Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 10/19/2020 05:01 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by S. Bolden,Deputy Clerk

1 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP

ROBERT E. MANGELS (Bar No. 48291)
2 rmangels@jmbm.com
MATTHEW D. HINKS (Bar No. 200750)
3 mhinks@jmbm.com
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
4 Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone: (310) 203-8080
5 Facsimile: (310) 203-0567

6 Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS

TECHNOLOGY CENTER
7

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

10

11 CHRISSIE CARNEL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458

BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
12 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, [Assigned to Hon. Steven J. Kleifield,
Dept. 57]
13 Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT RELIGIOUS
14 v. TECHNOLOGY CENTER’S REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AS TO
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS PLAINTIFFS CARNELL BIXLER,
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF BIXLER-ZAVALA, JANE DOE #1, AND
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE JANE DOE #2
17 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE;
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1-25, Dept.: 57
18 Date: October 26, 2020
Defendants. Time: 10:00 a.m.
19
Action filed: August 22, 2019
20 Trial date: Not yet set

21

22

23

24

25

26
27

28

DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION

 1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 Plaintiffs ask this Court to adopt a radical position never embraced by any court in the United
States—i.e., that Agreements to submit disputes to religious arbitration are null and void when one
3
of the signatories later decides to leave the religion. As fully briefed in the CSI and CC Reply, this
4
argument runs counter to established principles of contract law and arbitration law, and itself creates
5
an impermissible and unconstitutional separate standard for adjudicating agreements entered into
6 by churches. RTC hereby joins and incorporates by reference CSI and CC’s arguments

7 demonstrating that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to enforcement of the Agreements fails

8 as a matter of law and of fact. This Reply will address Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments against
enforcement of the Agreements. Given the primacy of the First Amendment argument in Plaintiffs’
9
Opposition, RTC recommends the Court read the CSI and CC Reply first, and then this Reply.
10
Setting aside Plaintiffs’ unsupported First Amendment argument, the Opposition argues that
11
their claims do not fall within the clear scope of the Agreements’ arbitration provisions. Those
12 provisions, and other terms of the Agreements, demonstrate the unambiguous intent of the parties

13 that they resolve all disputes between them, “of any nature,” through application of Scientology law

14 and under the “exclusive” jurisdiction of Scientology arbitrators. Plaintiffs’ consent was

15 “irrevocable” and “in perpetuity,” and any claim filed by them in court would be subject to
“immediate dismissal.” The unmistakable intent of the parties was to resolve any dispute through
16
Scientology arbitration, as required by Church doctrine and as a condition to joining the Church.
17
The Opposition also argues that the Agreements are unenforceable because, supposedly,
18 enforcement would violate “public policy” and the Agreements are unconscionable. Yet, the
19 Opposition fails to identify any supposed “public policy,” and fails to refute Defendants’ case law

20 permitting arbitration of tort claims. With regard to unconscionability, Plaintiffs admit signing the

21 Agreements but state they have no recollection of the circumstances surrounding their execution,
and therefore proffer no evidence of procedural unconscionability. As to substantive
22
unconscionability, Plaintiffs assert the requirement that the arbitrators be Scientologists in good
23
standing is unconscionable, while ignoring Defendants’ cited authority that courts reject ex ante
24
claims of arbitrator bias and reject claims of arbitrator bias when the agreements call for a certain
25 class of arbitrators. As a last ditch effort to avoid enforcement of the Agreements, Plaintiffs argue

26 that Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2(c) precludes enforcement of the Agreements because
27 Defendant Masterson cannot seek to compel arbitration. In so asserting, Plaintiffs ignore that they
alleged—and have argued—that Masterson is Defendants’ agent; therefore, he could seek to compel
28

2
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 arbitration. Under such circumstances, Section 1281.2(c) does not prevent arbitration of their claims.

2 Finally, seeking to delay a decision on the Motions, Plaintiffs request to take unspecified and
unbounded “discovery.” They have made no showing that such discovery is necessary or relevant.
3
Their unsubstantiated request should be denied.
4
II. RELEVANT FACTS
5
In their opposing declarations, Plaintiffs offer no testimony concerning the circumstances of
6 signing the Agreements. [JD #1 Decl. ¶ 7; JD #2 Decl. ¶ 7; Carnell Decl. ¶ 6; Bixler Decl. ¶ 6.]

