CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Outline
March-April, 2017
May 1, 2018

Edwin Rey Sandoval

Professor of Law

The INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

These are the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of
taxation. These are inherent to the State, co-terminus with the State. Once the State
comes into being, they become operative. Hence, there is no need of any grant of these
powers to the State.

As inherent powers, these are to be exercised by the legislature, i.e., the Congress,
in the case of the Philippines. However, these powers may be delegated by the Congress
to the President, to administrative agencies, to local governments. In the case of the
power of eminent domain, this may even be delegated to quasi-public corporations
(private corporations performing public functions or rendering some kind of public service,
like the MERALCO, the PLDT, etc.)

The Police Power

This is the most pervasive, the least limitable among the powers of the State as it
affects not only property and property rights, but even liberty and life, for the promotion
of the general welfare.

See: Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.

The Power of Eminent Domain

The Power of Taxation

The BILL OF RIGHTS

General Considerations

The rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are the Civil and Political Rights. They
are limitations on the powers of the State, limitations on the powers of government.

There is no constitutional right to appeal.

Appeal is not a constitutional right; it is not found in the Bill of Rights. It is merely
statutory, such that if there is no law that grants one the right to appeal, he may not
appeal.

Is there a constitutional right to privacy?

The SC answered this question in the affirmative in Ople v. Torres (GR No. 127685,
July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141 [Puno]). After all, the essence of privacy is the right to be
let alone. It is expressly provided in Section 3 (The Right to Privacy of communication
and Correspondence) of the Bill of Rights. Other facets of privacy right are found in other
sections of the Bill of Rights, i.e., Sections 1 (The Right to Due Process of Law and the
Right to the Equal Protection of the Law), 2 (The Right against Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures), 6 (The Right to Liberty of Abode, Liberty of Changing the Same Abode,
and the Right to Travel), 8 (Freedom of Association, which includes Freedom Not to
Associate) and 17 (The Right against Self-incrimination).

How the Bill of Rights is structured

The first eleven (11) sections (Sections 1 – 11) of the Bill of Rights pertain to the
civil and political rights in general, while the remaining eleven (11) sections (Sections 12
– 22) focus on the rights of an accused.

For a proper understanding of the rights of an accused, correlation with the Rules
on Criminal Procedure (in the Rules of Court) is essential. After all, the rights of an
accused in the Bill of Rights are the substantive rights, while those in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are the remedies to enforce the former.

Provisions of the Bill of Rights governed by the exclusionary rule on evidence

There are four (4) provisions of the Bill of Rights governed by the exclusionary rule
on evidence such that any evidence obtained in violation of any of the four will not be
admissible for any purpose in any proceeding, it being incompetent evidence. These are:

- Section 2 (The Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures)

- Section 3 (The Right to Privacy of Communication and Correspondence)
- Section 12 (The Custodial Investigation Rights)
- Section 17 (The Right against Self-incrimination)

Presumption

Any act of government that is alleged to have infringed upon or impaired a

constitutional right such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to privacy
or any other fundamental freedom comes to the Court with a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality, so that the burden lies on the part of the government to justify such
act (1) by showing some compelling State interest and (2) that the measure is narrowly
drawn to preclude abuses, i.e., the measure is not overbroad, it does suffer from the vice
of vagueness, it is not unreasonable.

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

Comment:

If what is involved is an act of government or government agents that appear to

be whimsical, capricious, oppressive, unreasonable, confiscatory, arbitrary, etc., the
proper right to invoke is the right to due process of law.

If what is involved is an act appears to be discriminatory, the proper right to invoke

is the right to the equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause is a guarantee
against any kind of discrimination or discriminatory conduct.

The Due Process Clause

Two (2) Aspects of Due Process

- Procedural – refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced, the
essence of which are the twin requirements of notice and hearing, or
opportunity to be heard.

- Substantive – requires that the law itself is fair, reasonable and just - not merely
the procedure by which the law is enforced.
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine and Due Process (See: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (Third
Div.), GR No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001, En Banc [Bellosillo])

Due Process and Extradition

An extradition proceeding is sui generis and is not similar to a criminal

proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights. (Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph Lantion [Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration], GR No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc [Puno])

Administrative Due Process

Seven (7) Cardinal or Primary Rights in an Administrative Proceeding (Ang Tibay

v. Court of Industrial Relations)

Case to read:

Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Exporters and Growers Association, Inc., et al.,
GR No. 189185, Aug. 16, 2016, En Banc (Bersamin)

The Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause does not guarantee absolute equality; what it merely
guarantees is equality among equals. As formulated, it means that persons or things
similarly situated as to rights conferred and obligations imposed should be treated
similarly; conversely, if they are not similarly situated, they are not to be treated similarly.

