Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
ISSN 1017-6772
African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 545–561
Tugba Zeydanli
Abstract: In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), competitive elections can cause considerable violence and widespread
destruction of property, most of which is ethnically motivated. Recent literature shows that ethnic identification is more
prominent during competitive election periods in comparison to other identifying categories such as gender, religion, and class/
occupation. This paper utilizes data from 12 SSA countries and over 40,000 respondents taken from the Afrobarometer. It asks
if individual perceived living conditions changes in the run-up to competitive elections. Strong evidence shows that a perceived
living condition does change. It is positively related to the proximity to an election and this proximity effect depends on the
competitiveness of the election. The paper further investigates the background mechanisms behind this positive relationship,
that is, to what extent does living conditions of the individual change if the party that the individual supports wins the election
and is there a change in living conditions of the individual before and after the election? In addition, this paper documents that
ethnic identification also has a positive impact on individual perceived living conditions after controlling for electoral cycle
variables.
1. Introduction
Elections in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are characterized by uncertainties because of the possibility of election-related violence.
Election-related violence could take place at every stage of the electoral process: before, during or after elections. The intense
environment of elections in SSA depends on several factors, including the economic performance of the country, the provision of
public goods, institutional, social, historical, geographical and identity factors. Identity factors such as ethnicity, religion, and
race can be manipulated by the political elite to gain votes. The most pronounced identification factor among countries is ethnic
identification during competitive elections (see Eifert et al., 2010).
Ethnic identity is an important determinant of people’s lives in SSA. It affects who they trust, conduct business with, and
vote for. Moreover, it can influence individuals’ overall well-being. It is often debated in the literature whether the
importance of ethnic identity is driven by social or political affairs. Some scholars argue that ethnic identification comes
from culture; that is, how people have lived throughout the centuries (see Geertz, 1993; Fishman, 1996; and Ajayi, 2000).
Others argue that it is a political construct; political parties in many African countries use ethnic identities as a tool to gain
access to political power (see Young, 1976; Bates, 1983; and Horowitz, 1985). Using the Afrobarometer,1 Eifert et al. (2010)
show that ethnic identification is more prominent during election periods in comparison to other identifying categories such
as gender, religion, and class/occupation. Ethnic attachments become even stronger if elections are in a competitive
environment. More specifically, they show that respondents are 1.8 percentage points more likely to identify ethnically for
every month closer the country is to a competitive presidential election. This suggests that ethnic identities in Africa are
strengthened by political competition.
Competitive elections in ethnically diverse societies usually involve manipulation and violence. These elections result in
loss of life, physical injuries, psychological issues, violation of freedom of speech and of human rights. For instance, Gabon
Department of Economics, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, IWH, Große Steinstraße 73, D-06099 Halle (Saale), Germany. E-mail: tugba.
zeydanli@wiwi.uni-halle.de. I would like to thank Pedro Vicente for his supervision and guidance as well as Olivier Bargain, Andrew Clark, Louis
L^evy-Garboua, Chou Nuon, Roxana Gutierrez-Romero, Ana Balcao Reis, Semih Sakalli, Claudia Senik, Semih Tumen, Christoph Wunder, two
anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Scottish Economic Society 2016, Centre for the Study of African Economies: Economic
Development in Africa 2016, 1st World Comparative Economics, 4th LCSR International Workshop, 4th LCSR International Summer School, and
NOVA Research Group for very helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors are mine.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 545
546 T. Zeydanli
(2009), Guinea-Bissau (2009), Kenya (2007), Lesotho (2008), Malawi (2009), Nigeria (2003–2011), Somalia (2009), and
Zimbabwe (2008) were characterized by violent national (or presidential) elections and more violence after elections. During
Nigeria’s 2003 federal and state election, at least 100 people were killed and many were injured. In Kenya’s 2007
presidential elections, 1,200 people were killed and over a quarter of a million people were displaced. The dispute caused
serious violence among supporters. As a result, leaders from the opposition and ruling parties were charged by the
International Criminal Court for inciting violence. In Zimbabwe’s election in March 2008 there was a violent dispute on the
election results. A civil conflict erupted and had to be resolved partly through an external military intervention. Election-
related violence in Africa is very high. Some elections considered to be free and fair may still experience violence during and
after the election is over.
The main focus of the paper is to investigate how individuals’ subjective living conditions change when competitive elections
are approaching. Due to the intense environment of competitive elections, the general tendency is to expect to observe a fall in the
individual living conditions the closer in time the survey is to an election and further that this decrease is greater in a competitive
election than a landslide election, which leads us to our main hypothesis. Moreover, the paper elaborates background
mechanisms of the relationship, which will be explained further in more detail.
The econometric framework captures the effects of proximity, the competitiveness of national elections, and the interaction of
both variables, while controlling for large sets of individual variables such as gender, age, age-squared, rural/urban areas,
education levels, employment status, and economic conditions. The Afrobarometer enables employing country-fixed effects that
control for country-level features, including unobservable characteristics that cannot be measured since they have been collected
not only across multiple countries but also at multiple points in time for the same countries. This creates a major advantage in
testing the election variables that vary within countries across survey rounds.2
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to shed light on the effects of elections on living conditions. This hypothesis is tested
with several living conditions questions provided by the Afrobarometer across 12 African countries. The main hypothesis is
rejected. This paper provides strong and robust evidence that political competition increases individual-level subjective living
conditions. The change in living conditions is related to how close in time the survey is to an election and this proximity effect
depends on the competitiveness of the election. Individual subjective living conditions increases more in a competitive election
period, in which the margin of victory is near zero compared to a landslide election. For every month closer a country is to a
competitive election, on an average the individual-level subjective living conditions demonstrates a 0.015 standard deviation
increase.
There are several possible mechanisms that account for these relationships. The first possibility is to test the effects of
winning elections on individual subjective living conditions. Kahneman et al. (1999) suggest that partisan identity has
considerable implications for the growing literature on well-being in economics, psychology, and other fields. The results
show that winning the national election increases subjective living conditions. The second possibility may be that individual
living conditions increases as election day approaches due to expectations and aspirations, but then starts to fall gradually.
The result shows that the proximity—before and after the election—is positively related to subjective living conditions, but
the impact before the election is greater than that after the election. The third possibility may be focused on whether there is
any link between public expenditure and individual living conditions. The result shows that the public expenditure on
defence increases the individual-level living conditions. The fourth possibility may be that having participated in politics can
improve living conditions. Stutzer and Frey (2006) show that in Switzerland, engaging directly in the democratic process
through referenda increases life satisfaction. Discussing politics and being interested in public affairs have a positive impact
on perceived living conditions in SSA. The fifth mechanism is that voting in free and fair elections improves the living
conditions of the individual.
In addition, this paper investigates in which direction ethnicity has an impact on one’s living conditions. One factor that
some political scientists and economists identify as a cause of instability and poor economic growth is ethnicity. There is
considerable literature documenting an inverse relationship between social heterogeneity and economic growth (see
Section 3.2 for details). Since the salience of ethnic identification grows stronger during political competition, this leads us
to expect that the higher the identification is, the lower is the individual living conditions. Finally, the sensitivity analyses
check whether the salience of ethnicity is also pronounced in the data and we run an analysis to test the econometric
model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the dataset, justifies the construction of dependent and
independent variables, and explains the details of the econometric model. Section 3 presents the estimates, discusses in detail the
results summarized above, and Section 4 runs some sensitivity analyses. Section 5 concludes the research.
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Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 547
The paper utilizes the Afrobarometer from Round 1 to Round 4. The Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research
network. It measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa at an individual-level with a cross-sectional
approach in 35 African countries. The survey collects detailed information about the respondents’ individual characteristics,
their views about democracy, governance, livelihoods, economic concerns, social capital, conflict and crime, their participation
in the electoral process, and perceptions about national identities. Each survey employs the same sampling methodology and
includes a large, nationally representative sample of individuals.
Twelve SSA countries are used in this study3: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.4 The data spans from 1999 to 2009, covering almost ten years of information from
each country. In order to account for country-fixed effects and have the variation of a different election in a given country, all
countries are included in each survey round. To achieve national representativeness, appropriate weights have been used.
Weights are calculated as 1/(number of observations for that country).
The Afrobarometer includes several candidates for living conditions:
1. Your Present Living Conditions—‘In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?’
2. Your Living Conditions in 12 Months—‘Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living
conditions in twelve months’ time?’
3. Your Living Conditions Compared to 12 Months Ago—‘Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve
months ago: Your living conditions?’
4. Your Living Conditions Compared to Others—‘In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of
others in your country?’
5. Ethnic Group Economic Conditions—‘Think about the condition of your ethnic group. Are their economic conditions
worse, the same as, or better than other groups in this country?’
The first three questions’ responses are based on a five-point scale with 1 representing ‘very bad’; 2 ‘fairly bad’; 3 ‘neither
good nor bad’; 4 ‘fairly good’; and 5 ‘very good’. ‘Your living conditions compared to others’ and ‘ethnic group economic
conditions’ are ranked on a five-point scale on which 1 indicates ‘much worse’ and 5 indicates ‘much better’.
To streamline the interpretation and draw a general conclusion, the paper analyses hypotheses with two different
dependent variables to create indices. Summary indices are created by aggregating information across related outcomes of
similar subjective living conditions (Kling et al., 2007). The main motivation for this grouping is to improve the statistical
ability to detect effects that are consistent across specific outcomes when these specific outcomes also have idiosyncratic
shocks. Following the methodology of Kling et al. (2007), summary indices are created based on specific outcomes, in
which specific outcomes are normalized by subtracting the mean of the group and then dividing by the standard deviation
of the group. Formally, X i is the ith of I outcomes; let mi be the group mean and X let s i be the standard deviation of the
group. The normalized outcome is X i ¼ ðX i mi Þ=si . The summary index is X i ¼ X =I . Overall, the summary index
i i i
is defined as the weighted average of z-score of its components. The z-scores are normalized scores based on the group
mean and standard deviation. As stated in Table 1, each component of the index has a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one.
The first outcome is for ‘your living conditions’, which is a combination of the first three questions. These questions
respectively evaluate the individual’s current situation, future condition, and the comparison of current and past living
conditions, in an attempt to measure living conditions in a time perspective. In this respect, they are from the same domain, which
enable aggregate information across related outcomes. The mean of ‘your living conditions in 12 months’ is higher than the other
two living condition variables, most probably due to the individual’s high expectations and aspirations for the future. The mean
of comparison of current and past living conditions using ‘your living conditions compared to 12 months ago’ is higher than the
current living conditions, which might roughly be interpreted as an indication that the people are becoming happier. The second
outcome is for ‘your conditions compared to others’, which is a combination of the last two questions. This assumes a reference
group of language/tribe/ethnic group. This assumption becomes stronger with the similar mean approximately 2.8, and high
correlation 68 percent.5
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548 T. Zeydanli
Dependent variable
1. Your living conditions 0 1 2-3-4
Your present living conditions 2.61 1.22 2-3-4
Nor. your present living conditions 0 1 2-3-4
Your living conditions in 12 months 3.39 1.25 1-2-3-4
Nor. your living conditions in 12 months 0 1 2-3-4
Your living conditions compared to 12 months ago 3.01 1.131 1-2-3-4
Nor. your living conditions compared to 12 months ago 0 1 2-3-4
2. Your conditions compared to others 0 1 3-4
Your living conditions compared to others 2.81 1.08 1-2-3-4
Nor. your living conditions compared to others 0 1 3-4
Ethnic group economic conditions to others 2.8 1.017 3-4
Nor. ethnic group economic conditions to others 0 1 3-4
Individual characteristics
Male 0.50 0.5 1-2-3-4
Age 36.79 14.89 1-2-3-4
Urban 0.37 0.48 1-2-3-4
Postgraduate 0.004 0.06 1-2-3-4
University 0.03 0.16 1-2-3-4
High school 0.07 0.25 1-2-3-4
Secondary school 0.37 0.48 1-2-3-4
Primary school 0.36 0.48 1-2-3-4
Informal schooling 0.03 0.18 1-2-3-4
No schooling 0.13 0.34 1-2-3-4
Employed 0.37 0.48 1-2-3-4
Interested in public affairs 1.78 1.10 2-3-4
Trust national electoral commission 1.56 1.1 2-3-4
Economic conditions 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without food 3.02 1.07 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without food 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without water 3.08 1.11 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without water 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without medical care 2.95 1.1 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without medical care 0 1 2-3-4
How often gone without cash income 2.58 1.17 1-2-3-4
Nor. how often gone without cash income 0 1 2-3-4
Personal identification
Occupation/Class 0.35 0.47 1-2
Language/Ethnic/Tribe Group 0.26 0.44 1-2
Religion 0.16 0.36 1-2
Gender 0.04 0.20 1-2
Other 0.17 0.38 1-2
No. of observations 60,050
Notes: Weights are calculated as 1/(number of observations of that country). Stated number of observations is for independent variables in all rounds. Number of
observations for each dependent variable is noted in estimation results.
Gender, age, age-squared, rural/urban areas, education levels, employment status, and economic conditions are controlled for
the individual characteristics. The variables of economic conditions are the indices of the following questions, ‘Over the past
year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without enough food to eat, enough clean water for home use,
medicines or medical treatment, and a cash income?’ To test the relationship between living conditions and ethnic identification,
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Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 549
the personal identification question is used; ‘Besides being [a citizen of X], which specific group do you feel you belong to first
and foremost?’ The responses are grouped into five categories: language/ethnic group/tribe, religion, occupation/class, gender,
and other. The other category stands for race, region, age, ‘I’m my own person’. This paper adopts a country-fixed effect
framework, which automatically controls for many other aspects of a country: level of economic development, history, civil war,
etc.6 All regressions include round dummies.
Nearly half of the individuals in the sample are male with an average age of 37. This paper restricts the sample
minimum age to 18, which means that all individuals have the right to vote. Approximately 37 per cent of individuals in
the sample live in urban areas. Education is grouped into seven categories. Postgraduate refers to graduate studies with 0.4
per cent of the sample meeting this criterion. Nearly 3 per cent graduated from a university. The highest share in education
falls into primary and secondary school. Less than half of the sample is unemployed. As a proxy of income variable,
economic conditions are controlled for, which is an index that averages together income-related variables such as how
often the respondent had gone without food, water, medical care, and income. Nearly 35 per cent of individuals in the
dataset identified themselves by occupation/class, 26 per cent by language/ethnic/tribe, 16 per cent by religion and 0.4 per
cent by gender.
Table 2 summarizes economic and political characteristics of sample countries. The average GDP per capita of sample
countries is higher than the average of SSA, which is mainly driven by Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. The other
countries are poorer on an average in the SSA. Rates of urbanization are almost the same level as the SSA average.
Utilizing at least two7 round surveys brings variations in the months to election variable, which is called ‘proximity to the
election’ in the regression. In Botswana, for example, 1 means that the survey round occurred one month before the
election and 15 means the survey round occurred 15 months after the election. The competition of presidential election is
measured by vote margin, and is simply the vote share difference between the winner and the runner-up. The
competitiveness level in sample countries is similar to the African average. Utilizing three rounds of the Afrobarometer
brings more variation within country in the competitiveness variable as analyses can make use of more elections. Out of 48
countries, 16 have an election in less than 10 months; 6 out of these 16 countries have a vote margin of more than 0.34,
which is the average vote margin of SSA. The last column stands for the name of the ruling party during that election
period. This variable is utilized for examining whether winning a competitive election changes individual-level subjective
living conditions.
The vector X ict represents individual-level variables,8 the vector C ct is for country-level factors, and mict is individual’s
idiosyncratic level. The focus of the paper is on election variables and are represented as C 0ct b ¼ b1 pct þ b2 cct þ b3 ðpct x cct Þ: pct
is a proximity variable that measures months until the election in the country compared to the survey round. In Table 2, negative
numbers indicate the most recent past election. Proximity is coded as 1absðmonths to=f rom the most recent electionÞ so that
larger numbers imply increasing proximity. cct is a competitiveness variable and defined as vote margin, which is the gap
between the vote share of the winner and the runner-up in the most recent election. The competitiveness variable is calculated
from the vote margin as 1ðvote marginÞ. Larger numbers indicate increasing competitiveness. pct cct is the interaction
variable of proximity and competitiveness.
Since the dependent variable is ordinal rather than cardinal, the ideal way to carry out analyses is through ordered
probit. However, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) demonstrate that the results from cardinal analysis using ordinary
least squares (OLS) is very similar to those from ordinal. For ease of interpretation, the equation is estimated by using
OLS.
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Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 551
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level, while living conditions are increased as the election draws nearer. Specifically, 6 out of 12 countries experience a different
election. The dataset allows analysis of ‘your living conditions’ in three rounds, so in that case the variation becomes higher
when all countries have experienced at least one different election. Given these concerns, it is wise to pay attention to interaction
terms between proximity and competitiveness. After adding the interaction term to the regression (the second column of Tables 3
and 4), positive and statistically significant coefficients of election variables among all dependent variables are obtained. More
specifically, every month closer a country gets to a competitive election, on average, individual-level subjective living
conditions increases 0.014–0.017 in standard deviation depending on the dependent variable of living conditions. Moreover, the
higher the competitiveness of the election, the greater the subjective living conditions of the individual. The results are confirmed
in Column 3, which controls for individual-level characteristics such as age, gender, education, economic conditions, and urban
or rural residence. Among all dependent variables, the results are quite consistent with each other, and they are identical between
the last two specifications.
Our first hypothesis was expected to reveal a fall in the individual living conditions due to the intense environment of
competitive elections. However, the results suggest the opposite. In the following sections, the paper tests what could be the
underlying mechanism of these results. Potentially, there could be three leading reasons: (a) people would like to be in a union,
where they support the same ideology and fight for it; in our context union might be ‘ethnic identification’; (b) people would like
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Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 553
to feel happy if they observed their supported party is close to winning the elections; (c) or simply participating in politics in any
way might give a feeling of contributing to their country’s political and economic affairs.
It has been clearly documented that elections increase people’s living conditions. This finding requires more research to
understand the underlying mechanism of the positive relationship. There might be several channels, but the most pronounced
ones are ethnic identification, winning elections, ex-ante and ex-post impact of elections, the effects of public expenditure on
education, health, and defence, the effects of having actively participated in politics, and trust in the national electoral
commission. This part of the paper explains these leading background relationships.
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554 T. Zeydanli
to ethnic identification. However, the other dependent variable is positively related. There may be several mechanisms behind
this relationship. Several studies argue that there are cultural differences between the ethnic groups regarding subjective living
conditions. Ethnic groups have different conceptions of well-being and that different factors influence their subjective living
conditions (Neff, 2007; Agyemang et al., 2013). For instance, Addai and Pokimica (2010) report that ethnicity is an important
determinant of perceived living conditions of individuals in Ghana. In their analysis, ethnicity tends to have both negative and
positive effects on living conditions among different ethnic groups and different sub-samples.
Identifying oneself in an ethnic group may be linked to belonging to a community, which in turn increases well-being. When
the analysis is conducted without electoral cycle variables, the coefficient of ethnic identification is smaller compared to
controlling for electoral cycle variables. This suggests that the more pronounced the ethnic identification, the higher is the
subjective living conditions of the individual. Unlike general expectations about high ethnic diversification creating lower living
conditions, individuals who identify themselves as their ethnic group report higher living conditions. Social heterogeneity in
SSA can make use of this information for policy. It may be the case that politicians who play the ethnic card strategy in their
election campaign stimulate the well-being of individuals.
Religion identification yields positive relationship with all dependent variables and has statistically significance in ‘your
living conditions’ and ‘your living conditions compared to others’. Individuals with strong religious beliefs report a higher level
of life satisfaction and greater personal happiness (Ellison, 1991; Ellison et al., 2001). In addition to that religion is also a key
determinant in Ghana for perceived living conditions (Pokimica et al., 2012).
The model is tested to determine whether winning the election has an influence on subjective living conditions. The dummy
variable is created for that purpose utilizing the following question: ‘Do you feel close to any particular political party or political
organization? If so, which party or organization is that?’ Since the winning party of this election is known, if the winning party is
the same as the answer from the individual, it is scored as a one; otherwise it is scored as zero. Using the same model, the results
show that an individual supporting the winning party in a competitive election increases individual-level subjective living
conditions (Table 6).
Individuals might think that winning the election brings economic privilege, employment opportunity, protection from
possible threats in the future such as civil war, ethnic clashes and so on, and easy access to health and education services. These
opportunities increase the expectations and aspirations of individuals and lead to higher individual subjective living conditions.
Moreover, almost all countries in the dataset except for Malawi and Mali have had the same incumbent for at least three
presidential elections. Winners might have perceived retaining the presidency as maintaining the status quo of ongoing policies.
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Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 555
prior to the nearest election. If the election to month variable is above (below) zero, it is referred to as ‘after (before) election’ and
carries a value of 1. The ex-ante and ex-post effects have a positive and statistically significant relationship with individual living
conditions.13 The impact of the electoral cycle on subjective living conditions is more powerful before the election than after the
election (Table 7).
During election campaigns, the general tendency is to conduct populist policies such as expansionary fiscal policies—cut
taxes, increase government spending, and subsidize small and medium-sized enterprises—by the incumbent, providing food,
water or other necessities that the people need, and gifts to entertain society. Block (2002) analyses a number of fiscal and
monetary variables in SSA during and after elections and concludes that governmental spending shifts toward more visible,
current expenditures, and away from public investment. This temporary help may increase individual living conditions. In
addition, individuals want to believe that something will change within their country with the upcoming election; this hope may
yield higher subjective living conditions. The leading reason for observing positive living conditions after an election may be due
to a decrease in the intensity of the environment. Individuals can attain relief since the uncertainty deriving from the election is
over.
conditions. The relationship between health expenditure and individual living conditions is only positive and statistically
significant in satisfaction with your living conditions. Regarding education expenses, it is positively related with living
conditions but is not statistically significant.
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Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 557
(Table 10). The higher the legitimacy in elections, the higher is the living conditions of the individual. The legitimacy of
elections also presents transparent political environment and democracy. Even in 1980s Africa, Odedokun (1993) documents
that the political democracy promotes economic growth. Williams (2016) shows the importance of the democratic institutions on
financial development, in addition to that more transparent countries attract foreign direct investment, which affects the
individual living conditions (Mijiyawa, 2015). Allowing people to freely choose from different alternatives in competitive
elections increases political trust as well as creating the democratic environment and those increases lead to greater subjective
living conditions.
In SSA, vote buying and ballot fraud are serious problems during elections. The only variable to control for that purpose is
‘trust national electoral commission’. However, this variable should be evaluated carefully as conditional correlations exist. An
individual who thinks that elections are free and fair, probably voted for the one who wins the election: s/he already feels content
about the election result. On the other hand, the loser starts blaming the commission since s/he is not happy with the result.
4. Sensitivity Analyses
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558 T. Zeydanli
Since 1990, the banning of ethnic parties has become the norm in SSA. In our dataset the ethnic banning countries are
Tanzania and Uganda. For instance, Tanzania has used the education system and redistribution of resources to develop a sense of
national as opposed to ethnic identity. The studies that show the impact of ethnic banning in parties conclude that these laws have
only marginally influenced the character of the political parties (Moroff, 2010). Ethnic banning may alter the origin of parties,
resulting in ethnic-free parties. This affects voting behaviour and subjective living conditions. Ethnic banning can also influence
the salience of ethnic identification. Tanzania has among the lowest degree of ethnic identity salience in one of the
Afrobarometer survey rounds, at just 3 per cent. Eifert et al. (2010) also show Tanzania’s outlier status. The presidential election
has little impact on the share of the population that identifies themselves in ethnic terms. In Figure 1, one can also observe that the
impact of the proximity of elections on subjective living conditions is less in Tanzania compared to other countries. Tanzania’s
situation is proof of the strength of ethnic identification in politics.18 Miguel (2004) examines the success of nation-building
policies in Tanzania, which have had a beneficial long-run impact on country’s political stability and economic development.
the environment of free and fair elections, and participation in politics. These mechanisms have a positive impact on the
subjective living conditions. Moreover, if individuals identify themselves ethnically higher, this is positively correlated with
individual-level subjective living conditions. As stated in Habyarimana et al. (2007), enforcing cooperation among
individuals, in this context the same ethnic group, would make policies more effective. Thereby, combination of these results
might enable us to draw a conclusion such that policies may be implemented in an ethnic group-level rather than a country-
level. These findings may be important for designing policies to increase social welfare in SSA. However, these positive
living conditions’ effects should be treated cautiously. Because these effects occur only when elections are proximate. In the
short run, these positive externalities might boost economic growth, but the long-run implications are ambiguous. Moreover,
there might be some events during competitive elections, which could possibly alter the living conditions, and these may
create some bias in the results.
Apart from the empirical findings, this paper has three good features for analysing hypotheses. It creates indices of living
conditions questions to aggregate same outcomes across domains such as time and comparison. The paper has grouped two
living conditions questions that evaluate living conditions regarding time and comparisons of respondents’ lives. A second
methodological contribution is to make use of repeated country-level observations with micro-individual survey data. Since the
data have been collected at multiple points in time for the same countries, it allows for variation in key parameters of interest such
as the proximity of the survey to the nearest election and the competitiveness of that contest. Moreover, living conditions of
individuals is affected mostly by the characteristics of the social and political environment in which he or she lives. Using the
feature of data, the paper employs a country-fixed effect model to overcome country-level characteristics. Thirdly, these results
are drawn from cross-national survey data rather than case studies and anecdotal evidence, which allows for generalized cross
settings and creates a much stronger position.
Notes
1. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in 35 African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. It measures social,
political, and economic atmosphere of countries. See Section 4.2 for more information.
2. The paper makes use of the countries whose data are present in at least three rounds of survey so as to gain variation in
election variables.
3. Number of observations in the regressions varies depending on the availability of the variable in rounds.
4. See Table 2 for detailed information of countries and survey years.
5. All regressions were also tested separately using the five living condition questions on the list. The results (not shown) are
parallel with the indices results. They are available upon request.
6. Results are robust even if dropping a single country in the dataset.
7. It can be three depending on the dependent variable.
8. See Table 1 for individual-level variables.
9. Since there is a robust result among dependent variables, this analysis is conducted with only the ‘your living conditions’
variable for the figure.
10. The results are robust to a non-parametric bootstrap of the standard errors using resampling at the country level, which is
theoretically more appropriate given the relatively small number of countries.
11. The personal identification question is derived from the specific question, which is available only in Rounds 1 and 2. Given
the availability of the dependent variable, it is possible to run the regression only for Round 2.
12. The same regressions have been run without election variables (not shown), which is in line with the previous one. The
results are available upon request.
13. See Table 7. Only ex-ante effects of the electoral cycle are represented. The results of ex-post effects are available upon
request.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
560 T. Zeydanli
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© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Elections and Subjective Living Conditions 561
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 562–574
Abstract: Using a Markov switching regression model, the study investigated the relationship between oil price shocks and
exchange rates movements in an oil-exporting economy. On the strength of theoretical and empirical evidence, Nigerian naira
exchange rates to US dollars were decomposed into two segmented time trends of depreciation (state 1) and appreciation
(state 2). Empirical results provided evidence that exchange rate returns exhibited an asymmetric response to oil price shocks
during depreciation and appreciation. We observed that, while the system is in depreciation, nominal oil prices had a positive
influence on nominal USD/NGN, whereas nominal oil price shocks had no significant effect on nominal exchange rate
movements during appreciation. In addition, real effective exchange rates appreciate with decreasing real oil prices but its
depreciation does not depend significantly on real oil prices. Given that a decrease in nominal oil prices induces rapid
naira depreciation and topples exchange rates stability, the study suggested that the government works towards a sustainable
diversification of the economy to avoid continued over-dependence on oil exports. Also, to rigorously pursue a sustainable fiscal
policy regime in order to boost local productions, encourage non-oil commodities exportation, and consequently increase
avenues for influx of foreign exchange.
1. Introduction
Oil-exporting economies may experience exchange rate appreciation when oil prices rise and depreciation when they fall. This
was the submission of early influential papers such as Golub (1983) and Corden (1984). Results from subsequent studies,
however, are divided on this submission: While some agreed that an increase in oil price leads to appreciation of domestic
currency (e.g. Amano and van Noden, 1998; Chen and Chen, 2007; Beckmann and Czudaj, 2012), some others have reported a
negative relationship (e.g. Huang and Guo, 2007; Ghosh, 2011). Some even claimed that no relationship exists between the two
variables (e.g. Akram and Holter, 1996; Buetzer et al., 2012). Figure 1 provides support for the latter group: the scatter plot and
the fitted regression line indicate an insignificant relationship between naira-dollar exchange rates and Brent prices in nominal
and real terms; meaning that oil price changes do not in any significant way contribute to the movements in exchange rates of the
US dollar to Nigerian naira.
However, is it intuitively realistic that oil prices do not contribute to naira-dollar movements in Nigeria? It is a fact that Nigeria
is a mono-product (crude oil) economy. Her annual federal budget is designed based on projections made on global oil prices and
the quantity of oil sold. Also, it is known that oil is denominated in US dollars. Hence, it is expected that any increase or decrease
in the global price of crude oil would affect the supply of foreign exchange, value of naira (relative to dollar), the Nigerian foreign
reserve, excess crude oil account, inflation rates, level of production, rates of unemployment and the economy. Thus, from the
theoretical point of view, a study of the nexus between oil prices and USD/NGN rates is key to exchange rates and economic
stability. Judging from the current experience in Nigeria, it could also help to avert potential spike in inflation and unemployment
rates; and more importantly, currency crises and economic recession.
From the empirical perspective, the plots of NGN/USD exchange rates and Brent crude oil prices displayed in Figure 2 show
clearly that the linear regression modelling depicted in Figure 1 does not reflect the true relationship between oil prices and
exchange rates in Nigeria in either nominal or real terms. It is evident that the two major depreciation episodes recorded in
2008M11–2012M01 and 2014M10–2015M03 in Figure 2a were preceded by some substantial fall in oil prices in 2008M07–
2008M12 and 2014M06–2015M03. Similarly, the major depreciation periods of 2008M11–2009M01 and 2014M10–2015M02
in Figure 2b were preceded by some substantial fall in oil prices in 2008M07–2008M12 and 2014M06–2015M01. However, the
Department of Mathematics, Obafemi Awolowo University, 220005, Ile-Ife, Nigeria; e-mail: idowu.sayo@yahoo.com, olusayo11@gmail.com
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 562
Oil and the Naira 563
Figure 1: Scatter plots of log-differenced USD/NGN and Brent for 2004M01–2016M05 in nominal and
real terms
same cannot be said about appreciation periods in both figures. It appears that an increase in oil prices did not result in any
substantial appreciation of naira against the dollar either in the real or nominal term, whereas the value of naira seems to
depreciate in the nominal and the real as oil price reduces. It is noteworthy that real effective exchange rate (REER) generally
appreciates with decreasing oil prices between 2011M06 and 2014M10, after which it briefly went into depreciation for some
four months, then it recovered. In other words, there seems to be some asymmetry in the response of exchange rates to the
changes in oil prices when naira is in appreciation and depreciation.