7 None of the Plaintiffs asserts that he or she did not sign the Agreements, and the Opposition

8 affirmatively states that the Plaintiffs entered into the Agreements. [Opp. Br., p. 10.]
The Opposition refers to a “Rinder Dec.” [E.g., Opp. Br., p. 3:2.] However, no “Rinder Dec.”
9
was served or filed with the Opposition. On March 3, 2020, in responding to a previous motion,
10
Plaintiffs filed a “Declaration of Michael Rinder.” Without waiving objection to Plaintiffs’ failure
11
to file a supporting declaration,1 RTC will assume the March 3, 2020 Rinder Declaration is similar
12 to whatever Plaintiffs intended to file in opposition to the present Motion.

13 Michael Rinder is a paid attacker of Defendants [Supplemental Declaration of Lynn R. Farny

14 ¶ 2] who left the Church thirteen years ago. [March 6, 2020 Declaration of Michael Rinder (“Rinder

15 Dec.”) ¶ 2.] Mr. Rinder has never seen or participated in a Scientology arbitration, [Supp. Farny
Dec. ¶ 3], and his description of “procedures” for a Scientology arbitration contradicts the plain
16
terms of the Agreements, as set forth in the CSI and CC Reply, and joined and incorporated herein.
17
He does not cite to any instance of Scientology arbitration being conducted as he describes. It is not
18 how the Garcia arbitration proceeded. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., No.
19 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2018 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla. July 17, 2018) (appeal pending) (Garcia II)).

20 III. ARGUMENT

21 A. Plaintiffs Do Not Dispute They Executed Arbitration Agreements that

Defendants Can Enforce Under the FAA
22
As set forth in the CSI and CC Reply, (1) Plaintiffs concede that they entered into the
23
Agreements at issue; (2) CSI, CC, and RTC can enforce the Agreements; and (3) the substantive
24
provisions of the FAA apply to the Agreements. RTC joins in the arguments of CSI and CC’s Reply.
25 B. The Arbitrability of the Disputes Is Reserved for the Arbitrators
26 As explained in CSI and CC’s Reply, under the substantive provisions of the FAA, questions

27
1
28 RTC hereby joins and incorporates by reference the Objections to the Declaration of Michael
Rinder and the Objections to the Declaration of Robert W. Thompson filed by CSI and CC.
3
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 regarding the enforceability of the Agreements and what issues are subject to arbitration must be

2 determined by the arbitrators and not the Court. This is because the Agreements preclude civil courts
from hearing any part of Plaintiffs’ disputes, given that Plaintiffs agreed to be bound “exclusively”
3
by the “law of the Scientology religion.” [CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 16; Exs. 7, 8-13, & 14,
4
¶¶ 6.a-d.] Delegation of all disputes to the arbitrators includes the arbitrability of disputes. Henry
5
Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019). RTC joins in and incorporates
6 CSI and CC’s full argument.

7 C. Enforcement of the Private Agreements Does Not Violate the First Amendment
8 As set forth in the Motions and the CSI and CC Reply, the Arbitrators are to decide questions
of Plaintiffs’ defenses to enforcement of the Agreements and if Plaintiffs’ claims are within their
9
scope. But even if the Court addresses those issues, they must be resolved in favor of Defendants.
10
1. Enforcement of the Agreements Does Not Constitute State Action and
11
Therefore Does Not Violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights.
12 As fully stated in the CSI and CC Reply and joined herein, Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
13 argument fails as a matter of law because “[i]n the context of First Amendment challenges to speech-

14 restrictive provisions in private agreements or contracts, domestic judicial enforcement of terms that

15 could not be enacted by the government has not ordinarily been considered state action.” Naoko
Ohno v. Yuko Yusama, 723 F.3d 984, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
16
2. The Agreements Do Not Call for So-Called “Rituals”
17
As demonstrated by CSI and CC’s Reply, which RTC incorporates and joins in, Plaintiffs’
18 First Amendment argument also fails because it is unsupported by any facts. It rests on the inaccurate
19 and foundationless “Rinder Declaration” that is not before the Court and is based on invented

20 “procedures” that Defendants do not seek to enforce or apply.

