NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 44 ISSN 1874-6276

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
National Policies and International Security

Edited by
Mark Fitzpatrick
Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK

Alexander Nikitin
Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security,
Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia
and
Sergey Oznobishchev
Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, Moscow, Russia

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC

Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division
Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines –
National Policies and International Security
Moscow, Russia
15–16 October 2007

© 2008 IOS Press.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher.

ISBN 978-1-58603-897-7
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies v
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Preface
This book presents the results of the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop
“Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines: National policies and International Security,” held
in Moscow on October 15–16, 2007. Co-directed by Dr. Sergey Oznobishchev, Direc-
tor of the Institute for Strategic Assessments (Moscow) and Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior
Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Lon-
don) and hosted by the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation, the work-
shop was sponsored by the NATO Science Programme. The workshop brought to-
gether policy experts and government officials from eleven nations and NATO for two
days of exchanges on some of the most serious issues affecting national and global
security.
The topic of the workshop was chosen in view of the overarching importance that
nuclear strategies and doctrines continued to play in the modern world and in relations
among the leading states. This introduction provides a summary of the workshop and
the main issues that were discussed throughout the two-day event.
The nuclear doctrines of the recognized nuclear weapons states and the activities
these policies entail – beginning with the acquisition and modernization of nuclear
forces – inevitably influence the defense and foreign policies of those nations which are
without nuclear weapons capabilities as well as the policies of those nations that are
considered to be de facto nuclear weapons states.
The present unstable balance between the “haves” and the “have-nots” is becoming
increasingly shaky. Many representatives of the latter countries consider this division
to be illegal, immoral and unresponsive to the demands of their national security.
The declaratory aspects of nuclear doctrines and their provisions, which now even
more than in the past do not exclude the use of nuclear weapons when the national se-
curity is considered to be in jeopardy, look extremely outdated in today’s globalized
world, when most countries are pursuing close cooperative and partnership-like rela-
tions. The nuclear doctrines still support the notion that only nuclear weapons may
serve as a “supreme guarantor” of military security, despite the situation in which nu-
clear deterrence cannot fulfill its role effectively, especially against rogue states, and in
view of new threats and dangerous regimes.
The non-declared “operational” aspect of nuclear doctrines, which, as a remnant of
the old times of nuclear confrontation, still presupposes the presence of hundreds of
nuclear targets on the territory of the opponent (primarily between Russian and Ameri-
can forces) serves as an additional destabilizing factor in relations between countries.
Throughout the conference it was emphasized that the existing policies of national se-
curity and military doctrines do not reflect modern realities and that nuclear deterrence,
which still comprises the essence of nuclear doctrines of the nuclear-weapons states,
cannot effectively fulfill its assigned role, especially in view of the new common
threats posed by non-state actors and dangerous regimes.
As outlined in an introductory presentation by Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director of
the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Rela-
tions, the acute problems to be discussed at the conference included the correlation
between the declaratory and the “operational” aspects of the nuclear doctrines, the
vi

“first use” or “no first use” concepts in the nuclear policies of the nuclear weapons
states, the launch on warning issue, the contemporary “crisis” concerning US plans for
ballistic missile defense in Europe, and the present status of the nuclear arms control.
The discussion of the first topic – on the new threats and challenges to international and
national security and on the role of nuclear weapons under present conditions – focused
on the situation of the nations that have nuclear weapons at their disposal. In addition
to the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, India, Pakistan, Israel and
North Korea are considered to be de facto nuclear power. Beyond these states, about 20
other countries have the technological potential to develop nuclear weapons. Analyzing
these issues, Dr. Alexander Khryapin, Senior Research Fellow from the Center for
Military Strategic Studies, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion, acknowledged that whether or not these countries would use their potential is de-
pendent not only on the political will of their leaders, but on the security environment
in the world and in their regions and on the degree to which the nuclear powers exer-
cise self-restraint.
Participants agreed that in contrast to the times of the Cold War, nuclear weapons
are increasingly presented in official policy documents not as instruments of political
containment but as combat weapons which may be physically used to deter the escala-
tion of aggression executed even by conventional means. This situation was considered
to be extremely dangerous.
Many experts expressed their concern that the most mighty nuclear arsenals (of
Russia and the USA) are still, as in times of the Cold War, aimed at each other. This
factor, as well as the left-over disposition inherited from the Cold War period of re-
garding the partner as a potential “nuclear opponent” strongly impedes prospects for
achieving true and effective partnership.
An interesting and timely analysis was given by Dr. Harold Smith, Distinguished
Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy of the University of California, who
presented a comparison of the Republican and Democratic Party policies towards nu-
clear weapons. His principal assessment was that differences between the parties are
diminishing, as evidenced by the 4 January 2007 op-ed by Messrs. Shultz, Perry, Kiss-
inger, and Nunn, which advocated steps toward “A world free of nuclear weapons.”
Smith predicted that in matters nuclear, candidates from both sides will move toward
multilateralism, legally binding treaties and international verification and enforcement;
e.g. sanctions.
Professor Vladimir Baranovsky emphasized the new factors connected with nu-
clear weapons: the appearance of highly accurate weapons, the lowered possibility of
regional conflict being escalated to the global level, and the crisis of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. A number of experts commented that in fact non-proliferation
policies are subordinate to the status of political relations, the level of confidence be-
tween states and their ability to work cooperatively to achieve common goals. The
deficit of partnership in many aspects of interactions between countries was acknowl-
edged.
Dr. Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor of Georgetown University, in analyzing sev-
eral aspects of nuclear deterrence, acknowledged that this phenomenon still exists.
Several participants emphasized that nuclear deterrence is no longer suitable in the
situation of a declared partnership between the former adversaries (Russia and the
USA, first of all), is not able to deter rogue states, poses a threat to international secu-
rity, and is impotent to counter the most acute modern threats and challenges, particu-
larly proliferation and terrorism.
 vii

Discussing the issue of Russia and US military strategies Major General (ret.)
Vladimir Dvorkin, the former director of the principal institute of the rocket forces,
also paid attention to the contradictory character of the present nuclear doctrines. He
also emphasized the issue of transparency of the nuclear programs which are not open
to the public in only two of the Permanent Five: Russia and China. His assessment was
that Russia in the coming future will support the level of 2000 nuclear warheads, taking
the course of MIRVing the Topol-M warheads. The experts discussing this issue ex-
pressed their opinion that Russia and US are interested in a new arms control treaty
which should be more transparent. At the same time the opinion was expressed that the
proposed enlargement of the INF Treaty to the “global” level does not seem to be pos-
sible in the near future.
In suggesting a cooperative approach to managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Rela-
tionship, Dr. Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President of Science Applications International
Corporation, recommended that the USA should address Russian uncertainty about
U.S. strategic intentions; that Russia should address U.S. uncertainties about Russia’s
commitment to preventing proliferation; and that both should find ways to build habits
of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack.
A vision of an alternative future US nuclear policy was presented by Joseph Cir-
incione, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy of the
Center for American Progress. In a document signed by several authoritative US ex-
perts on the Democratic Party side, a vision of such policy was presented. In their view,
deep reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals are achievable. This would pave
the way for the other nuclear states to join such reductions. Dr. Victor Mizin, Coun-
selor, Analytical Division of the Russian Council of Federation of the Federal Assem-
bly, reinforced many of these suggestions in his analysis of how to cure the inherent
defects of the NPT.
At the same time the discussion of British and French nuclear doctrines indicated
that joining in nuclear arms reductions is not necessarily on the agenda of both coun-
tries, particularly France. As was confirmed during the discussion of these issues, both
countries go along the way of their own national oriented understanding of minimum
deterrence.
The discussion segued to a presentation by Michael Rühle, Head, Speechwriting
and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of the NATO
Secretary General, who gave his prognoses of the new NATO strategic concept which
would appear rather soon. He paid attention to the fact that the situation in Europe con-
cerning the providing of nuclear security is steadily improving and expressed the opin-
ion that the nuclear doctrines of France, Great Britain and USA are developing in one
direction towards the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in the whole defense doc-
trine.
Dr. Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute
(London), assessed that the UK-USA relationship was of key importance in determin-
ing the UK’s nuclear stance and that while the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less
threatening but more uncertain strategic environment, nuclear ties with the US remain
as important as ever for the UK. Dr. Petr Romashkin, Senior Research Fellow at the
Institute of World Economy and International Relations, expressed his point of view
that the nuclear doctrines of the UK and France, like that of the US, reveal a break from
the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period
and a shift to preemptive and coercive use of nuclear weapons.
viii

Special interest was devoted to the issues of Chinese nuclear preparations. Speak-
ing on this topic, Dr. Jianqun Teng, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms
Control and Disarmament Association, emphasized that the term deterrence in connec-
tion with the national arsenal is not applicable to the understanding adopted among
Chinese experts and politicians. He noted that China is not supposed to enlarge the
number of warheads but would potentially go along the way of qualitative moderniza-
tion. At present China consider the security situation around its borders to be the best in
the last 50 years. Major General (ret) Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute
for USA and Canada Studies, agreed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider
nuclear weapons to be battlefield armaments. China’s commitment not to use nuclear
weapons first and its proposal to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obliga-
tions deserve support.
In analyzing Iran’s nuclear program, Fitzpatrick described the factors that lead to
a conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program has a military dimension. Dr. Alexander Pi-
kaev, Department Head of the Institute for World Economy and International Rela-
tions, presented the view that neither the sanctions nor the incentives employed by the
international community to date have had any impact on Iran’s stance, primarily be-
cause Washington has undercut the value of the incentives offered. Representative of
the Iranian Embassy in Moscow expressed confidence that Iran has neither the inten-
tion nor the capability to construct nuclear weapons and that “minor disputes” should
not impede Iranian-IAEA cooperation.
The example of North Korea was mostly treated as the successful case of coopera-
tive efforts of the leading states. Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pa-
cific Studies at the US Naval War College assess the various strategies pursued to date
to forestall North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, and noted that none of them
have yet achieved definitive results. Discussion focused on the loopholes in the non-
proliferation regime when a country can benefit from all the privileges of being within
the NPT regime and then withdraw without punishment. The existence of the suspected
nuclear arsenal in Israel, and the creation of arsenals by India and Pakistan outside the
limitations of the NPT at present pose even more challenges to the NPT regime.
Dr. Yair Evron, Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, assessed
that while Israel’s ambiguous nuclear posture signals self restraint and caution, the pol-
icy has not in fact deterred armed violence against the state, and it was only a secon-
dary factor in inducing Arab regimes to seek peace. Dr. Rajesh M. Basrur, associate
professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technologi-
cal University Singapore, explained that while India’s rapidly growing international
profile has raised concerns about the potential expansion of its nuclear capabilities.
Indian strategic culture is minimalistic, the product of decades of slow growth and a
firmly grounded policy of non-deployment. Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia also
stressed the minimum deterrence underpinning of his country’s nuclear forces.
Some experts lamented that “third states” are being presented with new incentives
to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, for many countries the US military campaign
in Iraq served as an additional proof that only nuclear weapons may provide real secu-
rity. The comment was made, for example, that “if Saddam Hussein really had nuclear
weapons at his disposal Washington would not dare to intervene.” Hence the acute
need for creating “security conditions” and collective security systems, including nu-
clear-weapon-free zones, if possible, in the most uneasy regions of the world. In this
respect, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vadim Grechaninov, President of the Atlantic Rada of
 ix

Ukraine, argued that Ukraine’s disarmament experience can serve as a positive exam-
ple for the world today.

Acknowledgments

The workshop directors appreciate the contributions to the discussion of all the partici-
pants, including those not named above. Credit is due the NATO officials and staff
who lent support, particularly Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, Programme Director for
Human and Societal Dynamics of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Pro-
gramme, and Elizabeth Cowan, program assistant. Special gratitude is extended to
Adelina Akhmentzyanova, Eugenia Andryushina, Eva Kharitonova, Oksana Novikova,
Varvara Sinitsina, Yulia Starilova, and Bejanishvili Zurab for their contributions in
Moscow toward the organization of the conference, and for their translation and editing
of chapters of this book. We also wish to thank Erin Blankenship and Rachel Yemini in
London for their skillful copy-editing and lay-out assistance in the preparation of this
book. Above all, Alexander Nikitin deserves acknowledgment for inspiring the work-
shop and for providing strategic direction and organizational advice before, during and
after the proceedings.

Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick

Workshop Co-Directors
This page intentionally left blank
 xi

Contents
Preface v
Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World 1

Alexander Khyrapin
A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding
Non-Proliferation 7
Harold Smith
Understanding Deterrence 16
Edward Ifft
Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing
the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship 25
Lewis A. Dunn
Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy 30
Joseph Cirincione
The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure
the “Inherent Defects” of the Nonproliferation Regime 39
Victor Mizin
NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision 58
Michael Rűhle
British Nuclear Strategy 64
Jeremy Stocker
Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective 70
Petr Romashkin
A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy 79
Jianqun Teng
Modern Nuclear Strategy of China 87
Pavel Zolotarev
Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? 92
Mark Fitzpatrick
Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 99
Alexander Pikaev
Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 113
Jonathan D. Pollack
Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons 121
Yair Evron
xii

India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement 129

Rajesh M. Basrur
Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security 138
Vadim Grechaninov
The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines 144
Alexander Nikitin and Sergey Oznobishchev

Author Index 153

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 1
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-1

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the

Modern World
Alexander KHYRAPIN1

Abstract. Deterrence policy was officially acknowledged as a constituent part of

national policy after the advent of nuclear weapons and therein became a main
instrument of military confrontation. The role of nuclear weapons as a means of
deterring aggression will be preserved for the foreseeable future. Deterrence as the
basis for strategic stability, however, may be endangered by various military
developments, including by: the creation of the global anti ballistic missile system;
attempts to reach strategic military dominance by re-equipping ballistic missiles
with conventional warheads and retaining a nuclear potential; the possible lifting
of restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space and the creation of
military bases in zones of so-FDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´

The strategy of deterrence

Throughout the centuries-old existence of the intergovernmental relations, the

deterrence of aggression has been one of the key elements of DVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
SROLF\  $W WKH VDPH WLPH ³GHWHUUHQFH SROLF\´ ZDV RIILFLDOO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG DV D
FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWRIWKHVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLF\RQO\ZKHQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVKDG
been created and thus became a main instrument of military confrontation. The term
³GHWHUUHQFH´LWVHOIWRRNRQVSHFLDOVLJQLILFDQFHDVZHOODVLWZDVQRZQHZO\DWWDFKHGWR
nuclear scenarios. In time nuclear deterrence became the basis for strategic deterrence
of a potential aggressor from unleashing war.
When understood as force containment, nuclear deterrence aims to convince the
enemy that aggression lacks any prospects in view of the consequences that such
military actions may entail. Hence the first key determinant of deterrence is the
FDWHJRU\ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ´ ZKLFK SUHVXSSRVHV WR IULJKWHQ WKH PLOLWDU\-political
leadership of the potential aggressor state with the consequences of the retaliation. In
WKLVOLJKWVRPHDQDO\VWVLQWHUSUHWWKHWHUP³GHWHUUHQFH´DV³GLVVXDVLRQWKURXJKIHDU´
The intimidation is based on the threat of retaliation, i.e. the guaranteed
punishment of a certain scale. The implementation of the retaliation threat suggests that
certain consequences for the aggressor state will follow. As the numerous examples of
armed conflicts including both world wars show, consequences in a broad sense may
be of various character and scale ± from moral-political deprecation and economic
sanctions imposed by the international community, up to heavy territorial, economic
and demographic losses including the disintegration of the state or significant limitation
of its sovereignty.
1
Leading Research Fellow, Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the RF Armed
Forces.
2 A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

The consequences of deterring the aggressor are usually associated with the
FRQFHSWRI³GDPDJH´PDLQO\XQGHUVWRRGDVSK\VLFDOORVVHVRILQGXVWULDOGHPRJUDSKLF
and military capacities that the aggressor would suffer as a result of the retaliatory
actions of the opposite party. Since the very moment of its formulation the category of
³GDPDJH´ KDV EHHQ RYHUWO\ RU GLVFUHHWO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG E\ DOO H[SHUWV DV WKH EDVLV RI
deterrence. At WKH VDPH WLPH RQO\ WKH GDPDJH ZKLFK LQ YLHZ RI WKH DJJUHVVRU¶V
political-military leadership, implies losses incommensurable with the benefits can
keep the adversary from direct military aggression. The level of inflicted damage
which exceeds the level RI ³DFFHSWDELOLW\´ GHILQHG E\ WKH HQHP\ KLPVHOI LV FDOOHG
³GHWHUUHQWGDPDJH´LQWKHGHWHUUHQFHWKHRU\7KHXSSHUOLPLWRIWKHGHWHUUHQWGDPDJHLV
³XQDFFHSWDEOHGDPDJH´LQLWVFODVVLFDOPHDQLQJ
7KHUHIRUH WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO FKDLQ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ ± retaliation threat ±
FRQVHTXHQFHVGHWHUUHQWGDPDJH´SURYLGHVWKHJURXQGIRUQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFH

Nuclear deterrence in the world

It should be emphasized that for over 60 years of its existence nuclear weaponry has
played an important role in preventing regional and large-sale wars in the first place, as
well as local conflicts between the nuclear powers and the coalitions they formed ± the
resolution of such conflict situations as the Taiwan (1954 and 1958), Berlin (1961), and
Cuban (1962) crises at the climax of the military-political and ideological confrontation
between the two world systems being glaring examples. Fortunately, each of these
crises ended peacefully and at the same time helped to create the mutual deterrence
system and the conceptual framework of nuclear security.
However, at that time more than 200 local wars and armed conflicts which
included the direct participation of nuclear states were unleashed: for example, the
USA and their NATO allies took part in the conflicts in Vietnam, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan and Iraq and the Soviet Union took part in the war in Afghanistan. This
shows that the existence of nuclear weapons cannot deter all armed conflicts, let alone
terrorist attacks. Therefore the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the
escalation of conventional wars, meaning the development of local conflicts into
regional, regional into large-scale, and large-scale into nuclear wars.
Today there are five states which officially possess nuclear weapons de jure:
Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and China. India and Pakistan have
acknowledged military nuclear programs. Israel neither confirms nor denies that it
possesses nuclear weapons and North Korea has claimed to have obtained such
weapons. According to the IAEA another 20 states possess the potential to create
nuclear weapons but owing to different reasons have refrained from it so far. For some
of them making the nuclear choice is only a question of political will, not of
technological impediments.
Countries have varying perspectives regarding their nuclear deterrent. The USA,
Great Britain and France, as both nuclear powers and NATO member states, follow the
coalition military strategy including nuclear strategy, though their national nuclear
strategies diverge on certain positions. For example, NATO coalition strategy views
QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ ODVW UHVHUYH ZKHUHDV $PHULFD¶V RZQ
QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ GRHV QRW UHJDUG QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ DV LW
DLPVWR³FUHDWHWKHKLJKHVWSRVVLEOH XQFHUWDLQW\´DERXWWKHSRWHQWLDOSHULRGDQGVFDOHRI
nuclear weapons use against the enemy.
 A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World 3

Interestingly, in contrast to the Cold War period, based on its economic and
military capacities the United States today has rather shifted its emphasis from nuclear
ZHDSRQVDQGEURDGHQHGWKHQRWLRQRI³WULDG´7KLVLQFOXGHVFRQYHQWLRQDOVWULNHIRUFHV
(high-precision weapons), the ABM system, and flexible infrastructure which
guarantee a possible quick build-up of operatively deployed nuclear forces. That being
said, the United States does not rule out the possibility of delivering pre-emptive
nuclear strikes against the adversary states possessing weapons of mass destruction
(chemical, biological or nuclear). It should be noted that in accordance with the
Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (2002), both Russia and the United States
are to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 2012 to 1700-2200 strategic nuclear
warheads. With regard to these reductions, however, the American side has implied
that the agreemHQW SHUWDLQV RQO\ ³RSHUDWLYHO\ GHSOR\HG´ QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV WKXV
reserving the opportunity to build up its nuclear forces at any time.
Other nuclear states have their own views of nuclear weapons and deterrence. The
Chinese military-political leadership sees its nuclear weapons as the basic instrument to
deter any attempts of military force pressure upon the state. India and Pakistan regard
their nuclear weapons not only as the means of defense policy in contemporary
conditions, but also as an indicator of high-tech development and status in the
international relations system.
The history of the nuclear deterrence in intergovernmental relations supports the
viewpoint of many states (primarily the developing countries) that nuclear weaponry is
one of the most effective instruments to protect oneself from the aggression of a more
developed adversary. It seems that this view on the role of nuclear weapons in the
overall system of international relations and national security will last for a long time.
Besides, GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ DFTXLULQJ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG PHDQV RI
delivery has been heated by the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, cases
which clearly showed them that no state outside of NATO can feel safe if in
confrontation with the western powers.
As a result there are a number of states which strive to possess nuclear weapons
production technology as an effective instrument to deter a more powerful adversary
even when the opposing parties have significantly asymmetric capacities. It should be
stressed once again that there are approximately 20 states today which have the
potential to develop nuclear weapons and this number will only grow.
There are several reasons underlying the desire to possess nuclear weapons:
Strengthening national (military) security;
Enhancing national status and prestige;
Protecting national freedom of action.

5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ

The position of the Russian Federation concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the
international relations system is close to the viewpoints of other nuclear powers. In
accordance with its military doctrine Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons
in retaliation against nuclear or any other WMD attack as well as in response to large-
scale conventional aggression if the situation is critical for the national security of the
Russian Federation and its allies. The nuclear de-escalation of unleashed aggression is
an extreme and forced measure and may be executed through nuclear strikes
4 A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

appropriate to the existing situation. The main aim of such strikes is to coerce the
enemy to stop the war at the earliest possible stage.
It should be stressed that Russia had further restrained its actions with the
obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons states parties to
the NPT except for the cases when Russia, its allies or states with shared security
responsibilities are attacked or if the aggression is launched in alliance with a nuclear-
weapon state.
Russia steadily adheres to the principles set in the international agreements in the
sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In particular Russia has
completely fulfilled its commitments within the INF Treaty as well as the SORT Treaty.
It is certain that by 2012 Russia will reach the quantitative level of nuclear warheads
defined by the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty.
However the treaty, which expires on December 5, 2009, does not provide any
verificatioQPHFKDQLVPVDVLWLVDQ³DJUHHPHQWRILQWHQWLRQV´SHUVH:LWKWKLVLQPLQG
it is necessary to carry on negotiations with the USA on a new agreement in the sphere
of strategic weapons reduction that is supported by an effective verification mechanism.
Such a new treaty should be legally binding and rest upon the basic principles of the
SORT Treaty.
It is necessary to stress once again that nuclear deterrence is based on the ides of
assured possibility and capability to cause unacceptable (deterrent) damage to an
aggressor through retaliation strikes of Russian forces, i.e. the threat of punishment
which in fact keeps the potential enemy from attacking Russia and its allies for any
rational political, military and economic reasons.
The understanding of the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weaponry
strengthens its role as a political instrument of prevention regional (large-scale) wars in
the first place. However, nuclear weapons should be also viewed as the military means
to destroy an enemy if the measures of deterrence turn out to be insufficient. Thus it
seems that the main functions of nuclear weapons which determine its role and place in
the strategic deterrence system are the following:
Political function ± deterring the aggressor (state or coalition of states) from
attempting to solve emerging differences by military means through the threat of
inevitable punishment;
Military function ± disruption or de-escalation of the unleashed aggression and
decisive defeat of the enemy through the use of nuclear weapons.
$IHZZRUGVDERXWWKHDWWHPSWVXQGHUWKHVORJDQRIµQXFOHDUULVNUHGXFWLRQ¶ZKLFK
certain experts have been undertaking recently in order to revise the role of nuclear
weapons in the Russian military security system, and hence change the essence of
nuclear deterrence based on the threat of mutually assured destruction in the Russian-
$PHULFDQ³FHQWUDOQXFOHDUFRQIURQWDWLRQ´WKH PDLQGUDZEDFNRIVXFKDWWHPSWVLVWKDW
they perceive nuclear deterrence as separate from strategic deterrence as it is.
Suggested measures such as reducing the forces on duty, slowing down the build-up of
high-alert elements of nuclear forces, and transparency about regions of SSBN
patrolling can significantly increase the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces against
a sudden conventional, high-precision attack, especially considering the creation of the
American global ABM system. After such a strike has been delivered, Russian nuclear
forces may become incapable of fulfilling their tasks and thus fail to ensure 5XVVLD¶V
nuclear deterrence capability. Therefore before the specific measures of nuclear risk
reduction can be discussed it is necessary to address the whole spectrum of issues
regarding the strategic deterrence maintenance, not only in the nuclear sphere but also
 A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World 5

in the field of general-purpose forces where the USA, let alone NATO, has certain
predominance.
It seems that before the revision of the essence of nuclear deterrence and nuclear
risk reductions can be discussed it is necessary to eliminate a whole complex of
differences and problems in the system of international and bilateral security. In order
to reduce nuclear risks several urgent measures should be taken, in particular the
commitment to:

Solve emerging international problems only through political-diplomatic

measures on the basis of the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions. The
use of military force should be regarded as an extreme measure which can only be
sanctioned by the UN Security Council and include a peacekeeping part;

Ban the deployment of nuclear weapons and its carriers on the territory of new
NATO-members as well as the use of the nuclear infrastructure created in the
former Soviet republics and the former members of the Warsaw Treaty;

Prevent (prohibit) the deployment of strategic ABM attack systems outside the
national territories of the states building them;

Take measures aimed at the practical reduction of strategic offensive arms and
OLTXLGDWLRQRIWKH³UHWXUQSRWHQWLDO´RQWhe common basis with the USA;

Involve other nuclear powers into the common process of fulfillment Article 6 of
the NPT through nuclear weapons reduction and comprehensive disarmament;

Sign new interrelated international agreements in the sphere of strategic offensive

(both nuclear and non-nuclear) and defensive systems, including the ABM
systems;

Prohibit any opportunity of arms deployment in outer space, to fix permanently

the weapons-free status of outer space; and

Restrict the creation and deployment of high-precision long-range conventional

systems as well as weapons based on newly developed technology.

5XVVLDLVDOVRFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQ³PLQLDWXUH´
nuclear warheads and re-equipment of strategic nuclear carriers with conventional
warheads. The claims that such means increase the effectiveness of the war against
terrorism are based on one-sided evaluations and do not stand up to critical analysis.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the appearance of such weapons would lower
the nuclear threshold and provoke the use of nuclear weapons.
It should be also stressed that the role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of
deterring aggression will hold out for a foreseeable perspective. However any steps
attempting to restrict the potential capabilities oI RWKHU VWDWHV¶ VWUDWHJLF GHWHUUHQW
systems would immediately lead to the collapse of the guaranteed security principles
not only of the individual states but also of the whole world. In the first place such
steps are as follows:
6 A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

Creation of the global ABM system which infringes upon the military security of
other countries;

Attempts to achieve military dominance in the sphere of strategic weapons by re-

equipping some of the ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads and building
up capabilities for nuclear reconstitution;

Attempts to lift any restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space; and

&UHDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\EDVHVLQWKH]RQHVRIWKHVRFDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´

Hopefully this approach to solving global problems will exhaust itself in the near
future as no global challenge can be solved outside a multilateral framework and
without considering the interests of all parties.
In conclusion ,as long as nuclear weaponry exists and the possibility of using it in
order to achieve military-political aims persists, and in the absence of a collective
security system with an effective verification mechanism, Russia will continue to
regard its nuclear weapons as the chief factor of deterrence and essential to maintaining
stability in the world.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 7
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-7

A Comparison of Republican and

Democratic Policies Regarding
Non-proliferation
1
Harold Smith

Abstract. The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists against urban targets is

generally agreed to be the most formidable threat faced by the United States
today. Yet, there is remarkably little discussion of the threat in the presidential
campaigns, and for good reason: one doesn’t win elections by frightening the
voters – better to concentrate on domestic issues such as the economy or medical
insurance or ethanol. Nonetheless, the populace is entitled to know what the
candidates intend to do to protect the country from so formidable a threat. Insight
can be found by studying the writings of key advisors on the general issue and
applying their thoughts to programs that must be considered by the next
administration, whether Republican or Democrat. In this case, modernization of
the nuclear arsenal and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provide
touchstones that separate the philosophical differences on these issues.

A Moving Target is Hard to Hit

There is nothing like a long American presidential campaign, particularly as a divisive

eight-year administration comes to an end, to show that Woody Allen was right: the
future ain’t what it used to be.2 Following 9/11, the Bush Administration adapted a
muscular, tightly controlled, unilateral approach to many areas, certainly to the area of
non-proliferation. Over the years, however, the strong-man approach has steadily
morphed into a more diplomatic, multi-lateral willingness to negotiate key areas of
concern. For example, a few years ago North Korea was part of the “axis of evil”
whose leader was a “tyrant”. This past year, however, Shapton in the New York Times,
which has been no admirer of the Bush policy, summarized the approach to North
Korea with a headline on October 8, “NK test – from regime collapse to multi-lateral
negotiation”, and Steven Lee Myers, also of the Times, began an article on October 7,
“Mr. Bush, who spent most of his presidency with a swaggering, go-it-alone style, has
increasingly turned to China…”. Even more recently, the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran, also a member of the “axis of evil”, discontinued
its nuclear weapon program in 2003. Evidently, Iran is no longer a proliferator of
nuclear weapons, which is truly a major change in American policy on non-

1
Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of
California, Berkeley, California, USA; formerly Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Programs, 1993-1998
2
Attributed
8 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

proliferation. One concludes that it is no easy matter to define a constant policy

regarding non-proliferation in “[T]these most brisk and giddy-paced times”.3
If it is difficult to ascertain the changing positions of an incumbent administration,
how much more so is the prediction of a policy of a dozen or so presidential candidates,
all of whom are trying to avoid taking any position on any matter so far in advance of
the actual election? Despite the cacophony, the answer is not as difficult as the
question implies. First of all, the candidates are focused on domestic issues of interest
to the primary election in the particular state at hand - Iowa at the time of this writing.
Debate of foreign policy, including non-proliferation, is limited to the war in Iraq, a
solution to the Palestinian problem, or the (now allegedly defunct) Iranian nuclear
weapon program. All of these pale when compared to health care, immigration, trade
balances, or farm policy, particularly in Iowa where ethanol – not a nuclear weapon – is
the issue of choice. It is a near certainty that the candidates themselves, whether
Republican or Democrat, will shed little light on their particular approach to non-
proliferation.4

The Role of Advisors in Determining Non-Proliferation Policy

The candidates may be evasive on such issues, but the advisors are certainly not, and it
would not be unusual for a newly elected president to turn to respected and experienced
(and published) advisors during the transition to and beginning of a new administration,
much as President Bush supposedly relied on (now) Secretary Rice in forming his own
foreign policy. The same could be said for most, perhaps all, of the recent presidents.
If one wishes to gauge the policy of either party regarding a subject as arcane as non-
proliferation, one should look to the published statements of presumably trusted
advisors rather than statements of candidates themselves during an election campaign.
One does not have to look far. Just as the candidates were beginning their
campaigns at the beginning of 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an Op-ed with
the strongest and most bipartisan statement on nuclear weapons that one can imagine.
George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, experienced,
respected, and trusted advisors, published an article entitled “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons”.5 It would be difficult to find four more qualified individuals to speak on the
subject. Collectively, they represent both parties and have experience dating at least to
the Reagan Administration as heads of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Defense, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. While one could question
whether their position is a policy or a hope – as John Deutch6 and Harold Brown7 have

3
William Shakespeare, “Twelfth-Night” II, iv, 6.
4
John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher provide an interesting twist to this conclusion. As a result of
their polling of Russian and American citizens, they conclude “that if future U.S. and Russian leaders wanted
to adopt cooperative nuclear risk reduction measures that match the changed circumstances of global
security, their citizens would be favorably disposed.” Arms Control Today, January/February 2008.
5
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007.
6
Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, 10
November 2007. Both are respected senior advisors although their impressive credentials are based primarily
on Democratic administrations.
7
Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-08. (Former
Secretary of Defense) Brown takes a particularly strong position against Shultz, et. al, by noting that they
have the proposition backwards. “[A] peaceful and orderly world is a prerequisite for the abolition of nuclear
weapons”; not the other way around.
 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation 9

done, their recommendations on how to proceed to a world without nuclear weapons

represent a forthright statement of non-proliferation policy as it might apply to the next
administration, whether Republican or Democrat. Furthermore, many of their
recommendations, but not all, have been espoused by the Bush Administration, the
notable exceptions being ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
and elimination of “short-ranged nuclear weapons designed to be forward deployed”.8
There are, however, notable absences in their recommendations; namely, whether to
proceed with deployment of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and the possible
need to modify the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the face of new weapon states
beyond the P-5 as well as an American willingness to provide nuclear technology to
India.9 In short, to the extent that the elected candidate is willing to follow the
recommendations of such senior advisors, there will be considerable unanimity
between the parties, but it will not be total. Partisan politics, despite the old adage, will
not end at the water’s edge.10 In this regard, the Reliable Replacement Warhead and
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty offer interesting contrasts between the parties.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a Touchstone

The Bush Administration has made a strong case, using a clear-eyed analysis of the
current American arsenal, for the design, development, and deployment of a new
nuclear weapon, the RRW. Democratic members of Congress and their advisors are
not against clear-eyed analysis, nor do they dispute the technical basis for the RRW
concept, but they are strongly against proceeding to deployment at this time. The
arguments for and against this program could well be a harbinger of the differences that
will separate the parties regarding non-proliferation after the next president is
inaugurated in January of 2009. Its omission in the bi-partisan opinion piece by Shultz,
et al., underscores a possible significant difference regarding non-proliferation between
the parties.11

The technical arguments; i.e., the facts

The technical arguments in favor of deployment of the RRW, which are not in dispute,
are similar to those associated with the common household decision to buy a new car
even though the old car is operating satisfactorily. Significant improvements are
possible, many of which will enhance non-proliferation (or operation, in the case of the
current automobile):

• Reliability can be improved and, therefore, the size of the arsenal can be
reduced.

8
Shultz et al. ,ibid. If the quoted statement were implemented, American nuclear weapons, under the
control of NATO and based in Europe, would be eliminated, which has been an untouchable subject in
American foreign policy for decades, despite Russian objections since the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and
its weapons returned to Russia.
9
James E. Goodby, “Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Missing Link,” The Brookings Institution, Global
Politics, 1 December 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/goodby/20061201.htm.
10
According to David Halberstam, the adage is nothing more than a myth: The Coldest Winter,
America and the Korean War, page 171, Hyperion, 2007.
11
Shultz et. al. ,ibid.
10 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

• Security of the new weapon can be enhanced; thereby further decreasing the
likelihood that a stolen weapon could be detonated should it fall into the hands
of terrorists.
• The new weapon will be certifiable without testing, an assertion that will
surely be debated sometime in the future but not for the moment. It is
presumed, although it is by no means certain, that the old weapons, the so-
called legacy arsenal, will eventually require testing.
• Performance will not be enhanced. The Administration has gone to
considerable effort to make this point. The RRW is a strict replacement; it
does not add nuclear capability and, therefore, in the opinion of the
administration should not be viewed as proliferation.
• Although not related to non-proliferation, it should be noted for completeness
that the safety and manufacturability will be increased and, in the long run,
costs will be reduced.

Although there is room for disagreement on these issues, they will not determine
the outcome of the debate on deployment; they merely set the stage for the debate,
much as a legal brief tries to establish the “facts of the matter” with a series of
sentences beginning with “whereas”.

The Bush position and, presumably, that of a succeeding Republican president

The present Republican administration does not rest its case simply on the technical
arguments; it goes further by noting that deployment of the RRW will have no effect
with regard to proliferation on the players of interest:

• The established nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China, the so-called P-5, see their reliance on nuclear
deterrence as unaffected by the modernity or lack thereof of the American
stockpile.
• The same could be said for the more recent nuclear powers, who entered the
scene following the 1967 signing of the NPT; viz., Israel, India, and Pakistan.
• Even those nations that may be on the threshold of recognition as nuclear
powers, North Korea and Iran, will not based their decision to cross the
threshold on whether the US modernizes its arsenal.
• Most importantly, the non-state players, the terrorists, who seemingly would
not hesitate to explode a nuclear weapon to further their cause, do not have a
nation to lose, and will not be deterred by the nuclear weapons of the nuclear
powers – whether modernized or not.

In short, the current Republican position is that no one who counts in the nuclear
world cares whether the US modernizes or not and, therefore, the decision should be
limited to the technical and economic advantages to the US. Simply put, the
international community is not a factor, and the country should get on with it.
 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation 11

The presumed position of a Democratic president regarding RRW

Except for the conclusion, most Democratic advisors agree with the administration’s
arguments. Where they part company is the size and importance of the international
audience watching to see if the new weapon is to be deployed. Rather than just the
nuclear powers and non-state terrorists, the Democrats see a much larger audience
composed of the vast majority of non-nuclear states that have conformed to the
conditions of the NPT.12 These nations have decided against the development of
nuclear weapons – indeed, some have cancelled such programs or, in the case of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have returned their nuclear weapons to the country
of origin. The Democrats argue that the broader audience did so for a variety of
reasons, not the least of which was the assumption that the United States and the other
members of the P-5 would act in accordance with Article Six of the NPT; that they
would, over time, reduce and, eventually, eliminate nuclear weapons. Deployment of
RRW would, in the eyes of these conforming nations, suggest otherwise. They will
conclude, according to the Democratic advisors, that the United States, contrary to the
NPT, intends to have a nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future; i.e., that the vision of a
road to eventual world-wide nuclear disarmament is a mirage and that, therefore, they
should reconsider their obligations under the treaty. Proliferation would, presumably,
follow.
There are also practical matters, such as time and money, which should be
considered in addition to the softer issue of international psychology. The question of
money, that most practical of matters, is of course, always with us, but especially so at
a time, or so the Democrats will argue, when federal deficits are both large and fast-
rising and when the (Democratically controlled) Congress cannot find a way to increase
taxes – as witnessed by its inability to fund the changes in the Alternative Minimum
Tax. As a result many programs will be postponed or curtailed by the next
administration. RRW will be a prime target for such postponement, thereby avoiding
the more contentious questions associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Fiscal conservativeness will be abetted, in this case, by the simple question: why
now? By all accounts, the Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP), while expensive but
probably less so than the early years of RRW, is proceeding satisfactorily. The
directors of the weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia) continue to
certify that the present arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable. Furthermore, they see no
need for nuclear testing at the present time and are sustained in this judgment by
reviews by multi-disciplined, prestigious advisory boards such as the Defense Science
Board and the JASONS. Even nature seems to be in agreement: the aging of
plutonium, the central ingredient of American weapons, has been studied intensively
and found to be surprisingly resilient.13 In short, there is no need for a deployment
decision at this time; hence, the Democratic advisors are clear: postpone the
deployment.

12
Raymond Jeanloz, “Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation,” Science 316, 1541 (2007) with supporting
material, including an extensive bibliography, at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full316/5831/1541/DCI
13
NNSA NEWS, “Studies Show Plutonium Degradation in U. S. Nuclear Weapons Will Not Effect
Reliability Soon,” National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Press Release on 29
November 2006
12 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

The CTBT Adds a New Wrinkle; Viz., “Advise and Consent” of the Senate

Whereas the RRW was conspicuous by its absence in the recommendations by Shultz,
et al.,14 discussion of the CTBT merited one of the longest and most substantive
paragraphs in the article, which suggests that there was little disagreement between the
prestigious advisors who were drawn from both parties.15 The candidates, themselves,
as is to be expected, have been relatively silent on ratification of the CTBT, or so the
absence of reporting on the issue would have us believe.16
The conservative Republican senators are, however, another and important matter.
They have resisted ratification since the Clinton Administration and have remained
unmoved by either the report by General Shalikashvili in 200117 or that of the National
Academy of Science in 2002.18 Because of its unique constitutional powers, the
Senate, thereby, becomes a useful metric in seeking differences between the parties in
foreign policy as it pertains to non-proliferation.
Because one-third of the US Senate can reject ratification of a treaty, it really does
not matter what the candidates think, let alone say, or what their advisors advise.
Every candidate from both parties realizes that the conservative arm of the Senate will
probably be able to block ratification, and therefore, there is little practical value in
expending election potential or political capital on this issue. The CTBT will, as a
result, probably remain in the Senate where there are stark differences among the
members. These will have little impact on the presidential campaigns but are worth
exploring for the insight they give into the philosophical differences between the
parties regarding non-proliferation.
In general, the differences can be characterized by the old metaphor of a glass half
full or half empty. The Republican senators ask what’s to be gained by ratifying the
treaty, and the Democrats ask what’s to be lost. Philosophically, the differences are
similar to those that divided the house with respect to the RRW; i.e., the Republicans
want to see tangible benefits and measure those benefits against risks and without
regard to the opinions of the international community. The Democrats are not against
risk/benefit analysis but want to consider less tangible benefits such as those sometimes
captured by the (forever undefined) expression of “world opinion”. Some differences,
such as the conservative fear that any treaty is an unacceptable invasion of national
sovereignty or the liberal desire for international control or outright elimination of
nuclear weapons can be set aside as debatable visions of the future, but other
differences are more immediate, deserve scrutiny, and hopefully will be debated even
though minority blockage seems the most likely outcome. These fall into the
categories of [1] whether nuclear tests can be reliably detected, [2] if detected what can

14
Shultz et. al. ,ibid.
15
The basis for the wide agreement is summarized in the comprehensive paper prepared by Professor
Jeanloz for the second conference on "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons" held at Stanford University in
October 2007, a meeting that resulted in a second Op-ed by the same authors in the WSJ on 15 January 2008,
"Toward a Nuclear-Free World"
16
The strongest reporting on the matter has been by Zachary Hosford in Arms Control Today
(December 2007) “The CTBT …has drawn little attention from the Republicans but widespread support from
the Democratic candidates.”
17
J. M. Shalikashvili (2001) Letter to the President and Report on the Findings and
Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt_report.html
18
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) (2002) Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 84 pp
 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation 13

be done about the violation, and [3] what impact the absence of nuclear testing may
have on the reliability of the future arsenals.

Is the technology up to the task?

Most Democratic senators were convinced in 1999 that the available systems were
adequate to detect and verify underground nuclear explosions of any useful magnitude
anywhere in the world, and the capability has improved markedly since that time. As
Professor Jeanloz points out, seismic networks to be available by 2009 can detect
accurately the time of release of energy as low as 0.1 – 0.5 KT with good geographical
accuracy and can distinguish between explosions, earthquakes, and implosions such as
collapse of a mine or the sinking of the Kursk. Furthermore, what seismic networks
cannot do, namely distinguish between a nuclear explosion and a large conventional
one, can be done through radiochemical means, which have been vastly improved since
the first Soviet test was detected by analysis of airborne debris off the coast of China in
1949. In fact, the two approaches are nicely complementary: radiochemistry provides
the requisite information about the type of explosion,19 nuclear or non-nuclear, but with
poor resolution of time and place; seismic nets provide the opposite. To this must be
added the enormous expansion and availability of satellite photography, both classified
and unclassified, which makes any activity on the ground related to nuclear testing
difficult to hide – especially if seismology provides the archival clue of when and
where to look. In short, technology is up to the task; detection of a test of a nuclear
weapon should be viewed by one and all as highly likely.