Now, why does asymmetry matter in oil prices-exchange rates relationship? From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that
in order to obtain a realistic and accurate empirical relationship between exchange rates and oil price movements, a researcher
must take into cognizance the dual nature of the exchange rates; otherwise, one may obtain wrong estimates, and consequently,
misleading inferences.
Previous empirical studies investigating this relationship in the matured markets have employed some form of linear models
such as the vector error correction (VEC) (e.g. Indjehagopian et al., 2000; Zalduendo, 2006), cointegration tests (e.g. Amano and
van Noden, 1998; Coudert et al., 2008), vector autoregressions (VAR) (e.g. Huang and Guo, 2007; Zhang et al., 2008), and an
ARCH-type model specification which assumed symmetric response from exchange rates to oil prices in the mean equation
Figure 2: Plots of USD/NGN and Brent for 2004M01–2016M05 in nominal and real terms
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
564 I. O. Ayodeji
models (e.g. Narayan et al., 2008; Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010). All these models assumed (though unrealistically) that the
response from exchange rates to changes in oil prices is symmetric.1
To show the significance of oil and exchange rates across regions, there have also been studies in Africa on exchange rates
(Igwe and Ogunleye, 2014), its policies (Eregha et al., 2016) and its volatility (Ozturk and Kalyoncu, 2009); also on
the oil wealth and its effect on governance (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2014). In particular, there have been a few studies on the
oil-exchange rate link in Africa, such as Turhan et al. (1991) and Pershin et al. (2015). These studies, like those on matured
markets, also ignored the dual nature of exchange rates while measuring the contributions of oil price shocks to exchange rate
movements.
However, there is evidence for asymmetries in exchange rates that challenge the assumptions of the conventional linear
models. Enders and Dibooglu (2001), for instance, documented several reasons that exchange rates may respond asymmetrically
to oil price shocks. Hamilton (1989) proposed the Markov switching model as an alternative to linear models. The Markov
switching model (MSM) may be used to characterize exchange rates into different states that are consistent with the reality.
MSM incorporates the Markov process into an autoregressive model such that the mean exchange rate may vary across
unobserved states that evolve according to an nth (usually, 1st) order Markov transition process. Engel and Hamilton (1990),
applied a two-state MSM to divide exchange rates into segmented time trends. They found convincing evidence to support that
exchange rates go through two distinct states of appreciation and depreciation, exhibiting asymmetric features in those states.
Some other studies have also confirmed the appropriateness of Markov switching specification in modelling exchange rates. See,
for instance, Kaminsky (1993), Evans and Lewis (1995), Dewachter (1997). All these provide motivation and justification for
modelling the oil–exchange rates link with a state-dependent process.
This study investigates whether oil price changes possess the relevant dynamics to drive the dichotomous exchange rate
system; or at least explain exchange rate movements at certain periods. Accordingly, we incorporate oil price shocks in the
conditional mean equation of the Markov switching process. We employed both the nominal and real effective exchange rates
together with the nominal and real prices of oil. This enables us to effectively scrutinize the relationship between the two
macroeconomic variables with respect to the Nigerian economy alone, and also other economies. As a direct consequence, it is
possible to draw fairly general inferences that are not limited to the Nigerian economy. In addition to measuring the impact of oil
price changes on exchange rates, our specification also identifies the periods that are mainly explained by oil price movements.
Information on the relationship between oil prices and exchange rates is very important for a country like Nigeria, as it would
enhance the exchange rates determination process, which is very significant if naira would indeed be stabilized (Emenike, 2016).
Thus, results from this study are very useful to monetary authorities, since it is always their goal to achieve exchange rate
stability; traders, since most commodities in Nigeria are denominated in dollars; and researchers alike. It also has important
implications for government revenue, rates of unemployment and inflation, economic growth, import structure, and other
economic factors.
The overview of the study is as follows: Section 2 describes briefly some policy issues in the Nigerian foreign exchange
market. Section 3 discusses the data and the Markov switching model to be employed. Section 4 presents empirical results while
Section 5 concludes.
certain authorized dealers. The Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) was introduced, so also was the Dutch Auction
System (DAS). We note that in addition to low global oil prices, Nigeria also had some $33 trillion foreign debt to settle at the
time. Thus, due to the pressure on naira, the IFEM had to be suspended for 6 months.
From late 2003 to the middle of 2008, oil prices rose steadily in the global market from US$30 to US$140 per barrel.
Consequently, Nigerian foreign reserves received a huge boost. According to the dailies, Nigeria had, in addition to the
foreign reserves, the Excess Crude Account which contained more than $20 billion sometime in 2008. Even CBN
reported that naira gained up to 20 per cent against the dollar at this period without conscious effort from any quarters to
strengthen it.
Sadly in late 2008, the era of the oil boom ended; oil prices had fallen to $50 per barrel at the end of that year. As expected,
CBN responded in the usual manner: Governor Soludo banned IFEM and DAS. By 2009, the value of naira had gone down to
147 to $1 from 127 in 2004. Soon enough, however, oil prices began to recover. Then came the Sanusi Lamido Sanusi era in
June 2009: he restored IFEM that Soludo had previously banned. It is noteworthy that oil prices remained high all through from
2009 until February 2014. In addition to the oil boom, Sanusi relaxed the one-year restriction on foreign investors who wanted to
buy government bonds, then dollars came pouring in like heavy rain. The Nigerian market was kept liquid, and consequently it
was included in the famous JP Morgan Index.
Emefiele took office after Sanusi. Global Brent oil prices again plunged to $62 at the close of 2014 from $112 it was in June of
the same year (Breul, 2015). As did Soludo, Emefiele also closed DAS on 18 February 2015 and quoted an exchange rate of
197–199 to $1. This continued until June 2016 when CBN was forced to revert back to the market-driven foreign exchange
system. The Nigerian naira immediately plunged to 261 to a dollar overnight.
System (1) represents the simplest model with switching features. For k ¼ 2 for instance, the intercept m takes two different
values representing the expectations m in the two different states, so also the variance V ðet Þ ¼ s 2 . S t is the unobservable
Markov-switching variable which evolves according to transition probabilities P:
!
P11 P12
P¼ ; ð2Þ
P21 P22
X
2
Pij ¼ 1; j ¼ 1; 2; and for all i ð3Þ
j¼1
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
566 I. O. Ayodeji
If the values of S t are known, estimation of the relevant parameters by maximum likelihood estimation is direct. However, in
Markov switching where the states S t are not known, the log likelihood equation may not be easily maximized. Hence, following
Hamilton (1994), we modify Equation (5) as follows:
0 1
!2
X T X 2
B 1 y mS bSt xt C
l¼ log @qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi exp t pffiffitffi PðS t jqt1 ÞA ð6Þ
t¼1 S t ¼1
2
2ps St 2 s S t
where qt1 is the information available up to time ðt 1Þ. Hamilton (1994) described in detail a suitable process, popularly
referred to as ‘the Hamilton filter’ which can be used to compute the estimates of the probabilities PðS t Þ for each state.
^ ðS t ¼ jjqT Þ of the smoothing probabilities for the full sample T may be obtained through a smoothing
Further, the estimates P
iterative process (Kim, 1994). In the same vein, the expected duration E½D of a regime is calculated as (Kim and Nelson, 1999)
X
1
1
E½D ¼ jPðD ¼ jÞ ; ð7Þ
j¼1
1 Pjj
where D is the duration of state j. More details of the estimation process can be found in Hamilton (1994) and Engel and Hamilton
(1990), among others.
As a closing remark, we note that the number of states can be extended from 2 to k ð> 2Þ. An example was demonstrated in
Ayodeji (2016) in the case of Nigeria when MSM for k ¼ 3 states of appreciation, depreciation, and stagnation were developed.
There is, however, no hard and fast rules in the choice of optimal number of states. The choice of k generally depends on the
exchange rates to be modelled, objectives of study, computational demand and mathematical tractability (Lee and Chen, 2006).
Here, when System (1) is extended to include covariates xt as in Model (4), the computational complexity increases. Besides, our
objective of study is to determine the movements of exchange rates in response to changes in the oil prices during appreciation
and depreciation periods. Clearly, the specification k ¼ 2 suffices to achieve this objective of study. Thus, we could have two
broad states of appreciation and depreciation, and study the intended relationship under them, without loss of generality.
(Loretan, 2005). Thus it can be said that, on average, the Nigerian naira experienced depreciation locally but appreciation
internationally from the period January 2004 to May 2016.
Whereas two distinct states of depreciation and appreciation could be observed in Figure 2, the linear regression model was
only able to identify one of them — depreciation in nominal and appreciation in the real. A very important inference is that when
exchange rate modelling is carried out without regard for all the possible states, the linear regression model only captures the
state with the longer swing. However, inferences from other possible states are also required to understand the dynamics of the
exchange rate. Policymakers, for instance, must have access to all available information to guide them in making the right
decisions while the currency value is either falling or rising.
The aggregate relationship between oil prices and the exchange rates, as depicted by b, is insignificant in the nominal and real
terms; meaning that change in oil prices, on average, does not affect exchange rate movements in any form. This position clearly
disagrees with Figure 2, in which the naira depreciates with decreasing oil prices and (seems to) appreciate with increasing oil
prices in the nominal. Also in the case of the real, the same pattern as in the nominal could be observed up until 2011 after which
REER, more or less, began to rise though real oil price was falling. It is noteworthy that the two measures of exchange rates differ
in the direction of the aggregate relationship: While b is positive in the nominal, it is negative in the real. In summary, from
January 2004 to May 2016, nominal exchange rates decreases, on average, with decreasing nominal oil prices while real
effective exchange rates increases, on average, with decreasing real oil prices.
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
568 I. O. Ayodeji
both real and nominal terms. This implies that whether in real or nominal, Nigerian naira with respect to dollars, experienced
more volatility while in depreciation than when in appreciation.
For nominal, the estimates of b in the depreciation and appreciation states were 0:08ðp ¼ 0:04Þ and 4:23 105 ðp ¼ 0:82Þ,
respectively. The fact that b had a positive sign means that as oil prices increase, more US dollars would be required to buy 1,
and vice versa, while the system is in depreciation. This implies that positive changes in oil prices would lead to higher
depreciation for dollar and less depreciation for naira. However, whether oil prices are increasing or decreasing does not impact
on exchange rates while the systemis in appreciation.
We note, in passing, that b ^ 2 ¼ 0:08; 4:23 105 is consistent with Figure 2a: while a nominal oil price decrease
^ 1; b
from $132 to $40 between 2008M06 and 2008M12 led to a corresponding 0.19 per cent depreciation in nominal NGN/USD
in 2008M11–2009M09, an increase in nominal oil prices from $40 to $123 in 2008M12–2011M04 did not yield
an appreciation of corresponding magnitude; NGN/USD only fluctuated between 0.0063 and 0.0066 from 2009M09 to
2012M03.
Taking into account Nigeria’s trading partners, the relationship between naira/dollar and oil price shocks is regime dependent:
it is positive in depreciation but negative in appreciation. In particular, b1 ¼ 0:082ðp ¼ 0:12Þ suggests that REER depreciates
less in value when oil prices rise. In the same vein, b2 ¼ 4:74 102 ðp ¼ 0:016Þ implies that while the system is in
appreciation, naira, relative to other relevant currencies, increases with decreasing oil prices. It is easily deduced that the
magnitude and direction of the relationship are similar for both the nominal and real terms while the exchange rate system is in
depreciation, though the relationship is insignificant in the real. Watching Figure 2b closely, we observe that the prevailing state
between 2004M01 and 2011M04 in REER is depreciation. We observe further that REER generally decreased with decreasing
real oil prices, in this prevailing state. In the same vein, it is obvious that REER generally appreciates in the periods following
2011M04. It is also obvious that the period between 2011M06 and 2016M05 is a clear departure from what was obtained earlier:
REER increased with decreasing real oil prices. Hence,
the nexus between real oil price and real effective exchange rates is
state-dependent, and b ^ 2 ¼ 0:082; 4:74 102 truly reflected Figure 2b more than the b estimate provided earlier by the
^ 1; b
linear model.
A reconstruction of the depreciation episodes for nominal rates and real effective rates are presented in the bottom panels of
Figures 3a and 3b, respectively. The top panels of the figures displayed their corresponding exchange rates returns. As is usually
the practice, we reckoned that switching has occurred when the smoothing probability PðS T ¼ jjqT Þ > 0:5. It is easily seen that
the Markov switching model augmented with oil price shocks provided a matching description of the movements in exchange
rates in both nominal and real terms. In the nominal, the depreciation episodes (i.e. the peaks) 2008M11–2012M10 and
2014M10–2015M02 were clearly identified. Recall that earlier in Section 2, we documented that global oil prices fell twice
between 2008 and 2014; precisely late 2008 and late 2014. Notice that those periods of oil price decrease correspond to the peaks
found in Figure 3a. These, in addition to b estimates obtained earlier, provide strong evidence that nominal oil price shocks drive
the dichotomous nominal naira exchange rates, hence should be included in the nominal exchange rates determination. In the
Figure 3: Exchange rate returns and smoothed probability plots of USD/NGN for 2004M01–2016M05 in
nominal and real terms
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Oil and the Naira 569
same vein, the periods of ‘appreciation’ (the troughs) were also well extracted in Figure 3a. These were mostly the times the naira
was pegged against dollar. It can be inferred that there was more or less no natural appreciation of naira against the dollar from
2004 to 2016 despite the fact that the oil price increased continuously from 2009 to late 2014.
Similarly, in the real smoothing plot, the peaks were also well identified as 2005M06–2005M07, 2008M12–2009M01 and
2014M11–2015M03. We note that in addition to the documented periods (late) 2008 and 2014, the real smoothing plot captured
the incidence of 2005 when oil sold globally for as low as $50 for a long time.
Lastly, the estimated transition probability matrices for the nominal P ^ n and the real P ^ r terms were P ^n ¼
! !
0:888156 0:111844 0:527662 0:472338
^
and P r ¼ . First and foremost, both estimated transition probabilities
0:110663 0:889337 0:036947 0:963053
indicate that (i) none of the two regimes is permanent, since all the estimated transition probabilities are less than one; and (ii)
REER had more appreciation episodes than the nominal exchange rates since 0:472 > 0:112. In addition, two other important points
can be inferred from the matrix P ^ n : (i) The nominal exchange rate system is almost equally likely to remain in either states;
^ 11 P
P ^ 22 0:89: This is true since aggregate duration of the peaks and those of the troughs depicted in bottom panel of Figure 3a are
almost equivalent. Accordingly, the estimated expected length of state 1 and 2 are approximately nine months. (ii) Movement
from state 1 to 2, and 2 to 1 are less likely, only a little chance of 0.112; whereas, with P ^ 22 0:96 in the P ^ r , REER has a
higher likelihood of remaining in the appreciation state than in the depreciation. This can be deduced from the smoothing plot
in Figure 3b since the longest duration of depreciation was only 4 months, that is, from 2014M11 to 2015M02 compared to
that of appreciation. Consequently, the movement from depreciation to appreciation is more likely with P ^ 12 ¼ 0:47 than the
^
converse, P 21 ¼ 0:0369.
In line with our objectives of study, the following research questions must be answered: (i) Was the Markov switching model
adequate for modelling the relation between oil price shocks and exchange rates movements in nominal and real terms? If this
were true, then there should be some significant changes in the values of m; s and b from regime to regime in both terms. For this
reason, we tested the following null hypotheses:
H 0m : m1 ¼ m2 ;
H 0b : b1 ¼ b2 ; ð8Þ
H 0s : s 1 ¼ s 2 :
Since the parameter vector u ¼ ðm; b; s Þ and the transition probabilities were all identified under the null hypotheses (8), we
may therefore test using the standard theory of distribution. The first segment of Tables 3 and 4 report Wald statistic (W) values
for the nominal and real terms. In the case of the nominal, we observed that all statistic values were significant at a ¼ 0:05
except, of course, for W m which was not too convincing. For the avoidance of doubts, the joint hypothesis
H 0 : m1 ¼ m2 ; b1 ¼ b2 ; s 1 ¼ s 2 ð9Þ
was also tested. The corresponding statistic W was highly significant with p ¼ 0:00.
Following Ayodeji (2016), an alternative test of MSM adequacy may be achieved by testing the following null hypothesis
1 Wm NA 3.817511
(0.0507)
Wb NA 4.032747
(0.0446)
Ws NA 1644.785
(0.0000)
W NA 1652.427
(0.0000)
Wp NA 24.2964
(4.29 107)
2 LogL 374.95880 654.1552
AIC 5.03998 8.731826
BIC 4.99948 8.569815
HIC 5.02353 8.666002
3 Qð10Þ 10.380 1.4470
(0.408) (0.999)
Q2 ð10Þ 1.4310 0.1472
(0.999) (1.000)
Notes: p-values in parentheses. NA ¼ not applicable. Where AIC ¼ 2logL þ 2p; BIC ¼ 2logL þ plogT and HIC ¼ 2logL þ 2plogðlogT Þ; L is the
likelihood function defined earlier in Equation (6) and p represents the number of parameters included in the model.
1 Wm NA 1.880474
(0.1703)
Wb NA 1.150189
(0.2835)
Ws NA 26.34564
(0.0000)
W NA 29.66608
(0.0000)
Wp NA 0.495099
(0.443)
2 LogL 356.3934 390.8641
AIC 4.789100 5.173839
BIC 4.748597 5.011827
HIC 4.772643 5.108014
3 Q(10) 17.389 14.790
(0.066) (0.140)
Q2(10) 23.101 3.3473
(0.010) (0.972)
Notes: p-values in parentheses. NA ¼ not applicable. Where AIC ¼ 2logL þ 2p; BIC ¼ 2logL þ plogT and HIC ¼ 2logL þ 2plogðlogT Þ; L is the
likelihood function defined earlier in Equation (6) and p represents the number of parameters included in the model.
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Oil and the Naira 571
P11 þ P22 1
Wp ¼ x2ð1Þ : ð11Þ
V ar½P11 þ V ar½P22 þ 2Cov½P11 ; P22
As can be seen in Table 3, W p ¼ 24:2964 is highly significant with p ¼ 0:00000043: Therefore, based on these statistics,
we reject the null hypothesis of equality of the tested parameters in the two regimes and conclude that the Markov switching
model employed was adequate for modelling the relation between nominal oil price shocks and nominal exchange rates
movements.
In the case of REER, W m and W s were not significant at a ¼ 0:05 since their p-values were p ¼ 0:17 and p ¼ 0:28,
respectively. W p was also not significant at p ¼ 0:495. Of course, this result could be explained using the smoothing probability
plot 3b. We observed that the switches from appreciation to depreciation occurred only thrice within the period of study. We
observed further that the maximum duration of those switches was only 5 months, that is, from 2014M11 to 2015M03. More
evidently, the probability for the REER system to remain in appreciation was computed as P ^ 22 ¼ 0:96 1. Also, the expected
duration of appreciation was 27 months compared to depreciation which was only 2 months. Therefore, in line with Klaassen
(2005), we conclude that the period 2004M01–2016M05 gave too few observations to differentiate the few depreciation periods
from appreciation.
(ii) Did exchange rate return exhibit some asymmetries in its response to shocks? If this were so, then b1 6¼ b2 statistically. So
we test the hypothesis
H 0 : b1 ¼ b2 : ð12Þ
Again, for the nominal series, the Wald statistic W b ¼ 4:03ðp ¼ 0:04Þ showed that the response to shocks during depreciation
was different from that of appreciation. As a matter of fact, the test of H 0 : b1 ¼ 0 yielded W ¼ 4:04ðp ¼ 0:0445Þ while
H 0 : b2 ¼ 0 yielded W ¼ 0:052ðp ¼ 0:819Þ (see Table 1). Thus we can conclude that while nominal oil price shocks had no
significant effect on nominal exchange rate movements during appreciation, it significantly drives nominal exchange rate
movements when the system is in depreciation. Negative changes in nominal oil prices would lead to more depreciation; positive
changes in nominal oil prices reduce the rate of depreciation.
In contrast to the nominal series, the Wald statistic for the real terms W b ¼ 1:50ðp ¼ 0:28Þ is insignificant. Thus the seeming
regime-dependent relationship reported earlier in b estimates does not hold significantly.
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
572 I. O. Ayodeji
where xt and yt represent the returns on Brent prices and exchange rates, respectively. The results (not reported here but are
available on request) showed that the Markov switching approach is also appropriate for modelling the upward and downward
movements in oil prices. Two states were identified: the ‘fall’ (State 1) and the ‘rise’ (State 2). However, exchange rates did not
explain the movements in oil prices either in the real or the nominal at any of the two states within the specified period.
5. Conclusion
Following Engel and Hamilton (1990) that exchange rates are better modelled using regime switching models rather than
random walk, this study employed the Markov switching model to study the effects of oil price shocks on exchange rate
movements in nominal and real terms. The mathematical approach adopted was to incorporate oil price changes in the
conditional mean equations in order to measure how much oil price shocks drive the dichotomous exchange rates. The outputs
from MSM were compared with those from linear regression models.
Empirical results from linear regression erroneously made us think that oil price shocks had no effect whatsoever on exchange
rates movements either in the nominal or real. However, with the dual nature of the exchange rate system taken into account,
nominal exchange rate returns exhibited an asymmetric response to nominal oil price changes during depreciation and
appreciation: we observed that negative changes in oil prices would lead to higher depreciation in naira while positive changes
would yield less depreciation; whereas oil price shocks had no significant effect on exchange rate movements when the exchange
rates system is in appreciation. We observed further that the nexus between real effective exchange rates (REER) and real oil
price is regime-dependent, though insignificant. In addition, smoothing probabilities indicated that the oil price shocks
adequately accounted for the depreciation episodes of 2008M11–2012M01 and 2014M10–2015M03 in the nominal series; and
2005M06–2005M07, 2008M12–2009M01 and 2014M11–2015M02 in the real effective series.
Results from this study have shown that a long-term relation exists between oil prices and exchange rates, especially while the
system is in depreciation. This implies that the value of naira would continue to fall so long as oil prices continue to fall. Thus, the
policy of pegging that the CBN usually adopts whenever oil prices fall is not a solution to Nigeria’s exchange rate instability as it
would only encourage dollar illiquidity and give control of the foreign exchange movements to speculators, currency traffickers
and perpetrators of arbitrage. Rather, in the meantime, CBN’s intervention should be to inject foreign exchange into the system
in order to ensure sustainable liquidity in the market; to identify genuine end users and ensure accessibility and affordability of
foreign exchange to them. This would bring some relief to local manufacturers, traders and other local users of US dollars while
waiting for crude oil prices to improve globally. In the long run, the government may work towards a sustainable diversification
of the economy to avoid continued over-dependence on oil exports; rigorously pursue a sustainable fiscal policy regime in order
to boost local productions. All these are necessary to establish a stable exchange rate system with a flourishing foreign exchange
market to manage supply and demand of foreign currencies, reduce inflation and unemployment rates.
The inclusion of the real effective exchange rates in our modelling mix gives a picture of the overall performance of the naira.
REER appreciates with decreasing real oil prices though nominal naira exchange rates generally depreciate against the dollar from
© 2017 The Author. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Oil and the Naira 573
January 2004 to May 2016. This suggests that the nominal appreciation of the dollar against the naira may be due to some temporary
weakness in the naira owing to the current status of oil prices in the global market, in view of the fact that oil is denominated in dollars.
Thus, if the current crisis is properly managed, the domestic value and overall competitiveness of the naira may be quickly restored.
The present study considers oil prices as the only independent variable. This is because, our intent here is to examine the direct
influence of oil prices on USD/NGN exchange rates. Besides, influential studies such as Amano and van Norden (1998) and Chaudhuri
and Daniel (1998) provided theoretical and empirical evidence that oil price shocks are the most important factor determining real
exchange rates in the long run. Further studies may, however, be carried out to determine the influence of other relevant macroeconomic
variables such as inflation rates, interest rates and GDP on the relationship between oil prices and exchange rates.
Note
1. A notable exception however is Beckmann and Czudaj (2012) who employed a Markov switching vector error correction model
(MS-VEC) to analyse the cointegration pattern between oil prices and effective dollar exchange rates in nominal and real terms.
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African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 575–588
Abstract: This paper examines the role of infrastructural development and natural resources on FDI inflows in Ghana. We
examine the empirical relations using the Prais–Winsten regression estimation procedure which is meant to overcome
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms in the model, often for regressions applied to series. The data was
obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) spanning from 1975 to 2014. Our findings suggest that infrastructural
development and natural resources are drivers of FDI inflows in Ghana. The other variables that significantly influence FDI
inflows in Ghana include the lending interest rate, market size and GDP growth rate. The policy implications of this study is that,
while Ghana seeks to expand its infrastructure and natural resources to enhance FDI inflows and economic growth, this must be
done in tandem with creating an enabling environment to ensure macroeconomic stability.
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been defined by Graham and Krugman (1982) as the source of acquisition of managerial
control by a business enterprise of a foreign country over a business activity in a host country. FDI, according to the World
Bank, are the net inflows of investments made to acquire a lasting management interest, which is usually 10 per cent or more
of voting rights, in a business functioning in an economy and not that of the investor. It is arrived at by summing equity
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, all depicted in the balance of payments. In
the past two decades, there has been an upward surge in FDI inflows across most regions of the world. This has led to a
resurgence in academia, of the debate regarding the benefits of FDI and it determinants (Omri et al., 2014). Benefits of FDI
include direct capital financing, generation of positive externalities, and the subsequent improvement in economic growth as
a result of technology transfer, spillover effects, productivity gains, and the introduction of new processes and managerial
skills (Lee, 2013).
The World Bank (2015) has witnessed a change in the direction of flow of FDI from developed to developing countries. Net
capital flows from FDI for instance, in 124 low- and middle-income countries as at 2015 was $1.2 trillion. Developing and
transition economies also received greater Greenfield investments than developed countries between 2008 and 2009 (World
Bank, 2010). Among the top 20 economies ranked by FDI inflows are developing countries and transition economies, who from
2011 to 2013 recorded FDI inflows between $725 billion and $778 billion, representing an increase from 43 per cent to 54 per
cent of global FDI inflows (World Bank, 2014). While on a yearly average basis Africa’s share of FDI inflows has been low and it
is far behind other regions of the world, Ghana on the average has experienced a significant rise in FDI inflows relative to other
countries in percentage terms. This has drawn attention as to what might have accounted for this in the face of massive
infrastructural development, oil discovery and challenges with power generation in recent times.
FDI acts as a rich source of capital, technology and skill transfer. For the home economy, FDI helps it reap the benefit of
an expanding market, lowering costs factors and other tariff measures (World Bank, 2010). In this regard, subsequent
governments in Ghana have aimed at improving the infrastructure and natural resource explorations in a bid to attract
increased FDI. In the last decade, Ghana has experienced an enormous investment in transport, health, education and
Ebenezer Bugri Anarfo (corresponding author), GIMPA Business School, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, PO Box AH 50,
Achimota, Accra, Ghana; tel: þ233 21 4010681, fax: þ233 21 421 622, e-mail: ebugri@yahoo.com. Abel Mawuko Agoba, Department of Banking and
Finance, Central University, PO Box 2305, Tema, Ghana; e-mail: aagoba@central.edu.gh. Robert Abebreseh, GIMPA Business School, Ghana
Institute of Management and Public Administration, PO Box AH 50, Achimota, Accra, Ghana; e-mail: rabebreseh@yahoo.com
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 575
576 E. B. Anarfo et al.
electricity infrastructure. There have been discoveries of oil in many parts of the country in addition to the gold and cocoa
natural resource base of the country. These two events are expected to attract resource-seeking FDI and efficiency seeking
FDI into the country. However, in the past year, for example, FDI reduced by about US$3 billion due to the erratic power
supply situation that the country has experienced in spite of the massive investments in the electricity, oil and gas sectors.
Factors that significantly influence FDI in one country may not be significant in other countries (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). Even
though Asiedu (2002) examines the determinants of FDI in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where infrastructural development
was considered as a determinant, the paper did not find infrastructural development significant in attracting FDI inflows in
SSA but found it significant in determining FDI inflows in non-SSA countries. Asiedu’s paper was a cross-country study
and therefore there is the need to examine the FDI, infrastructural development and natural resource nexus specific to a
particular country due to differences in political structure, the rule of law, FDI and capital repatriation regulations.
Countries in SSA do not have a homogeneous economic structures and hence doing a cross-country study on FDI
determinants will not be informative. Due to the heterogeneous nature of countries in SSA, this paper examines the
FDI, infrastructural development and natural resource nexus in Ghana. Ghana has a robust rule of law, political stability,
high flexibility of capital repatriation and fewer restrictions of FDI in to the extractive industry. Due to the lesser
restrictions of FDI into the extractive industry, this paper also considers the role of natural resources as a determinant of
FDI in Ghana.
Considering the expansion in infrastructure, oil discovery and electricity challenges in Ghana, the inflows of FDI has not been
consistent. With these investments, there is an expected increase in FDI inflow that is not forthcoming. Among many other
determinants of FDI, the study seeks to consider the impact of massive investments in infrastructural development and natural
resources on Ghana’s FDI inflows. Our paper contributes in a number ways to the FDI literature. This paper contributes to the
literature on FDI by being the first to examine the role of infrastructural development and natural resources in attracting FDI
specific to one country in sub-Saharan Africa.
Our paper extends the frontier of knowledge in economics by presenting new evidence showing that infrastructural
development and natural resources significantly influence FDI in Ghana. We also add to those recent studies that confirm a causal
link among FDI, infrastructural development and natural resources (see Asiedu, 2002).
Lastly, from a theoretical point of view, this paper will lay the foundation for the development of theory on the nexus of FDI,
infrastructural development and natural resources. Uncovering the theoretical underpinnings of the nexus of FDI–infrastructural
development–natural resources will help developing countries’ policymakers to devise policies that will let them get the most out
of FDI, infrastructural development and natural resources for socio-economic development. The study seeks to answer the
following research question: Does infrastructural development and natural resorces play a role in attracting FDI inflows in
Ghana?
Using data spanning from 1975 to 2014 we find that infrastructural development and natural resources positively and
significantly influence FDI in Ghana.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview of Ghana’s FDI and infrastructural
development. Section 3 presents a literature review on FDI. Section 4 discusses the empirical models and methodology. Section
5 describes the data and presents the estimation results. Section 6 presents the issues and implications of our findings.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Foreign Direct Investment in Ghana 577
Outlook, 2014). As shown in Figure 1, data on the flow of FDI globally shows that Ghana’s FDI as a ratio of its GDP over the past
decade has significantly been far above that of the world and the sub-Saharan region.
