The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a

Reelection Constraint Alter Their Voting Behavior?

Author(s): Mark A. Zupan
Source: Public Choice, Vol. 65, No. 2 (1990), pp. 167-180
Published by: Springer
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Public Choice 65: 167-180, 1990.
@ 1990KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printedin the Netherlands.

The last period problemin politics: Do congressional

representativesnot subject to a reelectionconstraintalter their
voting behavior?*

MARK A. ZUPAN
Departmentof Finance and Business Economics, USC School of Business, Los Angeles,
CA 90089-1421

1. Introduction

In a recentcross-sectionalstudyof Senateroll callvoting, Joe Kaltand I (1990)

findthatthe extentto whichlegislatorsfaithfullyrepresentthe interestsof their
constituentsis negativelyrelatedto the legislators'securityin office. Where
securityin office, as measuredby tenureor most recentmarginof electoral
victory,is higher,thatis, legislators'votingbehaviorlesscloselyreflectsunder-
lyingconstituents'economicinterestsand ideologicalpreferences.Contraryto
the capturetheoryof politics(Peltzman,1976;and Stigler, 1972),our findings
suggestthat policingof policymakersby constituentsis imperfect.In specific
instancesof policymakingas well as on the broadbundleof issues addressed
during their terms in office, policymakersappear to have some leeway to
pursuetheir own independentideologicalpreferences.
John Lott (1988), among others, has correctlypointed out that our cross-
sectionalresultsare subjectto an importantsimultaneitybias. While greater
securityin office may lead to moreideological"shirking"(Alchianand Dem-
setz, 1972;and Jensen and Meckling, 1976)by electedrepresentatives,more
ideologicalshirkingalso diminishesa representative'ssecurityin office.
As Joe Kalt and I (1990) note, the presenceof a simultaneitybias works
againstfindingthe resultsthat we report.Indeed,it is perhapsbecauseof such
a simultaneitybias that Lott (1987)finds legislators'votingto be unrelatedto
the presenceof a reelectionconstraint.For both retiringand nonretiringcon-
gressionalrepresentatives,Lott examinesthe (absolutevalue of the) changes

* The authorwouldlike to thankLindaCohen,Tom Gilligan,Ami Glazer,Doug Joines, Peter

Kretzmer,John Lott, Tony Marino,Hank McMillan,and GordonTullockand workshoppar-
ticipantsat USC for helpfulcomments.DavidFranzblauprovidedableresearchassistancewhile
the USC School of Businesssuppliedresearchfunding.
168

