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Over the last several years we have noticed that market participants seem to be paying ever larger amounts for firms that
demonstrate an ability to grow top-line irrespective of underlying fundamental firm health. The over-arching argument in favor of
such behavior has been that in a world where revenue growth has become increasingly scarce, growth is therefore intrinsically more
valuable. In this paper we explore the significant slowing of sales growth. We found that the R1000 3-year sales growth is at or near
the Great Recession low and that there has not been a corresponding decline in most valuation metrics to reflect this slower growth.
Our analysis also showed no correlation between 3-year revenue growth and average stock performance. However, we found that
the Kailash models were very effective in differentiating between stocks that would outperform and stocks that would underperform
among sales growth quintiles.
To the degree you believe that the Russell 1000 represents a reasonable proxy for public corporations in America, Figure 1 below
charts the rolling 3-year absolute revenue growth of the index’s constituents. It certainly conforms to the central construct of growth
bulls’ thesis: revenue growth is at levels last seen in the depths of the Great Recession. Market participants often categorize
themselves as bulls or bears, pessimists or optimists, or people who see the investing world as a glass half full or half empty. For
full disclosure, certain members of the Kailash team have been accused of “…looking at the investing world as if it were a half-
empty glass of dirty water with a crack in it and perpetually worrying that someone was trying to steal it from them.” Yet even given
this characterization, the chart below seems rather shocking particularly in light of just how resilient markets have been.
Fig. 1: The R1000 3-year sales growth is approaching the Great Recession lows
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
We cut the Russell 1000 up into quintiles of 3-year revenue growth with Quintile 1 representing the 200 companies with the worst 3-
year growth (Figure 2) and Quintile 5 representing the 200 companies with the best 3-year Revenue growth (Figure 6). Incredibly
there has, without exception, been nowhere to hide. From the worst to the best, every quintile of stocks in the R1000 is at or near
its Great Recession lows.
Rolling 3-Year Sales Growth of Quintile 1 in R1000 Rolling 3-Year Sales Growth of Quintile 2 in R1000
15% 30%
10%
25%
5%
0% 20%
-5% 15%
-10%
10%
-15%
-20% 5%
-25% 0%
-30%
-5%
-35%
-40% -10%
Rolling 3-Year Sales Growth of Quintile 3 in R1000 Rolling 3-Year Sales Growth of Quintile 4 in R1000
70% 120%
60% 100%
50%
80%
40%
60%
30%
40%
20%
10% 20%
0% 0%
350%
300%
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%
Investors seem to have become accustomed to operating in this ex-growth world and have continued to send equities in general on
a near vertical trajectory since the depths of the Great Recession as corporate America has become increasingly adept at
squeezing more cash flows out of a typical dollar of revenue. Figure 7 below shows that this trend, however, has begun to take its
toll in the form of increasingly elevated market valuations at the same time revenue growth has approached record lows. While 3-
year revenue growth today has hit the same low levels seen at the bottom of the Great Recession, market participants are paying a
65%+% higher price on EV/FCF than they did in the depths of 2009. The missing ingredient, of course, is fear and uncertainty, but
we would argue investors should be mindful of what they are paying for and cross-check that with whatever macro-economic views
they may have.
Fig. 7: EV/FCF valuation has risen 65+% since the Great Recession despite 3-year revenue growth falling similarly low
24x
22x
20x
18x
16x
14x
Valuations have risen
12x north of 65% since the
Great Recession
10x
While the data above certainly support the assertion that growth has become scarce, we find it a little surprising that investors are
so readily convinced that revenue growth is somehow more valuable. History is unequivocal in demonstrating that revenue growth
has had virtually no predictive value for stock returns. Figure 8 below splits the universe into rolling 3-year growth quintiles and
shows there is no correlation between revenue growth and stock returns.
Fig. 8: There is no correlation between revenue growth quintile and stock performance
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Universe 1 2 3 4 5
Slowest Fastest
Growers Growers
In an effort to better understand the dynamics of “what are we getting and what are we paying” we started with a simple
fundamental view of the cross-sectional characteristics of each group. Figure 9 below shows the historical averages for the R1000
Universe and by quintile. These historical averages are then followed by where we are today. When reviewing this table, it is again
easy to conclude that we are in a significant revenue recession viewed by the universe or by quintile. Current revenue trends are
abysmal relative to their history. However, it would appear that this current lack of revenue growth is not reflected in more modest
valuations. In fact, most valuation metrics are higher now (e.g., EV/Sales and P/E) despite the near-record low sales growth. With
that said, there are a few instances where ROE and operating margin are currently healthier than historic averages, but these
positive variances are usually marginal and seem inadequate to justify the premiums we see. This raises the question: Are we
overpaying for the current near-record low sales growth?