For this reason, not all classifications are invalid under the equal protection clause.
There may be a valid classification for as long the following requisites are present:

1. The classification must be based on substantial distinction;

2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It should apply equally to all members of the same class.

See: Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Exporters and Growers Association, Inc.,
et al., GR No. 189185, Aug. 16, 2016, En Banc (Bersamin)

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and so search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

General Rule: For a search or an arrest to be valid, there must be a search warrant or
warrant of arrest.

Only a judge may issue a search warrant or a warrant of arrest.

Requisites for the issuance of a search warrant or warrant of arrest

1. There must be probable cause;

2. To be determined personally by the judge;
3. After examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce; and
 4. Particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized or arrested.

The search warrant or warrant of arrest may only be issued in connection with a
specific offense. A general warrant may not do because a general warrant partakes of
the nature of a “fishing expedition” for evidence by the State (Stonehill v. Diokno)

Duration of Search Warrant or Warrant of Arrest

A search warrant has a limited duration (within ten days after issuance); a warrant
of arrest has no duration (the only requirement is that the warrant officer must make a
report thereon to the court after ten days).

Determination of Probable Cause is a Judicial Function

The determination of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a search warrant
or warrant of arrest is a judicial function. For this reason, a judge is not bound by the
finding of probable cause by the prosecutor; he is mandated by the Constitution to
determine probable cause personally. He cannot abdicate the performance of such
function in favor of the prosecutor. (See: Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1, Feb. 18, 2000,
3rd Div., [Gonzaga-Reyes])

Instances of valid warrantless searches

- Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest (Section 13, Rule 126, Rules of Court) (See:
Nolasco v. Cruz-Pano)

- Consented Search (See: Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC)

- Plain View Search (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, Jan. 22, 1999, En Banc
[Puno, J.])

- Search of a Moving Vehicle

- Customs Searches

- Stop-and-Frisk Search (Terry Search) (Manalili v. CA; Malacat v. CA)

- Searches at Checkpoints (See: Valmonte v. De Villa)

For searches at checkpoint to be valid, the requisites are:

First, the checkpoint must be preannounced;

Second, it must be stationary (a “roving checkpoint” is not allowed); and
Third, the search at checkpoint must be limited only to visual search. An
intrusive search is not allowed.

- Warrantless Searches at Airports (See: People v. Leila Johnson, G.R. No.

138881, Dec. 18, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza]; People v. Susan Canton)

- Administrative Searches

Mandatory drug testing may be considered a form of an administrative

search and, therefore, not subject to the strict probable cause requirement. (See:
SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board)

Instance of valid warrantless arrests (Sections 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court)

- In Flagrante Delicto Arrest (“Caught in the act”)

 - Arrest in Hot Pursuit

- Arrest of an Escapee

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall

be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

RA No. 4200 (The Anti Wiretapping Act)

Case to read:

Alejano v. Cabuay (The right to privacy of communication and correspondence

of pre-trial detainees)

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.

- Freedom of Speech

- Freedom of Expression (in particular)

- Freedom of the Press (See: Chavez v. Gonzales, GR. No. 168338, Feb. 15,
2008, En Banc [Puno])

- Freedom of Assembly

o BP Blg. 880 (The Public Assembly Act)

See : BAYAN V. Ermita, 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

The extent of the Protection

Freedom of expression includes not only freedom from censorship or prior

restraint, but also freedom from subsequent punishment.

The protection includes even “freedom for the thought we hate.” It is in this
context that the so-called “heckler’s veto” must be understood.

Limitation that may be validly imposed

The “clear and present danger” test is the test to be employed to justify such
limitation to freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms, like freedom of
religion. This test superseded the so-called “dangerous tendency rule” which had long
been rendered obsolete.

Another test to consider is the “balancing of interest” approach. This test is usually
employed by the Court if the competing interests involved in a case are equally desirable
to society, so that given a set of facts and circumstances, which of the two competing
interests should be upheld by the Court.