So what?

The problem, as seen from the Republican side of the aisle, is not whether a nuclear
test can be detected. That’s granted, as is the intrinsic value of the intelligence gained
from measuring various aspects of a nuclear test. The problem, rather, is what to do
about the detected test, aside from the intelligence gained there from. The Republicans
will cite the successful international detection of tests by India, Pakistan, and North
Korea and will ask, rhetorically, what was the effect of the treaty, did the known ability
to detect deter, or even impede, these nuclear programs; what actions were taken as a
result of the detection; and given these most recent tests, what would deter future tests
by the three countries or by other currently non-nuclear countries. In short, what
benefits accrue to the United States or any established nation, for that matter, from a
treaty that bans testing, when those who want to test, announce that they intend to test,
test, and nothing happens? There are no consequences.
The Republicans will call this “realism” and the Democrats will call it “cynicism”.
They will counter that an international treaty, where verification is essentially
guaranteed, provides a clear statement that the total number of nuclear weapons and the
number of nations possessing weapons and that there should be no major
improvements to weapons that exist. The argument will be the classic debate between
school children where every “why” is answered with a “why not”? The question of “so
what” will add rhetoric to the debate, but it will not add substance.

19
For example, a xenon-isotope anomaly, related to the North Korean test, was detected in Canada
fifteen days after the event; see Jeanloz.
14 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

Impact on established nuclear arsenals

Of far more substance would be a debate on whether testing is essential to maintaining

the reliability and safety of the American arsenal, which was designed for high
performance (high yield to weight ratio) at a time when it was assumed that testing
would continue indefinitely.20 The positions of the two parties, in this case, will show a
difference in degree – not in kind.
There is no serious doubt within the parties that, for the time being, the United
States must maintain a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear arsenal, and any development
that compromises its retaliatory nuclear threat must be addressed, and addressed
urgently and with highest priority. Furthermore, both parties will agree that if testing is
required to ensure the nuclear deterrent, so be it; the US will test. The difference will
be in the desired sequencing of events leading the test. The Democrats will argue that
the treaty specifically allows a states-party to withdraw from the (ratified) treaty if it
judges that testing is necessary to its national interest. Hence, the Democratic call will
be: ratify now and withdraw later, if necessary.
The conservative Republican senators will not accept this. They will note that
international political forces will be so strong and so varied and that the scientific need
to test will be so arcane that no president will have the political courage or capital to
withdraw from the treaty. Hence, the Republican call will be: do not ratify in order to
preserve a real option to test – not a paper option that realistically cannot be exercised.
Given the willingness of the present Bush Administration to withdraw unilaterally from
the ABM treaty, the Democrats will have the better of the argument – but the
Republicans will have the votes; i.e., the required number of votes to block ratification.

Conclusions

The quiet debate on non-proliferation among the advisors of both parties, which is
taking place far from the hustings and the candidates, and the recent willingness of the
Bush Administration to seek international agreement through negotiation, including
multi-lateral negotiation, suggests that the degree of difference regarding non-
proliferation between the parties will be not be a major factor in the forthcoming
presidential race. In forming policy, the Democrats will consider the broader
international community, while the Republicans will rely more on maintaining a
stronger, unilateral position, but the differences will be small, especially when
compared to the early years of the present administration.
Deployment of the Reliable Replacement Warhead serves as a touchstone for this
prediction. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, the (presumably Democratically
controlled) Congress and a Democratic president will consider the effect of deployment
on the large majority of signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than just the
present nuclear powers or terrorists. They will opt for postponement. A Republican
president may take the narrower view and be in favor of deployment, but it is difficult

20
The automotive metaphor which was applied above to the case of the RRW will be extended during
the debates to the arguments over the CTBT in the sense that high performance automobiles (and warheads)
need more maintenance and testing than more ordinary cars (and warheads). The comparison is a useful
pedagogical tool but its usefulness stops there. Cars that are used continually and nuclear warheads that (so
far) have seen no use have very little in common.
 H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation 15

to see how the new president could convince the congress to provide the funds. In
either case, however, consideration of non-proliferation will be secondary: the normal
bureaucratic processes will prevail; i.e., the absence of urgency and fiscal reality will
lead to the easy road of postponement.
Debate regarding ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will bring out
the same points as those made with regard to the RRW. Neither will spark debate
among the candidates but each will receive significant attention from presidential
advisors where the Democratic advisors will insist on the importance of international
standing and the Republican advisors will look for (and fail to find) more tangible
reasons. Both programs will languish in the coming administration, but for different
reasons: RRW deployment is easily postponed and CTBT ratification will be blocked
by a minority of the Senate.
Should there be a nuclear 9/11, or if the public suddenly becomes convinced that
there is a clear and present danger of nuclear terrorism, all bets are off. At that point,
all aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons will be center-stage, and the absence of
presidential statements during the campaign, including the long range aspects of non-
proliferation such as RRW and CTBT, will be overlooked. The world will have
entered a new era.
16 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-16

Understanding Deterrence

Edward IFFT1

Abstract. Nuclear deterrence continues to be an important concept in

international relations, despite the dramatic changes since the Cold War. As
efforts are made to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to very low levels, with
the ultimate goal of elimination, it is important to consider issues such as who is
entitled to have nuclear deterrence, how nuclear deterrence operates at very low
levels, the proper role of ABM defenses and how to strengthen nonproliferation
norms by assuring the security of states without nuclear weapons. One path to
resolving these difficult issues may be a greater reliance upon collective defenses
by groups of states, using conventional arms.

Introduction

Deterrence is a word used frequently in international relations. Even a casual

consideration of its usage shows that there is no common understanding of what it
means or how the concept operates. All the Nuclear Weapon States say that the
primary purpose, perhaps the sole purpose, of their nuclear weapons is for deterrence.
India and Pakistan say that deterrence is the goal of their programs. North Korea’s
Foreign Ministry declared that “nuclear weapons will serve as a reliable war deterrent
for protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation
from the U.S. threat of aggression.”2 If Iran decides to seek nuclear weapons, one can
be sure that they will justify it on the basis of deterrence. They would also tell us that a
major cause of their disastrous war with Iraq was the lack of a credible deterrent. Nor
is the concept of deterrence static even within one country. In the U.S., we have gone
from massive retaliation to assured destruction to flexible response to tailored
deterrence, with other variations along the way. Similar evolutions have taken place in
other countries.
Almost any proposed major new strategic weapon system will be both supported
and opposed on the basis of its supposed effect upon deterrence. A prominent recent
example is the ABM system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S.
believes it would strengthen deterrence, while the Russian Federation believes it would
weaken it. Evidently, someone is confused! Perhaps the most straightforward
explanation for the confusion is the failure to ask “deter whom from doing what?”
In view of the fact that this is a large and complicated subject, and in view of the
limited time available and the sophistication of the audience, I would like to use the
format of posing eight fundamental questions about deterrence and attempting to sketch
out what will be rather simplistic answers. My hope is that this may shed some light on

1
Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University. The views expressed are those of the author alone.
 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence 17

this important subject, or at least stimulate some useful discussion. Perhaps we can be
guided by James Thurber’s observation that it is better to know some of the questions
than to know all of the answers.

1. What is Deterrence?

At the most basic level, deterrence, which comes from the Latin verb deterrere—to
frighten—is convincing a person, group or state that the reaction to a contemplated
course of action would result in a degree of pain or punishment that would exceed the
expected benefit of such action. Seen in its most general terms, deterrence is clearly
basic to law enforcement or the rearing of children. Deterrence could also be used, not
to prevent an action, but to encourage one or to force the cessation of something. This
could also be called “compellance” or even “coercion,” although the latter carries an
emotional burden that makes rational discussion difficult. We are, of course, talking
here about nuclear deterrence, although the concept is certainly relevant to discussions
of other weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. As an aside it might be
noted that the word frequently used for deterrence in Russian, sderzhivaniye, carries a
slightly different meaning than the English word.

2. Has Nuclear Deterrence Been Effective?

Yes and no. Most scholars believe that nuclear deterrence kept the major powers from
going to war against each other for 60 years. There is no reason to dispute this
proposition, though it cannot be proven and history does not reveal its alternatives. On
the other hand, numerous actions almost universally condemned by the international
community have not been prevented. In some cases, this was almost certainly because
the international community did not really attempt to apply credible and effective
deterrence. In other cases, deterrence may have simply failed. An interesting example
is found in the first Gulf War. It is believed by many that Saddam Hussein did not use
chemical weapons because he was deterred by strong warnings from the U.S. However,
it is frequently overlooked that he was also strongly warned not to set fire to the
Kuwaiti oil fields, but did so anyway. In addition, he attacked Israel with ballistic
missiles, in spite of Israel’s nuclear potential.
In any case, without going into specific cases, one might observe that there have
been instances in which luck, or good decisions by a handful of individuals, saved us
from disaster, more than the operation of an abstract theory. The Cuban Missile Crisis
might be one such example.

3. What is the Relationship between Deterrence and Assured Destruction?

It is relevant here to recall Churchill’s memorable phrase, “Safety will be the sturdy
child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” He correctly foresaw the
implications of mutual deterrence between powerful and hostile powers armed with
nuclear weapons. Elaborate theories of nuclear deterrence, which we need not explore
here, were developed in an effort to impose some intellectual rigor on a confused and
difficult situation. These efforts tended to be strong on mathematics, which we knew
18 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence

how to do well, but weak on psychology and politics. Elaborate computer simulations
were carried out to attempt to predict how a nuclear war would develop, and how intra-
war deterrence could be established. However, these almost always broke down after
the initial nuclear exchange. In the real world, what resulted, in the name of deterrence,
were grotesque levels of nuclear weapons in both the U.S. and Soviet Union.
In an effort to answer the question, “How much is enough?” and to gain some
control over the “mad momentum of the arms race,” Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara tried to quantify what levels of destruction would be sufficient to deter the
Soviet Union from actions that would threaten the vital interests of the U.S. and its
Allies. Various considerations led to the conclusion that the destruction of 30% of the
population and three-fourths of the industry of the Soviet Union would be sufficient.
The spirit of those times is further illustrated by the fact that, in the late 1960s, as we
were preparing for the beginning of the SALT negotiations, we were told that, since the
Soviet Union had “accepted” 20,000,000 deaths in World War II, much greater levels
of destruction would be necessary for deterrence to be effective. That seemed absurd
to me then and is, of course, even more so today.
Similar calculations were presumably made by other Nuclear Weapon States. In
the West, we referred approvingly to the policies of states with smaller nuclear arsenals,
such as Britain and France, as “deterrence of the strong by the weak.” That phrase now
has a much more negative connotation in connection with asymmetric warfare. In the
U.S., an effort was eventually made to make deterrence less horrific by emphasizing
the targeting of military and economic assets, rather than population per se. However,
calculations of what would be the actual effects of a nuclear exchange indicated that
any feelings of moral superiority from the change were hard to justify. All along, the
concept should have been called Mutual Assured Deterrence, but the unfortunate
acronym MAD would have been the same.
Certainly there were, and are, differences in how individual states view the roles of
nuclear weapons and deterrence. There are experts at this Workshop from all the
Nuclear Weapon States who can address the views and policies of their countries
authoritatively.2 As far as NATO are concerned, previously it described nuclear
weapons as “weapons of last resort” and the possibility of their use as “extremely
remote.” The current NATO Strategic Concept, which dates from 1999, proclaims that
nuclear weapons make a “unique contribution” and describes them as “essential to
preserve peace.”3

4. Do We Still Have Assured Destruction Today?

The answer must be a qualified “yes.” Of course, we have the benefits of de-targeting
and far better relations, including greater openness and cooperation, among the states of
NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and China. One could claim that there is no longer a
“policy” of assured destruction. However, to claim, as some have done, that assured
destruction no longer exists, is a dangerous illusion. A more realistic view is to
consider assured destruction as an existential fact, rather than a policy. The only
prudent assumption is that, if the survival of a state possessing nuclear weapons were at
stake, and especially if it were attacked with nuclear weapons, it would respond with
nuclear weapons, probably on a large scale. The simple fact is that, as long as large
numbers of nuclear weapons exist, the threat of assured destruction hangs over us. As
 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence 19

former Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress, “You can’t entirely do
away with what has been known as mutual assured destruction.”4
There are clearly moral objections to be made to the policy, and perhaps legal ones
as well, flowing from the 1986 Advisory Opinion rendered by the International Court
of Justice. However, it is difficult to say that mounting a credible threat to inflict
unacceptable damage on an aggressor was or is wrong. What was wrong, in my view,
was the failure to recognize that the levels of nuclear weapons created by the two
superpowers were grossly in excess of what was necessary to do this. This was caused
by lack of trust, lack of communication, the extreme use of worst-case assumptions and
the lack of arms control agreements to regulate the competition. The unhealthy
competition has finally been brought under control by the SALT, INF, START and
Moscow (SORT) Treaties, but thousands of nuclear weapons remain, both deployed
and non-deployed.
Another result of the arms control process of the 1980s and 1990s was the
realization that not only the size, but also the structure of strategic forces, has important
effects upon stability and deterrence. While “freedom-to-mix” was recognized as
important to allow for differences in the geo-political situation, along with historical
factors, more sophisticated analysis showed that certain kinds of nuclear deterrent
forces would be more stabilizing, or at least less destabilizing, than others. Thus, the
U.S. concluded that placing relatively greater reliance upon more survivable systems,
such as SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), mobile ICBMs
(intercontinental ballistic missiles) and bombers would be better for stability than
relying upon fixed ICBMs, especially those with MIRVs (multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles). Similarly, systems which were slow-flying, and hence
provided more warning time, such as bombers and cruise missiles, are less
destabilizing than ballistic missiles, with their very short warning times.
The U.S. devoted considerable effort in the START negotiations to trying to
convince its Soviet partner of the wisdom of this view of deterrence, with some, though
not complete, success. Perhaps the greatest achievement of this philosophy of
deterrence was the agreement to a complete ban on ICBMs with MIRVs in the START
II Treaty. Unfortunately, this Treaty never entered into force. Nevertheless, the trends
in both U.S. and Russian force structures over the past 15 years do reflect this view of
deterrence and stability.

5. Who is Entitled to Have Nuclear Deterrence?

This awkward question is almost never asked, but is at the heart of the nuclear
proliferation issue. One obvious answer could be the five Nuclear Weapon States, as
defined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, there would not be consensus on
this point. Although each of the five would certainly assert its right to have nuclear
deterrence, it is far from clear that each of the five would agree that the others have the
right to deter it with nuclear weapons. The problem is that discussions of nuclear
deterrence in any country will invariably deal with how deterrence works for that
country, not how it might work to deter it. During the START negotiations, I
sometimes heard from my colleagues on the U.S. Delegation the statement, “We are
not trying to deter ourselves!”
It is clear that both publics and policy makers are ambivalent about the subject. It
would be quite easy to gain assent to the proposition that deterrence should be
20 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence

preserved. It would be quite another matter to gain acceptance of the idea that other
countries should be allowed to maintain the capability to destroy us. The paradox is
that these are simply two ways of stating the same question. If deterrence is legitimate
and stabilizing, it would follow that countries should refrain from attempting to take
away the deterrence of other Nuclear Weapon States. This is obviously a difficult
proposition. It was the basic premise of the ABM Treaty, which is no longer with us.
However, even in the ABM Treaty, there was always the feeling that the Treaty was
simply recognizing a basic fact of the military situation between the US and USSR and
the impossibility of an effective nationwide ABM defense. There was always the view,
in some quarters, that this balance could and should be overturned as soon as
technological developments permitted. This latter view was certainly at least part of
the vision behind President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
What we have is a collision between the need to maintain deterrence and the
fundamental right and basic instinct for self defense. We have never really solved this
problem.
The situation becomes even more delicate when considering the situation
regarding India, Pakistan and Israel. Of course, the fact that India, Pakistan and Israel
never joined the NPT puts them into a different category than North Korea and Iran,
but the fundamental question of who has the right to deterrence against whom remains.
This leads us to the next question.

6. What is the Difference between Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Blackmail?

Much of the discussion around the dangers of nuclear proliferation seems to be

crystallizing around the term “nuclear blackmail.” The best way to understand nuclear
blackmail is to recognize that it is simply nuclear deterrence in the wrong hands. The
term has become suddenly popular in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the
first Gulf War. In an important speech at the National Defense University in
Washington in 2001, President Bush declared, “The international community would
have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear
weapons.”5 President Putin, former President Chirac and former Prime Minister Blair
have all used the term. In the context in which it is being used, it basically expresses
the concern that the freedom of action of the Nuclear Weapon States would be curtailed
if other states acquired nuclear weapons, or perhaps other weapons of mass destruction.
The scenario frequently cited is that a Nuclear Weapon State will be unable to
intervene in a regional conflict if one of the hostile parties to that conflict has nuclear
weapons.
While this is certainly a legitimate concern, it does not take much thought to
conclude that an argument that proliferation is bad because it would limit the ability of
Nuclear Weapon States to attack other states is not likely to be at all convincing to
Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Framing the proliferation debate so that it focuses on
whether individual states can intervene without risk in distant regional conflicts will
clearly not turn out well. If anything, such arguments merely confirm the utility of
nuclear weapons and raise the incentives for rogue states to acquire them. Such
arguments also tend to undermine the credibility of the security guarantees and
extended deterrence that are so important to nonproliferation.6 Furthermore, they
imply that we would not defend our vital interests, thus weakening deterrence itself.
We would be better served to stop talking about nuclear blackmail and return to the
 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence 21

traditional arguments used in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for why it is
in the best interests of all states to hold the line firmly on nuclear proliferation.

7. Can Terrorists be Deterred?

The question of whether or not terrorists can be deterred has been discussed so
extensively recently that there is little new to say. It has become commonplace to
assert that terrorists cannot be deterred and therefore must be hunted down and
eliminated at the source. There is, unfortunately, much truth to this. The concept of
punishment as deterrence is difficult to apply to those who seek martyrdom or deranged
fanatics who believe that terrorist acts can hasten the end of the world. At the same
time, terrorists have to come from somewhere and states, and especially their leaders,
can be held accountable for training camps and other preparations for terrorism which
take place on their territory. The same is true for those who knowingly assist terrorist
activities. After the experience of Afghanistan, regardless of how Iraq turns out, it is
hard to believe that states would lightly welcome and shelter terrorists. Of course, in
the case of failed states, or states unable to control their own territory, some action by
the international community may be necessary.
One should also recognize that denial can also be an effective counter, if not
necessarily a deterrent, to terrorists. This could be brought about through cooperation
in intelligence, missile defense, better regulation of the transfer of the tools of terrorism,
effective management of the consequences of terrorist acts, and so on. More research
on nuclear forensics, so that the source of nuclear materials used in an attack could be
reliably determined would be very useful. As far as international law is concerned, UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 and the International Convention against WMD
Terrorism provide a good foundation upon which additional measures might be
formulated.7

8. Can We Escape from Nuclear Deterrence and Assured Destruction?

This is one of the crucial questions of our time. Real escape from under the sword of
Damocles does not appear to be a realistic possibility as long as large numbers of
nuclear weapons exist in the world. However, it should be possible to push the threat
far into the background through deeper reductions and more enlightened policies. Over
20 years ago, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev put forward competing visions of a
world free of nuclear weapons. Many people at the time, including myself, considered
these proposals rather unrealistic, and perhaps even an impediment to more practical
measures that were desperately needed. However, the goal of ridding the world of
nuclear weapons entirely has reemerged in quite responsible circles. In an article in the
Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger
and Sam Nunn—certainly not inexperienced or impractical men—advocated precisely
this course.8 In an important speech in Washington in June, 2007, Margaret Beckett,
then UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared that
almost no one believes that the current numbers of nuclear warheads are necessary and
called for further work to determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all
nuclear weapons.9 Hans Blix has recently written that “There is no conceivable use for
nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect is becoming increasingly ineffective. In
22 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence

regions where nuclear weapons might be a real basis for security, other measures, such
as integration into the fabric of the international community, are likely to be more
effective.”10
In the near term, a crucial question concerns what sort of a regime will replace the
START Treaty, which is scheduled to expire in December, 2009. The Moscow Treaty
of 2002, while usefully driving the START levels significantly lower, is clearly not the
answer in the longer term, for reasons that are well known. A practical path toward
very low levels of nuclear weapons may be through the gradual transformation of
deployed nuclear forces into “virtual” nuclear forces. Under this concept, nuclear
warheads would be separated from delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers), along
with other measures to reduce the imminent threat and reduce the possibility of
accident or miscalculation. On-site inspections and other transparency measures would
assure that these measures were being carried out as agreed. Reconstitution would be
possible as a safety net in the unlikely event that this became necessary. This concept
has recently been given expression by respected scholars in both the U.S. and the
Russian Federation.11
One could perhaps envision a sequential process involving five “D’s”:

• Declarations/Data Exchange
• De-targeting
• De-alerting
• Deactivation
• Disassembling/Dismantling

One would, of course, all the while be careful to preserve the most important “D”--
deterrence. Our goal is certainly not to make the world safe for conventional war.
Although we really do not know yet how to safely eliminate nuclear weapons
entirely, we do need to think in greater detail about how deterrence could work as the
levels approach zero. At some point, we would enter the realm of “minimum
deterrence.” This undefined term has been in use for many years and generally refers
to the minimum level of nuclear weapons that could still deter. Clearly what that level
might be is dependent upon specific scenarios and the psychology and goals of those
being deterred, but it is obviously far below current levels, or even those established by
the Moscow Treaty.
Anyone who has accepted the line of reasoning earlier in this paper will object that
there will always be bad people and outlaw nations and groups that refuse to abide by
international norms, and they must somehow be deterred. Weaker nations will
especially demand that they be protected from stronger nations, if they are to give up
nuclear aspirations. In order to achieve this, one can envision a system of positive and
negative security assurances, supported by collective deterrence by conventional means.
Although conventional weapons are more expensive than nuclear weapons for a given
level of damage, groups of countries can inflict unacceptable damage without resort to
nuclear weapons. Regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU and the AU come to
mind. The most universal body that could threaten to inflict unacceptable damage is,
of course, the United Nations itself. Conventional deterrence by collectives is more
credible than nuclear deterrence, since the latter is quite properly constrained by very
high thresholds and taboos. In addition, to the extent that one believes in blackmail, it
would be much more difficult for an outlaw state to blackmail a large group of states
than any individual state.
 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence 23

Many recent examples demonstrate the consequences of the failure to apply

credible deterrence, or to respond quickly and forcefully to flagrant violations of
international norms. Although the Bush administration’s doctrine of
preemptive/preventive war has been met with strong opposition, it is becoming clear
that the international community does need to respond more quickly and more
effectively to such outrages.

Conclusion

Nuclear deterrence has been a fundamental factor in international relations for the
entire lifetime of most of the people in this room. In recent years, the concept of
nuclear deterrence has come under attack. It is said that nuclear deterrence:

• No longer exists
• Is no longer effective
• Is no longer necessary
• Is dangerous
• Is immoral
• Is inconsistent with our nonproliferation objectives
• Encourages irresponsible nations and organizations to acquire nuclear
weapons

While there is some truth in each of these criticisms, in my view, they are too
simplistic, at least as long as significant numbers of nuclear weapons exist. In
retrospect, it is easy to see that the search for security led to deterrence, which led to
nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence required the capability to inflict unacceptable
damage, which was another name for assured destruction. With the spread of nuclear
weapons, this became mutual assured destruction. Unfortunately, this led to levels and
policies that were far beyond what was needed and were inconsistent with Article VI of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although this process did achieve its primary goal—the
prevention of nuclear war—we were lucky to survive the process.
Our task now should be to reduce nuclear weapons to very low levels, relying
increasingly upon collective conventional forces for deterrence, gradually pushing
nuclear deterrence into the background as a last resort.
If this sounds like the New World Order, it probably is. If it sounds naïve, it
probably has that flaw as well. Nevertheless, it does sound preferable to the world in
which we have been living for the past 60 years.12

NOTES

1. Washington Post, October 4, 2006, p. 18.

2. Recent discussions of the deterrent policies of all five Nuclear Weapon States can be found in
Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, Edited by Owen C. W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2007.
3. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Public Diplomacy Document SC99ENG0604,
paragraph 46, Brussels, NATO.
4. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20,
2001.
24 E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence

5. Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Washington,
D.C., May 1, 2001.
6. For a recent analysis of extended deterrence in the post-Cold War world, see Lewis A. Dunn,
“Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges and Responses,” IFRI Proliferation Paper No. 19, Security
Studies Center of the French Institute of International Studies, Summer, 2007.
7. A further recent discussion of deterring terrorists is found in Daniel Byman, “US Counter-
terrorism Options: A Taxonomy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 121-150. See also M. Elaine Bunn,
“Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum No. 225, Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University, January, 2007. See also Dunn, op. cit.
8. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear
Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. "The four authors elaborated their views in
another article in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008, as well as in a book entitled
"Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons," edited by George P.
Shultz, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, published by the Hoover Institution and the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (2008).
9. Margaret Beckett, Address to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference,
Washington, D.C., June 25, 2007.
10. Hans Blix, “CTBT: Going the Last Mile to Banish Nuclear Testing,” CTBTO Spectrum,
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (Vienna), July, 2007.
11. See, for example, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, What are Nuclear Weapons For?
Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Nuclear Forces, Washington, D.C., Arms Control
Association, April, 2005 (revised October, 2007). See also Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin,
Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2006.
12. For a more detailed discussion of nuclear deterrence by the author, see Edward Ifft, “Deterrence,
Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 237-256,
Routledge (London), September, 2007.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 25
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-25

Cooperative Security Management:

Toward a New Approach for Managing the
U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship
Lewis A. DUNN1

Abstract. U.S.-Russian strategic relations are approaching a turning point: a

continued drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and
growing political-military confrontation or an opportunity provided by presidential
elections in both countries to rethink and re-craft a non-adversarial relationship.
7RGD\¶V GULIW UHIOHFWV PDQ\ IDFWRUV SDVW PLVVWHSV GLIIHUHQFHV Rf interest and
approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of
breaking free from the Cold War legacy. Among other issues on the agenda,
action should be taken to address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic
intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing
proliferation; and ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist
WMD attack.

A Turning-Point:

The U.S.-Russian strategic relationship is approaching a turning point. The next years
may see a continued slow drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military
gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation ± but there also remains
WLPH IRU D MRLQW HIIRUW WR ³UHZLQG WKH ILOP´ DQG VHHN DJDLQ WR PRYH WRZDUG WKDW QRQ-
adversarial relaWLRQVKLS DIILUPHG E\ ERWK FRXQWULHV¶ OHDGHUV   7RGD\¶V GULIW LQ WKH
opposite direction reflects many factors: past missteps; differences of interest and
approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking
free from the Cold War legacy. That said, the upcoming presidential elections in both
countries offer one of those political points in time that can ± but need not ± provide an
opportunity to rethink and re-craft the relationship.

The Principle of Cooperative Security Management

Assuming a mutual interest in both Washington and Moscow to use that opportunity,
one starting point would be to seek joint agreement on the principle that a cooperative
security management approach should be the guiding concept for governing U.S.-
Russian strategic relations. As the phrase states, cooperative security management
ZRXOGSDUWO\HQWDLODPXWXDOFRPPLWPHQWWRPDQDJHFRRSHUDWLYHO\ERWKVLGHV¶HYROYLQJ
strategic choices ± ZLWKDQH\HRQHQKDQFLQJHDFKFRXQWU\¶VVHFXULW\DVZHOODVEroader

1
Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation. The views herein are those of
the author not necessarily those of Science Applications International Corporation or any of its sponsoring
organizations.
26 L.A. Dunn / Cooperative Security Management

global stability. It would entail as well a commitment in practice to efforts to seek a

mutual accommodation of interests, while containing any all-but-inevitable differences
RILQWHUHVWRUSHUVSHFWLYH,WZRXOGDIILUPLQWXUQERWKFRXQWULHV¶UHDGiness to pursue
cooperatively global strategic stability.
With regard to means, cooperative security management would not rule out
negotiated agreements (formal or informal, legally-binding or political). But it would
encompass many other types of implementing activities (parallel unilateral actions and
political understandings; exchanges of information and liaison personnel; joint
political-military studies, planning, and operations; establishment of jointly-operated
systems; and international reporting and monitoring).
Most broadly, this concept of cooperative management could be used as well to
govern other key global strategic relationships. In turn, it would provide a conceptual
framework for broader great power cooperation to meet global stability challenges.

Dimensions of Strategic Stability

Part of a cooperative security management approach would entail serious and sustained
consultations to reach agreement on a shared vision of future global strategic stability ±
and on the most pressing threats to stability. Even if some differences persisted, the
very process would be valuable ± assuming a high-level mandate on both sides to work
the issue in earnest.
Strategic stability is a long used, if ill-defined concept. It also has many
dimensions.2 IQWRGD\¶VZRUOGZKDWPD\EHWHUPHGSHDFHWLPHVWDELOLW\± ensuring that
conflicting interests do not spillover to undermine the overall Russia-U.S. political
relationship as well as the basis for cooperative actions to meet common security
threats ± is taking on increasing importance. More traditional arms race stability also
seems to once again be emerging as an issue. By contrast, given the extremely low
probability of a military clash between the two countries, crisis stability appears less
central to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. But it could be an area in which the
two sides would seek to cooperate to dampen crises in other regions. Two other
dimensions of stability today also could figure in the type of consultations being
suggested ± proliferation stability and anti-terrorism stability defined respectively in
terms of containing the risks and dangers of runaway proliferation and of terrorist use
of weapons of mass destruction.

Three Illustrative Areas for Action:

Agreement on a principle of cooperative security management and on a vision of global

strategic stability, however, would only be a starting point. Implementation in practice
would be critical ± both to rebuild confidence between Washington and Moscow and to
work the critical challenges that could fuel the drift toward suspicion, gamesmanship,
and political-military confrontation. The agenda would be a full one. Consider very
briefly three examples taken from that broader agenda, examples that span the different
dimensions of stability: Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S.
uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and building

2
The following breakdown of the different types of stability draws on conversations with Leonard
Spector.
 L.A. Dunn / Cooperative Security Management 27

habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack with chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear weapons.

5XVVLD¶V8QFHUWDLQW\DERXW866WUDWHJLF,QWHQWLRQV
Increasingly, Russian officials and experts have voiced concern about U.S. strategic
intentions. Their statements point toward an alleged U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy
based on a mix of lower-yield nuclear capabilities perceived being acquired, advanced
conventional strike options, and deployment of missile defenses. Some persons warn
that ultimately U.S. actions ± combined with Russian inactions ± will undermine
5XVVLD¶V QXFOHDU GHWHUrent capability. Isolated voices go so far as to warn of U.S.
military threats to coerce Russia in one or another area.
Cooperative security management would seek mutually acceptable approaches to
lessen this strategic uncertainty. A full discussion exceeds the scope of this brief
presentation. Suffice it to suggest some pathways to explore.
First, the possibility should be examined of putting in place sustained give-and-
take strategic consultations, at multiple levels. These consultations would build on and
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]H WKH UHFHQW ³WZR-plus-WZR´ PHHWLQJV EHWZHHQ WKH 6HFUHWDULHV RI
State/Foreign Affairs and Defense. These meetings could be extended to include
possible exchanges of liaison officers between the two militaries and defense
establishments in appropriate locations
Second, a renewed but expanded effort should be made to put in place a joint Early
Warning Capability. As a start this could entail bringing into effect the now moribund
2000 agreement for shared early warning (the Joint Data Exchange Center). But shared
early warning could go beyond that agreement to exchange national data to explore
creation of a jointly operated early warning capability, thereby providing each country
with direct real-time access to comparable warning imagery. This type of step would
JR IDU WR GHDO ZLWK RQH XQGHUO\LQJ URRW RI 5XVVLDQ VWUDWHJLF XQFHUWDLQW\ 5XVVLD¶V
eroded early warning capability.
Third, cooperative alternatives to regulate future missile defense deployments need
to be pursued ± from exploration of agreed deployment guidelines to actual pursuit of a
joint U.S.-Russian global missile defense capability against proliferation threats.
Finally, building on the preceding, steps could be taken to put in place a set of
confidence-building, transparency, and constraint measures ± technical, political, and
operational ± to accompany any U.S. deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic
missiles. For that matter, such measures also would be appropriate to accompany any
Russian deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles should Russia
eventually follow suit.

868QFHUWDLQW\DERXW5XVVLD¶V&RPPLWPHQWWR1RQ-Proliferation
Today, it often is remarked wistfully that during the Cold War, preventing proliferation
was the one area of sustained and successful strategic cooperation between Moscow
and Washington. Within some parts of the U.S. strategic community, there is a
SHULRGLFVSHFXODWLRQWKDWWRGD\¶VODFNRIQRQ-proliferation cooperation actually reflects
a Russian belief that more proliferation would be good ± especially as a means to tie-
down and impede a United States perceived to be seeking global hegemony. Russian
policies toward Iran are cited as an example.
So far, strategic dialogue alone has not been sufficient to put such doubts to rest,
particularly in the wider American foreign policy and defense community. Even so,
28 L.A. Dunn / Cooperative Security Management

that dialogue on proliferation challenges is essential ± particularly if as in the Cold War

era, it can become a genuine give-and-take process. What is even more necessary,
however, is to find ways to rebuild strong habits of non-proliferation cooperation
between Washington and Moscow. This includes cooperation on the tough cases. By
way of illustration, in the specific case cited of Iran, Russia and the United States ±
along with other great powers ± could take the lead in signaling to the Iranian
leadership that should Iran break out of the Nonproliferation Treaty and acquire nuclear
weapons, the great powers would respond cooperatively to ensure that Iran did not gain
from the bomb. By so doing, they could yet shift the balance of internal debate in Iran
where a key question remains whether Iran ultimately would make itself less not more
VHFXUHE\³JRLQJDOOWKHZD\WRWKHERPE´

Building Habits of Cooperation in Countering Terrorist WMD Attacks

Russia and the United States clearly share a strong common interest in countering
terrorist attacks using WMD ± chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Most narrowly, each country has been the target of WMD threats or use: in 1995,
Chechyan terrorists threatened the use of radiological weapons against Moscow; in
2001, an unknown individual or group mailed letters with anthrax to targeted
Americans. Both countries support the International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, are co-chairs of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism, and have cooperated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to
enhance protection against WMD terrorism. Cooperation in specific instances,
however, has sometimes been more problematic ± as it was after the 2001 anthrax
mailings (when the United States sought Russian expertise), or after the 2006 seizure
by Georgian authorities of smuggled highly-enriched uranium (when it proved difficult
to investigate the origins of the materials).
From this perspective, a key challenge for cooperative security management would
be to strengthen the habits of cooperation between Moscow and Washington ± and then
more widely among the great powers ± to prevent, detect, disrupt, attribute, or respond
to a terrorist WMD incident. Here, too, there are a variety of potential pathways to
explore.
By way of example, building on the Global Initiative, joint planning and exercises
could be undertaken to enhance capabilities to detect, interdict, and otherwise prevent a
successful terrorist WMD attack, from near-real time exchanges of warning
intelligence to joint operational deployments. Closely related, emergency response and
consequence management planning and exercises also could be begun. This could
include assessment of possible on-call capabilities to provide joint support to a third
country that requires assistance in assessing and rendering safe a terrorist device or in
dealing with the consequences of an event. In the area of cooperative attribution of the
sources of a terrorist WMD attack, discussions could focus on needed authorities and
procedures that would enable cooperation to ensure that the perpetrator of a terrorist
WMD attack (from the leaders to the aiders and abettors) will not be able to hide.
Still another area would be consultations and planning for a coordinated response to a
terrorist WMD event ± not least, on the one hand, to send the right global signal, and
on the other hand, to leverage the shock of a terrorist WMD attack as a means to
strengthen global counter-terrorist and non-proliferation activities.
 L.A. Dunn / Cooperative Security Management 29

What Next

7RGD\¶VFKDOOHQJH LVWRUHYHUVH WKH GULIWWRZDUGSROLWLFDO-military confrontation in the

U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. For the United States, reversing that drift will
UHTXLUH DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKDW WKH SDVW KDOI GHFDGH¶V SRVWXUH RI VWUDWHJLF ³ODLVVH]-IDLUH´
has not moved the U.S.-Russian relationship ahead successfully. But it will also
require not simply aGRSWLQJ D ³EDFN WR WKH WUDGLWLRQDO DUPV FRQWURO IXWXUH´ ZD\ RI
confronting stability challenges. For Russia, reversing the drift will require tempering
WRGD\¶V³QHYHUDJDLQ´DVVHUWLYHQHVVDVZHOODVDFRPSDUDEOHUHDGLQHVVWRWKLQNDQHZRQ
some issues. For both countries the stakes are high ± from strengthening stability in its
many different variants through reinvigorated cooperation to deal with proliferation,
WMD terrorism, and other global security challenges, to finally putting the Cold War
legacy behind the two countries. The principle and practice of cooperative security
management offer a possible way forward.
30 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-30

Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

Joseph CIRINCIONE1

Abstract. Three trends are converging to increase prospects for a fundamental

change in global nuclear policies: the failure of the existing U.S. national security
strategy to stem the growing proliferation threats; a nearly simultaneous global
change in executive leadership; and a developing consensus across ideological
lines for a renewed commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Leading
U.S. presidential candidates have endorsed nuclear disarmament and numerous
experts and non-governmental organizations are developing comprehensive
proposals, most prominently George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and
Sam Nunn. These campaigns have created political space for officials to embrace
a more ambitious agenda than most previously had. There is a greater likelihood of
historic change in global nuclear policy now than at any other moment in the past
15 years.

For the first time in fifty-six years, the United States will conduct a presidential
election in 2008 that does not include a sitting president or vice-president. This greatly
increases the possibility of changes in nuclear strategic policy, particularly if the
candidate of the Democratic Party wins over the Republican Party candidate, as is now
widely anticipated.
New leadership in the White House is one of four trends that indicate a high
probability of positive changes in global nonproliferation policies. The other three are:

• the growing recognition that the radical counter-proliferation policies

promoted by neoconservatives and adopted by the Bush administration have
failed;
• the opportunities presented by elections that are simultaneously installing new
governments in most of the leading nations or the world—a rare global
political realignment; and
• the campaigns begun by leading non-government groups, primarily in the
United States but also in Europe, that are promoting policies to increase
international nuclear security.

This paper briefly examines these trends, focusing on the elements likely to
emerge in the next nuclear strategy of the United States.

1
President of the Ploughshares Fund. When this paper was prepared and presented he was Senior
Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC
 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy 31

Policy Failure

The progress made over the past twenty years in reducing arsenals of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles, in reducing the number of states with nuclear weapons or
weapons programs, and fortifying the nonproliferation regime with new tools and new
barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons has been reversed in recent years. As a result,
dangers have grown and there is now a distinct possibility of the collapse of much of
the nonproliferation regime.
The security strategies championed by Washington-based neoconservatives and
formalized in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the National Security Strategy of
the United States have not produced the results they promised. Nearly all of the
proliferation problems inherited by the Bush administration have grown worse over the
past 7 years.
Today, we face greater nuclear insecurity than during the 1990s, including the risk
of a Middle East with several nuclear states; the possibility that Osama bin Laden will
eventually get a nuclear weapon from insecure stockpiles in Russia, Pakistan or some
other state; the probability that an upsurge in nuclear power programs would bring
many more states to the brink of nuclear weapons capability; and the possibility that
the flaws in command and control systems—including those exposed in the US system
by the unauthorized August 2007 B-52 flight with 6 nuclear bombs—could result in the
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
The growing recognition that current approaches are counter-productive helps
clear the field, providing space for policy alternatives, but does not, by itself, guarantee
that more effective policies will be implemented.

New Leaders

Prospects for policy change are increased by the period of political transition the world
has now entered. By early 2009, four of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia) will
have new leaders. Other key states, including Iran and Israel, may as well. The UK
and France have already made the switch, as have other major powers such as Japan,
Germany and Italy. International organizations, too, will refresh their leadership, with
a new Secretary-General now installed at the United Nations and possibly a new head
of the International Atomic Energy Agency in two years.
Rarely have the political stars re-aligned so dramatically. The photo of the G8
summit in 2009 will likely not have a single leader present at the 2006 summit save for
Canada’s Prime Minister Harper. This is a unique opportunity to advance new policies
that can dramatically reduce and even eliminate many of the dangers that have kept
political leaders and security officials worried about a nuclear 9/11.

U.S. Nuclear Politics

Several leading candidates for the presidency of the United States have already rushed
to fill the policy vacuum, detailing sweeping proposals for nuclear security. Former
Senator John Edwards promised in September 2007 that he would lead a charge for a
“Global Compact” to eliminate nuclear weapons. Governor Bill Richardson (D.-NM)
32 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

has given a similar pledge. Senator Barack Obama (D.-IL) has a plan to eliminate and
secure all loose nuclear materials in his first term as president, effectively preventing
nuclear terrorism. In an October 2007 speech he committed to the goal of a nuclear-
free world, and endorsed a plan that included negotiating a verifiable global ban on the
production of fissile materials, creating an international fuel bank to back up
commercial fuel supplies, increasing funding for IAEA safeguards, negotiating
dramatic reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, seeking a global ban on
Intermediate-range missiles, and taking missiles off of hair-trigger alert.
Senator Hillary Clinton (D.-NY) has promised similar presidential attention to
preventing nuclear terror and shrinking global arsenals. Her article in
November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, “Security and Opportunity for the
Twenty-first Century,” offers the first details of her plan. Senator Clinton laments the
lost opportunity of the failure to build upon profound international unity created after
the 9/11 attacks. She promises that she will not let her opportunity slip away, pledging
to negotiate an end to the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea; secure all loose
nuclear materials in her first term; establish a nuclear fuel bank; negotiate an accord to
verifiably reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals, and, significantly, to seek Senate approval
of the CTBT by 2009, the tenth anniversary of the Senates’ initial rejection of the treaty.
This last step, Senator Clinton says, “would enhance the United States’ credibility
when demanding that other nations refrain from testing.”
Summarizing this trend among the Democratic candidates, former National
Security staff member Ivo Daldaar and former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Director John Holum, two top advisors to Senator Obama, said in an October 5, 2007
op-ed:

“Although successive administrations (at least until the current one)

have mouthed the words affirming this objective, few have actually made
this commitment an organizing principle of their nuclear weapons
policies. That may be about to change….There is much that the United
States can do to lift the dark nuclear shadow over the world. It can
sharply reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,000 weapons or less, if Russia
agrees to go down to the same level. It can eliminate tactical nuclear
weapons to underscore that it understands that a nuclear weapon is a
nuclear weapon, no matter its size, yield, range, or mode of delivery. It
can agree never to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for
weapons purposes, and accept the need for intrusive verification if other
states agree to end such production as well. It can commit never again to
test a nuclear device, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

It is not clear if Senator Clinton accepts this as an organizing principle.