betweenthe 94th(1975-76) and95th (1977-78) Congressesin the ratingscales

providedby ideologicalwatchdog organizationssuch as the Americansfor
DemocraticAction(ADA), AmericanConservativeUnion(ACU), and League
of ConservationVoters (LCV). He finds that retiringrepresentativesdo not
generallyevidenceany significantlygreaterchangesin theirratingscalesthan
nonretiringrepresentativesdo.1
Lott's resultsare not entirelyunexpectedgiven that the sampleof retiring
representatives is likelyto be populatedby individualswithabove-averageabil-
ities and/or desiresto faithfullyservetheirconstituents- as arguedfor by a
theory of electoralsorting(Lott and Reed, 1989). While retirersmay engage
in more ideologicalshirkingafter decidingto quit office, in other words,the
change in such representatives'ideologicalratingsmay evidenceno greater
movementrelativeto the averagenonretirergiven the weakeroverall match
betweenconstituents'preferencesand legislatorroll call voting in the case of
nonretirers.Thatlegislatorswho retiremay displaya betterfit for servingcon-
stituents,at leastpriorto the retirementdecision,is suggestedby the relatively
long averagetenureof retirers.For the membersof the House retiringfrom
political life altogetherin 1978, for example, the averagetenure in 1977 is
approximately18.6 years. In comparison,acrossall membersof the House in
1977, the averagetenureis roughly8.5 years.2
To more fully investigatefor the presenceof a simultaneitybias whichmay
infect the resultsreportedby both Joe Kalt and I (1990)and Lott (1987), this
paper examinesthe extent to which representatives'voting behaviorreflects
underlyingconstituents'interestsduringthe 95thCongress- the last two years
in office for the retiringrepresentativesstudiedby Lott (1987). Specifically,a
comparisonis made of the extent to which representatives'voting behavior
reflectsconstituents'interestsin the year 1977(the first year of the 95th Con-
gress)versusthe year 1978(thesecondyearof the 95thCongress).The compar-
ison is made for four differenttypes of representatives:nonretirers;retirers
who chose not to run in 1978 duringtheir last term in office; retirerswho
decidednot to run in 1978priorto theirlast term in office; and retirerswho
opted not to run for Congressin 1978becausethey aspiredto a higher,state-
wide political office (this last group of retirersincludesrepresentativeswho
opted to run for other politicaloffices such as the U.S. Senateor state gover-
nor).3
The resultsof the investigationsupportthreeimportantconclusions.First,
the decision to retire does appear to affect a politician's voting behavior.
Namely, elected representativesengage in a greateramount of ideological
shirkingafter decidingto quit political office than prior to such a decision.
Second, even though they engage in a greater amount of ideological shirking
after deciding to quit office, retiring representatives are not appreciably further
from where their constituents would like them to be after the decision to quit
 169

politicaloffice thanarenonretiringrepresentatives- owingto electoralsorting

and the fact that retirersdisplayabove-averageabilitiesto serveconstituents
priorto theirretirementdecision.Third,politicianswho betterservetheircon-
stituents' interests in lower-levelpolitical offices (e.g., the U.S. House of
Representatives)appearto be rewardedfor theirmeritoriousservicewith not
only greaterelectoral success but also opportunitiesto run for higher-level
politicaloffices (e.g., a seat in the U.S. Senate).

2. An examination of ADA rating scale residuals

Previous studies (cf., Kalt and Zupan, 1984, 1990; Peltzman, 1984) have noted
that ideologicalrating scales reflect underlyingconstituentinterestsand not
just the independentideologicalpreferencesof imperfectlypoliced political
representatives.Accordingly,a two-stepresearchstrategyis adopted.First,an
attemptis made to explainas much of an ideologicalratingscale as possible
with constituentcharacteristicsin the hope of isolating, as the residual,an
orthogonalrepresentative-specific ideologyfactor.A representative's1977and
1978ratingsrepresentseparateobservations.
Second,the magnitude(in absolutevalueterms)of the ideologyresidualfor
both 1977and 1978is examinedfor four differenttypesof representatives: the
383 nonretiringmembersof the House of Representatives(NONRETIRERS);
the 12 memberswho decidedduringtheir last two-yearterm in Congressto
retirefrom politicallife altogetherin 1978(LATEDECIDERS);the 17 mem-
bers who decidedprior to their last two-yearterm in Congressto retirefrom
political life altogether in 1978 (EARLY DECIDERS); and the 21 members
who retiredin 1978becausethey aspiredto a higher-level,state-widepolitical
office (ASPIRERS).4Retirementdates for LATE DECIDERSand EARLY
DECIDERSarenot publicly-announced retirementdates,but reflectthe point
in time at whichtheserepresentativesprivatelydecidedto seek reelection.The
privateinformationwas obtainedby Lott (1987) in the early 1980sthrough
telephoneinterviewsof the ex-representatives or their spouses (in the case of
deceasedex-representatives).
Since the ADA ratingscale providesa broadly-basedrankingof a policy-
maker's "liberalness"/"conservatism"and is probablythe most frequently
employed measureof legislatorideology (cf., Kalt, 1981; Kalt and Zupan,
1990; Kau and Rubin, 1979; Lott, 1987; Mitchell, 1979; Netter, 1985; Zupan,
1989),this analysisfocuses on representatives'ADA ratings.5The ratingsfor
both 1977and 1978areexpressedas a functionof an intentionallykitchen-sink
set of variables to account for constituents' underlying demographic-economic
and ideological interests. The description of a representative's rating is thus:
170