Content-based Restrictions and Content-neutral Regulations

- See: Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998 {Mendoza, V.V.)
 - BP Blg. 880 is merely a content-neutral regulation. (See: BAYAN V. Ermita,
169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

In content-based restrictions on free speech, the restriction is directed against the

speech itself, or the contents of the speech; whereas in content-neutral restrictions, the
restriction is directed merely on the incidents of the speech like the manner, the time and
the place of the speech.

Content-based restrictions are censorial in character and constitute prior restraint

on free speech and, therefore, come to the Court with a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality. Thus, the burden lies on the part of government to justify such
restriction by pointing out some compelling state interest and that the measure is
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.

Freedom of Expression and Libel

The Doctrine of Fair Comment

Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999, 2nd Div (Bellosillo)
Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 460, Sept. 15, 1999, En Banc
(Mendoza)

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.

Related Constitutional Provisions:

- Section 6, Article II. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

- Section 29 (2), Article VI

- Section 3 (3), Article XIV (Teaching of religion in public elementary and

secondary during regular class hours)

Two Aspects of Freedom of Religion

- Freedom to believe – absolute

- Freedom to Act on One’s Belief – may be subject to State regulation once the
belief is externalized and it will now affect public peace, public morals, public
safety and public welfare.

The Separation of Church and State Doctrine

What are purely ecclesiastical affairs of the Church which may not be validly
interfered with by the State following this doctrine? (See: Pastor Dionisio V. Austria v.
NLRC)

The Non-establishment Clause

When it comes to religious differences, the State should remain neutral;

government should not support any particular religion by defending it against an attack
by another religion. (Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA, 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996 [Puno])

Government must not use religious standards in its decisions and actions. (Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC)
.
The Free Exercise Clause

Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, 269-
273, March 1, 1993, En Banc (Grino-Aquino)

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197, Sept. 1, 1994 (Regalado)

The “No Religious Test” Clause

The Benevolent Accommodation Policy

The Conscientious Objectors

See: The Diocese of Bacolod et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, Jan. 21, 2015,
En Banc (Leonen) on the power of the COMELEC to limit expressions made by the citizens
– who are not candidates or political parties – during elections.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

In American caselaw, this provision is often referred to as “freedom of locomotion.”

The Three (3) Rights involved in Section 6:

1. The right to liberty of abode;

2. The right to liberty of changing the same abode; and
3. The right to travel.

The right to travel involves the right to travel within the country and the right to travel
outside the country.

- Does the right to travel (outside the country) include the right to return to one’s
country? (See: Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989])

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

- Recognized Exceptions to this Right (See: Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744,
Dec. 9, 1998 [Panganiban])

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the

public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

- See: Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657, Nov. 14, 1997, En Banc
(Panganiban)

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

This provision is a limitation on the power of eminent domain of the State so that
if the State would like to take away private property and convert it to public use, the
State must pay just compensation and observe due process.
 Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

This is commonly referred to as the non-impairment clause. Take note however,

that this non-impairment clause always yields to the police power of the State - and even
to the power of taxation and the power of eminent domain - for as long as the subject
matter of the contract is imbued with paramount public interest. Into every contract is
deemed written the police power of the State. Also, the police power may not be
bargained away through the medium of a contract, or even that of a treaty.

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty.

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section

17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.

This is a set of rights popularly referred to as the Miranda rights (derived from the
American case of Miranda v. Arizona). At this stage (custodial investigation), the person
is not yet an accused as there is yet no case filed against him. He is merely a suspect.

The rights included therein are:

- The right to be informed that the suspect has the right to remain silent; that
any statement he may give may be used in evidence against him.

- He will have to be informed that he has the right to have an independent and
competent counsel preferably of his own choice.

- He will have to be informed that if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he

will have to be provided with one.

- He will have to be informed that these rights may be waived by him but the
waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.

RA No 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating
Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations thereof)

This is a special penal law enacted pursuant to Section 12, par. 4, Article
III above cited.
The Two (2) Kinds of Involuntary or Coerced Confessions under Section 12,
and the Presumptions (See: People v. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000, 2 nd Div.
[V.M. Mendoza])

Admissibility of uncounselled confessions given before a mayor, and before media

men. (People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95, March 3, 1997)

Admissibility of Video-taped Media Confessions (See: People v. Endino, 353 SCRA

307, Feb. 20, 2001, 2nd Div., [Bellosillo])

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be allowed.

