PEOPLE.

V PUNO

Facts: On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka
mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on
the head with a hammer until she was dead.

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz and by Lina Pajes. After the killing, Puno went to the
room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession
and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay
at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na
iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan
ko." Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the
killing.

The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that Puno was insane when he
killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.

The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that
he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes,
the old woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.

The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have
killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her
because he thought that she was a witch.

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic
schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he
liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment
and freedom of will.

Issue: Whether Puno is exempted from criminal liability because of insanity.

Ruling: No, he is not exempted. When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility,
the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution. Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence. Insanity under article
12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.

After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when
he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that
tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will. The trial court correctly
characterized the killing as murder.

FROM THE BOOK:

WHEN DEFENSE OF INSANITY IS NOT CREDIBLE

The accused was afflicted with schizopherenic reaction but knew what he was doing; he had psychosis, a
slight destrrction of the ego in spite of his schizzophernic reaction his symptoms were not socially
incapacitataing and he could adjust to his environment. He could distinguish between right and wrong. He
had no delusions and he was not mentally deficient. The accused was not leaglly insane when he killed
the hapless and helpless victim.
PEOPLE V. DUNGO (there is criminal liability)

Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office
with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the
victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in February 1987, the accused Rosalino
Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to
him the procedure at the DAR.

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense:

Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in deep thought
always, maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also times that her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not.

On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine as the
pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the
store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying
that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around.
She asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for my
ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a number of days, I would die.” That
same day, the accused went to Manila.

Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was
confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports
of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the
commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to
cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to
stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that
Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic.

Issue: WON the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged.

Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there be
complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of
insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that
insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which is manifested in
language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act.

Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act. However, it is
also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the
time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts.
It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. But in the
case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was
aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals.

Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his
act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua.
This statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he committed the act.

The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran away from
the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest,
indicate that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim. (This was
taken from the TC's decision).

PEOPLE V. PAMBID
FACTS: On January 24 1996, by virtue of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the Regional Trial Court
ruled that Joseph Pambid was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape of Marycon Delvie
Grefaldia. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the
accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the complainant, the sum of P50, 000.00 plus costs for
each count of rape.

However, accused-appellant filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision on the following basis:

1. At some point, the victim stated in her testimony, that she was only "fingered."

2. The mother of the accused claimed that her son was not in her house but in the house of his father
instead, when the first incident of rape allegedly happened.

3. The parents of the accused contended that their son is exempt from criminal liability by reason of
insanity specifically suffering from schizophrenia and mild mental retardation.

4. The trial court erred in its conviction of the accused-appellant while there was just one (1) information
filed against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant claim of insanity exempts him from criminal liability

RULING: NO. The bare testimony of the accused-appellant’s parents that he had suffered insanity was
inadequate to prove that when he raped the victim he was completely deprived of reason. Article 12 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability,
unless he has acted during a lucid interval, the presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every
man is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it,
which he failed to discharge. Hence, by the totality of the accused-appellant’s act as described by the
victim, it showed that he was fully conscious and aware of what he was doing.

PEOPLE V. DOMINGO
Facts: Herein appellant, Jesus Domingo, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
murder (Marvin and Melissa), two counts of attempted murder (Michelle and Jeffer), one frustrated
murder (Raquel) and one frustrated homicide (Ronaldo).
Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. of 29 March 2000, she and her
minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house when she was
awakened by the sound of appellant kicking their door open. Armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen
knife, herein appellant committed the said crimes. It is also noted that When Raquel pleaded that the
appellant spare her daughters lives, he retorted: "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na."

In his defense, appellant invoked insanity as an exempting circumstance. Dr. Afroilan stated that based
on his medical checkup dated Augusut 2004, appellant suffered from Schizophrenia (a mental disorder
characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor
impulse control and low frustration tolerance).

The trial court found the appellant’s defense of insanity unmeritorious, since what was presented was
proof of appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident.

Issue: Whether or not the accused be exempted from criminal liability due to insanity

Held: No. Court affirms the judgment of conviction.

Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the time he
committed the crime. The court ruled that insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence while committing the act, however when Raquel pleaded for the lives of her daughters, the
appellant's response of "Ngayon pa, Nagawa ko na" discredits his deprivation of intelligence. The court
also ruled that appellant's sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices,
while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an
absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude
imputability.

Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the
word "crazy" is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a
person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does not
conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not grant him or her absolution

PEOPLE V. BULAGAO

Facts: AAA, a 14 year-old, was an adopted daughter of BBB and CCC. The accused, Aniceto Bulagao
was a biological son of BBB and CCC.

On two occasions, June 17 and 29, 2000, Bulagao allegedly raped AAA. The first was done when
Bulagao poked a knife at AAA’s neck and forced himself into her. On the second account, AAA was
supposedly asleep when Bulagao undressed her and violated her again despite her resistance.