ADA Rating = f(Constituents' Demographic-Economicand Ideological

Interests)+ Error
= Fitted Rating + Representative-Specific
Residual. (1)

Selectedexplanatoryvariablesare based on previousanalyses(cf., Kalt and

Zupan, 1990)and includepercapitaincome, averagevoter age and education,
the rural-urbanmakeupof voters, employmentand industrialcharacteristics,
and a dummyfor the South. In additionto broaddemographic-economic vari-
ables,the partyof the electedrepresentativeandthe percentageof constituents'
votes going to GeorgeMcGovernin the 1972presidentialelectionare also in-
cluded.6These lattertwo variablesare intendedto reflect constituents'ideo-
logicalpreferences.Importantly,however,both the partyof the representative
and the McGovernvote providesummarystatementsof the attributesof con-
stituents; and whetherthey solely reflect constituents'ideological interests
ratherthan, to Someextent, latent demographic-economic characteristicsis
irrelevantto the purposeof isolatingthe representative-specific componentof
the ADA ratingscale.
A representative'sADA ratingcan rangefrom 0 to 100. The ratingreflects
the percentageof issues(selectedby the ADA so as to be "ideologicallyreveal-
ing") on whicha representative castsvotesconsonantwiththe ADA definition
of politicalliberalism.For estimationpurposes,the individualvotes compris-
ing the ADA scaleare usedto transformthe scaleinto an unboundedlog-odds
ratio; and (1) is estimatedas a logistic function, with adjustmentfor hetero-
scedasticityintroducedby cross-representative differencesin the numberof
votes cast.7 The resultingparameterestimates are shown in Appendix 1.
Roughly50%of the variationin representatives'ADA rankingsareexplained.
Both constituents' demographic-economiccharacteristicsand ideological
preferencesare significantin explainingthe types of representativesthat con-
stituents put into office.8 The Appendix 1 patterns of correlationclosely
resemblethosereportedby KaltandZupan(1990),Kalt(1981),Kauand Rubin
(1979), Peltzman(1984), and Zupan (1989).
Relyingon the Appendix 1 results,representatives'ADA ratingsfor both
1977and 1978arebrokendown into two parts:a fittedpartreflectingunderly-
ing constituents'interests and a representative-specific residual. While the
ADA rating scale providesa rankingof representatives'liberalness/conser-
vatismrelativeto each other, the residualcomponentof the ADA ratingscale
provides a measureof representatives'liberalness/conservatismrelative to
theirconstituents.That is, the ADA ideologyresidualis a measureof the dis-
tance betweenrepresentatives'actualpositioningon a bundleof issues faced
while in office and where their constituents would have the representatives be.
Thus, for example, Barbara Jordan could show up as being a conservative
relative to her constituents (i.e., could have a negative ideology residual); and
 171

David Stockmancould show up as a liberalrelativeto his constituents(i.e.,

could have a positiveideology residual).