African Economic Outlook (2014) gives an extensive overview of Ghana’s infrastructural development drive. Unlike many
other African countries, Ghana’s infrastructure spans the length and breadth of the country, helping to integrate the different
regions (Africa Economic Outlook, 2014). Two road corridors linking the northern and southern sectors, a national electricity
and power production and distribution grid, and an ICT network, connect major population centres. According to the African
Economic Outlook (2014), domestic air transport has increased significantly over the years with the modernization of air fields
and introduction of alternative domestic carriers. Recent data suggests passenger numbers have surged upwards from 540,000 to
780,000 between 2012 and 2013; representing a 43.3 per cent increment. The distribution of electricity, mobile
telecommunication and road construction has increased significantly. As at 2008 ending, the total number of fixed and
mobile lines was 11,714,330. Compared to other low-income countries, Ghana’s ICT penetration is better and above the 1.1 per
cent average for SSA (World Bank, 2015) which all goes to enhance investments. In 2009, Ghana was ranked as the most
preferred business destination in the sub-region for Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) in the AT Kearney Global Services
Location Index.
By African standards, Ghana also has a wide water resource infrastructure and arable lands made possible by the building of
dams for agricultural purposes in the north. However, in the natural resources endowed regions, though infrastructural
development is poor, Ghana’s major revenue sources, until recent times, has been from cocoa and gold. Ghana is currently the
second largest producer of cocoa in the world (GIPC, 2016). The discovery of oil introduced huge investments in the oil and gas
sector. This is subsequent to the increase in global demand for energy and a consequential upsurge in profits in the extractive
industry. Tullow reported a 100 per cent success rate in its oil explorations in Ghana in 2008 and a subsequent 88 per cent success
in 2009 (Asiedu, 2013). Within the same period, Tullow’s investments in oil in the SSA region including Ghana, went up by 230
per cent, with the expenditure in Africa alone being 70 per cent of the company’s total production expenditure in 2008 and 88 per
cent in 2009. Exxon Mobil Corp also agreed to buy a $4 billion stake in an oil field off the coast of Ghana (Asiedu, 2013). In the
midst of all these investments in infrastructure and natural resources, Ghana has not experienced the expected inflow of FDI from
these investments.
3. Literature Review
Studies on FDI have centred on the fundamental theories of FDI, the effect of various macroeconomic factors on FDI, the role
economic integration plays in the direction of flow of FDI and the advantages and disadvantages of FDI in the host country
(Inekwe, 2013; Yasin, 2005; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Barros et al., 2014). Dunning’s (1980) eclectic paradigm drew a
framework to assess the reasons why and where foreign enterprises invest overseas. It further grouped the determinants of FDI
into factors specific to particular industries and those that affect the entire economy. According to the theory, the determinants of
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
578 E. B. Anarfo et al.
FDI include the benefits of ownership, location and internalization that come to multinational corporations (MNCs) from foreign
companies. FDI takes place when these benefits exceed the associated costs.
Studies have also shown that the inflow of foreign capital significantly increases domestic savings, leading to investment
in the host country (Ajayi et al., 2016), improved technology transfers and spillovers (Carkovic and Levine, 2002). Since FDI
is market-driven, it increases productivity in the sectors they go into, and the economy as a whole, because of increased
competitiveness in the local market. This engenders an increase in demand for goods and services (Ajayi et al., 2016).
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Foreign Direct Investment in Ghana 579
competition, FDI became the main input mode, thereby getting MNCs to enjoy their property benefit (Agarwal and Ramaswami,
1992). Shah and Ahmed (2003) also showed a positive relationship between market size and inward FDI flow.
3.4 Infrastructure
Infrastructural development is able to motivate FDI as it facilitates access to resources and markets in line with resource seeking
and market seeking motivations for FDI. It also helps efficiency-seeking multinationals whose costs of production can be
reduced significantly by the availability of road networks, internet and telecommunication. Asiedu (2006), Erdal and Mahmut
(2008) and Khadaroo and Seetanah (2010) all argue that infrastructure significantly improves FDI inflows. Infrastructure
consists of road networks, railway networks, telecommunication networks and all tools, machines and materials which improve
the production and service turnaround cycle time (Musila and Sigue, 2006). Studies by Musila and Sigue (2006) find that FDI in
Africa is dependent on improving infrastructure which attracts foreign investors. Increased levels of internet users increase the
level of FDI (Mateev and Tsekov, 2013). According to Kahouli and Maktouf (2015), investors choose a country with greater
availability of the internet. Their result confirms the findings of Choi (2003) who also find that the number of internet users
increases and promotes inward FDI.
3.6 Inflation
Inflation is the persistent and appreciable rise in the general price level of goods and services (Erdal and Mahmut, 2008).
Countries confronted with higher inflation require appropriate higher return to reward the risk of high inflation. High inflation
usually signals macroeconomic instability of a country. In investigating the determinants of foreign direct investment flows to
developing countries while employing a cross-sectional analysis, Erdal and Mahmut (2008) found that low inflation rates have
significant positive influence on FDI. As inflation reduces, FDI into the receiving countries increases. Other studies show that
high inflation rate may also discourage investors and reduce FDI in the host country (Mina, 2012; Ngouhouo, 2013). Kahouli and
Maktouf (2015) and Cuong (2013) find that while high inflation rates in source countries decrease FDI in receiving countries, in
the home country it decreases FDI. When the price index increases and there is an increased demand, then investors can increase
investment overseas, with lower inflation rates to maintain competitiveness in prices (Kahouli and Maktouf, 2015; Kleinert and
Toubal, 2010; Medvedev, 2012).
increases FDI inflows into the economy. According to Chakrabarti (2001), openness to trade, which was proxied by
exports plus imports to GDP is positively correlated with FDI. Asiedu (2002), using the same proxy for openness, comes
to a similar conclusion when the paper distinguishes between sub-Saharan host countries from other host countries in
other regions. She finds that Africa differs significantly from non-African sample countries with regard to other FDI
determinants, whereas the promotional effect of openness to trade on FDI is found to be only slightly weaker in Africa.
Gastanaga et al. (1998), in addressing the tariff jumping hypothesis in the context of a panel analysis on the effects of
host country reforms on FDI, find that while cross-section results suggest that FDI flows were encouraged more strongly
by tariff jumping than by potential exports, the effects of import tariffs on FDI were negative in a time-series context.
Gastanaga et al. (1998) conclude that in individual countries, trade liberalization is a more important motive for FDI
overtime. Eicher and Kang (2005), in examining how optimal entry of multinationals in foreign markets is dependent on
the market size, FDI fixed costs and tariffs, showed that low trade barriers encourage the entry of multinational
companies.
4. Methodology
Prais–Winsten regression estimation is used to estimate the coefficients of the model of this study. Prais–Winsten estimation is
used in this study because its procedure is meant to overcome autocorrelation of type AR(1) in a linear model and
heteroscedasticity in the error terms in the model, often for regressions applied to time series data. It was devised by Sigbert Prais
and Christopher Winsten in 1954. It is a modification of Cochrane–Orcutt estimation in the sense that it does not lose the first
observation, which leads to more efficiency as a result and makes it a special case of feasible generalized least squares.
The study used secondary data obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI). The data spans from 1975 to 2014. In
examining the effect of infrastructural development and natural resources on FDI inflows in Ghana, the study control for the
following variables which include: GDP growth rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, market size, trade openness and lending
interest rate while FDI is the dependent variable. Table 1 presents a brief description of the variables and how they are measured.
Foreign direct investment FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Infrastructure INFRAS Fixed telephone subscriptions
Natural resources NATRES Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)
GDP growth rate GDPGR GDP growth rate (annual %)
Inflation INFLRA Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Exchange rate EXCHRATE Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average)
Market size MARKSIZE Log of GDP
Trade openness TRADE Exports plus imports as a % of GDP
Lending interest rate LEINRA Lending interest rate (%)
X
Y t ¼ b0 þ b X t þ et ð1Þ
with the subscript t representing the time series dimension. The left-hand side variable represents the dependent variable in the
model which is FDI, X t represents the independent variables in the estimation model, b0 is the constant term and et is the error
term.
We specify the general equation as:
X
n X
n
Y t ¼ bo þ bt X t þ bt Z t þ et ð2Þ
i¼1 i¼1
where Yit is the dependent variable FDI; Xt are the main independent variables, that is, INFRAS and NATRES; Zt are the
controlled variables, that is, GDPGR, INFLRA, EXCHRATE, MARKSIZE, TRADE and LEINRA; and eit is the error term,
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.
The equation above can subsequently be estimated as follows:
The study employed STATA 11.2 package to carry out two unit root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) in
order to determine whether the variables used in the study are stationary. All the variables were integrated of order one I(1)
except GDP growth rate and inflation rate that are stationary at levels and hence they are integrated of order zero I(0) stochastic
process. The results of the unit-root test are shown in Table 2.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
582 E. B. Anarfo et al.
global financial crunch and the energy crises that plagued the country for the past six years. The average lending interest in Ghana
is 20.67 per cent. The mean values of inflation rate and exchange rate are 33.23 per cent and 0.427 per cent respectively.
FDI 1.00 –0.27 0.60 –0.34 –0.33 0.15 –0.36 –0.30 –0.52
INFRAS –0.27 1.00 –0.08 0.57 0.32 –0.47 0.30 0.55 0.36
NATRES 0.60 –0.08 1.00 –0.31 –0.32 0.22 –0.35 –0.23 –0.54
LEINRA –0.34 0.57 –0.31 1.00 0.49 –0.40 0.35 0.53 0.84
GDPGR –0.33 0.32 –0.32 0.49 1.00 –0.41 0.47 0.37 0.59
INFLRA 0.15 –0.47 0.22 –0.40 –0.41 1.00 –0.43 –0.48 –0.47
EXCHRATE –0.36 0.30 –0.35 0.35 0.47 –0.43 1.00 0.49 0.30
MARKSIZE –0.30 0.55 –0.23 0.53 0.37 –0.48 0.49 1.00 0.80
TRADE –0.52 0.36 –0.54 0.84 0.59 –0.47 0.30 0.80 1.00
The Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation in time series data suggests that there is no problem of serial correlation in the
residuals. This implies that successive residuals are not correlated with each other and hence the classical linear regression
assumption of the absence of correlation between successive residuals or errors is not violated.
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
lags(p) | chi2 df Prob > chi2
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 | 0.173 1 0.6777
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
H0: no serial correlation
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
584 E. B. Anarfo et al.
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African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 589–600
Abstract: This paper explores the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) into FDI least recipient regions. Panel
data for 20 sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 11 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries are used for the period 2000–12.
Findings of the fixed effects estimations suggest that FDI inflows into these regions are influenced by GDP per capita,
infrastructure development, trade openness, and control of corruption. Conversely, inflation negatively affects FDI inflows, and
rents from natural resources do not significantly influence FDI. Furthermore, the findings show that marginal benefits from any
increase in the quantity of FDI determinants (with the exception of control of corruption) will be less for SSA countries. The
paper concludes with important policy implications deduced from the findings.
1. Introduction
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) receive the lowest levels of foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows in the world — around 2 per cent and 5 per cent respectively of all global FDI inflows (World Bank, 2015a). The
poor record of FDI flows into these regions is surprising considering the quality and quantity of natural resources and their
strategic location. It is often argued that the high levels of instability and corruption, weak governance, and poor quality
infrastructure account for their inability to attract FDI (Kandiero and Chitiga, 2006). However, over the last couple of years
efforts have been focused on attracting more FDI. For example, in the late 1980s the MENA countries began a significant shift
toward trade and FDI openness and the creation of an environment that is more favourable to FDI and exports (AbuAl-Foul and
Soliman, 2008). In SSA, structural adjustment programmes were also introduced to attract investment after years of policies that
deterred foreign investment due to fears that this would result in a loss of political sovereignty, a negative impact on domestic
firms and economic degradation with respect to the natural resource sectors (Dupasquier and Osakwe, 2006).
Tables 1 and 2 report levels of FDI inflows across different periods. In Table 1 it is clear that both SSA and the MENA regions
received very little FDI prior to the 1980s. However, the 1980s have seen a significant shift in flows particularly for the MENA
region. In Table 2 (Panel A) it is also clear that the countries in SSA have received by far the lowest amount of inward investment
in the latter period, followed by the MENA countries. Interestingly, the coefficient of variation for all regions, with the exception
of Europe and Central Asia, is very similar, suggesting that the dispersion of foreign investment activity is uniform. Panel B in
the table shows some encouraging growth in inward FDI for both regions in the present study although SSA lags behind the
MENA region to a considerable extent.
FDI can play a critical role in providing capital for investment, high quality managerial skills and technology transfer. It also
creates employment, competition and productivity, transfer of modern technology, increases exports and enhances opportunities
for growth and development, particularly in developing and emerging countries (Asiedu, 2002; Akinlo, 2004; Anyanwu and
Yameogo, 2015a). Hence, it is important that SSA and the MENA region attract sustained foreign investment that can be used to
assist in their development programmes and achieve higher levels of growth. Regrettably, as the data suggest, the regions are still
at the lower end of the distribution of FDI inflows, which suggests that the reforms over the last couple of decades to attract FDI
are still inadequate and have not attracted sufficient foreign investors.
Godwin Okafor (corresponding author), School of Business, Law and Communications, Southampton Solent University, UK; e-mail:
godwin.okafor@solent.ac.uk. Jenifer Piesse, Business School, Bournemouth University, UK and Stellenbosch University, South Africa; e-mail:
jpiesse@bournemouth.ac.uk. Allan Webster, Business School, Bournemouth University, UK; e-mail: awebster@bournemouth.ac.uk
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 589
590 G. Okafor et al.
This paper is largely motivated by Asiedu (2002), who examined the determinants of inward FDI to developing countries and
questioned whether Africa is different from other potential investment destinations. However, the present study differs in a
number of ways. Firstly, it focuses specifically on the determinants of FDI into the two least recipient regions. Both SSA and the
MENA region have embarked upon trade liberalization and reforms (adjustment programmes) at almost the same time, which
makes them more suitable for this study than the common approach of using a sample of developing countries with a huge
disparity in characteristics, levels of trade liberalization and reforms.1 Secondly, it incorporates an investigation of the
differences between the regions that arise from structural and behavioural factors. In addition, the paper departs from much of
the literature by using FDI per capita as the dependent variable as this allows for country size in a way that is not possible in the
standard FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. The use of FDI per capita will also avoid any bias in estimates that might arise due
to the dominant importance of some large FDI recipient countries. Finally, comparing FDI flows between these regions
contributes to the literature as while there are several shared characteristics some factors differ, which presents a platform for
further incentives, reforms and complementarities.
Panel data estimation (fixed effects) was applied to a sample of 20 SSA and 11 MENA countries to determine the factors that
influence FDI inflows. Findings suggest that trade openness, infrastructure development, and control of corruption positively
influence FDI inflows. Surprisingly, rents from natural resources do not significantly influence FDI while inflation negatively
affects FDI. In addition, the null hypothesis that both regions are not behaviourally and structurally different in terms of FDI
determinants was rejected. When considered separately, SSA performed poorly compared with the MENA countries, with the
latter group attracting more FDI inflows.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of FDI.
Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the variables and presents the preliminary data analysis.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
FDI Determinants in Least Recipient Regions 591
Section 5 specifies the models and reports the results followed by a discussion of the implications. The final section
concludes.
2. Determinants of FDI
There is a vast empirical literature on FDI that includes developed and developing countries with interests on various sectors and
for different time periods. However, the papers reviewed here focus solely on developing countries and regions as this is the
context of the present study. The topics specific to developing countries tend to concentrate on the impact of corruption, rate of
return, trade openness and natural resources with mixed findings on their relationship with FDI. Most emphasis has been on
market size, education and economic growth. For example, Tsen (2005) attribute the positive significance of human capital to
FDI to the fact that foreign investment does not only seek to reduce costs but also acquire access to technology and innovative
capacity. Conversely, Oke et al. (2012) find an insignificant relationship between education and FDI because of a lack of training
and integration in the pool of human capital in their sample. Akin (2009) argued that their findings that FDI is not related to GDP
per capita suggests that the small size of the market in low income countries is not an important determinant in the decision to
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
592 G. Okafor et al.
invest internationally, although again this is sample specific. Sanfilippo (2010) argued that the significant relationship between
FDI and gross national income shows that their study supports the market size hypothesis. Srinivasan (2011) claimed that the
efforts by governments to increase economic growth and GDP per capita are successfully attracting market seeking FDI. In slight
contrast, Anyanwu and Yameogo (2015a) found a U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and FDI. They argued that for
FDI to be positively related to GDP per capita, certain thresholds of GDP per capita should be attained.
With respect to infrastructure variables, there is further controversy. Adefeso and Agboola (2012), and Soremekun and
Malgwi (2012) find that the positive and significant relationship between infrastructure development (mobile users) and FDI
inflows is due to the fast penetration and adoption of mobile phones in the sample of developing countries they studied. However,
Wadhwa and Sudhakara (2011) used internet access as a measure of infrastructure and found a negative relationship to FDI. This
was justified by the fact that the developing countries in their sample have started using internet services extensively only in the
last few years and hence are yet to have a positive influence on FDI.
Finally, governance measures have been used extensively in FDI studies, and in particular with developing country samples.
Woo and Heo (2009) find a negative relationship between FDI and corruption in a sample of developing Asian countries and
suggested this was due to weak economic reforms, monopolistic power and rent-seeking behaviours of government officials, all
of which deter investors. Political instability was found to have a significant and negative impact on FDI in a study by Buthe and
Milner (2008). This is explained by increases in the uncertainty of the political environment that heightens the risk of policy
change and thus discourages FDI. Basemera et al. (2012) argue that the influence of free trade has been responsible for increased
levels of FDI in a sample of sub-regional governments. A similar line of argument was also adopted by Anyanwu and Yameogo
(2015b) following the positive relationship between FDI and trade openness in their study.
3. Hypothesis Development
The framework for the hypotheses was developed mainly according to the ownership, location and internalization (OLI)
paradigm although with emphasis on locational factors. Country-level studies can only explore the locational aspect of the OLI
paradigm. The literature on the location-specific variables of FDI suggests that infrastructure, human capital, natural resources,
market size, inflation, corruption, and trade openness influence the patterns of FDI inflows (Tsen, 2005; Mijiyawa, 2015).
The size of the market can be measured by GDP growth rate or GDP per capita. It is expected that a positive relationship will
exist between market size and FDI inflows especially if FDI is motivated by market-seeking activities (Ranjan and Agrawal,
2011). However, while the growth rate of GDP or growth rate of per capita GDP is often argued to be a poor indicator for market
seeking FDI activity in developing countries due to the fact that it is difficult to differentiate in the data the strategic imperative
behind FDI, this study nevertheless hypothesizes that a positive relationship with FDI will be found (Akin, 2009).
Natural resources have been found to be important in attracting FDI, particularly in the African continent (Asiedu, 2006;
Nsiah and Wu, 2014). The regions under review in this study are rich in natural resources and this is the sector that has
historically attracted large amounts of FDI, especially the mineral and oil sectors. This study uses rents from natural resources as
a percentage of GDP to capture the availability of these resources.
Available infrastructure increases productivity and thus the return on investment. Therefore a positive relationship between
infrastructure and FDI is expected (Asiedu, 2002; Akin, 2009). However, the quality of infrastructure in these countries is highly
variable and a quality adjusted measure would be preferred. Unfortunately, data constraints limit the construction of this variable
and in common with the literature, infrastructure availability and or development is used. This is proxied by per capita mobile
phone users, as is established in similar studies.
An educated workforce has been recognized as an important determinant of FDI especially when firms are efficiency seeking.
Srinivasan (2011) notes that a higher level of education can impact positively on FDI. The measure of human capital this study
uses is the number of technical education students per capita. For some of the countries employed in this study, FDI is also
attracted in technically oriented industries and not just in labour-intensive countries. The use of technical education students is
therefore justified because multinationals often seek to improve their technical efficiency particularly in the face of increased
competitive pressures. Furthermore, technical knowledge available in a country can positively impact on FDI flows because
innovation creates new demands for raw materials leading to FDI in their extraction and production. Such a technical knowledge
base can be supported through investments in skills acquisition. For example, large investments in education and training
increased the stock of skilled labour in some Asia-Pacific countries and, thus, helped increase their share of global FDI (Addison
and Heshmati, 2003).
Countries with greater levels of trade openness and with more links to the world economy attract foreign capital and welcome
overseas investment (Srinivasan, 2011; Owusu-Antwi, 2012). Using the established measure of openness (exports plus imports
as a share of GDP), the study hypothesizes a positive relationship with FDI. Evidence of this has been provided by numerous
empirical studies for the regions under review. This is particularly important because both SSA and MENA have embarked on
adjustment programmes and trade liberalization over the past two decades and few barriers to trade remain in these regions.
H6: There is a positive relationship between control of corruption and FDI inflows.
Corruption can create a considerable barrier to investment. Corruption impedes investment directly and indirectly (Habib and
Zurawicki, 2002; Al-Sadig, 2009). Although several countries in this study are not known for their high levels of control of
corruption (Owusu-Antwi, 2012), this study nevertheless hypothesizes there is a positive relationship between control of
corruption and FDI as the latter can reduce uncertainty in investment activities.
H7: Foreign investors are less likely to invest in countries with high levels of inflation.
One of the indicators of stable macroeconomic environment is price stability. Foreign investors are often deterred by high
inflation because it erodes their return on investment, raises uncertainty and shows the inability of host government to implement
sound macroeconomic policies that are conducive to business activities (Azam, 2010).
SSA region Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Uganda
Note: These countries are outliers and excluded from the analysis.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
594 G. Okafor et al.
FDI Inflow per Capita FDI inflows by country divided by the total host country population ($) (UNCTAD, 2015)
% Population in Vocational or Technical Percentage of population enrolled in technical and vocational education (World Bank,
Education 2015a)
Resource Rent Total natural resources rent are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral
rents and forest rents as a percentage of GDP (World Bank, 2015a)
% Population of Mobile Phone Users Percentage of population using mobile telephones either on a post-paid or prepaid basis,
proxies infrastructure (World Bank, 2015a)
Trade Openness Sum of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, proxies the degree of liberalization, as
in Srinivasan (2011)
Control of Corruption Measures the extent to which public power for personal gain is controlled (World Bank,
2015b). Ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank.
Inflation Annual percentage change in the cost of consumer goods and services (World Bank, 2015a)
GDP per Capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by mid-year population (World Bank, 2015a)
Given the widely different sizes of the countries under review it is important that the variables used take account of
population size in order that comparisons are valid and useful. In addition, levels of development are not constant and some
countries have higher income levels than others. Thus, the majority of variables in the modelling are considered on the basis
of percentage of total population or values per capita. Data on FDI inflows, pupils in technical education, and mobile users
are expressed in per capita terms. The data were obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015a),
UNCTAD (2015), and the World Bank Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2015b). Data definitions and sources are in
Table 4.
FDI Inflow per Capita ($ US) 79.402 170.693 331.306 1458.000 151.736 251.108 39.618 78.575
GDP per Capita 3350.042 7233.623 108.015 56366.570 7275.122 10921.180 1191.248 1624.291
Resource Rent (% of GDP) 19.402 17.599 0.256 71.605 27.878 19.744 14.740 14.336
Infrastructure Development 37.079 41.447 0.019 193.453 57.731 50.423 25.720 30.122
(% of Mobile Users)
% of Population in Technical Education 0.546 0.798 0.012 4.599 1.102 1.081 0.241 0.291
Trade Openness 74.641 34.157 19.356 202.850 76.786 22.025 73.461 39.255
Control of Corruption 37.434 21.222 0.957 85.854 41.208 19.992 35.358 21.627
Inflation 9.375 20.108 9.798 324.997 5.835 6.405 11.322 24.380
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
FDI Determinants in Least Recipient Regions 595
the MENA region including the variation from the mean. Correlation coefficients are listed in Table 6. The coefficients show no
high collinearity between the variables.
The models use a balanced panel of 20 SSA and 11 MENA countries. The data are annual for the period 2000–12. As already
identified above, this was mainly due to data availability for some of the variables. Fixed effects estimation was used as
the random effects estimator was rejected based on the Hausman test. Panel models are valuable for a number of reasons.
Firstly, panel data allow both the cross-section and the time series aspects of the data to contribute to the parameter estimates.
Secondly, panel data suggest that countries are heterogeneous. Time series and cross-section studies not controlling for this
heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results. Not accounting for country-specific differences in economic or
behavioural assumptions, such as countries operating under different political systems or more or less restrictive regulations, can
cause serious mis-specification in the models. Thirdly, it may be important to incorporate dynamic effects and these models
provide a means to study the dynamics of adjustment (Greene, 1997).
Given the differences between the regions as highlighted by the descriptive statistics (summarized in Table 5), it is important
that the models take into consideration possible heterogeneity across countries in order to reduce the risk of obtaining biased
estimates. The fixed effects model data used also allows the intercept to vary for each individual country but still assumes that the
slope coefficients are constant across the sample. The estimating equation can be expressed
where y is FDI inflows per capita in country i at time t, X is a matrix of independent variables and a and b are coefficients to be
estimated. mi and vit represent the decomposed disturbance term where mit are country specific effects and vit are random errors
distributed (Gujarati, 2004).
Equation (1) was first estimated with and without the SSA dummy. With respect to statistical tests, the Chow Test showed that
SSA and the MENA countries are behaviourally and structurally different based on the F test and critical values. Given these
statistical differences, the significant variables were interacted2 with the SSA dummy to establish any differences in marginal
effects. These behavioural and structural differences could also have accounted for the differences at the means and variations
already presented in the preliminary data analysis above.
In the specification tests, all models are acceptable. A Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for heteroscedasticity indicated
the presence of heteroscedasticity and therefore robust standard errors were used to relax the assumptions that the errors were
both independent and identically distributed. The GMM results were not reported in this study as the estimates and
instruments were inefficient and inconsistent. The inconsistency and inefficiency were not surprising considering that GMM
fits better for panels with large numbers of cross-section (N) and small time-series (T). However, the fixed effects technique
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
596 G. Okafor et al.
used is known to control for possible heterogeneity. Tests also revealed no statistical mis-specification of the model and no
omitted variable bias. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that the results obtained from the fixed effects estimation are
consistent and not spurious.
GDP per Capita 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Resource Rent (% of GDP) –0.137 –0.137 0.119 0.294 –0.554 –0.099 –0.334
(0.965) (0.965) (0.987) (1.150) (0.893) (0.968) (1.048)
Infrastructure Development 2.199 2.199 2.379 2.284 1.795 2.203 2.249
(% of Mobile Users) (0.687) (0.687) (0.687) (0.715) (0.661) (0.681) (0.686)
% of Population in Technical Education –37.269 –37.269 –16.384 –27.983 –44.698 –36.631 –42.864
(30.798) (30.798) (29.431) (34.563) (32.431) (30.222) (32.913)
Trade Openness 1.969 1.969 1.628 1.893 6.052 1.974 1.996
(0.479) (0.479) (0.497) (0.489) (1.302) (0.475) (0.480)
Control of Corruption 66.477 66.477 68.859 69.932 42.325 58.554 62.978
(33.589) (33.589) (33.564) (34.208) (30.529) (77.767) (35.235)
Inflation –0.606 –0.606 –0.446 –0.553 –0.517 –0.610 –0.899
(0.229) (0.229) (0.227) (0.232) (0.236) (0.229) (0.325)
SSA Dummy –199.706
(67.821)
GDP per Capita SSA –0.031
(0.014)
Infrastructure Development (% of Mobile –0.513
Users) SSA
(0.579)
Trade Openness SSA –4.944
(1.342)
Control of Corruption SSA 12.212
(74.842)
Inflation SSA 0.368
(0.384)
Cons 47.14627 –53.569 –91.259 –82.554 –292.237 –60.238 –16.061
29.12621 (64.803) (67.713) (77.546) (99.915) (71.414) (79.383)
No. of Obs. 403 403 403 403 403 403 403
F Stat 13.25 7.77 7.71 7.62 8.52 7.61 7.64
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-Squared 0.4097 0.6650 0.6713 0.6664 0.6865 0.6651 0.6655
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; Significance at the 10% level;
Significance at the 5% level;
Significance at the 1% level.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
FDI Determinants in Least Recipient Regions 597
the result of the interaction, the estimated partial coefficient of GDP per capita in SSA was insignificant compared to the positive
and significant effect in MENA. These findings most likely reflect that the higher levels of disposable income in the MENA
region attract FDI for market seeking opportunities. H2 tested the impact of rents from natural resources on FDI inflows.
Surprisingly, this was insignificantly related to FDI. These findings were similar to those of Asiedu and Lien (2011) and can be
justified with similar arguments. Huge rents generated from natural resources can lead to the appreciation of local currency and
thus can diminish the competitiveness of exports. This results in the crowding out of investments in non-natural resource tradable
sectors. Some of the countries in the sample often attract huge FDI inflows into their resource sectors and thus, while the
exploration of natural resources initially comes with high capital outlay, continued operations within that sector are usually
accompanied by smaller cash flows. Also, countries with a significant share of natural resources in total merchandise exports are
more prone to external shocks since they are weak in trade diversification. These shocks create macroeconomic instability and
can lead to the decline in FDI.
Infrastructure development is clearly important as a determinant of FDI inflows and it is positive and significant although SSA
has a lower elasticity overall than the MENA region. The interaction between infrastructure development and the SSA dummy
was negative and the estimated partial coefficient was higher for MENA countries compared to SSA countries. The findings are
expected and support the literature on FDI, particularly on the relationship between infrastructure and investment from
developed to developing countries. The impact of human capital as a predictor of FDI was tested in H4. The results showed that
technical education has an insignificant effect on FDI. The results suggest that human capital in these regions has not yet reached
the required threshold in technical education to stimulate efficiency and attract skill-seeking FDI. A test of H5 showed that trade
openness is positive and significant although SSA has a lower elasticity. That is, the result of the interaction between the SSA
dummy and trade openness was negative and significant. These findings nevertheless, demonstrate the importance of trade
openness in attracting FDI.
Results also showed that control of corruption has a positive influence on FDI inflows, however the marginal effect of
corruption control on FDI is significantly higher in SSA countries compared to MENA countries. The result of the interaction
between control of corruption and the SSA dummy is positive and the partial coefficient is positive but insignificant for the
MENA countries. These findings support the empirical evidence that controlling for corruption can be a means through which
FDI can be positively influenced. Foreign investors perceive SSA countries to be very corrupt and thus, genuine efforts against
corruption will have the most impact on investment in SSA. The impact of inflation was negative and significant. The partial
coefficient shows that the negative impact of inflation will be higher in the MENA region compared to the SSA region. Inflation
creates macroeconomic instability, reduces buying power, and erodes the return on investment.
hand, inflation deters FDI while rents from natural resources do not significantly attract FDI. Some of these findings are not
consistent with the stated hypotheses. The analyses also considered whether the regions are behaviourally and structurally
different and if so, how they compare in their FDI determinants. The results confirmed differences between the two regions and
that the marginal benefits from increases in the quality of FDI determinants will be less for SSA countries compared to the
MENA countries.