According to the testimony of a clinical psychologist, Yolanda Palma, a medical examination was
conducted on Bulagao on September 12, 2002 and found out that the accused was suffering from mental
retardation since he had an IQ that is below 50. However, she stated that despite this, Bulagao had the
capacity to discern right from wrong.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bulagao can claim insanity to be exempted from criminal liability.

RULING: No. Bulagao cannot claim insanity to be exempted from criminal liability.
The Supreme Court stated that only when there is complete deprivation of intelligence and reason at the
time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. The
Court has observed that the accused, during his testimony before the court, neither showed a complete
deprivation of intelligence or free will. Additionally, there was no proof that the mental condition being
claimed was already present at the time of the rape incident. When one claims for insanity, the burden of
proof is on the party who wishes to claim such exempting circumstance.

PEOPLE V. UMAWID

Facts: On November 26, 2002 at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Ringor was staying with his
two-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San
Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Roger Ringor Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a long
bolo (panabas) without any reason. While Vicente was able to escape Umawid's blows, the latter
nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instant death. Upon seeing Maureen
bloodied, Umawid walked away.

Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five meters away from Vicente's house
where his nephew, Jeffrey Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken by the sudden noise, Jeffrey went outside
only to see his uncle rushing to attack him with his panabas.

Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety. However, Umawid
was able to prevent Jeffrey from closing the door and the former barge into the house. Jeffrey crouched
and covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid's impending attacks.

Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter's fingers. Umawid
only stopped upon seing Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-
stained.

In court, Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to attest the
same. Instead, he presented the testimonies of Dr. Arthur M. Quincina and Dr. Leonor Andres Juliana to
support his claim. Dr. Quincina testifies that he evaluated Umawid's psychiatric condition in May 2002,
February 2003, and on March 2003 and found that the latter was evident of psychotic symptoms.
However, he could not tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the commission of
the crimes. On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on Umawid's mental stare since she merely
referred the latter to another doctor for further evaluation.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liability due to insanity?

Ruling: No. Under Article 12 of the RPC:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liabity - The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the
same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The
presumption is in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence. Considering the case, the evidence must relate to the time immediately
before or during the commission of the offense/s with which one is charged. Also, to support the defense
of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his or her acts.

In this case, Umawid relied solely on the defense of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to support his claim of
insanity. However, Dr. Quincina only examined Umawid six months before he committed the crime and
three months and four months thereafter. Her findings as she admitted did not include Umawid's mental
disposition immediately before or during the commission of the crimes. Also, given that Dr. Juliana failed
to testify in favor of the accused, Umawid's defense of insanity remained unsubstiantiated, hence, he was
properly adjudged by the RTC and CA as criminally liable.

PEOPLE C. DOQUENA

Facts: Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in their school yard. Valentin Doquena,
the accused, intercepted the ball and threw it to Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed Ragojos
chased Doquena and slapped him on the nape and punched him in the face. Ragojos then went back to
play the game. However, Doquena got a knife and confronted Ragojos. Ragojos denied Doquena’s
request for a fight and resumed playing. The accused stabbed the victim in the chest thereby killing the
latter. Being a minor, he contended that he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Ruling: Yes, the accused acted with discernment. The accused was conscious in the nature and
consequences of his acts. The discernment that constitutes exception which exempts criminal liability of a
minor are those under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity. It is the ability to understand the difference between right and wrong. The facts and
circumstance surrounding the case, the appearance, the attitude and behavior of the minor, not only
before the commission of the crime but after and even during trial shall be considered.

PEOPLE V. ALCABAO

Facts: The accused in this case was a minor and uttered the words “Putang Ina Mo” and “Mabuti
matikman mo” after he committed the crime.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Ruling: The accused acted with discernment. The perverted character of the accused is a factual
circumstance which manifests that the minor acted with discernment. This Office is of the belief that the
word contained in Exh.'A', coming as they are from a public school teacher, underwrites its author as unfit
for the role of moulder of the Filipino youth's character.

LLAVE V. PEOPLE

Facts: Neil Llave, 12 years old, raped Debbielyn. The victim was pulled from a vacant lot. The accused
ordered her to lie down on the cement. He removed her shorts and underwear and his own. He
penetrated his penis into the victim’s vagina and had a push and pull movement. Teofisto, the witness,
saw the incident and shouted. The accused fled the scene. During trial the accused argued that being a
minor, he is presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code thus exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

Ruling: Yes, the accused acted with discernment. The factual circumstance which bolstered that he acted
with discernment is when the accused stated that he was an outstanding student. This allegation proves
that he acted with discernment with full knowledge and intelligence. He was possessed of intelligence well
beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish which conduct is right or wrong. Hence, the accused is
not exempt from criminal liability.

JOSE V. PEOPLE

Facts: Police Superintendent Joseph Castro received an information on November, 14, 1995 that a big
time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking. Acting on such
report, SPO1 Bonifcacio Guevarra was assigned to act as a poseur buyer.