2.1. A qualitativetest of the retirementdecision'seffect on voting behavior

The absolute value of the representative-specific residualremainingafter a

broad-basedratingscale (such as the ADA scale) has been purgedof consti-
tuent characteristicsprovidesa naturalmeasureof the quantityof on-the-job
ideologicalshirkingconsumedby imperfectlypoliced representativeson the
bundleof issues over which they vote. As noted above, the absolutevalue of
the residualis a measureof distance:the distancebetweena representative's
actualvoting and the voting desiredby constituents.
Candidly,it must be the case that the list of factorsused to estimate(1) is
incomplete;the constituentforces that impingeon a representativemust be
very large, indeed, and more refined. Accordingly,a test is not made as to
whetherthe entire ADA residualis on-the-job consumptionby imperfectly
policed representatives.Rather, a test is conductedonly as to whetherthe
absolutevalue of a representative'sADA residualrespondsto changesin the
cost of wideningthe distancebetweenthe representative andhis or herconstitu-
ents as predictedby consumptiontheory. Does the decisionto retire,in other
words, by loweringthe cost of distancingoneself from one's constituents,
allow representativesto engagein more on-the-jobideologicalconsumption?
If noneof the (absolutevalueof the) ADA residualreflectsideologicalshirking
by imperfectlypolicedrepresentatives,it shouldnot behavelikea consumption
good in responseto a representative'sretirementdecision.9
Qualitatively,one can predictwith some confidencethat the absolutevalue
of the ADA residualshouldget largerbetween1977and 1978for both LATE
DECIDERSand ASPIRERS:the formerbecausethey opt in mid-termnot to
seek reelection;10 the latterbecause,whencampaigningfor higher-level,state-
wideoffice in 1978,they mustgenerallyappealto a broaderand differentcon-
stituencythan the one they contemporaneouslyrepresentin Congress(Glazer
and Robbins, 1985;Hibbing, 1986).
It is with less confidence that one can predictthat the absolute value of
the ADA residualshould get largerbetween 1977 and 1978 for EARLY DE-
CIDERS. Representativeswho decidedat least two years priorto November
1978 to retire in 1978 and not seek other political office are likely to have
viewedthe cost of distancingthemselvesfromtheirconstituentsas beinglower
in 1977as well as in 1978.
Finally, NONRETIRERS should move closer to their constituents and the
absolute values of their ADA residuals should decrease between 1977 and 1978
provided that voters have positive discount rates, memories that decay, and/or
172

Table1. A qualitativetest of the retirementdecision'seffect on representatives'

votingbehavior

Type of Between1977and 1978the absolute

representative valueof the representative's
error:

Became Became Did not Sign

larger smaller change statistic

LATEDECIDERS 10 1 1 2.71**

EARLYDECIDERS 9 5 3 1.07

ASPIRERS 15 5 1 2.24*

NONRETIRERS 166 189 28 1.22

* Significantat the .05 level in a one-tailedtest.

** Significantat the .01 level in a one-tailedtest.

attentionsthat turn to politics primarilyat electiontime. Such a patternmay

be faint, however,owingto congressionalrepresentatives'relativelyshorttwo-
year office termsand institutionssuchas the mediaand competingcandidates
which serveto refreshvoter memoriesat electiontime.11
Table 1 providesa qualitativetest of the precedinghypotheses.As can be
seen, the directionof the changein the absolutevalue of the ADA residual
between 1977 and 1978 is as predictedfor all four types of representatives.
Moreover,the directionof the changeis statisticallysignificantfor both LATE
DECIDERSand ASPIRERS.For example,of the 11 LATEDECIDERSwith
different ADA residualsin 1978 than in 1977, 10 moved furtheraway from
their constituentsin 1978 and only one drew closer to his constituents.The
associatedsign test statisticis 2.71 and is significantat the 1%olevel.12
Of the 20 ASPIRERSwith different residuals,15 furtherdistancedthem-
selves from their existingconstituentsin 1978when runningfor higher-level,
state-wideoffice and only 5 moved closer to their existingconstituents.The
associatedsign test statisticis 2.24 and is significantat the 50%7
level.13

2.2. A quantitativetest of the retirementdecision'seffect on voting behavior

Whilethe precedingqualitativetest suggeststhat the retirementdecisionleads

to an alterationin a representative'svoting behavior,thereremainsthe ques-
tion as to whetherthe inducedalterationis statisticallysignificantin a quantita-
tive sense. Importantly,the voting behaviordisplayedby a representativefol-
lowing a decision to retire can be comparedeither to the retirer'svoting
behaviorpriorto the retirementdecision or to the voting behaviordisplayed
by nonretirers.
 173

In addition,an empiricalquestionremainsas to whetherelectoralsortingis

at work, at least to someextent,in politicalmarkets(LottandReed, 1989).Do
representativeswho displayabove-averageelectoralsuccessas membersof the
House and who are not forced out of office by defeat at the polls (either
becausethey run for higheroffice or becausethey opt to retirefrom political
office altogether),possess superiorabilitiesand/or desireswhen it comes to
servingconstituentsthroughroll call voting? Is naturalselectionat work, in
otherwords, when it comesto the provisionof representationservicesand do
survivorsof the selectionprocessevidencea greaterfit betweenconstituents'
interestsand policymakervoting behavior?