Fig. 9: Quintile analysis confirms a disconnect between deteriorating sales growth and very high valuation metrics
To try and answer this question we thought it would be productive to research what history suggests we have historically paid for
revenue growth that is comparable to today’s growth. While the explanation behind Figure 10 below sounds complex, the
process is actually pretty straightforward. We essentially took the R1000 universe and each of its quintiles and then deciled the
time periods for each quintile based on revenue growth. This allows us to match the current revenue growth situation for each
quintile with the closest historical decile of revenue growth. To help explain what that means, let’s start by looking at the second
column of the R1000 Universe, “Current Decile of 3-Yr Sales Growth within Group,” shows a “1.” That means that across the time-
series history of the R1000, today’s 3-year revenue growth rate of 3% (found in R1000, row “Where We Are Today”) puts the
current growth rate in the bottom decile of time series monthly observations of rolling three year growth rates. Across every quintile
the current growth rate is in the historic worst decile of time periods. This clearly indicates a revenue recession. We then present
the historical averages for critical financial metrics that were associated with this worst decile. The conclusion is not encouraging.
The third row to the R1000 which is “Premium/(Discount)” allows us to quickly conclude we are currently paying a significant
premium compared to history in other periods of similarly slow revenue growth particularly as you move up the growth spectrum
(Q3-Q5). In our minds this speaks to the need for particular care to be taken when considering high-growth firms for portfolio
inclusion, and we believe the Kailash models may help investors remain disciplined.
Fig. 10: Most of the quintiles are in bottom time-series decile and look expensive relative to the average of the decile
Current Decile of
3-Yr Sales Growth Rolling 3-Yr
Group within Group Sales Growth FCF/EV EV/Sales P/E ROE Margins
Historical Average 4.0% 5.4% 1.6x 19.2x 19.8% 26.2%
R1000
1 Where We Are Today 3.0% 4.4% 2.2x 24.3x 23.6% 26.3%
Universe
Premium/Discount 20% 35% 26% 19% 0%
Historical Average -30.8% 3.3% 1.8x 34.7x 10.5% 24.9%
Quintile 1 1 Where We Are Today -28.8% 3.6% 2.1x 40.2x 15.0% 19.6%
Premium/Discount -10% 15% 16% 43% -22%
Historical Average -3.6% 5.1% 1.4x 17.4x 19.6% 24.1%
Quintile 2 1 Where We Are Today -0.1% 5.5% 2.0x 18.4x 23.0% 30.2%
Premium/Discount -8% 39% 6% 17% 26%
Historical Average 8.9% 6.1% 1.4x 16.3x 23.3% 24.6%
Quintile 3 1 Where We Are Today 11.9% 4.5% 2.0x 20.9x 38.0% 26.2%
Premium/Discount 25% 39% 28% 63% 7%
Historical Average 22.5% 6.6% 1.4x 16.8x 22.1% 26.8%
Quintile 4 1 Where We Are Today 25.8% 5.0% 2.2x 19.5x 27.8% 29.2%
Premium/Discount 24% 61% 16% 26% 9%
Historical Average 71.3% 5.2% 2.4x 21.4x 18.0% 31.5%
Quintile 5 1 Where We Are Today 70.4% 3.3% 2.6x 32.9x 15.0% 27.7%
Premium/Discount 36% 5% 53% -17% -12%
In Figures 11 and 12 below we have graphed the premiums/(discounts) shown above paid for FCF Yields and the ROE differentials,
respectively, for all revenue growth quintiles. We are struck by the dispersion of the two tails. Slow growers are priced at a discount
to historical average FCF/EV despite significantly better ROE while at the other end of the spectrum, growth investors seem to be
paying what some might argue are reckless premiums for revenue growth despite atypically low ROE when compared to similar
periods in history. So while our analysis above does indeed agree with growth aficionados’ assertions that we are in a period of
epically low growth, the simple analysis below would indicate that investors are simply paying significantly more than they have in
other periods where growth has been unusually scarce. We believe this is cause for caution.