The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga, the driver accompanied by Jose. The
informant called SPO1 Guevarra and informed him that Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. The
policemen offered to buy the shabu and showed his money and in turn, Jose handed over to Guevarra
the illegal drugs. The other police officers approached and introduced themselves as operatives and
arrested Zarraga and Jose.

The RTC finds both the accused guilty for violation of RA6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. On
appeal to the CA, it affirmed the ruling of the RTC by reducing the penalty of Jose by reason of minority
as he was only 13 years old when he committed the crime. Appellant Jose, now petitioner, filed his
petition for review on certiorari alleging that he should be exempt from criminal liability as he was only 13
when he committed it.

Issue: Whether or not Jose acted with discernment.

Held: Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a
crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove
his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor
of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as
distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which
the term is used in moral wrong. However, such presumption is rebuttable. For a minor at such an age to
be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and
that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts
before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the
commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the
corpus delicti.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was
thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the
sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he
was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer,
SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after
which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic
and white soft paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga,
who handed the same to the poseur-buyer.

US V. MARALIT

FACTS: While walking along in a road with a bundle of zacate, Maximo Maralit, less than 15 years of age,
passed along Florentino Luistro, 15 years old, and ended with a fist fight. They soon separated but Maralit
ran to Florentino quickly and stabbed him in the left side with a knife. Maralit and his companion then ran
away. The witnesses and Florentino went home. Florentino died a few days later as a result of the wound
thus received.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maximo acted with discernment when he committed the crime.

RULING: Yes, Maximo is criminally liable for the committed act despite his age.

Article 12 of the Penal Code referred to provides that a person over 9 years of age and under 15 is
exempt from criminal liability "unless he has acted with discernment." It also provides that "in order to
impose a penalty upon such a person . . . the court shall make an express finding upon this fact," that is,
the fact that he acted with discernment.

In the case at bar, while the evidence, through the witnesses, showed that he is guilty and acted with
such knowledge, all of the facts and circumstance presented by the record drew the conclusion that he
was of sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with judgment to know that the act which he
committed was wrong and that it was likely to produce death.

PEOPLE V. CORTEZANO

Facts: Bernardo and Joel Cortezano were minors charged with rape of a certain Leah Cortizano. The
latter, together with her siblings, were once residing with the accused in Camarines Sur. One time,
Bernardo and Joel asked Leah to go to a certain room in the house. It was the time that both of the
accused raped Leah, one was undressing her while the other one was a lookout. Leah was told not to tell
anyone about what happened. The incident occured several times and subsequently, Leah told her
mother that she was raped by both of the accused.

Issue: Whether or not both accused are to be exempted from their criminal liability

Held: No. In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the appellants acted with
discernment when they raped the victim. Since the appellants were both minors at the time they
committed the offenses, they are entitled to the benefits of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority under Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 68-

PEOPLE V. CAPISTRANO

Facts: At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945, the defendant with other Filipino members
of the Yoin and several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near the house of Carmen Verdera in Barrio
Malay, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon), and ordered the inmates therein to
open the door. The appellant and h is companions entered the house, raised the mosquito nets and
ordered the inmates to rise. The appellant and his companions tied Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera,
Alejo Enriquez Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio Canada, Remedios Anastacio, Dolores
Enriquez, Teodora Zamora, Presentacion Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a rope which was used as a
clothesline. The intruders then searched the premises and seized from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1,000, U.S.
currency, and P4,000, Philippine currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and other inmates to the
Japanese garrison at Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The
motive for the raid was that Pedro Canada, a brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant in Lopez and
Salvador Fortuna, son of Graciano, was a soldier in the said organization. One night during the detention
of Placer and her companions in the Yoin garrison, the appellant attempted to sexually abuse Placer and
her companions, but when the women cried and the Japanese came, the defendant escaped. Placer and
her companions were released after one month when they paid to the chief of the Yoin and the appellant
the sum of P2,500 Japanese war notes.

Issue: W/N the accused is entitled to the exempting circumstance of minority

Held: No. The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen (15) years of age at the time that he
committed the crime. However, the court which had the opportunity to see and hear the accused at the
trial found that he acted with discernment. It should be noted, furthermore, that he appeared as the leader
or commander of the raiding party. Although his minority does not exempt him from criminal responsibility
for the reason that he acted with discernment, yet it may be considered as a special mitigating
circumstance lowering the penalty by two (2) degrees.

ESTIOACA V. PEOPLE

Facts: One of the accused of conspiring and robin an elementary school was a minor, 14 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime. The appellate court held that Boniao is exempt from criminal liability
but his civil liability remains pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise known as The Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, thus:

On a final note, considering that it is axiomatic that an appeal opens the entire case for review and
considering further that any decision rendered in the appeal does not bind those who did not appeal
except if beneficial to them, We hold that herein accused Kevin Boniao should be acquitted and his
criminal liability extinguished pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, which took effect on May 22, 2006. The pertinent provision thereof provides,
thus:

"Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to Section 20 of this Act.

