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Bataclan v.

Medina

[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]

MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts:

At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina and
driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on its way to
Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on
the right side of the road and turned turtle.

Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not
get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed passengers, including the driver and
the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside
the vehicle.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned
bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the
four passengers trapped inside it.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.

After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC.

Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that
burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.

Held:

The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected.

The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did
from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.

In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through
its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus.

The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus.

In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina Transportation
failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of
the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the
blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as
instructed by Mariano Medina.

The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his
passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed
to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.

Ratio:

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
INTOD vs CA

G.R. No. 103119

October 21, 1992

FACTS:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed
with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the
location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied
by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was
hit by the gun fire.

RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER CA: Affirmed in toto

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime (YES)

HELD:

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:

1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;

2) there is intention to perform the physical act;

3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and

4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.

In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.
Colinares vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide by the
RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of
prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with
the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position
that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that
makes his offense probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that
under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has
perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that
Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court

Ruling:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the
RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from
the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court
ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the
Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the
accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore
defying fairness and equity.

Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of theft

Facts:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the
accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them
where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket,
and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started
loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked
Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the
crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should
only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be
present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of
persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to
freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Jinggoy Estrada, G.R. No. 158754, 10 August 2007.

FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution of herein respondent Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private
respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for brevity). Jinggoy was among the
respondents in the crime of Plunder filed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the Court
an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before
the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the prosecution filed its comment and
opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda. Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to escape, thus a flight risk.
But in a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application for Bail. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on the ground that he is no longer considered a
flight risk?

HELD: YES, the grant of bail is proper.


To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to
bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation
of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by
Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this
regard:

It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently respectful of
the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight
risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and
his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not nil.

The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May
10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who
usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as
long as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a
respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot
accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any
plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice

UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISAAC DOMINGUEZ, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Isaac Dominguez (defendant-appellant), salesman at Philippine Education CO., received the sum of
seven pesos and fifty centavos (?7.50) or thirty-seven and one-half pesetas (37 ½) due to sales from the
store of the said company. This amount would then be turned over to the company’s cashier or his
authorized representative, instead of the delivering the said amount to the cashier which he knew that it
was his obligation to do so, the accused criminally misappropriate and convert it to his personal used.

The accused defense was that he did not deliver the money immediately after the sale, because the cash
boys were very busy as well as the cashier, while he had to go to the toilet for some necessity, and upon
coming out, the cashier caught him by the arm and asked him for the money, and then he delivered the
sum of ?7.50 to him; and that it was not his intention to make use of said money.

Trial Court found the accused guilty of consummated offense of estafa.


Issue: WON the defendant was guilty of frustrated offense of estafa

Held: Yes, defendant was guilty of frustrated offense of estafa. Under Article 6, first paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code:

“A FELONY is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is FRUSTRATED when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator”

Defendant performing all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a consequence. But
as the cashier caught him and asked for the money, which he then delivered, is independent of the will
of the perpetrator causing no appreciable damage to the offended party.

Supreme Court appealed the decision of Trial Court and charged the appellant guilty of frustrated
offense of estafa.

PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG G.R. No. L-43530

FACTS:

The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted robbery.

At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.

At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.

The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when
the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

ISSUE:

WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:

YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.

RATIONALE:
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his
evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final
objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates,
or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must
be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). The relation existing between the facts
submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the
intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice.

Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact under
consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Against the
accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former
convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have
been rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

Case Digest: People vs Lingad

G.R. No. L-6989           November 29, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
AGAPITO LINGAD Y SANTOS, LEOCADIO CARREON Y CELSO, AMADO
MAMUCOD Y CORTES and CONRADO GRAHAM Y ALEGRIA, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