The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of an accused
in a criminal proceeding.

The main purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused during trial of
the criminal case, or that the accused will not abscond during the pendency of the case.

When is Bail a Matter of Right?

When is it a Matter of Discretion?

- Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015
(Bersamin)
- Joselito V. Narciso v. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17,
2000, 3rd Div. (Panganiban)

A condition imposed by the judge that before an accused may be allowed to post
bail he must be arraigned first was declared unconstitutional because it will violate two
(2) important rights of an accused, i.e., the right not to be put on trial except upon a
valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him in court, and the right to bail;
itself. (Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb. 1, 2000, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])

The Right to Bail and Extradition

- (See: Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia,

GR No. 153675, April 19, 2007, En Banc [Sandoval-Gutierrez])

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

- The right to be presumed innocent

- The right to be heard by himself and counsel
- The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
- The right to speedy trial
- The right to impartial trial
 - The right to public trial
- The right to meet the witnesses face-to-face
- The right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of evidence on his behalf

Trial in Absentia

The provision on trial in absentia is found in the last sentence of this

provision. It is clear from the provision that there can be no trial in absentia if the
accused has not yet been arraigned.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it.

- The Writ of Amparo

- The Wirt of Habeas Data

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

This is a right that is available to all persons in all kinds of proceeding,

whether criminal, civil, or administrative, unlike the right to a speedy trial which is
available only to an accused in a criminal case and, therefore, only the accused
may invoke such.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.

Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of

physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance
emitted from the body of the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for
acts of lasciviousness (US v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) and morphine forced out of
the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him (US v. Ong Siu Hong,
36 Phil. 735 [1917]). Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress. (People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, 399-401, Dec. 9, 1999,
En Banc [Per Curiam])

This right may be invoked not only in a criminal case, but even in administrative
proceedings that partake of a criminal nature

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held

that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an
administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty.
The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]),
pointed out that the revocation of one’s license as a medical practitioner, is an
even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. (Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 184, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc [Melo])

This may even be invoked during inquiries in aid of legislation in the Congress, and
even in impeachment proceedings.
 It has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to inquire is ‘subject
to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,’
including ‘the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is

the right against self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain
completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may
be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in

administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman v. Pamaran, the
Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan to illustrate the right of witnesses
to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but
also in all other types of suit. (Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767, Nov. 20, 1991, En Banc [Padilla])

Immunity Statutes

If an accused is given some kind of immunity by the State in exchange for his
testimony against his co-accused in a criminal case, he may no longer validly invoke his
right against self-incrimination. That is the very purpose of an immunity statute.

The two (2) types of immunity statutes

Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United States, there
are two types of statutory immunity granted to a witness. They are the
transactional immunity and the use-and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional
immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness can no
longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or
transaction. In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a
witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived
from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. (Mapa,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 797-798, April 26, 1994, En Banc [Puno])

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his

political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a

punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Exceptions

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall
be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading

punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by
law.

Mere extinguishment of life alone does not constitute cruel, degrading, inhuman
punishment. To be such, it must involve prolonged agony and suffering; it refers more
to the nature of the punishment to be inflicted upon a convict, i.e., that which is shocking
to the conscience of mankind under contemporary standards. (See: Leo Echegaray v.
Court of Appeals)
 The power to re-impose the death penalty for certain heinous crimes is vested in
the Congress; not in the President. After all, the power to define crimes and impose
penalties is legislative in nature.

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a

poll tax.

The word “debt” in this provision refers to an obligation arising from contract.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for

the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.

In American caselaw, this right is sometimes referred to as “res judicata dressed

in prison grey.”

The Two (2) Kinds of Double Jeopardy

1. Double jeopardy for the same offense (First sentence, Section 21 of the Bill of
Rights)
2. Double jeopardy for the same act (Second sentence of the same section)

See: People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996

Requisites of Double Jeopardy

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: (1) A

first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.

Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
(Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998 [Panganiban])

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

What is an Ex-post Facto Law?

(See: Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, et. al., G.R. No. 128096, Jan.
20, 1999 [Martinez])

What is a Bill of Attainder?

[T]he Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative

act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group
without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court
intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to
be imposed, is the most essential. (Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, Jan. 30,
1990, En Banc [Cortes, I.])