Interestingly, in her Foreign Affairs article, she redefines the Nuclear Free World
initiative of George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn (detailed
below), saying they “have called on the United States to ‘rekindle the vision,’ shared
by every president from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, of reducing reliance on
nuclear weapons.”
Republican candidates have not yet addressed these issues in detail. However, in
the US Congress there is some support for these new policies, as demonstrated by
legislation (SR 1977) introduced by Senators Obama and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) that
 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy 33

would authorized the policies detailed by Senator Obama in his speech, plus others.
Most significantly the bill would continue:

“…the United States moratorium on nuclear test explosions,

initiating a bipartisan process to achieve ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, working to secure ratification by other
key countries, and fully supporting United States commitments to fund
the international monitoring system to help detect and deter possible
nuclear explosions by other countries…”

The legislation also specifically endorses “pursuing and concluding an agreement

to verifiably halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.”
There is conservative opposition to these measures in the Senate. In October, in
reaction to an effort by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator Carl
Levin (D-MI) to link production of the so-called “Reliable Replacement Warhead” to a
sense of the Senate provision in the Defense Authorization bill that the CTBT should
be ratified, Senator Jon Kyl (R.-AZ) organized a letter signed by 38 Senators opposing
the provision. The principle reason given in the letter was that no hearings had been
held on the CTBT since 1999, therefore it was impossible to declare that there was a
“sense of the Senate” in favor of ratification. Republican presidential candidates are
likely to keep their positions close to this conservative line.
This underscores the urgent need for a thoughtful, nonpartisan review of the core
issues involved with the test ban treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and
related issues. There are already bipartisan appeals for just such reviews in the U.S.
House and Senate. Senators Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Susan Collins (R-ME)
introduced legislation (SR 1914, The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007)
requiring that a comprehensive nuclear weapons policy and posture review be
submitted to Congress by the administration (and prohibiting funding for any new
nuclear warhead development until such reviews are completed).
The legislation would require that the review examine “the role of nuclear forces in
United States military strategy, planning and programming,” and the “policy
requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable and
credible nuclear deterrence posture,” among other issues. There is similar legislation in
the House, added to the Defense Authorization bill by the Chairwomen of the House
Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Rep. Ellen Tauscher
(D.-CA). It includes a provision creating an independent commission to examine U.S.
nuclear policy.
This year, there have been other bipartisan Congressional actions that generally
had the effect of blocking production of new nuclear weapons and construction of new
anti-missile bases in Europe, reducing funding for these anti-missile programs overall,
and providing funding for an international fuel bank, and in general moving toward a
more progressive national security posture.

Positive Policy Initiatives

Non-government organizations are already working to provide policies the new

executive could adopt. “With this leadership change,” former United Nations Under-
Secretary-General of Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala told a February conference in
34 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

New York organized by the Center for American Progress and The Century Foundation,
“it is for us in civil society to try to urge new perspectives and new opportunities for
them to seize so that we all make the right choices at the right time.”
Analysts at over a dozen institutes are perfecting proposals to reaffirm the goal of
the elimination of nuclear weapons, ratify the nuclear test ban treaty, establish an
international nuclear fuel bank, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, move to zero
deployed nuclear weapons and convene a global nuclear summit in 2009, among
others. They are promoting their ideas in conferences, reports, testimony, blogs,
interviews and film projects.
Chief among them and propelling all of them, is the bipartisan appeal from
Republicans George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and Democrats William Perry and
Sam Nunn in their January 4, 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons.” Their campaign has already created political space for several
leading officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than they previously had. These
four veteran cold warriors urged the United States to recommit to the vision of
eliminating nuclear weapons and married their vision with a ten-point action plan
including steep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the end to the production of nuclear weapons
material. The four sponsored a follow-up conference at the conservative Hoover
Institute at Stanford University in October to advance this agenda.
The group plans an international conference in winter 2008, and will soon
announce a broad list of additional supporters of their elimination vision. The October
conference demonstrated the sophisticated approach of this moderate, bipartisan group
and the political support their efforts have garnered thus far. Nancy Reagan sent a
personal letter of endorsement to the conference and California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger provided a dramatic statement of his support. Former Secretary
George Shultz read the speech for the governor, who was prevented from attending as
planned only by the state emergency of wild fires then raging in southern California.
He said, in part:

“The words that this audience knows so well, the words that
President Kennedy spoke during the Cold War, have regained their
urgency: ‘The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits
his execution.’ Here in California we still have levees that were built a
hundred years ago. These levees are an imminent threat to the well-
being of this state and its people. It would be only a matter of time
before a disaster strikes. But we’re not waiting until such a disaster.

We in California have taken action to protect our people and our

economy from devastation. Neither can this nation nor the world wait to
act until there is a nuclear disaster. I am so thankful for the work of
George, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger Sam Nunn, Max Kampelman, Sid
Drell and so many of you at this conference. You have a big vision, a
vision as big as humanity—to free the world of nuclear weapons….I
want to help. Let me know how I can use my power and influence as
governor to further your vision. Because my heart is with you. My
support is firm. My door is open.”
 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy 35

Thus, for the first time since the initial efforts of the Truman administration in the
1940s, a movement to eliminate nuclear weapons has developed, not from the political
left but from the moderate middle. This promises to give the movement a political
importance and policy relevance that previous efforts, even the broad-based Nuclear
Freeze Movement of the 1980s, have lacked.
The goals of the new movement enjoy strong support from the traditional, non-
governmental arms control and nonproliferation organizations. More than a dozen
leading U.S. arms control organizations have formed the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free
World to coordinate their efforts. The New American Foundation hosts a bi-partisan
Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative that seeks to forge a consensus on a
new policy among former senior officials from both parties. The most ambitious effort
is led by World Security Institute President Bruce Blair. His plan for a Compact to
Eliminate Nuclear Weapons already enjoys the support of a bipartisan group of senior
experts and former officials. The campaign includes organization of a World Summit
to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons in 2010 that would endorse a new treaty calling for the
elimination of nuclear weapons by a date certain. The organizing document for the
Compact explains:

“Three circumstances have converged to create an historic

opportunity to achieve this goal: a dramatic shift among conservative
leaders to the belief that nuclear weapons must be eliminated; increased
public awareness and support, with 82% of Americans now favoring
elimination; and an unprecedented changing of the guard, with four of
the five original nuclear weapons states electing new leadership between
2007 and 2009. While time is limited to act before a nuclear catastrophe
occurs, history has shown that the right idea at the right time can capture
the public imagination and shift the public mindset – when that happens,
political change that once seemed impossible becomes inevitable.”

Towards A Comprehensive New Policy

The circumstances that may make it possible for the first time since the beginning of
the Cold War to move decisively towards the elimination of nuclear weapons also
make it possible to secure long-sought nuclear security goals, including deep
reductions in nuclear arsenals, the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a
FMCT.
One of the best previews we have of what a new nuclear policy might look like in
the next administration comes from the October 2007 report, “Reducing Nuclear
Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” by the National Security Advisory Group.
The group includes over 30 senior experts and former officials, including Madeleine
Albright, Graham Allison, Samuel Berger, Thomas Daschle, Robert Gallucci, William
Perry, John Podesta, Susan Rice, John Shalikashvili, and this author.
The report proposes a consensus strategy for reducing all the nuclear threats – one
that takes seriously the mission of preventing a nuclear 9-11, stops new states from
going nuclear, deters any state from launching a nuclear strike on America and restores
American leadership to the broad network of nations willing to work towards reducing
nuclear perils.
36 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

It is fair to say that this report represents the moderate middle of a significant part
the American foreign policy establishment at this point. It is a balancing of the more
cautious position sought by some to protect against charges that they are weak on
defense, and the more ambitious agendas of those who seek dramatic policy change.
The 20-page report details what the endorsers believe is an effective, realistic strategy
to realize a bipartisan agenda.
Key findings include:

• For the foreseeable future, the U.S will have to maintain effective, reliable
nuclear forces to deter adversaries, but deterrence can now be achieved at
significantly lower force levels. By reducing the political and military
salience of nuclear weapons, global support can be built for the tough actions
needed to stop terrorists and hostile regimes from obtaining nuclear weapons.
• America and other nations can be protected from nuclear terrorism by
accelerating the currently weak efforts to secure and eliminate bomb-making
nuclear materials worldwide, to detect and interdict illicit shipments of such
materials, and to develop nuclear forensic technologies that would hold states
accountable if they knowingly assisted terrorists in acquiring or using nuclear
weapons.
• The United States must mobilize the nations of the world to roll back North
Korea’s nuclear program and head off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
That will require increasing the financial and diplomatic pressures applied by
the UN Security Council and by states outside the Council, as well as offering
the positive incentive of normalized and economically beneficial relations
with the U.S.
• The United States should develop a range of conventional weapons and
operational concepts that would give the President credible and technically
suitable options for dealing with any threat. This would reduce and eventually
eliminate any need to resort to nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear
attacks.
• Given the widely-shared scientific judgment that U.S. nuclear weapons are
reliable and safe, there is no urgency to proceed with any new warhead,
included the “reliable replacement warhead” proposed by this administration,
but questioned by the Congress.
• With North Korea and Iran actively seeking nuclear weapons and long-range
ballistic missiles, the U.S. should pursue missile defenses. But the nation
should not buy weapons that do not work. The government should continue a
robust development effort and proceed with deployment only when warranted
by the results of realistic test programs and the evolution of the threat. Plans
to deploy new bases in Eastern Europe should be delayed until there has been
a serious exploration with the NATO allies and Russia for a cooperative
approach to missile defense that could help protect Europe, Russia, and the
U.S.
• The tough verification agreements negotiated with the Russians by Ronald
Reagan should not be allowed to expire in 2007. The United States should
agree with the Russians to replace START I with a legally binding follow-on
agreement that reduces nuclear forces significantly below the levels called for
in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The two sides should also agree to lower the
current alert rates that keep thousands of nuclear warheads ready to launch
 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy 37

within 15 minutes, reducing the risk that the weapons would be used by
accident or misperception.
• A bipartisan effort should be pursued in the Senate to finally achieve the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would make it illegal
for any nation to test a nuclear weapon. With more nuclear tests than all the
other nations combined, the United States does not need any more tests; nor
should it want any other nation perfecting or developing weapons.
• The U.S. should restore its historic leadership role in building and
strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including by strengthening the
ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency ability to verify strict
compliance, reassuring allies that U.S. security assurances remain reliable, and
joining with all other nuclear-weapon states in reaffirming their pledges to
seek full nuclear disarmament.
• States embarking on or expanding nuclear power programs should be given
incentives to forgo their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
capabilities. The U.S. should work with the IAEA and other states on an
arrangement to provide reliable assurances of nuclear fuel supply to states that
do not have their own fuel cycle facilities.

Conclusion

These reports and efforts are harbingers of a new policy moment. There is a greater
chance to achieve dramatic, historic change in global nuclear policy in the next few
years than at any other moment in the past 15 years. Those involved in these policy
initiatives all believe that a world of increasing numbers of nuclear weapon states is not
inevitable. Neither is a nuclear attack by terrorists. Both can be prevented, but only if
their prevention becomes an overriding national priority and only with strong U.S.
leadership in international arms control and nonproliferation efforts.
The prospects of that developing over the next few years are already encouraging.
The next president of the United States—whether Republican or Democrat—will likely
have a decidedly different nonproliferation policy than the failed neoconservative
strategy attempted over the past few years. There are already signs that other
governments are willing to develop and promote new initiatives, such as the
remarkable June 2007 speech by then-Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett at the
Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference—by far the most dramatic
reaffirmation of the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons yet delivered by any senior
official in a nuclear-weapon state. This speech was approved by the incoming Prime
Minister Gordon Brown and provided both vision and practicality. She said, in part:

“When it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear

disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking
and the practical work; to be, as it were, a disarmament laboratory. As
far as new thinking goes, the International Institute of Strategic Studies is
planning an in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the
eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will participate in that
study and provide funding for one of their workshops focusing on some
of the crucial technical questions in this area. The study and subsequent
38 J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

workshops will offer a thorough and systematic analysis of what a

commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice.”

With this vision and this type of practical, detailed work, it is very possible that the
policy deadlocks of the past few years can be broken. Achieving a world free of
nuclear weapons is—as even the most ardent proponents admit—a daunting task. By
marrying the vision to pragmatic steps, however, is should be possible to implement
measures that can restore the lost momentum of previous years, concretely reduce the
risks of nuclear terrorism, nuclear war and nuclear use, and rebuild the global
consensus to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states and drastically
reduce the arsenals of the current weapon states. As Minister Beckett said:

“So my commitment to that vision, truly visionary in its day, of a

world free of nuclear weapons is undimmed. And although we in this
room may not see the end of that road, we can take those first further
steps down it. For any generation that would be a noble calling. For
ours, it is a duty.”
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 39
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-39

The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian

9LHZRQKRZWR&XUHWKH³,QKHUHQW
'HIHFWV´RIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH

Victor MIZIN1

Abstract. Due to a number of reasons, including the emerging crises in relations

between Russia and the West, the urgency of global concerns regarding the
proliferation of WMD and missiles appears to have diminished. But emergence of
new threats brought back to life the key problem of global security: the survival of
leading world powers. In the face of the new global security challenges, Russia
and the West have revitalized the importance of non-proliferation. Still, the non-
proliferation regime is suffering from intrinsic drawbacks and should be improved.
Such improvement presupposes the close cooperation, or at least an accord,
between the leading world powers as a core element.

Diminished sense of urgency

Global concern regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
missiles appears to have lost its sense of urgency in world politics lately. This was
partly due to the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, as well as
what can be termed the North-South divide, stemming from the political and diplomatic
rifts in their respective foreign policy approaches. 2 New confrontations between the
former Cold War rivals on almost every major issue became particularly evident after
the G-8 summits in 2006-2007 and the landmark speech of President Putin at the 43 rd
Munich Conference on Security Policy. Supported in certain European circles, these
Russian WKHVHV RQ WKH FROODSVH RI WKH ³XQLSRODU ZRUOG´ IROORZHG E\ 0RVFRZ¶V FODLP
IRU HQWLUHO\ HTXDO VWDWXV ZLWK WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV DQG LWV ³QHZ ZRUOG RUGHU´
concept seemed to have ruined all prospects for Russia actually joining the West - thus
once again underlining the lingering gap in values between the two sides 3. Likewise,
plans to create a kind of broad front of the states which would make meaningful efforts
to stop WMD proliferation and strengthen international security and strategic stability
including the arms control process seem rather bleak. 4
Still, even in the long-HVWDEOLVKHG VFHQDULR RI WKH ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ RQ WKH
world arena, the issue of nonproliferation and its core element ± the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ± retain their importance. After all,

1
Counsellor, Analytical Division, Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly
2
Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin, ³U.S.-Russian Relations: The Case for an
8SJUDGH´&DUQHJLH0RVFRZ&HQWHU5HSRUWJanuary 20,.2005
3
%UHW 6WHSKHQV ³/LWWOH 6ZHDW\ )LVW Why is Putin now getting tough on Iran?´ Wall Street Journal,
March 27, 2007
4
The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Secretary-General's remarks at
Macalester College Convocation to inaugurate Institute for Global Citizenship , St. Paul,
Minnesota, 22 April 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1999
40 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

nonproliferation in fact relates to the key problem of global security- the survival of
leading world powers, Russia and the West - in the face of new global security
challenges.
The current security situation is marked by the emergence of new threats the form
of terrorist activities and the potential use of WMD by international Islamic
IXQGDPHQWDOLVWVLQWKHLUILJKWDJDLQVWWKHµPDLQHQHPLHV¶± the so-FDOOHG³LQILGHO´:HVW
and Russia, which prevent the former from attaining world dominance. 5 This
SKHQRPHQRQLVODEHOHG³VXSHUWHUURULVP´E\VRPHH[SHUWV 6 Compared with other types
of WMD and even subversive activities, nuclear weapons, obviously would be difficult
to incorporate into the cannibalistic plans of the Islamists.7 But even the minor risk of
the use of nuclear weapons, in view of their terrible destructive consequences, must be
treated seriously.
It is not accidental that President Putin referred to WMD proliferation as the main
security threat of the 21st century.8
The advent of new actors possessing nuclear weapons in unstable regions,
SDUWLFXODUO\UDGLFDO WHUURULVWJURXSVDQGLUUHVSRQVLEOHµURJXH¶VWDWHVKDVVXUSDVVHGWKH
possibility of nuclear showdown between the members of the traditional nuclear
SRZHUV µFOXE¶ DV WKH JUHDWHVW WKUHDW WRGD\ IRU WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV 7KLV VHW RI
issues also presents the basis for the security dialogue between both East and West and
North and South. Most probably it will continue to dominate the agenda in the sphere
of defense and global security in the foreseeable future.
In this respect, the developed countries still view the NPT of 1968 as the central,
integral factor in maintaining peace and international stability. Russia, as the main
successor of the USSR which was a founding member of the NPT at the very peak of
WKH &ROG :DU DOVR VWLFNV WR WKLV VWDQFH 'HVSLWH DOO RI WKH GLIILFXOWLHV 0RVFRZ¶V
approach is unambiguous. The Treaty, which comprises 189 member states today, has
passed the test of time over its 30 year history. There is no obvious alternative to the
NPT as a mechanism for containing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening
international security on the global and regional levels. 9 In fact, there are no means for
counteracting nuclear weapons¶SUROLIHUDWLRQWRGD\WKDWFRXOGEHPRUHVXFFHVVIXOWKDQ
the NPT. Any other options that include the use of military force would be more costly,
both in the financial and political aspects. The point is how to improve the NPT,
increase its effectiveness and adjust this useful Cold War-era contraption to new
realities.

5
'U .HQW +XJKHV %XWWV DQG 3URIHVVRU %HUW % 7XVVLQJ ³$GGUHVVLQJ The Conditions That Foster
7HUURULVP´8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\:DU&ROOHJH6\PSRVLXP, Center for Strategic Leadership, CSL 1 Issue, U.S.
Army War College , Volume 10-05, July 2005, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/10-05.pdf
6
Marvin J. Cetron, Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism  (KXG 6SULQ]DN  ³7KH *UHDW
6XSHUWHUURULVP6FDUH´Foreign Policy, Fall 1998
7
,$($'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO'U0RKDPHG(O%DUDGHL³1XFOHDU7HUURULVP,GHQWLI\LQJDQG&RPEDWLQJWKH
Risks´International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future , London, 16 March
2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n003.html
8
The BBC Interview with V. Putin, June 22, 2003, Novo-Ogarevo,
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/06/47510.shtml (Russian)
9
See /HZLV $ 'XQQ ³&RXQWHULQJ 3UROLIHUDWLRQ ,QVLJKWV IURP 3DVW µ¶:LQV /RVVHV DQG 'UDZV¶¶´
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 41

Treaty successes

Conceived in a period of optimism over ideas to prevent nuclear war, and promote
arms control and peaceful coexistence of the two radically opposite social and political
global systems, the NPT has proven, in general, to be a helpful instrument of
international law. Taking into account the complex realities of the modern world, it has
HVWDEOLVKHGDUDWKHUHIIHFWLYHOHJDOUHJLPHZKLFKFRQWUDU\WRWKHSHVVLPLVWV¶SURJQRVHV
managed to prevent the emergence of dozens of new nuclear states in the world. On the
whole, by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, a certain level of international
security had been reached through the enforcement of this Treaty. During this period
almost 40 countries joined the NPT. Access to nuclear weapons was blocked for Iraq.
Military nuclear programs were shut down in countries like Argentina, Brazil and
South Africa. The authority of the nuclear nonproliferation regime had been growing
steadily.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of confrontation
between the two antagonistic military-political blocks, the NPT gained particular
significance. Newly independent nations ± Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan ± agreed
to become non-nuclear states, abandoning the nuclear weapons they had inherited as
breakaway parts of the former Soviet Union. Thus Russia became the only nuclear
power and therefore the natural though informal political and military leader of the CIS
countries.
In the new phase after the end of the Cold War, the importance of the NPT grew
significantly when it became the key instrument of sustaining stability in the chaotic
world where no politico-military blocs existed. At the historic NPT 1995 Review
Conference, the Treaty was indefinitely extended. A series of countries which had
refused to join it earlier, including such nuclear powers as France and China, joined the
Treaty in the years leading up to the review and extension conference.

Inherent defects

Concurrent with the above-mentioned positive processes, the so-called built-in defects
of the treaty appeared. They can be roughly grouped into philosophical, political and
technological categories.
The inherent shortcomings of the Treaty became particularly evident with the
HPHUJHQFHRIWKH³SUREOHP´VWDWHVWKHQRWRULRXVµJURXSRIWKUHH¶LQFOXGLQJ,UDQ,UDT
North Korea and, to some extent, Libya) which in fact circumvented the NPT-imposed
constraints and covertly started to develop nuclear weapons. As India and Pakistan
MRLQHG WKH ³QXFOHDU SRZHUV FOXE´ DQG 1RUWK .RUHD DQG ,UDQ SXUVXHG WKLV VWDWXV D
critical point was reached. By the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious that the NPT
could not become the panacea for the mushrooming spread of nuclear-weapon states
that it had seemed to be in the 1970-80s. The Treaty failed to develop into a
³XQLYHUVDO´ WRRO HPEUDFLQJ DOO VWDWHV RI WKH ZRUOG ZKLOH WKH LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI
international nonproliferation regimes was exposed. The main dilemma of the
nonprolifeUDWLRQSDUDGLJPWKHNH\³SKLORVRSKLFDO´IODZYLVLEO\FDPHWRWKHIRUH 10

10
-RVHSK61\H³1377KH/RJLFRI,QHTXDOLW\´Foreign Policy, Summer 1985
42 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Philosophical flaws

First, the NPT regime discriminates between states, placing them into two unequal
groups ± µRIILFLDO¶ QXFOHDU SRZHUV ZKLFK FRQGXFWHG QXFOHDU WHVWV EHIRUH  DQG all
others. It is thus the question of the discrepancy between the rights of the most
developed and military-PLJKW\ ³ROG´ JUHDW SRZHUV SRVVHVVLQJ IRUPDO QXFOHDU VWDWXV
within the NPT and new players, seeking the role of regional power centers, as well as
UDGLFDO ³URJXH´ VWDWHV  7KRXJK DFFHSWHG LQ WKH WLPH RI WKH JOREDO FRQIURQWDWLRQ
between two antagonist blocs with respective nuclear-weapons leaders, this formula is
rejected by the developing countries today.
Second, there are many states mainly within WKH ³DQWL-Imperialist, anti-JOREDOLVW´
EORF ZKLFK VWLOO YLHZ WKH 137 DV DQ LQWULQVLFDOO\ XQIDLU ³:HVWHUQ SOR\´ GHVLJQHG WR
prevent them from developing nuclear weapons potentials and benefiting from nuclear
energy unhindered.
Most leaders of the developing countries find it difficult to concede that they are in
fact compelled to forego these crucial assets of military might that are particularly
significant in the regional balances of power. The motivation to acquire nuclear
weapons as a means of promoting foreign policy and strategic military interests is
considerably weakened but is not eliminated completely. The argument in favor of the
strengthening of the nonproliferation regimes needs further theoretical development,
especially after the conflicts in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Iraq.
It would be very difficult to persuade a regional leader of a developing country
striving to build national defense capabilities to refrain from developing the weaponry
that, in his perception, is the only definitive means of preventing the hypothetical
aggression of great powers against his country (in the guise of a peacekeeping
RSHUDWLRQRUD³KXPDQLWDULDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ´XQGHUWKH81IODJ

Political flaws

Third, the NPT presumes that nuclear powers will assist non-nuclear states in mastering
GRPHVWLFSHDFHIXOQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJ\LQUHWXUQIRUWKHLUUHMHFWLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶
GHYHORSPHQW +RZHYHU WKLV ³EDLW´ GRHV QRW DOZD\V ZRUN WRGD\ )RU VRPH ³URJXH´
VWDWHV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV UHPDLQ DQ ³HQG LQ LWVHOI´ IDU PRUH DWtractive than peaceful
technologies. Besides, the supply considerably exceeds the demand in the global
markets of nuclear materials and technologies.
Finally, among the political defects is the obvious fact that certain states including
Russia and the USA, while being parties to the NPT, do not strictly comply with all its
provisions (in particular, regarding the progress of disarmament and arms control talks
and certain aspects of nuclear technology transfer). The remarkable nixing of decades
of American nonproliferation policies by the US-India deal on peaceful use of nuclear
energy that was declared in July 2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime
Minister M. Singh, though sharply criticized by most nonproliferation and arms control
³]HDORWV´11 received unequivocal bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, thus proving
once again that economic interests tend to take precedence over nonproliferation
objectives. Although some obstacles must be overcome to effectuate this sweeping
agreement which has to be endorsed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group

11
See for example: Michael Krepon³Betting the Ranch on the US-India Nuclear Deal´June 5, 2006,
ttp://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=297
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 43

(NSG) before it can take effect, it is obvious that India was de facto recognized as a
nuclear state even by the nonproliferation-conscious Washington.

Technological flaws

At the same time - and this LVWKHNH\³WHFKQRORJLFDO´GUDZEDFNRIWKH7UHDW\- several

developing countries even ventured to start the development of nuclear weapons under
the front of their membership and to profit from certain lacunas of the NPT. The point
is that any state member FDQ FUHDWH DOPRVW FRPSOHWH SRWHQWLDO IRU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶
production while staying within the NPT confines and formally observing its
obligations ± this opportunity is historically built into the NPT.
All this poses the problem of the NPT implementation and compliance anew± both
on the basis of the traditional mechanisms of international law including the IAEA and
the UN Security Council venues (which by no means are able to stop attempts to
acquire WMD capabilities each time) and by military counter-proliferation operations
WKDW DUH DOVR FULWLFL]HG DV XQLODWHUDO ³LPSHULDOLVW´ HVFDSDGHV DQG IUHTXHQWO\ SURYH
themselves inefficient, as the Bush and Clinton administrations have demonstrated).

Differing priorities

It seems that the flaws and legal gaps of the NPT are obvious even to non-specialists.
However, possible ways of improving the situation and eliminating these inherent
defects raise much controversy as a result of the conflicting approaches between the
followers of the traditional political and diplomatic methods and the advocates of the
non-RUWKRGR[ DSSURDFKHV IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH WKUHDW RI IRUFH RU DG KRF ³FORVHG-FLUFXLW´
deals for any specific case of the NPT violation.
Not every state ± for example, Russia or some members of the EU ± considers
nuclear non-proliferation the top priority. 12 In real life, double standards are used
rather often in assessing the threat of proliferation ± WKHUHLVDNLQGRI³JRRG´DQG³EDG´
proliferation.13 The world ± TXLWH IDU IURP .DQWLDQ ³HWHUQDO SHDFH´ SLSH GUHDPV - is
VWLOOGLYLGHGLQWRRSSRVLQJFDPSVZKHUHFHUWDLQIDLOHGVWDWHVILJKWLQJWKHODUJHQDWLRQV¶
KHJHPRQ\ DFW LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH +REEHVLDQ SULQFLSOH RI ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´
spending almost the entirety of available resources on the arms race. Owing to its
inborn imperfections, the NPT failed to prevent the development of covert nuclear
ZHDSRQVSURJUDPVLQWKHFKDLQRI³DQWL-V\VWHPLF´VWDWHVZKLFKXVHGWREHWKHFOLHQWVRU
allies of the Soviet Union and came to be rogue states later.

Clash of systems

Thus the essential problem is the clash of two broad concepts of ensuring international
security and strategic stability in the extreme critical circumstances. On the one hand,
there is the course on establishing dialogue, using political and diplomatic means,
incremental strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and arms control mechanisms,
HPSOR\LQJ WROHUDQW SHUVXDVLRQ DQG HQJDJLQJ IRUPHU DQG SUHVHQW ³URJXH´ VWDWHV LQ WKH

12
George Perkovich³7KH(QGRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH"´Current History, November 2006
13
5LFKDUG 1 +DDVV ³,QGLD ,UDQ DQG WKH FDVH IRU GRXEOH VWDQGDUGV´ Daily Times, May 14, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10685/india_iran_and_the_case_for_double_standards.html
44 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

international relations system as equal partners without demonizing them (for example,
the traditional diplomatic rhetoric of Moscow that is shared by Beijing and most part of
WKH³ROG´(XURSHQRZ7KLVOLQHFDQEHWHQWDWLYHO\FDOOHGWKH³FDUURW´VWUDWHJ\
7KLV ³SRVLWLYLVW´ DQG LQ PDQ\ UHVSHFWV LGHDOLVWLF DQG SURSDJDQGD-GULYHQ ³FDUURW´
modeOLVMX[WDSRVHGWRWKH³VWLFN´DSSURDFK± the policy pursued by a certain part of the
conservative US elites. This new strategy is aimed at creating new mechanisms for
SURWHFWLQJ $PHULFDQ LQWHUHVWV WKURXJK WKH UHYLVLRQ RI WKH RXWGDWHG ³<DOWD V\VWHP´
renunciation of failing and anachronistic norms of international law such as the
SULPDF\ RI WKH ³VWDJQDWLQJ´ 81 SURQJHG E\ DWWHPSWV WR VWDNH H[FHSWLRQDO ZHLJKW RQ
military force (the basis of the counter-proliferation philosophy, promoted by
contemporary AmerLFDQ QHRFRQV  )LQDOO\ D NLQG RI WKLUG ³PHGLDQ´ OLQH IROORZHG
largely by the European Union has recently appeared.

Nonproliferation provisions

The problems with the NPT could be most visibly examined through the analysis of its
specific articles. Articles I and II, which are the core of the Treaty, prohibit the transfer
RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV IURP QXFOHDU VWDWHV WR ³DQ\ UHFLSLHQW ZKDWVRHYHU´ DQG EDQ QRQ-
QXFOHDU VWDWHV IURP UHFHLYLQJ WKHP IURP ³DQ\ WUDQVIHURU ZKDWVRHYHU´ WKXV GHSULYLQJ
them of any direct or indirect control over nuclear weapons. The wording of Article I
FRQFHUQLQJWKHSURKLELWLRQWRWUDQVIHUQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQGFRQWURORYHUWKHPWR³DQ\
UHFLSLHQW ZKDWVRHYHU´ LQFOXGLQJ QRW RQO\ QRQ-nuclear states but also individuals,
separate groups, parties or organizations, has particular significance today. President
3XWLQ KDV UHSHDWHGO\ VWDWHG 5XVVLD¶V UHVROYH WR SUHYHQW WHUURULVWV RU WKRVH KDUERULQJ
them from acquiring WMD and associated materials, equipment and technologies. In
case terrorists get access to nuclear weapons and related technologies the strictest
compliance with the Treaty by nuclear powers as well as the entire nuclear
nonproliferation process would lose all the meaning and importance. 14
At the same time, the second part of Article I contains a provision which becomes
obsolete today ± 3DUWRIWKH$UWLFOHREOLJHVRQO\WKHQXFOHDUVWDWHV³QRWLQDQ\ZD\WR
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
ZHDSRQV RU H[SORVLYH GHYLFHV´ 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ KRZHYHU D ³EODFN PDUNHW´ IRU VXFK
technologies is operating today. It provides the opportunity to deliver and receive
nuclear and other critical WMD-related materials and technologies, for example
WKURXJK $4 .KDQ¶V LOOLFLW LQWHUQDWLRQDO QXFOHDU WUDGH QHWZRUN 15 Terrorists are also
supported by a kind of international black market club of WMD-technology
SUROLIHUDWLRQ VSRQVRUV ZKLFK LQFOXGHV WKH PHPEHUV RI WKH ³miserables¶ FOXE´ ±
Pakistani, North Korean and Iranian and some other Asian and Middle-Eastern
organizations which pose the main threat of dissemination of critical technologies in
the world.
Resolution 1540 adopted by the UN Security Council in April 2004 (for which
Russia was one of the initiators) steers states toward preventing the acquisition of
WMD and associated materials by non-state actors who seek to obtain them with

14
Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, (Times Books: 2004)
15
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein ³7KH $4 .KDQ ,OOLFLW 1XFOHDU 7UDGH 1HWZRUN DQG
Implications for NonproliferatioQ(IIRUWV´Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6, July 2006
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 45

primarily terrorism-related goals. It is essential to develop effective multilateral

cooperation in counteracting this danger.

Safeguards provision

In the present international situation, Article III of the NPT, describing the set of IAEA
safeguards, which by the cooperation of the states parties to the Treaty should ensure
the verification and compliance with its provisions by non-nuclear states, acquires key
importance. The IAEA safeguards are aimed at prevention or timely detection in case
significant quantities of nuclear materials are diverted from peaceful nuclear activities
to the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The system of so-
called comprehensive safeguards should have assured the peaceful nature of the non-
nuclear states programs as an indispensable condition for the transfer of nuclear
materials and technologies. Aimed at promoting cooperation in the sphere of peaceful
atomic energy, the IAEA is practically the only regulatory mechanism of global control
today which has played an important role in the strengthening of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime.
However, in the early 1990s the Agency had also failed to detect illicit nuclear
programs. It is another question whether the IAEA can cope with the task of
FRQWUROOLQJ KXQGUHGV RI QXFOHDU UHDFWRUV ZRUOGZLGH LI WKH ZLGHO\ GLVFXVVHG ³QXFOHDU
UHQDLVVDQFH´LHWhe rapid development of peacefully oriented nuclear energy in many
countries, actually takes place. After all, tens out of 189 countries of the world have not
yet concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA during the 30-
year span of NPT enforcement. More than 90 states, including one and a half dozen
states with substantial nuclear programs, have not signed or ratified the IAEA
Additional Protocol. The largest nuclear powers ± the United States and Russia ±
belong to this group as well.
Earlier in 1981, doubting the effectiveness of this international organization, Israel
was forced to launch a pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear research reactor
³2]LUDN´ZLWKRXWUHFHLYLQJDQ\LQWHUQDWLRQDOVDQFWLRQV
The clandestine activities in countries like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and
South Africa required a more intrusive and stricter safeguards system. After it was
GLVFRYHUHG WKDW 6DGGDP +XVVHLQ¶V UHJLPH LQ ,UDT LQIULQJHG XSRQ WKH 137 FRYHUWO\
trying to produce nuclear weapons, the IAEA safeguards system was strengthened by
introducing special intrusive inspections at nuclear sites. They were aimed toward
ensuring access of IAEA inspectors to all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle and
comprehensive information about the nuclear activities of the state. This was fixed in
the model Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
approved by the IAEA in 1997 and signed by all nuclear states, which became a more
secure instrument of transparency for national nuclear programs (IAEA document
INFCIRC/540). Today, a growing number of states are on the way to accede to this
document; the procedures set in the Protocol are being implemented in practice.
Unfortunately, not all countries with significant nuclear activities have acceded to the
Additional Protocol under the pretext of its infringement on the sovereign rights or
disregard for arms control and nonproliferation priorities.
46 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Integrated safeguards

The next step in strengthening the safeguards system should be the adoption of an
integrated safeguards system based on an optimal combination of the Additional
Protocol requirements and the previous safeguard system16. This measure aims at the
most rational use of existing technical instruments of verification with an emphasis on
tracking highly critical technologies and materials. It is devised to draw
comprehensive conclusions regarding compliance by a state with its nonproliferation
obligations, taking into account the entirety of its nuclear assets and relevant
infrastructure. It is focused on the total nuclear activities of the state and presumes
increased interaction between the Agency and the national system of nuclear
accounting and control. However, it is clear that if such a system of thorough
accounting for past programs is put in place, many states may be faced with serious and
uncomfortable problems. Likewise, many nuclear powers including Russia are not
ready to put all their nuclear sites including the military facilities under IAEA control.

Verification

Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the system which even nuclear powers are not
ready to accept does not preclude all opportunities to conduct covert development of
nuclear weapons and related research. In fact, the inspections are normally held only in
order to detect the illegal activities at the nuclear sites and not in all possible venues
throughout the country. However, covert nuclear activities may be conducted at
various undisclosed underground sites, or duplicate or dispersed facilities as - in the
case of Iran which signed the Additional Protocol in October 2003. Undisclosed
facilities can be detected in theory, provided that exceptionally accurate intelligence is
at hand, which most developed countries, with the possible exception of Israel, very
often lack today. The complete destruction of such facilities and guaranteed non-
renewal of illicit WMD-related activities are viable only through the nation-devastating
carpet bombing using nuclear weapons or next-generation earth-penetrators followed
by an actual occupation of the noncompliant state and by an effective regime change
with step-by-VWHS ³GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ´  6XFK FRQWURYHUVLDO UDGLFDO PHDVXUHV DUH UDWKHU
problematic today in view of the stark fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan where U.S. and
NATO states have shown themselves to be completely unprepared for the daunting
tasks of post-conflict rehabilitation and meaningful nation-building on the road to
modernity and democracy. For this kind of operation, say, in Iran, the United States
would have to deploy a 600,000-800,000-strong military contingent, with a strong
grasp of the pitfalls of modern guerilla warfare and warped regional specifics necessary
for winning hearts and minds in the predominantly hostile Islamic ambiance.
It is obvious that although this option is highly questionable operationally and
almost excluded on political grounds, other measures (for example, UN Security

16
2Q LQWHJUDWHG VDIHJXDUGV VHH  ,$($ 'LUHFWRU *HQHUDO 'U 0RKDPHG (O%DUDGHL ³6WDWHPHQW WR WKH
6\PSRVLXP RQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6DIHJXDUGV 9HULILFDWLRQ DQG 1XFOHDU 0DWHULDO 6HFXULW\´ 2FWREHU  1;
DOVR  )ULW] 6FKPLGW ³137 ([SRUW &RQWURO DQG  WKH =DQJJHU &RPPLWWHH´ Nonproliferation Review,
Fall/Winter 2000
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 47

&RXQFLOVDQFWLRQVRU³VXUJLFDO´DLUVWULNHVDJDLQVWWKHGHWHFWHGQXFOHDUVLWHVRUHYHQWKH
extensive system of on-site inspections throughout the problem country with the threat
of use of force in case of refusal) cannot completely assure the full dismantlement or
non-renewal of proscribed nuclear programs.
Moreover, even the modern technical means of verification, including outer space-
based surveillance and intelligence data collection, do not provide the states (according
to the unclassified information) with the full coverage and understanding of nuclear
activities in such states as Iran or North Korea.
Apart from strengthening international compliance mechanisms and unifying the
UN Security Council on nonproliferation issues that currently divide its leading
members, the use of ad hoc schemes based on regionally-linked solutions would seem
to be more effective.

Improving safeguards

In the past, each major crisis has led to a major upgrade in the NPT safeguards. They
should be further perfected and reinforced in their intrusiveness and scope, assuring
WKDWWKHVSUHDGRIQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJLHV¶EHQHILWVGRHVQRWRSHQgates or create potential
loopholes for the acquisition of nuclear weapons know-how - with no prejudice to the
NPT-stipulated inalienable rights of member-states.
New practically achievable and regionally-based opportunities must be pursued, if
the formerl\KDELWXDOSUDFWLFHVRIGLVDUPDPHQWGLSORPDF\DUHQRWZRUNLQJLQRXUµSRVW-
post-FROGZDU¶HQYLURQPHQW
&XUUHQWO\WKH137UHJLPHZRUNVLQWZRRSHUDWLRQDO³WUDFNV´RU³SODQHV´7KHILUVW
µSODQH¶- the traditional multilateral disarmament diplomacy avenue which is based on
WKH 81 ,$($ DQG RWKHU JURXSV¶ DFWLYLWLHV FDQ KDUGO\ VROYH WKH DFXWH FRQWHPSRUDU\
problems of the NPT application.
The second channel - regional or ad hoc solutions, used for example in the recent
settlement around the North Korean nuclear entanglement - addresses the primary
problem of the drives and stimuli urging states to seek nuclear weapon capabilities.
Ideally, both tracks enhance and support each other. In practice, the first one is
arguably idle and limited to useless declarations, resolutions and petitions lost on
potential proliferators.

Internationalizing nuclear activities

Placing all nuclear activities in the problem countries under the control of international
nuclear-energy consortiums and incarnating the idea of an international nuclear fuel
cycle (INFC) presents another solution. Such entities could include, for example -
apart from reemerging Russia - representatives from the EU, primarily France, Great
Britain and Germany, as well as states within close proximity like China and South
Korea, and possibly Japan in the case of the DPRK, and the Gulf states or India in the
case of Iran.
These initiatives could be based on the suggestion of suspending the transfer of
enrichment technologies made by President George W. Bush at the session of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group in February 2004 and the proposal made by Director General
ElBaradei to create a web of international nuclear fuel cycle centers for providing
services under the IAEA aegis.
48 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Past plans for the internationalization RI QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV¶ GHYHORSPHQW OLNH
Acheson-Lilienthal or Baruk Plans, President (LVHQKRZHU¶V ³$WRPV IRU 3HDFH´ DQG
³QXFOHDUVKDULQJ´LGHDVDOOIDLOHGIRUSROLWLFDOUHDVRQVLQWKHWXPXOWXRXVDQGVXVSLFLRXV
environment of the Cold war.
President Bush¶V LGHDV LQ  SURSRVLQJ WKDW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO PDUNHW SURYLGH D
guaranteed supply of fresh fuel to states that do not possess or pursue fuel cycle
facilities, or his initiative of GNEP (based on some Russian ideas) envisioning
enhanced production, meeting ecological concerns and enforcing nonproliferation now
look more promising and garner significant, if muted, international support.
5XVVLDQ3UHVLGHQW3XWLQ¶VLQLWLDWLYHRI-DQXDU\WRFUHDWHDQXFOHDUIXHOF\FOH
center in Russia as a prototype of future global infrastructure also has been met quite
positively.
President Putin confirmed that Russia is ready to build such an international center
on its territory, while all the problems can be solved only within the framework of the
broad internationaO FRRSHUDWLRQ  +H FODLPHG WKDW ³WKLV FRXOG EH D ORQJ-haul project
LQYROYLQJ WKH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ RI VWDWHV SRVVHVVLQJ VLJQLILFDQW VXSSOLHV RI XUDQLXP IXHO´
Such centers could be built not only in Russia, but also in the nuclear states providing
³WKHXQGLVFULPLQDWLQJDFFHVVRIDOOLQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHV´ 17
Russian nuclear industry experts believe that if the implementation of this proposal
is endorsed by the international community, it would, in the first place, ensure the
development of atomic energy in the world with the strict observance of the
nonproliferation regime. 18 According to the position of the former Federal Agency for
the Atomic Energy of the RF (now recast into a government-run corporation) a
uranium enrichment center in Russia and four or five such centers in the key regions of
the world would be quite sufficient. As the head of the Agency (presently of the
corporation), Sergey Kirienko, noted, it is necessary to complete several tasks
including some on the international level. These are the establishment of a chain of
international centers of uranium enrichment, as well as ones on the utilization
(disposal) of spent nuclear fuel, and on nuclear-energy personnel training.19
The idea of ad hoc consortiums to run the nuclear complexes in each individual
case implies an ideology underlying the initiative of creating international centers more
comprehensively. Its crucial point is the involvement of the regional factor since
nuclear ambitions of states are primarily spurred by their perception of real or alleged
military threats, absence or insufficiency of security guarantees and persistent
instability in a number of regions in the world. 20
Vested with extensive rights with the partial delegation of national sovereignty in
establishing a kind of protectorate over nuclear programs of the relevant states, such
consortiums could carry out all practical activities and research in the nuclear energy
sphere in the problem states. Only small-scale pilot development programs under strict
control could be allowed to save the feelings of national pride in indigenous societies.
Certainly, in the beginning, not many countries will be ready to rescind INFC
development rights and options. The basic argument in favor of such centers is based

17
$QVZHUVRI3UHVLGHQWRI5XVVLD93XWLQDWWKH³ELJSUHVV-FRQIHUHQFH´IRU5XVVLDQDQGIRUHLJQPDVV-
media, Moscow, January 31, 2006, http://g8russia.ru/news/20060131/1142061.html (Russian)
18
³1XFOHDU ³5HQDLVVDQFH´ DQG WKH 1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ 5HJLPH´ *HQHUDOL]DWLRQ )HEUXDU\ 
http://www.rian.ru/review/20060209/43450514.html
19
Ibid.
20
*HUDOG 6WHLQEHUJ ³1RQ-3UROLIHUDWLRQ 7LPH IRU 5HJLRQDO $SSURDFKHV"´ Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 3,
Summer 1994
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 49

on the prohibitively high costs of the local pursuit of nuclear cycle capabilities in the
dilapidated conditions in the third world. At the same time, artful PR should
demonstrate the potential benefits and acquisitions in the case of entry into
international cooperative schemes.
In return for the partial surrender of national sovereignty, nuclear powers would
stimulate the flow of novel technologies and Marshall-plan-level investments in the
non-nuclear industries of developing countries. Such projects could serve as a hedge
against arbitrary forceful actions of such countries as the USA, and at the same time
ensure strict enforcement of the NPT and international nonproliferation norms. 21
$WWUDFWLYH ³VWLFNV DQG FDUURWV´ DQG HFRQRPLF DVVLVWDQFH SDFNDJHV VKRXOG IXUWKHU
promote this type of system in the world and win support of national nuclear
bureaucracies and politico-military elites. The development of an international fuel
F\FOH FHQWHUV¶ ZHE FRXOG OHDG WR WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D QHZ LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ
assuring a guaranteed supply of nuclear services (most probably, under the IAEA aegis
or linked to it).
The problems surrounding this endeavor seem immense. Among them: How to
enforce compliance? How to foster credibility and trust to this body? Is the IAEA
powerful enough to substitute this new organization or itself for current individual
national projects promoted by fiercely competing companies in the field of nuclear
technology?
Expected outcries from third world states that such plans border on re-introducing
³DSDUWKHLG´ LQ FLYLO QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV FRXOG EH FKDOOHQJHG ZLWK DUJXPHQW WKDW
extending INFC services to developing nations, primarily on a discount basis of
relevant agreements, serves the far-reaching objectives of the sustained development
paradigm.
However, it is clear that these initiatives go beyond the traditional conceptual
framework of the NPT ± foregoing nuclear-weapons programs in exchange for the right
WRGHYHORSSHDFHIXODWRPLFHQHUJ\RQRQH¶VRZQZLWK,$($RYHUVLJKW

The right to peaceful nuclear energy

Today, when developed countries make serious attempts to deny terrorists, their
supporting regimes and international structures the access to WMD technologies,
Article IV of the NPT which codifies the right of all the states party to the Treaty to
develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, gains paramount importance.
Historically, the commitment of non-nuclear states not to create nuclear weapons in
return for the assistance of nuclear powers in developing peaceful nuclear energy
programs (thH VR FDOOHG ³QXFOHDU GHDO´ ZKLFK ZDV SURPRWHG E\ WKH GHYHORSLQJ
countries and actively supported by the USSR, became a major incentive that ensured
the acceptance of the very concept of the treaty by the third World.