Evening of July 18, 1952 in Sulucan Street, Sampaloc Manila, two persons purchased drinks and
cigarettes at the store of Vicente Go and went away. After a while, one of them returned with two
others and two of them entered and one stayed outside, where Vicente Go was standing waiting for a
garbage truck. The two persons who entered pointed a gun towards the attendants of the store, which
were son and daughter of the owner, and demanded all of their cash. The same guy went over the
counter and grabbed all of the money. While all of this was happening, the owner was outside with the
third guy beside the owner, who also happens to have a pistol. After grabbing all of the money, the
assailants made a hasty retreat outside the store. The owner, who was still outside, was pushed and
shot. The bullet entered behind and exited out the front chest. After the incident, the three robbers
immediately ran to a taxi parked far away ahead of the store.
The Police learned the taxi used was a Villacorta taxicab number 6, through that, the police soon
knew who the driver was; Amado Mamucod. He was then investigated by the police. After admitting and
identifying the ones who used the taxi, the police investigated further the persons involved by the
confession of Mamucod, tracked and apprehended Leocadio Carroen, Conrado Graham, and Agapito
Lingad. The Fiscal filed the information for robbery with homicaide against them and Estanislao Real,
who is still at large. The accused were charged and tried and found guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide. They are to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Go in a
sum of P10,000 and P110 (the value of the stolen money), and each to pay one-month of the costs.

Carlos and Amparo Go, (son and daughter of the deceased) identified Carreon as the person
who came first with another to purchase, and returned after with Graham and Lingad to do the crime.
They recognized Carreon as the one who pointed the pistol at them and stole the money from them.
With him, Graham was the one he was with and together went away with the money (P110). They also
pointed out Lingad as the one outside and killing their father Vicente Go. From the testimonies, the
prosecution also introduced the confessions of the four accused, which the police testified to as having
been executed by the latter freely and voluntarily.

The accused denied having participated in the commission of the crime and alleged the defense
of alibi. They claimed that their confessions were secured from them by force. The trial court refused to
believe these statements in the face of the positive identification of them by Carlos Go and Amparo Go,
the facility with which alibis are fabricated, and the improbability of their claim that their confessions
have been secured by violence. The trial court has carefully read the evidence and that the findings of
the trial court are supported thereby.

While it was certain that Carreon and Graham were the ones who Pointed, entered and grabbed
the money, it was not clear who shot and killed Vicente Go, as it was dark and raining, and the shooting
happened outside the sight of Carlo and Amparo Go. Because the victim was in a dark and raining alley,
south of the store, and two pistols were used, it was difficult to the witnesses what actually happened.
These would create a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of the identification. The Court is unable to
agree with the finding of the trial court’s decision that it was Agapito Lingad who killed Vicente Go.

The prosecution submitted a confession. It says that, before 9:00 o'clock, Estanislao Real and
Agapito Lingad had been perpetrating a hold-up and the same Conrado Graham offered to join them;
that thereupon it was agreed that Graham contact Leocadio Carreon, who was going to get a taxi for
them; that evening, Carreon saw the taxi Driven by the accused Amado Mamucod on Tayabas and Ipil
streets, where Conrado Graham came down with Agapito Lingad and Estanislao Real, and that all four
embarked in the taxi driven by the said Amado Mamucod; that they went around in the taxi to Sulucan
Street; that as two persons were then in the store, they let the time pass by and waited the two persons
to go away by going around and then coming back to the store; that the second time that they passed
the store the two persons in the store had already gone away, and so they parked the taxi around two
posts (electric) from the store to prevent suspicion; that Leocadio Carreon and another first came to the
store to buy cigarettes and coca cola, to determine where the storekeepers kept the money; and that
three of them went back, namely, Leocadio Carreon, Conrado Graham and a third, who is either
Estanislao Real or Agapito Lingad. Under these circumstances, it is evident that all the three accused,
namely, Agapito Lingad, Leocadio Carreon and Conrado Graham, irrespective of their respective
participations in the hold-up, are guilty of the offense committed; it is immaterial which of the two,
Lingad or Real, shot the deceased Vicente Go, because the conspiracy is conclusively shown by their
common concurrence and their coordinate acts.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lingad or Real is guilty of homicide

Whether or not Lingad be convicted of the crime robbery with homicide with only a
preponderance of evidence

(actually hindi ko makita kung ano ung actual issue e, best to read the full case sorry)

HELD

All of the accused, whether they have actually participated in the killing or not, are still guilty of
the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
in the complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide,
unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed as to the
accused-appellants Agapito Lingad, Leocadio Carreon and Conrado Graham, but modified as to the
accused-appellant Amado Mamucod, who is hereby found guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
robbery with homicide.

Conspiracy – The act of one, is the act of all the others.

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