2.2.1. No accountingfor simultaneity

To answerthe foregoingquestions,econometricanalysisis employed.If one
regresses,in ordinaryleast squaresfashion, the absolutevalue of the ADA
residualfor both the years 1977and 1978on dummyvariablesto accountfor
LATEDECIDERS,EARLYDECIDERS,and ASPIRERS,the resultsshown
in Column 1 of Table 2 are obtained.As can be seen, if no account is made
of differencesin voting behaviorbetween 1977 and 1978, late-decidingand
early-decidingretirersappearto be statisticallyno furtherawayfromtheircon-
stituentsthan the averagenonretiringrepresentative- a resultin keepingwith
Lott's (1987)findings. If anything,LATE DECIDERSappearto be closerto
their constituentsthan the averagenonretiringrepresentative;although the
differenceis not statisticallysignificant.
In termsof distancefrom constituents,only representativeswho retirebe-
cause they aspire to higher-level,state-wideoffice differ significantlyfrom
nonretiringrepresentatives.On average,aspiringcongressionalrepresentatives
haveADA residualsthat are roughlytwo-thirdsas large, in absolutevalue, as
those possessedby nonretirers- a resultwhichsuggeststhat aspiringlegisla-
tors aredrawnfrom a pool of representatives that do an exceptionallyfinejob
of promotingtheir constituents'interestsin floor voting.
The resultsreportedin Column 1 of Table 2, of course, are subjectto the
simultaneitybias discussedin the introductionof this paper. For example,
althoughLATE DECIDERSmay appearto be no differentfrom nonretirers
whenvoting behaviorin 1977is treatedidenticallyto voting behaviorin 1978,
they may still be engaging in greaterideological shirkingafter decidingto
retire. If the retirementdecision occurs midterm, LATE DECIDERSmay
engagein greaterideologicalshirkingin theirlast year in office (1978)than in
their penultimateyear in office (1977) - as the evidencein Table 1 suggests.
Becausethey aredrawnfroma pool of representatives withabove-averageelec-
toral success and have smaller ADA residuals (in absolute value terms) prior
to the retirement decision, however, the average magnitude of their ADA
residuals pooled over 1977-78 may appear to be no different than the average
174

Table 2. A quantitative test of the retirement decision's effect on representatives' voting behavior

Explanatory Column Column

variables 1 2

LATE DECIDERS -0.160 -0.452*

(-0.96) (-1.92)

LATE DECIDERS*DUMMY1978 0.584*

(1.75)

EARLY DECIDERS 0.056 -0.033

(0.40) (-0.17)

EARLY DECIDERS*DUMMY1978 0.178

(0.63)

ASPIRERS -0.433** -0.693**

(-3.43) (-3.94)

ASPIRERS*DUMMY1978 0.530*
(2.11)

CONSTANT 1.266** 1.304**

(43.49) (31.77)

CONSTANT*DUMMY1978 -0.077
(-1.32)

F-statistic's
Significance level < .01 < .01

* Significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.