Issue: W/N RA 9344 can apply retroactively to Boniao’s case?

Held: Yes. The said law can retroact in this case. The reckoning point in considering minority is the time
of the commission of the crime. In the present case, Boniao was 14 years old, hence, he is exempted
from criminal liability without prejudice to his civil liability. Art. 22 of the RPC provides that penal laws may
be given retroactive effect if they are in favor of the accused.

SIERRA V. PEOPLE

Facts: Private complainant was playing with her friend when petitioner arrived with a knife. It was alleged
that petitioner succeeded in raping the private complainant and her friend. The private complainant
subsequently disclosed the incident to her teacher and the mother of her classmate. Upon physical
examination, it was revealed that there was a laceration on her hymen which supports her claim of sexual
abuse. Petitioner was charged with rape and the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner. Upon
appeal, petitioner invoked paragraph 1, section 6 of RA No 9344 to exempt him from criminal liability
considering that he was only 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Petitioner
contended that there is no need to present a birth certificate to invoke RA No 9344 because the burden of
disproving his claim lies with the prosecution.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can invoke paragraph 1, section 6 of RA No 9344 to exempt him from any
criminal liability
Held: Yes, petitioner can invoke section 6 of RA No 9344 to exempt him from any criminal liability. The
Court of Appeals was wrong when it rejected the testimonial evidence showing that petitioner was only 15
years old at the time he committed the crime. The age of the child may be determined from his birth
certificate, baptismal certificate, or other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself or herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In the case at bar, the petitioner and his mother both
testified regarding his minority.

However, the contention of petitioner that the prosecution has the burden of disproving his claim is
untenable. The defense has the burden of showing by evidence that petitioner was indeed 15 years old
when he committed the crime charged.

MADALI V. PEOPLE

Facts: Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel Madali, 16 years old, along with Jojo Bernardino, were charged
with homicide for the killing of AAA of Romblon.

Jovencio, a cousin of the victim who witnessed the killing, claims that on the night of April 13, 1999
Raymund and Rodel Madali, Bernardino, AAA and him were gathered near the National high school up in
the hagdan-hagdan. Bernardino blindfolded AAA with a handkerchief from Raymund. Bernardino gave the
first blow using a coconut frond, next by Raymund and when AAA wobbled, Rodel punched him while
wearing brass knuckles. All Jovencio could muster was say “enough” twice. Yet the three did not stop but
instead hanged AAA on the tree using the handkerchief and the dog chain. Before leaving the area, Rodel
threatened Jovencio to not tell anyone or else he will be next. The corpse of AAA was found a few days
later. The body was decomposing and stinking.

Jovencio filed an information against the three but recanted it and refiled it again. After the final judgment
was pronounced, Bernardino filed for probation. Raymund’s case on the other hand was dismissed due to
RA 9344 also known as Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 for being only 14 years old at the time
of the commission of the offense. Rodel’s case however, was sustained but was suspended pursuant to
RA 9344.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.

Ruling: Yes, the petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability by virtue of RA 9344.

Petitioners should be exempt from criminal liability due to the provisions of RA 9344. Although it was only
passed on 2006, it can be applied to petitioners since laws favorable to the accused can have retroactive
effect. Section 38 of the act also provides for the automatic suspension of sentence. The exemptions
however, differ. Raymond’s case is dismissed for being only 15 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime. Rodel’s case was sustained since he was 16 at the time of the commission. His sentence was
however suspended. And since he acted with discernment, he shall be under an intervention program.

ORTEGA V. PEOPLE

Facts: At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the victim AAA was 6,
both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three different occasions in 1996. The
lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case was pending when
Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted
amending the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said law took effect on
May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of
majority. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that petitioner is not exempt from criminal
liability because he is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that the
retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by reason of minority

HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of the
exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the
conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Hence, while
there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.

By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of
the alleged rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act. The Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. While the
law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not exempt from civil liability. For this
reason, petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA civil indemnity.

REMIENDO V. PEOPLE

Facts:[aaa] was a minor below 12 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. She knew
the accused as he was residing near the house where her family used to stay. Sometime in March 1997,
Roberto sexually assaulted her inside their house. She kept the said incident to herself as the accused
threatened to kill her. Sometime in May 1997, she was again sexually assaulted by the accused, which
took place in the house of the latter. Just like the first time, she again kept it to herself out of fear. It was
just after the accused moved to another place that the victim had courage to file a complaint against
Remiendo.

The prosecution presented Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera Administrative Region, who physically examined [aaa] on 2 January 1998.
Upon examination of her genital area, he found old lacerations of the hymen. The lacerations were done
more than three (3) months prior to the examination. They like wise presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Elsie I.
Caducoy, who conducted an examination of the mental condition of the victim. The result of the
examination showed that [AAA] suffers from psychosis and organicity although she is not insane. She has
tendencies to suffer from seizure. During seizures she lose her consciousness. During the interview the
victim was able to narrate that Roberto and one Reynoso Sera raped her. The psychiatrist opined that
during the rape, she did not have a seizure. The fact that she was able to narrate what happened and
who raped her suggested that she was on her conscious level at such time.