A number of policy implications follow from these findings. First, trade openness and control of corruption are very important
determinants of FDI and, thus, efforts targeted at reducing corruption and improving trade policies should be seriously pursued.
Second, since rent from resources does not significantly influence FDI, the SSA and MENA regions should encourage more trade
diversification by pursuing policies that will increase the competitiveness of the non-resource tradable sectors. Third, serious
attention should be paid to technical education because countries with high levels of low-skilled labour are less likely to be
attractive to foreign investors focusing on high value-added industries or FDI inflows motivated by efficiency seeking. This is
also important because of the spillovers that flow to host country firms from FDI in high-skilled sectors that contribute more
value added than those from low-skilled sectors. Finally, all things being equal, SSA countries will attract less FDI compared to
MENA countries and thus it is crucial that countries and sub-regional blocs in SSA direct their efforts towards programmes that
improve their image as international partners. Therefore they should introduce credible policies targeted at restoring confidence
and maintaining global relationships, thus countering the negative perception of SSA as a region.
Notes
1. For further details that African countries embarked on adjustment programmes in the 1980s see Nsouli and Zulu (1985) and
Campbell and Loxley (1989).
2. An interaction is formed as of a product off two (or more) variables. An important application of the interaction variables is
that it allows for differences in the slopes of two regression lines. For further reading, see Dielman (2005).
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African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 601–614
Abstract: The road influence zone has been used to analyze the influence of roads on ecological and environmental effects
but not on socio-economic conditions. In a first study of its kind, we measured the extent and type of relationship underlying the
road influence zone of rural roads on socio-economic outcomes. Four indicators — namely, trip per capita, use of fertilizers,
motorized transport and commercial activities — and three indicators — namely, road dust, flooding and erosion — have been
used to analyze the positive and negative effects of roads respectively. Four rural roads and 529 households from four tabias
were surveyed and we used piecewise and linear regressions to determine delineation of road influence zones. Except for trips
per capita and erosion, threshold effects were observed for the rest of the outcome variables. The road influence zone ranges from
240 meters on both sides of the road in the case of road dust to about 2.6 kilometers in the case of motorized transport. The study
results suggest that socio-economic impacts of roads differ not only on socio-economic and wealth differences of households but
also on distance to road.
1. Introduction
In most African countries, road transport network and road density measured per person and per square kilometer of land area is
very low compared to the global average. Yet the road transport sector is the dominant means of transport in the continent,
carrying around 80 to 90 percent of passenger and freight traffic; and most rural communities are accessible only through roads
(Gwilliam, 2011). Recently countries in the continent are making huge progress in allocating funds and building road
infrastructure, but still rural road accessibility remains one of the challenges to eradicate extreme poverty and achieve the
sustainable development goals (SDGs).
Cognizant of the importance of roads, the Government of Ethiopia has embarked on massive investment on road
construction and formulated a large-scale infrastructure development program, the Road Sector Development Program
(RSDP) in 1997. Since then, the RSDP has been implemented in four separate phases, and as part of the fourth RSDP, a
Universal Rural Roads Access Program (URRAP), envisaged to connect rural kebeles by standard rural roads, has been set
out and implemented.
Previous empirical works conducted in various countries show that rural roads infrastructure development reduced poverty
and improved the quality of life, especially for the poor, and narrowed down the income gap between citizens (Calderon and
Serven, 2014). In their study in rural Ghana, Menash et al. (2014) found that infrastructure access has important but differential
impacts on household welfare, indicating that better infrastructure such as roads are not sufficient but necessary conditions to
benefit the poor. The ability of the poor to make significant economic use of a road depends on their asset base and the
entitlements to resources and opportunities that they can command.
Besides socio-economic conditions of the poor, distance of location of households from road also affects their ability to
harness the direct and indirect benefits of roads. In the rural areas where settlement of rural households is highly spread, some
households may travel hours on foot to get a road. Households located far from a road, for example, may not have similar
motivation to use motorized transport compared to households located close to a road due to long distance they have to walk
before they get to a road. Thus the socio-economic impact of a road on both sides may become different as we go outwards from
Fredu Nega Tegebu (corresponding author), Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI), PO Box 2692 Code 1250, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia; e-mail: fredu.nega@hespi.org. Edris Hussein Seid, Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI); e-mail: eddrissa@gmail.com
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 601
602 F. N. Tegebu and E. H. Seid
the road. If the change follows some pattern, it is possible to delineate the socio-economic impact of roads in an attempt to
formulate a road influence zone.
The road influence zone, defined as the area over which significant ecological, environmental, socio-economic effects
extend outward from a road (Forman and Deblinger, 2000), is widely used to assess ecological and environmental
effects of roads. However, this has not been used to analyze the socio-economic influence of roads. This study intends to
use the methodology to quantify the socio-economic influence zone of rural roads in two woredas1 in northern
Ethiopia. Four rural roads were selected for the study — two of the roads connect rural villages to main road and the
other two roads connect two rural woredas. The study focuses on mobility and other socio-economic impacts of roads
including some roadside effects. It is the first attempt to quantify the influence zone of roads on socio-economic
outcomes.
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 reviews relevant literature followed by Section 3 which describes
the data source and methodology. Results and discussion are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2. Empirical Evidence
Infrastructure investments, especially in rural road development, enhance access to markets for inputs such as fertilizers and
improved seeds and enables farmers to sell their produce to nearby markets through a reduction in transport fare and time
(Raballand et al., 2010). On the other hand, lack of road network can lead to increased transaction cost in rural areas which results
in limited market access for farmers (Key et al., 2000). In developing countries like Africa, transport costs constitute a significant
proportion of marketing costs. For example, in Benin, Madagascar and Malawi, transport cost constitutes more than half of the
marketing costs (Fafchamps et al., 2005). Hence such roads are vital in improving agricultural productivity and raising living
standards in poor rural areas (Gannon and Liu, 1997), enhance intra-regional trade (Akpan, 2014) and increase competitiveness
(Yogo and Verdier-Chouchane, 2015).
Rural roads also allow farmers to achieve additional non-farm employment opportunities, leading to a rise in income and
reduce rural poverty (Ali and Pernia, 2003). Rural roads improve mobility which in turn facilitates access. In Uganda, Fan and
Zhang (2008) found that the impact of low-grade roads such as feeder roads is larger than that of high-grade roads such as
murram and tarmac roads.
Using Generalized Methods of Moments and controlling for household fixed effects, Dercon et al. (2008) found that access to
all-weather roads reduces poverty by 6.9 percentage points and increases consumption growth by 16.3 percent in Ethiopia.
Improvement in road infrastructure resulting from a large-scale public investment program like RSDP also contributed
positively to the size and structure of the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia (Admasu et al., 2012). Bryceson et al. (2008) found
that in extremely remote areas, road improvements may catalyze the expansion of social-service provision, as evidenced in
Ethiopia.
Although the impact of roads on socio-economic development as evidenced in the literature review above and elsewhere is
not disputable, the extent to which such influences extend on both sides of a road is not clear. Most empirical evidences use
quasi-experimental methods and wealth differentiated approaches to analyse impact of roads on socio-economic developments.
Attempts to delineate the road influence on the basis of distance to road are scanty at best. This study is the first attempt to
quantify and map out the influence zone of roads on socio-economic outcomes.
To account for geographical context, two woredas namely Raya Azebo and Kilte Awlaelo in Tigray regional state in northern
Ethiopia were selected. The two woredas have diverse topography and economic characteristics. Kilte Awlaelo is situated at
higher altitude, features mountainous terrain and is relatively intensively irrigated. Raya Azebo is lower, more arid and includes
pastoralist activities. Two types of rural roads and four tabias2 — namely, Hade Alga, Werebaye, Lailay Adiksanded and Mai
Quiha — were selected from the two woredas. Figure 1 shows the location of the study sites. Our study sites are representative in
terms of their connectivity and distance to localities of economic importance through a network of rural roads. The roads selected
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Quantifying the Road Influence Zone 603
in the study sites include the two types of rural roads in the area — rural roads that connect village centres to regional highways
and those that connect two woredas. In two of the study villages — Adiksanded and Worebaye — the roads connect the village
centers to regional highways, whereas, in the remaining two villages, rural roads that connect two woredas cross the village
centers.
A total of 529 sample households were selected from the four study tabias along the four roads. Sample households were
distributed proportionately to each tabia and in each tabia, sample households were further proportionately distributed to each
sub-village locally called kushet. Once sample households were proportionately distributed to each kushet, simple random
sampling was used to select sample households from each kushet. List of households was obtained from each kushet and sample
households were selected at regular intervals with a random start.
A multi-purpose questionnaire was used to gather information on household demographics, mobility, household activities and
income; and impact of roads on selected welfare indicators. The survey questionnaire was administered to the 529 sample
households selected from the four tabias.
3.2 Methodology
Both descriptive and statistical analysis were used to summarize the influence of roads on the socio-economic conditions of rural
households. Tables and figures were used for the descriptive analysis. For the statistical analysis of the road influence zone on
selected welfare indicators and roadside effects, we built a generalized linear regression and, when appropriate, a generalized
linear piecewise regression model for each indicator. Because the distribution of the response varied among the welfare and
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
604 F. N. Tegebu and E. H. Seid
roadside effects, we used a Gaussian, Poisson, Binomial or Negative Binomial link function as appropriate. We used the glm
function for the regressions.
A piecewise linear regression with one breakpoint (Muggeo, 2003 and Toms and Lesperrence, 2003, cited in Eigenbrod et al.,
2009) is expressed as:
Y ¼ a þ b1 X 1 þ . . . þ bj X j þ dD where D breakpoint T
where Y is the response, a is the intercept; b1 ; . . . ; bj are the regression coefficients for all X j local predictors; d is the slope of
distance to the road (D) in the piecewise regression model to the left of the breakpoint (T), and e is ‘difference in slope parameter’
so that d þ e is the slope of the line segment to the right of the breakpoint.
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Quantifying the Road Influence Zone 605
divided by household members, a person located close to the road made 2 more trips per month than a person located more than
1.5 km from the road.
In a similar way the per capita distance travelled in kilometers corresponds with distance to road. Households located close to
a road not only travel frequently but also travel a relatively long distance per capita than households located far from road.
Households located up to 300 m on both sides of the road travel on average 59 km per month compared to 51 km for households
located 1.51 km or more on both sides of the road. This could be due to the fact that households located close to a road have better
access to motorized transport and possibly travel relatively long distances.
As far as travel by mode of transportation (walking, animal transport and motorized transport) is concerned, there are no
significant or consistent differences across all modes of transport between households located at different distances from
the road except for motorized transport. As expected, walking is the frequent mode of transportation. Regardless of how
far or close to a road rural households are located, the frequency of trips made on walking is comparable. On the other
hand, transportation by pack animals, although very low, seems to be relatively frequently used by households at the far
end from the main road than households close to the road although statistically insignificant. Finally, motorized transport
which is the second most frequently used by the sample households after walking, shows clear association with distance to
road. Households located close to the road use motorized transport for an average of 10 trips per month compared to an
average of 8 and 6 trips per month for households located in the medium and long distance ranges from the road
respectively and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. This means households
close to the road travel on average four more trips per month, a 67 percent increase, than households located 1.5 km or
more from the road.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
606 F. N. Tegebu and E. H. Seid
A quarter of the respondents said that they would not have purchased inputs if roads were not constructed. Similarly, a third of
the respondents (32 percent) said they would have responded by purchasing smaller amount of inputs. Close to a third of the
respondents (31 percent) said they would continue to purchase the same amount of inputs they are purchasing now but
transportation cost would have been higher. Only 11 percent of the respondents believe that both the purchase and transportation
cost of inputs would have remained unchanged.
The survey asked questions on different sources of income of households and types of commercial activities households were
engaged in. Table 4 indicates contributions of different sources of income and percentage of respondents who reported changes
in income following construction of rural roads.
As agricultural communities, it is understandable that most of the income source (more than three-fourths) comes from
agriculture followed by wage income contributing 12 percent of the total income. Income from own business and transfer income
(both aid and remittance) contribute about 5 percent each. Livestock income which contributes only 2 percent of the income
source includes sale of livestock products. Sale of live animals and livestock products used for own-consumption were not
included.
Survey respondents were further asked how income from the different sources has changed after construction of rural roads.
The last three columns in Table 4 summarize the result. A reasonably good percentage of respondents have said that income from
the different categories has risen after roads were constructed. The percentage varies among income types, the highest being in
agriculture with 48 percent of the respondents who earned agricultural income reporting a rise in income, followed by wage
earning respondents where 41 percent indicated their wage income had increased. The least being in business income where only
29 percent reported a rise in business income after construction of a rural road. The relatively low percentage response of
business income earners could be partly due to the fact that most business activities operated only after roads were constructed.
Table 4: Household income source and changes in income after road construction
% of households who
responded changes in income
% of households Share of
No. of with income Mean household Standard total
Income source observations source income (in Birr) deviation income Increased Decreased Unchanged
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Quantifying the Road Influence Zone 607
The perceived increase in income could be due to the fact that road construction eases access to markets and technology, which in
turn expands farm and nonfarm production through increased availability of relevant inputs and lower input costs as well as
growth of rural enterprises.
The changes in income discussed above indicate only possible association. The reason(s) for changes in income could be due
to other factors other than road construction. To indicate how much of the changes in income could be due to rural road
construction, respondents were asked how much of the change in income they attribute to road construction. The three-point
scale response of households is summarized in Table 5. Most respondents believe that only part of the change in income is
attributable to the construction of a road. However, a good percentage of respondents (ranging from 17 to 33 percent) also believe
that the change in income is fully attributable to construction of a road. Except in the case of transfer income, where close to 22
percent of the respondents believe road construction had no influence on income change, in all the remaining cases, only a small
fraction — not more than 4 percent — believe road construction contributed nothing to income change.
Although communities in the study sites mainly depend on agriculture for their living, with the expansion of infrastructure and
rural towns, it is expected that non-farm activities, especially small business activities, play a role in diversifying income sources
and supporting the lives of rural households. In the survey, rural households were asked whether they engage in commercial
activities and type of commercial activities they undertake, and the result is summarized in Table 6.
The commonest type of commercial activity in the rural area is trading of live animals, grain and other agricultural products.
Close to 36 percent of the commercial activities is constituted by trading of livestock and other agricultural products, followed by
small shops which constitute close to a third of the business activities. The third dominant form of business activity is selling
local drinks. The remaining commercial activities — selling food, tea and coffee; and hair dressing — constitute only 8 percent
and 4 percent of the business activities respectively.
To relate the commercial activities to construction of rural roads, survey respondents were asked whether they started to
engage in the business after/before construction of rural roads. As indicated in Table 7, most commercial activities were opened
only after construction of a road (65 percent). If we add to this those that were operating before construction of a road but were
closed for some time and reopened after roads were constructed, it increases to 77 percent.
Small shops 16 33
Barber/Women’s hairdresser 2 4
Selling local drinks 9 19
Selling food, tea, coffee 4 8
Trader (grain, livestock, etc.) 17 36
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
608 F. N. Tegebu and E. H. Seid
Moreover, most of the newly opened or reopened businesses are concentrated in areas close to the rural road (Figure 2). As
indicated in the figure, the number of newly opened and reopened businesses in areas close to a road is almost three times that of
the newly opened and reopened businesses in the areas far from road.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Quantifying the Road Influence Zone 609
Table 8: Effects of roads on flooding, erosion, water logging, sediment deposition and dust
Households
reported effect of
road Amount of decrease in crop production
Percentage of households with crop Between Between
Effect of road Frequency % production affected Less than 10% 10–30% 30–50%
be undertaken to turn negative effects of roads into productive purposes. One such intervention is roadside water harvesting
which not only reduces erosion and sediment deposition, but also harvests water for productive purposes (see, e.g., Kifle
et al., 2015). As pointed out in Valipour (2015, 2016), adoption of an efficient water management system along roads to
minimize the possible soil erosion and conserve the limited water resources could contribute to the poverty reduction efforts
of governments.
In the previous section we saw how different socio-economic and local environmental effects are associated with distance to
road. In this section, we present statistical analysis in order to identify if a threshold type of relationship can be established
between the socio-economic and local environmental outcome variables and distance to road. The statistical analysis is made for
seven outcome variables — trips per capita, access to motorized transport, use of fertilizer, commercial activities, dust, flooding,
and erosion — using linear regression and piecewise regression models.
To quantify the magnitude of the effect of road on the different welfare indicators, we compared the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) values for the simple linear models, the piecewise regression model, and of an additional simple log linear
model, which was identical to the first, except that we log-transformed distance to road.
A stepwise regression model was used to determine the variables to include on the regression models. We included all
household characteristics, income variables and some asset variables along with distance to road. The variables that were
retained through the stepwise selection (see Table 9) were used in the piecewise and linear regression models.
Table 9: Variables included in both the linear and piecewise regressions models
Response Variables
Trip per capita Sex of hh head, no. of children, marital status and hh size
Motorized transport Sex of hh head, no. of children, marital status, hh size and income per capita
Use of fertilizer Sex of hh head, age of hh head, land holding and hh size
Commercial activities Sex of hh head, age of hh head and education of hh head
Dust Age of hh head, level of education of hh head and income per capita
Flooding Income per capita and no. of adults
Erosion Income per capita and no. of children
Note: hh ¼ household.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
610 F. N. Tegebu and E. H. Seid
Table 10: Relationship between outcome variables and distance to road as measured by linear, log-
linear and piecewise regressions
Simple linear model Log linear model Piecewise regression model
Slope: Slope:
Distance log(distance Breakpoint Slope before Difference in
Response AICs to road AIC to road) AIC (km) breakpoint slope parameter
Trip per capita 6.4239 –0.0006357 6.4244 –0.5248077 6.4213 1.162871 –1.63418 1.667077
0.0002 0.1746 0.589226 1.1299 1.184257
Motorize trans. 3.926561 –0.0002057 3.932637 –0.1537283 4.132065 2.582799 –0.6803487 0.8057044
0.0000475 0.0392254 0.5999455 0.1315623 0.2423928
Fertilizer 10.84331 –0.0002489 10.86748 –0.1762703 11.12777 1.827203 –25.4246 12.49647
0.0000343 0.0320652 0.7809998 5.830958 7.562724
Commerce 0.5814599 –0.0001687 0.578345 –0.1728623 0.575394 1.509743 –0.7504323 1.178707
0.0001486 0.0975074 0.022683 0.5296078 0.5754481
Dust 0.5653387 –0.0022705 0.562908 –0.7454171 0.554017 0.2380927 –8.35692 7.097131
0.0004803 0.1040662 0.0429969 3.104761 3.138872
Flooding 0.5145403 –0.6977623 0.499878 –0.4607678 0.520029 0.6984002 –2.127998 2.091812
0.2355912 0.1020981 0.0270316 1.112379 1.155207
Erosion 0.4568031 –0.491879 0.450038 –0.3546718 0.462087 1.745005 –0.8228435 0.7570253
0.2239143 0.1099543 1.041801 0.4713619 0.647741
Significant at 10%; significant at 5%; significant at 1%.
Regression results are shown in Table 10. We tested the significance of the slope of the relationship between distance to road
and the response in the linear models. For the piecewise regression model, we tested the significance of the slope of the
relationship between distance to road before the breakpoint, and the significance of the ‘difference in slope parameter’. We
compared overall model fit of the linear and piecewise regression models for each response using the AIC.
We found a statistically significant difference in slope parameter and that the piecewise regressions model gave at least as good a
fit to the data as the linear models for all the response variables except for trips per capita and effect of erosion on households.
The breakpoint occurred approximately at 2 to 3 km from the road for access to motorized transport which includes
transportation by bus, car, bajaj (three wheel drive) and so on, 1 to 2.6 km from the road for use of fertilizers, 1.5 to 1.53 km for
commercial activities, 0.2 to 0.24 km for effects of dust, and 0.67 to 0.74 km for flooding effect. For all the five response variables
— access to motorized transport, use of fertilizer, commercial activities, dust, and flooding — there was also a statistically
significant relationship with distance to road up to the threshold distance (Table 10). For trip per capita and effects of erosion,
there was no significant change in slope in the piecewise regression models and the linear regression model gave a better fit than
the piecewise regression model.
Table 11 shows the best fitting models for the statistical analysis. Three of the seven outcome variables were fitted using
simple linear regression, two using log linear regression and the remaining two using piecewise regression.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Quantifying the Road Influence Zone 611
4.3 Discussion
Our results show that road influence zone delineated by threshold exists for access to motorized transport, use of
fertilizers, commercial activities, dust and flooding, and that the influence extends from up to 0.24 km in the case of road
dust to about 2.6 km in the case of access to motorized transport from the road (Table 12). The other two responses, trips
per capita and erosion showed a significant linear negative response to distance from road, but not threshold type
relationship.
Our findings indicate that comparing linear and piecewise regressions is a useful method to quantify the shape of the distance
response of the welfare and effects of roads. However, for the statistically significant piecewise regression models, we found
more than one estimate of the location of the breakpoint. This is likely a result of there being a zone in which threshold effects
exist, rather than a sharp break.
There is no threshold effect observed for trips per capita. This is mainly due to the fact that most trips in rural areas of Ethiopia
including in the study sites are made on foot. For walking, roads are not required and that is why a threshold effect could not be
observed in trips per capita.
For the responses in which a threshold type relationship was observed, the threshold effects occurred at different distances to
road. Considering the number of times household members use motorized transport such as cars, buses, bajaj and so on, in a
typical month as a proxy for access to motorized transport, we observe that a threshold for access to motorized transport exists at
a distance of about 2.6 km from both sides of the road. Although different other factors such as topography of the land can affect
people’s ability to access motorized transport, the idea of the above threshold is that households up to 2.6 km on both sides of the
road have comparable patterns in their access to motorized transport.
Similar to access to motorized transport, threshold type relationships were observed in application of fertilizer
and commercial activities. For fertilizer application, threshold occurs at a distance of about 1.83 km from both sides of
the road indicating that the influence of rural roads on use of fertilizer is well perceived in a radius of 1.83 km from
the road.
Similarly, commercial activities in rural areas are influenced by road. The influence of rural roads on commercial activities is
well perceived in the range of 1.5 km from both sides of a road. After all, most of the commercial activities in the study sites were
opened only after the roads were constructed.
Finally, roads can also have negative consequences. The two typical consequences reported in this case are road dust and
flooding. A threshold type relationship has been observed between distance to road and the roadside effects. The effect of dust
that is lifted up when cars, especially heavy trucks, use rural roads is typically felt in a radius of 240 m from both sides of the road.
In a similar way, floods coming out of the road especially from the road culverts, influence households in the range of 0.7 km on
both sides of the road.
Figure 3 shows the influence map for the selected indicators for each of the four study sites. Depending on distance of
settlement of households from road, the road influence zone is different for the different study sites. In the case of the lowlands
(Hade Alga and Werebaye), the settlement is so disperse that there are a good number of households that lie outside the influence
zone of the different indicators including motorized transport. On the other hand, in the highland tabias, mainly in Adi Kisanded
where most households reside close to the road, the influence of the road on the community is large even in the case of road dust,
where the influence dimension is the smallest of all.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
612 F. N. Tegebu and E. H. Seid
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Quantifying the Road Influence Zone 613
5. Conclusion
This study investigated the influence zone of rural roads on socio-economic development in rural Tigray using four rural roads
and a sample of 529 households. Analysis was made on rural mobility, selected welfare indicators and the local environment.
Results indicate that rural roads contribute to the socio-economic development of rural livelihoods. However, roads can also
have unwanted environmental consequences. Dust, flooding and erosion were the commonest environmental consequences of
rural roads negatively affecting rural livelihoods.
One of the direct effects of rural roads is that it enhances rural mobility. What is abundantly clear is that when roads
enhance mobility they do so in association with wheeled or motorized transport easing people’s movement and making
them faster and capable of achieving longer distance. This can have influence on the socio-economic development when the
time saved and distances bridged provide either greater economic opportunities or better access to social services or useful
social contacts. Households in the study areas traveled on average 14 trips per month per person. However, more than
80 percent of these trips were made by ‘walking’. The use of motorized transport is limited, indicating the fact that road
improvement alone may not enhance the mobility of the rural poor unless appropriate and affordable means of transport is
available.
Besides wealth, location of households also plays an important role to benefit from roads. Classifying distance of location
of households from road into three — close, medium and far — produces results that indicate that households located close to
roads are more mobile both in terms of number of trips and average distance traveled, and better use motorized transport than
households located far from the road. Given the differential impact of roads on households located at different distance to a
road, attempts were made to see whether there exists a threshold pattern that would enable us to delineate the influence zone
of a road. Our results indicate that threshold patterns were observed on use of motorized transport, use of fertilizers,
commercial activities that the rural households engaged in and on two environmental effects of roads dust and flooding.
However, threshold patterns were not observed on mobility. The fact that the study sites are overwhelmingly a walking
world, and since walking in the rural areas does not require roads, a threshold effect was not observed on mobility proxied by
number of trips.
Notes
1. Woreda is the second administrative unit above tabia.
2. Tabia is the smallest unit of local government in rural communities in present day Tigray and consists of three to four kushets.
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Resume : Ce papier a pour objectif d’examiner les effets de la croissance economique sur les emissions de dioxyde de
carbone (CO2) et sur l’evolution de la temperature au Cameroun sur la periode 1972–2010. Le test de cointegration par les retards
echelonnes ou Auto Regressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) indique l’existence d’une relation de long terme sous forme de « N
inverse » entre la croissance economique et les indicateurs de degradation environnementale (emissions de CO2 et evolution de
la temperature) retenus dans cette etude. Ensuite, on constate que la consommation d’energie et les activites industrielles
accroissent les emissions de CO2 mais pas l’evolution des temperatures au Cameroun. Par contre, l’ouverture commerciale
entraine une baisse du niveau de CO2 mais pas de la temperature. Ce resultat laisse entrevoir que le Cameroun exporte ou
transmet sa pollution vers l’exterieur ou vers d’autres pays.
1. Introduction
Les dernieres decennies ont ete marquees par une prise de conscience accrue des problemes environnementaux, comme en
temoigne l’ampleur des debats sur ce sujet. Une des questions centrales soulevees par ces debats est celle de la possibilite d’une
croissance davantage respectueuse de l’environnement, d’un developpement durable qui ne serait pas dommageable aux
generations futures.
L’accumulation de problemes environnementaux engendres par l’activite humaine semble ^etre au cœur d’une telle prise de
conscience. Parmi les degradations de l’environnement naturel, on peut citer la pollution de l’air, des sols et de l’eau, la
deforestation ou la surexploitation des ressources. Ces dommages etant interconnectes, ils ont de surcro^ıt tendance a se renforcer
mutuellement.
Dans les annees 1970, les travaux du club de Rome (Meadows et al., 1972) se sont attardes a repondre a cette question et ont
ainsi permis d’informer et de sensibiliser l’opinion publique sur les dangers que peut representer la croissance economique sur
l’environnement. Les conclusions de ce rapport sont tres pessimistes. Au-dela des travaux passes comme ceux de Malthus
(1798), Ricardo (1817) ou Jevons (1865) qui concluaient qu’une croissance economique nulle etait une fin inevitable en raison
du caractere limite des ressources, ce rapport preconise une croissance zero afin d’eviter une catastrophe economique a venir. En
se focalisant sur la dimension environnementale, le Club de Rome considere que la degradation environnementale engendree par
l’activite economique est ineluctable et conclut ainsi que la seule solution pour assurer la subsistance de l’environnement est de
stopper la croissance economique.
On comprend ainsi mieux pourquoi l’analyse des determinants de la degradation environnementale est devenue un sujet tres
passionnant dans la litterature economique et l’essentiel des travaux s’attele a verifier l’hypothese de la Courbe
Environnementale de Kuznets entre la croissance economique et les indicateurs de degradation environnementale (Grossman
et Krueger, 1995; Panayotou, 1993 et 1995; Shafik et Bandyopadhyay, 1992). L’inter^et de la CEK est qu’elle postule la
possibilite pour les pays pauvres d’ameliorer la qualite environnementale au fur et a mesure qu’ils se developpent, a mesure que
le niveau de vie des individus s’ameliore et favorise l’eclosion d’une conscience environnementale (Banque Mondiale, 1992).
Divers auteurs ont propose une revue detaillee des travaux empiriques sur la relation entre la croissance economique et la qualite
de l’environnement (Dinda, 2004; Nourry, 2007). La diversite des travaux confirme que les problemes environnementaux sont
Edmond Noubissi Domguia (auteur correspondant), Docteur au departement d’Economie Publique et des Ressources Humaines, Faculte des Sciences
Economiques et de Gestion, Universite de Dschang, B.P. 110 Dschang, Cameroun; Tel: (þ237) 675 72 20 91, e-mail: enoubissidomguia@yahoo.fr.
Henri Njangang Ndieupa, Doctorant au departement d’Analyse et Politiques Economiques, Faculte des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion,
Universite de Dschang, B.P. 110 Dschang, Cameroun, Tel: (þ237) 679 35 82 89, e-mail: ndieupahenri@yahoo.fr
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 615
616 E. Noubissi Domguia et H. Njangang Ndieupa
differents d’une region a l’autre voir d’un pays a l’autre, rendant particulieres les solutions proposees afin de limiter le desastre
environnemental.
Consideres longtemps comme un sujet sans importance dans les pays en developpement, les problemes environnementaux
prennent de plus en plus d’ampleur depuis la tenue du premier sommet de Rio en 1992. Cette prise de conscience est d’autant
pertinente que l’augmentation des emissions de CO2 a ete acceleree par la croissance economique dans les regions en
developpement. En effet, au cours de la decennie 1990–2000, les emissions de CO2 ont augmente de 48% dans ces regions, et de
81% au cours de la decennie suivante (2000–2010), tandis qu’elles diminuaient de 7% et 1% respectivement dans les pays
developpes au cours de la m^eme periode (ONU, 2013, p. 43).
Nous voudrions rappeler qu’il existe bien entendu d’autres faSc ons d’etudier la relation developpement-environnement. La
plupart des etudes empiriques consacrees a l’analyse de cette relation s’appuient sur des modeles dont les variables expliquees
sont des indicateurs de pollution comme les emissions de CO2 ou celles de SO2, il en existe d’autres qui prennent en compte
diverses variables de degradation environnementale comme la deforestation (Van et Azomahou, 2003) ou encore la pollution
organique de l’eau (Clement et Meunie, 2010), mais, une fois encore, les resultats sont contradictoires en ce qui concerne la
forme fonctionnelle de cette relation.