21
About the possibility of creating such consortium for Iran see: Charles D. Ferguson and Victor Mizin,
³Russia can help resolve Iran crisis´ The Baltimore Sun , May 22, 2006; Victor Mizin and Brian Finlay,
³Pride or Prejudice: The Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Policy in Russia on the Iranian Nuclear
3URJUDP´ The Stimson Center Cooperative Nonproliferation Program,
http://www.stimson.org/?SN=CT200611161136; *HRIIUH\ )RUGHQ DQG -RKQ 7KRPVRQ ³,UDQ DV D 3LRQHHU
&DVH IRU 0XOWLODWHUDO 1XFOHDU $UUDQJHPHQWV´ 0,7 6HSWHPEHU  
http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Iran%20as%20a%20pioneer%20case%20for%20multilateral%20nuclear%20agr
eements%20v2.pdf
50 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

The balance between the rights and obligations of the NPT parties regarding the
peaceful use of atomic energy is a rather contentious issue between the developed
countries possessing nuclear technologies and the developing countries seeking to
acquire them. These differences come to the fore at the NPT Review conferences and
pose as an important theme in the bilateral contacts. This is all due to the fact that
YDULRXV µSHDFHIXO¶ QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJLHV PD\ EH XVHG IRU WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI QXFOHDU
weapons.
It is still a theoretically unresolved issue whether all states should enjoy equal
rights to participate in international affairs regardless of the nature of their political
regime, level of development of democratic institutions, foreign policy specifics,
H[LVWHQFH RI µFKHFNV DQG EDODQFHV¶ V\VWHP and operational transparency of
governmental institutions. This concerns membership in international organizations
including the UN as well as access to sophisticated technologies leading to the creation
of nuclear weapons and other kinds of WMD and modern combat missiles. In
SDUWLFXODU FDVHV WKH TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU GLFWDWRUVKLS RU µURJXH¶ WHUURULVW UHJLPHV - if
Iran and North Korea are to be classified as such - have a right to develop peaceful
nuclear programs or biotechnologies at all. Or they should be totally ostracized in a
sort of international ghetto, even if not by the whole international community then, at
least, by key world powers, thus systematically driving the regime-change and follow-
up step-by-step national recovery and democratization? This approach is vehemently
debunked by hordes of left-leaning and Third-World-obsessed experts asking why, in
the times of sweeping globalization, the West and U.S. in particular should be anointed
as the world judge and constable. However, a new core of world democracies and
economic powerhouses is evidently forming that is bound to govern the global
development and must be efficiently protected against loony terrorist infringements on
its security. Even communist China, currently slated to take the leading global role of
economic powerhouse that Britain played in the 18th century, will inevitably become
truly democratic or face internal turmoil and painful confrontation with the West.
Finally, this could lead to the substitution of this democratic core group to the now
DOPRVW RSHUDWLRQDOO\ GHIXQFW 81 V\VWHP EDVHG RQ WKH DQDFKURQLVWLF ³<DOWD V\VWHP´
(sealing the handover of Eastern Europe to the Stalinist regime) and the permanent
status for the handful of the World War II victors. Then the remaining camp RIµKDYH-
QRWV¶ZLOOMXVWEHOHIWWRFRQWLQXHUHFHLYLQJHFRQRPLFKDQGRXWVRUUHPDLQLQWKHSDULDKV¶
corral. Once any country achieves the democratic norms plank, it could be invited to
HQWHU WKH QHZ RUJDQL]DWLRQ ZKLFK LV QRW VXSSRVHG WR EH D ³SODWIRUP IRU DOO´ PL[LQJ
democracies, failed states and totalitarian regimes.22
Russia normally rebuffs such an approach preaching the all-encompassing
³PXOWLSRODULW\´GRFWULQHDQGQHHGIRUIXUWKHUGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV
Russian experts and politicians today harbor a great deal of suspicion regarding
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V ZRUOGZLGH GRPLQDQFH LQWHQWLRQV DQG ODPHQW $PHULFDQ ³GRXEOH
VWDQGDUGV´UHJDUGLQJ0RVFRZ¶VYLWDOLQWHUHVWV 23 However, if Russia is seriously invited
into such a leading group of core nations (a kind of enlarged democracy-minded G-8)

22
6LPLODUYLHZVZHUHH[SUHVVHGE\,YR'DDOGHUDQG5REHUW.DJDQLQ³1H[W,QWHUYHQWLRQ´Washington
Post, August 6, 2007. TheiUYLHZZDVKDUVKO\FULWLFL]HGE\3DXO6DXQGHUVIRULWV³DOLHQDWLQJ´DSSURDFKLQKLV
³1RWWKH:D\WR,QWHUYHQH´Washington Post, August 13, 2007.
23
6HUJH\ /DYURY ³&RQWDLQLQJ 5XVVLD %DFN WR WKH )XWXUH"´ Russia in Global Affairs no.4, October-
December 2007, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/21/1147.html ,Q /DYURY¶V ZRUGV LQIOXHQWLDO SROLWLFDO
forces on both sides of the Atlantic apparently want to launch a discussion about whether or not tR³FRQWDLQ
5XVVLD´
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 51

and consulted on major issues, it would be hard for the Kremlin to resist such an offer.
Nonproliferation and the fight against global terrorism could provide a natural avenue
for achieving such entente cordiale. This could be sealed by a new meaningful legally-
binding US-Russian agreement on further reductions of strategic offensive weapons
(say, to the ceiling of 1,000, presently loathed by military planners in both states),
limited collaboration on strategic defenses starting with confidence-building,
transparency and reciprocal control measures, and a general outline of the new tenets
RIVWUDWHJLFVWDELOLW\EDVHGRQWKHFRQFHSWRIDFRKHUHQWGRFWULQHIRUWKH³FROODERUDWLYH
non-provocative, low-level nucleDUGHIHQVH´WREHHODERUDWHG
Despite the generally shared vision of a democratic and stable international
community comprised of equally empowered states, our world - this is the fact of life -
is divided into leading and non-essential states in terms of global influence. There exist
two groups of states - QXFOHDU ³KDYHV´ DQG ³KDYH-QRWV´ &XUUHQWO\ LW LV LPSRVVLEOH WR
assure equal rights for all states or non-state actors.
The nuclear domain is dominated by a few states - donors of technology and fissile
materials -USA, Russia, France, Canada and probably Japan with China and India
arguably in the offing. Other players so far have limited chances to develop their
indigenous nuclear technology potentials - thus depending on the group of nuclear
³SULQFLSDOV´

Regulating nuclear transfers

At the same time, if forceful counter-proliferation actions which undoubtedly

antagonize the world community are to be avoided, certain additional measures could
be undertaken in order to strengthen Article IV of the NPT. 24 This could also
supplement the right of non-nuclear states to the greatest possible access to non-
military nuclear technologies, which is stated in part II of the article.
The key issue of discussion could be the further increase of effectiveness of the
Additional Protocol so that the transfer of nuclear technologies and materials could be
carried out only by the states which subscribe and strictly comply with it and any
violators would be deprived of the right to develop peaceful nuclear programs.
Another point could consist of a further strengthening of the safeguards system based
on improved intelligence, as paragraph III of Article III states that safeguards should
not hamper international cooperation. 25 At the same time, efforts to prevent non-
nuclear states from acquiring access to critical technologies would be continued
through the strengthening of international system of nuclear export control.
In fact, another essential point could include a further increase of effectiveness of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee by the improvement of their
control lists and guidance documents with the potential harmonization of their already

24
Lawrence Scheinman, ³$UWLFOH ,9 RI WKH 137 %DFNJURXQG 3UREOHPV´  3DSHU SUHSDUHG IRU WKH
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, June 7, 2004, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No5.pdf
25
³Nuclear Weapons, Energy, and Nonproliferation: Pressures on the Global Community, 41st
&RQIHUHQFHRQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVRIWKH1H[W'HFDGH´6SRQVRUHGE\WKH6WDQOH\)RXQGDWLRQ-XQH-21,
2006, Enchantment Resort, Sedona, Arizona,
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/UNND06.pdf
52 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

overlapping structures, and formally fixing their status as the international nuclear
exports control system under the IAEA aegis.26
As to the efforts aimed at strengthening the international nonproliferation controls
in the technological sphere, the Russian initiative concerning the development of
proliferation-resistant nuclear cycle technologies proposed at the Millennium summit in
2000 should be noted. The first phase of the international project implementing the idea
that was similar to the Russian initiative has already been completed under the IAEA
auspices within the INPRO project (Task Force for Innovative Nuclear Reactor and
Fuel Cycle). Apparently, cooperation this and similar projects (primarily, the program
³,QWHUQDWLRQDO )RUXP ± )RXUWK *HQHUDWLRQ´ DOORZV IRU WKH HODERUDWLRQ RI D FRPPRQ
vision of the future development of atomic energy.
In June 2004, Russia joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at the
detection, prevention and suppression of illegal transactions and cross-boundary
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ WKH ³EODFN PDUNHW´ RI :0'-related materials and means of
delivery using coercive inspections of sea, air and land transport and communications.
Moscow views the PSI as a potentially useful mechanism of WMD counter-
proliferation consistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Russian naval
forces participate in the MediterUDQHDQ LQ VXFK PDQHXYHUV DV ³$FWLYH (QGHDYRXU´
Nevertheless, this general concept of forceful interception of suspicious cargoes has
many critics within Moscow government circles.

Disarmament obligations

In contrast to the now outdated Article V on peaceful nuclear explosions (the USSR
planned to use them for fire extinguishing), Article VI of the NPT is of fundamental
importance for the whole structure of the Treaty today. Some of the formulation of the
Article sounds nostalgically naïve as, for example, the requirement to carry on
QHJRWLDWLRQV ³RQ D WUHDW\ RQ general and complete disarmament under strict and
HIIHFWLYH LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWURO´  5XVVLDQ GLSORPDF\ SOD\V RXW WKLV $UWLFOH YHU\
skillfully underlining the fact that as opposed to the USA de facto obstruction, Moscow
adheres to its commitment to observe the obligations undertaken in the nuclear
disarmament sphere.
1HYHUWKHOHVV$UWLFOH9,LVFRPSOLHGZLWKRQO\FXUVRULO\ ZKLOHQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶
reductions of the major nuclear powers have almost no relation to the NPT obligations.
7KXV WKH ³ 6WHSV´ DFWLRQ SODQ DGRSWHG E\ WKH  137 5HYLHZ &RQIHUHQFH LV
widely ignored by the leading NWSs as an idealistic overly-demanding agenda
imposed on them by the developing countries.
Nuclear weapons and nuclear strikes planning are becoming more prominent in
nuclear doctrines or military training of leading nuclear weapon states, as a tool to
FRXQWHURUGLVVXDGH:0'SUROLIHUDWLRQRULWVXVHE\WKH³URJXHV´RUWHUURULVWHQWLWLHV
At the same time, despite the criticism and concern on behalf of the developing
countries or zealous Nonalignment movement members, the nuclear disarmament
process is evolving successfully in general, as far as it is possible in the modern world.
Besides, this article as it is does not demand immediate disarmament ± it only relies on
the obligation to conduct negotiations that approximates the set goal bona fide.
26
Russian Federation and the Situation in the Sphere of Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Means of Their Delivery: Threats, Evaluations< Tasks and Ways of Solution, National
report, http://www.government.ru/government/presscenter/new/2290e5589d7648a98063e532d70c6995.doc
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 53

One of the significant steps in this direction is the ratification of Russian-American

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty which foresees a mutual reduction of the overall
quantity of strategic nuclear warheads by up to 1,700-2,200 units by December 31,
2012 ± which is about three times less than the level established by the START-1
Treaty.
The process of destroying Russian and American deactivated ICBMs and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, launchers, strategic atomic submarines and
heavy bombers as well as tactical nuclear weapons is continuing successfully and
incrementally and in accordance with the physical amortization. Since the early 1990s,
Russia and the United States have reduced their strategic nuclear forces in warheads by
50% (and are to reduce by 60% by 2012); taking into consideration tactical nuclear
weapons, the reduction of nuclear arsenals has reached 80%.
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V SROLF\ DLPHG DW WKH FUHHSLQJ GLVPDQWOHPHQW RI WKH QXFOHDU
GLVDUPDPHQWWUHDWLHV¶V\VWHPZDVVKDUSO\FULWLFL]HGE\PRVW81PHPEHUVSDUWLFXODUO\
E\WKHVWDWHVWKDWDUHSDUWLHVWRWKH137$VDFRQVHTXHQFHRI3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VSROLFLHV
such documents as the ABM Treaty, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, START-2,
the framework agreement on START-3, the agreement delineating the strategic and
tactical ABM systems, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and other agreements have been
buried. It is still unclear whether the US administration would actually extend the
duration of START-1 which expires in 2009.
On the other hand, Russian potential withdrawal from the INF and actual walk-out
IURP WKH &)( 7UHDW\ ZRXOG SUREDEO\ XQGHUPLQH 0RVFRZ¶V DXWKRULW\ as a consistent
proponent of arms control and suit American hardliners quite well. Moreover, this
would demonstrate the adherence to the concept of eternizing nuclear deterrence what
would lead to the further weakening of the NPT since such measures could be regarded
as the violation of the spirit, if not the letter of nuclear powers obligations on nuclear
disarmament stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty.
Developing countries consider the development of new types of nuclear weapons,
particularly the intention of the Bush administration to develop new types of low-yield
nuclear weapons (to substitute for the tactical B-61 Mod.11 warhead) designed for the
liquidation of terrorist formations and fight against groups and regimes proliferating
WMD as a serious threat to the NPT viability.
Russia is also reprimanded for her increasing emphasis on the use of non-strategic
nuclear weapons as a deterrent of potential large-sale aggression under the pretext of
OLQJHULQJ ZHDNQHVV RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFHs. The importance of nuclear
weapons has been only growing recently and Russian doctrinal documents, military
exercises and military building, as far as they can be assessed on the basis of open
sources, are the evidence of it. Contrary to the expectations of international experts
Russia does not intend to scrap tactical nuclear weapons or reduce its stockpiles in the
near future ± once again referring to the NATO policies on these weapon systems.
Both the United States and Russia continue working out new systems of nuclear
weapons. Russia keeps on testing new strategic offensive arms systems elaborated as
an asymmetric response to the USA ABM plans.
All these facts reveal that the difference between nuclear and non-nuclear states
will remain ± like the differences between the rich and poor, technologically developed
and developing countries. Even the next wide±ranging agreement between Russia and
WKH86RQIXUWKHUVWUDWHJLFZHDSRQV¶FXWVDQGFORVHUFRRSHUDWLRQRQVWUDWHJLFVWDELOLW\
issues might not allHYLDWHWKLVGLVFRQWHQWRIWKH³JOREDOSHULSKHU\´UHJDUGLQJWKHDFWXDO
disarmament-oriented reticence of the leading nuclear nations.
54 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Steps outside the NPT

So far, the threat of dumping other key arms control agreements as a result of nuclear
powers politics has not been eliminated. For example, further strengthening of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could become possible only if it is ratified by
the USA thus ensuring that such problem states as India, Pakistan and Israel join the
Treaty. Up until now, it has been impossible to start negotiating about the elaboration
of the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) owing to the strict positions of the US
and China. It is unlikely that the nuclear disarmament program agreed at the NPT
review conference in 2000 would induce nuclear powers to adhere to the new
disarmament measures within the action plan for the13 steps in the foreseeable future.
The creation of nuclear free zones envisaged in Article VII of the NPT provides an
effective measure (including the purely psychological effect) of strengthening the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. It leads to the strengthening of regional and
international security and the increase of mutual confidence. At the same time, after
nuclear free zones had been established in Latin America (the Tlatelolko Agreement),
South Pacific Ocean (the Rarotonga Agreement), Southeast Asia (the Bangkok
Agreement) and in Africa (the Pelindaba Agreement) there is no progress in creating
them in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East. Apparently, only the fact
that the elaboration of the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear free zone in
Central Asia has reached final phase can be regarded as a certain success in this
direction. Russia had managed to set in Article 12 of this agreement the right to the
transportation of nuclear weapons through the zone in case of threat to the security of
the country or its allies as well as the invocation of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty
signed by the CIS countries. Therefore three nuclear powers abstained from signing the
Agreement.
Russia also supports the endeavors of non-nuclear states parties to the NPT to
receive legally obliging security guarantees that the nuclear powers would not use
nuclear weapons against them and had already provided such guarantees to more than
100 states which joined the corresponding agreements on nuclear free zones. However,
these guarantees are not in place so far and, as it is a question of national security of the
states, they require mandatory anchoring in the international law including the binding
resolutions of the UN Security Council. It is not even clear how much importance all
WKHVH VDIHJXDUGV¶ GHFODUDWLRQV KDYH LQ WKH OLJKW RI QXFOHDU SROLFLHV RI WKH OHDGLQJ
powers including RussLDLQSDUWLFXODUWKHLUUHDGLQHVVWRGHOLYHU³FRXQWHUWHUURULVW´SUH-
emptive strikes and launch force operations against the WMD threat which is rather a
warning to certain developing countries not to follow the example of such problem
states like North Korea. Though, according to Russia, the elaboration of international
DJUHHPHQW RQ ³QHJDWLYH´ VHFXULW\ JXDUDQWHHV SUREDEO\ ZLWKLQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH
Conference on Disarmament) had become impending long ago. However, such an
agreement should also include the clauses concerning the cases in which nuclear
weapons can be used in response to the large-scale aggression and must be applied only
to those countries which strictly observe the WMD non-proliferation obligations.
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 55

Withdrawal clause

Article X of the NPT, which determines the conditions of withdrawal from the Treaty,
acquires new relevance under modern conditions.27 It is obvious that member states
should not apply this right selectively. Those states which break Article IV and intend
to use nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes should be deprived of such a right.
From the other side, those states which withdraw from the Treaty arbitrarily
without holding any consultations should be deprived of the rights within Article IV
and any cooperation with them at least in the nuclear sphere, if not in general, should
be ceased with the possible dismantling of their already created facilities. At the
present moment, the NPT does not provide any legal mechanism to regulate actions
towards the states which arbitrarily decided to withdraw from the Treaty as was the
case with North Korea. On the whole, the question of sanctions against states violating
the NPT remains the most difficult problem of Treaty enforcement.
Some of the experts propose to complicate the withdrawal procedures from the
NPT thus impeding problem states like North Korea from freely walking away from
the Treaty. Supposedly, the state should prove the feasibility of threat to its national
interests and start intensive inspections within the IAEA framework in order to detect
possible earlier violations. It is also proposed to prohibit the state withdrawing from
the Treaty to use the materials, technologies and industrial capabilities it had received
within the NPT and to leave them under the IAEA control. The UN Security Council is
supposed to ensure compliance with these conditions and could impose sanctions
including use of force against the state in case it refuses to allow IAEA inspections.
All these proposals are very interesting and innovative. However, the experience
of the political struggle around the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates that they can
only become feasible if the international relations acquire new dimensions that the
disarmament experts and leftist politicians so strive for. It is obvious that the
implementation of these proposals requires unity both within the UN Security Council
as well as between the developing and the developed countries within international
organizations which is, deplorably, mostly impossible today. In this respect, the
incremental steps based on the decisions in every single case seem more realistic.
0HDQZKLOHWKHUHDUHVWLOOSOHQW\RIUHDVRQVIRURSWLPLVP1RQHZ³URJXHV´KDYH
HPHUJHGDIWHUWKH,UDQLDQRU1RUWK.RUHDQEUHDNRXWV´'RPLQR-theor\´SUHGLFWLRQVRI
rolling weaponization in problem regions (with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil,
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, and many others getting nuclear weapons potentials)
EHFDPHKLJKO\LPSUREDEOH$QGWKH³PRUHLVEHWWHU´FRQFHSWLQ QXFOHDUSUoliferation
studies advocating the merits of the unbridled spread of regional nuclear-weapons
states that had been promoted by some theorists in the early 1980s today stands out as
an absurdly incorrect vision.
3UHVHQWO\ WKH 137 PHPEHUV DUH DOPRVW µIL[HG¶ ZLWKLQ WKH 7UHDW\ FRQILQHV DQG
would hardly venture to withdraw from the Treaty without consequences. That is why
no amendment or strengthening of the NPT Article X provisions on walkout rights of
its members is necessary today.
At the same time, the potential of the most daring ideas which can be implemented
LQWKHQHZ³JROGHQDJH´VKRXOGEHXQGRXEWHGO\DFFXPXODWHG
Today, it is almost impossible to take any measures against countries obviously
violating the NPT (like Iran or the DPRK) because of the contradictory interests and
practical absence of consensus in the UN Security Council and the IAEA Governing
27
George Bunn and John Rhinelander ³7KH 5LJKW WR :LWKGUDZ IURP WKH 137 $UWLFOH ; LV 1RW
8QFRQGLWLRQDO´Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 79, April/May 2005
56 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Board ± which significantly undermines the efficiency of the Treaty. It is essential to

create a clear mechanism assuring that the IAEA has all the required competences to
investigate violations of the NPT and immediately transfer the results of the inspections
to the UN Security Council in order to take the appropriate actions provided in the UN
&KDUWHU DQG &RXQFLO¶V UHVROXWLRQV  8QIRUWXQDWHO\ LW is a utopia as of yet, with the
position of Russia being one of the reasons for it. Perhaps it would be advisable to
hold an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the states which are party to
the NPT to examine the withdrawal notification; however it is doubtful that any serious
measures against the violators could be taken at such conference.

Looking for a breakthrough

7KH³LQFDQWDWLRQV´PDGHE\5XVVLDQH[SHUWVWKDWWKH7UHDW\LV³EHWWHUDOLYHWKDQGHDG´
can hardly solve the problem of the NPT efficiency. Up until now, Russia has not
proposed any clear or feasible ideas of strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. The adaptation of the Treaty to the new post-Cold War world and the reality
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks require the amendments in Article VIII or something
radically new as the extension of the NPT scope. Thus, the provisions of the
safeguards Additional Protocol can become part of the NPT.
At the same time it is clear that despite the legalistic plans of developing states or
the pacifist ideas of developed countries proposed at international conferences, it is
very hard to expect any serious progress in strengthening the NPT viability at
international forums. In spite of the positive efforts of Russia and other nuclear powers
in the nonproliferation and arms control sphere, there has been no visible breakthrough
since 2000. The NPT Review Conference in 2005 thus turned out a complete failure. 28
Most probably, further nonproliferation efforts ± as well as the peacekeeping
RSHUDWLRQV DQG KXPDQLWDULDQ LQWHUYHQWLRQV LQ WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI ³SDUDO\VLV´ RI WKH 81
Security Council ± would be focused on regional factors, particularly the activities of
NATO and European Union and other regional organizations. In a sense, it can be
observed already in the debate round the six-party talks on the non-nuclear status of
1RUWK.RUHDRUWKHGLSORPDWLFDFWLYLWLHVRIWKH³(8WURLND´LQFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK5XVVLD
concerning the Iranian nuclear program.
On the whole, radical reconfiguration of the NPT when all the nuclear energy
services would be rendered through the above-mentioned system of global and regional
consortiums on the international basis should not be discarded. Somehow, the latest
developments round the DPRK nuclear program and the considered options of solving
the Iranian nuclear problem shape the further evolution of the NPT after the end of the
Cold War and the exposed failure of the multilateral diplomacy within its legalistic
framework.
Various options including counter-proliferation measures based on the ad hoc
principle seem also possible.
In general, the ways of improving the NPT can be grouped in several categories:
strengthening the IAEA and safeguards system; implementing conscious exports

28
See three DUWLFOHV E\ 5HEHFFD -RKQVRQ ³Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review
Conference Failed´ Disarmament Diplomacy,VVXH1R$XWXPQ³Looking Towards 2010: What
does the Nonproliferation Regime Need?´, Disarmament Diplomacy 1R6SULQJDQG³Back from
the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report´ Disarmament Diplomacy No. 85, Summer 2007
 V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” 57

control policies; creating consortiums and concluding regional agreements; developing

active counter-proliferation policies; further armaments reduction and preventing a new
arms race.
Notwithstanding the evident deficiencies the NPT remains an important element of
international law and a measuring scale, in a sense, which allows for the determination
of the degree of danger posed by nuclear programs of certain states and the
organization of activities of the IAEA and other international institutions in the nuclear
sphere. This scale only needs to be clearly calibrated ± ZLWKRXW WKH XVXDO ³SROLWLFDO
FRUUHFWQHVV´RIWKH&ROG:DUSHULRG± in order to define the parameters of violation of
the nonproliferation norms inevitably entailing international sanctions. All this
presupposes the close cooperation or at least the accord between the leading powers of
the world.
The status and direction of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century would
depend on how actively Russian leadership would be involved in the various global
nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the nuclear and other
WMD-related sphere.
58 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-58

NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors

Shaping a Decision
Michael RŰHLE1

Abstract. NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2009 is likely to launch the

elaboration of a new Strategic Concept, to replace the 1999 document. The new
Concept will have to reflect NATO’s more operational nature and its more global
orientation. It may also feature new language on nuclear matters, reflecting both
the new proliferation landscape and renewed arms control concerns. Despite
fundamental changes in these areas, and subsequent modifications of the nuclear
doctrines and postures of the US, Britain and France, the statements on NATO’s
nuclear aspects are likely to remain conservative, with an emphasis on nuclear
sharing and the maintenance of a small number of European-based tactical nuclear
weapons.

Introduction: preparing for a new strategic concept

In 2009, the year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, the Heads of State and Government of
the Alliance are likely to task the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to draft
a new Strategic Concept. Replacing the 1999 document, this new Strategic Concept
would probably be published at the subsequent Summit, possibly in 2010.
The new Strategic Concept will have to cover a lot of ground. In describing the
new strategic environment, this document will have to put a much stronger emphasis
on post-“9/11” developments: international terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction; and failed states. In addition, one can expect the document to say
something about NATO’s potential role in cyber defence and energy security. In
setting out the basic approaches to NATO’s missions and operations, the new
document will also have to reflect the fact that, compared to the 1999 Strategic Concept,
the range of NATO’s engagements has broadened further. It now includes combat in
Afghanistan, peacekeeping in the Balkans, anti-terrorist naval operations in the
Mediterranean, providing support for the African Union, training Iraqi security forces,
and providing humanitarian relief after natural disasters.
Moreover, NATO’s partnership policies, which featured prominently in the 1999
Concept, have also broadened significantly since then; they meanwhile include several
Gulf States as well as new ties with countries from the Asia-Pacific region. In line with
the need for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, NATO’s links with
other international institutions, notably the European Union and the United Nations,
will have to be defined. And, last but not least, the new Strategic Concept will need to
give specific guidance on the direction of NATO’s military transformation.

1
Head, Speechwriting and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit, NATO. Personal views only.
 M. Rűhle / NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision 59

The nuclear conundrum

It is widely assumed that a new NATO Strategic Concept will also feature new
language on the role of nuclear weapons. In the 1999 Concept, the approach to this
issue was conservative: the document took note of the positive changes after end of the
Cold War, and stressed that they had paved the way for huge cuts in NATO’s
European-based nuclear forces. It also noted that the circumstances in which any use
of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated were now “extremely remote.” 2
With respect to the rationale for NATO’s nuclear forces, however, the language was
largely the same as that of the previous Strategic Concept from 1991.
The conservatism of the 1999 Concept was not without reason. After all,
statements on nuclear matters, very much like everything else in NATO, must be
approved by all Allies (France constituting an exception in certain cases).
Conservatism is thus an inherent feature, all the more so in areas that do not appear to
require radical and/or imminent changes. Another factor that naturally tilts the balance
in favour of conservatism is the multi-purpose nature of any NATO Strategic Concept:
it not only seeks to explain NATO to a wider public, both inside and outside the NATO
nations; it also provides strategic guidance for NATO’s military authorities (who then
work out more detailed follow-on documents); and, above all, it serves to provide a
snapshot of an intra-Alliance consensus on the key elements of NATO’s agenda. In
other words, a Strategic Concept is as much about internal “housekeeping” as it is
about public diplomacy. Thus, while public diplomacy requirements may suggest bold,
far-reaching policy statements, the need for political consensus within an Alliance of
sovereign nations will eventually compel the Allies to settle for the lowest common
denominator. This is all the more true for sensitive nuclear matters.
Still, the drafters of the next Strategic Concept might not get away quite so easily.
The changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the 1999 Concept
may prove to be too fundamental to allow for a simple cut-and-paste job. In 1999,
when NATO was still a “Eurocentric” organisation, its nuclear pronouncements were
justifiably influenced by an improving security situation in Europe. Today, however,
such a focus would appear far too limited. With NATO acting outside of its traditional
European perimeter, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
related technologies constituting a “second nuclear age”, and with the non-proliferation
regime under threat from various directions, a mere repetition of the 1999 language on
nuclear issues would fall short of current requirements. Worse, as the new Strategic
Concept is likely to feature much new, forward-leaning language on many other parts
of NATO’s agenda, a conservative approach would make the nuclear part of the new
Concept stand out as “retro”, thereby inviting interpretations that the Allies were
shying away from revisiting this part of their defence policy.

What Has Changed?

Several issues stand out. The first is a further improvement of the security situation in
Europe, which has lead to a further disentanglement of NATO’s nuclear weapons from

2
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. of 23rd and 24th April 1999, para.64,
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/p99-065e.htm (accessed on 6 December 2007).
60 M. Rűhle / NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision

the conventional sphere. The absence of Cold War antagonisms and the overall
military situation in Europe with respect to conventional forces make the logic of
resorting to nuclear weapons to compensate for weaknesses in NATO’s conventional
posture a rather hypothetical issue. Current disagreements between NATO Allies and
Russia of the future of the CFE Treaty or on missile defence are not likely to change
this positive picture.
The second development is the proliferation of WMD and related technologies.
Essentially a by-product of globalisation, this trend had been visible throughout the
1990s, yet it became a major international issue only in the late 1990s. Key events
include the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998; North Korea’s nuclear and
missile programmes and its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003; and the revelation of
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which now threaten a nuclear domino effect in the Middle
East. Moreover, the A. Q. Kahn nuclear supply network indicated that proliferation
may exceedingly happen outside the classical NPT/interstate regime. Finally, the
difficulties of establishing a strong sanctions regime against Iran and the US-India
nuclear deal indicate that other considerations, such as economic and geopolitical
interests, may ultimately override non-proliferation concerns.3
These developments have lead to the third factor of change: the crisis of non-
proliferation and arms control. The non-proliferation optimism of the early 1990s has
meanwhile been replaced by a deepening schism between the NWS and some NNWS.
Differences between the NWS and many NNWS on whether to put the emphasis on
compliance or disarmament (Art VI) have been exacerbated in the recent past. This has
led to increased pressure on the NWS, notably from the NGO community, to rejuvenate
the non-proliferation regime by undertaking major disarmament steps. As the new
NATO Strategic Concept may be published in 2010, the year of the next NPT Review
Conference, its language on nuclear matters, particularly on arms control, will be the
subject of much public scrutiny.
Finally, one might also add a more general recognition of the limits of nuclear
deterrence. “9/11” and the rise of Al Qaida have re-focussed international attention
away from classical scenarios of interstate conflict and towards non-state actors bent on
inflicting mass casualties. Once religious fundamentalism is factored into the nuclear
equation (witness the debate about a “Talibanisation” of Pakistan), the chances of
erecting a stable, long-term mutual deterrence regime in a multinuclear world appear
slim indeed. These doubts about the reliability of deterrence in new scenarios have
also contributed to the return of missile defence, notably in the United States.

Reactions: Changes in US, British and French Nuclear Doctrines

How would these changes in the security environment since the end of Cold War
influence the language on NATO’s nuclear forces in a new Strategic Concept? Recent
changes in the nuclear policies of the three Nuclear Weapons States in NATO – the US,
the UK and France – might provide one part of the answer.4

3
See Michael Ru hle, Order and Disorder in the Second Nuclear Age, Internationale Politik
(Transatlantic Edition), vol.7, no.4, 2006, pp.18-24.
4
See David S. Yost, New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States,
International Affairs (Chatham House), vol.81, no.1, 2005, pp.83-114.
 M. Rűhle / NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision 61

Clearly, the arsenals and policies of these three nations differ substantially,
reflecting the considerable differences in size, geography, culture, and self-perception,
as well as different levels of political-strategic ambition of these countries. The US
arsenal, in particular, stands out in many ways: its size trumps those of the two
European Allies; its missions – notably to provide extended deterrence for NATO and
other US allies – are far more ambitious; and the public debate about US nuclear
strategy is far more lively, provocative and intellectually challenging than the debates
on the UK and French deterrents, which are conducted within a much smaller strategic
community. The US debate is also far more explicit, both in naming potential threats
as well as in discussing specific employment options. Notwithstanding these
differences, however, all three nations have affected changes in their nuclear policies
that appear to follow roughly similar patterns. With a view to NATO’s future Strategic
Concept, three elements of change are particularly noteworthy.
First, a further reduction of the centrality of nuclear weapons for national security.
This is most obvious in the case of the United States. International criticism of the
Nuclear Posture Review (and the project of a new warhead for underground targets)
has been vocal, yet it has obscured the fact that the trend towards a lesser reliance on
nuclear weapons has not changed, let alone been reversed. The UK and France, given
the smaller size of their arsenals, have far less leeway in this regard, as they have
always stressed the eminently political function of their nuclear weapons. Yet both
London and Paris have also stressed that the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons
remains remote.
Second, the need to make nuclear arsenals more flexible. This trend is as much a
reflection of opportunities created by advancing technology as of strategic necessity.
While critics have traditionally charged the development of high accuracy/low yield
nuclear weapons as a dangerous desire to “conventionalise” nuclear war, the trend
towards more selective employment options is fully in line with a view of nuclear
weapons as predominantly political tools of war termination rather than “normal” war-
fighting instruments. Reducing self-deterrence and limiting damage in case deterrence
fails are two more factors that make nuclear flexibility a value per se.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a more explicit link between nuclear
deterrence and new and emerging threats: the use of biological and chemical weapons
by an adversary, and, most recently, the deterrence of (or reprisals against) states that
sponsor terrorism. These threats of nuclear retaliation against an attack with other
weapons of mass destruction do not constitute a radical departure from past policy.
The United States, for example, articulated threats of nuclear retaliation in response to
chemical (and conventional) attacks during the Cold War in the NATO-Warsaw Pact
context. By the same token, the UK and France (and Russia) have also long
maintained that their nuclear arsenals were also intended to deter WMD other than
nuclear. In recent years, however, Washington, London and Paris have been more
explicit about the need to deter not just nuclear weapons, but also other WMD.
The role of nuclear deterrence in the context of terrorism is largely a result of
“9/11” and its aftermath. While there is widespread agreement that suicidal terrorist
non-state actors cannot be deterred by threatening nuclear retaliation, states that
sponsor them may well remain susceptible to nuclear threats. Hence, all three NATO
NWS seem to agree that there is a role for nuclear deterrence. As then British Prime
Minister Tony Blair put it in December 2006, “[i]t is true that our deterrent would not
deter or prevent terrorists. But it is bound to have an impact on governments that might
62 M. Rűhle / NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision

sponsor them.”5 For all these reasons, some analysts maintain that the policies of all
three NATO NWS are, in fact, much more similar than the general discussion might
suggest.6
Would these three elements – reduced reliance on nuclear weapons; more
flexibility of remaining weapons; and a more explicit definition of the role of
deterrence against other WMD and states sponsoring terrorism – find their way into a
new NATO Strategic Concept? At first glance, it would seem logical to assume that a
new document would indeed somehow have to amalgamate these developments.
However, NATO’s nuclear doctrine cannot simply be derived by analysing the nuclear
policies of the three NWS. After all, the large majority of NATO is made up of nations
that have foresworn a nuclear status by signing the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapons
States (NNWS). This fact will significantly influence the language of the future NATO
Strategic Concept, regardless of doctrinal innovations in the US, the UK or France. It
will also ensure that considerations of doctrine will be influenced by factors other than
the question of what constitutes effective deterrence. At least since the London
Declaration of July 1990, when NATO introduced the “last resort” formula as a
political signal to the Soviet Union (to allow for a united Germany in NATO), NATO’s
nuclear pronouncements must be seen as major political statements, where general
political principles may ultimately be more important than explanations of specific
military postures.

Some Enduring Principles

Taking into account the changes in the international security environment, the
adjustments in US, British and French nuclear policies, and the compromise nature of
any Alliance document, this author would suggest that a new NATO Strategic Concept
might contain the following elements:
First, more explicit references to an emerging strategic environment characterised
by the proliferation of WMD and delivery means. Since the 1999 Strategic Concept
already covers a lot of ground, highlighting proliferation dangers and even non-state
actors, this should not be too difficult to agree on. Moreover, the 2006
“Comprehensive Political Guidance” also contains strong wording to this effect. 7 It
will be interesting to see, however, whether NATO Allies will also agree on more
explicit language regarding the implications of this environment for their own nuclear
deterrent posture – for example, whether nuclear weapons are given a specific role in
deterring other kinds of WMD.
Second, an endorsement of European-based US nuclear systems. The logic of
maintaining a small number of highly secure US theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) in

5
Tony Blair, Parliamentary Statement on Trident, 4 December 2006,
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page10532.asp (accessed on 6 December 2007); see also The Future of
the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence and
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of her Majesty, Cm 6994
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, December 2006), p.19, par.3-11.
6
See Bruno Tertrais, “A Comparison between US, UK and French Nuclear Policies and Doctrines,”
Centred’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Cntre National De La Recherche Scientifique, March 2007,
http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/mars07/art_btpdf (accessed on 6 December 2007).
7
Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29
November 2006, http://nato.int/docu/basictxt/bo61129e.htm (accessed on 6 December 2007).
 M. Rűhle / NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision 63

several European NATO countries is likely to prevail. Ritualistic claims by the NGO
community that this particular aspect of NATO’s sharing arrangements circumvents the
NPT and thus should be abandoned, or that these systems no longer serve any military-
operational purpose, will not prove convincing enough to effect major changes. To be
sure, current fears about a further deterioration of the NPT regime may make such
claims appear timely, and some NATO governments and parliamentarians may well be
sympathetic to such views. However, the principle of Allied risk sharing (a principle
that is currently under severe strain in Afghanistan) and not least the low number of
remaining systems will ultimately trump arms control arguments – all the more so as
the latter appear rather specious. If the past is any guide, no change of NATO’s nuclear
doctrine or posture will enamour the arms control community, nor is a withdrawal of
NATO sub-strategic nuclear forces likely to put pressure on Russia to do engage in
TNW arms control. On the contrary, Russia is likely to argue that it has long completed
the return of its TNW to its own territory and that, hence, the onus is on the US and
NATO to do the same.
Third, an endorsement of nuclear sharing arrangements. Nuclear sharing, as
institutionalised in the Nuclear Planning Group and other bodies, enables non-nuclear
Alliance members to have an active role in shaping the evolution of strategic policy. It
allows for consultation and coordination in an unparalleled way and thus constitutes an
important aspect of the very notion of “alliance”. Moreover, the non-proliferation
aspects of US extended deterrence – conveniently ignored by the NGO community –
may well be “rediscovered” once a nuclear armed Iran will lead to heightened fears of a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East.8 If such a “domino effect” were to occur, Europe,
and notably Turkey, would be faced with a neighbourhood in which any conventional
skirmish would carry the risk of nuclear escalation. The answer to the question of how
to safeguard security in view of such a nuclearised neighbourhood without recourse to
a national nuclear option might well be a reconfirmation of the US “nuclear umbrella”.
In sum, despite arguments that US extended deterrence does not require European-
based nuclear systems, that the British and French nuclear deterrents would be
sufficient, or that NATO should provide a major impulse for the rejuvenation of
nuclear arms control, a new Strategic Concept is likely to reemphasise the sharing
principle.
For some observers, the above elements may confirm the risk that was mentioned
at the outset of this paper, namely that the nuclear language of a new Strategic Concept
would be overly conservative. However, in this author’s view, the basic principles of
NATO’s nuclear doctrine are eminently sound and require very little change. What a
new NATO Strategic Concept should primarily aim for is to provide a more cogent
rationale for nuclear deterrence and risk-sharing in the 21st century. The Allies should
resist the temptation of “balancing” strategy and arms control elements in the faint
hope that this would make it acceptable to a broader audience. Instead, the language
should be firm and unapologetic. Allies should make it clear that nuclear deterrence, as
understood and implemented within the NATO framework, remains an intelligent way
of dealing with the realities of the second nuclear age.