Roberto Remiendo y Siblawan, was convicted with two counts of statutory rape by the RTC. Petitioner
contends that he must be entitled of the benefit of REPUBLIC ACT 9344. Remiendo further contends that
the prosecution failed to establish that he acted with discernment in the commission of the crimes
charged. Thus, he claims that he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled of the exempting circumstance of minority as mandated by
REPUBLIC ACT 9344 also known as THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006.

Held: No, Roberto Remiendo is not entitled of REPUBLIC ACT 9344 also known as THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006.

First, records of this case show that Remiendo acted with discernment. Discernment is the mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that
the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.

At the time of the commission of the offense, he already know what is right and wrong and he is fully
aware of the consequences of his acts against AAA. In fact, Remiendo waited for AAA to be left alone at
her house before he came, and, while doing his dastardly act, threatened to kick her should she shout for
help. In May 1997, Remiendo again molested AAA in the room of his house when the latter passed by
and, thereafter, threatened to kill her if she told anybody about what had just happened. From his own
testimony, he knew that committing rape was wrong because he claimed to have been enraged when he
was asked by AAAs playmates if he indeed raped AAA, to the point of slapping her and revving up the
engine of a jitney and directing the smoke from the exhaust pipe towards her.

Second, Remiendo is above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, but he already reached
22 years of age at the time of the imposition of his sentence by the trial court, his claim for the benefits of
R.A. No. 9344 is rendered moot and academic in view of Section 40[29]. Remiendo could no longer be
considered a child for the purposes of the application of R.A. No. 9344.

PEOPLE V. JACINTO

Facts: Accused-appellant who was charged and convicted with raping a 5-year old child were neighbors
(to the victim and her family) since they were born. The victim then usually calls him kuya.

At about 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to a
store to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He
thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt. Julito went to the same store that evening
to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. There, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap. AAA recalled that
appellant held her and they walked towards the rice field where the raping incident happened. After, she
went straight home crying. FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. After being
interrogated and learned about the incident, FFF went to the accused-appellant and called the police.

Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story which the RTC found
Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the defense moved to reopen trial for reception of
newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was
only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003. The trial court
appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetual. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in determining the imposable penalty.

Held: In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic
Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3)
years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the
appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: (1) choosing an isolated and dark place to
perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection; and (2) boxing the victim to weaken her defense are indicative
of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his
unlawful action. To give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of the
child in conflict with law should be extended to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long
as he. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive
member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when
he was still of tender age.

PEOPLE. V MANTALABA

Facts: The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at. Thus, a buy-bust operation was organized and was able to recover from the appellant
one small and big sachet of shabu, two pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso
(P50) bill. The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright
orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets were
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Issue: Whether or not accused Mantalaba is entitled of automatic suspension of sentence as provided
under Section 38 of RA 9344.

Held: The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the
said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did
not suspend the sentence in accordance with The Child and Youth Welfare Code and The Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to
death.

The appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA
9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. -
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon
suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law
limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic.

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should
be imposed. A penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper
imposable penalty.

HUBILIA V. PEOPLE

Facts: Around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School
campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of
Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.

The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not
able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the
campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who ganged up on him.
He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession of a
knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating
that day. He went home after the incident. Petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in
violation of his rights as a child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344

While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay hall, and
later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed
was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled of the exempting circumstance of minority.

Held: NO. A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of
children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344
bestows on children in conflict with the law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on
the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort,
and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the
trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the
penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse
after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term
of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.

A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), 14 the
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United
Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed asa last resort and for the minimum
necessary period.

ART 12. – EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

PAR. 4 – INCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR
INTENTION OF CAUSING IT.

Facts: On January 31, 1936 at around 7 o’clock in the morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor
Josefina Bandian went to a thicket to respond to the call of nature. After a few minutes, she saw Bandian
arise from the thicket, with her clothes stained with blood, and showing signs that she can’t upkeep
herself. Aguilar rushed to help and brought her to her house, then lay her down on the bed. He called
Adriano Comcom who was also their neighbor, to help in taking care of Bandian who was still bleeding.

Afterwards, Aguilar asked Comcom to get bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage of Bandian. While
Comcom was walking not far from Bandian’s house, he saw a newborn baby from the thicket and brought
it to Bandian’s house. Bandian was asked whether the baby was hers, and she answered in the
affirmative.

At around 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that Bandian gave birth in her own
house and threw her newborn child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit to this opinion.

Issue: Whether or not Art.12 Par.4 of the Revised Penal Code can be applied in this case.