L’une des reproches qui est faite a la courbe environnementale de Kuznets est d’utiliser comme seul indicateur de la qualite de
l’environnement le CO2 par t^ete. En tentant d’identifier les effets des hausses de temperature sur les performances
macroeconomiques des pays, les travaux de Melissa Dell, Benjamin Jones et Benjamin Olken (2012), s’inscrivent d’une part,
dans le debat entourant le r^ole de la temperature dans le developpement economique et, d’autre part, dans le debat autour des
repercussions du rechauffement climatique. Leur etude identifie un important lien causal de la temperature sur le processus de
developpement en mettant en evidence qu’elle n’affecte pas seulement diverses composantes dans une economie, mais influence
aussi fortement la production nationale.
Cette etude se propose de determiner la relation existante entre la croissance economique et deux indicateurs de
determinations de la qualite de l’environnement ou du changement climatique a savoir le niveau d’emission de CO2 par t^ete et la
temperature au Cameroun. Le choix de la temperature se justifie par le fait de sa forte correlation avec les gaz a effet de serre et
donc le CO2.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Croissance economique et degradation de l’environnement 617
La principale explication a la forme de la CEK est la notion selon laquelle, lorsqu’une population atteint un niveau de vie
suffisamment eleve, elle accorde une plus grande importance aux equipements environnementaux (Pezzey, 1989; Selden &
Song, 1994; Baldwin, 1995). En effet, apres avoir franchi un seuil particulier du revenu par t^ete, la volonte des populations a
payer pour se procurer un environnement de qualite s’accro^ıt dans une proportion plus grande que celle du revenu (Roca, 2003).
Ceci se traduit generalement par de plus en plus de dons aux organisations de protection de l’environnement, la demande et la
consommation de produits moins polluants. A ce niveau, l’elasticite revenue de la demande d’une qualite de l’environnement est
superieure a l’unite; un environnement de qualite et sa preservation deviennent des biens de luxe.
L’utilisation des emissions de CO2 comme proxy de la degradation environnementale pose souvent un probleme de pertinence
selon les auteurs. En effet, certains auteurs justifient l’absence d’une relation en U inverse entre la croissance et les emissions de
^ de reduction des changements climatiques
CO2 par le fait qu’il n’existe pas d’incitation a la reduction de rejets polluants, le coUt
etant locaux et leurs benefices globaux (Nourry, 2007).
Grossman et Krueger (1994, 1995), Panayotou (1993, 1995), Shafik et Bandyopadhyay (1992) et Selden et Song (1994) sont
les premiers auteurs a tester empiriquement les effets de la croissance economique sur les indicateurs environnementaux (SO2,
NOx, CO2, CO, dechets municipaux, particules en suspension). A la suite de ces travaux, plusieurs auteurs ont examines
l’hypothese de la CEK en utilisant differentes variables de la degradation environnementale, telles que le dioxyde de carbone
(CO2) (Apergis et Payne, 2009; Lean et Smyth, 2010; Du et al., 2012; Shahbaz et al., 2013; Tiwari et al., 2013), le dioxyde de
soufre (SO2) (Day et Grafton, 2003 et Llorca et Meunie, 2009), l’Oxyde Nitreux (N2O) (Cho et al., 2014), methane (CH4) (Cho
et al., 2014), le gaspillage d’eau (Haisheng et al., 2005).
Grossman et Krueger (1994) sont les premiers a obtenir une courbe en U inverse dans leur Working Paper sur les effets
environnementaux de l’Accord de Libre Echange Nord-Americain. Ils verifient la relation de Kuznets pour la pollution de l’air et
la pollution de l’eau avec des points de retournement fixes a 5000$ et 8000$ respectivement. Cette conclusion est confortee par
les travaux des auteurs tels que Shafik et Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou (1993) et Selden et Song (1994); Jalil et Feridum
(2011) pour la Chine; Saboori et al. (2012) et Shahbaz et al. (2013) pour la Malaysie; Yavuz (2014) pour la Turkey; Shahbaz
et al. (2015) pour le Portugal; Zambrano-Monserrate et al. (2016) pour l’Equateur. Ils obtiennent aussi la courbe
environnementale de Kuznets pour differents indicateurs environnementaux et zones d’etudes. Plus recemment, Aboagye
(2017) a egalement montre a partir d’un modele ADRL l’existence d’une relation en U inverse entre la croissance economique et
la soutenabilite environnementale au Ghana.
Toutefois d’autres investigations (Shukla and Parikh, 1996; Carson et al., 1997; Halicioglu, 2009; Akpan et Chuku, 2011;
Chandran et Tang, 2013; Ozcan, 2013) n’aboutissent pas a la relation en U inverse. Ces auteurs obtiennent diverses formes
alternatives en fonction du degre du modele econometrique retenu. Cependant, la plus part de ces auteurs ont retenu pour la
plupart uniquement la croissance economique comme seule variable determinante de la qualite de l’environnement.
C’est ce qui a justifie par la suite l’introduction des variables supplementaires dans l’analyse des determinants de la qualite
environnementale par un second groupe d’auteurs. Ainsi, Shi (2003); Cole et Neumayer (2004); Halicioglu (2009); Shahbaz
et al. (2010); Ngepah (2011); Wang et al. (2011); Akpan et al. (2012); Ismael and Mawar (2012); Gao et Zhang (2014); Ben Jebli
et al. (2015) entre autres ont obtenu une relation positive entre les emissions de CO2 et un ensemble de variables
macroeconomiques telles que l’ouverture commerciale, la consommation energetique, la population (densite et taux
d’urbanisation).
Cependant, le choix de l’indicateur pour capter la qualite de l’environnement n’a pas ete entierement elucide par ces differents
auteurs. De plus, une telle etude n’a pas encore ete faite pour le cas du Cameroun qui ambitionne pourtant ^etre emergent a
l’horizon 2035. La nouveaute de cette etude reside notamment dans le fait qu’elle utilise un indicateur nouveau pour capter la
qualite de l’environnement (la temperature) et qu’elle le fait pour le cas particulier du Cameroun.
3. Methodologie et donnees
Depuis que le debat sur l’hypothese CEK a ete lance, de nombreuses etudes ont prouve l’existence de la relation en forme de U
inverse entre la pollution et le revenu par t^ete. Toutefois, d’autres etudes ont trouve diverses formes a cette relation. Dans cette
section, nous presentons le modele et determinons pour le Cameroun la forme de la relation entre les emissions de CO2 par
habitant ou l’evolution de la temperature et le revenu par t^ete.
L’Hypothese CEK telle que proposee par Grossman et Krueger (1991) est empiriquement testee en estimant l’equation (1)
definie ci-apres.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
618 E. Noubissi Domguia et H. Njangang Ndieupa
Ou y represente la variable environnementale, x represente le revenu par t^ete et z designe toute autre variable qui peut
influencer la degradation de l’environnement. L’indice t designe le temps. a0 est une constante et a1, a2, a3 et a4 sont les
coefficients des variables explicatives. L’equation (1) permet de tester toutes les formes possibles de la relation entre le revenu
par t^ete et la pollution. Sept differentes formes de cette relation peuvent ^etre obtenues en fonction des valeurs prises par les
coefficients.
a) Si a1 ¼ a2 ¼ a3 ¼ 0, alors il n’existe aucune relation entre la variable economique x et la variable environnementale y.
b) Si a1 > 0 et a2 ¼ a3 ¼ 0, alors il existe une relation lineaire positive entre le revenu x et la pollution y.
c) Si a1 < 0 et a2¼ a3 ¼ 0, alors il existe entre le revenu x et la pollution y une relation lineaire negative.
d) Si a1 > 0; a2 < 0 et a3 ¼ 0, alors la forme de la relation entre le revenu x et la pollution y est en « U » inverse. L’hypothese
CEK est dans ce cas verifiee.
e) Si a1 < 0; a2 > 0 et a3 ¼ 0, alors la relation est en forme de « U » entre le revenu x et la pollution y.
f) Si a1 > 0; a2 < 0 et a3 < 0, alors la relation entre le revenu x et la pollution y a une forme cubique polynomiale ou en forme
de « N ».
g) Si a1 < 0; a2 > 0 et a3 < 0, alors la relation prend la forme d’un « N » inverse.
L’hypothese CEK correspond au cas (d), il faut que a1 > 0 et a2 < 0. Si c’est le cas l’on pourra aussi calculer le point de
retournement dont la formule est:
a1
x ¼ exp
2a2
L’estimation du modele (1) permet de detecter et de definir la forme de la relation entre le developpement economique et
l’environnement certes, toutefois elle peut permettre de repondre a d’autres questions. Par exemple, y a-t-il une influence
d’autres variables ? Si oui, comment affectent-elles la forme de la relation environnement-developpement economique ? Notre
objectif est de determiner la trajectoire des emissions de CO2 par habitant ainsi que l’evolution de la temperature au Cameroun et
de capter l’influence d’autres variables telles que la consommation d’energie fossile, la valeur ajoutee de l’industrie, le taux de
croissance economique, la densite de la population et l’ouverture commerciale. Le but est d’ameliorer la specification de base du
modele en y incluant des variables de contr^ole susceptibles d’influencer directement ou indirectement les emissions de CO2
d’une economie.
lnðCO2Þt ¼ a0 þ a1 lnðPIBÞt þ a2 ðln PIBÞ2t þ a3 ðln PIBÞ3t þ a4 lnðENERGÞt þ a5 lnðDPOPÞt þ a6 lnðOUV Þt þ a7 lnðV AINDÞt þ et
ð2Þ
lnðTEMPÞt ¼ a0 þ a1 lnðPIBÞt þ a2 ðln PIBÞ2t þ a3 ðln PIBÞ3t þ a4 lnðENERGÞt þ a5 lnðDPOPÞt þ a6 lnðOUV Þt þ a7 lnðV AINDÞt þ et
ð3Þ
Ou la variable CO2 et TEMP representent respectivement les emissions de dioxyde de carbone par t^ete et l’evolution de la
temperature. La variable PIB est le revenu par t^ete il capture l’impact du niveau de developpement sur l’environnement. ENERG
est la consommation d’energie fossile en % de la consommation energetique totale, DPOP est la densite de la population, VAIND
est la valeur ajoutee du secteur industriel en % du produit interieur brut. Le terme a0 represente l’effet specifique inobserve, et est
le terme d’erreur, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 et a7 sont les coefficients a estimer, t ¼ 1. . ., T designe les periodes. OUV represente
l’ouverture commerciale, il permet de verifier l’hypothese de « havres de pollution » telle que developpe par Birdsall et Wheeler
(1992). En effet les pays en developpement attirent les activites dommageables a l’environnement gr^ace a une reglementation
environnementale moins stricte, ce qui reduit les coUts ^ de production et peut donc favoriser les delocalisations (Low et Yeats,
1992). Ces indicateurs sont extraits du World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). Les statistiques descriptives des
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Croissance economique et degradation de l’environnement 619
differentes variables quantitatives sont synthetisees dans le tableau 1 tandis que les tableaux 2 et 3 recensent les differentes
correlations entre les variables. Les matrices de correlation des variables des deux modeles laissent entrevoir une forte
correlation entre certaines variables.
Les tests d’Engel et Granger (1987) et le test de Johansen and Juselius (1990) sont les plus utilises pour identifier une relation de
cointegration (relation de long terme) entre plusieurs variables. Ces methodes necessitent que toutes les variables soient stationnaires
en difference premiere. Toutefois, ces methodes presentent des limites dans le cas des echantillons de petite taille (Chaudhry et
Choudhary, 2006). Pour pallier a ces limites, Pesaran et al. (2001) ont developpe le test de cointegration par les retards echelonnes, en
Anglais Auto Regressive Distributed Lags (ADRL) approach to cointegration popularisee par Pesaran et al. (2001); Pesaran et
Pesaran (1997). Cette methode a ceci de particuliere qu’elle ne necessite pas que toutes les variables soient integrees du m^eme ordre,
c’est-a-dire I(1). Cette methode est valable aussi bien pour les variable I(0), I(1) ou les deux (Pesaran et Pesaran, 1997).
lnCO2 40 –1.4 –1.53 2.02 0.522 –2.41 –0.394 0.516 0.441 2.6
lnPIB 40 7.04 7.03 0.677 0.175 6.75 7.42 0.203 0.456 2.58
lnPIB2 40 49.6 49.4 9.59 2.48 45.5 55.1 2.85 0.506 2.61
lnPIB3 40 350 348 102 26.4 307 409 30.1 0.555 2.64
lnENERG 40 2.8 2.8 1.28 0.295 2.2 3.48 0.206 0.0187 3.65
lnDPOP 40 3.24 3.25 1.09 0.331 2.69 3.77 0.577 –0.0633 1.76
lnOUV 40 –1.08 –1.05 0.71 0.199 –1.49 –0.782 0.345 –0.478 2.19
lnVAIND 40 3.32 3.4 0.854 0.233 2.77 3.62 0.222 –1.03 2.68
lnTEMP 40 3.17 3.17 0.0982 0.0204 3.1 3.2 0.0187 –1.35 5.14
lnCO2 1.0000
lnPIB 0.5461 1.0000
lnPIB2 0.5439 0.9999 1.0000
lnPIB3 0.5415 0.9996 0.9999 1.0000
lnENERG 0.5260 0.5463 0.5399 0.5334 1.0000
lnDPOP 0.1542 0.0378 0.0294 0.0211 0.6993 1.0000
lnOUV 0.1525 0.0873 0.0823 0.0773 0.5977 0.8894 1.0000
lnVAIND 0.5079 0.4903 0.4875 0.4847 0.6508 0.6763 0.7563 1.0000
lnTEMP 1.0000
lnPIB 0.0149 1.0000
lnPIB2 0.0156 0.9999 1.0000
lnPIB3 0.0163 0.9996 0.9999 1.0000
lnENERG 0.2953 0.5463 0.5399 0.5334 1.0000
lnDPOP 0.1507 0.0378 0.0294 0.0211 0.6993 1.0000
lnOUV 0.1561 0.0873 0.0823 0.0773 0.5977 0.8894 1.0000
lnVAIND 0.0123 0.4903 0.4875 0.4847 0.6508 0.6763 0.7563 1.0000
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
620 E. Noubissi Domguia et H. Njangang Ndieupa
C’est sur cette base que nous effectuerons le test de cointegration a partir des equations suivantes:
X
q X
q X
q
DlnðCO2t Þ ¼ a0 þ a1 D lnðCO2ti Þ þ a2 D lnðPIBti Þ þ a3 D lnðENERGti Þ
t¼0 t¼0 t¼0
X
q X
q X
q
þ a4 D lnðDPOPti Þ þ a5 D lnðOUV ti Þ þ a6 D lnðV AINDti Þ ð4Þ
t¼0 t¼0 t¼0
þ a7 D lnðCO2t1 Þ þ a8 D lnðPIBt1 Þ þ a9 D lnðENERGt1 Þ þ a10 D lnðDPOPt1 Þ
þ a11 D lnðOUV t1 Þ þ a12 D lnðV AINDt1 Þ þ et
X
q X
q X
q
DlnðTEMPt Þ ¼ a0 þ a1 DlnðTEMPti Þ þ a2 D lnðPIBti Þ þ þ a3 D lnðENERGti Þ
i¼0 i¼0 i¼0
X
q X
q X
q
þ a4 D lnðDPOPti Þ þ a5 D lnðOUV ti Þ þ a6 D lnðV AINDti Þ þ a7 lnðTEMPti Þ ð5Þ
i¼0 i¼0 i¼0
þ a8 lnðPIBt1 Þ þ a9 D lnðENERGt1 Þ þ a10 D lnðDPOPt1 Þ þ a11 D lnðOUV t1 Þ
þ a12 D lnðV AINDt1 Þ þ et
L’implementation du test de cointegration par les retards echelonnes necessite qu’on effectue un test de racine unitaire pour
s’assurer que les variables ne sont pas I(2), auquel cas cette methode n’est plus valide. Dans l’optique de determiner la relation de
long terme donnee par les equations (4) et (5), nous effectuerons un test de cointegration au sens de Pesaran et al. (2001) en
utilisant la valeur de la statistique F. L’hypothese nulle stipule l’absence de cointegration. Ainsi lorsque la valeur du F est
superieure a la borne superieure on rejette H0. Si la valeur du F est inferieure a la borne inferieure on accepte H0. Si F est
comprise entre les deux bornes, le test est juge non concluant. A la suite de ce test, le retard optimal a ete selectionne a travers les
criteres d’information d’Akaike (AIC) et de Schwarz (SBC). La methode ADRL s’acheve avec l’estimation de la dynamique de
court terme (MCE) donne par les equations (6) et (7) suivantes:
X
q1 X
q2 X
q3 X
q4
D lnðCO2t Þ ¼ a0 þ a1i DlnðCO2ti Þ þ a2i D lnðPIBti Þ þ a2i D lnðENERGti Þþ a3i D lnðDPOPti Þ
t¼0 t¼0 t¼0 t¼0
X
q5 X
q6
þ a4i D lnðV AINDti Þ þ a5i D lnðOUV ti Þ þ lECT t1 þ U t ð6Þ
t¼0 t¼0
X
q1 X
q2 X
q3 X
q4
D lnðTEMPt Þ ¼ a0 þ a1i D lnðTEMPti Þ þ a2i D lnðPIBti Þ þ a2i D lnðENERGti Þþ a3i D lnðDPOPti Þ
t¼0 t¼0 t¼0 t¼0
X
q5 X
q6
þ a4i D lnðV AINDti Þ þ a5i D lnðOUV ti Þ þ lECT t1 þ U t ð7Þ
t¼0 t¼0
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Croissance economique et degradation de l’environnement 621
toutes les variables respectent les normes d’application de l’ARDL, l’ordre d’integration maximal des variables etant 1 (tableau
4). De m^eme, ce resultat est confirme par le test de racine unitaire avec une rupture (tableau 5).
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
622 E. Noubissi Domguia et H. Njangang Ndieupa
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Croissance economique et degradation de l’environnement 623
(Bois, Petrole et minerais) qui contribuent de plus en plus a la croissance economique. Par contre, l’ouverture commerciale
semble ne pas contribuer a la degradation de l’environnement au Cameroun tout au contraire, elle semble ^etre benefique pour
l’environnement. Ceci peut se justifier par le fait qu’au Cameroun, les exportations occupent une place preponderante dans les
transactions commerciales du Cameroun avec l’exterieur. De m^eme, les importations ont ete longtemps contr^olees et limitees par
les differentes barrieres douanieres. De plus, les activites menees par la plupart des menages sont des activites agricoles
traditionnelles et le tissu industriel est faiblement developpe. Ce modele accepte donc l’hypothese du havre de transmission car
la valeur de son parametre est significative.
Toutefois, pour le modele 3 bien que la valeur des parametres des variables explicatives soit moins importante, elle laisse
presager une relation en N inverse entre l’evolution de la temperature et la croissance economique. Nous sommes en effet dans le
cas ou a1 < 0; a2 > 0 et a3 < 0 donc la forme de la relation entre le revenu (PIB) et l’evolution des temperatures est en « N »
inverse. Ce resultat vient confirmer celui trouve par Nordhaus (2008) qui semble confirmer l’existence d’une correlation
negative entre la temperature et la croissance economique. En outre, la consommation d’energies fossiles constitue le principal
determinant de la pollution atmospherique dans ce modele. L’accroissement de la population entraine l’augmentation des
temperatures ou la deterioration de la qualite de l’environnement. Ce resultat vient confirmer les resultats trouves par Brajer et al.
(2007) qui montrent que l’augmentation de la densite de la population est associee a un accroissement des emissions de dioxyde
D(lnCO2) 1 0.823051
(4.835272)
D(lnTEMP) 1 0.341723
(2.835001)
D(lnPIB) 0 –2480.885046 0 –226.117248
(–1.021056) (–2.562347)
1 4598.681991
(1.747573)
D(lnPIB2) 0 335.873651 0 31.992813
(0.982745) (2.573108)
1 –650.014766
(–1.747083)
D(lnPIB3) 0 –15.099137 0 –1.508225
(–0.942547) (–2.583789)
1 30.618582
(1.746833)
D(lnDPOP) 0 6.440274 1 1.931947
(0.186575) (1.262347)
D(lnENERG) 0 0.769281 0 0.043252
(1.288701) (1.771288)
D(lnOUV) 0 –3.451543 0 0.033839
(–3.071996) (1.001135)
1 2.730081
(2.806866)
D(lnVAIND) 0 2.012114 0 –0.039112
(1.894521) (–1.226613)
1 1.0920034
(1.118563)
ECT(-1) 1 –2.647026 –1.740781
(–8.247710) (–8.491169)
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
624 E. Noubissi Domguia et H. Njangang Ndieupa
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Croissance economique et degradation de l’environnement 625
de souffre en Chine. Enfin, on constate que le commerce international ne serait pas un determinant de l’evolution de la
temperature au Cameroun. Contrairement a la prediction theorique, ce resultat indique que la liberalisation commerciale ne se
traduit pas necessairement par la migration des entreprises polluantes des pays developpes en direction des pays en
developpement, moins intransigeants en matiere de protection environnementale.
5. Conclusion et recommandations
L’objectif de ce papier etait d’examiner les effets de la croissance economique sur les emissions de CO2 et l’evolution de la
temperature au Cameroun. A partir des series temporelles sur une periode allant de 1972 a 2010, il a ete applique le test de
cointegration par les retards echelonnes developpe par Pesaran et al. (Pesaran et Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran et al., 2001). Afin de
contourner les limites des tests de cointegration traditionnels. Globalement, il apparait que la relation qui lie les emissions de
CO2 avec le PIB rev^et la forme de « N » inversee de m^eme, le lien entre l’evolution de la temperature par rapport au PIB est de la
m^eme nature. Les variables explicatives retenues ont des effets differents suivant les modeles. Par exemple, la consommation
d’energie et les activites industrielles seraient les principaux determinants des emissions de CO2 ce qui n’est pas le cas pour la
determination de l’evolution de la temperature au Cameroun.
Au plan politique, ces resultats suggerent que les objectifs de croissance soient accompagnes des mesures d’adaptation. Dans
ce cas, il faut incorporer des programmes d’adaptation aux strategies de developpement, telle que l’initiative ethiopienne qui
prevoit des limites aux emissions, une productivite accrue et un meilleur rendement des ressources.
Par ailleurs, le Cameroun doit promouvoir une Croissance Inclusive Verte, qui passera necessairement par la lutte contre les
inegalites d’opportunites, les investissements en Recherche et Developpement, la sensibilisation des populations sur les risques
environnementaux et enfin, la collecte et le suivi des indicateurs environnementaux.
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© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 630–647
Abstract: The study assesses the degree and patterns of horizontal inequity in maternal and child health care utilization in
Nigeria. Horizontal inequity was estimated using concentration curves and a standardized concentration index, which was
decomposed into need and non-need variables to capture the major drivers of inequity in utilization. Maternal and child health
care utilization was measured by antenatal visits, skilled delivery and immunization utilization. Four rounds of Nigerian
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data (1999, 2003, 2008, 2013) were used. The results show a positive horizontal
inequity index from 1999 to 2013; which indicates that there is pro-rich inequity in utilization of antenatal, skilled delivery and
immunization, respectively. The study concludes that there is higher and increasing inequity in maternal health care while
inequity in utilization of child health care decreased over time with wealth status and education as the major non-need drivers of
inequity in utilization. Interventions to enhance women’s wealth status and education could significantly improve equity in
skilled delivery and antenatal care utilization. Hence wealth creation, women empowerment and education should be given more
attention to improve the deteriorating equity in maternal health care utilization.
1. Introduction
The health and survival of mothers and children constitute a major challenge to governments and health policymakers in
developing countries. In developing countries 830 women and 6,000 children die daily from preventable causes mostly related to
pregnancy and child birth; this accounts for 99 per cent of global maternal and child deaths (WHO, 2016). In Nigeria, 576 of
every 100,000 live births results in the mother’s death; this constitutes 14 per cent of the world maternal mortality burden
(UNICEF, 2009). Although the under-five mortality rate decreased from 201 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2003 to 109 in 2015,
Nigeria could not achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of 64 in 2015. The high rate of maternal and child
mortality constitutes a major economic problem due to its impact on productivity, poverty, human capital formation and
economic growth.
The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports (National Population Commission, 1990–2013) show few
statistical evidences of socioeconomic inequality in maternal and child health care utilization. However, these evidences are not
sufficient for policy that will deal with the challenge of maternal and child mortality in Nigeria. The primary objective of this
study is to estimate horizontal inequity in maternal and child health care utilization in Nigeria. Further, we investigate the
contributions of need and non-need variables in explaining the drivers of inequity in maternal and child health care utilization in
Nigeria.
In recent times, there has been increased growth of interest on equity/inequity in health care utilization as a research topic on
the part of policymakers, donors and non-governmental organizations due to the essential role it plays in resource allocation and
general well-being of a nation (O’Donnell et al., 2008; Whitehead, 1985). Equity in use of health care is defined according to two
major classifications; vertical and horizontal equity. Vertical equity means providing unequal treatment of health care need to
individuals with unequal health care need (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993). Horizontal equity is
the notion that persons with similar health conditions and needs should be given equal treatment irrespective of their income, and
socioeconomic status (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1998, 2000; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993). Inequity, on the other hand, simply
means when there is no equity; that is, health care resources are unfairly distributed and utilized based on income and
socioeconomic status. Inequity is also categorized into vertical and horizontal. Vertical inequity in health care resource
Rifkatu Nghargbu, Department of Economics, Usmanu Danfodiyo University Sokoto, Nigeria; e-mail: rifnghargbu@gmail.com. Olanrewaju
Olaniyan Department of Economics, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; e-mail: lanreolaniyan@yahoo.co.uk
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 630
Maternal and Child Health Care 631
allocation occurs when greater treatment of health care need is not provided to persons with greater health care need while
horizontal inequity occurs when persons with similar health care needs do not receive similar treatments for their health care
need, rather health care is utilized based on income and socioeconomic status.
Horizontal inequity also means when utilization of health care is affected by non-need variables so that individuals with the
same level of needs consume different amounts of care (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1998; Gravelle et al., 2006). Horizontal
inequity is identified by comparing the deviation of the actual health care utilization from that which would arise if utilization
were driven by need alone (Gravelle et al., 2006). Need variables are those factors that predispose an individual to use health
care, this can be ill health, age and disability (Culyer, 2001; Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993; Gravelle et al., 2006) while non-need
variables are factors that influence the use of health care outside the need variables. The non-need variables are socioeconomic
factors such as wealth, education, region, residence, employment, insurance and marital status. Inequity is synonymous to
inequality but they are not the same. Inequality in health care represents absolute differences in health care utilization between
individual populations, while inequity in health care utilization represents inequalities that are considered unfair or unjust
between different social groups in relation to their need for the health care (Fleurbaey, 2006). Horizontal inequity in utilization is,
therefore, part of inequality, that is considered unjustified/unfair (O’Donnell et al., 2008; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009;
Wagstaff et al., n.d.).
Inequity in this study is important for policymakers because the study provides components of the causes of inequity in
maternal and child health care utilization that will give policymakers ideas on what to focus on in tackling the problem of high
maternal and child mortality. Following this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized into literature review, methodology,
results, discussions, conclusions and policy recommendations.
2. Empirical Literature
Empirical studies on inequality, whether on health, health care or nutrition, use the decomposition method of estimation
(Abalo and Agbodji, 2014; Ssewanyana and Kasirye, 2012). Most studies on inequity/equity in health care utilization estimated
horizontal inequity by standardizing for differences in need and non-need variables on out-patient, in-patient, dental, specialist,
hospital care and contraceptives. They proxy need using age, sex, self-reported health problems, symptoms of chronic illness and
family planning desire, while non-need variables were mostly measured by socioeconomic and demographic factors (Ong et al.,
2009; Allin, 2006; Bonfruer et al., 2012; Gravelle et al., 2006; Van de Poel et al., 2011; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009;
Hotchkiss and Maido, 2011). Some studies have attempted to estimate inequity and inequality using regression, descriptive, and
concentration index methods in maternal and child health care utilization without standardization for differences in need and
non-need variables (Houweling et al., 2007; Bonfruer et al., 2012; Zere et al., 2011; Antai 2011; Alam et al., 2015; Målqvist
et al., 2012).
Houweling et al. (2007) estimated pro-rich inequality in use of skilled delivery and antenatal care for 45 developing countries
and then compared it with child health care. They observed pro-rich inequality in skilled delivery which was higher than
antenatal care, child immunization and treatment of respiratory infection. Bonfruer et al. (2012) examined whether health care
utilization matches needs in 18 sub-Saharan Africa countries using a concentration index to estimate inequality in antenatal and
skilled delivery. Inequality was observed in all countries. The study fails to standardize to obtain horizontal inequity even though
homogenous need across sample was observed. Similarly, Zere et al. (2011) observed high level of socioeconomic inequity
with pro-rich bias in antenatal and skilled delivery in the private health facilities in Namibia. They found that women with high
wealth status and education have a 70 per cent utilization level compared to the poorest with 47 per cent. Alam et al. (2015) found
that inequality in maternal health care utilization in six sub-Saharan African countries (Ethiopia, Madagaska, Uganda,
Cameroon, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have declined over time in the countries making progress towards reducing maternal
mortality although wealth-related inequalities remained high in all countries. Målqvist et al. (2012) observed that influence of
informal fees and testimonies of discrimination and negative attitudes from health staff towards women and ethnic minorities
were responsible for the low utilization level. However, these studies did not estimate horizontal inequity.
There have been attempts to estimate inequality using the concentration index in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia and five
other African countries with a focus on standardizing the concentration index (Hossain, 2010; Mahmood and Bashir, 2012;
Memirie et al., 2016). Hossain (2010) measured the horizontal inequity index in skilled delivery using unstandardized
and need-standardized inequity. He observed that the difference between the approaches is marginal. Horizontal inequity for
skilled delivery was found to be positive and decreasing over time. The pattern of inequalities in access in Pakistan was also
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
632 R. Nghargbu and O. Olaniyan
examined by Mahmood and Bashir (2012) using Pakistan DHS 1990–91 and 2006–2007. Findings indicate that socioeconomic
status and wealth were significant; this was also similar to findings by Ahmed and Mahran (2009). Similarly, Memirie et al.
(2016) observed persistent wealth-related inequality in Ethiopia. Utilization of primary care facilities for selected maternal and
child health interventions showed pro-poor improvement over the period 2005–11. Although there was low coverage of measles
immunization in Ethiopia, it was the most distributed indicator with a horizontal inequity index of 0.08 in 2011.