21 D. There Are No Grounds to Set Aside the Agreements Due to the Scope of the
Agreements, Supposed Unconscionability, or “Public Policy”
22
As with Plaintiffs’ First Amendment argument, Plaintiffs’ remaining defenses to
23
enforcement must be decided by the arbitrators, not this Court. See Section III.B, supra.
24
Nonetheless, if the Court addresses these issues, the Agreements are enforceable.
25 1. Plaintiffs’ Fail to Address the Agreements’ Unambiguous Text that “Any”
26 Dispute Is to Be Arbitrated
27 Plaintiffs assert that they did not “intend” to arbitrate any disputes when they entered into
the Agreements and that “no reasonable person” would have thought that their causes of action
28

4
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 would be subject to arbitration. [Opp. Br., p. 10:20-25.] The argument fails for several reasons.

2 First, as pointed out in the Motions, Plaintiffs’ claims do incorporate events that allegedly
occurred while they were Church parishioners and that were part of their religious services.
3
[Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 11:19-25; JD # 2 Motion at 14:21-15:6.] The Opposition completely ignores
4
these allegations. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions that their claims have nothing to do with
5
their experiences within the Church or religious services received, their claims as pled are to the
6 contrary. Plaintiffs also aver that the alleged recent events of harassment were “religiously

7 motivated” and prompted by a supposed Scientology doctrine called “Fair Game.” [Opp. at 1:4, 4:4-
2
8 11.] As their claims specifically invoke and rely on alleged religious doctrines of the Church as
evidence for their claims, their claims are appropriate to resolve by ecclesiastical bodies. Haney v.
9
Church of Scientology, et al., J. Burdge, (Forman Decl., Ex. 8) (reviewing the same arbitration
10
clause and finding “[w]hile the arbitration agreements are broad, they are intended to be so to protect
11
the religious doctrines of the Defendants and for them to be able to address challenges to the
12 practices within religious rather than secular legal structures”).

13 Second, the Agreements themselves undermine Plaintiffs’ argument that the “intent” of the
14 Parties was to arbitrate only disputes related to Plaintiffs’ participation in religious services. As the

15 Opposition itself correctly states, “Intent is derived from the plain meaning of the language in the
Agreement.” [Opp. Br., p. at 9:22-23 (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 204
16
(2002)).] But then Plaintiffs fail to cite the unambiguous language of what they agreed to: “should
17
any dispute, claim or controversy arise between me and the Church … I will pursue resolution of
18 that dispute solely and exclusively through Scientology’s internal Ethics, Justice, and binding
19 religious arbitration procedures.” [Agreements, ¶ 6.d.]3 This broad arbitration clause is not arbitrary

20 or accidental, but reflects the Parties’ written intent stated throughout the Agreements that all