8
The “intangibles” of NATO’s sharing mechanisms also deserve mentioning even though they would
probably never feature explicitly in a NATO document. A credible nuclear protection provided by the United
States also serves to equalize the military-political status of individual Alliance members and thus facilitates
political integration. In this author’s view, at least, the principles of nuclear sharing and extended deterrence
help to play down the differences between European Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, thus
preventing weapons from becoming purely a means of national power and prestige.
64 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-64

British Nuclear Strategy1

Jeremy STOCKER2

Abstract. In 2007 the British Government announced that the UK strategic

nuclear deterrent is to be maintained until the 2050s, by which time Britain will
have been a nuclear weapons state for almost a century. During the Cold War
Britain need to deter the Soviet Union, but the UK's relationship with the United
States was at least as important in determining the country's nuclear stance. Today
the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less threatening but more uncertain
strategic environment. Nuclear ties with the US remain as important as ever, and
enable the UK to remain a nuclear power at modest cost.

The last three years have seen the re-emergence of an active public debate about
nuclear weapons in Britain. The catalyst for this debate and subsequent Government
policy was the need to decide on the renewal of the British nuclear deterrent capability
over the next 20 years. As a result of decisions announced earlier this year, the UK
will remain a small nuclear weapons state, a status enjoyed by the country for over half
a century and now set to continue for another half-century.
Britain was the first country to seriously investigate the use of atomic energy for
military purposes, as early as 1940. Its efforts were soon subsumed into the much
larger Anglo-$PHULFDQµ0DQKDWWDQ¶SURMHFWZKLFKOHGWRWKHERPEVGURSSHGRQ-DSDQ
in 1945. After the abrupt termination of Anglo-American atomic cooperation the
following year, the UK chose to pursue its own national programme. The first British
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nuclear weapons state.
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SXUSRVH,WSURYLGHGWKHµXOWLPDWHJXDUDQWHH¶RI security in the face of a much larger,
hostile and nuclear-armed superpower, the Soviet Union. It gave the UK some
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States. And nuclear weapons preserved some element of %ULWDLQ¶VIRUPHU*UHDW3RZHU
status, a means of levelling the otherwise enormous and growing disparity in
conventional military capability as compared to the two superpowers.
One can argue that whilst in an operational sense the British nuclear deterrent was
DLPHGDWWKH6RYLHW8QLRQVWUDWHJLFDOO\LWZDVDLPHGDW:DVKLQJWRQ7KDWLV%ULWDLQ¶V
modest nuclear capability was designed to influence American, at least as much as
5XVVLDQEHKDYLRXU7KRXJK%ULWDLQUHWDLQHGDµPLQLPDO¶QXFOHDUGHWHUUHQWDVDKHdge
against the failure (real or perceived) of the US nuclear guarantee of Europe, its main
purpose was to exercise influence over the much larger American nuclear arsenal
which provided the best basis of security for the UK.

1
This paper summarizes many of the argumentVSUHVHQWHGLQWKHDXWKRU¶VUHFHQWPRQRJUDSKThe
United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence, Adelphi Paper 386 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, February
2007)
2
Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute
 J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy 65

7KHHVVHQFHRI%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOear policy has been a complex mix of independence,

interdependence and dependence, all expressed in relation to the United States rather
than the physical target of British nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union. Once the United
States itself became vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike, the credibility of an
American willingness to use, or threaten the use of, nuclear weapons on behalf of
Europe became a matter of potential uncertainty. A British ability to strike the Soviet
Union independently provided an insurance against the failure of an American promise
WRGRVR,WDOVRSUHVHQWHGDµVHFRQGFHQWUHRIGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ¶WRFRPSOLFDWH5XVVLDQ
calculations as Moscow would need to take British, as well as American, actions into
account.
+RZHYHU %ULWDLQ¶V PRGHst deterrent capability could be no substitute for the US
QXFOHDU µXPEUHOOD¶%ULWDLQ¶VRZQQXFOHDU IRUFH ZDVWKHUHIRUHD ZD\RI VKRZLQJWKDW
WKH 8. ZDV µSXOOLQJ LWV ZHLJKW¶ DQG WKDW LWV YLHZV DQG LQWHUHVWV VKRXOG EH WDNHQ LQWR
account. Once the UK had independently demonstrated a nuclear capability (its
bomber-delivered atomic weapons became operational in 1956) the US had an
incentive to co-ordinate its own plans with its only nuclear-armed ally, and close
Anglo-American nuclear cooperation was re-established in 1958. It has endured to this
day.
Interdependence with the United States also implied a growing dependence, as the
UK could only ever be a junior partner in this relationship. This was not just a function
of relative numbers. The resumption of nuclear cooperation has enabled Britain to
develop its warheads at more modest cost and, perhaps more importantly, obtain
American delivery systems.
%ULWDLQ¶VH[SHULHQFHVLQFHWKHHDUO\VKDVFRQVLVWHQWO\GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWIRUD
small nuclear power acquisition of an adequate delivery system is at least as
challenging as developing the warheads themselves. After several false starts, in 1963
the UK settled on the only delivery system which really satisfies the strategic
requirements of a small, densely-populated island state ± the submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM). Development of such a weapon was beyond British
resources at the time, especially after the cancellation of British-developed land- and
air-launched missiles.3 The US Administration of John F Kennedy agreed to supply
the Polaris V\VWHPRQIDYRXUDEOHWHUPVDQGWKLVEHFDPHWKHEDVLVRIWKH8.¶VVWUDWHJLF
deterrent in 1968.
Polaris solved the problem of vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike, as to date no
means of reliably detecting ballistic missile-firing submarines (SSBNs) whilst on patrol
has been devised. The ballistic missile itself is much the most difficult delivery system
to intercept once launched. But Polaris GLG QRW VROYH DOO %ULWDLQ¶V SUREOHPV LQ LWV
asymmetric nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. The Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) system deployed around Moscow could not undermine the ability of US
nuclear forces to devastate the Soviet Union, but it did pose a severe challenge for the
much more modest (if technically sophisticated) British force. This became apparent
even before Polaris entered service.
The answer to this conundrum was the Chevaline Polaris Improvement
Programme. Chevaline drew on some earlier American research and made extensive
use of US test facilities, but was a unique British technical success. It substituted a
complex system of decoys for one of Polaris¶VWKUHHZDUKHDGVDQGPHDQWWKDWHDFKRQH

3
Blue Streak and Blue Steel Mk2, respectively
66 J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy

of the 16 missiles carried per submarine presented over 40 objects to the Moscow
defence system, instead of just three. No other nuclear weapons state has, to date,
deployed such a comprehensive system of missile defence countermeasures. Chevaline
entered service in 1982, the same year that the British Government selected the Trident
D5 missile as its eventual replacement. The latter entered service in the mid-1990s,
purchased from the US under the same terms as the original Polaris Sales Agreement.
It should be emphasised that while the UK is completely dependent upon the
United States for the provision of the missiles, and benefits from some American
assistance in relation to warheads and submarines, both the latter are designed and built
in Britain. Most importantly, operational control of the British Trident force, including
navigation and targeting, is in exclusively British hands.
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union removed the single,
over-ULGLQJ UDWLRQDOH IRU WKH H[LVWHQFH DQG RSHUDWLRQDO SRVWXUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU
forces. Ironically, however, the Trident system, ordered during the Cold War, was just
coming into service. Other than the unlikely option of complete nuclear abandonment
no major decisions were required about the strategic deterrent. Several nuclear
reductions were made, including the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons and the
cancellation of an Anglo-French stand-off air-launched missile designed to perform
µWKHDWUH¶QXFOHDUWDVNV%XWTrident itself, already largely paid for, was retained though
with reduced numbers of missiles and warheads. By 1998 all other nuclear weapons
had been withdrawn from service and for the first time since the 1950s Britain came to
rely on a single nuclear delivery system. Subsequent reviews have resulted in further
reductions so that the UK today has fewer operational warheads than at any time since
the early 1960s.
7RGD\ %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH LV WKH VPDOOHVW RI WKH ILYH 1XFOHDU :HDSRQ 6WDWHV
(NWS) recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). British nuclear weapons
account for about 1.5% of the world's total stock of nuclear warheads. Four Vanguard-
class submarines entered service between 1994 and 2001. Each can carry 16 Trident
D5 SLBMs though usually deploy with fewer, probably about 12. Each missile can
carry up to 12 Mk.4 re-entry vehicles (RVs) with a 100-kiloton (kt) warhead, though
the British Government has stated that no more than 48 warheads are carried per boat.
With the withdrawal from service of Britain's other nuclear systems, Trident was
reconfigured in the 1990s to include a 'sub-strategic' role in addition to its main
strategic task. Officially, this was achieved by varying the number of warheads carried
per missile and introducing a reduced yield for some of the warheads. Though the
Government will not publicly confirm further details, it is widely believed (and not
officially contradicted) that 'sub-strategic' configured missiles carry a single warhead
with a reduced yield in the range of 1-10 kt. As part of the British Government's
review of future nuclear policy in early 2007 the term 'sub-strategic' was quietly
dropped, recognising that any use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons would be
firmly Strategic with a capital 'S'. 4 Instead, flexibility in the number and yield of
warheads provides more targeting options and, arguably, greater deterrence credibility
in the face of 'limited' nuclear threats.
Given that the newest of the Trident submarines entered service as recently as
2001, it came as a surprise to many when in 2003 the British Government announced
that "...decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed [in] this Parliament [ie

4
Michael Codner "Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: Keeping the Options Open" in RUSI Newsbrief Vol.25
No.8 August 2005 p.88
 J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy 67

the period 2001-2005] but are likely to be required in the next one".5 By the end of
2006 initial studies were complete and the Government announced that "...we
have...decided to take the steps necessary to sustain a credible deterrent capability in
the 2020s and beyond...We have...decided to maintain our nuclear deterrent by building
a new class of submarines".6 After a short period of public consultation, in March 2007
the House of Commons voted to support Government policy.
The need to make decisions on the future of the nuclear deterrent is driven by two
factors. First, the submarines have a design life of 25 years which, for a range of
technical reasons, can only sensibly be extended by a further five years. The first new
boat will therefore be required in service by around 2022 (the clock starts ticking when
the submarines are launched, rather than when they enter operational service). Design
work therefore needs to start now. Secondly, the United States is undertaking a life-
extension programme for the Trident missile, which will keep it in service into the
2040s. If the UK wants to join this programme, a commitment is required in 2007. A
further decision will be required in later years as to whether a new warhead will need to
be designed, in which case the UK can be expected to cooperate with the US in the
development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which does not require
explosive testing. Nuclear weapons tests are now banned by the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) which the UK has ratified.
All of this begs the question as to why, with the Cold War a fading memory, the
British Government has committed some £15-20 billion over a 15-year period for the
renewal of a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Though this sum represents less than
0.25% of overall Government expenditure, it carries a significant opportunity cost in
terms of the conventional military capabilities that might otherwise be funded. Part of
the explanation lies in domestic politics. The ruling Labour Party adopted an anti-
nuclear stance in the 1980s, a position which is widely believed to be a significant
factor in Labour being out of power for 18 years. Though the now-governing party still
contains many anti-nuclear MPs, the Party leadership would not want to risk repeating
the unilateralist experiment, preferring a commitment to eventual, multilateral nuclear
disarmament. But domestic political calculations come nowhere near fully explaining
current British policy.
Long-term strategic considerations dictate a retention of the 'minimal' nuclear
GHWHUUHQW  'XULQJ WKH &ROG :DU %ULWDLQ¶V GHWHUUHQFH UHTXLUHPHQW ZDV H[SUHVVHG LQ
WHUPV RI WKH µ0RVFRZ &ULWHULRQ¶  7KRXJK 0RVFRZ ZDV QHYHU Whe only target for
British nuclear weapons, the ability to hit the Soviet capital was indicative of the scale
of deterrent effect demanded.
,Q WRGD\¶V µ6HFRQG 1XFOHDU $JH¶ WKH 0RVFRZ &ULWHULRQ REYLRXVO\ QR ORQJHU
applies. Nor does any other target suggest itself as a realistic substitute. Instead
%ULWDLQ LV OHIW ZLWK ZKDW KDV EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV D µ7R :KRP LW 0D\ &RQFHUQ¶
requirement. The UK does not currently need to deter any defined state, but nuclear
weapons remain salient and a specific threat could well re-emerge. The British
Government puts it this way:

...the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear
arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently

5
Cm 6041-I Delivering Security in a Changing World London: TYSO, December 2003 p.9
6
Cm 6994 The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent London: TSO, December 2006 p.7
68 J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy

represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our

security.7

Put another way, retention of the nuclear deterrent is a prudent hedge against an
unknown and uncertain future. In particular, any decision to abandon nuclear weapons
would quickly become, for all practical purposes, irrevocable. Should a future crisis or
more gradual worsening of the international security scene warrant a reversal of policy
and the re-creation of a nuclear weapons capability, it could never be achieved
sufficiently quickly for it to be an adequate response to the changed conditions that
made it necessary in the first place. This is especially so in terms of an adequate
delivery system. Moreover, following a decision to abandon nuclear weapons, no
British Government could take for granted a resumption of close Anglo-American co-
operation.
,QWKHDEVHQFHRIDQREYLRXVQHHGWRGHWHUDKRVWLOHVXSHUSRZHU%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOHDU
VWDQFHLVQRZPRUHRSDTXHRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVµVWXGLHGDPELJXLW\¶7KH*RYHUQPHQW
says little about who might need to be deterred, and under what circumstances. It does
say that

We deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at

what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will
not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more
precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our
nuclear capabilities.8

6XFFHVVLYH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQWV KDYH DOVR GHFOLQHG WR PDNH D µQR ILUVW XVH¶
declaration. This stems from two considerations. First, in the extreme circumstances
in which the use of nuclear weapons might be considered, advance declarations of this
W\SHKDYHOLWWOHLIDQ\FUHGLELOLW\7KH\DUHQRWLQRQHWHOOLQJSKUDVHµORDG-EHDULQJ¶
Such was certainly true, for example, of Soviet no first use statements during the Cold
War. Second, such a declaratory policy could serve to encourage non-nuclear
aggression, secure in the knowledge that a nuclear response would not be forthcoming.
The UK has issued a Negative Security Assurance, which states that British
nuclear weapons will not be used against a non-nuclear state provided it is not in
DOOLDQFH ZLWK D QXFOHDU SRZHU  7KLV H[SODLQV IRU H[DPSOH ZK\ %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU
capability had no role WRSOD\LQGHWHUULQJ$UJHQWLQDLQDKHDGRIWKHODWWHU¶VLQYDVLRQRI
the Falkland Islands in 1982.
Whilst the UK has a distinct national policy in relation to the retention and use of
nuclear weapons, it is also signed-XS WR 1$72¶V QXFOHDU GRFWULQH  %ULWish nuclear
IRUFHVDUHDOVRIRUPDOO\DVVLJQHGWR1$72H[FHSWµZKHUH+HU0DMHVW\¶VJRYHUQPHQW
PD\GHFLGHWKDWVXSUHPHQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVDUHDWVWDNH¶2IFRXUVHWKHXVHRIQXFOHDU
weapons could only be contemplated under just these circumstances so assignment of
the UK deterrent to NATO may be more formal than substantive. Nonetheless, Britain
DFFHSWV1$72¶VSRVLWLRQZKLFKLVWKDWµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSXUSRVHRIWKHQXFOHDUIRUFHV
of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kiQGRIZDU¶9

7
Cm 6994 p.12
8
Cm 6994 p.18
9
NATO 7KH$OOLDQFH¶V6WUDWHJLF&RQFHSW Washington DC: NATO, April 1999 p.20
 J. Stocker / British Nuclear Strategy 69

This makes it clear that, re-HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH SRLQW DERXW µVWXGLHG DPELJXLW\¶
nuclear weapon deter more than just the use of other nuclear weapons. The
µIHDUVRPHQHVV¶ RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LQGXFHV FDXWLRQ DOO URXQG DQG DFWV DV D SRZHUIXO
inhibition to the onset of hostilities between nuclear-armed states. It is often said that
democracies do not fight each other. The same may be true of nuclear weapon states.
The British approach to nuclear deterrence has always focussed exclusively on
deterrence by punishment that is, the threat of a retaliation the costs of which would
vastly out-weigh any possible gains from aggression. In the nuclear age, successive
British governments have been deeply sceptical about the possibilities for deterrence by
defence, the ability to ward off the initial blow rather than hit back in response. Whilst
Britain was worried by Soviet missile defences, it never saw active defence as having
much to offer the UK. The scale of the Cold War threat and the limited resources
available to counter it made only a retaliatory posture feasible.
In the face of threats that are much more limited (in terms of both numbers and
sophistication), defences may be able to reinforce deterrence and serve to mitigate the
consequences of deterrence failure. Britain is today much more sanguine about the
strategic implications of American missile defence programmes, and even participates
in some of them (for example, the use of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS) at Fylingdales). But resource constraints continue to dictate that the UK is
reluctant to spend any of its own defence budget on active missile defence, apart from
some research programmes designed, as much as anything, to assess the efficacy of US
developments.
MentiRQVKRXOGDOVREHPDGHRIWKH8.¶VVWDQFHRQQRQ-proliferation. Britain is
active in all arms control and non-proliferation forums and has unilaterally reduced its
own nuclear forces to the bare minimum consistent with a credible deterrence
capability. Like the other NPT nuclear weapons states, it pays lip service to the goal of
eventual and complete nuclear disarmament. It is often alleged that retention of
nuclear weapons is at odds with non-proliferation efforts, even hypocritical. But the
8.LVµDOORZHG¶QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVXQGHUWKHWHUPVRIWKH137DQGPRUH LPSRUWDQWO\
non-proliferation serves to reduce the number and scale of potential threats that might
need to be deterred.
The UK continues to see a role for nuclear weapons in preventing war and
specifically in deterring the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. Its own forces
have been reduced to a single system with modest numbers of warheads. Britain is
committed to extending the life of the Trident system into the middle years of the
century, a time likely to look very different to today. The British nuclear posture is a
good deal less clear-cut than during the Cold War, but Britain will remain, for the
foreseeable future, a nuclear weapons state.
70 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-70

Nuclear Doctrines of the United

Kingdom and France: a Russian
perspective
Petr ROMASHKIN1

Abstract. Nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom and France have their own
specific features, but to a great extent reflect the national consent on principal
issues. But in broader terms, the three allied nuclear powers ± France, the USA and
the UK ± have in fact come out with a coordinated position which reveals a break
from the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War
period and the shift to the doctrine of pre-emptive and coercive use of nuclear
weapons. The position of these three states, at the same time, determines the
outlook of NATO in this sphere.

First of all, it seems appropriate to review the history of nuclear weapons

development in the UK and France, in order to improve our understanding of their
contemporary nuclear doctrines. After the end of the World War II, the United
Kingdom aimed at the closest nuclear cooperation with the USA which had been
already been foreseen in the wartime agreements.
In the November 1945 Washington summit in which the USA, Great Britain and
Canada considered consigning the nuclear problem to the UN, the United States and
%ULWDLQ VLJQHG D VHFUHW PHPRUDQGXP RQ ³IXOO DQG HIIHFWLYH´ QXFOHDU FRRSHUDtion.
However, the USA later disavowed this document and in 1946, the US Congress
adopted the McMahon Act, which prohibited the release of atomic technology to other
nations. In the summer of 1945, British Prime Minister C. Attlee established a top-
secret FRPPLWWHH ³-HKQ-´ ZKLFK ZDV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU SODQQLQJ DQG EXLOGLQJ WKH
capacities for the development of an atomic bomb.
Britain had developed the plutonium bomb and successfully tested it on October 3,
1952 on the Monte-Bello Islands in the Indian Ocean, which Australia lent the UK for
this purpose. The bomb was detonated on a frigate.
If the USA-USSR nuclear balance of power is taken as a starting point that
determined Post-Cold War international relations and laid the basis for the, more-or-
less, completed political division of the world, then the answer to the question about
the first nuclear proliferant-state raised above could be reconsidered. In this view, the
UK may be regarded as the first serious violator of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
It seems that one of the main motives which induced Britain to pursue nuclear
weapons was the desire to remain a great power using all the advantages of victory in
World War II. British nuclear weapons as well as American ones were developed,

1
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS
 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective 71

within the NATO framework on the basis of common views on and interests in the key
nuclear issues and not in compensation for any sense of vulnerability.
In May 1957, the United Kingdom conducted its first hydrogen bomb test. Since
1961, the first US atomic submarines had been based in Scotland. Later on, the United
States agreed to Britain conducting a series of nuclear tests on the American polygon in
Nevada.
The maximum quantity of UK warheads was 350 between 1975 and 1981.
Currently, UK nuclear weaponry consists primarily of the American submarine-
launched ballistic missile Trident-II (D5) equipped with British Multiple Reentry
9HKLFOHV ZKLFK DUH GHSOR\HG RQ IRXU GRPHVWLFDOO\ PDQXIDFWXUHG 66%1V %ULWDLQ¶V
nuclear capability is the smallest among other nuclear poZHUV¶DUVHQDOVHVWLPDWHGWREH
some 185 warheads within the maritime component only whereas in the 1950s the
United Kingdom possessed a whole triad of nuclear weapons. British nuclear
capabilities were traditionally oriented in accordance with the US missile attack
warning system.
$V QRWHG DERYH %ULWDLQ¶V QXFOHDU FDSDFLW\ FRQVLVWV RI IRXU QXFOHDU VXEPDULQHV
with 12 Trident-II missiles per submarine. Thus the United Kingdom has 48 missiles
with four warheads per missile. Each missile is armed with one to three warheads of
100 kiloton weight. The number of operationally available warheads is 160, with
another 35 warheads in stock, bringing the total number of warheads to 185 units.
All submarines have a dual subordination ±national and under the US ± and act
according to the single plan. One of the four submarines is on patrol, while another two
are at the base or in territorial waters and can be deployed relatively quickly. The
fourth submarine is in repair.
According to UK Foreign Office documents, Britain just like the USA is ready to
review counter-proliferation instruments. On March 20, 2002 the Defense Minister
VWDWHG WKDW ³%ULWDLQ LV UHDG\ WR XVH QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV WR SURWHFW LWV DUPHG IRUFHV IURP
ZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ´
A 2003 British Defense White Paper stated that the nuclear deterrence potential of
WKH 8. ³UHPDLQV WKH HVVHQWLDO HOHPHQW RI RXU VHFXULW\´  $FFRUGLQJ WR 3DUOLDPHQWDU\
hearings, the document also revealed plans to consider replacing the existing deterrent
forces based on American Trident-II SLBMs. Although the four Vanguard class
SSBNs can operate for another 20 years before their nominal retirement date, the
British government must decide now if the ageing warheads are to be modernized or
totally replaced. Submarines of this class could be also configured for use with non-
nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles or for special force operations.
The United Kingdom is the only nuclear power which had openly assigned its
66%1VWR³VXEVWUDWHJLF PLVVLRQV´ $OWKRXJKUDWKHUOLPLWHGLQWKHVHOHFWLRQ of nuclear
weapons, such missions should be powerful enough to convince an aggressor who had
XQGHUHVWLPDWHGWKH%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLWLHVDQGDWWDFNHGLWWRVWRSDQDWWDFNDQGUHWUHDWRU
encounter a destructive strategic strike. Similar to the US and Russian doctrines, the
UK nuclear doctrine emphasizes the new role of deterrence or retaliation for attacks
non-nuclear states employing chemical or biological weapons.
7KLV LGHD DSSHDUHG DIWHU WKH *XOI :DU LQ  ZKHQ WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH ³QHZ
limited nuclear war´ZDVLQWURGXFHGILUVWLQWKHIRUPRI³WKHQXFOHDUUHWDOLDWLRQIRUD
non-QXFOHDU :0' DWWDFN´ DQG WKHQ XQGHU WKH VORJDQ RI ³WKH OLPLWHG XVH RI QXFOHDU
ZHDSRQVDJDLQVWDWHUURULVWRUWRWDOLWDULDQUHJLPHV´GUDIWQXFOHDUGRFWULQHRIWKH8QLWHG
Kingdom).
72 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective

In 2002, in an Appendix to the Strategic Defense Review of 1998 the role of

QXFOHDU ZHDSRQVLQGHWHUULQJ³WKHVWDWHVRIFRQFHUQDVZHOODVWHUURULVWRUJDQL]DWLRQV´
was expanded.
The advocates of nuclear disarmament criticize the UK government for its position
on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The plan to build new facilities for the
production of warheads violates Article VI of the Treaty and the ongoing active
cooperation with the USA (including the intended prolongation of the Cooperation
Agreement, joint research activities, participation in sub-critical tests and building the
ABM system) violates Article I. The Labor Party position on the development of
nuclear weapons and their possible use in substrategic missions (delivering limited
strikes against non-nuclear states that are parties to the NPT) contradicts the Prime
0LQLVWHU¶V VWDWHPHQWV DERXW PRYLQJ DZD\ IURP QXFOHDU DQG RWKHU ZHDSRQV RI PDVV
destruction and the implementation of practical initiatives in the nuclear disarmament
sphere.
Opponents oI%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQXHGUHOLDQFHRQQXFOHDUDUPVEHOLHYHWKDWWKURXJKRXW
its 50-year history, British nuclear weaponry did not play any role in armed conflicts
and the United Kingdom did not receive any advantages from possessing it. Therefore,
if Britain gives up its nuclear weapons capability, its security would not decrease.
They argue that London should declare that it would not develop new means of
delivery after the operational life of the existing submarines expires.
In 2006, the Defense Committee of the British Parliament decided to make radical
changes in the UK strategic nuclear doctrine and stop the 24-hour patrolling of the
nuclear submarines in international waters. The Committee also discussed the
forthcoming replacement of the ageing Vanguard class submarines armed with the
Trident-II ballistic missiles.
The Labor government has considered various options for the modernization of
nuclear strategic forces. One of the options entails the renewal of the nuclear
submarine fleet. However, the costs may be as high as 25 billion pounds. According to
officials, the costs may be less if the 24-KRXUDOHUWGXW\LVFDQFHOOHG³7KH&ROG:DULV
RYHUDQG ZHGRQRWQHHGWRNHHSWKHVXEPDULQHVLQWKH:RUOG2FHDQDOOWKHWLPH´ ±
claimed the head of the committee, J. Arbuthnot. However, the government hurried to
reject this proposal. A representative of the Defense Ministry stated that 24-hour duty
RIWKHQXFOHDUVXEPDULQHVLVHVVHQWLDOIRU³WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHVWDELOLW\LQWKHJOREDO
VHFXULW\«:HFDQQRWEHVXUH how other states would react if our submarines are on the
DOHUWVWDWXVRQO\ZKHQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWHQVLRQLQWHQVLILHV´KHFODLPHG
The UK naval forces possess four nuclear Vanguard class submarines armed with
American SLBMs Trident-II. By 2023-2024, they should be removed from service.
Currently, the government is considering what the new generation maritime component
of the British nuclear weaponry may look like.
Moreover, while previous UK policy limited the launching of nuclear strikes only
against nuclear weapon states, current policy does not rule out the possibility of nuclear
attacks against non-nuclear states which possess or are suspected of possessing other
weapons of mass destruction. The policy also allows for nuclear attacks against states
that pose a strategic threat.
 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective 73

French nuclear forces

The development of British nuclear weapons did not seriously influence the global
balance of power. However, after France had joined the nuclear club, the level of
strategic stability decreased as the confrontation between the USSR and the USA and
Britain, transformed into a confrontation between the USSR and NATO.
French scientists made a prominent contribution to the development of atomic
science. After the end of World War II, France resumed research in nuclear energy and
in the 1950s, began creating its own strategic nuclear weapons under President C. De
Gaulle, who established the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in 1945. F. Joliot-
Curie was the first chief of the Commissariat who managed the heavy-water reactor
program launched in 1948.
The final decision to develop strategic nuclear capabilities was made by the end of
1956 after the Suez crisis, when the French, British, and Israeli intervention in Egypt
was stopped under the influence of the USSR and the USA. Officially, De Gaulle
proposed the development of a French nuclear weapons capability in response to the
XQUHOLDELOLW\ RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DV D JXDUDQWRU RI )UDQFH¶V PLOLWDU\ VHFXULW\
particularly in light of the rising military-strategic tensions between the USA and the
8665'H*DXOOHZURWH³>GHSULYLQJ@)UDQFHRILWVRZQGHWHUUHQWIRUFHLILWLVFDSDEOH
RIFUHDWLQJWKHPPHDQVWRLQFXUWKXQGHUZLWKRXWKDYLQJDOLJKWQLQJURG«7KLVZRXOG
PHDQ WR UHO\ RQ WKH $PHULFDQ GHIHQVH FRPSOHWHO\« RQ WKeir politics in the foreign
SURWHFWRUDWHDQGUHPDLQLQWKHXQFHUWDLQW\«'HILQLWHO\ZHGHVHUYHVRPHWKLQJEHWWHU´
Within NATO, France always occupied a unique position, somewhat distancing
itself from the USA. When Paris had acquired its own atomic bomb in the early 1960s,
the departure from NATO became a mere question of time. It happened in 1966 when
General De Gaulle demonstratively made a step towards the Soviet Union and declared
WKH GRFWULQH RI ³GHIHQVH RQ DOO D]LPXWKV´  7KLV PHDQW WKDW )UDQFH¶V VWUDWHgic forces
were aimed not only eastward against the USSR (though mainly in this direction), but
also towards the West. This annoyed Washington and, consequently, the French
socialists who came to power in 1981 completely re-oriented French nuclear forces
against the USSR.
For a long time, France had ignored the calls to join the nuclear test ban treaty and
to acknowledge the principle of non-first strike as China urged. As the disarmament
process intensified under American and Soviet efforts at the end of the Cold War, it
seemed that these principles had won. Almost all nuclear powers stopped nuclear tests
and joined or declared their intentions to join the disarmament process (after the USA
and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals to comparable levels).
But in 1998 the first thunder broke out: India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests
and almost officially joined the privileged nuclear club (Israel had joined it already in
the mid 1970s). The suspicions that Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and some other
states were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction was once again revived.
Strictly speaking, such suspicion which turned out to be unfounded was used as the
official pretext for the military operation of the USA and Britain against Iraq. It is
interesting that Paris actively protested against this operation. But the new French
nuclear doctrine shows that France itself would act according to the American scenario
if necessary.
)UDQFH¶VQHZGRFWULQHGHSDUWVIURPWKHSUHYLRXVSULQFLSOHRIGHWHUUHQFHDQG shifts
WRZDUGWKHDFWLYHSROLF\RI³QXFOHDULQWLPLGDWLRQ´ZKLFKLPSOLHVDWOHDVWLQZRUGVWKH
possibility of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.
74 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective

Another new and important idea in the French nuclear doctrine is the inclusion of
China in the list of the targets of nuclear deterrence. Certainly it is a purely
hypothetical scenario of the French General Staff, but it stresses the shifts in the global
VWUDWHJLFEDODQFHRISRZHUDQGUHYHDOV)UDQFH¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKHP 5XVVLDLV QRORQJHU
the first and foremost target for the French nuclear forces, having become almost an
ally of France, NATO and the West overall. However, this fact did not prevent France
from modernizing its nuclear doctrine and shifting to the concept of pre-emptive
nuclear strikes.
Thus the French nuclear forces were designed as self-sustainable and independent
from NATO and aimed to ensure the possibility of nuclear strike in case the United
States were unable to fulfill its allied commitments, or in case it were necessary for
France to protect national interests that did not coincide with American interests.
France conducted its first nuclear test in 1960 in the Sahara.
,Q FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI )UDQFH¶V ORQJ DWRPLF KLVWRU\ ZKLFK LPSOLHV GHHS NQRZOHGJH
about the consequences of the development and use of nuclear weapons) as well as its
withdrawal from the military operation of NATO while remaining a member of the
Alliance as a political power, France can also be regarded as one of the first nuclear
weapons proliferants. Thus, the creation of the French nuclear arsenals not only
significantly expanded the territory of nuclear deployment in the world but also led to
the emergence of the third world power capable of pursuing independent nuclear policy.
France is guided by its own atomic, aviation, shipbuilding and rocket production
industry. By the early 1960s the strategic line on the creation of the nuclear weapons
KDG IRUPHG 2Q 1RYHPEHU   LQ 6WUDVERXUJ GH *DXOOH VWDWHG ³D JUHDW VWDWH
without nuclear weapons while others possess them is not the master of its own
GHVWLQ\´$QGVLQFHWKHQ³WKHQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURIWKHVWUDWHJLFQXFOHDUIRUFHVKDGEHHQ
QHYHUGRXEWHG´
In 1968, France tested its first hydrogen bomb.
)UDQFH¶V RZQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLW\ KDV DOZD\V UHPDLQHG RQH RI WKH Pain
instruments of maintaining a great power status, the symbol of its national
independence and sovereignty. De Gaulle was not the only one who wrote about it - his
successors, including two-term President Jacques. Chirac, agreed with him. While
France did not possess such intellectual resources as the USA, it has created and
continues to develop its own independent school of nuclear strategic thinking.
2QH RI )UDQFH¶V NH\ GRFWULQDO SULQFLSOHV RQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LV WR HQVXUH
maximum freedom of choice in thHLUXVH)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHGRHVQRWUXOHRXW
pre-emptive nuclear strikes in certain situations.
The number of the French warheads had reached its height ± 540 - in 1991-1992.
7KHLU VWUXFWXUH FRQVLVWHG RI WKH ³WULDG´  LQWHUPHGLDWH-range S-3 ballistic missiles
deployed at the silo launchers on the Albion Plato, 6 Redoubtable type SSBNs and
aircraft specially designed to use tactical nuclear weapons. However the SSBNs have
always been main element of the strategic nuclear capabilities.
)UDQFH¶V QXFlear forces are being modernized and at the same time reduced. In
1997, France possessed 450 warheads; at present, this number has been reduced to 348
units. Through the retirement of the whole land component (IRBMs were dismantled
in 1998) the transition IURP WKH ³WULDG´ WR WKH ³G\DG´ VWUXFWXUH RI )UHQFK QXFOHDU
armament was completed. The Redoubtable type submarines are being replaced with
the series of four modern Triomphant-type SSBNs. Two of them are already
operational, the third one was adopted in 2004, and the fourth submarine should be
made operational in 2010 (armed with 16 SLBMs with new type MIRVs with the
 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective 75

operational range of 5,300 km). The question of replacing these missiles with the new
units armed with 6 warheads with the combat range of 10000 km in 2008 is also being
considered.
Guided missiles ASMP (Air-Sol-Moyenne-Portee or air-to-air guided missile) are
operational in the French air and naval forces. The nuclear warhead has an explosive
power of 300KT and the missile has a range of 300 km. Three squadrons of Mirage
2000N are prepared to deliver nuclear strikes. These guided missiles are deployed on
the aircraft-FDUULHU ³&KDUOHV 'H *DXOOH´ IRU WKH DUPDPHQW RI WKH PRGHUQL]HG FDUULHU-
EDVHGDLUSODQHV³6XSHU(WHQGDUG´7KHQHZFUXLVHPLVVile ASMP-A which would have
much larger range capacity and be armed with a new warhead, is being designed for the
air and naval forces.
There is a stable national consensus on nuclear issues which consolidates
practically the whole political spectrum from the communists to the left parties.
In 2003, France conducted a review of its nuclear doctrine.
In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac delineated the basic priorities of
the national nuclear doctrine. These priorities included the struggle against terrorism,
protection of the allies and maintaining a strategic delivery capability. President Chirac
made this statement during his working visit to the naval base in the Brest region (in
north-western France) where the nuclear-armed submarines and nuclear command
FHQWHUDUHEDVHGDQGZKHUH)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHZDVSUHVHQWHG
During this visit, the President noted that the French nuclear forces were
FRQILJXUHV IRU D UDSLG UHDFWLRQ VWUDWHJ\ ³+HDGV RI WKH VWDWHV WKDW PD\ XVH WHUURULVW
methods against us, as well as all those who intend to use weapons of mass destruction
in any form, must understand that they will be subjected to hard and adequate
UHWDOLDWLRQIURPRXUVLGH7KHUHWDOLDWLRQFDQEHERWKFRQYHQWLRQDODQGXQFRQYHQWLRQDO´
claimed Chirac. Thus, for the first time the French president indicated the possibility
RIXVLQJQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDJDLQVW³WHUURULVWVWDWHV´GHVSLWHKDYLQJUXOHGRXWWKLVRSWLRQ
earlier.
$WWKHVDPHWLPH&KLUDFVWDWHG³2QHVKRXOGQRWKRZHYHU\LHOGWRWKHWHPSWDWLRQ
of restricting all defense and security-related considerations to this necessary fight
DJDLQVW WHUURULVP 7KH IDFW WKDW D QHZ WKUHDW DSSHDUV GRHV QRW UHPRYH DOO RWKHUV «
Our world is marked also by emerging assertions of power based on the possession of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Hence the temptation for certain States to
DFTXLUHQXFOHDUSRZHUWKXVYLRODWLQJWUHDWLHV³
$QRWKHULQQRYDWLRQLQWKH)UHQFKGRFWULQHPHQWLRQHGE\&KLUDFZDVWKH³VWUDWHJLF
IRUFHVIOH[LEOHUHDFWLRQ´WRH[WHUQDO threats. The President declared that starting from
WKHVH FRQVLGHUDWLRQV )UDQFH KDG ³UHGXFHG LWV QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV GHSOR\HG RQ VRPH RI
WKHVXEPDULQHODXQFKHGPLVVLOHV´1RUPDOO\HDFK)UHQFKQXFOHDUVXEPDULQHFDUULHV
missiles armed with 6 warheads per missile.
&KLUDFVWUHVVHGWKDW)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVVKRXOGEHSUHSDUHGWR³UHDFWIOH[LEO\´
to external threats. Up to now, the traditional French nuclear doctrine was based on the
assumption of the total use of nuclear weapons which should guarantee the decisive
VXSHULRULW\RYHUWKHHQHP\&KLUDF¶VVWDWHPHQWVLJQDOHGWKHGHSDUWXUHIURPWKLVSROLF\
thus opening broad opportunities of the punctuated use of WMD for the French armed
IRUFHV ,Q IDFW WKH ILUVW VLJQV WKDW )UDQFH ZDV JLYLQJ XS LWV ³QXFOHDU GHWHUUHQFH´
GRFWULQHLQIDYRURIWKH³QXFOHDULQWLPLGDWLRQ´SULQFLSOHDSSHDUHGLQDXWXPQ
At that time, the experts started to discuss the fact that the new French nuclear
doctrine allowed the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the doctrine
accounted not only for states that pose a direct strategic threat, but also those countries
76 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective

which France suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. According to the

nuclear doctrine, strikes should target WMD production facilities as well as training
FDPSVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQEDVHVRIWHUURULVWV0LQLDWXUHQXFOHDUZHDSRQV³DWRPLFSDFNV´
that, according to some of the experts, until recently had been even more advanced in
France than in the USA and Russia, should help the French armed forces to fulfill this
difficult task.
However, after the scandal with the never-found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
which had been used as the key pretext for unleashing the war against Saddam
+XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHLWLVLQDZD\DZNZDUGWRVSHDNDERXWSUH-emptive nuclear strikes. In
WKLV YLHZ &KLUDF KDG SURPLVHG WR XVH ³XQFRQYHQWLRQDO´ PHDQV DJDLQVW WKRVH VWDWH
OHDGHUVZKLFKXVH³WHUURULVWPHWKRGV´DJDLQVW)UDQFH7KLVLVDYHU\GDQJHURXVSURPLVH
DV PRGHUQ WHUURULVWV XVXDOO\ GR QRW KDYH DQ\ ³KRPHODQG´ ,W LV E\ QR PHDQV DOZDys
easy to determine the nationality of non-VWDWHDFWRUVRUPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\ZKLFK³VWDWH
OHDGHUV´ WKH\ ZRUN IRU ,Q WKH JHQHUDO FRQWH[W RI WKH (XURSHDQ SROLF\ ZKLFK LV
WUDGLWLRQDOO\ FDXWLRXV DQG ZHOO EDODQFHG &KLUDF¶V VWDWHPHQW VHHPV FOHDUO\ LOO-
considered. At the same time, it fits in perfectly with the loud rhetoric of the American
³KDZNV´± neoconservatives, preparing the public opinion for another big war against
Iran this time. Certainly France would deliver no nuclear strikes against terrorists or
DQ\ERG\ HOVH EXW &KLUDF¶V VWDWHPHQW GHPRQVWUDWHV SROLWLFDO VXSSRUW IRU WKH $PHULFDQ
doctrine of pre-emptive strikes. Although France actively protested against the war in
Iraq caused by the suspicions that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass
destruction, the French nuclear doctrine after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001 has been incrementally shifting from the deterrence principle to the active nuclear
intimidation policy.

