM in International Law
(ECUPL), paralegal of Shanghai KaiRong Law Firm.
其中之《中华民国边界海岸及面积区划图》以连续线表示南海海疆线，线西起北
[1]
部湾中越陆上边界线，最南端在北纬 °左右。版本信息：亚东出图书馆出版， 15-16
年。
1914

11
[2] 其中第七图为《中华疆界变迁图》，绘“连续疆界线”，从广西防城一直沿北部
湾中越中间线往南，最南端在北纬 15-16°左右。版本信息：世界舆地学社出版，1927
年。
[3] 图中绘“连续疆界线”， 线西起北部湾中越陆上边界线，最南端在北纬 15-16 °
左右。在东沙群岛和西沙群岛的外围，画出一条国界标志线。版本信息：明光印刷公
司印，上海舆地学社发行 1933 年 7 月。
[4] 图中绘有“连续疆界线”，扩展至九小岛之外，南端扩至北纬 9 °左右。版本信
息：上海商务印书馆印行 1934 年 8 月。
[5] 绘有东沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛、斯卡巴洛礁（黄岩岛）和团沙群岛，无海
疆线。版本信息：《水陆地图审查委员会会刊》， 1935 年第 2 期。
[6] 其中之《海疆南展后之中国全图》绘“连续疆界线”，内标有东沙群岛、西沙群
岛、南沙群岛和团沙群岛，最南端绘在北纬 4°左右。版本信息：北平建设图书馆 1936
年印行，系中学教科书。
[7] 其中之《中国南海各岛屿图》绘东沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛、斯卡巴洛礁（黄
岩岛）和团沙群岛，上标注“属中国”，无海疆线。这是 1935 年 4 月《水陆地图审
查委员会会刊》第 2 期刊印《中国南海各岛屿图》的彩印版。版本信息：日新舆地学
社 1937 年 9 月初版。
[8] 其中之《广东》以开小窗口的方式，绘有东沙群岛、西沙群岛、南沙群岛、和团
沙群岛等。南至安达息波礁（今息波礁）。版本信息：申报馆 1939 年 7 月第 4 版。
[9] 内政部为调整各群岛名称，将三十年代命名的南沙群岛正式改为中沙群岛，将团
沙群岛改称为南沙群岛，以符合诸岛在南海海域中所处的地理位置。绘有 11 段断续
线。最南端绘在北纬 4°左右的曾母暗沙。版本信息：1947 年国防部测量局代印，1948
年 2 月正式公布。
[10] 其中之《政治区域图》与《广东》以连续线的方式划出南海海疆线，最南端绘在
北纬 4°左右的曾母暗沙。本书经内政部审核，并获得地图发行许可证。版本信息：
申报馆 1948 年 7 月第 5 版。
[11] 黎蜗藤，《从地图开疆到人工造岛：百年南海纷争史》，台北：五南图书出版股
份有限公司， 2017 年版。
[12] Bill Hayton (2018). The Modern Origins of China’s South China Sea Claims: Maps,
Misunderstandings, and the Maritime Geobody. Modern China, 45(2), 127-170.
[13] South China Sea Arbitration, Day 1 Hearing on the Merits and Remaining Issues of
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 24. Nov. 2015, 96.
[14] South China Sea Arbitration, Day 1 Hearing on the Merits and Remaining Issues of
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 24. Nov. 2015, 98.
台湾学者陈鸿瑜认为，这应该是民国政府首次将南沙群岛纳入版图。参陈鸿瑜：
[15]
《旧金山和约下西沙和南沙群岛之领土归属问题》，《远景基金会季刊》，第 卷 12
第 期， 年 月
4 2011 10 .
郑志华：《论国际法上地图证据的效力》，《法商研究》 年第 期。
[16] 2013 2
[17] Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso /Republic of Mali) , [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 554.
[18] Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), [2002] I.C.J.
Rep. 625, p. 649, para. 45.
[19] Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. U.S.A.), Award of 4 April 1928, [2006] II
–
Reports of International Arbitral Awards 829 at 852 3.