In the case of Nigeria, several studies have attempted to investigate the determinants of immunization utilization in Nigeria
(Sibeudu et al., 2017; Eboreime et al., 2015; Olorunsaiye and Degge, 2016; Chidiebere et al., 2014). These studies show that
socioeconomic status — such as maternal education, wealth status, child and mother’s age and employment status — determines
immunization utilization. Other variables include lack of information about immunization, fear of side-effects and the
immunization centers being too far away. In terms of inequity studies, there have been previous attempts to study inequity in
child health care utilization in Nigeria (Antai 2011). The study centered on rural-urban inequity in immunization using logistic
regressions at community level. Other dimensions of inequity such as wealth, education and region were not given appropriate
attention in the study. However, these dimensions are important because they constitute some very vital socioeconomic factors
that affect child immunization in Nigeria. Second, the logistic regression is also deficient in the analysis of inequity because it
does not estimate clearly the profile of inequity. This study estimates the extent of horizontal inequity in antenatal, skilled
delivery and immunization utilization and further provides the contributions of need and non-need variables in explaining
inequity in each of the health care areas. This approach is considered appropriate because it provides a true picture of the profile
of inequity due to need and non-need variables. Inequity due to need variables is considered to be justified and does not constitute
a problem since utilization is according to need. On the other hand, inequity due to non-need variables poses a great challenge to
the health sector because individuals who need a particular health care do not have it, owing to factors beyond their control.
Although studies from other SSA countries show that there is wealth-related inequity in antenatal care and skilled delivery,
they have limitations. First, for some of the studies, the concentration index was not standardized for differences in need and
non-need variables as such other driving factors may not be visible. Second, given that Nigeria is the most populous nation in
Africa with about 200 million people, the results from these countries might not apply. This study fills that gap by providing
evidences on horizontal inequity in maternal and child health care among one-fifth of Africa’s population.
3. Methods
To measure horizontal inequity, utilization of health care must be standardized into need and non-need variables. Standardization
helps to measure and quantify the contributions of need and non-need variables to horizontal inequity. The concentration curves
and index are the most acceptable (Ganle et al., 2014; Wagstaff et al., 1999; O’Donnell et al., 2008; Alaba and Chola, 2014).
The curves show socioeconomic inequality in health care utilization but it does not measure the magnitude. The concentration
index which is directly related to the concentration curve does that. Geometrically, the concentration curve is represented in
Figure 1. It plots the cumulative percentage of health care utilization against the cumulative percentage of the population ranked
by living standards, from poorest to the richest (O’Donnell et al., 2008). Once health care use is standardized for need, horizontal
inequity can be measured by the concentration index. The need standardized concentration index falls above or below the
diagonal of the concentration curve if health care utilization is concentrated among the poor or rich. If it lies on the diagonal, there
is equity. The concentration index is twice the area between the concentration curve (C(p)).
Z 1
CI ¼ 1 2 ½CðpÞdp ð1Þ
0
The CI can be positive or negative depending on where the concentration curve lies. It is positive if utilization is concentrated
among the rich and vice versa. Symbolically, we can use a linear model to illustrate the concept of concentration index and how it
is standardized to obtain the horizontal inequity index. Given a linear model of health care utilization:
X X
yi ¼ a þ bj X ji þ g k Z ki þ ei ð2Þ
j k
Maternal and Child Health Care 633
Source: https://www.google.com.ng/search?q=concentration+curve&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj6hcjI5
ILUAhWsK8AKHQyOCdIQ_AUIBigB&biw=1366&bih=665&dpr=1
where the y is a linear function of health care utilization, the Xs are the justifiable determinants or standardizing variables while
the Zs are the unjustifiable determinants, which is termed horizontal inequity. The concentration index for yi can be written as:
X X
CI ¼ j
ðbj X j =mÞC j þ k
ðg k Z k =uÞC k þ GC e =m ð3Þ
The CI is the concentration index which measures total inequality. ðbX =mÞ are the elasticities which indicate the
responsiveness of y to changes in the X and Z. The elasticities of the X and Z as well as their index can take a positive or negative
value. A positive and negative value means that the X or Z and the CI is concentrated among the rich or the poor. However, the CI
must be decomposed and standardized in terms of the need and non-need in Figure 2.
The resulting outcome of direct or indirect standardization of the concentration index forms three parts: the concentration
index CI, which measures the total inequality; the X component of the index, which measures the justified inequality due to need
variable; and the Z, which measures the unjustified inequality also known as the horizontal inequity index HI. The horizontal
inequity derived from concentration index can be defined as;
X
HI ¼ CI j
ðbj X j =mÞC j ð4Þ
This means horizontal inequity (HI) is total inequality minus need-based inequality. Need-induced inequality is acceptable
because health care utilization should be according to need, while non-need inequality is not acceptable. The non-need inequality
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
634 R. Nghargbu and O. Olaniyan
can be due to three factors: direct contribution of income, contribution of other variables such as education, health insurance,
residence, marital status and so on, and the contributions of the residuals, which is the unexplained inequality:
HI ¼ ½ðincome contributionÞ þ ðother non-need variablesÞ þ ðresidualsÞ ½ðneed induced inequityÞ ð5Þ
Note that decomposition of the concentration index holds if the model is linear. For nonlinear models where health care
utilization is measured in binary or count form, decomposition is achieved by a linear approximation of the nonlinear model
(O’Donnell et al., 2008). This can be written as:
X X
yi ¼ a þ bm x þ
i i ji
gmz
k k ki
þ ei ð6Þ
where
i ¼
bm dy
dx
and g m
k ¼
dy
dz
Empirically CI is estimated by direct or indirect standardization using STATA or ADePT to obtain the horizontal inequity
index. Indirect standardization is, however, preferred to direct standardization because of its greater accuracy when dealing with
individual level data.
for policy implication easy. The ADePT software breaks down inequalities into justifiable and unjustifiable, then decomposes
the causes of inequities so that the contribution to inequality from each component of non-need variables can be quantified. Since
ADePT has no data manipulation capability, STATA software was used to clean the data before analyzing in ADePT.
4. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables that were used in the analysis for the four rounds of NDHS.
Women in the four rounds of survey had an average of 4 to 5 antenatal visits with 50–66 percent attendance. About
90 percent of women did not have skilled delivery, just 6–10 percent were assisted by doctors/nurses/midwives and auxiliary
midwives. An average of 53–70 percent of children received immunization between 1999 and 2013. Women’s mean age
was 34 to 36 years, children were mostly 10 months. About 80–90 percent of women were either not pregnant or unsure,
9–11 percent were pregnant with an average BMI of 23 to 32. In addition, 20–27 percent were within the poorest wealth
index, while 12–20 percent were in the richest category; 70 percent of women were employed; only 2 percent had health
insurance; 50–59 percent of the women and 40–49 percent of their partners had no formal education; and 60–70 percent of
respondents were from rural areas.
Table 1 (Continued)
NDHS 2013 NDHS 2008 NDHS 2003 NDHS 1999
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean
Figure 3a: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index of antenatal care utilization 1999–2013
1.00
1.00 Line of
Line of 0.90
0.90 equality
equality 0.80
0.80
Cumulative % of antenatal cae utilisation
Antenatal
Cumulative % of antenatal care
0.40 0.40
pregnancy
0.30 0.30
0.20 0.20
0.10
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of respondents, ranked from poorest to richest Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.372 and - 0.048 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.386 and -0.043 for year 2008
1.00 1.00
Line of Line of
Cumulative % of antenatal care
0.90 0.90
0.80 equality 0.80
equality
Cumulative % of antenatal care
0.40 0.40
0.30 pregnancy
0.30
0.20
0.20
0.10
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.316 and -0.068 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.262 and -0.078 for year 1999
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
638 R. Nghargbu and O. Olaniyan
Figure 3b: Standardized concentration index of antenatal care utilization for need and non-need variables
Figure 4a: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for skilled delivery utilization 1999 to 2013
1.00 1.00
0.90
Line of
0.90
Line of equality
0.80 0.80
0.70 equality 0.70 Doctor/
0.60 0.60
Doctor/ nurse/midwife/
utilization
0.50 0.50
utilization
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of respondents ranked from poorest to richest Cumulative % of respondents ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.483 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.458 for year 2008
1.00 1.00
0.90
Line of 0.90 Line of equality
Cumulative % of skilled delivery
0.70 0.70
0.60
Doctor/ 0.60 nurse/midwife/
nurse/midwife/ 0.50
aux. midwife = 1
delivery
0.50
utilization
0.40
0.40 aux. midwife = 1
0.30 0.30
0.20 0.20
0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of respondents ranked from poorest to richest Cumulative % of respondents ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.433 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.353 for year 1999
Figure 4b: Standardized concentration index of skilled delivery utilization for need and non-need variables
Maternal and Child Health Care 639
Figure 5a: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for immunization utilization between 1999
and 2013
1.00
Line of
0.90
equality 1.00
0.80 Line of
Cumulative % of utilization of
0.90
Cumulative % of utilisation of immunisation
immunization
0.60 0.70
0.50 0.60 vaccination
0.40 0.50
0.30 0.40
0.20 0.30
0.10 0.20
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of respondents ranked from poorest to richest Cumulative % of respondents ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.068 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.114 for year 2008
1.00 1.00
Line of
Cumulative % of utilszation of
Line of
Cumulative % of utilization of
0.90 0.90
0.80
equality equality
0.80
immunisation
Ever had
immunization
Horizontal inequity index = 0.069 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.216 for 1999
Slight pro-rich inequity in immunization utilization is observed for all periods. The values of the horizontal inequity index
declined consistently from 0.216 to 0.068 in 1999 to 2013. Although an increase was observed from 0.069 to 0.114 in 2003 to
2008. Figure 5b shows that mother’s wealth status, and mother’s and father’s education accounts for 80–90 percent of the
non-need factors driving inequity in immunization utilization in Nigeria. Need variables accounted for less than 0.5 percent of
the inequity for all periods.
The horizontal inequity index was estimated for measles vaccination, medical treatment for fever/cough and diarrhea for the
purpose of robustness check. The results are presented in Figures A3 to A5 in the appendix. Similarly, immunization, measles
vaccination, medical treatment for fever/cough and diarrhea have a positive horizontal inequity index with concentration curves
falling below the diagonal for all periods.
Figure 5b: Standardized concentration index of immunization utilization for need and non-need variables
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
640 R. Nghargbu and O. Olaniyan
5. Discussion
The results on the concentration index for antenatal, skilled delivery and immunization are in line with the findings of
Houweling et al. (2007), Bonfruer et al. (2012), Zere et al. (2011), Antai (2011), Alam et al. (2015), Målqvist et al. (2012),
Hossain (2010), Mahmood and Bashir (2012), Memirie et al. (2016), Sibeudu et al. (2017), Eboreime et al. (2015),
Olorunsaiye and Degge (2016), Chidiebere et al. (2014) and Antai (2011). This study added value to this literature by
standardizing for differences in need and non-need variables using respondent’s age, pregnancy status, BMI and child age as
well as estimating horizontal inequity for four periods. Standardization revealed that wealth status and education were the
major non-need factors driving inequity in maternal and child health care utilization in Nigeria. Need variables contributed
little to horizontal inequity in utilization. Women with higher economic and educational status had a higher probability of
utilizing antenatal and skilled delivery than those with lower status. This has policy implications. Maternal and child health
care policy on free antenatal and immunization utilization is not effective; this can be attributed to four reasons. First, most
health facilities where free antenatal and skilled delivery care is administered are located in the urban areas where most
women in the middle, richer and richest wealth quintile live. Secondly, very poor women from rural areas may not have
access to information on where free antenatal care is administered even if it is available. Thirdly, there are more private
facilities especially in villages than public ones. In private facilities, out-of-pocket payment is the only way to access any
type of health care services except if the individual obtained insurance. As income of individuals increases, they will prefer
to go to private hospitals to obtain health care services (Anyanwu, 2007). Fourthly, some public health centers request initial
charges which the poor women may not afford to pay. This can affect their health care utilization. Region and other ‘non-
need variables’ contributed largely to horizontal inequity in maternal health care utilization in Nigeria, although it is not the
major driver. The results on region is in contrast with Zere et al. (2011).
Estimation for four periods, which is also a valuable addition, shows that inequity in antenatal and skilled delivery increased
consistently over time with the highest incidence in 2008 and 2013, even with the policy on free maternal health care. These
findings are in contrast with results from other countries especially those that have made substantial progress in achieving the
MDGs of reducing maternal mortality (Hossain, 2010; Mahmood and Bashir, 2012 and Memirie et al., 2016). However, inequity
in immunization decreased over the period.
Inequity is higher in skilled delivery than antenatal care; this was shown by their values of the horizontal inequity index. Poor
women especially from rural areas may go for antenatal care but are found to deliver at home with the assistance of friends,
relatives and traditional midwives/birth attendants. This may be due to the problem of easy accessibility to skilled delivery
especially in rural areas. The accessibility problem poses a great danger to women as they are exposed to infectious diseases,
prolonged labour, hemorrhage and death due to delivery complications. Higher inequity in skilled delivery utilization may be
attributed to distance to health facilities especially in rural areas, cost associated to caesarean sections in some public and private
facilities as well as cultural beliefs. Immunization utilization had lower inequity due to mobile vaccination programs mostly in
rural areas as well as improvement in immunization utilization. The results on the robustness check show that all maternal and
child health care were inequitably utilized either in favour of the rich or poor.
Although the horizontal inequity index does not appear to be significantly different from total inequality, the concentration
index gives a good picture of inequity in health care utilization. The implications for health policy of a low level of justifiable
inequality due to need variables is that there is a serious demand problem in terms of maternal and child health care utilization.
Demand is largely determined by socioeconomic status instead of the need for health care. Health policymakers must work hard
to reduce socioeconomic inequality especially in wealth and education if substantial progress is to be made in reducing maternal
and child mortality.
The policy implication of this study is that maternal health care utilization has to be improved through interventions that can
improve women’s wealth status, their education and that of their partners before substantial progress can be made in reducing
maternal and child mortality.
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Maternal and Child Health Care 643
Appendix
Need variables
Currently pregnant 0.000<0.001 0.000<0.001 0.000<0.001 0.000<0.001
Age of woman 0.003 0.000<0.001 0.001 0.001
Respondent’s Body Mass Index –0.001 0.000<0.001 0.008 0.001
Subtotal of need variables 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.002
Non-need /controlled variables
Wealth index 0.129 0.146 0.144 0.092
Health insurance –0.001 –0.002
Employment status 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.020
Woman’s educational status 0.044 0.035 0.045 0.039
Partner’s educational level 0.042 0.032 0.022 0.040
Birth order 0.004 0.001 0.014 0.001
Current marital status 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001
Ethnicity 0.018 0.031
Region 0.034 0.037 0.019 0.030
Residence 0.019 0.021 0.005 0.020
Religion 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.021
Subtotal of non-need variables 0.309 0.313 0.264 0.261
Residual error 0.067 0.073 0.077 0.001
Residual missing data –0.003 –0.004 –0.003 0.001
Inequality total 0.371 0.382 0.322 0.264
Horizontal inequity index 0.373 0.386 0.316 0.262
Need variables
Currently pregnant 0.000<0.001 0.000<0.001 0.000<0.001 0.000
Age of woman –0.015 –0.014 0.001 –0.026
Respondent’s Body Mass Index –0.001 –0.001 0.002 0.001
Subtotal of need variables –0.016 –0.015 0.003 –0.025
Non-need variables
Wealth index 0.097 0.105 0.114 0.091
Health insurance 0.000 –0.000
Employment status 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.014
Woman’s educational 0.066 0.059 0.046 0.073
Partner’s educational status 0.018 0.009 0.015 0.022
Religion 0.024 0.01521 0.017 0.025
Birth order –0.030 –0.023 0.020 –0.011
Current marital status –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ethnicity 0.010 0.016
Region 0.012 0.015 0.003 0.036
Continued
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
644 R. Nghargbu and O. Olaniyan
Table A2 (Continued)
NDHS 2013 NDHS 2008 NDHS 2003 NDHS 1999
Variable Index Index Index Index
Need variables
Current age of child 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.005
Subtotal 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.005
Non-need/controlled variables
Wealth index of mother 0.043 0.065 0.025 0.119
Educational status of mother 0.015 0.042 0.013 0.059
Religion of mother 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.010
Ethnicity of mother –0.006 0.006
Insurance status of mother 0.001 0.001
Current marital status of mother 0.000 0.000 0.000
Father’s educational level 0.029 0.013 0.017 0.019
Employment status of mother 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.022
Region of mother 0.011 –0.005 0.002 0.014
Residence of mother –0.019 0.001 0.003 0.028
Birth order of child –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
Sex of child 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Subtotal of non-need variable 0.079 0.133 0.064 0.272
Residual regression error –0.011 –0.019 0.006 –0.056
Residual missing data 0.000 –0.001 0.001 –0.002
Inequality total 0.072 0.121 0.073 0.219
Horizontal inequity index 0.068 0.114 0.069 0.216
Maternal and Child Health Care 645
Figure A1: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for antenatal visits and timing of antenatal
visits
1.00
Line of 1.00
0.90 Line of
equality 0.90
0.80 equality
Number of 0.80
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.70 Antenatal
Horizontal inequity index = 0.373 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.386 for year 2008
1.00 1.00
0.90
Line of equality Line of equality
0.90
0.80 Antenatal visits 0.80 Antenatal visits
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.70
Horizontal inequity index = 0.316 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.26 2 for year 1999
Figure A2: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for skilled delivery and place of delivery
1.00
1.00
Line of equality Line of
0.90
0.90
0.80
equality
0.80 Doctor/nurse/
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.70
0.70 Doctor/nurse/
midwife/aux.
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.60 midwife/aux.
0.60 midwife = 1 0.50 midwife = 1
0.50
Place of 0.40
0.40 Place of
0.30
delivery 0.30
delivery
0.20 0.20
0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Horizontal inequity index = 0.483 and 0.141 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.458 and 0.167 for year 2008
1.00
Line of equality
0.90 1.00
Line of
0.80 Doctor/nurse/ 0.90
equality
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.60 0.70
midwife/aux.
0.50 Place of 0.60
midwife = 1
0.40 delivery 0.50
Place of
0.30 0.40
delivery
0.20 0.30
0.10 0.20
0.00 0.10
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.433 and 0.127 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.353 and 0.130 for year 1999
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
646 R. Nghargbu and O. Olaniyan
Figure A3: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for immunization and measles
immunization
1.00 1.00
Line of Line of
0.90 0.90
equality equality
0.70
0.60
vaccination 0.60 vaccination
0.50
0.50
0.40 Received Received
0.30 0.40
measles 0.30
measles
0.20
0.10 0.20
0.00 0.10
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Horizontal inequity index = 0.069 and 0.265 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.115 and 0.210 for year 2008
1.00
1.00
Line of
0.90
Line of equality
0.90 0.80
equality Ever had
0.80 0.70
Ever had vaccination
0.70 0.60
Received
0.60 0.50
Received measles
0.50 0.40
measles
0.40 0.30
0.30 0.20
0.20 0.10
0.10 0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.070 and 0.186 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.216 and 0.216 for year 1999
Figure A4: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for fever/cough medical treatment
1.00
Line of
0.90
equality 1.00
0.80 0.90
Line of
0.70 Fever/cough: 0.80
equality
0.60 medical 0.70 Fever/cough:
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.50
0.40 treatment
0.40
0.30
0.30
0.20
0.20
0.10
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Horizontal inequity index = 0.132 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.132 for year 2008
1.00
Line of 1.00
0.90 Line of
equality 0.90
0.80 equality
0.80
0.70 Fever/cough:
0.70 Fever/cough:
0.60 medical
0.60 medical
Cumulative % of utilization variable
treatment
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.50
0.50 treatment
0.40
0.40
0.30
0.30
0.20
0.20
0.10 0.10
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.231 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.151 for year 1999
Maternal and Child Health Care 647
Figure A5: Concentration curves and horizontal inequity index for diarrhea medical treatment
1.00
Line of equality
0.90
Diarrhea: 1.00
0.80 Line of
0.90
0.70 medical equality
0.80
treatment
Cumulative % of utilization variable
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Cumulative % of population, ranked from poorest to richest
Horizontal inequity index = 0.145 for year 2013 Horizontal inequity index = 0.152 for year 2008
1.00 1.00
0.90
Line of Line of equality
0.90
0.80 equality 0.80
Cumulative % of utilization variable
Horizontal inequity index = 0.272 for year 2003 Horizontal inequity index = 0.113 for year 1999
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 648–659
Resume : Le present travail a pour objectif d’identifier les determinants du financement bancaire des PME camerounaises. Il
s’appuie pour cela sur l’enqu^ete « Formulation d’un Plan de Developpement Local des PME au Cameroun » realisee aupres de
413 PME par le ministere des petites et moyennes entreprises, de l’economie sociale et de l’artisanat (MINPMEESA) du
Gouvernement camerounais et l’Agence Japonaise de Cooperation Internationale (JICA). Nous utilisons un modele logit simple
et les methodes d’estimations recentes. L’analyse statistique des donnees revele que les PME autofinancent leurs activites a court
terme et font recours aux institutions financieres a long terme. L’analyse econometrique a montre que les principaux
determinants du financement des PME sont la presence reguliere des effets financiers, la qualite des garanties offertes, la taille de
la PME, la rentabilite et le capital social (appartenance aux reseaux sociaux, participation des etrangers au capital, soutien des
autorites gouvernementales). Cependant, les relations sociales qui sont des indicateurs du degre de confiance des PME
ameliorent significativement la probabilite d’acces au financement bancaire en reduisant le degre d’opacite des PME aux yeux du
banquier.
Abstract: The present work aims to identify the determinants of financing banking Cameroonian SMEs. It is based on the
survey ‘Formulation of Local Development Plan for SMEs in Cameroon’ conducted among 413 SMEs by the Ministry of Small
and Medium Enterprises, Social Economy and Handicraft (MINPMEESA) Government of Cameroon and Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA). We use a simple logit model and robust statistical tests. The results of our analysis reveal that SMEs
in the short term self-finance their business while in the long run they use financial institution funds. Moreover, analysis of the
determinants of their access to external finance reveal that the main determinants of SME financing are: regular presence of
financial effects, the cost of financing, quality guarantees, the SME size, its profitability, the skills of the manager and the social
capital. The latter significantly improves SMEs’ conditions of access to credit by reducing their degree of opacity in the eyes of
bankers.
1. Introduction
Depuis plusieurs annees, de nombreux travaux convergent pour souligner l’importance des petites et moyennes entreprises
(PME) dans le tissu economique des pays aussi bien developpes qu’en developpement. Considerees comme des cellules
substantielles de l’economie de marche, les PME ont en effet joue un r^ole important autant dans l’innovation, la creation
d’emplois et la croissance economique des pays industrialises au cours du XXeme siecle (Quiles, 1997). Dans les pays en
developpement, et principalement en Afrique Subsaharienne (ASS), les PME constituent la quasi-totalite de la population des
entreprises, soit environ 99% au Cameroun (INS, 2009), 93% au Maroc, plus de 90% en RDC, et 95% de l’activite
manufacturiere au Nigeria (OCDE, 2006). Malgre ce poids, la contribution des PME au PIB est estimee a moins de 20% dans la
plupart des pays africains, alors qu’elle peut atteindre jusqu’a 60% dans les pays a haut revenu (Admassu, 2009). De plus, les
PME qui operent dans les pays de l’ASS emploient en moyenne moins de 30 % de la main-d’œuvre dans le secteur manufacturier
alors que cette proportion est de 74,4 % dans les pays asiatiques, de 62,1 % dans les pays de l’Amerique latine et Cara€ıbes et de
Andre Dumas Tsambou, Universite de Yaounde II-Soa; e-mail: tsamboudumas@yahoo.fr. Christian Zamo Akono, Universite De Yaounde Ii-Soa; e-
mail: zchristy2@yahoo.fr. Ludwick Ndokang Esone 1er, University of Yaounde II-Soa; e-mail: ndokang2087@gmail.com. Roger Tsafack Nanfosso,
Universite de Dschang; e-mail: rtsafack@gpeyaounde.org
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 648
Financement Bancaire 649
73,1 % dans les pays de l’OCDE (Ondel’ansek, 2010). Au Cameroun, les PME n’emploient que 19% de la population active et
leur contribution au PIB est estimee a moins de 20% (INS, 2009).
Au-dela de ce contraste, il convient de souligner que dans les pays en developpement comme le Cameroun, les PME
presentent un enorme potentiel en matiere de stimulation de l’esprit d’entreprise et de creation d’un tissu industriel capable de
s’adapter aux besoins des grandes entreprises de leur pays. Aussi admet-on qu’elles pourraient contribuer d’avantage a la
croissance economique des pays de l’ASS si elles parvenaient a trouver de meilleures conditions de leur developpement. Ces
entreprises eprouvent des difficultes pour financer leurs projets d’investissement (Coluzzi et al., 2009). Cela tient notamment a
leur capacite limitee a fournir une information fiable ainsi qu’a leur expertise financiere limitee qui resulte de leurs specificites
financieres. Ang (1992), ces specificites sont liees a la difficulte de separer les ressources financieres de l’entreprise de celles de
son proprietaire, aux problemes de succession qui peuvent rendre le developpement de l’entreprise incertain et a la presence de
contrats implicites. Nombre de travaux affirment a ce sujet que les difficultes d’acces aux financements sont le premier obstacle
au developpement des PME d’ASS, assez loin devant les problemes de corruption, de deficience des infrastructures ou de
fiscalite abusive (Banque Mondiale, 2009). En fait, pour leur bon fonctionnement, les PME ont besoin de ressources financieres
necessaires a leur cycle d’exploitation et a leurs investissements. Or, il apparait que 80 a 90 % d’entre elles connaissent des
difficultes d’acces au marche des financements en ASS (Lefilleur, 2009). Une enqu^ete effectuee au Cameroun en 2009 revele que
pres de 77% des PME camerounaises ont les problemes de financement et que l’indice d’acces au credit bancaire est de 2,625
(MINPMEESA, 2009). Cette fragilite financiere d’une PME peut raccourcir son cycle de vie et une mauvaise conjoncture
engendrerait la defaillance.
Plusieurs syntheses des travaux theoriques et empiriques ont recemment ete consacrees aux PME dans les pays en
developpement, notamment en ASS. Ces travaux mettent principalement l’accent sur le financement interne ou externe des PME
et sur la pertinence des theories concurrentes au regard de l’explication de leur financement. S’inscrivant dans ce contexte
theorique et empirique, le present article a pour objectif d’identifier les leviers sur lesquels il faut agir pour ameliorer l’acces de
ce type d’entreprise au financement bancaire au Cameroun. De maniere plus specifique, il s’agit:
D’examiner le niveau de financement des PME;
D’analyser les sources de financement des PME;
D’identifier les obstacles au financement des PME.
Si bon nombre d’etudes portent sur l’acces au financement des grandes entreprises, nous mettons l’accent sur les PME.
L’analyse d’un echantillon de 413 PME camerounaises nous permet de comparer nos resultats avec ceux d’autres travaux
anterieurs ou contemporains relatifs aux PME.
Considerant que le financement externe est essentiel a la croissance et au developpement de la PME et en admettant que
plusieurs facteurs peuvent expliquer la frilosite des banques a l’egard des PME camerounaises, le reste de ce document est
organise ainsi qu’il suit. La section 2 procede a la revue de la litterature. La section 3 presente la methodologie et les donnees. Les
resultats sont presentes a la section 4 et discutes a la section 5, et la derniere section conclue.
2. Revue de la litterature
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650 A. D. Tsambou et al.
Sur le plan du financement bancaire, chaque banque adopte un modele propre d’evaluation de credit dont les criteres et
l’importance accordee a chacun d’eux varie. Par contre, toutes les banques doivent evaluer le risque de defaut des emprunteurs
pour minimiser au maximum le risque de pertes monetaires. Au vue de ces differents risques, la vision classique du marche sur
lequel le mecanisme des prix permet d’ajuster l’offre et la demande, et ainsi induire la satisfaction de l’ensemble des agents,
conna^ıt dans le domaine du credit bancaire d’importantes contradictions. Stiglitz et Weiss (1981) montrent que, dans le cadre
d’une asymetrie d’information entre banquier et emprunteur, le marche de l’intermediation financiere est souvent caracterise par
un equilibre de rationnement. Ce rationnement est attribuable selon eux a deux formes d’asymetrie d’information: le risque
moral et la selection adverse prejudiciables au creancier. Van Pham et al. (2009) montrent sur le cas des PME vietnamiennes et
GICAM-GTZ (2008) et Taka (2009) sur le cas des PME Camerounaises que l’asymetrie d’information constitue un probleme
majeur dans la relation entre les banques et les PME.
En effet, le risque de selection adverse est fortement lie a la meconnaissance de l’emprunteur d’une part, et a la qualite de
l’information fournie dans les demandes de financement d’autre part (Observatoire europeen des PME, 2003). Pour minimiser ce
risque, les banques s’interessent au risque de remboursement en se basant sur les criteres que sont les garanties, les ratios
financiers et la rentabilite anticipee (Rand, 2007; Egbetunde et Akinlo, 2015). Pour ce qui est phenomene de l’alea moral, les
banques sont tres souvent incapables d’evaluer les projets des PME et refusent de s’engager. Selon l’Observatoire Europeen des
PME (2003), le bilan et le compte de resultat sont les documents les plus demandes par les banques europeennes. Or, seulement
60 % des PME fournissent regulierement ce type d’information.
Dans le contexte camerounais, Wamba (2013) montrent que les promoteurs des PME hesitent a devoiler l’ensemble des
informations dont ils disposent concernant leur entreprise, que ce soit pour des raisons fiscales, concurrentielles ou liees aux
^ qu’engendre leur production ou simplement par ignorance ou manque de competences. Tres recemment, certains auteurs
coUts
(Williams, 2016; Tsambou et al., 2015; Nguena et Tsafack, 2014) ont montre que cette insuffisance d’information est due a la
petite taille et le peu de notoriete de la plupart des PME.
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3. Methodologie
Afin de repondre a la problematique de cette recherche, la presente etude rapproche les theories de financement des organisations
et du Capital Social a l’acces au financement des PME. Les elements methodologiques presentes dans ce travail portent sur la
source des donnees, la specification du modele ainsi que les variables du modele empirique.
Les donnees utilisees pour cet article ont ete recueillies dans le cadre des enqu^etes effectuees en 2009 par le ministere des petites
et moyennes entreprises, de l’economie sociale et de l’artisanat (MINPMEESA) du Gouvernement camerounais et l’Agence
Japonaise de Cooperation Internationale (JICA) au nom du Gouvernement Japonais.1 L’objectif de cette enqu^ete est de mener
une etude de formulation de projet afin de comprendre la situation presente des PME et la politique de promotion des PME dans
le dit pays. Sur les 3193 PME camerounaises identifiees, 500 avaient ete enqu^etees avec un taux de reponse de 82,6% (413 PME).
La methode de sondage par quota a permis de determiner la taille de l’echantillon par region. A cet effet, trois modalites (le
secteur d’activites, la taille et la localisation geographique de la PME) ont servi de base de stratification. Pour le premier, trois
secteurs (secteur industriel 70%, secteur commercial 15% et secteur des services 15%). De m^eme, les exigences de
representativite regionale dans l’echantillon ont conduit a considerer les villes de Douala et de Yaounde comme regions a part,
compte tenu de leur forte densite en entreprises. Enfin, selon le critere de la taille, 20% des entreprises a enqu^eter proviendraient
de micro entreprises et 80% de petites et moyennes entreprises. Le questionnaire administre etait relative aux caracteristiques des
entreprises, a la production et au marche, a l’acces au financement et a la gestion globale de l’entreprise.