21 disputes between them must be dealt with exclusively by Scientology law, including religious
arbitration:
22
 As part of their religious commitment to the Church, Plaintiffs professed their “freely given
23 consent to be bound exclusively by the discipline, faith, internal organization, ecclesiastical
24
2
Plaintiffs’ cite to Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal. App. 3d 872 (1989) (Opp. at 4,
25 n. 8) in support of the “Fair Game” argument. The Supreme Court vacated the decision and the case
did not even involve arbitration. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 499 U.S. 914 (1991). The
26 Opposition quotes the vacated Wollersheim decision, not the Supreme Court decision.
3
27 For exemplars of the Agreements, see Marmolejo Declaration, Exs. 8-13 (Carnell Bixler
Agreements). The arbitration provisions in all of the Agreements are the same. [Compare paragraph
28 6 of Ex. 7 (Jane Doe #1 Agreement) to paragraph 9 of Exs. 1-6 (Jane Doe #2 Agreements) to
paragraph 6 of Exs. 8-13.]
5
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 rule, custom, and law of the Scientology religion in all matters relating to Scientology
Religious Services, in all my dealings of any nature with the Church, and in all my dealings
2 of any nature with any other Scientology church or organization.” [Agreements, ¶ 6a.]
3  The commitment to be bound by Church law with respect to not only matters relating to
religious services but matters of “any nature” manifested itself in the further agreement to
4 waive “legal recourse with respect to any dispute, claim or controversy against the Church .
. . regardless of the nature of the dispute, claim or controversy.” [Id.]
5
 Plaintiffs’ waiver of legal recourse and agreement to be bound exclusively by ecclesiastical
6 law and procedures was “unconditional and irrevocable” and applied “under any and all
circumstances, foreseen or unforeseen, in perpetuity, without exception or limitation.” [Id. ¶
7
6.b.]
8  The Parties even addressed what should happen if Plaintiffs sought legal recourse for a claim
against Defendants: “Should I . . . ever sue, or otherwise seek legal recourse with respect to
9
any dispute, claim or controversy against the Church, . . . regardless of the nature of the
10 dispute, claim, controversy, I intend for the submission of this Contract to the presiding
judicial officer to be a complete and sufficient basis for the immediate dismissal of any and
11 all such proceedings with prejudice to further proceedings of any kind.” [Id. ¶ 6.c.]
12 The authority that Plaintiffs cite in support of their “intent” argument provides no basis to
abrogate this language and violate the clear intent of the Parties. Moritz v. Universal Studios, Inc.,
13
54 Cal. App. 5th 238, No. B299083, 2020 WL 5228531 (2020) held that the parties’ agreement to
14
arbitrate any dispute related to certain films in franchise did not evince an intent to agree to arbitrate
15
disputes related to a spin-off film not referred to in their agreement. Id. at *5. In Wexler v. AT&T
16 Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 500 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), the court declined to find that the plaintiff’s arbitration

17 clause covering any dispute with her mobile carrier AT&T Mobility was unconscionable if extended

18 to disputes with separate entity AT&T Corp. Id. at 504. The court acknowledged that there was no
19 reason why clauses to arbitrate “any” dispute regardless of nature would not be enforceable, but
held that the issue was one of contract formation: “If a company wishes to bind its customers to
20
something broader, it must take steps to secure something that a reasonable person would understand
21
as an objective expression of his or her agreement.” Id.
22 It is difficult to imagine a contract where the parties’ intent to arbitrate any and all disputes
23 could be more clear: Repeated promises to “be bound exclusively” by Scientology law “in all

24 dealings of any nature with any . . . Scientology Church or organization”, “forever abandoning”

25 the “right to sue or seek legal recourse, . . . regardless of the nature of the dispute,” agreeing that
such relinquishment is “unconditional and irrevocable . . . in perpetuity, without exception or
26
limitation,” and constitutes “sufficient basis for the immediate dismissal” of any action in court is
27
much more than “checking a box.” See Wexler, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 504. Any “reasonable person”
28
would understand what is being asked of her in agreeing to sign the Agreements to join the Church.

6
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Third, and finally, Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Agreements as merely for isolated

2 “religious services” is misleading and constrained. As is clear from the language quoted above,
Plaintiffs agreed to be bound by Scientology law in all dealings with the Church as part of their
3
commitment to participate in the Scientology religion. They acknowledged that in determining
4
whether to accept them for participation in the religion, the Church “will rely on the
5
acknowledgments, agreements, representations and promises which I have made herein.”
6 [Agreements, ¶ 8.] As shown in the Motions, the conditions a religion imposes for membership are

7 not the same as, and not treated the same as, say the conditions listed in boilerplate by a mobile

8 phone company. [CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 17.] Defendants have a constitutional right to
accept or reject members on whatever basis they wish. They may impose conditions on membership
9
or participation in the Church’s religious services free from government intrusion: Watson v. Jones,
10
80 U.S. 679, 729-31 (1871); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2
11
F.3d 1514, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993) (striking down a city ordinance requiring a church to disclose to
12 its members all its expenditures from their donations: “The City may not intervene on behalf of such

13 dissidents. If they remain dissatisfied with the church’s voluntarily assumed disclosure policy then

14 they may attempt to reform that policy from within, they may acquiesce in the policy despite their

15 objections or they may leave the church”); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-
Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020) (“The First Amendment protects the right of religious
16
institutions ‘to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as
17
well as those of faith and doctrine.’”). Plaintiffs seek nothing less than to have this Court annul the
18 unmistakable conditions on which the Church admits persons to the Scientology religion. Their
19 departure from the religion alters not at all the “irrevocable” promises they made that Defendants

20 required as condition to join the religion.