Held: Yes. The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,
according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time,
was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same
place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all
happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

PEOPLE V. ABRAZALDO

Facts: Appellant stabbed Delfin Guban with a knife. Appellant invoked self-defense. He alleged that Delfin

Guban went to his house drunk and threatened to kill him. When he went out, Guban hit him with an iron
pipe. He hurriedly went back inside to get his two children and a knife. Guban followed him inside and
they grappled for the possession of the knife. Both of them fell down, and that was when appellant
accidentally stabbed Guban.

Issue: Whether or not appellant can apply paragraph 4 of Article 12 to the case at hand.

Held: No. The Court held that if there was truth to his claim that it was an accident, his natural course of
action would be to assist the victim, or at the very least, report to the authorities. The exempting
circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated because of appellant’s flight from the crime scene and
his failure to inform the authorities of the accident. Appellant did not surrender the knife used for the
crime. This indicates lack of a clean conscience and culpability of the crime charged.

PEOPLE V. FALLORINA

FACTS: Eleven-year old Vincent Jorojoro and Whilcon Rodriguez played with their kite on top of the roof
of an abandoned carinderia beside the road. Ricardo Salvo, who was playing at the basketball court
beside the carinderia, heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across them.
Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP)
officer, knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof so Ricardo called both kids to get down. Fallorina
stopped his motorcycle when he saw the two kids, then shouted and badmouthed them. Whilcon rushed
to jump off from the roof and as soon as Vincent stood up and turned his back, ready to get down from
the roof, Fallorina suddenly pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot.
When Vincent fell from the roof, Fallorina quickly carried his hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought
him to the Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot wound in the
head.

In the appellant's defense, he claimed that his gun fell from his right waistline when he was passing
through that area and it suddenly went off when it hit the ground, even though the safety lock was on.
That's when he saw Vincent sprawled to the ground when he checked if there was anyone who got hit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability?

HELD: No. The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense when compared
to the positive and straightforward testimony of the eyewitness Ricardo Salvo. Under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the RPC, the following are exempt from criminal liability, "Any person who, while
performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it". As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally while his back was
turned against the appellant. Therefore, the RTC decided that the accused is found guilty for the crime of
Murder.

PEOPLE V. GENITA

FACTS: On December 17, 1991 while the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon were loading
firewood in a truck. Appellant, who was drunk and armed, fired his gun at Jesus' feet hitting his left leg.
Then he changed the magazine of his gun and fired again at Jesus. Reynaldo ran away; Appellant
chased him and fired at him, hitting his nape and right hand.

The court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of homicide. Appellant, relying
on the exempting circumstance of accident as his defense, contends that he was performing a lawful act
with due care when the victims were killed. He had no intention to kill the victims thus he should have
been exempted from any criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be exempted from criminal liability.

HELD: Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. In raising this
defense, appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent upon him to establish that he
was exempt from criminal liability. He must show with clear and convincing proofs that: 1) he was
performing a lawful act with due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no fault
or intention of causing the injury. Considering appellant’s evidence, it is clear that the requisites of
accident as an exempting circumstance were not proven.

AMPLOYO V. PEOPLE

Facts: On 27 June 1997, Kristine Joy Mosquera, then eight years old, was walking to school at around
seven o’clock in the morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged from hiding from a nearby
store. Petitioner Alvin Amployo approached Kristine Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on her
shoulder where it then moved down to touch her breast several times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine
Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her. This was not the first time that the incident happened as
petitioner had done this several times in the past, even when Kristine Joy was still in Grade II. However,
it was only during this last incident that Kristine Joy finally told somebody her grandmother, who
immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera, Kristine Joy's mother.

Issues: Whether or not the act of the petitioner is an accident.

Held: No. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident
if it only happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act
to the very same victim in the past. Moreover, the incident could never be labeled as accidental as
petitioner's hand did not just slip from Kristine Joy's shoulder to her breast as there were times when he
would touch her breast from under her shirt. Finally, the theory that what happened was accidental is
belied by petitioner having threatened Kristine Joy to keep silent and not tell on him.

PEOPLE V. CASTILLO

FACTS: In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and angry. His
father-in-law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former to leave the house.
As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was
heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen carrying the bloodied body of
Consorcia out of the house and was later taken to the hospital but to no avail. Cause of death was the cut
jugular vein caused by a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed instrument like a nail.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was accidental.

RULING: The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful
act (2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4) without fault or intention of
causing it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the
consideration of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury. Also, the fact that
the accused-appellant disappeared while his wife was in the hospital is unbecoming of a husband with a
dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defense’s evidence, the claim that the act was accidental cannot
be appreciated in favour of the accused.

Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE V. LATOSA

Facts: Suzan Latoza filed an appeal from the decision of the RTC and CA convicting her of parricide. She
argues that the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to prove that she intentionally killed her
husband. She insists that the gun fired accidentally while she was giving it to her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the exempting circumstance of accident was established by Susan Latosa.

Held: No. he basis of appellants defense of accidental shooting is Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal
liability: 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.