7DEOH)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVGDWDIRU
Type Deployed Year of Operational Warhead number and Nuclear
units deployment range, km explosive power weapons
( kiloton) stockpile
Land-based 60 1988 2750 ɯ 50
aircraft: Mirage
2000N
Carrier-based 24 1978 650 ɯ 10
aircraft
6/%0Ɇ 64 1996 6000 ɯ 288
Total 348

In the foreseeable future, neither Britain nor France plan to create new strategic
nuclear systems. However, taking into account the deep reduction of the Russian and
86 ³FHQWUDO´ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV SODQQHG LQ WKH IRUWKFRPLQJ \HDUV RWKHU QXFOHDU VWDWHV
may maintain the aggregate potential that would be comparable with the arsenal of
each leading nuclear power or even surpass it under certain conditions. This is
determined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, according to which the process of
reduction should be continued.
$WWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQWWKHWRWDOQXPEHURI%ULWDLQ¶VDQG)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQV
is 533 warheads.
When discussing the nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom and France one
cannot but compare these documents with the nuclear doctrine of the USA as their
main NATO ally.
 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective 77

Since autumn 2005, the world media has been discussing the evolution of the
American nuclear doctrine. . The draft document was prepared by the Pentagon and
posted on the internet in March 2005, but it attracted broad attention only in the
beginning of September after it was reported in the Washington Post. After that, the
document was removed from the US Department of Defense website. In other words,
there was an obvious leakage of information. In the preamble of the document which
outlined the basic principles of the doctrine, the aims of the nuclear deterrence were
IRUPXODWHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ ZD\  ³Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to
take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision
PDNLQJ´$QGIXUWKHURQ³The focus of US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence
potential adversaries to withhold actions intended to hDUP86¶QDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV´2
Such an interpretation of deterrence is equal to the radical broadening of its goals
and potential acts. National interests of the United States are not limited to security
issues; they include economic, energy, ideological and other interests that, most likely,
would be much more important for the USA than any hypothetical threats to national
VHFXULW\7KHHPSKDVLVLVSODFHGRQWKH³LQGXFHPHQWWRUHIUDLQ´LHRQWKHSUH-emptive
DQG ³GHFLVLYH´ LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH GHFLVLRQ-making process at the stage at which
³SRWHQWLDODGYHUVDULHV´IDUIURPKDYLQJFRPPLWWHGDQ\DFWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHWKDW
would justify the use of nuclear weapons against them), did not even make any
decision in this sphere. Neither international terrorism, nor weapons of mass
destruction are mentioned in this part of the doctrine; however the document stresses,
³The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it
would use nuclear weapons.´  $SSDUHQWO\ WKLV PHDQV WKDW QXFOHDr weapons can be
used ± and/or the threat of use can be actively employed ± in situations that have
nothing to do with military and political threats to American national security.
According to the assessments of the London Times this is a radical shift after almost
KDOI D FHQWXU\ RI WKH QXFOHDU LQWLPLGDWLRQ SULQFLSOH EDVHG RQ WKH LGHD RI ³PDVVLYH
counter-VWULNH´
The necessity of the operation in Iraq was justified by the supposedly existing Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction; the falsity of these explanations has been generally
admitted both in London and Washington today. Therefore, the references to the WMD
problem in the doctrine do not impress. Moreover, the fact that the WMD issue in
particular was highlighted in British and American mass media reports about the new
doctrine invites a, certain speculation. The key phrase of the document, as the Times
writes, appears in the list of possible scenarios of the use of pre-emptive nuclear strike;
WKHILUVWRQHDVVXPHVWKDWWKHDGYHUVDU\XVHVRU³LQWHQGVWRXVH´:0'0RVWOLNHO\WKH
enemy would not inform us about his intentions and thus the final assessment and
decision would be left up to Washington.
2Q 6HSWHPEHU   %ULWDLQ¶V 'HIHQVH 0LQLVWHU ' -RKQ 5HLG VWDWHG WKDW KLV
country could be involved in a nuclear conflict in the near future and it is, therefore
necessary to renew the nuclear weapons arsenal which guarantees the national security.
According to the minister, the decision should be made in the next two to four years.
Thus the three nuclear powers ± France, the USA and the UK ± have in fact come
out with a coordinated position which reveals a break from the doctrine of defensive
nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and the shift to the doctrine of pre-emptive

2
US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 15 March 15, 2005
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-12_05draft.pdf
78 P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective

and coercive use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The position of these three
states determines the position of NATO on this issue even if no corresponding changes
to the Alliance strategic doctrine have been made yet.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 79
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-79

$1HZ/RRNDW&KLQD¶V1XFOHDU3ROLF\
Jianqun TENG 1

Abstract. 5HOHDVH RI WKH  'HIHQVH :KLWH 3DSHU EURNH &KLQD¶V WUDGLWLRQDO
silence and ambiguity regarding its nuclear policy and strategy, which continues to
be founded on the principles of self-defensHDQGJOREDOEDODQFH&KLQD¶VHPSKDVLV
on its commitment to a minimal deterrence capability shows that its nuclear forces
DUHSULPDULO\DVWUDWHJLFSROLWLFDOWRRO7KHFRUHHOHPHQWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\
are that nuclear weapons must be the last resort for China and it is the quality not
quantity that plays the key role. Beijing is unlikely to change its non-first use
nuclear policy in the future. The most important aspect of Chinese nuclear
WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV D FOHDU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KLQD¶V DFWXDO SROLFies rather than its
number of warheads.

A framework for nuclear policy

Nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine are the three layers for a nuclear state to develop,
plan, and use nuclear forces. Policy is the highest and dominant layer for achieving
political, economic, and military goals through the development and future use of
nuclear forces. The strategy level mainly deals with guidelines, constructions, and
preparations for the future use of nuclear forces, while doctrine is the basic operational
use of nuclear forces. Nuclear policy decisions depend on many elements, including the
assessment of the current LQWHUQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWWKHµJUDQG¶VWUDWHJ\RIDVWDWHIRU
its development, the geopolitical situation of its neighborhood, as well as the social
features and character of that state. Moreover, as part of assessing the nature of a
country, it is important to have a good understanding of the country¶s history, culture,
and philosophy of thinking. The subsequent nuclear doctrine will be in accordance with
national nuclear policy and overall strategy.

&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\

Since the country first tested its nuclear weapons in 1964, Chinese officials have been
reluctant to talk about China¶s nuclear policy, either at home or abroad. In fact, the
release of the China Defense 2006 White Paper in December of that year was the first
time China announced its overall nuclear strategy, specifically as one of self-defense.
Scholars and correspondents tend to conclude that such an announcement is part of
&KLQD¶V national military transparency endeavors, which Beijing has been attempting
for years. Nevertheless, several reasons can be given for China¶s traditional silence on
its nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine:

1
Deputy Secretary General of China Arms Control and Disarmament, and also Director of the Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation Studies Centre of the China Institute for International Studies in Beijing. He
served in the PLA for 25 years and demobilized as a colonel in 2004.
80 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

x China¶s traditional culture and philosophy is one of doing things quietly and
avoiding extremism.
x Sensitivities involving nuclear use in the military sphere led officials and
scholars to seek to avoid any criticism from the government over possible
misinterpretation of policy.
x Before the 2006 announcement of the self-defense strategy, there had been no
clear divisions among the three layers and thus no need to distinguish among
them. Sometimes scholars LQWHUSUHWHG &KLQD¶s ³non-first use´ as its official
nuclear policy, sometimes as a strategy, and sometimes even as a doctrine.
Basically, ³non-first use´ is the only a declaratory nuclear policy for China;
x The small size of its nuclear arsenal led decision-makers to think that an
ambiguous attitude towards its nuclear policy would be of greater international
benefit to China. Ambiguity is always a meaningful way for a weak side to
protect its security interests when facing strong counterparts; and
x The foundation of WKH35&¶V nuclear policy established by its first-generation
leaders consolidated ground that later leaders could not change in a dramatic
way. The more than 40-year-long rational tradition of ambiguity did not
provide any incentives for state leaders to make any comprehensive changes
of its nuclear policy.

Many Western scholars have studied &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ in recent years. 2
Some thought that before the 1980s China had no nuclear strategy and that its use of
nuclear weapons would be based instead by its nuclear doctrines. Some have argued
that limited technologies and economic resources were the key factors influencing
&KLQD¶VDGRSWLRQRIDPLQLPXP deterrent strategy. However, others noted that during
the 1980s some PLA research fellows published articles saying that China should
upgrade the minimum deterrent VWUDWHJ\WRDµOLPLWHGUHWDOLDWLRQ¶VWUDWHJ\7KH\DUJXHG
that with the development of high technologies and in order to protect the achievements
accomplished through the reform and opening processes, China today could not absorb
any massive attack on the mainland, a risk that would be heightened by escalating its
own nuclear strategy.
However, neither of these two schools of thought comprehensively reflects the true
HVVHQFHRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLFy.

2
See, in particular John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press,
1988; &KLQD¶V6WUDWHJLF 6HDSRZHUWKH 3ROLWLFVRI 0RGHrnization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford University
Press, 19994; Xue Litai, (YROXWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V 1XFOHDU 6WUDWHJ\ in John Hopkins and Weixing He eds.,
Strategic Views from the Second Tier: the Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China,
Transaction Publishers, 1995; Alastair Iain Johnston, &KLQD¶V1HZ2OG7KLQNLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\ Vol
20, No.3, Winter 1995/96, pp5-42; Lastair Iain Johnston, Prospect for Chinese Nuclear Force
Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control, The China Quarterly, June 1996; Bate
Gill and James Mulvenon, China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United
States ,<http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/conference-reports/weapons-mass-destruction.Html>; Bate Gill and
Mark Stokes, the Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition too Credible Deterrence, in James C.
Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang eds., WKH3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\DV2UJDQL]DWLRQ5HIHUHQFHVolume
v1.0, Rand, 2002.
 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy 81

3ROLF\RULJLQVDQGIRXQGDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\

The basic framework of &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ZDVODLGE\WKHILUVWJHQHUDWLRQleaders

of the PRC. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were the two key players
LQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\:LWKKLVPDVWHU\RI&KLQHVHSKLORVRSK\
Chairman Mao in the late 1940s viewed atomic bombs DVµSDSHUWLJHUs¶VWUHVVLQJWKDW
victory in war does not depend on one or two weapon systems. However, he was also
quite familiar with the strength of an atomic bomb and pointed out that strategically
one should despise it while tactically one should respect it. After the first nuclear test
on Oct 16th&KLQDGHFODUHGWKDWµWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDGEHHQDOZD\VLQIDYRURID
comprehensive and complete dismantlement of nuclear weapons. If this could be
realized, China would not devHORS LWV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶ 3 In 1970, Mao Zedong
GHPRQVWUDWHG KLV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI GHWHUUHQFH ZKHQ KH VDLG µLW LV
possible that only the big powers could wage a global war with nuclear weapons, but
they are not going to war because of atomiFERPEVWKH\KDYH¶$VIRU&KLQDKHVDLG

µ2XU FRXQWU\ ZLOO PDNH D IHZ DWRPLF ERPEV LQ WKH IXWXUH ZKLFK
GRHVQRWPHDQWKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRXVHWKHP«ZKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRGRLV
WR WDNH LW DV D GHIHQVLYH ZHDSRQ«$WRPLF ERPEV FDQQRW EH GURSSHG
causally, even when we have acquired atomic bombs, we should not drop
WKHPFDXVDOO\DQGRWKHUZLVHDQ\FDXVDOXVHZLOOYLRODWHWKHODZ¶4

Premier Zhou Enlai additionally emphasized that nuclear weapons depended less
on the quantity than the quality and variety of nuclear weapons. 5 Even the Chinese
scientists who had been involved in the research and development of nuclear bombs
thought that nuclear bombs could only be used as a political tool rather than for
military leverage.6
Year in and year out, the successors of WKH35&¶VILUVWGHFLVLRQ-makers continued
to carry on this policy. During a May 1978 meeting with the PLA Second Artillery
Force leaders, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that &KLQD¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV
ZDVMXVWWRVKRZ&KLQD¶VFDSDELOLW\µ\RXKDYHDQd I have; you want to destroy us and
\RX ZLOO EH UHWDOLDWHG DJDLQVW D OLWWOH ELW¶ 7 President Jiang Zemin gave a further
H[SODQDWLRQ RQ &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU SROLF\ during a meeting with the Second Artillery
leaders where he explained that the purpose of developing strategic nuclear weapons
was not an offensive but a defensive one. He argued that such capability provided
China with a strong deterrent against other nuclear-weapons states from using such
weapons against it, thus proving its defensive value. Moreover, he illustratively wrote:
µenhance the construction of the strategic missile force to safeguard the motherland and
PDLQWDLQ ZRUOG SHDFH¶8 This nuclear strategic thought shown by the declarations and
UHPDUNVRI&KLQD¶VOHDGHUVUHIOHFWVDQGUHLQIRUFHVWKH FRUHHOHPHQWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDU

3
See WKH3HRSOH¶V'DLO\ Oct 17th, 1964.
4
Selected Work of Mao Zedong on Diplomatic Affairs, p 541, p 453.
5
Selected Work of Zhou Enlai on Culture, p 661.
6
Some interviews by Ms Su Xiangli, a Chinese scholar, see $VVHVVPHQWRQ&KLQD¶V1XFOHDU6WUDWHJ\in
the Li Genxin and Teng Jianqun eds., Annual Collection of Papers on International Arms Control and
Disarmament: 20005, World Knowledge Press, p 215.
7
Interviews by Xin Hua News Agency correspondent with the Second Artillery leaders,
<http://www.xinhuanet.
com/mil/2006-06/27/content_4753519.htm>
8
Ibid.
82 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

policy: (1) nuclear weapons must be the last resort for China; (2) it is the quality not
quantity that plays the key role.
So, from the very beginning of attempting to make an atomic bomb, the PRC
leaders were quite aware of its strategic role. In their opinions, an atomic bomb is more
a political tool rather than a military weapon, with a basic objective of self-defense.
China believed then, as it does now, that it should have such a weapon as a basic means
for the defense of the country. It is based on these understandings and principles that
China developed its nuclear force. The central objective is to maintain the minimum,
effective self-GHIHQVH 7KDW LV WR VD\ WKH LQWHQW LV WKDW &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH ZLOO
survive a first nuclear strike from any country and will be able to retaliate in kind.

7KHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\

7KHUHDUHDWOHDVWWKUHHFKDUDFWHULVWLFDVSHFWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\

1. The non-first-use policy makes nuclear weapons a last resort in war.

National policy holds that:

µ&KLQDUHPDLQVILUPO\FRPPLWWHGWRWKHSROLF\RIQRILUVWXVHRIQXFOHDU
weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally
undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the
comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear
ZHDSRQV¶9

This policy depends on a number of factors, including: an understanding of nuclear

ZHDSRQV E\ &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV FRQILGHQFH WKDW &KLQD¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFH LV VWURQJ
HQRXJK DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VLWXDWLRQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V FXOWXUDO DQG
philosophical traditions and socialist ideology. China encourages other countries to
IROORZ VXLW µ&KLQD VWURQJO\ DSSHDOV WR WKH RWKHU QXFOHDU VWDWHV WR UHVSRQG WR &KLQD¶V
initiative, immediately reach an agreement on a treaty on non-first use of nuclear
weapons and unconditionally reach agreement on no-use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear ZHDSRQV]RQHV¶10
In recent years, the non-first-use policy has been challenged by some Chinese
scholars and officers who argue that in light of the economic development along the
coastal areas and the development of sophisticated military technologies, fundamental
changes in the style of modern warfare are justified, and that the non-first-use policy
should therefore be changed.
However, it seems unlikely that China will change its non-first-use policy for the
following reasons:
(1) It is a state policy which reflects Chinese philosophy and culture on
warfare. Just as Sun Tzu wrote in his work Art of War, war is of vital importance
to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence

9
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense
in 2006, December 2006, Beijing.
10
3HRSOH¶V'DLO\-XO\th, 1996.
 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy 83

it is too important an issue, with possible consequences too dire, to be neglected or

de-structured from the non-first-use policy. To have a good understanding of
China¶s nuclear policy, one must have a solid mastering of China¶s culture and
history.
(2) In the predictable future, there is slim possibility of a large-scale
conventional war against China. According to government and scholarly
assessments of the international situation in the coming years, China today enjoys
its most favorable relations with world¶V big powers and its neighboring countries
since the establishment of PRC. The war alert¶VWDWXVLV at its lowest level for years
and this is expected to continue.
(3) The PLA, which has been modernizing over the last twenty years, has the
capability to defend the mainland from any invasion and prevent the separation of
Taiwan, the chief security issue of the day. Since the early 1990s, the strategic
guideline for national defense was shifted to focus on any crisis happening across
the Taiwan Strait, which will absolutely not require a nuclear bomb.
(4) Tactically speaking, changing its nuclear policy will would completely
change the structure and deployment posture RI &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH, which
would cost billions of Chinese Yuan. For the 30 years since WKHFRXQWU\¶V opening-
up, the Chinese have been putting all their efforts into economic development and
improving society; it seems unlikely that the government would pay the costs for
such a large change in economic priorities as dropping the non-first-use policy
would entail.

2. Maintain the minimum capability for self-defense.

7KHLQLWLDOGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVFRPHVIURPWKHSUH-condition that
the survival of the newborn socialist country depended on it. According to an Indian
VFKRODUWKH\RXQJ3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRIChina had faced nuclear threats several times,
both from the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, for example in the Korean War, over the
Taiwan issue and &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSURMHFWDQGWKH6LQR-Soviet border conflict from the
1950s to the 1970s. 11 The drive to go nuclear during the 1950s and 1960s can be
understood as an effort to break up the nuclear blackmails from the two superpowers.
$V 'HYLQ 7 +DJHUW\ SRLQWV RXW µ&KLQD¶V  QXFOHDU WHVW DQG VXEVHTXHQW
ZHDSRQL]DWLRQ ZHUH URRWHG LQ %HLMLQJ¶V FRQFHUQ RYHU WKH 8nited States and later the
6RYLHW8QLRQDVWKUHDWHQLQJDGYHUVDU\¶12
6LQFHWKHODWHV&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHKDVEHHQDVPDOORQHEXWLWLVHQRXJK
for a second strike against any state which uses nuclear weapons against China. The
justification for keeping a small arsenal is that China believes that even a small nuclear
strike would create an unbearable disaster for the enemy. The level of retaliation
capability maintained by China is lower than any other nuclear power in the world.
Today, the Chinese gRYHUQPHQW VWLOO LQVLVWV RQ LWV µILYH QR¶V¶ principles on nuclear
weapons development, further demonstrating its commitment to minimal capacity:
(1) no competition with other nuclear powers;
(2) no dependence on other nuclear powers;
(3) no proliferation of nuclear weapons;
(4) no deployment of nuclear weapons abroad; and
11
Jasjit Singh, Why Nuclear Weapons?, see Nuclear India, p 12-13.
12
Devin T. Hagerty, the Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, (London,
1998), p 72.
84 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

(5) no nuclear alliance with any other countries.

And as mentioned above, in 2006 the government announced clearly that its
nuclear strategy was one of self-defense:

µ&KLQD
VQXFOHDr strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and
military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from
using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China
upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited
development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and
effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It
endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons
and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is
under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has
never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any
other country¶.13

3. China supports the process of nuclear disarmament and maintaining strategic

stability among the nuclear weapons states.

&KLQD¶VVWDQFHLVWKDWDOOQXFOHDUZHDSRQVVWDWHVVKRXOGUHGXFHWKH QXPEHURIQXFOHDU
warheads until their eventual, complete abolishment. China pledges it will follow suit if
the other nuclear countries destroy their nuclear weapons. This principle lends great
value to the international efforts to maintain peace and stability through an arms control
approach. China firmly supports the reactivation of arms control policies, advocating
that all nuclear weapons states should genuinely undertake their obligations of
disarmament as stipulated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Treaty. It has consistently
stressed that the first step should be the conclusion of a treaty by all nuclear weapons
states to commit to a no-first use policy, emphasizing that such an agreement would be
a significant confidence-building measure among these states to put their subsequent
actions on the right track.
Stable relations among the nuclear states are of great importance to the peace and
stability of the world. While it proclaimed self-defense in its recent White Paper,
&KLQD¶V LQ-depth rationale for its nuclear policy is to keep stable relations among the
nuclear weapons states. Non-first-XVHKDVEHHQDSLOODURI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\DQGLW
VHUYHV &KLQD¶V IRUHPRVW VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV 7KXV LW DSSHDUV KLJKO\ LPSUREDEOH WKDW
China will abandon it.

7KHIXWXUHWUHQGRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\

The future trend RI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\KDVEHHQDKRW-topic at home and abroad in

recent years. Some argue that China should expand its nuclear arsenals in order to meet
national security requirements in the new era, which would mean a fundamental change
RI&KLQD¶VSDst policy. In 1995, the Journal of International Security published a paper

13
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense
in 2006, December 2006, Beijing.
 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy 85

that pointed out that since 1987 many papers had been published within China
supporting a limited war-ILJKWLQJ FDSDELOLW\ RI &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH UDWKHU WKDQ
minimal deterrence. IQ WKH DXWKRU¶V RSLQLRQ WKHVH DUJXPHQWV DUH RQO\ VFKRODUV¶
personal views rather than official ones.
In the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to alter its nuclear policy since there
has been no change to date, since its inception, in the foundation of its nuclear strategy
and forces. However, this does not preclude possible change in the future evolution of
&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\:LWKUHJDUGWRWKDWIXWXUHVHYHUDOWUHQGVGHVHUYHPHQWLRQKHUH
(as personal observations of the author):

1. The issue of greater transparency in military matters, especially regarding

nuclear weapons and nuclear transparency, has been a sensitive subject not
only for China but also for other nuclear weapons states. However, some
officials and analysts have narrowed the fundamental meaning of the term
µWUDQVSDUHQF\¶
,Q FRPSDULVRQ WR RWKHU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQ VWDWHV &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU
transparency has been at the forefront of international attention. From its first
test of nuclear bombs in the 1960s, China had declared its aforementioned
three basic principles on the development and use of an atomic bomb: non-
first use, no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, and
support for nuclear disarmament. In additional moves towards more
transparency, in October 2005 China opened the command post of the Second
Artillery Force in Beijing to the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld; and as described earlier, in December 2006 China announced its
nuclear self-GHIHQVHVWUDWHJ\LQWKH&KLQD¶V'HIHQVH:KLWH3DSHU
Actually, the Chinese government had been considering announcing its
White Paper on nuclear issues over a number of years. This is an
understandably difficult challenge, and the government has been trying to find
the best way to explain its nuclear policy to the world and it will continue in
these endeavors. Of critical note, however, is that the most important aspect
RI &KLQHVH QXFOHDU WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV D FOHDU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KLQD¶V DFWXDO
policies rather than its number of warheads.

2. Also in the future, China will continue the modernization of its nuclear
arsenal to meet the new and changing security environment, for which there
are several considerations. As official papers and academic journals confirm,
China today is in its most secure position of the past 59 years. Its relations
ZLWKWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJSRZHUVDUHVWDEOHDQGLWVUHODWLRQVZLWKQHLJKERULQJ
countries are also favorable. However, the nuclear challenge is still there.
Nuclear weapons states have continued to modernize their respective arsenals
and also began to deploy missile defense systems, which has already altered
the balance of power among them. Meanwhile, with the proliferation of
nuclear technologies through licit and illicit means, more countries have
acquired the technology to make nuclear bombs. For China, it is absolutely
necessary to face these challenges.
&KLQD¶VRZQPRGHUQL]DWLRQZLOOEHIRFXVHGRQWKHTXDOLW\UDWKHUWKDQWKH
quantity of the nuclear bombs. Moreover, today the overriding task for Beijing
is to build up a fairly developed and harmonious society, leaving few
resources leftover for building up the nuclear arsenal. The purpose of the
86 J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

&KLQD¶V PRGHUQL]DWLRQ LV WR PHHW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU D VWUDWHJ\ RI VHOI-
defense. Modernization of its nuclear force has been continuing since the
1970s with the development of precision technologies and long-range delivery
systems. For example, silo-based and liquid-engine nuclear weapons have
been replaced by mobile and solid-engine systems. All such efforts are
explained as a means to enhance the self-defense capabilities of the PLA.

,QOLJKWRIWKH&KLQD¶VIXWXUHHQHUJ\GHPDQGVPXFKPRUHHIIRUWZLOOEH
put into the civilian use of nuclear technology in the coming 15 years. In fact
the use of nuclear energy by the military has already led to civilian purposes.
:KLOH DW WKH 35&¶V IRXQGLQJ &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV JDYH JUHDW SULRULW\ WR WKH
military use of nuclear technology to address the nuclear threat posed by other
states, civil nuclear energy use was also given attention. In 1950, China
established its first institute on nuclear technology, though it was only in
March 1985 that China launched its first nuclear power plant in Qinshan,
which then began to produce commercial power in 1994.
Now China operates several nuclear power plants. AFFRUGLQJWR &KLQD¶V
11th Five-Year Plan, over the next 15 years, the portion of nuclear power in
total national electricity production will be increased from its current 1.7% to
4%, which to implement requires 2 reactors brought online every year for the
coming 15 years. Compared to the nuclear energy use of developed countries
such as France (around 80%), South Korea (around 40%), Japan (around 30%),
the U.S. (around 20%), UK (around 20%), and Russia (around 17%), the use
of nuclear technology in power production in China is still at a low level. To
meet the demand for energy and to protect its environment, China will give
great effort to the development of nuclear energy in the coming years.

Conclusion

,QFRQFOXVLRQ&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\LVWUDQVSDUHQW In recent years it has been under

internal and external pressures to undertake some changes in a variety of and often
opposing directions. However, as it considers the foundation of its nuclear policy to be
sound, China does not judge such changes to be necessary and it is doubtful that they
will happen in the foreseeable future.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 87
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-87

Modern Nuclear Strategy of China

Major General (ret) Pavel ZOLOTAREV1

Abstract. Chinese military policy, including nuclear strategy, should be

considered not only in the context of the policy of the state as a whole but also in
the context of this ancient FRXQWU\¶VFXOWXUH&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\FRUUHVSRQGV
to the conditions of the rising world order and this does not presuppose that China
would give up the development of its nuclear forces. Still it should be stressed that
Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider nuclear weapons to be battlefield
DUPDPHQWV&KLQD¶VFRPPLWPHQWQRWWRXVHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVILUVWDQGLWVSURSRVDO
to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support.

Chinese military policy, including nuclear strategy, should be considered not only
in the context of the policy of the state as a whole but also in the context of this ancient
FRXQWU\¶VFXOWXUH:LWKRXWDQ\SDUWLFXODUH[DJJHUDWLRQLWFDQEHVWDWHGWKDWFRPSDUHG
to other countries, China lives within a slightly different system. Attempts to analyze
any aspect of Chinese policy from the viewpoint of Western culture may lead to
inadequate conclusions.
7KH YHU\ QRWLRQ RI ³ZDU´ KDV FRPSOHWHO\ GLIIHUHQW PHDQLQJV LQ :HVWHUQ DQG
Chinese culture. The course of history demonstrates how economics, politics and war
are closely and constantly interconnected. Karl von Clausewitz articulated the
relationship between politics and war most clearly ± ³ZDULVWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRISROLF\
E\RWKHU PHDQV´ $V ZDULVWKH GHULYative of politics, it therefore follows the patterns
inherent to politics itself. Already in the sixth century BC, Chinese military theorist,
6XQ7]XKDGQRWHGWKDW³ZDUIDUHLVWKHZD\RIGHFHSWLRQ´
Further on, however, Sun Tzu gave recommendations which reflected the specific
FKDUDFWHURI&KLQHVHFXOWXUH³ZKHQFDSDEOHRIDWWDFNLQJIHLJQLQFDSDFLW\ZKHQXVLQJ
our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe
we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near; hold out baits
to entice the enemy; feign disorder, and crush him; if he is secure at all points, be
prepared for him; if he is in superior strength, evade him; if your opponent is of
choleric temper, seek to irritate him; pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant; if
he is taking his ease, give him no rest; if his forces are united, separate them; attack
KLPZKHUHKHLVXQSUHSDUHGDSSHDUZKHUH\RXDUHQRWH[SHFWHG´
But even more typical are the following views of the Chinese military wriWHU³,Q
the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. Hence to fight and conquer in all your
battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's
UHVLVWDQFH ZLWKRXW ILJKWLQJ´  2QH RI WKH 5XVVLDQ PLOLWDU\ WKHRULVWV VNHSWLFDOO\ QRWHG

1
Deputy Director, Institute for USA and Canada Studies
88 P. Zolotarev / Modern Nuclear Strategy of China

that Sun Tzu was a military leader who had not won a single battle. This statement
reveals the significant difference in approaches to war and victory.
While Sun Tzu was certainly a military writer of antiquity, it is worth
UHPHPEHULQJWKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRI'HQJ;LDRSLQJZKLFKXQGHUOLH&KLQD¶VPRGHUQ
PLOLWDU\ SROLF\ 7KHLU HVVHQFH LV DV IROORZV ³2EVHUYH FDOPO\  0DQDJH \RXU WDVNV
evenly. Defend our position. Hide our might and wait when our time has come. Adhere
to discreet position and never demand leadership´.
In order to understand the foundation of the Chinese strategy, it seems appropriate
to mention an analogy used by Russian military expert, Sergey Grinyaev. To illustrate
the difference between Western and Eastern civilizations he compares two logic games
popular in the West and in the East. Though both games had appeared in the east, the
game of chess became more popular in the West, while the game of Go became
popular in the East. One may assume that the logic of the chess game corresponds more
to Western culture while the game of Go to Eastern culture.
As is well known, chess implies the availability of the full set of pieces in the
beginning of the game. Throughout the course of the game, the strength of both players
diminishes with the mutual capture of pieces. Eventually the game is won by the player
ZKRGHIHDWVWKHRSSRQHQW¶VNLQJ regardless of his own losses. In Go, the game starts
with an empty board and strength is built up with the increase of control over the
RSSRQHQW¶VVWRQHV2YHUWLPHSOD\HUVEHFRPHPRUHYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHLURZQPLVWDNHV
DQG WKH SOD\HU ZKR PDQDJHV WR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI KLV RSSRQHQW¶V PLVWDNHV ILUVW
strengthens his position. The victory in Go goes to the player who establishes control
over the larger part of the board; the more powerful the opponent, the more significant
is the victory.
From this comparison, the essence of Eastern strategy becomes more clear ± the
pursuit of greater influence at minimal costs, not through annihilation of the enemy
ZKLFK LQHYLWDEO\ HQWDLOV RQH¶V RZQ ORVVHV EXW DW WKH H[SHQVH RI WKH DGYHUVDU\¶V
UHVRXUFHVE\XVLQJKLVPLVWDNHVIRURQH¶VRZQGHYHORSPHQW
Not accidentally, China uses the Comprehensive National Power index (CNP) to
assess the position of the country in the world and the Strategic Configuration of Power
LQGH[6&3LQLWVVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ$SSDUHQWO\6&3LVXVHGWRFDOLEUDWHWKHFRXQWU\¶V
power, including military power, in order to correspond proportionally to existing and
SRWHQWLDO WKUHDWV  ,Q GRLQJ VR &KLQHVH OHDGHUV VHHN WR VOLJKWO\ XQGHUVWDWH &KLQD¶V
capabilities and avoid confrontation in order to create the best possible conditions for
further development. Following the major transformation of its armed forces, China
stressed that the first decades of the new century would be peaceful and that military
might would not be necessary for further economic development.
The threats identified in the official Chinese documents are related to the dispute
over Taiwan and potential inter-state conflicts in Tibet and the Xinjiang±Uyghur region.
However, it seems that the most serious problems which may constrain the
development of the country are connected with the securing of stable energy sources.
&KLQD¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ IRUHLJQ HQHUJ\ VXSSOLHV   FRQWLQXHV WR JURZ GHPDQGLQJ
security guarantees for the deliveries from various regions of the world. In light of this
FRQFHUQ WKH PRVW VWUDWHJLF XVH RI &KLQD¶V DUPHG IRUFHV would be to carry out joint
local operations in different regions of the world. Therefore, the emphasis within the
technical transformation is placed on bringing both of the country and the armed forces
into the computer age. This process in its turn demands the development of space
programs and ensuring security in outer space.
 P. Zolotarev / Modern Nuclear Strategy of China 89

7KHTXHVWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[W
of all these nuances of Chinese strategy and military policy.
China possesses both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Chinese
strategic nuclear forces include strategic missile forces, strategic aviation and a nuclear
missile fleet. On January 1, 2007, the total number of strategic nuclear weapons
delivery vehicles was 244 units.
Strategic missile forces are composed of 130 land-based ballistic missile launchers
including 30 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM),18 launchers of Dong Feng-5F
ICBMs, 6 launchers of Dong Feng-31 ICBMs, and 6 Dong-Feng-31A ICBM launchers.
The number of Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles is significantly larger:103
IRBMs including 11 launchers of Dong Feng-4 IRBMs, 36 Dong Feng-21 IRBM
launchers and 35 Dong Feng-21A IRBM launchers. All ICBMs and IRBMs are single
RV missiles.
Strategic aviation is composed of 120 Xian-6 bombers (Chinese modification of
the soviet bomber Tu-16). Each bomber is outfitted to carry one nuclear B-5 air bomb
ZLWK  PHJDWRQV RI H[SORVLYH SRZHU &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU PLVVLOH IOHHW FRQVLVWV RI RQH
submarine with 12 single RV ballistic missiles (SLBM) Julang-1. The total stockpile of
nuclear warheads and air-dropped gravity bombs is estimated at 240-280 weapons.
Information concerning non-strategic nuclear capacity is restricted. There is,
however, information known about the Chinese fighter ± the Xian-5 bomber with a 400
km operational range and nuclear bomb-load of one air bomb with 5-20 kilotons of
explosive power.
Besides this, strategic missile forces include missile brigades armed with
operational-tactical missiles Dong Feng-11A, Dong Feng-15 and Dong Feng-
15A.Chinese land forces are also armed with short-range ballistic missiles; they may
also possess nuclear artillery systems and nuclear land mines.
The stockpile of B-4 nuclear air bombs is made up of 350 units; the number of
warheads for operational-tactical missiles is 40. The total number of tactical nuclear
weapons is estimated at 120 units.
&RPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUQXFOHDUSRZHUV&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVDUHDWDORZFRPEDW
readiness level owing to the technical shortcomings of the nuclear missile potential of
the country.
In assessing Chinese nuclear potential in relation to other states, it can be stated
ZLWKFHUWDLQW\WKDW&KLQD¶VVWUDWHJLFQXFOHDUIRUFHVDUHLQFDSDEOHRIODXQFKLQJDVXGGHQ
nuclear strike against states, such as Russia or the United States. Consequently, in a
crisis with either of these countries (i.e. conventional war) China would have no
alternative to launching a nuclear strike first ± that is, a pre-emptive strike. Otherwise,
&KLQD¶VVWUDWHJLFPLVVLOHV forces could be destroyed with one conventional strike due to
their high vulnerability. Therefore another conclusion follows ± the key thesis of
Chinese nuclear doctrine concerning the non-first use of nuclear weapons is nothing
more than a declaration.
The principle of nuclear non-first use can be based only on the concept of a limited
nuclear retaliatory strike. The concept rests on the operational status of nuclear forces
which creates a real threat of inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy through the
retaliatory strike. It is presumed that, in this case, the enemy would abstain from using
nuclear weapons or military actions of such scale that would force the use of nuclear
ZHDSRQVLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIRQH¶VRZQVHFXULW\
Nevertheless, it seems thDW&KLQD¶VFRPPLWPHQWQRWWRXVHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVILUVWLV
by no means of a declarative character. On one hand the concept of limited retaliatory
90 P. Zolotarev / Modern Nuclear Strategy of China

nuclear strike allows a country to maintain a strategic nuclear force structure

commensurate with the economic capabilities of the country, without engaging in a
QXFOHDU DUPV UDFH EHWZHHQ WKH OHDGLQJ QXFOHDU SRZHUV  2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG &KLQD¶V
policy also allows it to feel confident in terms of ensuring national security.
But this is not the crucial point. The use of nuclear weapons in warfare is an
extreme measure; it is the last step in inflicting the maximum possible damage to the
HQHP\LQVSLWHRIRQH¶VRZQWUHPHQGRXVORVVHV6XFKDQDSSURDFKHQWLUHO\FRQWUDGLFWV
Chinese philosophy of war and victory. Chinese philosophy of war and the use of
nuclear weapons are incompatible.
The difference between China and other official nuclear states, whose nuclear
policies do not exclude the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons under certain
circumstances, should be also stressed here.
5XVVLD¶V ³%DVLF 3URYLVLRQV of the Military Doctrine of the Russian )HGHUDWLRQ´
which was adopted in 1993, formulated the possible cases of first use of nuclear
ZHDSRQV5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ ZDVSDUWO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKH 1$72DSSURDFK supported
by the negative security assurances not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear
states. It was also shaped by the collapse of the Soviet armed forces and the incomplete
forming of Russian armed forces, with their limited capabilities to wage conventional
war. The conditions of possible first use of nuclear weapons aimed to prevent the
development of local conflict into a large-sale war.
5XVVLD¶ PLOLWDU\ GRFWULQH RI  SUDFWLFDOO\ UHSHDWHG WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI QXFOHDU
weapons use formulated in 1993. The capabilities of Russian armed forces have not yet
reached a level at which the possibility of a large-scale conventional war could be
practically excluded.
In 2001, the United States has not only changed its previous approach to nuclear
weapons use but also broadened the conditions of its use as far to include pre-emptive
strikes. US nuclear policy, in contrast to Russian policy, reflects a desire to strengthen
American global supremacy.
However, the similarity of Russian and American doctrines lies in the fact that
they both accept the appropriateness of nuclear weapons possession, in contradiction to
the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The prospects of nuclear
disarmament in such a situation become impossible. At the same time, Chinese
doctrinal provisions are in accordance with the NPT.
$SSDUHQWO\ &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ FRUUHVSRQGV WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI WKH DULVLQJ
world order in the best way. But this certainly does not mean that China would give up
the development of its nuclear forces. First, the operation life of nuclear missiles is
limited; replacement is inevitable. Obviously, improved modern armaments which
correspond to the emerging conditions would be made operational.
6LQFH  &KLQD¶V VWUDWHJLF PLVVLOH forces have been, and are being, equipped
with missile complexes armed with advanced solid propellant Dong Feng-21A IRBM
(compared to the prototype IRBM Dong Feng-21, whose operational range had been
increased by 1,000 km ± from 2,000 to 3,000 km). In 2003, the first mobile missile
complex with solid propellant Dong Feng-31 ICBM (estimated range of 12,300 km)
was made operational. The development of the new mobile IRBM Dong Feng-25,
based on the Dong Feng-31,31A has been started. According to some evaluations, this
new missile would consist of the first and second stages of ICBM Dong Feng-31,31A
and have an operational range of 4,000 km. The first tests of Dong Feng-25 IRBM can
be conducted in the end of this year or in the beginning of the next.
 P. Zolotarev / Modern Nuclear Strategy of China 91

The US development of the ABM system induced China to adopt the program of
equipping its strategic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles capable of penetrating the
ABM systems. The Dong Feng-5B with a nuclear cassette warhead has already been
developed.
Still, it should be stressed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not aim to make
QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LQWR WKH EDWWOHILHOG DUPDPHQWV &KLQD¶V FRPPLWPHQW QRW WR XVH
nuclear weapons first and its proposal to other nuclear powers to undertake similar
obligations deserve support. This provides a means for persuading other states to give
up the drive to possess nuclear weapons. It is only in this case that the question of
compliance with the NPT requirement concerning the prospect of comprehensive
nuclear disarmament can be discussed with practical results.
92 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-92

Iranian nuclear program ± peaceful or

military goals?1
Mark FITZPATRICK2

Abstract. Iran has no known nuclear weapons or doctrine, other than an insistence
on its right to sensitive fuel cycle technologies, which it asserts are for peaceful
purposes. Yet THKUDQ¶VEHKDYLRUDQGWKHQDWXUHRILWVSURJUDPSURYLGHUHDVRQVWo
conclude that the purpose is a nuclear weapons capability. The history of
VDIHJXDUGV YLRODWLRQV DQG RI FKDQJLQJ VWRULHV LV RQH UHDVRQ WR GRXEW WKDW ,UDQ¶V
answers to the IAEA work plan warrant early closure of the file. Other reasons
for concern are the economic illogic of its enrichment effort and at least ten
indicators of military involvement in the nuclear program.

If one were representing the Islamic Republic of Iran, one might protest why the
WRSLFRI,UDQLVHYHQRQWKHDJHQGDDWDZRUNVKRSRQWKHVXEMHFWRI³QXFOHDUVWUDWHJLHV
DQG GRFWULQHV´  ,UDQ KDV QR QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG QR QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ RU GRFWULQH± at
least not any that are known to the world -- beyond an insistence on its right to the all
QXFOHDU IXHO F\FOH WHFKQRORJLHV  ,UDQ¶V OHDGHUV UHSHDWHGO\ LQVLVW WKDW ,UDQ KDV QR
intention to possess nuclear weapons and moreover has no need for them. Indeed,
Iranians stress that their Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa
against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. And yet,
much of the world does not believe it. It is useful to remind ourselves why, and to try
WR XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW ,UDQ¶V UHDO QXFOHDU LQWHQWLRQV DQG VWUDWHJLHV DUH, so that we might
better find the best way, collectively and nationally, to deal with this proliferation
problem.
Nobody outside the Iranian decision-making circle knows if Iran has made a
decision to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, this is not a choice Iran needs to make
yet; an actual decision to build a nuclear weapon can be made later. What can be said
with a high level of confidence, however, is that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons
capability. For this, there is plenty of evidence.
It has been suggested that Iran just wants to be like Japan ± with a fissile material
production capability for use only in peaceful purposes and a latent potential for
military use if a nuclear deterrent were ever deemed necessary. But it is a highly
misleading to compare Iran to Japan in this way. Critically, Japan did not seek uranium
enrichment technology as a security hedge; at least there is no evidence to suggest this.
-DSDQ¶VIXHOF\FOHSURJUDPKDVDVWURQJHFRQRPLFUDWLRQDOH'HYRLGRIVLJQLILFDQWRWKHU
energy producing resources and fearful of the effects of oil price shocks as the third
ODUJHVWJOREDORLOFRQVXPHU-DSDQ¶VHQHUJ\VHFXULW\GHSHQGVKHDYLO\RQQXFOHDUSRZHU
5RXJKO\RQHWKLUGRI-DSDQ¶VJURZLQJHOHFWULFLW\GHPDQGLVVXSSOLHGE\QXFOHDUHQHUJ\
Throughout its nuclear history, Japan has never been suspected of hiding aspects of its

1
Paper updated in March 2008
2
Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
 M. Fitzpatrick / Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? 93

program, never violated its safeguards agreement, never refused to accept strengthened
VDIHJXDUGVSURYLVLRQVDQGQHYHUUHIXVHGWRDQVZHULQVSHFWRUV¶TXHVWLRQVWRGHQ\ them
DFFHVV RU WR LPSHGH WKHLU LQYHVWLJDWLRQV  -DSDQ¶V SURJUDP KDV EHHQ RQH RI FRPSOHWH
transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
,UDQ¶V FDVH LV EHHQ YHU\ GLIIHUHQW  ,WV KLVWRU\ RI GHFHSWLRQ DQG VDIHJXDUGV
violations, the economic illogic of its enrichment program, and the many indications of
military connections provide a good deal of evidence that a capability for nuclear
weapons ± whether for deterrence or hegemonic purposes ± is its real intent.