21 2. Plaintiffs Offer No Evidence of Procedural Unconscionability

A plaintiff seeking to vacate an arbitration agreement on the grounds of unconscionability
22
must present evidence showing both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Crippen v.
23
Central Valley RV Outlet, 124 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1165 (2004). As to procedural unconscionability,
24 Plaintiffs offer no evidence. While they admit entering into the Agreements [Opp. Br., p. 10:20], all

25 assert that they have no recollection of signing them, so they cannot, and have not, offered any
4
26 evidence of coercion, oppression, duress, or surprise in the formation of the Agreements. [JD #1
27
The Opposition asserts that “oppression” is present because of the requirement that the arbitrators
4

28 be Scientologists in good standing. (Opp. at 12:8-17.) The qualifications of the arbitrators is not an

7
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 Decl. ¶ 7; JD #2 Decl. ¶ 7; Carnell Decl. ¶ 6; Bixler Decl. ¶ 6.] At most, they assert that Plaintiffs

2 “had no choice” but to sign the Agreements “in order to participate in the religious services.” [Opp.
Br., p. 11:27-28.] But this is merely a recitation of the bargain they entered into: signing the
3
Agreements to be bound by Scientology law is how one begins participation in the Church. Plaintiffs
4
do not even address Defendants’ authority [CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 19-20] that religions
5
have the constitutional right to set the conditions for joining. As Plaintiffs themselves offer no
6 evidence such as surprise, duress, or fraud regarding their execution of the Agreements, and the

7 Agreements themselves are not subject to “bargaining” as one might find in a commercial context,

8 Plaintiff have made no record to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. Robinson v. City
of Manteca, 78 Cal. App. 4th 452, 458 (2000) (mere statements that a party to an agreement was
9
“coerced” to sign the agreement insufficient to constitute proof of coercion.)
10
3. There is No Substantive Unconscionability.
11 The failure to show procedural unconscionability ends the unconscionability discussion.
12 Crippen, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 1165. Plaintiffs freely chose to enter into the Agreements [Opp. Br.,

13 p. 10:20], so they cannot now attack the substantive terms they agreed to. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’

14 substantive unconscionability argument fails on its own.

Plaintiffs argue that the Agreements are substantively unconscionable because the arbitrators
15
to be selected by the Parties must be “Scientologists in Good Standing.” [Agreements ¶ 6.d.]
16
Supposedly this requirement will result in “appallingly one-sided decisions.” [Opp. Br., p. 12:18-
17
20.] The Motions anticipated this argument and presented specific case authority showing that courts
18 reject arguments of ex ante arbitrator bias—especially in the context of religious arbitration. [See
19 CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 22; see also RTC Motion at 23.] Plaintiffs fail to address any of

20 that authority. Plaintiffs also fail to address the authority cited by Defendants that generally courts
recognize that parties who choose to have their disputes heard by specific persons cannot claim
21
unfairness based on partiality when any such partiality was inherent in their choice of arbitrators.
22
[CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 22; RTC Motion at 23]; see e.g., Nat’l Football League Mgmt.
23
Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n (2d. Cir. 2016) 820 F.3d 527, 532, 548 (“arbitration
24 is a matter of contract, and consequently, the parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality

25 than inheres in the method they have chosen”); Winfrey v. Simmons Food, Inc., 495 F.3d 549, 551

26 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Unconscionability must be measured at the time the agreement is made [citation
27
example of procedural unconscionability in the formation of the Agreements, but of a supposedly
28 substantively unconscionable term.

8
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 omitted]. . . . When a person agrees to arbitration before a certain class of arbitrators, he may not
5
2 later ask a court to find his agreement was delusional and the agreement unconscionable.”).
Plaintiffs’ argument is only further undermined by their assertion that any Scientologist in
3
good standing is “instructed” by church “doctrine” to “destroy” Plaintiffs because they are
4
supposedly “Suppressive Persons.”6 [Opp. at 12:18-21.] This is an outrageous slur: Plaintiffs have
5
not been “declared,” and Church doctrine does not require Scientologists to destroy anyone. But
6 what is important for this Motion is that this Court may not adjudicate the tenets of a religion.