Thus, it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the following
essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident, to wit:
1. She was performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. She caused the injury to her husband by mere
accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it.

To prove the circumstance she must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted
the killing.

However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husband’s head and
pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. As correctly found by the CA,
which we quote in full:

Appellant’s version that she accidentally shot her husband is not credible. Appellants manner of carrying
the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of due care in the performance of an act. The location of the
wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was not merely accidental. The victim was lying
down and the fact that the gun was found near his left hand was not directly disputed by her. The court
finds it contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military man would suddenly ask his wife for his
firearm, and even patiently wait for her return to the house, when the said firearm was just inside the
cabinet which, according to appellant, was just about two meters away from his bed.

In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her husband who was
still lying in bed. Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned how to fire a gun and was merely
handing the firearm over to the deceased, the muzzle is never pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety
rule which appellant is deemed to have already known since she admitted, during trial, that she
sometimes handed over the gun to her husband. Assuming further that she was not aware of this basic
rule, it needed explaining why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there was
pressure on the trigger.

PEOPLE V. LANUZA

Facts: That on April 1 2007 in the city of Laog, Lanuza y bagaoisan(Lanuza) with an intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked the victim in the person of Joel Butay (Joel). The accused performs all
the acts of execution of the crime which would cause the felony as a consequence, however, does not
produced it by reason of causes independent of his will and with timely medical attention, Joel did
survived the killing. The accused then voluntarily surrender to the authorities together with his shotgun.
He asserted that the shooting was accidental, contrary to the victim’s statements, yet, a reversed trial was
granted. The RTC found that the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
frustrated homicide. The accused appealed to the CA, and maintained that the shooting was a mere
accident, and with the absence of intent to kill, he could only be liable of serious physical injury. CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decisions.

Issue: Whether the accused-appellant have killed the victim by accident.

Held: NO. The court agrees with the affirmation of the CA to the decisions of the RTC, finding that the
accused-appellant implausible alibi of accident cannot overcome the private complainant’s positive and
forthright testimony that the accused-appellant had an intention to kill the private complainant. Decisions
were not only based on the loading of bullets by the accused-appellant to the shotgun but also the
existence of motive on his part, the location, and the severity of the complainant’s injury and the accused-
appellant’s behavior after of the shooting.

PEOPLE V. MACAL

FACTS: Sometime in 2003, accused- appellant Manuel Macal, stab his wife, Auria Macal inside their
bedroom which later caused her death. In his defense, accused seeks exoneration from criminal liability
by interposing the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional. He further alleged that he
saw his wife at their bedroom with another man, which led to the killing.

The RTC convicted the accused for the crime of Parricide. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant be merited with the Exempting Circumstance of Affirmative
Defense of Accident.

HELD: No. The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code to release the
accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential requisites of accident as
an exempting circumstance are: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes
an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

Transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal that the accused-appellant was not performing a lawful act
at the time Auria was stabbed. The defense of accident presupposes lack of intention to kill. This certainly
does not hold true in the instant case based on the aforequoted testimony of the accused-appellant.
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who were then within hearing distance from the bedroom, testified
that they distinctly heard Auria screaming that she was going to be killed by the accused-appellant.

Hence, the Court affirmed the decisions of both the lower court and the Court of Appeals.

ART. 12 – EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

PAR. 5&6 – COMPLUSION OF

IRRESISTABLE FORCE/
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR

PEOPLE V. MORENO

Facts: Moreno was the section commander of the San Ramon Penal Colony in 1944. He was accused of
killing one Paciano, but only because he was ordered so by Major Sasaki. Moreno stated that such order
is against his well, but he was threatened by Captain Susuki that if he has to comply with the order of
Major Sasaki otherwise he have to come along with them.

Issue: Whether or not Moreno be exempted from criminal liability under subsection 6, article 12 of the
revised penal code.

Ruling: No. Moreno is not exempted from criminal liability under subsections 5 and 6, article 12 of the
revised penal code.

It is plain that there was no compulsion of an irresistible force that compelled the defendant to kill the
victim against his will; nor was there any threat of such a serious character and imminence as to create in
the mind of the defendant an uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater or injury would be inflicted upon
him if he did not comply with the alleged order to kill the deceased. The only part of the defendant's
testimony relating to a sort of a threat is the one made by Captain Susuki, and it is not such a threat as
contemplated by said provision of the Revised Penal Code; especially taking into consideration that the
defendant himself declared that the captain told him "that they could not be present (at the execution of
the deceased) because they had to return that same day to Zamboanga.