** Significant at the .01 level in a one-tailed test.

Note. T-statistics are in parentheses.

magnitudeof the nonretirers'ADA residualsover the same two-year time

period.
For anotherexample,ASPIRERSappearto be closer to their constituents
than nonretiringrepresentativesbased on the resultsof Column 1 in Table 2.
Because the Column 1 model allows for no distinctionbetween voting in
1977 and 1978, however, the amount of ideologicalshirkingundertakenby
ASPIRERSpriorto theirdecisionto run for higheroffice is likelyto be over-
stated. Based on the Table 1 evidence,since ASPIRERSmove furtheraway
from their House seat constituenciesonce they begin to run for higheroffice
(in 1978versus1977),the averageamountof ideologicalshirkingobservedfor
ASPIRERSover 1977-78 shouldbe largerthanthe amountof shirkingunder-
takenby suchrepresentatives in 1977priorto theircampaignsfor higheroffice.
 175

2.2.2. Accountingfor simultaneity

By distinguishingbetweenrepresentatives'voting behaviorin 1977and 1978,
it is possible to addressthe simultaneityprobleminfecting the relationship
betweenlegislatorshirkingand electoralsuccess.In makingsucha distinction,
threeimportanthypothesescan be advanced.First, to the extentthat thereis
naturalselectionat work in marketsfor politicalrepresentatives,membersof
the House thatvaremore representativeof theirconstituentswhen it comesto
floor votingshouldbe rewardedwithelectoralsuccess.Priorto beginningtheir
campaignsfor higheroffice or decidingto quit politicaloffice altogether(i.e.,
in 1977), in other words, membersof the House that do not leave office on
accountof electoraldefeat(i.e., ASPIRERS,LATEDECIDERS,andEARLY
DECIDERS)shoulddisplaysmallerADA results(in termsof absolutevalue)
than nonretiringmembersdo. Among the representativeswho retire from
politicaloffice altogetherand whose voting behavioris observedin 1977and
1978,moreover,this is especiallylikelyto be the case for LATE DECIDERS.
BecauseEARLYDECIDERSalreadyanticipatetheir 1978retirementin 1977,
the magnitudesof theirADA residualsfor 1977arelikelyto reflectthe expecta-
tion of leavingoffice and thus evidencegreaterideologicalshirkingthan the
1977ADA residualsof LATE DECIDERSdo.
Second, once retirersdecideto leave their House office, the magnitudesof
theirADA residualsshouldincrease.Forthe reasonsgivenin Section2.1 above
this is especiallylikelyto be the case for ASPIRERSand LATE DECIDERS.
Nonretirers,on theotherhandshouldmovecloserto theirconstituentsbetween
1977and 1978as the proximityof the next electoraltest increases- although
the patternmay be faint owing to representatives'relativelyshort two-year
office termsandinstitutionssuchas the mediaandcompetingcandidateswhich
serveto refreshvoter memoriesand to disciplinenonretiringrepresentatives'
voting in the first year of their termsin office as well as in the second year.
Finally, even though the absolute value of a retirer'sADA residualmay
increasebetween1977and 1978,the magnitudeof this residualin 1978maynot
differ significantlyfromthe magnitudeof the averagenonretirers'ADA resid-
ual in 1978. Becauseretirers(especiallyASPIRERSand LATE DECIDERS)
start off being closer to their constituentsin 1977 than nonretirersare, any
increasein ideologicalshirkingby retirersbetween1977and 1978maynot leave
them furtheraway from their constituentsin 1978than nonretirersare.
To test the precedinghypotheses,Column 2 of Table 2 interactsthe Col-
umn 1 explanatoryvariableswith a dummyvariable,DUMMY1978,intended
to pick up any changesin voting behaviorbetween1977and 1978. As can be
seen, the results that obtain provide confirmation for all of the hypotheses
advanced above. In the first place, relatively successful members of the House
(especially representatives who are given the opportunity to run for higher
176