Afin d’enrichir ce travail et d’apporter des elements de reponses a notre problematique de base, une modelisation
econometrique s’avere indispensable. La variable « Acces au financement bancaire » etant dichotomique, il est fait usage du
modele a choix binaire.2 Ainsi, ce modele d’acces au financement bancaire a estimer est tel qu’on observe n individus (PME).
Ce qui conduit de toute evidence a l’observation d’une decision presentee par la variable Yi (acces au financement) qui peut
prendre deux valeurs (0 ou 1). L’acces au financement des PME etant la manifestation visible de la variable latente3 (yi )
inobservable de la PME, on se ramene a conceptualiser un modele d’analyse de la variance sur cette variable latente. Nous
formulons le probleme en termes de fonction de credibilite (C) de la PME. Pour une PME i de caracteristiques Xi, l’acces au
financement est sous condition d’une certaine credibilite C(1, Xi), alors que le refus du financement est sous condition d’une
credibilite C(0, Xi). On a alors:
(
1 si C ð1; X i Þ > C ð0; X i Þ
Yi ¼ ð1Þ
0 si C ð0; X i Þ > C ð1; X i Þ
La banque choisissant la situation qui lui permet de maximiser le remboursement futur de la somme empruntee, on se ramene
au cas de la variable latente en posant:
u X i ¼ ð1 xi1 xi2 xik Þ est le vecteur des variables explicatives; b ¼ ðb0 ; b1 ; b2 ; . . . ; bk Þ le vecteur des parametres a
O
estimer; ei correspond a la realisation des evenements aleatoires. L’acces au financement etant une variable qualitative, la
probabilite que la PME i obtient un financement (Y i ¼ 1) est alors
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652 A. D. Tsambou et al.
Avec F la fonction de repartition. La solution recherchee vise a trouver la forme fonctionnelle telle que PrðY i ¼ 1Þ respecte
X
N
les proprietes ci-apres: 0 < PrðY i ¼ 1Þ < 1 et PrðY i ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 tel que lim PrðY i ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1 et lim PrðY i ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0.
X i b!þ1 X i b!1
i¼1
En n’admettant que la fonction de repartition F ðX i bÞ est une representation de la loi logistique (modele LOGIT),4 la
probabilite pour qu’une PME i obtienne un financement bancaire depend d’un ensemble de variables explicatives representees
par le vecteur X i tel que:
expðX i bÞ 1
Pi ¼ PrðY i ¼ 1Þ ¼ FðX i bÞ ¼ ¼ ð5Þ
1 þ expðX i bÞ 1 þ expðX i bÞ
L’estimation de ce modele logit simple est effectuee selon la methode du maximum de vraisemblance.
Les variables exogenes sont envisages en fonction de notre objectif. Ces variables sont presentees selon les facteurs de risque
devoiles dans le modele theorique. Pour evaluer le risque d’asymetrie d’information entre les entreprises et les bailleurs de fonds,
nous utiliserons la disponibilite de livres comptables et la qualite des informations qu’ils contiennent (Audet et al., 2009). La
garantie et les informations financieres jouent un r^ole important pour evaluer la capacite de remboursement des entreprises. Les
garanties privilegiees par les bailleurs de fonds au Cameroun sont les biens immobiliers.
Le risque commercial est approxime par la part d’exportation (St-Pierre, 2004). Une PME exportatrice peut facilement
acceder au credit bancaire. Le risque lie aux PME est evalue par la taille (Audet et al., 2009) et l’^age (Zambaldi et al., 2009) de la
PME. La taille de l’entreprise est mesuree par l’effectif de la main d’œuvre alors que l’^age appara^ıt ainsi comme vecteur de la
reputation de l’entreprise. Le risque lie au cas particulier du Cameroun est evalue par les variables suivantes: la localisation des
PME (St-Pierre, 2004), absence d’agence de garantie, financement partiel des banques. Les variables caracteristiques du capital
social portent essentiellement sur: l’appartenance a des reseaux d’affaires et associations (Kim et al., 2009), le soutien des
autorites locales pour obtenir des credits; le poids de la main d’œuvre familiale dans le personnel (Bjornskov, 2006); le poids du
chiffre d’affaires etranger et du chiffre d’affaires familial sur celui de la PME.
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Tenant compte du capital social des PME (la localisation, le soutien des autorites locales pour obtenir du financement et la
participation a des associations de PME), les tests pour deux dernieres variables sont tres significatifs. Ce qui demontre une
relation forte entre ces variables et l’obtention de financement bancaire. Parmi les PME qui obtiennent un financement bancaire,
88,46% sont urbaines, 93% obtiennent le soutien des autorites locales et 41,54% sont membres de differentes associations
(Tableau 1).
En observant les variables liees aux caracteristiques des PME dans le tableau 2, on se rend compte qu’en moyenne les PME
(58.46%) ont 13 ans d’^age. Les entreprises les plus jeunes ont donc un acces moindre au financement bancaire. Par contre, les
entreprises les plus anciennes obtiennent facilement un financement bancaire du fait de leur reputation, de leur historique
financier et de leur relation de long terme avec les creanciers. Ces PME constituees de tres petites entreprises (0,77%), de petites
entreprises (32,31%) et de moyennes entreprises (66,92%) ont en moyenne un effectif de 39 employes. Les plus grandes
entreprises auraient donc moins de difficulte a obtenir du financement aupres des banques par rapport aux petites entreprises. Par
rapport a la structure de propriete, les PME ayant un dirigeant proprietaire ou appartenant a une seule famille ont une decision de
Tableau 1: Analyse statistique des variables qualitatives (%) et tests statistiques univaries
Variables Designation Financement bancaire Test statistique
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654 A. D. Tsambou et al.
financement qui depend du dirigeant ou du chef de famille. Cet indicateur influence negativement l’acces au credit du fait que les
creanciers s’inquietent quant a la gestion de la firme.
4. Resultat
L’analyse multivariee a travers les coefficients de correlations entre variables explicatives permet d’examiner la question de
multi-colinearite d’une part et d’autre part, la liaison entre les differentes variables. En effet, la presence du probleme de multi-
colinearite est signe d’une redondance d’information dans le modele et deteriore sa qualite. Generalement, la solution proposee
est le retrait de la variable responsable du probleme jusqu’a ce que celui-ci disparaisse. Le test de la multi-colinearite nous amene
au constat selon lequel tous les coefficients de correlation partielle qui sont significatifs sont faibles (inferieurs a 0,5). Ceci
conduit a l’absence d’une multi-colinearite entre les variables exogenes. Vu la nature exploratoire de cette etude, nous avons
prefere une regression pas a pas avec les criteres d’entree et sortie des variables selon leur significativite. Nos resultats (tableau 3)
sont robustes selon les standards usuels.
Selon les resultats obtenus, la valeur du ratio de vraisemblance (474,49) est plus grande que la valeur de la statistique de Khi-
deux theorique au seuil de 1% (Prob > chi2 ¼ 0.0000). La valeur du pseudo-R2 de ce modele (0,9223) est assez satisfaisante et le
pourcentage de prediction du modele (97.82%) est largement superieur au seuil (50%) predefini. Ce qui signifie que le modele est
applicable et globalement significatif. L’observation des T de Student et des Prob(z) renseigne sur les variables statistiquement
pertinentes. Etant donne que les parametres du modele estime ne renseignent que sur le degre et le sens de l’evolution de la
probabilite d’acces au financement bancaire, le calcul des Odds Ratio et des effets marginaux (Thomas, 2002, p. 60) permet de
completer les resultats de l’estimation afin de capter l’amplitude de la variation des variables. Suite a ces differents tests, on
obtient les resultats presentes dans le tableau 3.
5. Discussion
Le degre d’opacite de la PME s’est avere comme facteur pertinent limitatif d’acces au credit bancaire. Ce risque d’asymetrie
d’information mesure par la disponibilite et la qualite des livres comptables a un impact positif sur l’obtention du financement
bancaire. En effet, la qualite du livret comptable produit par la PME conditionne son acces au credit bancaire. Les effets comptables
m^eme de maniere occasionnelle influencent positivement la probabilite d’acces au financement. Cette comptabilite constitue une
source importante d’information pour les partenaires externes de l’entreprise et specialement les banquiers. Ces resultats corroborent
avec ceux de Steijvers (2008) relatifs a l’acces au credit bancaire des PME belges. En plus de la qualite des documents comptables
produits par la PME, les caracteristiques de la personne etablissant ces documents jouent sur la decision de la banque. La qualite de ce
document est douteuse lorsque l’entreprise n’a pas un personnel qualifie qui s’occupe de la tenue de sa comptabilite. La plupart des
PME dans le contexte camerounais ont deux rapports financiers (un pour l’entreprise et l’autre pour l’autorite fiscal), ce qui amene les
banquiers a ne plus se fier exclusivement sur les effets comptables pour prendre une decision de credit.
Pour le risque de remboursement, la garantie a une influence positive sur la probabilite d’acces au financement bancaire. Cette
forte significativite de l’octroi de garanties pour l’acces au financement corrobore les resultats empiriques de plusieurs etudes
(Van Pham et al., 2009; Taka, 2009). Offrir un bien en garantie est une condition obligatoire chez plusieurs banquiers et cela s’est
verifie dans le contexte des PME camerounaises. Ainsi, a un seuil de significativite de 1%, une PME presentant des garanties de
remboursement de son credit a plus de chance de voir sa demande de credit acceptee qu’une entreprise sans garanties. Ces
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656 A. D. Tsambou et al.
garanties permettent aux banques de reduire significativement leur risque de pertes monetaires. Ce resultat se confirme par une
correlation positive entre l’acces au credit bancaire et la valeur de la garantie. Au-dela des garanties, la rentabilite influe
significativement au seuil de 5% sur la probabilite d’acces au credit bancaire. Ce resultat s’explique par le fait que, plus une
entreprise est rentable, plus elle s’endettera pour profiter au maximum du principe de deductibilite fiscale des charges des dettes.
De plus, une meilleure rentabilite va de pair avec une probabilite de remboursement des dettes plus elevee. Ce qui, aux yeux des
creanciers, constitue une garantie supplementaire. La significativite negative de cette variable s’explique par le fait que, les
firmes biaisent leurs resultats financiers dans l’optique d’obtenir un financement.
Concernant les risques lies aux PME, il existe une relation positive et significative au seuil de 5% entre la taille des PME
camerounaises et l’acces au financement bancaire. Ce qui montre qu’une PME qui a un grand nombre d’employes a une
probabilite plus grande d’obtenir un financement bancaire. En effet, les PME camerounaises ayant plus de 20 employes ont plus
de chance d’obtenir un financement aupres d’une banque que celles ayant moins de 5 employes. Ce premier constat rejoint les
resultats des etudes empiriques anterieures (Taka, 2009; Zidi et Djelassi, 2016). Cette taille de la PME peut ^etre non seulement
indicative de sa capacite financiere et de la disponibilite d’information, mais aussi, une taille importante entraine une bonne
organisation et une bonne gestion d’un capital important de l’entreprise.
Le risque commercial evalue par les activites d’exportation presente un impact negatif et significatif sur l’acces au financement
des PME. Certes qu’une PME exportatrice est perSc ue comme dynamique par ses partenaires externes; cependant, ses chances
d’acceder au credit bancaire sont moindre. Ceci s’explique par le fait que le circuit des operations d’exportation et la fluctuation des
cours exterieurs peuvent conduire au risque d’insolvabilite susceptible d’hypothequer le respect des engagements de credit.
Quant aux risques lies au contexte particulier du Cameroun, l’attitude passive des banques vis-a-vis des projets PME presente
un impact positif et significatif sur l’acces des PME au credit bancaire. Il est interessant de constater d’ailleurs que les banques
camerounaises ont une attitude passive au regard du financement des PME. Quelque soit la viabilite des projets, les banques ne
financent pas le montant total des besoins de financement requis. Ce montant pour certaines banques est fixe a 80% du montant
total des ressources demandees. En effet, une demande de credit appreciee a 80% par les differentes commissions de la banque a
7 fois plus de chance d’^etre financee qu’une demande ayant une appreciation moindre. En outre, si le taux d’appreciation du
projet de la PME augmente d’une unite, sa probabilite d’obtention de financement augmentera de 76% (tableau 3). En revanche,
l’absence d’un systeme officiel de garantie du credit pour completer l’insuffisance d’hypotheque presente un effet negatif et non
significatif sur l’acces au credit bancaire des PME au Cameroun. Ce resultat s’explique par l’intensification du secteur de la
microfinance, la creation de la banque des PME, la creation d’une agence pour la promotion des PME.
Pour ce qui est du capital social, l’appartenance d’une PME aux reseaux sociaux a un impact significatif au risque de 1% sur
l’acces au financement bancaire. Ainsi, appartenir a un groupe pourrait ^etre un facteur de reduction de l’asymetrie d’information
entre les entreprises et les offreurs de capitaux. Dans un contexte d’information imparfaite comme celui du Cameroun, les reseaux
^
et associations des entreprises rendent moins coUteuses les transactions economiques. Ces structures facilitent la circulation de
l’information, procurent aux banquiers des garanties personnelles plus solides, exercent des mecanismes internes de contr^ole et de
sanction aux membres. Non seulement, l’appartenance aux reseaux d’affaires offre au banquier des garanties plus solides, mais
aussi elle exerce un mecanisme d’auto surveillance sur les membres de l’association et accroit la confiance de la banque.
En outre, le soutien des autorites gouvernementales facilite l’obtention d’un financement bancaire. Cette significativite
positive s’explique par le fait que certaines banques de la place preferent se sacrifier a prendre d’enormes risques pour entretenir
de bonnes relations avec les autorites gouvernementales et poursuivre par la d’autres objectifs non financiers. En plus, le ratio du
chiffre d’affaires etranger, le ratio du chiffre d’affaire familial et le ratio du nombre d’employes familial impactent positivement
sur l’acces au financement bancaire des PME. L’integration des externes dans une PME serait un facteur de reduction de
l’asymetrie d’information vis-a-vis des offreurs de capitaux.
Les relations sociales, qui sont des indicateurs du degre de confiance entre le banquier et l’entrepreneur, ont des effets positifs
sur les conditions de credit ainsi que sur le niveau de risque qu’assument les porteurs de projet. En definitive, le capital social
ameliore significativement la probabilite d’acces de la PME camerounaise au credit bancaire en reduisant son degre d’opacite
aux yeux du banquier.
6. Conclusion
L’objectif de cette recherche etait d’identifier les facteurs explicatifs de l’acces au financement bancaire des PME
camerounaises. Il en ressort que la probabilite d’acces au financement bancaire s’accroit chez les PME etablissant regulierement
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Financement Bancaire 657
leur comptabilite et est d’autant plus croissante si ces effets financiers sont « audites » par un comptable qualifie ou par un cabinet
comptable. Ce qui permet de comprendre que les cadres bancaires ont besoin d’une information complete et parfaite pour les
aider a prendre une decision claire et d’evaluer parfaitement les caracteristiques de l’entreprise qui sollicite le credit. Cette
probabilite augmente avec la qualite de garanties offertes.
Le present travail qui contribue a l’amelioration du financement des PME camerounaises suggere conformement aux analyses
theoriques et aux resultats empiriques, les propositions suivantes: Suite au decret de la creation d’une banque specialisee au
financement des PME, il faut egalement la creation d’une institution de renforcement des capacites de la PME et la mise en place
des cabinets de consultation pour mieux renseigner les PME sur leur analyse financiere et leur plan d’investissement. La
necessite de ces propositions trouve sa justification dans les trois raisons suivantes: Premierement, les problemes de financement
de la PME que sont le financement limite, l’absence ou insuffisance d’un fonds de garantie et l’asymetrie d’information ne
peuvent pas ^etre resolus par chaque banque commerciale, car il s’agit d’une affaire de systeme financier. Deuxiemement, les
problemes de financement courant de la PME ne peuvent pas ^etre resolus en laissant jouer les mecanismes du marche comme le
preconisent les classiques. L’intervention et l’appui du gouvernement sont indispensables. Troisiemement, il faut un
developpement du marche financier qui donnera la possibilite aux PME non seulement de se financer directement sur le marche
des capitaux, mais aussi de vendre les actions ou de rechercher de nouveaux actionnaires pour se refinancer.
Les limites de ce travail sont liees a la qualite de donnees qui ne permettent pas d’etudier l’acces a la finance informelle, alors
que l’economie camerounaise est caracterisee par une forte presence des activites informelles dans tous les secteurs. Elles ne
permettent non plus d’evaluer l’acces au credit offert par les Microfinances, alors que la structure de ces dernieres propose des
conditions de credits accessibles aux agents economiques dont le credit bancaire est rationne. Cependant, dans la mesure ou la
microfinance a ete creee pour accompagner l’activite des PME compte tenu des conditions rudes imposees par les banques, quel
serait les facteurs explicatifs de l’acces au financement informel et des Microfinances?
Notes
1. Cf. MINPMEESA, Etude sur la Formulation du Plan Directeur (M/P) pour le Developpement des Petites et Moyennes
Entreprises en Republique du Cameroun (MINPMEESA, 2009), Agence Japonaise de Cooperation Internationale, Unico
International Corporation, IDD- JR-08-069.
2. La base theorique de ce modele a ete donnee par McFadden (1968) a travers une theorie de l’utilite aleatoire.
3. La variable latente est une variable non observable et representative du phenomene etudie.
4. Le choix du modele LOGIT par rapport au modele probit pouvant resoudre la question est que le Logit a l’avantage d’une plus
grande simplicite numerique et aussi parce que les estimateurs obtenus avec le modele LOGIT sont environ p/3 fois plus
grands que ceux obtenus par le modele PROBIT.
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African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 660–673
Abstract: This paper examines urban-rural welfare inequality in Tunisia. Founded on the recentred influence function and
quantile regression based counterfactual decomposition, we dissect the gap between the two areas. Results of the present study
suggest that the difference between rural poor households and urban poor households is due essentially to characteristic effects;
while for wealthier households both characteristic and returns to these characteristic effects (for example, efficiency of
educational system) are responsible for this gap. Additionally, the results demonstrate that this is an issue of value, and, more
specifically, an economic development fairness conflict. It is suggested that policymakers should address a positive
discrimination programme in favour of the marginalized region.
1. Introduction
Regional disparities are a central issue in recent literature, and it can be assessed through various approaches. Some of the most
common approaches to measure regional disparity are inequality indices such as coefficient of variation, the Theil index as well
as the generalized entropy index and the Gini coefficient, and so on. These indices are directly used in the studies of regional
inequality. For example, the National Institute of Statistics (INS) used these conventional indices to explore the evolution of
Tunisia’s regional inequality occurring over different temporal scales. Although, inequality can efficiently refer to the overall
trend of regional development, it does not completely explain whether certain families are different in their welfare due to spatial
localization, or due to high social inequality within the regions. In such a case, decomposing inequality, which divides aggregate
inequality to analyse between-regions variability, is required for a positive assessment of inequality and for the purposes of
effective social policies. Moreover, the level of welfare in a country cannot be analysed only through average consumption level
or poverty rate. In fact, quality of life in a country also depends on how consumption is distributed throughout its population. The
analysis of the distribution of consumption, therefore, enables us to better assess the relevance of social policies.
There has been a wide proliferating literature on inequality decomposition measurement between regions and its application
to micro-data surveys in the developing countries context. Several studies have been published addressing the source of
inequality between rural and urban households. Nguyen et al. (2007) discuss the welfare inequality between urban and rural
areas from 1993 to 1998 in Vietnam using Machado-Mata decomposition (2005). In this study, they conclude that inequality
differences between the two regions were due to three factors, namely, education, ethnicity, and age. Mussa (2014) used
disaggregate household expenditure to look at how inequality in household expenditure components affects total inequality and
poverty in Malawi.
Studying in depth the persistent gap between rural and urban sectors can put more emphasis on the principal factors
contributing to this gap and thus improve the decisions required to be undertaken by policymakers to support regional
development. In the spirit of this debate, this paper proposes to use a quantile regression model (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and
counterfactual decompositions to examine the source of welfare’s inequality across both urban and rural areas. This general
decomposition method involves a semiparametric estimation (quantile regressions) model on log expenditure applied to rural
and urban households, which then will contribute to the building of a counterfactual function for rural log expenditure using
Amal Jmaii (corresponding author), Department of Quantitative Methods, LAREQUAD, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Tunis
El Manar, Tunisia; e-mail: jemaiamal@yahoo.fr. Damien Rousseliere, Professor, SMART-LERECO, AGROCAMPUS OUEST, INRA, Angers,
France; e-mail: damien.rousseliere@agrocampus-ouest.fr. Christophe Daniel, Associate Professor, GRANEM, Faculty of Law and Economics,
University of Angers, France; e-mail: christophe.daniel@univ-angers.fr
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 660
Semi-parametric Regression-based Decomposition Methods 661
urban characteristics. The counterfactual distribution aims to assess the function of rural log expenditure, as it would have
existed if the rural households had urban household’s characteristics.
The paper makes an empirical contribution to the literature compared to previous studies on the same topic, namely Hassine
(2015), Chang (2012) and Pieters (2011). We use the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) and the new decomposition method
developed by Chernozhukov et al. (2013), which permit to specify whether expenditure differences between rural and urban
areas are related to the difference in characteristics effects or to returns effects.
In particular, in Tunisia, inequality is still a predominant phenomenon. In fact, an asymmetric allocation of basic services (i.e.
education and employment) attest that growth benefits do not drip equally among regions, which may cause a feeling of
insecurity and injustice, and can lead to a potential social unrest. In this study, we examine and dissect the welfare gap between
urban and rural areas in Tunisia using Chernozhukov’s counterfactual decomposition, which will represent a general form of the
Machado-Mata decomposition (2005), and will decompose regional welfare’s gap to identify the source of this persistent
inequality. In this paper, we use the 2010 National Survey that is considered the most recent available survey in order to assess
the welfare gap between the areas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on inequalities, while Section 3
gives background information on economic reforms in Tunisia. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics of the used data and
presents the details of the decomposition methods. We apply the proposed methodologies to the context of urban-rural welfare
inequality in Tunisia in the fifth section. Finally, we give our final findings and conclude with some recommendations.
3. Tunisian Background
Tunisia, as a developing country, has implemented since the early years of statehood, several national programmes to reduce
poverty and regional disparities. The country has indeed shown some progress in many areas. The per capita income has risen,
public services have developed, health indicators have improved and the demographic trends have been favourable. In fact, the
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
662 A. Jmaii et al.
country has opted for an open trade policy since the beginning of the 1990s. This strategy was preceded by the implementation of
a Structural Adjustment Plan. While this policy has led, over the last twenty years, to an increase in growth and income, the gains
from free trade are not equally distributed within the country. Economic restructuring, globalization of capital markets and
structural adjustment are synonymous of drawdown of the number of permanent workers, the subcontracting with resort to
temporary and seasonal work and the reduction of costs through deregulation of the labour market.
The deterioration of living conditions among the rural population, the increase in the unemployment rate and the inflation in the
consumer prices for basic goods associated to climate change and water scarcity problems, all threatened the sustainability of
growth in these areas, which has provoked the uprising of the people in the interior regions leading to the 2011 Tunisian revolution.
Indeed, after the revolution, Tunisia is boldly emerging from the recession considered to be the longest period of economic
downturn since the establishment of statehood. In this paper, we emphasize the failure of agricultural, trade and social policies and
the insufficiency of the measures taken to deal with the vulnerability of the rural population. More than 800,000 people were
unemployed in 2014 and the poverty rate reached 15 per cent, according to data released by the INS. Poverty rate is correlated with
many factors such as unemployment rate, illiteracy, access to health services and especially education (African Development Bank,
2013). Therefore, poverty in Tunisia is mainly concentrated in rural areas and in some regions of the country, particularly the
Central West, a region that first witnessed the first sparkles of the revolution. In addition, the lack of an infrastructure in these areas,
such as roads and communication facilities, may limit poor people’s access to information or to the labour markets.
A strong variation in poverty rates between regions (Figure 1) may be the cause of social instability and population movement.
Households with a higher level of poverty rate are more concentrated in the interior regions of the country than in the inland ones.
In addition, the measurement of poverty at the regional level allows a better definition of the priorities for regional development.
In fact, the decrease in the poverty rate compared to the higher consumption disparities with economic inequalities assert that the
GDP growth is biased towards the non-poor. Up to now, the adopted economic and social development does not correspond to
the good regional governance objectives that Tunisia has to achieve. Hence the disappointment expressed by many Tunisians
because they had better expectations after the revolution. Many Tunisians have expressed feelings of distrust towards public
policies that devote little regard for regional inequalities.
The analysis and the measurement of inequality in developing countries, and in particular in Tunisia, is further impeded by
difficulties in the choice of welfare indicator due to the limitations of the household/individual micro-data available from a
specific population. In fact, there is a wide literature about the choice between consumption expenditures or income to measure
inequality. The ideal is to use the two indicators as advocated by many researchers. In this study, we use welfare measures based
on consumption expenditures because incomes are not observable/biased.
We used data from the 2010 National Survey on Households’ Budget, Consumption and Living Standard. This survey is
conducted by the INS every five years and provides socio-demographic and economic characteristics of households and
individuals. Indeed, for 2010, it takes a representative sample of 11,281 households with 50,371 individuals. The data includes
information concerning the head of the household, composition, area of household’s location and total household’s consumption
expenditures. The choice of explanatory variables is based on the literature (Nguyen et al., 2007; Skoufias and Katayam, 2011)
and is validated by the AIC and BIC criteria.1 Therefore, we use household size, the proportion of children under 15 years old in
each household and the gender of the household head. We divided the age variable into five categories: 16–30, 31–45, 46–60,
61–75 and over 76. As far as the household education and employment characteristics are concerned, we have included the
variable of schooling of household head: illiterate (as reference), primary, secondary and higher level. For the employment
variable, we select four sectors, respectively governmental sector (as reference), private sector, self-employed and agricultural
sector. Since there are frequently monetary transfers from foreign countries, we use a dummy variable depending on whether a
household has received transfers from abroad or not. We also include the west regions as an explanatory variable, for these
regions have the highest poverty rate (Figure 1). Finally, we use log of real per capita expenditure as the dependent variable.
Table 1 and Table 2 show descriptive statistics of the selected variables. First of all, we point out that 85.23 per cent of urban
households are headed by a man against 84 per cent in rural areas. However, in rural zones the number of households headed by a
woman exceeds the urban ones.
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Semi-parametric Regression-based Decomposition Methods 663
Source: INS.
Many researchers have highlighted that higher educational level may lead to a potential reduction in poverty by increasing
employment opportunities and the possibility of having higher income (Becker, 1992). Table 2 reveals that household heads in
rural areas are less educated than their counterparts in urban ones. In fact, about 47.68 per cent of rural household heads are
illiterate compared to 24.07 per cent in urban areas. However, the most important statistic is the high level of education, which
was recorded 10 per cent for heads in urban zones against only 1.29 per cent in rural zones. This result shows that there exists a
substantial disparity between rural and urban household heads. This gap is mainly due to geographic isolation and social/
financial norms constraint. In fact, if students in rural-isolated areas want to continue postsecondary education they often need to
move because of insufficient local educational opportunities. Nevertheless, most of the time there is strong preferences to stay
near family because moving and education are expensive. A look at the employment variable enabled us to develop some
interpretations. The share of people in rural regions employed in the governmental sector is only 8 per cent in reference to the
urban areas. For the private sector, we noticed 11.45 per cent in urban zone. However, in the rural zone, the share of this sector is
only 5.32 per cent (half of the urban one).
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664 A. Jmaii et al.
Consumption expenditure (Tunisian milim dinars) 1,457,248 1,714,634 1,743,354 1,976,768 940,476.5 881,890.7
Log Consumption expenditure 13.843 0.805 14.053 0.758 13.464 0.746
Age 54.321 14.289 54.153 13.652 54.625 15.369
Household size 4.465 1.885 4.353 1.757 4.667 2.081
Percentage of children 0.209 0.231 0.203 0.226 0.219 0.240
Number of observation 11,281 7,261 4,020
Source: Own computing based on INS (National Institute of Statistics) data, Tunisia 2010.
In fact, it is hard to invest in this region because they do not have good infrastructures. The plotted kernel densities for the two
areas (Figure 2), can better visualize the difference between the characteristics of urban and rural areas.
4.2 Methodology
Semi-parametric Regression
This section aims to assess the role of various household characteristics to explain welfare inequality between urban and rural
areas. Most empirical studies focus on means modelling, a model that gives essential but limited information. We choose in this
Gender
Man 85.23 84.08
Woman 14.77 15.92
Education
Illiterate 24.07 47.68
Primary Level 36.33 38.59
Secondary Level 29.67 12.96
Superior Level 9.91 1.29
Region
East 71.10 28.9
West 28.89 71.11
Employment
Sector_gov 19.93 8
Sector_private 11.45 5.32
Self 21.29 10.49
Sector_agri 4.8 29.85
Unemployed 18.53 25
Inactive 24 21.43
Housing
Homeowner 84.39 95.17
Tenant 11.51 1.02
Free housing 4.09 3.8
Foreign transfer 1.58 1.21
Source: Own computing based on INS (National Institute of Statistics) data, Tunisia 2010.
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Semi-parametric Regression-based Decomposition Methods 665
paper to deal with quantile regression, which is a semi-parametric approach as it makes no assumptions about the distribution of
the errors. Furthermore, quantiles represent an approximation of poverty lines. Lower quantiles can represent the proportion of
poor in the distribution while higher quantiles represent the richest proportion. We consider the following model, inspired from
Koenker and Bassett (1978):
Qq ðY jX Þ ¼ aq þ X bq ð1Þ
where Y is log expenditure, Qq ðY jX Þ is the qth conditional quantile of Y, aq is the regression intercept and bq are values
parameters for given quantiles. The goal of the estimation is to solve the following program of minimization:
Xn
b q ¼ argminb 1
Q rq ðY i X i bÞ ð2Þ
n i
This estimation can be used for all quantiles where 0 q 1 and rq (x) ¼ (q 1(x 0))x. Then, there are an infinite number of
possible quantile regressions. Standard in comparable studies, we choose to deal with seven quantiles namely, (5th, 10th, 25th,
50th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles). In fact, the estimation of the quantile regression model is relatively straightforward, but
performing the corresponding robust standard errors is often viewed as being more problematic. In this study, we follow
Machado et al. (2013) and Parente and Santos Silva (2016), which present an improvement to the old command of Stata2 to
enable to report standard errors and t statistics that are asymptotically valid. In addition, the new command presents the result of
heteroscedasticity test (Machado-Santos Silva or MSS test) which we can use as a guide in the choice of the appropriate
covariance matrix estimator to use.