Fig. 11: Despite large premiums paid for the fastest Fig. 12: …investors are receiving 17% lower ROE relative to
growers… history
FCF/EV Premium/Discount Today vs. History ROE Premium/Discount Today vs. History
40% 36% 70% 63%
60%
30% 25% 24% 50% 43%
20% 40%
30% 26%
17%
10% 20%
10%
0% 0%
-10% -10%
-10% -8% -20%
-17%
-20% -30%
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Slowest Fastest Slowest Fastest
Growers Growers Growers Growers
Kailash Portfolio by Growth Quintile: Best Opportunity in Fastest Growing Kailash Portfolio Stocks
In an effort to see how the Kailash models were faring in attempting to optimize stock selection across all the various quintiles of
revenue growth, Figure 13 below shows the Kailash portfolio characteristics and the market characteristics for each quintile of
growth. In Quintiles 1-4 we find a fairly homogenous story where the Kailash picks in each quintile deliver roughly equivalent rates
of historical revenue growth while offering investors substantially higher cash flows, lower EV/sales, lower P/E despite equivalent if
not higher ROEs and operating margins. Intuitively then, we would encourage investors to cross-check the various levels of growth
of their holdings and compare their fundamental metrics with the relevant quintiles and associated Kailash picks. We hope that by
doing this it helps clients reconcile various levels of valuation and firm health with different rates of revenue growth. For example, if
a client owns a deep cyclical that has been under significant revenue pressure over the last few years (a stock that would be in
quintile 1) and you believe the firm is due to benefit from mean reversion, we imagine it would be beneficial to see if this stock was
among the Kailash picks and, if not, consider the possible opportunity costs of this stock vs. one of those held in the Kailash
portfolio. With that said, we have to admit that Quintile 5 represents a serious outlier. Unlike Quintiles 1-4, the Kailash quintile 5
high-growth stocks, while offering a significant value advantage, also have historical growth rates that trail the group’s growth rate
by a significant margin (55.8% vs. 70.4%). We believe that this is a function of a select few ultra high-growth stocks that lack an
economic model and do not generate the things we are most fond of (e.g., good profits and FCF). By avoiding these high revenue
growth firms that lack profitable and self-funding business models, we are effectively forced down the growth curve. With that said
we would encourage our readers to take a hard look at some of these ultra high-growth firms that Kailash portfolios have avoided
and ask “when will they be profitable?” and “what type of equity risk premium would decimate the share prices?”.
Fig. 13: Kailash portfolio stocks are consistently less expensive across all quintiles while typically having higher ROEs
Rolling 3-Yr
Sales Growth FCF/EV EV/Sales P/E ROE Margins
Large Cap Where R1000 Portfolio Is Today 1.0% 7.3% 1.5x 15.9x 32.8% 26.1%
Universe Where LC Universe Is Today 3.0% 4.4% 2.2x 24.3x 23.6% 26.3%
Where R1000 Portfolio Is Today -20.8% 6.6% 1.3x 18.5x 23.4% 24.2%
Quintile 1
Where LC Universe Is Today -28.8% 3.6% 2.1x 40.2x 15.0% 19.6%
Where R1000 Portfolio Is Today 0.8% 7.7% 1.8x 15.0x 41.8% 27.6%
Quintile 2
Where LC Universe Is Today -0.1% 5.5% 2.0x 18.4x 23.0% 30.2%
Where R1000 Portfolio Is Today 11.4% 7.8% 1.1x 15.2x 33.2% 24.2%
Quintile 3
Where LC Universe Is Today 11.9% 4.5% 2.0x 20.9x 38.0% 26.2%
Where R1000 Portfolio Is Today 27.6% 7.9% 1.8x 15.2x 24.1% 29.5%
Quintile 4
Where LC Universe Is Today 25.8% 5.0% 2.2x 19.5x 27.8% 29.2%
Where R1000 Portfolio Is Today 55.8% 3.5% 1.7x 13.1x 48.0% 24.5%
Quintile 5
Where LC Universe Is Today 70.4% 3.3% 2.6x 32.9x 15.0% 27.7%
Source: Kailash Capital, Russell, Compustat; Data from 4/30/1989-4/30/2016
It is our core belief that markets are indeed inefficient and, with the tidal wave of money flowing to index funds and trendy lo w
volatility vehicles, these imbalances have been expanding at a pace not seen since deep into the Tech Bubble. What is fascinating
to us is the degree to which some investors allow “investment stories” to carry the day despite poor fundamental metrics.
In working through this research, we could not help but ask ourselves once again, what might be a better way to source reasonably
priced revenue growth? We think an excellent area of opportunity would be to focus on fast growing and highly ranked stocks in the
Kailash Ranking Tools. These stocks usually have stable businesses with robust capital structures, honest accounting, adept
management, and reasonable or attractive valuations. We think that the fastest growers among the highly ranked Kailash stocks
would represent an excellent pond to source growth and generate alpha.
The data confirm the attractiveness of the top ranked stocks with the highest 3-year sales growth. We ran a simple grid that showed
the intersection of our aggregate model rank with trailing 3-year revenue growth and found that there was indeed a robust sample of
firms that, despite having logged top rates of growth over the prior three years have still not been embraced and elevated to “story
stock” status. These stocks are shown in the green bars in the back right corner of Figure 14 below. These stocks’ average
performances have been impressive and are worth further investigation should any of these names be on your radar. In particular,
the stocks in the top quintile of both Kailash rank and sales growth (5, 5) performed particularly well with 1,200 bps of average
annual outperformance. The neighboring green bars (4, 5 and 5, 4) also performed quite well with ~500 bps of average annual
outperformance.