12
 ’
[20] Bill Hayton (2018). The Modern Origins of China s South China Sea Claims: Maps,
Misunderstandings, and the Maritime Geobody. Modern China, 45(2), 158.
[21] 《水陆地图审查委员会会刊》， 1935年 月第 期。
1 1
[22] 《水陆地图审查委员会会刊》， 1935年 月第 期。
4 3
[23] Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali, [1986] I.C.J. Rep.554.
[24] Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. U.S.A.), Award of 4 April 1928, [2006] II
–
Reports of International Arbitral Awards 829 at 852 3.
’
[25] Bill Hayton (2018). The Modern Origins of China s South China Sea Claims: Maps,
Misunderstandings, and the Maritime Geobody. Modern China, 45(2), 158-159.
[26] Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), Decision of 18 February 1977,
[2006] XXI Reports of International Arbitral Awards 53 at 164, para. 137.
[27] 林金枝：《南海诸岛范围线画法的由来演变》，《南洋研究》 年第 期。
1979 4
[28] Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 554 at 583, para.
56.
[29] Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Separate Opinion of Judge Oda at 1133
– 4, para. 40.
李国强：《民国政府与南沙群岛》，《近代史》 年第 期第 页。另参，
[30] 1994 2 166
吴士存：《民国时期的南海诸岛问题》，《民国档案》 年第 期，以及沈顺根： 1996 3
《可爱的南沙》，上海远东出版社， 年版，第 页。 1992 106
[31] UBAY, Romulo R. Jr. Evidence in International Adjudication: Map Evidence in
Territorial Sovereignty Dispute Cases. Aegean Review of the Law of the Sea and
Maritime Law, (2011) 1, 287.
[32] Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports1999, at 1100,
para. 87.
[33] Charles Cheney Hyde, Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes,
American Journal of International Law, (1933) 27, 311 at 315.
´
[34] Ahmed ABOU-EL-WAFA, Les diffe rends internationaux concernant les frontie`res
terrestres dans la jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de justice. Collected Courses of
–
the Hague Academy of International Law, (2010) 343, 9 at 432 4.
’
[35] Bill Hayton (2018). The Modern Origins of China s South China Sea Claims: Maps,
Misunderstandings, and the Maritime Geobody. Modern China, 45(2).
黎蜗藤，《从地图开疆到人工造岛：百年南海纷争史》，台北：五南图书出版股
[36]
份有限公司， 年版。 2017
[37] Boundary between the Dominion of Canada and the Colony of New Found Land in
the Labrador Peninsula, 425.
李国强：《从地名演变看中国南海疆域的形成历史》，《中国边疆史地研究》
[38] 2011
年第 期。 4
葛兆光教授曾一针见血地指出：“问题是，如何维持 五族共和 ？如何捍卫领土
[39] “ ”
主权？当时，很多中国的政治家和知识人却没有想清楚。从 年之后，南北和议、 1913
袁氏窃国、青岛事件、二十一条，这一连串事件的发生才提醒人们高度注意，也恰恰
是日本对于满蒙回藏鲜的觊觎，刺激了人们对这个既是政治问题又是学术问题的日益
关注：‘中国’究竟应当有多大的疆域，‘中华民族’究竟应当包括多少族群”“ 过
去很多人认为，20
去很多人认为，20 世纪上半叶，在“救亡”和“启蒙”两大主题之间，是“救亡”
压倒了“启蒙”，我却觉得“启蒙”似乎从来没有压倒过“救亡”，因为“救亡”始
13
终是现代中国的中心话题和巨大力量，而“启蒙”却是精英世界的话题，远远没有成
为民众世界的共识。因此，“启蒙”至今仍是一个未竟的事业。”参见葛兆光，从“帝
国疆域”到“国家领土”——“五四”之前有关“主权”问题的日本刺激与中国反应，
《文史哲》 2019 年第 3 期。
[40] Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia (Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission), Decision of 1 January
2002, International Legal Materials, Vol. 41, 2002, 1089, para. 4.67.
[41] Delimitation Between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the
Dispute (Eritrea/Yemen), Decision of 9 October 1998, [2006] XXII Reports of
–
International Arbitral Awards 209 at 1075 6, para. 3.21.
详细论述参见，郑志华《中国南海 形线地图的可采性与证明力》，《外交评
[42] U
论》 年第 期。
2013 4
[43] Yehuda Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965) at
150.
[44] Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962] I.C.J. Reports 6 at 23.
［美］约瑟夫·列文森，《儒教中国及其现代命运》，郑大华、任菁译；中国社
[45]
会科学出版社 年版，第 页。 2000 87
“天下是否有道”是天下存亡之关键，所以顾炎武先生说，“有亡国，有亡天下。
[46]
亡国与亡天下奚辨？曰：易姓改号，谓之亡国。仁义充塞，而至于率兽食人，人将相
食，谓之亡天下。……知保天下然后知保国。保国者，其君其臣，肉食者谋之；保天
下，匹夫之贱与有责焉耳矣。顾炎武：《日知录·卷十三·正始》。

Legal implications of the Map of the South China Sea Islands of China under
International Law
Zheng Zhihua, Wu Jingnan

Abstract: Map of China’s Islands in the South Sea made in the year 1935 was the first map

of the Kuomintang government to officially define China's land borders in the South China Sea. It

is of great significance for China's claims to the sovereignty of the South China Sea islands and

the maintenance of maritime rights and interests. However, the value of the Map has been

questioned by some scholars and countries at the international level. Taking the principle of

probative force of map evidence and the historical background of the Map into consideration, this

dissertation reexamines the significance of the Map in international law from the following

aspects: whether it reflects the will of the State or States concerned; whether it is accurate or

objective representations of the realities on the ground; whether it was produced neutrally;

whether it is consistent; whether it received a clear recognition or tacit consent of States

concerned.
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 Keywords: Map of China’s Islands in the South Sea; sovereignty; map evidence; probative

force

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