7 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450

8 (1969) (First Amendment “forbids civil courts from” making their own “interpretation of particular
church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion”). The Court thus cannot
9
accept Plaintiffs’ erroneous interpretation of doctrine and rule that Scientologists may not sit as
10
arbitrators because their religion supposedly dictates that they must “destroy” Plaintiffs or that that
11
the arbitrators would be “forbidden from finding against Scientology.” [Opp. at 8; Supp. Farny Decl.
12 ¶ 5 (stating that “Fair Game” is contrary to Church orthodoxy and not Church doctrine).]7

13 4. Enforcement of the Agreements Is Not Against “Public Policy”

14 The Opposition also argues “the enforcement of this agreement for allegations of rape and
subsequent cover-ups would violate public policy.” [Opp. Br., p. 14:9-18 (initial capitalizations
15
omitted).]8 Plaintiffs do not further articulate any public policy that would preclude arbitration of
16
their claims for harassment, and their cited authority does not illuminate the issue. Plaintiffs cite to
17
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) and Stroehmann Bakers, Inc. v.
18 Local 776, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1438 (3d Cir. 1992), two cases concerning
19
5
Plaintiffs instead cite to authority that was previously distinguished by Defendants. [RTC Motion
20 at 23, n.5.] Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1000-05 (9th Cir. 2010) (Opp. at 12:12-14);
Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 936 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1153-56 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (Opp. at
21 12:14-16); Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 923-26 (9th Cir. 2014) (Opp. at 12:16-
17) Defendants previously showed that none of these cases supports the claim that mutual selection
22 of arbitrators qualified as Scientologists is unconscionable. [RTC Motion at 23, n.5.]

23 Plaintiffs assert without any foundation that they have been declared “Suppressive Persons” by the
6

Church. (JD #1 Decl. ¶¶ 15-16; JD #2 Decl. ¶ 15; Carnell Decl. ¶ 14; Bixler Decl. ¶ 10) This is not
24 correct, and there is no evidence in the record to support the claim.
7
Garcia demonstrates why Plaintiffs’ argument of ex ante bias fails. In Garcia, Plaintiffs had been
25 declared “suppressive persons” by the Church and asserted no Scientologist could ever side with
them against the Church. Yet the Scientology arbitrators heard Plaintiffs’ claims and awarded them
26 $18,000 over the objections of the Church. Garcia II, 2018 WL 3439638, at *2. While Mr. Rinder
refers to the Garcia arbitration as a “Kangaroo court,” he fails to mention the arbitration was
27 affirmed by the district court and does not cite to any of the facts discussed in either Garcia opinion
or to any part of the Garcia record.
28 8
Despite the Opposition’s rhetoric, Plaintiffs do not assert any causes of action for rape in this case.
9
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 arbitration of workplace sexual harassment claims. In Hooters, the court expressly rejected the

2 argument that Title VII discrimination claims were per se inarbitrable. 173 F.3d at 937. In
Stroehmann the court affirmed the vacation of an arbitration award reinstating an employee accused
3
of sexual harassment without determining the merits of the accusation, and remanded the matter
4
for determination before a new arbitrator. 969 F.2d at 1438. Both cases support the conclusion that
5
claims for sexual harassment—which are not even asserted here—can be determined in arbitration.
6 This is consistent with the general rule, cited in the Motions and unaddressed by the Opposition,

7 that Plaintiffs’ tort claims are arbitrable. [See CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 14:20-15:24.}

8 E. Plaintiffs Fail to Address that Daniel Masterson Is Not a Third Party Under

9 CCP Section 1281.2(c)

Plaintiffs argue that the Court may deny the Motions under CCP § 1281.2(c) because
10
Defendant Daniel Masterson is a not a named party to the Agreements and thus is a “third party”
11
under the statute. [Opp. Br., p. 15-16.] Plaintiffs completely fail to address the fact that they have
12 alleged that Masterson is an agent of Defendants; and as an alleged agent, Masterson may

13 enforce the Agreements and therefore, is not a “third party” under Section 1281.2(c). [CSI & CC

14 Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 14.] In addition, Plaintiffs now have argued to this Court that Masterson is

15 Defendants’ agent and prevailed in defeating Masterson’s demurrer through taking that position.
[10/6/2020 Order Denying Masterson’s Demurrer.] They may not now assert that Masterson is a
16
“third party” for purposes of Section 1281.2(c). See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App.
17
4th 171, 183-84 (1997). As Masterson is a party that “may” have been able to move for arbitration,
18 the provisions of CCP § 1281.2(c) are not met and the Court does not have discretion to deny
19 Defendants’ Motions. (See generally CSI & CC Bixler/JD #1 Motion at 14.)