Safeguards violations

,UDQ¶VFHQWULIXJHSURJUDPVWDUWHGLQ7KLVZDVDWDWLPHZKHQWKH86DQG8665
were making arms control deals to sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals. The concept
that horizontal proliferation is directly linked to vertical proliferation or the failure of
disarmament does not apply to the Iran case. In comparison with the nuclear weapons
programs of most other countries, however, Iran was not on a fast track for most of this
time. Twenty-three years later Iran is still at least a year away from being able to
produce enough fissile material sufficient for a nuclear weapon. By contrast, it took
Pakistan eleven years to be able to produce a bomb from the time A.Q. Khan stole
enrichment technology from Europe. In the past few years, however Iran has
TXLFNHQHG WKH SDFH  3UHVLGHQW $KPDGLQHMDG¶V ERDVW RQ  $SULO  WKDW ,UDQ KDV
begun installing an additional 6,000 centrifuges to add to the 3,000 already in place at
the underground enrichment plant at Natanz suggests that Iran is now speeding ahead
as rapidly as possible.
7KHIXOOH[WHQWRI,UDQ¶VILVVLOHPDWHULDOSURGXFWLRQSURJUDPVGLGQRWFRPHWROLJKW
until August 2002, when an exile group revealed the existence of the underground
enrichment plant under construction at Natanz and a heavy water-moderated research
reactor at Arak, the latter ideal for producing weapons grade plutonium. Western
intelligence agencies knew about these facilities but had not provided the IAEA with
specific information about them for fear of compromising intelligence sources. The
facilities and the deception surrounding them turned the glare of international attention
to focus on Iran. Iranian representatives protest that they had no legal requirement to
notify the IAEA about these facilities anyway until six months before any nuclear
material was introduced. This is legally correct insofar as Natanz is concerned. Unlike
every other country with a nuclear program, Iran had not signed a subsidiary
arrangement to its safeguards agreement requiring giving the IAEA advance
notification of the construction of any new nuclear facility as soon as a construction
decision is taken. Iran finally did sign the subsidiary agreement in 2003, but then they
unsigned it in 2007 ± an action for which there is no precedent or legal justification.
For many other aspects of its nuclear development programme, Iran did in fact
have legal obligations to notify the IAEA. Under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement, Iran was required to report the importation of nuclear material, experiments
ZLWKLWDQGIDFLOLWLHVLQZKLFKLWZDVLQWURGXFHG,UDQ¶VIDLOXUHWRUHSRUWWKHLPSRUWDWLRQ
of uranium compounds from China, and its facilities and experiments involving both
enrichment and reprocessing at places including Kalaye Electric, were among the 14
different kinds of safeguards failures that IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to
the Board of Governors in November 2003. If there were one or two failures to report,
one might give Iran the benefit of the doubt that it was only a technical failure. But
94 M. Fitzpatrick / Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals?

benefit of the doubt is not warranted when the failures are systematic. It was this
systematic pattern of serious safeguards violations that obliged the IAEA Board of
Governors to report safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council, although
this step was put off as long as Iran suspended its enrichment activity. When Iran
EURNHWKHVXVSHQVLRQWKH%RDUGILQDOO\UHSRUWHG,UDQ¶VQRQ-compliance to the Security
Council in September 2005. As a second reason for reporting to the Security Council,
WKH %RDUG VHSDUDWHO\ IRXQG WKDW WKH DEVHQFH RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes gave rise to questions regarding
international peace and security that are within the competence of the Security Council.
,W LV ZRUWK UHPHPEHULQJ WKH ,$($¶V DWWHPSWV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH WUXH SLFWXUH RI
,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDP HYHU VLQFH WKH YLRODWLRQV ILUVW FDPH WR OLJKW LQ   ,Q WKH
course of the IAEA investigations, Iran repeatedly changed its story whenever the
IAEA came up with new information that contradicted the old story. Two examples
DPRQJ PDQ\ VXIILFH WR PDNH WKH SRLQW   )LUVW ZKHQ ,UDQ¶V HQULFKPHQW program was
disclosed in 2002, the government insisted that the technology development and all of
the material and equipment was indigenous. When environmental sampling proved
this to be false, Iran admitted that it obtained technology and components from a black
market network, but it continued to repeatedly change its answers regarding the degree
of cooperation and to this day doubts remain about the degree of foreign assistance,
including whether Iran received the same set of nuclear weapons plans that the A.Q.
Khan network sold to Libya and apparently offered to Iraq. A second example
FRQFHUQV WKH ,$($¶V efforts to inspect the Kalaye Electric Company facilities on the
outskirts of Tehran, where open sources alleged that enrichment work had taken place.
When inspectors arrived in March 2003, authorities claimed they had done no
enrichment work at Kalaye and could not find the keys to the workshop. Later, when
inspectors arrived again in August that year, authorities produced the keys to a room
that had been fully refurbished and repainted in the intervening months. Yet the
inspectors could still find traces of contamination, causing Iran belatedly to
acknowledge work there with contaminated machines.
7KLVSDWWHUQRIFKDQJLQJVWRULHVLVXVHIXOWRUHFDOOLQDVVHVVLQJ,UDQ¶VSURPLVHVLQ
$XJXVWWRDQVZHURQFHDQGIRUDOOWKH,$($¶VRXWVWDQGLQJTXHVWLRQs, after which
it insisted there would be no more answers. Past experience thus rightfully raised
GRXEWVWKDW,UDQ¶VDQVZHUVWKLVWLPHZRXOGZDUUDQWHDUO\FORVXUHRIWKHQXFOHDUILOH$V
it transpired, Dr. El Baradei had to report to the Board of Governors in February 2008
WKDW ,UDQ KDG UHIXVHG WR DQVZHU PRVW RI WKH DJHQF\¶V TXHVWLRQV DERXW DOOHJHG
weaponisation studies (see below).

Economic illogic

7KHUHLVQRDSSDUHQWVRXQGHFRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHWR,UDQ¶VXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWSURJUDP
especially when it does not yet have even one power reactor on-line that requires fuel.
When Bushehr and any future reactors are ready for operation, it will be far cheaper for
Iran to import enriched uranium fuel, like most countries with nuclear power do. Of
the twelve countries most dependent on nuclear energy, only one has its own
enrichment capability. Russia has already offered life-time fuel for Bushehr, and other
producers stand ready to provide fall-back fuel cycle services, if Iran eliminates the
suspicions about its programme.
 M. Fitzpatrick / Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? 95

The Iranians argue that they need to be self-sufficient in fuel production because
they cannot trust any country to provide fuel. Having been the target of US-led
sanctions ever since the 1979 revolution, Iranians distrust the intentions of the powerful
QDWLRQVRIWKH ZRUOG7KH KLVWRU\RIEURNHQQXFOHDUGHDOVZLWKWKH :HVWDQG5XVVLD¶V
delay on delivery to Bushehr until late 2007 proved their point, the Iranians say.
However, one might ask why Russia delayed delivery of fuel to Bushehr. If Iran met
contractual obligations and international non-proliferation mandates it would have no
reason to fear fuel cut-off.
This is a vicious cycle. Iranian behavior incited proliferation concern, so its fuel
for Bushehr was delayed. This in turn caused Iran to protest more firmly that it needed
to produce its own enriched uranium to protect its interests, no matter what the Security
Council mandates to the contrary, which only intensifies the proliferation concern. If
Iran stopped the activity that gives rise to the concerns, then this vicious cycle could be
turned into a virtuous cycle.
In any case, for both technical and contractual reasons, Iran cannot produce fuel
for Bushehr. Enriched uranium fuel is not a generic product; it is tailor-made for the
specifics of the reactor. Russia is not going to turn over the specifications or allow Iran
to break the contract by producing its own fuel for Bushehr.
0RUHRYHU ,UDQ¶V OLPLWHG XUDQLXP UHVHUYHV PHDQV LW FDQQRW EH VHOI-sufficient in
nuclear fuel production anyway. Iran will have to import uranium ore if it wants to
produce its own fuel for the additional reactors it plans to build. In the meantime,
however, Iran will be in a good position to strike a deal that would give it a guaranteed
source of foreign fuel. Many different plans have been put forward for how to
guarantee enriched uranium fuel to countries that have solid non-proliferation records,
so that they never need to consider enriching uranium on their own.
Notwithstanding the economic illogic, Iran argues that it will enrich uranium
because it has a right to do so. It is argued that the nationalistic sentiment in support of
the programme, in defensH RI ,UDQ¶V ULJKWV WR SHDFHIXO HQHUJ\ LV VR VWURQJ WKDW WKH
government could not in any case forgo the right. In fact, however, Iran currently does
not have the right to enrichment. The inalienable right to nuclear energy development
mentioned in Article IV is conditioned on fulfillment of the non-proliferation
conditions of the NPT, which Iran has demonstrably violated. Also, the UN Security
Council created a new international law status for Iran last year when it mandated
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that Iran must suspend its enrichment and
reprocessing-related activity. This explains why IAEA Director General ElBaradei
reportedly said recently that Iran has no right to enrichment. He was not, as has been
implied, making some unfounded interpretation of his own; he was simply stating a
fact of current international law.

Military involvement

$W OHDVW WHQ LQGLFDWRUV RI PLOLWDU\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
program and of weapons intentions have come to light through IAEA reports or other
reputable public sources. These indicators show military links to various phases of the
fuel cycle, from mining to uranium conversion, centrifuge component production as
well as procurement, along with administrative links. There is also evidence that
suggests weaponization design work and testing.
96 M. Fitzpatrick / Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals?

Together these indicators strongly suggest that, until 2003 at least, there was a
coordinated military connection for purposes of exploring a nuclear weapons
programme. As far as is known from unclassified sources, the trail stops in 2003, the
date the last documents about explosives testing, missile re-entry vehicles and other
damning evidence, was found on a computer hard drive turned over by an Iranian walk-
in at an American embassy. It is possible, of course, that the apparent weapons
development and testing plans found on the computer were only feasibility studies that
never left the drawing table. There is no confirmed evidence that development
continued after 2003. In fact, the US National Intelligence Estimate released in
December 2007 concluded that Iran stopped the explicit weaponisation work in
1RYHPEHU3UHVLGHQW3XWLQUHDIILUPHG5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKLVSRLQW2FWREHU
 ZKHQ KH VDLG DIWHU PHHWLQJ )UHQFK 3UHVLGHQW 6DUNR]\ WKDW ³:H  GR QRW KDYH
objective data that says Iran is trying to produce nuclear weaponV´  ,Q D QDUURZ
definition, this is true. But this tapered statement overlooks the earlier evidence about
intentions to produce a nuclear weapons capability.
At least some of these questions were supposed to be cleared up in the course of
WKH ,$($¶V GLVcussions with Iran under the terms of their work plan announced on
August 21, 2007. In two of these areas ± circumstances regarding operation of the
Gchine uranium mine and Polonium-210 experiments that have application in nuclear
weapons designs ± the I$($ GHFODUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH ³FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK LWV
ILQGLQJV´,QWZRRWKHUDUHDV± the presence of highly enriched uranium contamination
at a technical university in Tehran and procurement efforts by a former head of the
Physics Research Centre at Lavisan-Shian of dual-use equipment useful in uranium
conversion and enrichment work ± WKH ,$($ GHFODUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH ³QRW
LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH GDWD FXUUHQWO\ DYDLODEOH WR WKH DJHQF\´  7KLV ODWWHU SKUDVH
indicates that the IAEA has a lower lHYHO RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV DUH
FRPSOHWH,WPHDQVWKDWWKH,$($KDVQRWEHHQDEOH\HWWRYHULI\,UDQ¶VDQVZHUVDQG
will continue to evaluate them against other information. With regard to the
weaponisation studies documented in a computer hard drive turned over to a Western
LQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQF\E\DQ,UDQLDQGHIHFWRULQ,UDQVDLGWKHHYLGHQFHZDVµEDVHOHVV
DQGIDEULFDWHG¶DQGGHQLHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRUUROHRIVRPHRIWKHSHUVRQQHOQDPHGLQWKH
documents.
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the authenticity of the computer documents,
EXWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGDOWKRXJKFDXWLRXVO\UHIHUULQJWRWKHPDVWKHµDOOHJHG¶VWXGLHVWKH
IAEA showed no hint that it suspected them to be a fabrication. Reporters from the
Washington Post and the New York Times, who after the Iraq experience are cautious
about uncritically accepting US intelligence claims, also seem to believe that the
documents are credible. They note that US intelligence officials subjected the defector,
who was not a member of an exile group, to a number of polygraphs and interviews
and, based on the volume, consistency and technical nature of the drawings, concluded
it was highly unlikely that the documents were fabricated. British, French and German
intelligence agencies, with whom the information was shared, all concurred that it
appeared authentic.
In briefing to IAEA member state missions about the weaponisation studies on
February 25, 2008, IAEA Deputy DG Olli Heinonen indicated that the IAEA had
multiple sources of information. With regard to the studies themselves, it appears that
more than one Western intelligence agency provided documents from the computer
hard drive. In addition, the IAEA obtained information from other sources about the
military organization structure it briefed to IAEA missions. The IAEA also obtained
 M. Fitzpatrick / Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? 97

information from various sources about Iranian procurement activity that was
consistent with the allegations of weaponisation studies.
$PRQJ WKH GRFXPHQWV RQ WKH KDUG GULYH ZHUH VFKHPDWLFV IRU ,UDQ¶V 6KDKab-3
medium-range ballistic missile showing a series of attempts between 2001 and 2003 to
redesign the size, weight and diameter of the nose cone ± or re-entry vehicle ± to
accommodate a spherical object with the characteristics of a nuclear implosion weapon.
Miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to be able to fit the dimensions of the Shahab-3 would
not present an insurmountable challenge for Iran, particularly if it obtained design help
through the black market, such as the nuclear weapons design that the A.Q. Khan
network provided to Libya. The exact specifications of that design are not publicly
available, other than that it had a mass of about 500 kilograms and a diameter of less
WKDQDPHWHU7KHZDUKHDGRI&KLQD¶VHDUO\QXFOHDUWHVWVIURP2FWREHU which
used the design sold to Libya, appear to have a diameter of between 80 and 90 cm. It is
ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW WKH GLDPHWHU RI WKH QRVH FRQH RI ,UDQ¶V 6KDKDE-3M version
VRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDVDµEDE\ERWWOH¶EHFDXVHRILWVVKDSHWKDWZDVWHVW-launched in
2004 also appears to be about 80-90 cm in diameter.

Looking ahead

While waiting for the results of the IAEA-Iran work plan, the Security Council delayed
imposing any further sanctions until March 2008, even though most of the conditions
of the three previous Security Council mandates remained unfulfilled. The additional
sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1803 will surely not be
sufficient to persuade Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. This resolution only
expanded the number of Iranian individuals and entities subject to the two previous
sanctions resolutions without increasing the severity of the penalties. Maintaining the
unanimity of the permanent members of the Council does send an important signal in
GHPRQVWUDWLQJ ,UDQ¶V isolation. The most important aspect of UNSCR 1803 is that it
gives the European Union and other states a basis individually to apply additional
sanctions of their own. After each of the previous resolutions, the EU imposed its own
tougher sanctions. Resolution 1803 calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in
particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. This clause could be a basis for the EU
to stop transactions with these banks. Such financial sanctions will be the strongest
pressure Iran faces. It is difficult to quantify the effect of such sanctions, however. In
an 8 February 2008 speech, US Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmit said Iranian
banNVKDG IRXQG ZD\VWRFLUFXPYHQW VDQFWLRQVDQG ³UHPDLQ XQGHWHFWHGDVWKH\ PRYH
IXQGV WKURXJK WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP WR SD\ IRU WKH UHJLPH¶V LOOLFLW
DFWLYLWLHV´
Even if Iran were to satisfactorily address all the questions and to honor its
safeguards agreement, enrichment in Iran would still be a problem until through a
sustained period of honesty and transparency Iran restored the credibility gap it created
with its history of safeguards violations, obfuscation, weapons-related procurements
and experiments, lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and military involvement. The
proposal put to Iran in August 2005 by Britain, France and Germany (the E3) and
repeated by the E3 plus China, Russia and US in June 2005 included a provision that
the suspension of enrichment could be reconsidered in ten years. If transparency
allowed the IAEA to be in a position to provide guarantees about the absence of
98 M. Fitzpatrick / Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals?

undeclared activity, then an enrichment programme in Iran would pose fewer grounds
for objection, even though it would still be far more reassuring to the world and
economically better for Iran if it obtained all sensitive fuel cycle services from overseas.
In conclusion, there is ample reason to be concerned about the intentions behind
,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH It is good that Iran has foresworn nuclear weapons, but it
remains very worrisome that it continues to develop the capability. To Iran¶VQHLJKERrs
and to much of the rest of the world, there is little difference between having a
capability and having the weapons.
While there are ways to try to ensure that a latent capability does not become a
weapons programme, they are far from perfect. The best option is to forego enrichment
DQG UHSURFHVVLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV XQWLO FRQILGHQFH LV UHVWRUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V LQWHntions are
indeed peaceful, which is why the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council
have demanded suspension.
7KH TXHVWLRQ SRVHG IRU WKLV WRSLF ZDV ZKHWKHU ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH KDV
peaceful or military goals. The answer is both. Now the question is whether there will
be a peaceful or military solution.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 99
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-99

Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a

Solution
Alexander PIKAEV1

Abstract. Prospects for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem are still dim.
7KH GLVFORVXUH RI WKH VHFUHW ,UDQLDQ IDFLOLWLHV GHDOW D VHULRXV EORZ WR 7HKUDQ¶V
assertions that it had not pursued any illegal nuclear activities. The present
approach to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem has little chance for
success. The position of the world community towards the Iranian nuclear
program can be characterized as the policy without a stick and carrot. Fortunately,
in terms of technology, the Iranian nuclear program does not have the capability to
FUHDWHDQXFOHDUZHDSRQVSURJUDPTXLFNO\HYHQLI,UDQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSKDGVHWWKLVDV
its aim.

Prehistory

Iran is one of the founding countries of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) - the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It signed this
document on February 2, 1970. According to the treaty, Tehran pledged to neither
produce nor seek to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. On May 15, 1974, a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force. In accordance with this agreement the
IAEA had been given access to facilities on Iranian territRU\UHODWHGWR,UDQ¶VSHDFHIXO
atomic activities. The acceptance of these documents opened the way to international
cooperation between Iran and some Western countries in the peaceful atomic energy
sphere. In particular, with the assistance of the German business group Siemens,
Tehran started building an atomic power plant in Bushehr. However, after the Iranian
Islamic revolution of 1979 and a drastic deterioration of relations with the USA,
Western companies were forced to stop cooperation with Iran in the sphere of the
peaceful use of atomic energy. The construction of the Bushehr power plant was also
frozen.
At first the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran showed no interest in nuclear
technologies. But in the late 1980s, as it became known later, Iran research and
development activities continued in this sphere. It seems that this was caused by the
Iranian-Iraqi war when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in defiance of its
international commitments. This act received no serious condemnation by the
international community, a factor which probably encouraged Tehran to launch its
QXFOHDU SURJUDP ,Q YLRODWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V  &RPSUHKHQVLYH 6DIHJXDUGV $JUHHPHQW
however, Iran did not declare these activities and IAEA inspectors had no opportunity
to verify they were in accord with the NPT requirements.
1
Department Head, Institute for World Economy and International Relations
100 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

In the 1990s, Tehran significantly expanded the scale of its nuclear activities and
in particular decided to resume construction of the Bushehr power plant. Afraid of
tough reaction from the USA, including sanctions legislated by Congress, Western
companies hesitated to render any assistance to Iran, and therefore the Iranian
authorities asked Russia to finish building the Bushehr plant as well as to deliver and
assemble all the necessary equipment. Iranians also wanted to buy equipment which
was not related to the Bushehr project.
5XVVLDIRXQGQRJURXQGVIRUUHIXVLQJ,UDQ¶VUHTXHVWDVDWWKDWWLPHEHFDXVHQRWKLQJ
was known about the secret nuclear activities of this country. From the legal viewpoint,
Moscow in fact was required to assist Iran in the sphere of the development of peaceful
atomic energy. This was the direct requirement of Article IV of the NPT, which
obliged parties in possession of nuclear energy to share the technology with states
parties to the treaty who did not yet enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy.
Information about Russian-Iranian cooperation in the peaceful nuclear sphere
caused concern in the United States, which feared that under cover of the Bushehr
reactor construction, Iran would develop military nuclear technologies, prohibited by
the NPT. Washington started to exert rather serious pressure on the Yeltsin
administration in order to make it give up any nuclear cooperation with Iran. However,
Moscow demonstrated unexpected persistence and managed to defend the Bushehr
project. Still, Moscow was forced to refrain from the delivery to Tehran of certain
technologies including uranium enrichment. As became known later, Iran purchased
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology from other countries.
Despite the 1995 deal with Moscow, the USA continued to follow Russian-Iranian
contacts in the peaceful atomic sphere very attentively. Officially Washington opposed
the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant although it kept from introducing
sanctions against Russian companies and private persons participating in this project.
At the same time, based on intelligence data including information received from
Israeli intelligence services, Washington from time to time imposed sanctions against
Russian companies which cooperated with Tehran on projects other than Bushehr. In
doing so, the United States persuaded other countries, first of all Ukraine, not to
cooperate with the Russian companies on Bushehr subcontracts. Sometimes this
pressure yielded certain results. Under the pressure of their governments,
subcontractors gave up projects and contracts had to be transferred to other companies.
Certainly it complicated and even delayed the construction of the reactor.
Washington was afraid that the irradiated nuclear fuel from the Bushehr power
plant could be used to extract weapons-grade plutonium and to create an atomic bomb.
The Russian side, in response, pointed out that according to Russian legislation Iran has
no obligation to repatriate the spent fuel to Russia. As another argument, Russia cited
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VUHIXVDOWRWDNHEDFNVSHQWQXFOHDUIXHORI$PHULFDQRULJLQIURPDZKROH
number of countries including such near-nuclear states as Taiwan and South Korea.
,Q  5XVVLD¶V Oegislation was modified and repatriation of the spent nuclear
fuel was permitted. After that, Moscow demanded that Tehran conclude a protocol on
returning to Russia the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor, upon threat of otherwise
cutting off deliveries of fresh fuel. The absence of such deliveries would mean that
Bushehr would never become operational. After many years of long and painful
negotiations, the Iranian side accepted Russian terms and signed the corresponding
protocol.
It is interesting that in the dialogue with Russia, the United States had invariably
refused to provide any concrete facts concerning Iranian illegal nuclear activities and
 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 101

about contacts between the Iranians and Russian companies. The USA was motivated
by reluctance to disclose its sources of information. In fact it was most probably
politically imprudent for the Americans to confess that they had received data from
intelligence services of third countries. However, it is possible that Washington could
have had other reasons for LW3UREDEO\LWZDVQRWWR:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDGYDQWDJHWRH[SRVH
the information that Iran had started building the uranium enrichment facilities.
Theoretically these facilities would allow Iran to develop nuclear explosive devices
based on weapons-grade uranium instead of plutonium which could have been
potentially extracted from the spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr power plant. The
publication of this information would inevitably result in the decrease of the
international pressure upon Russia aimed to induce it either to cease all activities on the
Bushehr project or at least to achieve confirmation of the protocol with Iran on
returning the spent nuclear fuel back to Russia.
Only when the unwillingness to reveal this information became nearly absurd and
the signing of the Russian-Iranian protocol on the spent fuel was inevitable, in August
2002 an Iranian exile group revealed the existence of Iranian uranium enrichment
IDFLOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH XUDQLXP KH[DIOXRULGH ³\HOORZFDNH´ FRQYHUVLRQ SODQW DW
Esfahan and the uranium enrichment centrifuges at Natanz. Soon an American
nongovernmental organization published satellite photos of the facilities. It was also
UHYHDOHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V FHQWULIXJHV KDG EHHQ PRVW SUREDEO\ DFTXLUHG WKURXJK WKH LOOHJDO
nuclear black market network headed by the prominent Pakistani scientist - the creator
RI WKH ,VODPDEDG¶V QXFOHDU ERPE - A.Q. Khan. This showed that contrary to long-
VWDQGLQJ$PHULFDQDQG,VUDHOLDOOHJDWLRQV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPZDVGHYHORSLQJQRW
due to Iranian contactVZLWK5XVVLDRUWKH%XVKHKUFRQWUDFWEXWWKURXJKWKH³VHFRQGDU\
SUROLIHUDWLRQ´OLQH± WKHQXFOHDU³EODFNPDUNHW´IHGE\GHOLYHULHVIURPWKHQHZQXFOHDU
states.

The Diplomatic Process in 2003-2005

The disclosure of the secret Iranian facilities dealt a seULRXVEORZWR7HKUDQ¶VDVVHUWLRQV

that it had not pursued any illegal nuclear activities. The construction of the above-
mentioned facilities and building of the heavy-water reactor in Arak as well as all
previous experiments had not been declared to the IAEA as required under the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of 1974. The scandalous nature of these
disclosures resulted in a rapid increase of international pressure aimed to induce the
Iranian leadership to fairly cooperate with the IAEA and to lay bare all undeclared
nuclear activities. However, it should be mentioned that the nature of these activities in
itself apparently did not contradict Iranian obligations within the NPT. Only the fact
that Tehran had not informed the IAEA about these activities could be viewed as an
NPT violation. In fact, it contradicted the provisions of the 1974 agreement.
$IWHU WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ ,UDQ¶V LOOHJDO QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV WKH
United States proceeded to build up political pressure upon the country, demanding
that it not only come clean about all undeclared nuclear activities but also that it give
up any uranium enrichment programs. In response, Tehran agreed to cooperate with the
IAEA on uncovering its previous nuclear programs but categorically refused to suspend
its uranium enrichment activities. According to Tehran, such activities were allowed
within the NPT framework and were aimed toward creating national capacities for fuel
102 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

production for atomic power plants. Many non-nuclear states, including :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
close ally Japan, possess similar capacities.
The British-$PHULFDQ LQYDVLRQ RI ,UDT DQG WKH UHPRYDO RI 6DGGDP +XVVHLQ¶V
regime from power in March-April 2003 had temporarily changed the attitudes not
only in Tehran but also in a number of the European capitals. Clearly frightened by the
ease with which American troops occupied Baghdad, the Iranian leadership started
sending signals to the USA and European countries which stated its readiness to seek a
compromise on its nuclear program. Tehran signed the Protocol on returning the spent
nuclear fuel to Russia and accepted the IAEA safeguards Additional Protocol.
According to this document, the IAEA inspectors obtained the right to visit not only the
facilities declared by Iran itself but also other facilities where they suspected of illegal
QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV 7KLV VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQFUHDVHG WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
programs. At the same time Iran decided not to speed up the parliamentary ratification
of this agreement, obviously trying to retain freedom of action for the future. Until
ratification - the date of which had not even been specified - the agreement was to be
implemented on a provisional basis.
In 2003, Iran decided to take a step which was unprecedented in the whole history
of Iranian-American relations since the victory of the Islamic revolution. It proposed
to the United States to start direct consultations on Iraq, clearly counting on the
significant improvement of relations with Washington in exchange for the cooperation
of American occupation forces on behalf of the Shia groups who were significantly
influenced by Iran.
Moreover, Tehran agreed to discuss its nuclear program not only with the IAEA
but also with some of the Western countries. In late 2003, informal contacts between
the representatives of Iran on the one side and Germany, France and Britain on the
other side started. In November 2004 these contacts resulted in the signing of the Paris
agreement according to which Iran was obliged to provide clear and long-term
JXDUDQWHHV RI WKH SHDFHIXO QDWXUH RI LWV QXFOHDU SURJUDP 8QWLO WKHVH ³REMHFWLYH
JXDUDQWHHV´FRXOGEH DJUHHG XSRQ7HKUDQDVVXPHG YROXQWDU\REOLJDWLRQVWRFHDVHDOO
uranium enrichment activity as well as radio-chemical plutonium reprocessing from
spent nuclear fuel. In return, West European countries made it clear that they would be
UHDG\WR³UHZDUG´,UDQLILWJDYHXSXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWRQDSHUPDQHQWEDVLV
The diplomatic initiative of France, Germany and Britain (the EU-3) was sparked
by a whole series of reasons. First, Britain and France strove to return to the region east
of Suez which they had been forced to leave in the late 1950s. Second, Germany and
)UDQFH KDG DFFXPXODWHG VLJQLILFDQW LQYHVWPHQWV LQ ,UDQ¶V FLYLO HFRQRP\ DQG VKRZHG
great interest in the oil and gas sector of the country. Third, they wished to smooth over
the differences between Paris and Berlin on the one side and London on the other,
which appeared during the British-American preparation of the military operation in
Iraq. The preservation of differences could have negatively influenced relations within
the European Union on the eve of its enlargement planned for 2004. Finally, all three
countries wished to avoid another military operation which could have unpredictably
influenced both transatlantic and internal European relations as well as contacts
between the West and the whole Islamic world. Besides, Britain needed contacts with
Iran as its occupational sector in Iraq was situated to the south of the country, mostly
populated by Shias who had close relations with the Iranian co-religionists.
It should be mentioned that the initiative of the EU-3 was taken very painfully by
some European countries, in particular Italy which had its own interests in Iran. In
order to keep unity within the European Union, the EU-3 was forced to agree to the
 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 103

participation of EU High Commissioner for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Javier Solana in negotiations with Tehran. This extremely complicated the format of
the negotiations, which in fact were transformed from four-party to five-party talks.
Under such conditions, it was simply physically difficult for the five delegations
assembled in a small room to discuss very delicate issues and achieve any progress.
Moreover, the four European delegations clearly did not always manage to coordinate
WKHLU SRVLWLRQV $QG WKH %UXVVHOV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV KDG WR WDNH LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH
interests of the unrepresented EU countries interested in a change of the negotiation
format rather than in the success of the talks. This hardly added any constructiveness to
WKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH%UXVVHOV¶GHOHJDWLRQ
In fact the negotiations were programmed for failure from the very beginning.
Although the Iranian leadership had not formulated its interests very clearly, in
exchange for the refusal from the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing it
obviously sought to receive promises from the USA not to change the political regime
in Iran by military actions; to loosen, and ultimately, to lift American sanctions which
ZHUH YHU\ SDLQIXO IRU WKH ,UDQLDQ HFRQRP\ DQG WR DFKLHYH :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI,UDQ¶VLPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKH*UHDW0LGGOH(DVWUHJLRQ$OOWKLV,UDQ
could have attained only through talks with the United States, not with the European
Union. In such circumstances the negotiations with the West European countries were
of interest to Iran from two viewpoints: first, to gain time and remove the immediate
threat of the American invasion (which seemed quite real to Tehran in 2003-early
2004); and secoQGWRXVHWKH(XURSHDQQHJRWLDWRUVDVD³EULGJH´WR:DVKLQJWRQ7KH
European Union could have possibly interested Iran if it had proposed a far-reaching
political and economic partnership with Tehran. However, the West European
representatives turned out to be clearly unprepared for that in view of the weakness of
WKHLUFRXQWULHV¶SRVLWLRQVLQWKHUHJLRQDVZHOODVWKHLQWHUQDOGLIIHUHQFHVDQGFRQVWDQW
looking over their shoulders at the USA.
Initially, Washington regarded the initiative of the three European countries with
great suspicion. It seems that the right-wing conservative wing in the Bush
administration sincerely thought that this initiative was an attempt by France and
*HUPDQ\WR³VWHDO´WKHUHVXOWVRIWKH$PHULFDQPLOLWDU\YLFWRU\LQ,UDT$QG though this
position did not become the dominant one, in 2003-2004 the United States preferred to
move away from its European allies. It restricted itself to the tough anti-Iranian rhetoric
and urged that the Iranian issue be taken up in the UN Security Council. However,
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ,UDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHGLDORJXHZLWK:DVKLQJWRQDQGDOVRJLYLQJLQWRWKH
pressure of the pro-American lobby in the EU, West European states made certain
attempts to enlist the support of the United States. This was also facilitated by the
gradual softening of the American position influenced by the course of events in Iraq,
which were unfavorable for the USA. In March 2005, US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice promised that if Tehran agreed to curb uranium enrichment and
other related elements of its nuclear activities, Washington would not block Iran
entering into the WTO and would lift its embargo on deliveries of equipment for
American-manufactured civil airplanes to Iran. In turn, the West Europeans agreed to
bring the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council in case Iran refused to make the
demanded concessions.
The March deal between the EU and USA most probably reflected a significant
shift in the American position and obviously was regarded in Europe as a serious
victory of the moderate wing in the Republican administration. However, Iran did not
share these feelings. Obviously, Tehran was not prepared to change its almost only
104 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

diplomatic trump card for the symbolic concession from the Americans. At the same
time it VWLOOKDGFHUWDLQKRSHVIRUELJ³FDUURWV´IURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ2QWKH RQH
hand, in March 2005 Iran threatened to terminate its unilateral moratorium on uranium
enrichment and plutonium if the EU, in fulfillment of the Paris agreements, did not
present in a written form the list of benefits which Iran could have in exchange for its
FHVVDWLRQRIFHUWDLQDVSHFWVRILWVQXFOHDUSURJUDP2QWKHRWKHUKDQG5XVVLD¶V'HSXW\
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak who visited Tehran in May 2005, managed
to persuade the Iranian leadership not lift its moratorium until it received the proposals
from the EU.
Also in May, the Iranian leadership for the first time had clearly defined what it
would like to receive from the European Union. In view of the US unpreparedness for a
serious dialogue with Iran the latter simply could not agree to the idea of the complete
cessation of uranium-enrichment activities, and made an intermediate proposal which
included a number of limitations on Iranian nuclear activities under the conditions of
unprecedented transparency. The so-FDOOHG³IRXU-VWDJHSODQ´SHUPLWWHG,UDQWRFDUU\RXW
uranium conversion at the facility at Esfahan and the construction of 3,000 uranium-
enrichment centrifuges at the facility in Natanz. Tehran promised the immediate
placing of the enriched uranium into the fuel rods in order to make further enrichment
to the weapons-grade level impossible. It guaranteed the permanent presence of the
IAEA inspectors at both plants in Esfahan and Natanz and promised to agree to other
transparency measures outside the framework of the Additional Protocol. The
agreement itself had to be ratified and until ratification was completed ± was to be
strictly observed. Finally, the Iranians committed themselves not to extract plutonium
from the spent nuclear fuel.
In return, Iran demanded the delivery of the light-water reactor for the atomic
power plants; the provision of firm guarantees of the reactor fuel deliveries as the
alternative for its own production; a loosening of export control procedures on
advanced technologies; and ensured broader access of Iranian products to EU markets.
Besides, the Iranian proposal called for the creation of joint commissions on strategic
cooperation and defense issues, as well as for the adoption of a joint statement on the
principle of relations between the EU and Iran.
7KH :HVW (XURSHDQ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV UHMHFWHG 7HKUDQ¶V SODQ ULJKW IURP WKH VWDUW
7KH\ KHOGWKH RSLQLRQWKDWD FHUWDLQ³UHGOLQH´ ZRXOGEH ,UDQ¶VFRPSOHWHFHVVDWLRQRI
uranium enrichment. The diplomats from the EU were not prepared to agree with the
idea of limited enrichment. Besides, they were required to make tangible concessions
in exchange for the promise to keep from any future activities.
It seems clear in retrospect that the :HVW (XURSHDQ UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH ³IRXU-stage
SODQ´ ZDV D VHULRXV EOXQGHU 7KH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ UHIXVHG WR DFFHSW WKH ,UDQLDQ LGHD
after the victory in the Iranian presidential elections in spring 2005 of hardliner
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It was not difficult to predict that with such a leader Iran
could altogether give up attempts to find a compromise. Especially as the situations in
Iraq and Afghanistan were deteriorating, the Iranian leadership has less reason to fear
the prospect of American regime-change intervention and some Iranian radicals used
the persistent threat of US bombings as an argument to increase their own political
influence.
Further events unfolded according to the worst possible scenario. The European
Union presented its proposals only on August 5, 2005, at the time of the ongoing
governmental changes in Tehran when it was hard to expect any sensible answer from
it. The EU-3 proposed to sign a long-term agreement consisting of the interconnected
 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 105

package of stimuli in the atomic energy sphere, technological cooperation and

proposals in the economic and political sphere2. The central idea behind this package
was the assurance of Iran that it would get access to international nuclear fuel services
at market prices. The Europeans agreed to deliver a research reactor to Iran and
committed themselves to cooperate with it in the nuclear security sphere.
In the political and security sphere, the proposal of the three European states called
for the strengthening of counterterrorism cooperation; implementation of joint
programs in fighting against drug production and trafficking; and starting a dialogue
between the EU and Iran on regional security issues. In the sphere of technological and
HFRQRPLF FRRSHUDWLRQ WKH SURSRVDOV UHIHUUHG WR (8 VXSSRUW RI ,UDQ¶V entry into the
WTO and proposed cooperation in various areas including scientific research, civil
aviation, railway and sea transport, oil chemistry and communications. All these
proposals were rather vague and clearly offered less than Iran had demanded in its
2005 plan.
$WWKHVDPHWLPH,UDQKDGWRDFFHSWDOORIWKH:HVW¶VGHPDQGV7KHVHLQFOXGHGWKH
legal obligation not to pursue any activities within the nuclear fuel cycle except for the
construction and exploitation of the light-water reactor and research reactors (i.e. the
complete termination of uranium enrichment); full cooperation with the IAEA in order
to settle all the remaining issues concerning implementation of the 1974
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; ratification of the Additional Protocol before
the end of 2005; legal obligation not to withdraw from the NPT and to bring all nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards; the return of spent fuel to the supplier; and cessation
of the heavy-water reactor building in Arak.
It is not surprising that the proposals of the EU-3 were met by the new Iranian
leadership with an undisguised animosity and were completely rejected. On August 8,
Iran made a decision on partial suspension of the unilateral moratorium on uranium
enrichment. At the first stage, Tehran declared only its renewal of uranium-conversion
activities in Esfahan, stating that it would keep from the exploitation of the pilot
uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. Besides, the IAEA inspectors continued to
monitor both facilities. Nevertheless, the decision made in Tehran was interpreted as
,UDQ¶VFURVVLQJRIWKH³UHGOLQH´GUDZQE\WKH:HVW(XURSHDQGLSORPDWVDQGZDVWDNHQ
badly in the European capitals. Already on August 9, the European Union decided to
exacerbate the situation claiming its sXSSRUW IRU WKH LGHD RI UHSRUWLQJ ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
program to the UN Security Council. The next round of talks between Iran and the EU-
3EU-3 scheduled for the end of August was cancelled. In fact this meant the failure of
the EU-3 mission. The format of negations on the Iranian nuclear program was
radically changed.