office) appear to engage in significantlyless ideological shirkingthan less

successful membersof the House do. The amount of ideological shirking
undertakenby ASPIRERS,for example,is at least half as smallin 1977as the
amount of shirkingundertakenin the same year by the averagenonretirer.14
The amount of shirkingundertakenby LATE DECIDERSin 1977 is two-
thirdsas smallas the amountof shirkingundertakenin the sameyearby non-
retirers.15
In addition,upon decidingto runfor higheroffice or to retirefrom political
life altogether,relativelysuccessfulrepresentativesengagein greaterideologi-
cal consumption.In the case of ASPIRERS,for instance,the distancebetween
a representative and his or her constituentsincreasedby roughly75%between
1977and 1978;an increaseapparentlyowingto the needof suchpoliticiansto
appealto a broaderand differentconstituencywhen campaigningfor higher
office in 1978.16LATE DECIDERSalso evidencea statisticallysignificant
movementaway from theirconstituentsbetween 1977and 1978;the distance
betweena representative and his or herconstituentsgrowsby roughly60% for
representatives that decideat some point in time duringtheir 1977-78 termin
office to retire from political life altogether in 1978.17Similar to LATE
DECIDERS,representativeswho decide priorto their final term in office to
retirefrompoliticallife in 1978driftawayfromtheirconstituentsbetween1977
and 1978, althoughin the case of such EARLYDECIDERS,the drift is not
statisticallysignificant.Nonretiringrepresentativesmove closer to their con-
stituentsin 1978but the movementis significantat only the 10%level.
Finally,althoughretiringrepresentatives increasetheirideologicalconsump-
tion between 1977 and 1978, the magnitudesof their ADA residualsin their
final year in House office (1978)are not appreciablylargerthan the contem-
poraneousmagnitudesof ADA residualsof nonretiringrepresentativesare.
Owingto naturalselectionin the marketfor legislatorsandthe fact that retirers
evidencea better fit for politicaloffice, the averagemagnitudeof the ADA
residualin 1978is smallerfor ASPIRERSthan for nonretirers.18 In absolute
value terms, the averageADA residualin 1978is only 1107olargerfor LATE
DECIDERSthan for nonretirersandonly 12%largerfor EARLYDECIDERS
than for nonretirers.19

3. Conclusion

This study of roll call voting behaviorin the U.S. House of Representatives
empiricallydocumentsthe existenceof an importantsimultaneitybias in the
heretofore much-investigated relationship between legislator ideological shirk-
ing and the security with which a legislator holds office. The results indicate
that while greater security allows a policymaker more leeway for ideological
 177

consumption,increasesin ideologicalon-the-jobconsumptionalso diminisha

policymaker'ssecurityin office.
It is because naturalselectionis at work in the marketfor legislatorsand
becauseretiringlegislators,priorto the retirementdecision,are "fitter" when
it comes to representingtheir constituentsin roll call voting, that the voting
behaviordisplayedby retirersfollowing their decision to quit House office
does not differappreciablyfrom the votingbehaviordisplayedby nonretirers.
Much as academicsmay publishless in the yearsimmediatelyafter obtaining
tenureeven though they continueto publishat least as much as the average
assistantprofessor,retiringmembersof the House appearto shirktheir con-
stituents' interestsmore after decidingto retireeven though the amount of
shirkingthey undertakedoes not differ markedlyfromthe amountof shirking
undertakenby the averagenonretirer.