20 F. Plaintiffs Make No Showing of the Need for Discovery

Courts deny requests for discovery in connection with motions to compel arbitration when:
21
(1) the questions upon which discovery is sought are questions to be decided by the arbitrator,
22
Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999); (2) the discovery “seek[s]
23
information already within the personal knowledge of the party requesting discovery,” Advocat Inc.
24 v. Blanchard, No. 4:11-cv-00895, 2012 WL 1893735, at * 5 (E.D. Ark. May 24, 2012) (citing Bell

25 v. Kock Foods of Miss., 358 Fed. App’x 498, 501 (5th Cir. 2009)) (add’l citations omitted); (3) the

26 proposed discovery would not provide “new information necessary for the court to determine the
issue[s]” presented on the motion for arbitration, Hodson v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 12-02827, 2012 WL
27
5464615, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012); McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2013 WL 1190277, at
28

10
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013); and/or (4) the requested discovery is too broad, Meyer v. T-Mobile

2 USA Inc., No. C-10-05858, 2011 WL 4435810, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011).
First, Plaintiffs’ vague, undefined request to conduct discovery “in order to aid the court in
3
determining if the agreements or any clause thereto is unconscionable” appears—to the extent it
4
means anything—to justify denying discovery on all of the grounds listed above. First, as set forth
5
above, the questions of unconscionability, duress, and scope must be decided by the arbitrator, not
6 the Court, and therefore, the requested discovery is irrelevant.

7 Second, Plaintiffs do not purport to seek discovery of information that is not within their
8 knowledge. They refer extensively to the Rinder Declaration, and nowhere do they claim that their
knowledge of Scientology arbitration is incomplete and requires additional information. Indeed, the
9
entire premise of their argument is that they are asserting what Scientology arbitration “really” is.
10
But as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ false portrayal of the Scientology justice procedure as a “ritual”
11
where they are subject to charges is a religious question that cannot be adjudicated. Further, the
12 entire argument is immaterial. Defendants are seeking to enforce the procedures on the face of the

13 Agreement, including that the Parties mutually select arbitrators, Plaintiffs present their claims,

14 and the arbitrators’ decision is final. Plaintiffs’ position is not that the Agreements are unclear on

15 what should happen. Their position is that they predict something entirely different will happen than
what the Agreements provide. But Plaintiffs’ self-serving prediction to defeat arbitration does not
16
create a present dispute of fact. And the undisputed present fact is that Defendants are asking this
17
Court to enforce the plain terms of the Agreements and nothing more. For these same reasons, the
18 undefined proposed discovery would not provide “new information necessary for the court to
19 determine the issue[s]” presented on the motion for arbitration. Hodson, 2012 WL 5464615, at *8.

20 Finally, the requested discovery is impermissibly broad. Unlimited discovery to determine

21 “if the agreements or any clause thereto is unconscionable” is nothing but a license to harass for no
articulated purpose. The fact is Plaintiffs had six months to oppose the Motions. It is their burden to
22
come forward with evidence to support claims of unconscionability. In the end they chose to submit
23
declarations which fail to make any showing about the circumstances surrounding the formation of
24
their Agreements. They chose not to submit any information about how the arbitration in Garcia
25 was actually conducted (because it undermines their position). They even failed to file the Rinder

26 Declaration with the Opposition. They have done nothing, and point to nothing, justifying discovery.
27 IV. CONCLUSION

28 The Motions to Compel Arbitration of RTC and CSI/CC should be granted.

11
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 DATED: October 19, 2020 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
ROBERT E. MANGELS
2 MATTHEW D. HINKS
3

4 By:
MATTHEW D. HINKS
5 Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
6 TECHNOLOGY CENTER

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26
27

28

12
DEFENDANT RTC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 Chrissie Carnell Bixler v. Church of Scientology International
LASC Case No. 19STCV29458
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1900 Avenue
of the Stars, 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308.
6
On October 19, 2020, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as
7 DEFENDANT RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION AS TO PLAINTIFFS CARNELL
8 BIXLER, BIXLER-ZAVALA, JANE DOE #1, AND JANE DOE #2 as follows:

9 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

10 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package
provided by the overnight service carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the
11 Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or
a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight service carrier or delivered such document(s) to a
12 courier or driver authorized by the overnight service carrier to receive documents.

