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I N V I T E D PA P E R
Secure Spectrum Sensing — There are two types of Potential Security Threats — While most existing Without ensuring the
attack that exploit the vulnerabilities in spectrum work focused on accurate detection of the pres-
sensing, primary user emulation attack (PUEA) ence/absence of legitimate primary signals, correctness of such
and spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF). attackers may distort some information regard-
ing other fundamental PU characteristics, such PU characteristics, it
Defense against PUEA — The main objective of as their location and transmit power level. With-
PUEA is to force SUs to vacate or stay away out ensuring the correctness of such PU charac- is difficult to achieve
from a licensed channel by transmitting a fake teristics, it is difficult to achieve efficient
primary signal when SUs sense the channel. A spectrum utilization with sufficient primary pro- efficient spectrum
straightforward way of identifying such fake pri-
mary signals is to estimate the location of the
tection. Moreover, the design of defense mecha-
nisms against attacks on higher-layer protocols
utilization with
signal source and compare it with the true loca- as well as cross-layer protocols is still an open sufficient primary
tion of the primary transmitter, as proposed in problem that requires further investigation.
[72]. Another approach is to exploit the PHY- protection. Moreover,
layer signal characteristics to verify the authen- CR STANDARDS AND APPLICATIONS the design of
ticity of a primary signal. For example, the
authors of [73] proposed to jointly exploit the In [6] the FCC allowed the introduction of two
location-dependent link signature (i.e., multipath types of unlicensed devices in the TVWS, includ- defense mechanisms
fading profile) and conventional cryptographic
authentication. In a similar context, the authors
ing fixed devices with up to 4 W of transmission
power and personal/portable devices with up to
against attacks on
of [74] proposed to inject a watermark signal 100 mW of power. Responding to the recom- higher-layer protocols
into each incumbent transmission for authentica- mendation, there have been two emerging inter-
tion. national standards: IEEE 802.22 and Ecma 392. as well as cross-layer
IEEE 802.22 is designed for last-mile service in
Defense against SSDF — Ensuring the robustness of rural areas with fixed devices including the BS protocols is still an
cooperative sensing is of critical importance to and the end-customer devices called customer
the realization of DSA. However, it is challeng- premises equipment (CPE). Ecma 392 has been open problem that
ing to achieve this goal since the strict detectabil-
ity requirement imposed by the regulatory body
proposed more recently to create an internation-
al standard for the personal/portable use of
requires further
(e.g., the FCC) renders the performance of TVWS in urban areas. IEEE 802.11af (also investigation.
cooperative sensing highly sensitive to manipu- known as Wi-Fi 2.0 or White-Fi) has also been
lated (or erroneous) sensor reports [75, 76]. The introduced as a potential application of CR that
impact of such sensing report manipulation may enhance the capacity and services of current
attacks on detection performance can be mitigat- Wi-Fi systems by utilizing the TVWS, which pro-
ed by employing reputation-based decision/data vides better channel propagation characteristics.
fusion schemes. For example, [77] proposed to In this section we introduce each CR applica-
assign different weights to sensor reports accord- tion and discuss its prospects for realizing the
ing to sensors’ reputation based on their history consumer-oriented CR market.
of reports. An alternative approach is to filter
out abnormal sensing reports before the fusion IEEE 802.22
center (or the base station [BS]) makes a final The IEEE 802.22 WRAN is an infrastructured
decision. A simple statistics-based filtering cellular network where the BS covers an area of
method was proposed in [75], where the BS pre- radius spanning from 30 km (typical) to 100 km.
filters outliers based on the mean and variance The WRAN end user is referred to as CPE
of sensing reports. Signal propagation character- whose transceivers are installed on a house. A
istics in the PHY layer has also been exploited in conceptual illustration of IEEE 802.22 is provid-
[76] where the BS detects abnormal sensing ed in Fig. 3.
reports by cross-validating the shadow-fading- The WRAN is designed to provide through-
induced correlation in sensing reports among put of 1.5 Mb/s in the downstream and 384 kb/s
neighboring sensors. in the upstream, and its PHY utilizes OFDM
modulation to overcome possibly excessive
Enforcing Spectrum Etiquette — Spectrum WS can be delays in a wide coverage area [82]. In addition,
utilized most efficiently and fairly when all the it provides PU protection such as spectrum sens-
CRs abide by a common spectrum etiquette. ing and a geolocation database for PU-SU coex-
However, the open architecture of low-layer istence, and also supports self-coexistence
stacks in SDR devices (e.g., USRP [78]) allows between WRANs via the Coexistence Beacon
CRs to easily break the rules and behave selfish- Protocol (CBP).
ly. Such misuse of spectrum WS can be a major IEEE 802.22 is the first international CR
obstacle to the success of DSA, so detecting/pun- standard, so it can become a touchstone for the
ishing such misbehavior is of critical importance. potential of CR technology. However, we believe
One approach to prevent CR devices violating that alongside the technical completeness of the
spectrum etiquettes is to implement monitor- draft standard, it is also necessary to provide
ing/punishing mechanisms in hardware [79]. The assurance to the market that the WRAN could
unauthorized use of licensed spectrum can also create a profitable service in rural areas by con-
be detected by external monitoring devices by sidering the following two major investment
exploiting the predictability of wireless signal costs: deployment cost of WRAN infrastructure
propagation characteristics such as path loss (e.g., BSs, good [thus expensive] sensors, and
[80]. The incentive mechanism for enforcing/ geolocation databases), and the cost of manufac-
enticing SUs to observe spectrum etiquette has turing CPEs equipped with sophisticated sensors
also been studied in [81]. and optional directional antennas.