Table 3: OLS and quantile regression of total consumption expenditure per capita
Quantile regression
5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
Variables Means percentile percentile percentile percentile Percentile Percentile percentile
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Semi-parametric Regression-based Decomposition Methods 667
a) Recentered Influence Function (RIF): RIF regression (Fortin et al., 2011) is a convenient tool to conduct OB type
decomposition for other methods besides the mean such as quantiles regression. Therefore, when we perform quantile
model, RIF regression will be considered as a rescaled linear model. According to this definition, the rescaling factor relies
on the estimate of the interest quantile density:
q 1fy Qq g
RIFðy; Qq Þ ¼ Qq þ ð3Þ
f y ðQq Þ
The distributional statistic can be written based on the conditional expectations of its recentered influence function: We,
then, can perform an OB decomposition using the RIF as response variable (dependent variable).
b) The General Chernozhukov-Decomposition: The difference between FY (u|u), the observed distribution functions for the
urban area and FY (r|r), the observed distribution functions for the rural areas could be written:
where FY (r|u) is the counterfactual distribution functions of expenditures that would have prevailed for the urban area had
they faced the expenditure program F Y r jX r :
Z
F Y ðrjuÞ ðyÞ :¼ F Y r jX r ðyjxÞdF X r ðxÞ ð5Þ
xu
5. Empirical Analysis
In this section, the methodology described above is applied within urban and rural subsamples and the entire population. Thus,
three quantile regressions are performed to assess the welfare gap between the two areas.
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Semi-parametric Regression-based Decomposition Methods 669
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670 A. Jmaii et al.
of skilled young people and the arrival of elderly close to retirement (Jelili and Mzali, 1998). This phenomenon of older
age groups having considerable within-cohort inequality is an important acknowledged fact and can be clearly observed in the
Tunisian data. These results confirm the urgency of the issue of rural old-age vulnerability in Tunisia.
Results also show that the agricultural sector has a positively significant coefficient in rural area at all quantiles excluding the
25th and the 90th. For both urban and rural areas, welfare is determined by governmental and private sectors, since they are
statistically significant with a positive sign. In the urban model, the effect of these variables is higher in the upper quantile. In
the rural regression, they are much higher at the bottom of the distribution. As indicated in Tables 4 and 5, returns to education are
statistically significant across all quantiles. The findings show that, for the entire distribution, consumption expenditures for
people with higher education levels are higher than illiterate people and those who have just acquired primary education and
secondary education level. In addition, results show that the west region is more vulnerable and has a lower welfare than East
region. In fact, employments are paying off in the East relatively to the West and probably for the same reasons: the East gets the
lion’s share of the market’s activity in Tunisia (manufacturing and services).
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672 A. Jmaii et al.
The fight against regional inequalities is not just a matter of equality, but also a question of economic development fairness. We
should know that the development of social groups and deprived regions inevitably involves a strategy to reduce regional
inequality. In addition, the Tunisian state is not only required to build universities and hospitals (etc.), but also to provide the needed
resources to get the rural areas to the level of the urban ones. We recommend a positive discrimination programme in favour of the
marginalized region. For example, the government can start by sending most competent teachers and doctors to work in these areas,
and provide the necessary resources (good infrastructure, access to quality schools, internet, software and so on).
By decomposing the gap between urban and rural areas, this study has shown that the problem is not only about equality but it
is an equity issue. Such equity implies that resources should be allocated equally between areas with regard to the quality.
Although, for a social phenomenon, such as inequality, a dynamic analysis is required. This type of inequality is often known as
income variation/mobility and poverty dynamics and is important, when viewed from the social welfare and political
perspectives, to understand policy changes, an issue left for future research.
Notes
1. Using both AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion), the most adequately model is the
one that we have chosen.
2. Machado et al. (2013) demonstrated that the qreg2 command on Stata, which is a wrapper for the old qreg command, enables
us to obtain consistent estimators and report robust standard errors.
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African Development Review, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2017, 674–688
Resume : Cet article analyse les effets de la qualite des institutions sur la volatilite des Investissements Directs Etrangers
(IDE) en Afrique. Nous utilisons un modele estime en donnees de panel par les methodes des moments generalises en systeme et
des doubles moindres carres sur la periode 1996–2014. Les resultats montrent que la qualite des institutions accroit la volatilite
des entrees d’IDE. L’Afrique en general et les sous-regions Afrique Centrale et Afrique Australe en particulier doivent reformer
leurs institutions.
Abstract: This article analyzes the influence of institutional quality on the volatility of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Africa. We use an estimated model in dynamic panel data using the generalized method moment in system (GMM-S) and double
least squares (2SLS) over the period 1996–2014. Results show that the quality of institutions increases the volatility of FDI
inflows. In order to stabilize FDI inflows and set development prospects the African authorities must reform their institutions.
1. Introduction
Au cours de la derniere decennie, l’Afrique a enregistre des entrees importantes d’IDE accompagnees d’un volume de plus en
plus croissant des investissements intra africains (Dunne et Masiyandima, 2017). En 1990, les entrees d’IDE en Afrique etaient
evaluees a 2,84 milliards USD. Elles ont atteint 54,08 milliards USD (CNUCED, 2016). Mais cette evolution est caracterisee par
une forte volatilite. En 2000, le continent attire 9,65 milliards USD et en 2015, les IDE se chiffrent a 54,07 milliards USD en 2015
(CNUCED, 2016). En general, la volatilite des IDE suit l’evolution des cours des matieres premieres, notamment le petrole.
Pourtant, l’accroissement recent du prix du baril de petrole contraste avec l’evolution non reguliere des IDE. En decembre 1995,
le baril de petrole se vendait a 14,9 dollars USD, contre 32,62 dollars USD en decembre 2004, et 38,01 dollars en decembre 2015
(INSEE, 2016).
La volatilite des IDE est analysee dans la litterature sous deux angles: ses determinants et son r^ole sur la croissance
economique. S’agissant de l’impact de la volatilite des IDE sur la croissance, les travaux aboutissent a un resultat negatif et
significatif (Eregha, 2015; Lensink et Morrissey, 2006). La litterature sur ses determinants souligne le r^ole des facteurs
institutionnels (Vadlamannati et al., 2009), avec des resultats mitiges (Sane, 2016; Anyanwu et Yameogo, 2015a; Avom et
Ongo, 2013). La volatilite des IDE en Afrique a toujours ete expliquee a travers les variations des cours des matieres premieres.
Cependant, les travaux de Alley et Poloamina (2015) et Broto et al. (2011), ont justifie la volatilite des IDE par des facteurs
politiques.
Une attention portee sur les indicateurs de gouvernance en Afrique entre 1996 et 2015 montre trois groupes selon le
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2016). Le premier groupe compose de bons eleves avec un indice moyen fluctuant
entre 0,74 et 0,22 (Ile Maurice et Seychelles). Le deuxieme groupe compose d’eleves moyens avec un indice proche de 0 (Ghana,
Tunisie, Maroc). Le troisieme groupe est constitue de mauvais eleves avec un indice superieur a 1 ou a 2 (Somalie, RDC,
Bruno Emmanuel Ongo Nkoa (auteur correspondant), Departement d’Economie et de Gestion, Faculte des Sciences sociales et de Gestion, Universite
de Buea-Cameroun, BP: 63;Tel: 00237 675 19 40 49, E-mail: ongoema@yahoo.fr, Laboratoire d’Analyse et de Recherche en Economie Appliquee de
l’Universite de Yaounde 2 Soa. Jacques Simon Song, Departement d’Economie publique, Faculte des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, Universite
de Dschang-Cameroun, Tel: 00237 696 94 58 15, E-mail: jacquessimonsong@gmail.com, Laboratoire d’Analyse et de Recherche en Economie
Appliquee de l’Universite de Yaounde 2 Soa. Les auteurs remercient les trois rapporteurs anonymes de la revue pour leurs critiques et suggestions
pertinentes qui ont permis d’ameliorer substantiellement la premiere version de cet article.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 674
Analyse des effets de la qualite des institutions 675
Soudan). Selon une analyse regionale, l’Afrique Australe (0,11) et l’Afrique du Nord (0,57) sont bien classees. L’Afrique de l’Est
(1,03) et l’Afrique Centrale (1,05) sont considerees comme de mauvais eleves. En Afrique Centrale, les IDE ont grandement
fluctue. Ces constats induisent des questionnements sur la volatilite des IDE, et confirment le r^ole des institutions en Afrique.
La prise en compte de la qualite des institutions dans l’analyse de la volatilite des IDE en Afrique est benefique a deux titres.
D’une part, elle permet de se demarquer de l’assertion generale, qui justifie les ressources naturelles comme seul facteur de
volatilite des IDE. D’autre part, elle contribue a enrichir la litterature empirique sur les fluctuations des IDE en Afrique, puis que
l’etude considere deux mesures de la volatilite des IDE (l’ecart type des fluctuations et le filtre de Prescott). Nos resultats
econometriques montrent que la qualite des institutions est responsable de la forte volatilite des IDE en Afrique.
L’article est organise de la maniere suivante apres cette introduction. La deuxieme section presente quelques faits stylises des
IDE et des institutions en Afrique. La troisieme section fait une revue selective de la litterature. La quatrieme section esquisse la
methodologie. La cinquieme section presente et analyse les resultats. La sixieme section conclut et formule quelques
recommandations de politique economique.
2.1 Les entrees d’IDE en Afrique restent volatiles et different d’une region
a une autre
Entre 2002 et 2014, le taux de croissance des entrees d’IDE en Afrique est de 267 %. En 2016, l’Afrique est non seulement une
destination privilegiee d’IDE, mais egalement un fournisseur avec des flux sortants evalues a 13 milliards USD (CNUCED,
2016). Malgre les baisses de 2010 et 2011, les flux entrants d’IDE sont repartis a la hausse en 2014 atteignant 58,3 milliards USD.
Les entrees d’IDE different d’une sous-region a une autre (Graphique 1). Entre 1996-2014, avec une moyenne de 10,26
milliards USD, l’Afrique du Nord est la sous-region la plus attractive (Anyanwu et Yameogo, 2015b). L’Afrique de l’Ouest se
classe au second rang avec une moyenne de 7,76 milliards USD. L’Afrique de l’Est et l’Afrique australe viennent
successivement avec 5,38 milliards USD et 4,83 milliards USD. L’Afrique centrale se classe en derniere position avec une
moyenne d’attractivite des IDE de 3,43 milliards USD. En depit de l’effet de la forte production de produits de base et de la
demande d’exportations, la sous-region fait face aux effets de la guerre civile et du terrorisme.
Graphique 1: Evolution des flux entrants d’IDE en Afrique et dans les sous-regions entre 1996 et 2014
en millions USD
La periode de 1996–2014 est marquee par une deterioration de la qualite institutionnelle en Afrique. Le score est passe de
0,688 en 1996 pour s’etablir a 0,725 en 2014. De 1996 a 2004, l’indice moyen de gouvernance est passe de 0,688 a 0,659.
Cette periode est caracterisee par la creation des institutions africaines avec l’aide des institutions internationales visant a
ameliorer la qualite de la gouvernance dans les pays. Alors que l’Afrique du Nord progresse dans le classement, l’Afrique
Centrale reste moins bien classee.
En general, il ressort des observations que, l’evolution des institutions ne suit pas toujours la dynamique des entrees des IDE.
L’Afrique Centrale fait preuve d’une forte amelioration de la qualite des institutions passant de 1,164 a 0,982 et d’une forte
variation des IDE. Les bonnes performances institutionnelles en Afrique Australe et en Afrique du Nord contraste avec les
fluctuations des entrees d’IDE. L’Afrique de l’Est et l’Afrique de l’Ouest ont connu des ameliorations bien que relative de leur
qualite des institutions dont les niveaux sont passes respectivement de 1,052 a 1,046 puis de 0,684 a 0,627 entre
1996–2014. Ces contrastes sont aussi expliques dans la litterature.
les etudes qui traitent de la volatilite des IDE ne couvrent pas tous les pays Africains, et encore moins ne mettent pas en exergue
les specificites sous regionales. Notre article apporte trois contributions majeures. Premierement, nous traitons de la volatilite
des IDE dans une perspective institutionnelle en prenant en compte les deux principales mesures (Ecart type et filtre de Prescott).
Deuxiemement, nous utilisons les donnees de panel estimees par la methode GMM-Systeme tout en prenant en compte les
problemes d’endogeneite (Sevestre, 2002). Troisiemement, nous etablissons une estimation econometrique par la technique des
doubles moindres carres en considerant des donnees sous regionales.
4. La strategie methodologique
4.1 Le modele
Pour determiner les effets de la qualite des institutions sur la volatilite des IDE en Afrique, nous utilisons un modele empirique
inspire de Mijiyawa (2015), et Asamoah et al. (2016) pour les variables de contr^ole et d’inter^et, de Buchanan et al. (2012) et
Komlan (2016) pour la mesure de la volatilite des IDE. La version compacte du modele est donnee par l’equation (1):
VolIDE capture la volatilite des flux nets d’IDE en pourcentage du PIB. Suivant Broto et al. (2011) et Buchanan et al. (2012),
cette volatilite est mesuree par la variance des flux entrants d’IDE selon la formule:
XT 2
ðIDEit IDEÞ
V olIDE ¼ t
n
est la moyenne arithmetique simple des IDE du pays i sur l’ensemble de la periode T. VolIDEit1 la volatilite des entrees
IDE
d’IDE de l’annee precedente. Selon Asiedu et Lien (2011), l’IDE retarde montre un effet de retour positif de l’IDE passe sur
l’IDE actuel. Les investisseurs preferent operer dans un environnement familier. L’IDE passe attire de nouvelles firmes.
Le choix des variables institutionnelles repose sur la disponibilite des donnees (Benassy-Quere et al., 2007). Buchanan et al.
(2012) font usage d’un indice composite. Bien qu’il facilite l’estimation et l’interpretation du resultat, il n’indique pas le r^ole
individuel de chaque indice. La consideration dchaque composante institutionnelle est necessaire, car les progres realises par les
pays dferent d’un indicateur a l’autre (Asamoah et al., 2016). I est une matrice des indicateurs de gouvernance constituee de:
la stabilite politique qui mesure la perception de la probabilite d’une destabilisation par des moyens non constitutionnels ou
violents;
la qualite de la reglementation mesure la capacite des pouvoirs publics a elaborer et appliquer de bonnes politiques
favorables au developpement du secteur prive;
l’etat de droit mesure le degre de confiance qu’ont les citoyens et la maniere dont ils s’y conforment au respect des contrats,
des competences de la police et des tribunaux, la perception de la criminalite, et de la violence;
la qualite du service public mesure les performances de la fonction publique et son niveau d’independance vis-a-vis des
pressions politiques, la qualite de l’elaboration et de l’application des politiques, la credibilite de l’engagement des pouvoirs
publics a l’egard de ses politiques;
la liberte d’expression qui mesure la liberte des citoyens face au pouvoir dont les notes des indicateurs reposent sur trois
criteres: pays non libre, partiellement libre ou libre;
la corruption mesure l’utilisation des pouvoirs publics a des fins d’enrichissement personnel, y compris la grande et la petite
corruption, ainsi que « la prise en otage » de l’Etat par les elites et les inter^ets prives.
X est la matrice de variables de contr^ole constituee de la Formation Brute du Capital Fixe (FBCF) approximee par
l’accumulation du capital physique (Barrios et al., 2005). Le capital humain est approxime par le taux d’inscription au
secondaire. Il facilite l’absorption de nouvelles technologies, et stimule l’attractivite des IDE (Cleeve et al., 2015). Les
infrastructures sont approximees par le nombre de lignes telephoniques pour 100 habitants (Anyanwu, 2012). L’aide publique au
developpement influence grandement les entrees d’IDE (Yasin, 2005). Le logarithme du PIB par habitant decrit la taille du
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
678 B. E. Ongo Nkoa et J. S. Song
marche et de la production nationale (Avom et Ongo, 2013). Les ressources naturelles sont approximees par la rente des produits
petroliers, gaziers et mineraux en pourcentage du PIB (Dupasquier et Osakwe, 2006). eit est le terme d’erreur compose de ni qui
capte les effets specifiques pays non observes et de mt qui prend en compte l’effet specifique temporel commun a tous les pays; i
designe les pays de l’echantillon, t represente l’annee, a et b sont les parametres a estimer.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Analyse des effets de la qualite des institutions 679
5.1 Qualite des institutions et volatilite des entrees des IDE en Afrique
Le tableau 5 contient les resultats de l’estimation par les GMM en systeme. La volatilite des IDE en Afrique est prise comme
variable dependante dans les deux modeles. Dans le modele 1, la volatilite des IDE est estimee par l’ecart-type, alors que dans le
modele 2, elle est estimee par le filtre de Prescott.
Les resultats du modele 1 montrent que les coefficients associes aux variables institutionnelles regime politique, etat de droit,
stabilite politique et liberte d’expression ont des effets positifs et statistiquement significatifs sur la volatilite des IDE en Afrique.
Autrement dit, a l’etat actuel, ces variables accroissent la volatilite des entrees d’IDE en Afrique respectivement de 0,11; 0,20;
1,72 et de 0,23. Ce resultat confirme celui obtenu par Daude and Stein (2007). Sur l’ensemble des pays de l’echantillon, seuls le
Botswana, la Mauritanie, le Senegal, le Burkina-Faso, le Nigeria et le Kenya ont fait des avancees significatives du point de vue
democratique. En depit du fait que l’Afrique ait connu un processus de liberalisation politique substantielle marquee par la
democratie, on note peu d’avancees significatives en matiere de droits civil et politique qui sont pour la plupart bafoues. Par
consequent, les structures erigees et les ideologies qui emergent en Afrique incarnent pour la plupart des inefficiences rendant
volatiles l’attractivite des IDE.
La corruption et la qualite de la regulation ont des effets negatifs et statistiquement significatifs sur la volatilite des IDE en
Afrique. La qualite du service public par contre, a un effet negatif et non significatif sur la volatilite des IDE en Afrique.
Au rang des variables de contr^ole, la Formation Brute du Capital Fixe et les infrastructures concourent aussi a la volatilite des
IDE qui s’explique par l’incapacite a reduire les co^uts de transaction, et a impulser une dynamique de productivite aux industries.
Les resultats sur les variables institutionnelles et les variables de contr^ole sont conformes a ceux de Buchanan et al. (2012).
Les resultats du modele 2 suggerent deux analyses. D’une part, la volatilite accrue des IDE en Afrique est davantage du ressort
de la FBCF, du regime politique et de la taille du marche. Les autres variables mises a contribution de cette volatilite des IDE bien
de maniere marginale sont la qualite du service publique et la stabilite politique. D’autre part, la volatilite des IDE est davantage
attenuee par la liberte d’expression et la qualite de la regulation.
5.2 Qualite des institutions et volatilite des entrees d’IDE dans les sous regions de l’Afrique
Le tableau 6 donne l’impact de la qualite des institutions sur la volatilite des IDE dans les differentes sous-regions de l’Afrique
par la technique des doubles moindres carres.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
680
V.IDE 1
FBCF 0,117 1
Cap_Hum –0,18 –0,13 1
Infrastr –0,02 –0,15 0,315 1
APD 0,142 –0,06 –0,352 –0,402 1
Res_Nat 0,102 –0,09 0,089 0,448 –0,40 1
Polity2 0,244 –0,33 –0,231 0,030 0,702 0,079 1
Taille_mar 0,260 –0,12 –0,431 0,243 –0,14 0,818 0,280 1
Corrup 0,100 –0,37 0,238 –0,120 0,127 –0,281 0,034 –0,329 1
Etat_droit 0,018 –0,25 0,606 –0,108 –0,11 –0,15 –0,17 –0,467 0,792 1
Qual_Reg 0,061 –0,35 0,467 0,040 –0,13 –0,096 0,064 –0,330 0,678 0,824 1
Qual_Ser 0,085 –0,32 0,285 0,046 0,065 –0,058 –0,02 –0,199 0,791 0,736 0,728 1
Stab_Pol –0,27 0,118 0,707 0,163 –0,37 0,186 –0,39 –0,319 0,334 0,711 0,508 0,414 1
Lib_Exp 0,154 –0,40 0,456 –0,050 –0,04 0,018 0,081 –0,188 0,763 0,862 0,904 0,860 0,493 1
Source: Calcul des auteurs.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
B. E. Ongo Nkoa et J. S. Song
Analyse des effets de la qualite des institutions 681
Tableau 5: Impact de la qualite des institutions sur la volatilite des IDE en Afrique
Variable dependante: Volatilite des IDE
Methode d’estimation: GMM-Systeme
Modele 1: Avec ecart-type Modele 2: Avec filtre de Prescott
Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t
Tableau 6: Qualite des institutions et volatilite des IDE avec ecart-type: analyse sous regionale
Variable dependante: Volatilite des IDE avec ecart-type Methode d’estimation: DMC
Afrique Centrale Afrique de l’Ouest Afrique de l’Est Afrique Australe Afrique du Nord
Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t
Formation Brute du Capital 1,4228 0,613 0, 2174 0,116 0,1307 0,029 0,1416 0,088 0,082 0,035
Fixe
Capital Humain 0,118 0,608 0,1058 0,044 0,0503 0,108 –0,003 0,001 –0,019 0,042
Infrastructures –0,0128 0,922 0,0708 0,009 0,0003 0,983 0,0138 0,020 –0,0009 0,002
Aide Publique au –0,343 0,084 0,7163 0,000 0,1511 0,028 0,078 0,315 0,1648 0,677
Developpement
Taille du marche 0,1912 0,745 0,1837 0,017 0,0325 0,805 0,107 0,027 –0,0736 0,036
Ressources naturelles 0,4352 0,093 0,0385 0,000 6,6273 0,000 –0,0154 0,885 –1,2296 0,264
Polity 2 0,4256 0,007 –0,3705 0,070 0,069 0,009 –0,0154 0,727 –0,1102 0,002
Corruption –0,2711 0,848 –1,256 0,687 2,5581 0,040 2,534 0,069 –0,4487 0,04
Etat de droit 0,1444 0,038 –1,4307 0,657 3,8403 0,013 1,8684 0,385 –0,7137 0,485
Qualite de la regulation –1,0976 0,078 –3,7434 0,296 0,1557 0,070 0,8217 0,029 –0,1618 0,097
Qualite du service public 5,5577 0,403 –0,9016 0,755 1,7545 0,022 –1,4933 0,059 0,918 0,001
Stabilite politique –1,8421 0,004 –0,8332 0,614 1,6117 0,004 –1,3904 0,007 0,367 0,053
Liberte d’expression 5,5213 0,722 2,3844 0,406 1,9611 0,123 –3,9097 0,019 –2,805 0,03
Constante 7,256 0,609 –12,775 0,000 4,2704 0,078 –1,0473 0,648 1,2547 0,403
Observations 96 163 64 146 63
Prob>F 0,0001 0,000 0,000 0,0008 0,007
R2 0,4003 0,3455 0,692 0,4663 0,4125
Notes: , , et indiquent respectivement les significativites a 10%, 5%, et 1%.
Source: Auteurs.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
682 B. E. Ongo Nkoa et J. S. Song
En Afrique Centrale, le regime politique et l’etat de droit accroissent la volatilite des IDE. Ceci se justifie par les faibles
niveaux de democratie, caracterises par le manque d’alternance au pouvoir dans les pays membres. La qualite de la regulation et
la stabilite politique reduisent la volatilite des IDE. Les legislations erigees en matiere de paix, de securite et d’amelioration du
climat des investissements motivent les investisseurs etrangers. Les ressources naturelles accroissent de maniere significative la
volatilite des IDE, alors que l’aide publique au developpement contribue a reduire bien que de maniere marginale, la volatilite
des IDE en Afrique Centrale.
En Afrique de l’Ouest, la volatilite accrue des IDE est expliquee par les variables economiques. Seul le regime politique reduit
de maniere significative la volatilite des IDE en raison des avancees significatives en matiere de democratie qui impulsent une
credibilite en matiere de droit de propriete et de stabilite sociopolitique.
En Afrique de l’Est, le regime politique, la corruption, l’etat de droit, la qualite de la regulation, la qualite du service public et
la stabilite politique engendrent une volatilite accrue des IDE. Ceci, s’explique par des niveaux moyens de democratie qui
favorisent des legislations et des revendications couplees a des destabilisations. Les ressources naturelles, l’aide publique au
developpement et la FBCF accroissent significativement la volatilite des IDE.
En Afrique Australe, la corruption et la qualite de la reglementation accroissent la volatilite accrue des IDE. La qualite du
service public, la stabilite politique et la liberte d’expression reduisent la volatilite des IDE. L’effet positif des variables
institutionnelles sur la volatilite des IDE s’explique par les institutions qui favorisent l’application inefficace et a co^uts eleves des
contrats sur les marches qu’induit a priori la corruption qui engendre des co^uts additionnels. La FBCF et l’aide publique au
developpement contribuent a accro^ıtre significativement la volatilite des IDE. A contrario, le capital humain contribue a reduire
la volatilite des IDE en Afrique Australe du fait d’une scolarisation de la jeunesse qui constitue une meilleure absorption et
stabilise les entrees d’IDE.
En Afrique du Nord, la qualite du service public et la stabilite politique accroissent la volatilite des IDE. En effet, les conflits
armes ont un impact negatif sur l’attractivite des IDE (Ezeoha et Ugwu, 2015). Dans une situation de conflit, il est fort probable
d’enregistrer des desinvestissements. Par contre, le regime politique, la corruption, l’etat de droit, la qualite de la reglementation
et la liberte d’expression reduisent la volatilite des IDE. Ces resultats s’expliquent par la vision optimiste portee sur l’alternance
Tableau 7: Qualite des institutions et volatilite des IDE avec filtre de Prescott: analyse sous regionale
Variable dependante: Volatilite des IDE avec filtre de Prescott Methode d’estimation: DMC
Afrique Centrale Afrique de l’Ouest Afrique de l’Est Afrique Australe Afrique du Nord
Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t Coefficients P< t
Formation Brute du Capital 0.0497 0.809 0.462 0.000 –0.0008 0.987 0.1865 0.245 0.081 0.038
Fixe
Capital Humain –0.195 0.001 0.0446 0.376 0.0467 0.077 –0.094 0.006 –0.0295 0.356
Infrastructures 0.0482 0.009 –0.0159 0.485 –0.0229 0.045 0.054 0.001 0.004 0.064
Aide Publique au –0.0813 0.489 –0.393 0.006 0.093 0.000 –0.0648 0.538 0.2035 0.599
Developpement
Taille du marche 0.0720 0.528 –0.1532 0.420 0.421 0.000 –0.001 0.088 –0.103 0.023
Ressources naturelles 0.2154 0.045 0.253 0.009 4.892 0.000 0.019 0.095 –0.4356 0.674
Polity 2 0.052 0.045 –0.078 0.079 –0.0599 0.380 –0.103 0.000 –0.087 0.018
Corruption –1.8713 0.510 1.925 0.040 –1.907 0.062 0.0171 0.801 –0.675 0.006
Etat de droit 1.1232 0.735 1.023 0.006 –0.786 0.026 0.0060 0.780 0.992 0.005
Qualite de la regulation 3.444 0.090 –0.647 0.092 –0.546 0.006 –0.029 0.065 –0.613 0.613
Qualite du service public 1.2817 0.010 –4.8485 0.142 –0.528 0.058 0.821 0.029 1.0587 0.332
Stabilite politique 3.7263 0.078 0.6951 0.723 0.6813 0.149 0.0037 0.714 0.3677 0.453
Liberte d’expression –0.0408 0.049 –0.6824 0.828 –0.1628 0.871 –0.008 0.040 –2.181 0.002
Constante 14.52 0.000 1.0183 0.750 –3.628 0.033 9.332 0.000 1.6764 0.248
Observations 96 163 64 150 64
Prob>F 0.0008 0.0029 0.0001 0.0005 0.0053
R2 0.3206 0.5104 0.5001 0.1397 0.3964
Notes: , , et indiquent respectivement les significativites a 10%, 5%, et 1%.
Source: Auteurs.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
Analyse des effets de la qualite des institutions 683
au pouvoir qui vise a mettre fin aux differentes inefficiences de la gestion du pouvoir. Cette vision optimiste induit un
environnement institutionnel caracterise par une reglementation peu excessive qui facilite les transactions des investisseurs
etrangers et accelere leurs procedures dans un climat d’opacite administrative. Ainsi, l’environnement institutionnel instaure un
cadre legal efficace en reduisant les pots-de-vin qui incitent les investisseurs etrangers a acquerir des actifs.
Notes: 1 ¼ Benin, 2 ¼ Burkina Faso, 3 ¼ Cape Vert, 4 ¼ C^ote d’Ivoire, 5 ¼ Gambie, 6 ¼ Ghana, 7 ¼ Guinee, 8 ¼ Guinee-Bissau,
9 ¼ Liberia, 10 ¼ Mali, 11 ¼ Mauritanie, 12 ¼ Niger, 13 ¼ Nigeria, 14 ¼ Senegal, 15 ¼ Sierra-Leone, 16 ¼ Togo.
Source: les auteurs.
© 2017 The Authors. African Development Review © 2017 African Development Bank
684 B. E. Ongo Nkoa et J. S. Song
Notes: 1 ¼ Comores, 2 ¼ Djibouti, 3 ¼ Erythree, 4 ¼ Ethiopie, 5 ¼ Kenya, 6 ¼ Somalie, 7 ¼ Soudan, 8 ¼ Tanzanie, 9 ¼ Ouganda.
Source: les auteurs.
Le tableau 7 presente les resultats de l’impact de la qualite des institutions sur la volatilite des IDE dans les differentes sous
regions. Il ressort des estimations que les institutions en Afrique centrale et en Afrique de l’Ouest, accroissent la volatilite des
IDE. Dans les autres trois regions, les institutions creent un climat favorable a l’investissement contribuant ainsi a une croissance
constante.
Les graphiques 2, 3, 4, 5 et 6 donnent les filtres de Prescott de la volatilite des IDE dans chaque region et pour chaque pays.
L’observation importante ici est que les pays dotes de faibles institutions ont des entrees d’IDE tres volatiles.
En Afrique centrale, le filtre de Prescott indique que la volatilite des IDE est accentuee en Angola, en Guinee Equatoriale, au
Congo, a Sao Tome et Principe et au Tchad (Graphique 2).
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Corrigendum
In Nwosu and Orji 2017, an error has been identified in the published version.
After issue publication, the author wants to add an acknowledgement to recognize the funding agency of his study.
This research work was carried out with financial and scientific support from the Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP)
(www.pep-net.org) with funding from the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom (or UK
Aid), and the Government of Canada through the International Development Research Center (IDRC). The authors are also
grateful to Luca Tiberti, Jean-Yves Duclos and Guy Lacroix for technical support and guidance, as well as to John Cockburn
and Abdelkrim Araar for valuable comments and suggestions.
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