13 BY E-MAIL: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address

sj2@jmbm.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive,
14 within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the
transmission was unsuccessful.
15
BY CM/ECF NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING: I electronically filed the
16 document(s) with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system. Participants in the case
who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the CM/ECF system. Participants in the case
17 who are not registered CM/ECF users will be served by mail or by other means permitted by the
court rules.
18
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
19 foregoing is true and correct.

20 Executed on October 19, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.

21

22
Sheila Jimenez
23

24

25

26
27

28

68428020v1
 1 SERVICE LIST
2
SERVED VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL, Attorneys for Plaintiff
3 EMAIL AND COURT E-FILING SYSTEM Chrissie Carnell Bixler, Cedric Bixler-Zavala,
Jane Doe #1, Marie Bobette Riales, and Jane
4 Robert Thompson Doe #2
Casey A. Gee Phone: (650) 513-6111
5 Thompson Law Offices Fax: (650) 513-6071
700 Airport Boulevard bobby@tlopc.com
6 Suite 160 casey@tlopc.com
Burlingame, CA 94010 alicia@tlopc.com
7
SERVED VIA EMAIL AND COURT E- Attorneys for Defendant
8 FILING SYSTEM Church of Scientology International
Phone: (213) 613-4680
9 Peggy Dayton Fax: (213) 613-4656
William Forman pdayton@scheperkim.com
10 David Scheper wforman@scheperkim.com
Jeffrey Steinfeld dscheper@scheperkim.com
11 Scheper Kim & Harris LLP jsteinfeld@scheperkim.com
800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
12 Los Angeles, CA 90017

13 SERVED VIA EMAIL AND COURT E- Attorneys for Defendant

FILING SYSTEM David Miscavige
14 Phone: (310) 746-4400
Jeff Riffer Fax: (310) 746-4499
15 Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP jriffer@elkinskalt.com
10345 W. Olympic Boulevard
16 Los Angeles, CA 90064

17 SERVED VIA EMAIL AND COURT E- Attorneys for Defendant

FILING SYSTEM Daniel Masterson
18 Phone: (310) 556-3501
Andrew Brettler Fax: (310) 556-3615
19 Lavely & Singer Professional Corporation abrettler@lavelysinger.com
2049 Century Park E 2400
20 Los Angeles, CA 90067

21 SERVED VIA EMAIL AND COURT E- Attorneys for Plaintiffs

FILING SYSTEM
22 Phone: (215) 399-9255
Brian D. Kent Fax: (215) 241-8700
23 Gaetano D'Andrea bkent@lbk-law.com
M. Stewart Ryan gdandrea@laffeybuccikent.com
24 Helen L. Fitzpatrick sryan@laffeybuccikent.com
Lauren Stram
25 Laffey Bucci & Kent LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
26 Philadelphia, PA 19102
27

28

68428020v1
 1 SERVED VIA EMAIL AND COURT E- Attorneys for Plaintiffs
FILING SYSTEM
2 Jeffrey P. Fritz Phone: (215) 732-2260
Soloff & Zervanos P C Fax: (215) 732-2289
3 1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor jfritz@lawsz.com
Philadelphia, PA 19102
4

5 SERVED VIA EMAIL AND COURT E- Attorneys for Plaintiffs

FILING SYSTEM
6 Marci Hamilton Phone: (215) 353-8984
University of Pennsylvania Fax: (215) 493-1094
7 Fox-Fels Building Hamilton.marci@gmail.com
3814 Walnut Street
8 Philadelphia, PA 19104
9
SERVED VIA REGULAR MAIL Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Graham E. Berry
Law Office of Graham E. Berry
11 3384 McLaughlin Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90066-2005
12

13

14

15

16

17

18
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26
27

28

68428020v1