Fig. 14: Stocks in the corner of best rank and fastest sales growth have been the best opportunities for outperformance
15%
10%
5%
5
0%
4
3
-5%
2
1
-10%
1 2 3 4 5
It is worth noting that there is an especially wide range of stock performance within the top quintile of 3-year sales growth. In fact,
the Kailash Rank Quintiles have the most profound effect within the fastest growing sales quintile in differentiating the stocks that
significantly outperform vs. those that significantly underperform. There is a whopping 1,900 bps 12-month performance spread
between the top-ranked quintile vs. the bottom-ranked quintile within the fastest growing quintile of stocks. There also seems to be
a significant dispersion in the number of firms making up these groups as the fastest growers with the highest aggregate rank have
nearly 50% fewer firms today than their historical average. On the other end of the spectrum, the fastest growers with the poorest
aggregate rank have nearly 50% more firms today than their historical average.
Given the significant opportunities historically seen among the green bars in Figure 14, we list below in Exhibits 1-3 the attractive
stocks currently in each of the three green bars. We also provide in Exhibit 4 the unattractive stocks currently in the back left corner
red group. We hope that clients will find some compelling investments among these stocks. Please contact your
Kailash Concepts representative if you have any questions or comments.
Exhibit 1: Attractive Top Quintile 5 of Aggregate Rank and Top Quintile 5 of 3-Year Sales Growth
Exhibit 2: Attractive Top Quintile 5 of Aggregate Rank and Quintile 4 of 3-Year Sales Growth
Exhibit 3: Attractive Quintile 4 of Aggregate Rank and Top Quintile 5 of 3-Year Sales Growth
Exhibit 4: Unattractive Quintile 1 of Aggregate Rank and Top Quintile 5 of 3-Year Sales Growth
Conclusion:
1. The Russell 1000 3-year sales growth is at or near the Great Recession lows for not only the index as a whole but also for each
of the sales growth quintiles.
2. Despite the significant decline in revenue growth, there has not been a corresponding decline in most valuation metrics to
reflect the slower growth. Even our analysis of each of the quintiles of sales growth confirms a disconnect between
deteriorating sales growth and very high valuation metrics. Our analysis by sales growth quintile showed that we are currently
in the worst decile of growth periods for each of the groups and we are currently paying a significant premium compared to
history in other periods of similarly slow revenue growth, particularly as you move up the growth spectrum.
3. Our analysis showed no correlation between revenue growth quintile and average stock performance for the quintiles as a
whole.
4. However, we found that the Kailash models were very effective in differentiating between stocks that would outperform and
stocks that would underperform among the sales growth quintiles. In particular, we found that the fastest growers among the
highly ranked Kailash stocks (green bars in Figure 14) represented an excellent pond to source growth and generate alpha. In
particular, the stocks in the top quintile of both Kailash rank and sales growth (5, 5) performed particularly well with 1,200 bps of
average annual outperformance. The neighboring green bars (4, 5 and 5, 4) also performed quite well with ~500 bps of average
annual outperformance. The Kailash Rank Quintiles have the most profound effect within the fastest growing sales quintile in
differentiating the stocks that significantly outperform vs. those that significantly underperform. There is a whopping 1,900 bps
12-month performance spread between the top-ranked quintile vs. the bottom-ranked quintile within the fastest growing quintile
of stocks.
Appendix:
As some clients may wonder if the slowing R1000 sales growth is driven in large part due to falling energy prices and the
corresponding drop in the energy sector’s revenues, we show below the R1000 sales growth excluding the energy sector to show
that the results are only modestly different.
Fig. 15: R1000 sales growth is not materially different when the energy sector is excluded
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
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Disclaimer
The information, data, analyses and opinions presented herein (a) do not constitute investment advice, (b) are provided solely for
informational purposes and therefore are not, individually or collectively, an offer to buy or sell a security, (c) are not warranted to be
correct, complete or accurate, and (d) are subject to change without notice. Kailash Capital, LLC and its affiliates (collectively,
“Kailash Capital”) shall not be responsible for any trading decisions, damages or other losses resulting from, or related to, the
information, data, analyses or opinions or their use. The information herein may not be reproduced or retransmitted in any manner
without the prior written consent of Kailash Capital.
Kailash Capital, in preparing the information, data, analyses and opinions presented herein, has obtained data, statistics and
information from sources it believes to be reliable. Kailash Capital, however, does not perform an audit or seeks independent
verification of any of the data, statistics, and information it receives.
Kailash Capital and its affiliates do not provide tax, legal or accounting advice. This material has been prepared for informational
purposes only, and is not intended to provide, and should not be relied on for, tax, legal or accounting advice. You should consult
your own tax, legal and accounting advisors before engaging in any transaction.