PEOPLE V. FRONDA
Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1986, the deceased Eduardo (Edwin) Balaan And
Esminio Balaan who are brothers, were taken by seven (7) armed men in fatigue uniform with long
firearms, suspected to be NPA members, accompanied by accused Rudy Fronda and Roderick Padua
from the house of one Ferminio Balaan, at Barangay Cataratan, Allacapan, Cagayan. The said Rudy
Fronda and Roderick Padua are residents of the same place. The armed men tied the hands of the
deceased at their back lying down face downward, in front of the house of Ferminio Balaan. The armed
men together with Roderick Padua and Rudy Fronda proceeded towards sitio Tulong, Cataratan,
Allacapan, Cagayan passing through the ricefields (taking along with them the Balaan brothers).

Issue: WON Fronda can claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear.

Held: NO. Appellant cannot claim the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear (Art. 12, par. 6,
RPC). Fear in order to be valid should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or
limb (People vs. Abanes, 73 SCRA 44, [1976]). In the case at bar, records indicate that appellant was
seen being handed by and receiving from one of the armed men a hunting knife. Also, as afoesaid,
appellant was not able to explain his failure to report the incident to explain his failure to report the
incident to the authorities for more than three (3) years. These circumstances, among others, establish
the fact that appellant consciously concurred with the acts of the assailants. In order that the
circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People vs. Loreno, 130 SCRA 311,
[1984]) Appellant had the opportunity to escape when he was ordered by the armed men to go hoome
after bringing the victims the mountains. He did not. Instead he joined the armed men when required to
bring a spade with which he was ordered to dig the grave. Appellant also chose to remain silent for more
than three (3) years before reporting the killing to the authorities. Based on these circumstances, The
Court held that the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of appellant cannot be regarded as having
been done under the impulse of uncontrollable fear.

PEOPLE V. SALDANA

Facts: The accused Fernando Morales, Elmer Esguerra, and Narciso Saldaña were charged with the
crime of kidnapping for ransom.

Jefferson Tan, one of the victims, testified that he requested Bautista to allow him to speak with his father
and so later that morning, Bautista and Saldana escorted him to Balanga, Bataan, to a PLDT office. He
told his father that their abductors planned to send him home to get the P2 million ransom. His father then
negotiated with Romeo Bautista who agreed to reduce the ransom to P 1.5 million. Subsequently,
Bautista and Saldana took Jefferson to Guagua, Pampanga, aboard a minibus. Bautista alighted at
Cleluz, Lubao, while Saldaa remained with him until they reached Sta. Cruz, Lubao. At Sta. Cruz, Saldaa
transferred him onto a jeepney going to the town proper of Guagua. Before disembarking at San Pablo in
Guagua, Saldana instructed Jefferson to bring the ransom to the St. Peter and Paul Snack Center later
that day. According to Jefferson, he arrived home and lost no time relaying to his father, Feliciano Tan,
and the police the directives the kidnappers gave him.

Upon the advice of the police, however, his father no longer allowed him leave to deliver the ransom
money. Later, the kidnappers called and demanded an explanation from Feliciano Tan why the money
was not delivered. He heard his father request for a lower ransom. The amount finally agreed upon was
only P92, 000.

Appellant FERNANDO MORALES testified for the defense. He denied under oath that he willingly
participated in the kidnapping. He interposed the defense of having acted under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear. He averred that a day before the incident, his brother-in-law, Elmer Esguerra, offered
to help him secure a construction job at Floridablanca with a daily wage of P150.00. He and Elmer
Esguerra planned to go together to ask permission from the contractor to start working. They agreed to
meet.
A few minutes later, Narciso Saldana flagged a van and poked a gun at its driver. He and appellant Malit
got scared so they tried to walk away but they didnt get very far because Elmer Esguerra, Romeo
Bautista, and Narciso Saldana, after taking over said vehicle, chased them. Bautista threatened to shoot
them both if they didn’t board the vehicle, so they did.

Appellant ARTURO MALIT testified also for the defense. He interposed the defense of uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury. According to appellant Malit, when he saw that the children were scared, he
talked to them and asked them to pray. He did not try to stop or tell his companions not to pursue their
nefarious plan because he could not overcome his fear brought by the threats earlier made on him by
Esguerra, Saldana, and Bautista. He did not talk to any of the three who abducted them because he was
mad at them. He also did nothing to tell Saldanas in-laws that he was not a willing participant in the
kidnapping. But when he heard Saldana say something about killing the driver and one of the children, he
interceded and pleaded with Bautista not to proceed with the killing.

Issue: Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury can be appreciated

Held: Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts
under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however, the Supreme
Court held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.

In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the ransom money was to be delivered,
appellants Arturo Malit and Fernando Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused, entered the
van wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time Narciso Saldaa, Elmer Esguerra and Romeo Bautista were
waiting for both appellants from a distance of about one (1) kilometer. By not availing of this chance to
escape, appellants’ allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable. The Court held that in order that the
circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. Moreover, the reason for their entry
to the van, where the father of the victims was, could be taken as their way of keeping Feliciano Tan
under further surveillance at a most critical time.

Appellant Morales contention that their families were similarly threatened finds no support in the evidence.
The records are bereft of any showing that such threats to appellants’ families were made at all.