Notes

1. WhileLott reportsthatthe retirementdecisiondoes not influencehow a representative votes,

he finds that representativesvote less frequentlyonce they decideto retire.
2. Thetenuredataconcerningretirersdoes not includeretirerswho leaveHouseoffice to runfor
higherpoliticaloffice. The behaviorof such politicalaspirersis discussedand empirically
investigatedbelow.
3. Retirersfromthe Housewho aspireto higheroffice arenot includedin Lott's (1987)studyof
retiringrepresentatives.
4. The numberstotal to 433 ratherthan435 sincethe Speakerof the House only votes in cases
of a tie and EdwardKochretiredfrom the Housewhenhe won the New York City mayoral
electionin 1977.
5. An obviousline of futureresearchwouldinvolveexaminingsome otherratingscalessuchas
the ACU and LCV ratingscales.
6. For a full discussionof the use of the McGovernvote, see Kaltand Zupan(1984).The party
of the electedrepresentativeis takento reflectonly constituentinterestsfor the purposeof
isolatingthecleanestpossiblemeasureof representative-specific ideology.As notedin Kaltand
Zupan(1984),however,partyalsomayreflecta representative's worldviewat the timeof party
affiliationchoice.
7. See Kaltand Zupan(1984)for an expandeddiscussionof the estimationtechnique.
8. Themeasureof constituents'ideologicaltastesare not only highlysignificantbut arealso not
particularlycollinearwiththe demographic-economic characteristics
thatmightbe expectedto
influencethe partyand presidentialcandidatessupportedby constituents.Thislendssupport
to the Brennanand Buchanan(1984)explanationof how and why peoplevote.
9. A richerexplanationof ideologicalshirkingwould, of course,involveadditionalexplanatory
variablessuchas a legislator'smarginof last victory,tenure,committeepower,etc. (cf., Kalt
and Zupan,1990).Sincesuchvariablesarelikelyto be correlatedwitha representative's deci-
sion to retirefrom politicallife, however,their inclusionin the econometricmodel below
wouldweakenone's abilityto detecttheextentto whichretirersdisplayabove-average fits with
theirconstituenciespriorto the retirementdecision.Consequently,the econometricanalysis
in Section 2.2 below does not focus on the developmentof a richermodel of ideological
shirking.
178

10. Importantly, this qualitative test is biased against finding any change in the voting behavior
of LATE DECIDERS to the extent that the decision to retire is not made exactly at the mid-
point of a LATE DECIDER's final term in office (according to Lott, 1987, only four of the
LATE DECIDERS opted to retire around the midpoint of their final term in office). This bias
strengthens the results reported below.
11. Dougan and Munger (1989) report that a politician's voting behavior appears to evidence only
a weak, if any, relationship to the proximity of the politician's next electoral test. Dougan and
Munger, however, fail to account for any interaction effects between the years until a
policymaker's next election and the other protective endowments (e.g., committee stature,
tenure, etc.) possessed by the policymaker against policing constituents. Accounting for such
interaction effects, Kalt and Zupan (1990) find that legislators move closer to their constituents
as election time approaches.
12. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic for LATE DECIDERS is 2.85 and is also significant
at the 1% level.
13. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic for ASPIRERS is 2.39 and is also significant at the 5%
level. For EARLY DECIDERS, the signed-rank test statistic is 1.07.
14. The mean absolute value of the ADA residual in 1977 is 0.61 for ASPIRERS and 1.30 for non-
retirers.
15. The mean absolute value of the ADA residual in 1977 is 0.85 for LATE DECIDERS.
16. The mean absolute value of the ADA residual for ASPIRERS increases from 0.61 to 1.06
between 1977 and 1978.
17. The mean absolute value of the ADA residual for LATE DECIDERS increases from 0.85 to
1.35 between 1977 and 1978. The size of the change for LATE DECIDERS, furthermore, is
likely to be understated given the bias noted in footnote 10 above.
18. The average magnitudes are 1.06 and 1.23, respectively.
19. The respective average magnitudes of the ADA residuals are 1.35, 1.37, and 1.22 for LATE
DECIDERS, EARLY DECIDERS, and nonretirers.

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Appendix1

Explaining representatives' ADA ratings for 1977 and 1978

Explanatory
variables

Party dummy 1.095**

(Democrats = 1) (16.26)
Percent of district vote 0.056**
for McGovern in 1972 (13.75)
Percent nonwhite -0.008**
(-2.68)

Average voter age -0.014

(-1.26)

Average years of 0.061

voter education (1.14)
Percent of labor force 0.005
that is white collar (0.53)
Percent of labor force 0.002
that is blue collar (0.28)
Per capita income 0.981**
(3.02)
Percent urban 0.014
(0.12)
Southern dummy (Districts -0.140
in the South = 1) (-1.37)
Constant -4.449**
(-4.16)

F-statistic's
Significance level < .01

* Significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test.

** Significant at the .01 level in a one-tailed test.

Note. T-statistics are in parentheses.