Bringing the discussion of the Iranian record into the UN Security Council: late
2005 ± 2007

After the failure of negotiations in the EU-3 format, the focus of the international
discussion shifted to the IAEA Board of Governors. The United States and, to the

2
,$($µ&RPPXQLFDWLRQGDWHG August 2005 received from the Resident Representatives of France,
*HUPDQ\DQGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPWRWKH$JHQF\¶,1)&,5&9LHQQD Aug. 2005, URL
<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc651.pdf>.
106 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

lesser degree, the EU countries demanded that the board should make a decision on
moving the discussion of the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council. Obviously,
under the conditions of a very restricted list of pressure instruments upon Iran, the
Western states counted on the threat to bring the discussion within the UN Security
Council to make Tehran show greater compliance in the talks. At the same time, the
shift of focus to the IAEA implied the engagement of other players who did not quite
share the Western position on the necessity of applying coercive measures against Iran.
7KH\ LQFOXGHG QRW RQO\ 5XVVLD DQG &KLQD WKH WUDGLWLRQDO SURSRQHQWV RI D ³VRIW OLQH´
towards Tehran, but also some influential developing countries like the South African
Republic and Indonesia. The differences were also to be observed within the European
Union as a number of states held the EU-3 responsible for the failure of negotiations,
and demanded to continue the dialogue with Tehran, although in a different format.
Thus in 2005 and in the early 2006 most countries were not prepared to sanction the
transfer of the discussion of the Iranian record to the UN Security Council, but at the
same time, in principle they did not object to the threat of such a transfer as an element
of diplomatic bargaining with Iran.
On September 27, 2005 on the wave of international indignation after the partial
cancellation of the Iranian moratorium on uranium enrichment, the Board of Governors
passed a resolution calling for reporting the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security
Council, leaving open the date for this referral, (which happened in February 2006, as
described below). Although Tehran had responded to this resolution rather sharply, it
nevertheless continued its cooperation with the IAEA, assuming it was a better
alternative to the UN Security Council discussion as a result of which it could be put
under international sanctions. In November 2005, it even agreed to IAEA inspections at
the military complex in Parchin, although the Agency traditionally restricted its
activities strictly to the civil facilities. At the same time, the Iranians warned that if the
Iranian issue was brought before the UN Security Council, they would not ratify the
Additional Safeguards Agreement and cease its voluntary implementation. In
November, the Iranian parliament adopted a resolution carrying out this threat.
The results of voting in the Board of Governors on September 27 showed that the
coPSURPLVHUHVROXWLRQZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKHPDMRULW\RIWKH%RDUG¶VPHPEHUVRXW
of 35) whereas the representatives from 13 countries including Russia and China turned
it down. Thus, the Iranian pertinacity resulted in the fact that the majority of the
BoaUG¶V PHPEHUV VXSSRUWHG WKH 86 DQG (8 KDUG OLQH 7KLV DOVR GHPRQVWUDWHG WR
Moscow and Beijing that the possibility of bringing the Iranian issue into the UN
Security Council was rather great and that most probably they would fail to prevent it.
Under these circumstances, although potentially the possible UN economic
sanctions could have threatened its extensive investment plans to a much greater degree
as compared with Russia, China preferred to keep an expectant position leaving to
Russia the initiative in attempting to unblock the Iranian knot. China restricted itself to
rendering the diplomatic support to Moscow, obviously not wishing to exacerbate
relations with the United States.
Consequently Russia was forced to step into the diplomatic forefront, perfectly
understanding that it was unable to solve this problem on its own. Moscow chose to
advance in two directions. On the one hand, Moscow persuaded Iran to cooperate with
the IAEA more actively so as to settle the issue concerning the violations of the 1974
Safeguards Agreement. If this problem could have been solved then the accusations
against Tehran of violations of the international non-proliferation regime would be no
ORQJHUUHOHYDQW$VLWZDVPHQWLRQHGDERYH,UDQ¶VXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWDFWLYLW\GLGnot
 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 107

contravene any international norms. From the international law perspective the point
was to make Iran agree to voluntary suspension in exchange for concessions on the part
of third parties, first of all the United States.
On the other hand, being aware of the importance of the enrichment issue both
from the political perspective and in view of its real significance for non-proliferation,
Russia made attempts to bring the positions of the EU and Tehran closely together
WKURXJK³VLOHQWGLSORPDF\´WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQW7HKUDQ¶V³IRXU-VWDJHSODQ´SURSRVHGLQ
May 2005. At the same time, there was an effective plan presented by Russian Minister
of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov on the creation of a joint Russian-Iranian uranium-
enrichment factory which had little chance of being accepted by the Iranian side.
7KH SURMHFWZDVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDRIUHFRQFLOLQJ,UDQ¶VULJKWWRGHYHORSSHDFHIXO
nuclear technologies including uranium enrichment with the elimination of the
international concerns that Tehran would use peaceful technologies to produce
weapons-grade uranium. As far as it is known the plan foresaw partial uranium
conversion at the Esfahan plant. After that the extracted intermediate product would be
sent to Russia where the final stage of the hexafluoride uranium production would be
completed and its enrichment up to the reactor-grade could be carried out. The enriched
uranium would be delivered to Iran and the spent nuclear fuel would return back to
Russia.
Obviously such a plan was unacceptable for the Iranian side which asserted that it
needed its own fuel production in order to be independent from foreign suppliers.
,QLWLDOO\ ,YDQRY¶V SODQ ZDV UHMHFWHG E\ ,UDQ DQG RQO\ ZLWK WKH GHWHULRUDWLRQ RI WKH
situation surrounding Iran did it begin to show interest. The plan, however, was never
accepted.
,WLVQRWWREHUXOHGRXWWKDW5XVVLDXQGHUVWRRGWKHLPSODXVLELOLW\RI,YDQRY¶VSODQ
and hoped that it could serve as a catalyst for the resumption of negotiations with the
EU, thus removing from the agenda the undesirable issue of bringing the discussion of
the Iranian issue to the United Nations. In late 2005, it seemed that the talks with Iran
could be resumed. Apparently, the EU-3 recovered from the August shock and some
other EU countries were inclined toward this idea. Probably by November the
consensus within the European Union regarding the resumption of the talks had been
UHDFKHGEXWWKLVWLPHWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVKRXOGEHFDUULHGRXWQRWLQWKH³(8-6RODQD´
format. The office of the High Representative on the CFSP had to be the only
participant representing the whole European Union.
Most likely it is also one of the reasons that in November, the IAEA Board of
Governors decided not to pass another resolution on Iran, despite the anti-Iranian
majority, so as to give time to settle the problem through the direct talks. In December,
Iran and the European Union decided to resume the talks in January 2006.
However, on January 3, 2006 Iran suddenly informed the IAEA that it had
withdrawn from the unilateral moratorium and resumed uranium enrichment activity.
7KXVWKH ³UHGOLQH´GUDZQE\WKH(XURSHDQGLSORPDWV ZDVILQDOO\FURVVHG0RUHRYHU
,YDQRY¶V SODQ ZKLFK LPSOLHG 7HKUDQ¶V DEVWHQWLRQ QRW RQO\ IURP HQULFKPHQW EXW DOVR
from the production of hexafluoride uranium was crossed out. In such circumstances,
reporting the Iranian issue to the UN Security Council was practically inevitable.
The motives of this unprovoked Iranian demarche remain unclear. It seems that the
circles of the new president chose rude and aggressive rhetoric as an instrument of
consolidating their internal political influence and snatching away the power remaining
in the hands of the moderate conservatives who gathered round Ayatollah Hashemi
Rafsanjani. Besides, through the resumption of activity at the Esfahan plant, Iran
108 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

apparently managed to produce a certain amount of hexafluoride uranium and thus

Tehran obtained the materials for uranium enrichment that it previously had lacked.
Certainly after such a decision, the negotiations between Iran and the European
Union could not take place and their first round scheduled for January 2006 was
cancelled. Foreign ministers of the EU-3 and Solana issued a sharp statement
demanding an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and submitting
the Iranian problem to the UN Security Council. The extraordinary meeting of the
*RYHUQRUV¶%RDUGZKLFKWRRNSODFHRQ)HEUXDU\SUDFWLFDOO\UHIHUUHGWKH,UDQLDQ
file to the Security Council. The majority of the members (27 members of the Board)
voted for this decision. Russia and China also supported this resolution only after
KDYLQJDFKLHYHGWKH:HVW¶VFRQVHQWWKDWWKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO ZRXOG QRWFRQVLGHUWKH
Iranian issue until the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors scheduled for
early March had taken place. Moscow and Beijing tried to give Tehran one more
chance to overcome the deadlock through negotiations. However, the attempts of the
Russian diplomats to bring Iran back to the way of restraint were unsuccessful.
Already on February 6 Tehran started the implementation of the threats to decrease
the cooperation with the IAEA in case its nuclear program was submitted to the United
Nations for discussion. Tehran declared the cessation of observance of the Additional
Protocol with the IAEA as well as a number of other voluntary measures, and
demanded to break the seals and boxes in those places except where required by the
1974 Safeguards Agreement. On February 15 Ahmadinejad declared that experimental
uranium enrichment of a 10-centrifuge cascade had started in Natanz.
On February 27, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei issued a regular
report on cooperation with Iran concerning the clarification of unresolved questions
regarding its past nuclear activities. He noted that a number of questions still remained
XQUHVROYHG $ORQJ ZLWK ,UDQ¶V FRQIURQWDWLRQDO DFWLRQV LQ -DQXDU\-February, the report
gave a green light for the discussion of the Iranian issue in the UN Security Council in
March 2006. On March 29, the President of the Security Council made a statement
reflecting the unanimous position of all 15 members of the Council. He urged Tehran
to stop the uranium-enrichment activities and fulfill other requirements of the IAEA
resolutions. This statement was not legally binding.
Still, Iran continued to pursue its hard line. It rejected the statement of the UNSC
3UHVLGHQW DV YLRODWLQJ ,UDQ¶V ULJKW WR D SHDFHIXO DWRPLF SURJUDP 2Q $SULO 
Ahmadinejad reported on new successes in uranium enrichment. He claimed that the
Iranians had succeeded in enrichment uranium to the 3.5% level necessary for its use as
reactor fuel. According to Ahmadinejad, a certain quantity of uranium had been
enriched in the laboratory conditions on the 164 centrifuge cascade. Some observers
expressed doubt of the truth of the Iranian statements. According to them, at that
moment the Iranian scientists had not managed to solve all problems connected with
the reprocessing of a sufficient quantity of uranium hexafluoride, or to coordinate the
centrifuge cascades properly.
In fact, bringing the discussion of the Iranian problem to the UN Security Council
had complicated the position of the West. While the West had the anti-Iranian majority
in the IAEA Board of Governors, Russia and China possessed the veto right in the
Security Council. This required constant consultations with Moscow and Beijing and
closer attention to their positions. In this respect, in early 2006 an informal mechanism
of interaction between the leading powers on the Iranian problem was established. The
related issues were discussed at the regular meeting of high-ranking officials from the
United State, Russia, France, China, Germany and Britain. The emergence of this
 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 109

mechanism brought US representatives into the negotiations process on a permanent

and regular basis and allowed for the elaboration of a unified position depriving Tehran
of the opportunity to play on the differences between the leading global players. At the
VDPH WLPH 0RVFRZ DQG %HLMLQJ ZKR SDUWLFLSDWHG DV IXOO PHPEHUV DW WKH VL[ VWDWHV¶
meetings, bore the responsibility for the joint decisions.
$IWHU ,UDQ¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH 81 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO VWDWHPHQW WKH JURXS RI VL[
decided to advance in three ways. First, the six countries started to discuss the new
package of proposals for Iran in case it gave up its undesirable nuclear activities. This
time the proposal would be presented on behalf of all six states. Thus, the Western
countries declared their readiness to continue the negotiations process with Tehran.
Second, the United States had to slightly change its position. On May 31, Secretary
Rice claimed that Washington was ready to take part in the dialogue with Iran if the
latter suspended its uranium-enrichment activity. In other words, for the first time the
USA made it clear that it was ready for direct talks with Tehran which it had refused
since 1980. Third, the Western countries prepared the full draft UN Security Council
resolution which repeated the demands made by the IAEA and the Security Council
President earlier. Though the resolution did not imply any concrete sanctions or
deadlines for implementation, the adoption of this document for the first time legalized
WKH GHPDQGV WR VWRS ,UDQ¶V XUDQLXP HQULFKPHQW DFWLYLW\ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH
international law. Thus a separate international regime was established for Iran,
overseeing specific restrictions in the sphere of the peaceful atomic activities.
On June 6, the group of the six officially proposed to Iran to start negotiations on
the package of measures providing them with certain preliminary conditions. Before
talks started, Tehran was required to settle all the remaining issues with the IAEA
concerning its past nuclear activities; to suspend all uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing activities for the period of the negotiations; and to resume the
implementation of the Additional Safeguards Agreement. In exchange, it was offered
guaranteed delivery of the light-water reactor and nuclear fuel both through the
creation of the joint Russian-Iranian plant and through the deployment of five-year fuel
supplies on Iranian territory under IAEA control. Unlike the EU proposals presented in
August 2005, the proposal of the six countries allowed for the production of reactor
fuel in Iran after international confidence in the peaceful purposes of the Iranian
nuclear program was restored, i.e. in the indefinite future.
The 2006 package looked weightier that the EU proposals made in August 2005 as
it was supported by all leading world powers, including the United States. At the same
time, the package included preliminary conditions that were not raised in the previous
year; it also did not specify the benefits which Iran could receive in the broader
economic and political context. Even the EU initiative earlier rejected by Iran as an
insufficient one, proposed more clear directions of cooperation. Therefore, in fact,
Tehran had to pay beforehand for the goods that were to be agreed upon. Besides, these
goods looked far less attractive than those proposed a year ago.
Taking advantage of the unspecified time constraints in the proposals of the six
countries, Iran declared that it would take as long as was necessary in preparing its
answer. At the same time, Russia urged Tehran to give a positive answer by the Saint
Petersburg summit in the beginning of June. For this purpose Ahmadinejad was invited
to the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which Iran took
part as an observer. However after the SCO summit Iran made a statement in which it
promised to give its answer only in the end of August.
110 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

Most probably, this provoked serious irritation in Moscow, and on July 12, the
group of six countries made a statement that it considered Tehran to have failed to give
any answer to its proposals. This meant that the way to the adoption of the first full
Security Council resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear problem had been opened.
2Q -XO\   WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO DGRSWHG 5HVROXWLRQ  ZLWK  \HD¶V DQG 
abstention (Qatar) which demanded Iran to cease all uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing works by August 31 under the IAEA control. Otherwise the
GRFXPHQWWKUHDWHQHGWRWDNH³DSSURSULDWHDFWLRQ´DJDLQVW,UDQ
It is unclear why the group of six which patiently tried to restore the negotiations
process decided to adopt the statement of July 12 and the UNSCR 1696 even before
Iran had presented its answer by the end of August. Probably it was an attempt to exert
additional pressure upon Iran and make it give a positive answer to the June proposals.
However, in practice these actions could not but provoke Tehran to further sharpen its
statements as it was impossible for the Iranian leadership to demonstrate its weakness
at this conjuncture.
As would be expected by August 31 Iran did not cease its uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing activity. In its long-awaited answer, made as promised in the
end of August, Tehran declared its consent to start negotiations but without any
SUHOLPLQDU\FRQGLWLRQV,QIDFW WKLV PHDQWDQ,UDQLDQ ³QR´ ERWKWRWKH-XQHSURSRVDOV
and the UN Resolution 1696.
The adoption of Resolution 1696 had radically changed the international situation
around the Iranian nuclear program. The refusal to implement this resolution meant that
Iran was violating the norms of international law, as implementation of UN Security
Council decisions is obligatory for all member-states of the organization. A separate
restrictive international regime was being created around Iran, which banned Tehran
from carrying out the peaceful nuclear activities allowed in all other countries. And,
most importantly, Russia and China who tried to avoid tough measures against Tehran
ZHUHIDFLQJDVHULRXVGLOHPPD(LWKHUWKH\KDGWRLJQRUH,UDQ¶VYLRODWLRQVRIWKH81
SC resolutions supported by Moscow and Beijing thus undermining themselves the
authority of the institution within which China and Russia enjoyed exceptional rights;
RUIRUWKHVDNHRIPDLQWDLQLQJWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VVWDWXVDVWKHNH\LQWHUQDWLRQDO
forum which decided the questions of international war and peace, both countries had
to agree to adopt more and more tough resolutions against Iran thus undermining their
own important regional and economic interests.
Clearly, such a situation suited the United States quite well. Iran was put under
increasingly heavy international pressure exerted through the UN as well, which
HQMR\HG JUHDW DXWKRULW\ DPRQJ WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG (XURSHDQ DOOLHV ,UDQ¶V
systematic violations of the Security Council resolutions allowed Washington to
demand the adoption of more restrictive resolutions including those implying the use of
military force. If the Security Council refused to adopt such resolutions the United
States could still count on the broader international support for potential unilateral
operation against Iran, in case America would seek to bypass the United Nations. The
involvement of China and Russia in this process would prevent both countries from
using the large Iranian resource for the attainment of regional and economic goals and
would limit their influence in Iran and Asia.
$OO WKHVH GLOHPPDV DSSHDUHG DOUHDG\ LQ DXWXPQ  ZKHQ WKH VL[ FRXQWULHV¶
JURXSZDVIRUFHGWRGLVFXVVWKHPHDVXUHVLQUHVSRQVHWR7HKUDQ¶VUHIXVDOWRLPSOHPHQW
the 1696 Resolution. The USA and some European countries insisted on relatively
harder measures whereas Russia and China supported a milder option though, for the
 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution 111

sake of UN prestige, they were not contesting the necessity of such measures. After the
many-month diplomatic marathon, on December 23 the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1737 in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The document
banned the delivery of technology and equipment for uranium enrichment, plutonium
reprocessing and construction of the heavy-water reactor to Iran. At the same time, the
sanctions did not cover the Bushehr project. Iran was also allowed to import weapons
and prohibited from exporting them. The sanctions were also imposed on certain
persons in the Iranian politico-military leadership connected to the nuclear program.
They were forbidden to go abroad and their foreign accounts had to be frozen.

Conclusions

The present approach to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem has few chances
for success. This is determined both by the internal political situation in Iran and
insufficiently balanced frameworks of the international approach to its solution.
The situation in Iran is characterized by deep differences between the
representatives of the clerical and secular elites. President Ahmadinejad, elected on the
ZDYH RI WKH SHRSOH¶V GLVFRQWHQW, does not possess the full power and is forced to
compete with the conservative clergy. For this purpose, he broadly uses radical rhetoric
to strengthen his positions in the electoral sector that is loyal to the Islamic regime. In
these conditions, the moderate conservatives who seek compromise on the nuclear
program have a very limited freedom of maneuver and hesitate to openly oppose the
SUHVLGHQW¶VWRXJKIRUHLJQSROLF\FRXUVH7KHRQJRLQJILJKWIRUSRZHUSUHYHQWVGLIIHUHQW
factions within the Iranian leadership from achieving consent on various key issues
including those aspects of the nuclear activities which arouse the international
FRPPXQLW\¶VFRQFHUQ
The international diplomatic situation around the Iranian nuclear program can be
characterized as a policy without a stick or carrot. The sudden weakening of the
American position in the world after the unsuccessful attempts to stabilize the situation
in Iraq and, to the lesser degree, in Afghanistan, allows the Iranian leadership to doubt
that Washington would decide to start another regime change operation. The limited air
strikes may, on the contrary, encourage the population to consolidate around the
present regime and therefore they should not be feared. It appears that Tehran also
regards the comprehensive economic sanctions as unlikely. In the situation of high
world prices on oil ± the main item of Iranian export ± the introduction of an oil
embargo against Iran seems highly unlikely as well. Such a step would cause another
increase in prices and could seriously undermine the economies of Western states who
buy the main part of the imported oil from Iran. At the same time, the restrictive
resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council have very little impact on the economy
and everyday life in Iran.
$V WR WKH ³FDUURWV´ WKH WHUPV SURSRVHG WR ,UDQ LQ LWV RZQ YLHZ KDG EHHQ
LQVXIILFLHQWULJKWIURPWKHVWDUWDQGLQGXHFRXUVHEHFDPHHYHQZRUVH7HKUDQ¶VPDLQ
demands can be fulfilled by the USA. However, the United States refuses to engage in
a direct dialogue with Iranian leaders until they agree to accept the hardly
accomplishable American preliminary conditions. Within the framework of the six
FRXQWULHV¶JURXS:DVKLQJWRQDOVRPHWKRGLFDOO\GRHVHYHU\WKLQJSRVVLEOHWRUHGXFHWKH
attractiveness of the stimuli articulated by the international community for Iran.
112 A. Pikaev / Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution

Fortunately, from the technological aspect, the Iranian nuclear program does not
KDYH WKH FDSDELOLW\ WR GHYHORS D QXFOHDU H[SORVLYH V\VWHP TXLFNO\ HYHQ LI ,UDQ¶V
leadership has set this as its aim. According to the CIA assessments, Tehran would be
able to create nuclear weapons in the beginning of the next decade. Thus there are still
a couple of years for the leading global players to coordinate a more realistic policy on
Iran.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 113
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-113

Unfinished Business: The North Korean

Nuclear Weapons Program

Jonathan D. POLLACK1

Abstract. Over the course of 25 years, the U.S. and other states have employed
IRXU VHSDUDWH VWUDWHJLHV WR SUHYHQW RU LQKLELW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V SXUVXLW RI D QXFOHDU
weapons capability, none of which have yielded definitive success. The current
efforts through the Six-Party Talks (also encompassing separate bilateral
understandings between the United States and North Korea) seem likely to achieve
measurable results, especially the cappLQJ RI 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V LQYHQWRU\ RI ILVVLOH
material. But a host of larger issues remain unresolved, including the
GLVPDQWOHPHQWRI1RUWK.RUHD¶VNQRZQQXFOHDr infrastructure and (in a more long-
WHUP VHQVH WKH GLVSRVLWLRQ RI 1RUWK .RUHD¶V ZHDSRQV-related materials and
technology, fissile material inventory, and any completed weapons.

1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVGHYHORSPHQWLVDPRQJWKHORQJHVWUXQQLQJGUDPDV
LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV7KHILUVWVLJQVRI3\RQJ\DQJ¶VLQWHUHVWLQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVLn
then-secret diplomatic exchanges) date from the early 1960s, and evidence of
developing an indigenous nuclear infrastructure was first apparent in the mid-1980s.
,QLWLDOHIIRUWVWRLQKLELWRUSUHYHQWWKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUGHYHORSPHQWDOVRGDWHIURPWKH
mid-1980s. The Six-Party Talks underway in Beijing constitute the fourth distinct
strategy of the past two and a half decades to forestall nuclear weapons acquisition in
the 'HPRFUDWLF3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD (DPRK), and are thus the latest iteration in
a long policy lineage. To date, none of these strategies have achieved definitive results.
Though the current approach may yield measurable achievements in denuclearization,
there is no assurance that it will provide a solution any more lasting than previous
efforts.
$QDO\VWV GLYHUJH ZLGHO\ LQ MXGJPHQWV DERXW WKH SXUSRVHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH 1RUWK¶V
pursuit of nuclear weapons. There are three predominant schools of thought.
Depending on the favored interpretation, the effort to forestall nuclear weapons
development in the DPRK has been a partial success, an outright failure, or an illusion.
The first school argues that the DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons out of legitimate
fears for its security, but that external powers have failed to provide sufficient
inducements and assurances to convince the North to forego nuclear development. A
second school of thought asserts that the major powers have not imposed enough costs
and punishment on Pyongyang to compel the North to desist from nuclear development.
A third VFKRRORIWKRXJKWYLHZVSXUVXLWRIFRPSUHKHQVLYHGHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQDVDIRRO¶V
errand. In this latter view, pursuit of a nuclear capability reflects the deepest internal
compulsions of the North Korean system, and is not a negotiable proposition, except

1
Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, US Naval War College. All views in this paper are personal,
and should not be attributed to the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Naval War College.
114 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

fRUWDFWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRUSUHFLVHEHQHILWVWKDWGRQRWLQKLELWWKHUHJLPH¶VORQJ-term
nuclear goals.
The choices facing policy makers, however, differ from mechanistic
characterizations of North Korean behavior and intentions. No one disputes the
determination of the DPRK leadership and technical personnel to pursue nuclear
capabilities, all under acute international isolation and grievous internal privation. In
WKLVUHVSHFWWKH1RUWK¶V nuclear history bears obvious FRPSDULVRQZLWK&KLQD¶VQXFOHDU
wHDSRQV GHYHORSPHQW LQ WKH ODWH V DQG HDUO\ V  7KH '35.¶V ZHDSRQV
program did not develop by accident or serendipity. But the impulses and strategies
underlying the pursuit of nuclear weapons have shifted across the decades, thereby
affecting policy options for forestalling realization of these goals. This essay will
EULHIO\ UHYLHZ WKH 1RUWK¶V SXUVXLW RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG WKH HIIRUWV RI H[WHUQDO
powers to inhibit or reverse this process. We will then assess ongoing possibilities in
light of this nuclear history, and ask whether current efforts are likely to prove more
successful than those in the past.

1RUWK.RUHD¶VSXUVXLWRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQGIRUHLJQHIIRUWVDWUHYHUVDO

The first evidence of DPRK interest in nuclear weapons dates (albeit secretly) from the
early 1960s, though programmatic pursuit of these capabilities did not begin to emerge
until the mid-1980s, following completion of the graphite moderated 5 MW (e) reactor
at Yongbyon.2 Kim Il Sung presumably believed that the DPRK was entitled to possess
advanced capabilities to gain notional equivalence with the major powers. Kim was no
doubt mindful of U.S. nuclear weapons deployments on the Korean peninsula and of
the subsequent disclosure of a covert nuclear weapons program in the Republic of
Korea (ROK) in the 1970s. He may have anticipated or solicited direct nuclear
assistance from the Soviet Union and from China, but neither state was prepared to
LQFXUPDMRUULVNVWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKH1RUWK.RUHDQOHDGHU4XLWHDSDUWIURP.LP¶V
fears of the United States, he likely believed that nuclear weapons were the best means
to ensure that North Korea could not be controlled by any external power, including his
Soviet and Chinese allies. Any meaningful prospect of a weapons capability presumed
acquisition of civilian nuclear technologies that the Soviet Union was best able to
provide. However, Soviet officials made major enhancement of civilian nuclear
DVVLVWDQFHWRWKH1RUWKFRQWLQJHQWRQ3\RQJ\DQJ¶VUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ
Treaty (NPT)0RVFRZ¶VRIIHURIFRQGLWLRQDODVVLVWDQFHZDVWKHILUVWDWWHPSWWRLQKLELW
WKH 1RUWK¶V SRWHQWLDO QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV GHYHORSPHQW  8QGHU 6RYLHW SUHVVXUH 1RUWK
Korea signed the NPT in 1985, though it took another seven years before the DPRK
ratified safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).3

2
)RUVRPHLQLWLDOKLQWVIURPGLSORPDWLFDUFKLYHVVHH³&RQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ6RYLHWAmbassador Vasily
Moskovsky and NRUWK.RUHDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU3DUN6XQJ&K¶RO´$XJXVWLQ%DOD]V6]DORQWDLDQG
Sergey Radchenko, 1RUWK.RUHD¶V(IIRUWVWR$FTXLUH1XFOHDU7HFKQRORJ\DQG1XFOHDU:HDSRQV(YLGHQFH
from Russian and Hungarian Archives (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #53, August 2006, p. 33.
3
See, in particular the essays by Georgiy Kaurov, Valery I. Denisov, and Alexander Zhebin in James
Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (eds.), The North Korean Nuclear Program-Security, Strategy, and
New Perspectives from Russia (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 15-20, 21-26, and 27-37,
UHVSHFWLYHO\DQG5RODQG7LPHUEDHY³7KH,$($6DIHJXDUGV-Dµ&UDVK7HVW¶´LQ$OH[HLArbatov (ed.), At the
Nuclear Threshold-The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (Moscow:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 59-61.
 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 115

These agreements were in jeopardy almost from the time the ink was dry. In the
,$($¶VLQLWLDOYLVLWVWRWKH1RUWKLQWKHHDUO\V$JHQF\SHUVRQQHOZHUHQRWDEOHWR
resolve major GLVFUHSDQFLHVLQWKH1RUWK¶VFODLPVUHODWHGWRWKHRSHUDWLRQRILWVJUDSKLWH
moderated reactor and associated facilities. 4 The North refused to allow IAEA
inspectors unrestricted access to various suspect sites, and in March 1993 Pyongyang
announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In response, the United States
(having initially weighed highly coercive military options) developed a second
denuclearization strategy, congruent with NPT goals but negotiated bilaterally with the
DPRK. This led to a U.S.-North Korea accord (the Agreed Framework) that froze the
1RUWK¶V SOXWRQLXP-based weapons program for eight years, in exchange for various
inducements and assistance provided by the United States and other parties, primarily
the ROK and Japan.5
The Agreed Framework ultimately foundered and then collapsed in the fall of 2002,
when the United States accused the North of undertaking a covert highly enriched
uranium program, which if fully realized would have provided Pyongyang with an
alternative source of fissile material, thereby enabling it to circumvent the constraints
imposed under the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration decided to halt its
heavy fuel oil deliveries to the North, and announced suspension and ultimate cessation
of plans to construct two replacement light water reactors (LWRs) under the auspices
of the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In response, the
DPRK abruptly withdrew from the NPT and the IAEA; unsealed its frozen facilities;
restarted its long-dormant reactor; and reprocessed the spent fuel rods that had been in
storage at Yongbyon, thereby moving the North much closer to a realized weapons
capability.6
,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH1RUWK¶VDFWLRQVWKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQLQLWVILUVWWHUPRSWHG
for a third strategy. The administration sought to raise the costs to the North for its
weapons development, and to deny the North any presumptive claims to legitimacy as
a negotiating partner outside the NPT. Washington demanded the complete, verifiable,
irreversible dLVPDQWOHPHQW&9,'RIDOOWKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDFWLYLWLHVEHIRUH
the United States would even consider proffering renewed assistance to the North. The
United States also refused to agree to any bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang,
though it did consent to trilateral discussions arranged under Chinese auspices in the
VSULQJRI:LWK&KLQD¶VH[WHQVLYHLQYROYHPHQWDQGIDFLOLWDWLRQWKHVHSUHOLPLQDU\
discussions were then expanded into Six-Party Talks that opened in Beijing in the
summer of 2003. However, for the next several years, these discussions were episodic,
highly predictable, and singularly unproductive. They provided an arena for diplomatic
interaction, but without undertaking meaningful negotiation. Unlike the Agreed
Framework, the U.S. approach was no longer inducement-based, nor was there an
authoritative bilateral channel for discussions between Washington and Pyongyang.
5DWKHUWKDQLQKLELWLQJWKH1RUWK¶s nuclear development, U.S. policy provided the
DPRK with a rationale to justify its renewed pursuit of a weapons capability. As the
Six-Party Talks proceeded fitfully and unproductively, North Korea steadily
4
For a detailed examination, see David Albright and KeviQ2¶1HLOOHGVSolving the North Korean
Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000).
5
Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical-The First North Korean
Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
6
-RQDWKDQ'3ROODFN³7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV1RUWK.RUHDDQGWKH(QGRIWKH$JUHHG)UDPHZRUN´ Naval
War College Review, Vol. LVI, Number 3, Summer 2003, pp. 11-49; and Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula
Question-A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2007).
116 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

augmented its inventory of fissile material and explicitly declared that it was moving
WRZDUGD³SK\VLFDOGHWHUUHQW´Flaiming possession of nuclear weapons for the first time
in February 2005. All six parties assented to an ³LQ SULQFLSOH´ DJUHHPHQW RQ
denuclearization in September 2005, but a range of policy disputes and diplomatic
impediments stalled any additional progress for well over a year.7 The North persisted
ZLWKLWV ZHDSRQVGHYHORSPHQW FXOPLQDWLQJLQWKH '35.¶VILUVWQXFOHDU detonation in
2FWREHU   3\RQJ\DQJ¶V accumulation of separated plutonium was equally
significant, since it provided the essential building blocks to operationalize a nuclear
ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLW\   $ GHWDLOHG HIIRUW WR HVWLPDWH WKH 1RUWK¶V SOXWRQLXP LQYHQWRU\
SXEOLVKHGE\'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQLQHDUO\HVWLPDWHGWKH'35.¶V
extant stockpile at between 46 and 64 kg, with between 28-50 kg in fully separated
form and available for weapons fabrication. Depending on assumptions about the
amount of fissile material required for weapons fabrication, Albright and Brannan
concluded that the DPRK has sufficient separated plutonium for five to twelve
ZHDSRQV  7KLV ZHDSRQV SRWHQWLDO ZDV DWWULEXWDEOH DOPRVW HQWLUHO\ WR WKH 1RUWK¶V
breakout from the Agreed Framework constraints. 8
The fourth denuclearization strategy developed in the aftermath of the abject
failure of the compellant apSURDFKSXUVXHGGXULQJ3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VILUVWWHUPLQRIILFH
Some U.S. officials (notably, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
$IIDLUV &KULVWRSKHU +LOO DUJXHG WKDW FDSSLQJ WKH 1RUWK¶V H[WDQW SOXWRQLXP LQYHQWRU\
was more important than insisting on an immediate and unconditional end to all the
1RUWK¶V QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DFWLYLWLHV 7KH IRXUWK VWUDWHJ\ OHG WR WKH ILUVW PHDQLQJIXO
negotiated breakthroughs since the Agreed Framework deliberations of 1993-94,
building on the September 2005 agreement and signed by all participants in the Beijing
WDONV LQ )HEUXDU\ DQG 2FWREHU   7KLV DSSURDFK DVVXPHG WKDW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
nuclear test was not an irrevocable decision. Rather, the fourth strategy posited that a
step-by-step process would enable tKH 1RUWK¶V HIIRUWV WR EH VORZHG DQG XOWLPDWHO\
reversed.

Current approach and prospects

The current approach nominally represents an agreement among all six parties, but the
accords are also premised on bilateral understandings between the United States and
the DPRK. Pyongyang had long sought such bilateral negotiations with the United
States. Though reminiscent of the Agreed Framework, the outcomes to date have been
different. Embedded bilateral negotiations have advanced a multilateral diplomatic
process involving China, the ROK, Russia, and Japan as well as the United States and
the DPRK. The regional negotiations are focused on the six-decade abnormality in the
'35.¶VUHODWLRQVKLS with the United States, the ROK, and Japan, and the absence of a
longer-term framework governing political and security relations on the Korean
peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The essence of the recent agreements is

7
³-RLQW6WDWHPHQWRIWKH)RXUWK5RXQGRIWKH6L[-3DUW\7DONV´%HLMLQJ6HSWHPEHU
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm.
8
'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQ³7KH1RUWK.RUHDQ3OXWRQLXP6WRFN)HEUXDU\´
(Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 20 February 2007). For a reassessment in
OLJKWRIWKH1RUWK¶VUHSRUWHGGLVFORVXUHVWR86RIILFLDOVVHH'DYLG$OEULJKW3DXO%UDQQDQDQG-DFTXHOLQH
6KLUH³1RUWK.RUHD¶V3OXWRQLXP'HFODUDWLRQ$6WDUWLQJ3RLQWIRUDQ,QLWLDO9HULILFDWLRQ3URFHVV´
(Washington, DC: The Institute for Science and International Security, January 10, 2008).
 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 117

two-IROG  )LUVW WKHUH LV DQ ³DFWLRQ IRU DFWLRQ´ SURFHVV ZKHUHE\ WKH UHOHYDQW SDUWLHV
(especially Washington and Pyongyang) undertake parallel steps as various milestones
are met. These include the provision of heavy fuel oil to the North in conjunction with
the DPRK first shuttering and then disabling the reactor, reprocessing facility, and fuel
fabrication plant at Yongbyon, as well as Pyongyang providing a full accounting of its
past and current nuclear activities.9 In exchange for these measures, the United States
pledged various assurances and political measures in addition to various multilateral
forms of economic compensation to the North. Separate working groups addressing
1RUWK .RUHD¶V HQGXULQJ HVWUDQJHPHQW IURP WKH RXWVLGH ZRUOG KDYH also been
established, with these efforts moving forward as specified milestones in
denuclearization proceed.
Assuming that the fourth strategy is sustained, it fulfills various requirements that
earlier approaches did not. The process is addressing three irreducible expectations in
1RUWK .RUHD¶V negotiations with the outside world, and especially with the United
States: compensation, validation, and assurance. In addition to specific assistance such
as heavy fuel oil shipments, the symbolic value of these agreements for the North
VKRXOGQRWEHGLVFRXQWHG86SOHGJHVWR³EHJLQWKHSURFHVVRIUHPRYLQJWKH'35.¶V
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and advancing the process of terminating the
DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH 7UDGLQJ ZLWK WKH (QHP\ $FW ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH '35.´ DVVXPH
intrinsic significance to Pyongyang, even if neither designation is related to the NoUWK¶V
nuclear activities.
At the same time, however, these accords obligate the DPRK to actions to which it
KDG EHHQ SUHYLRXVO\ XQZLOOLQJ WR FRPPLW  7KH ³GHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQ DFWLRQ SODQ´ RI
)HEUXDU\UHTXLUHGWKH 1RUWKWR³VKXWGRZQDQGVHDOIRUWKHSXUSose of eventual
DEDQGRQPHQWWKH<RQJE\RQ QXFOHDU IDFLOLW\´DQGWRHQDEOH,$($ SHUVRQQHOWRDJDLQ
PRQLWRU DQG YHULI\ WKH 1RUWK¶V FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK LWV FRPPLWPHQWV  7KHVH PHDVXUHV
ZHUH FRPSOHWHG GXULQJ WKH VXPPHU RI   7KH ³VHFRQG SKDVH DFWLRQ SODQ´ RI
OFWREHU  REOLJDWHV WKH 1RUWK WR ³GLVDEOH DOO H[LVWLQJ QXFOHDU IDFLOLWLHV´ DW
Yongbyon (i.e., the 5 MW (e) reactor, the reprocessing plant, and fuel rod fabrication
facility), with the United States directly involved in this process; the DPRK also had to
SURYLGH ³D FRPSOHWH DQG FRUUHFW GHFODUDWLRQ RI DOO LWV QXFOHDU SURJUDPV´ 7KHVH
disablement and disclosure commitments were to be completed no later than 31
December 2007, but these milestones were not met by the specified date. These
obligations and procedures remain under intensive negotiation in mid-2008, and there
has been undoubted forward movement, if not yet comprehensive fulfillment. The
'35. DOVR ³UHDIILUPHG LWV FRPPLWPHQW QRW WR WUDQVIHU QXFOHDU PDWHULDOV QXFOHDU
technology, or nuclear know-hoZ´,IIXOO\UHDOL]HGWKHVHPHDVXUHVZRXOGPHDVXUDEO\
LQKLELW WKH '35.¶V FDSDFLW\ WR H[SDQG LWV QXFOHDU SRWHQWLDO DQG ZHDSRQV LQYHQWRU\
beyond what it currently possesses.
There is also a more cautionary view of these agreements. Foreign technical
specialists who have visited the Yongbyon nuclear complex have remarked on the
IDFLOLW\¶V RXWULJKW GLVUHSDLU VHHPLQJO\ H[WHQGLQJ WR PDMRUHQYLURQPHQWDO GDPDJH and
related risks to the safety and well-being of technical personnel. 10 7KH 1RUWK¶V

9
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www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htmDQG³6L[-Party Talks-Second Phase Actions for the
,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH6HSWHPEHU-RLQW6WDWHPHQW´2FWREHU
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93217.htm.
10
For a detailed assessment prepared by a prominent U.S. expert who has visited Yongbyon on multiple
RFFDVLRQVVHH6LHJIULHG6+HFNHU³5HSRUWRI9LVLWWRWKH'HPRFUDWLF3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI1RUWK>VLF@1RUWK
118 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

leadership may have well have concluded that Yongbyon was a diminishing asset or
even a liability; closing the facility may have been judged a prudent step that would in
turn generate significant political, energy, and financial benefits for the DPRK. But
Yongbyon remains WKH 1RUWK¶V RQO\ NQRZQ PHDQV WR SURGXFH ILVVLOH PDWHULDO IRU LWV
weapons program. Shuttering, disabling and ultimately dismantling the facility would
UHGXFHKLJKHUHQGHVWLPDWHVRIWKH1RUWK¶VSURVSHFWLYHQXFOHDUFDSDELOLWLHV 11
In an earlier publication, the author hypothesized three alternative nuclear
scenarios to 2015, posed more in qualitative than in quantitative terms: (1) a largely
V\PEROLFRU³SROLWLFDO´QXFOHDUIRUFHDQRSHUDWLRQDOO\RULHQWHGIRUFHZLWKDFUHGLEOH
means of delivery; and (3) a deficient or failed effort to achieve an operational
capability.12 A program capped at six to twelve weapons is smaller than what the North
could achieve in the absence of binding, verifiable constraints on fissile material
production. But it remains highly worrisome for regional security and in relation to
non-proliferation objectives. To be sure, little is known or understood about how the
DPRK views its deterrent options, or how it conceptualizes nuclear doctrine. It is
entirely possible that Pyongyang has yet to give serious thought to this issue. But (as
argued by Siegfried Hecker) it now VHHPV YLUWXDOO\ LQGLVSXWDEOH WKDW ³WKH '35.
leadership has made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the
United States and the other four parties live up to their October 3, 2007
FRPPLWPHQWV´ 13 A political deterrent force (especially in the absence of additional
nuclear tests) has inherent limits, and might under some conditions be valued less as a
FRUHFRPSRQHQWLQWKH1RUWK¶VORQJHU-term national defense strategy. But even a fully
implemented second phase action plan leaves wholly unaddressed the disposition of the
1RUWK¶VSOXWRQLXPLQYHQWRU\DQGRILWVDFWXDOQXFOHDUZHDSRQV
The negotiating process has also entailed differences over the details of
disablement and disclosure. Earlier hints from U.S. negotiators suggested that the
North could undertake specific actions at Yongbyon to render these facilities
inoperative and dysfunctional, perhaps permanently. More detailed technical
assessments, presumably drawing from the evaluations and observations of U.S.
personnel directly involved in the disablement process, suggest that it would take as
ORQJ DV  PRQWKV ³WR UHVWDUW DOO IDFLOLWLHV´ DVVXPLQJ D GHFLVLRQ ZDV PDGH WR DJDLQ
resume operations.14 This outcome falls short of irreversibility, though any effort by
the DPRK to reverse course and restart the facility would entail major political and
technical costs.15 Additional technical assessments by Siegfried Hecker (derived from
multiple site visits) impart the highly complex technical and procedural issues
accompanying the disablement process. In retrospect, the original target date of 31
December 2007 was in all likelihood an overly ambitious target, but such a goal does
seem feasible by the end of 2008.
1RUWK .RUHD¶V REOLJDWLRQ WR provide ³D FRPSOHWH DQG DFFXUDWH GHFODUDWLRQ RI LWV
nucleaUSURJUDPV´KDVSURYHQSDUWLFXODUO\QHWWOHVRPHDQG1RUWK.RUHDQGLVFORVXUHVRI

Korea (DPRK), Pyongyang and the Nuclear &HQWHUDW<RQJE\RQ´6WDQIRUG8QLYHUVLW\&HQWHUIRU

International Security and Cooperation, 12-16 February 2008.
11
For an estimate that posited QRQHJRWLDWHGUHVWUDLQWVRQWKHSURJUDPVHH-RQDWKDQ'3ROODFN³1RUWK
.RUHD¶V1XFOHDU:HDSRQV3URJUDPWR7KUHH6FHQDULRV´Asia Policy, Number 3, January 2007, pp.
105-123.
12
Ibid.
13
Hecker, Note 10, p. 1.
14
Hecker, Note 10, p. 6.
15
'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQ³'LVDEOLQJ'35.1XFOHDU)DFLOLWLHV´:Dshington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, 5 October 2007).
 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 119

WKH '35.¶V ILVVLOH PDWHULDO LQYHQWRU\ UHPDLQ WR EH YHULILHG  %XW the negotiating
process continues to progress, albeit in fits and starts. In May 2008, the DPRK
provided U.S. diplomats with approximately 18,000 pages of documentation on the
operating records of the Yongbyon complex. These records dating from as early as
1986, when the reactor began operations. Once fully reviewed, these materials should
HQDEOHPRUHVDWLVIDFWRU\UHFRQFLOLDWLRQRIYDULRXVHVWLPDWHVRIWKH'35.¶VWRWDOILVVLOH
material production, including the claims provided by North Korean officials. 16 These
data do not include physical samples from the Yongbyon facility upon which a more
FRPSUHKHQVLYH HYDOXDWLRQ ZRXOG GHSHQG EXW WKH 1RUWK¶V DFWLRQV HQWDLO IDU IXOOHU
provision of information than the DPRK has heretofore allowed.
The United States has aOVR VRXJKW IXOO GLVFORVXUH DERXW WKH 1RUWK¶V SDVW QXFOHDU
activities, including prior U.S. allegations about a covert uranium enrichment program
that were the proximate cause for the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in late 2002.
U.S. intelligence officials now seem far less confident in their judgments about these
HDUOLHUDFWLYLWLHVZKLFKIRFXVKHDYLO\RQWKH1RUWK¶VDOOHJHGSXUFKDVHVRIPDWHULDOVDQG
technologies through the A.Q. Khan network. After rounds of bilateral talks in Geneva,
Singapore, and Pyongyang during early 2008, the United States and North Korea have
reached agreement on a bifurcated disclosure process. These understandings appear to
meet U.S. expectations that Pyongyang acknowledge its past exploration of enrichment
options and separDWHDOOHJDWLRQVDERXW3\RQJ\DQJ¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI
a nuclear reactor by Syria, destroyed in a Israeli air attack during September 2007. 17
Assuming satisfactory fulfillment of the phase two action plan, what happens next?
The Six-Party accords of February and October 2007 make no reference either to
QXFOHDUZHDSRQVRUWRWKHGLVSRVLWLRQRIWKH1RUWK¶VSOXWRQLXPLQYHQWRU\DQGDQ\RWKHU
weapons-related technologies and materials. Prior diplomatic interactions with the
North suggests that all parties should anticipate ±even in an optimistic scenario²a very
protracted negotiation. The North will likely seek to determine the ultimate value that
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGRWKHUVDWWDFKWRWKHGHILQLWLYHHOLPLQDWLRQRIWKH1RUWK¶VZHDSRQV
capabilities and weapons potential. Unlike the 1994 agreement, a new accord would
presuppose a leveraged buyout, not a long-term rental. There is every reason to believe
WKDW WKH 1RUWK¶V SULFH ZLOO EH IDU KLJKHU WKDQ DW WKH WLPH RI WKH QHJRWLDWLRQ RI WKH
Agreed Framework.
Is there a market-clearing price that North Korea would deem sufficient and the
United States and others would consider acceptable? The answer is far from clear and
(in all likelihood) has yet to be broached in any negotiations. Though Pyongyang has
somewhat soft-pedaled its claims to status as a nuclear-armed state, these claims have
not wholly disappeared. There have also been periodic reports that North Korean
negotiators have told U.S. counterparts that the DPRK seeks a nuclear status from the
United States not unlike what Washington has accorded India, which is demonstrably
unacceptable to American negotiators. All senior U.S. policy makers, including
President Bush, have repeatedly emphasized that full normalization of U.S.-DPRK
relations presuppose a definitive end to the North Korean nuclear program. But even
though North Korean expectations seem wholly unrealistic, they beg an additional
issue: if the United States deems the market price demanded by the North for its
nuclear commodities as excessive, does this imply a price that Washington is

16
Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 10 May 2008.
17
*OHQQ.HVVOHU³861.RUHD7R:RUN7RZDUG(QGLQJ:HDSRQV,PSDVVH´Washington Post, 12
March 2008; idem, ³1.RUHD$JUHHVWR%ORZ8S7RZHUDW,WV1XFOHDU)DFLOLW\´ibid., 2 May 2008.
120 J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

unprepared to pay? And if this should leave North Korea with an intact nuclear
weapons capability, what then?
To be sure, numerous statements from authoritative DPRK sources suggest a
different long-term outcome. In the prevailing characterization of North Korean policy
PDNHUV WKH WHVWLQJ RI D QXFOHDU GHYLFH ZDV VWULFWO\ D ³GHIHQVLYH FRXQWHUPHDVXUH´
North Korean officials have made repeated UHIHUHQFHWR.LP,O6XQJ¶Vsupposed dying
wish for the North to forgo a nuclear weapons capability. The imprimatur on such
instructions should not be discounted. But what meaning should be attached to Kim Il
6XQJ¶VVXpposed testament, and how could the United States test this proposition?
North Korea repeateGO\DVVHUWVWKDW ³KRVWLOHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKH '35.DQGWKH
8QLWHG6WDWHV>DUH@WKH URRWFDXVH RIWKHQXFOHDULVVXH RQWKH.RUHDQSHQLQVXOD´,Q
North Korean characterizations, the technical specifics of disabling or dismantlement
are secondary to more fundamental political considerations between Washington and
Pyongyang. 18 There is an explicit parallelism in the maximal expectations of the
United States and North Korea. The United States insists that the North must make a
³VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQ´WRHOLPinate its nuclear weapons program; the North insists that the
8QLWHG 6WDWHV PXVW PDNH D ³VWUDWHJLF GHFLVLRQ´ WR FHDVH LWV ³KRVWLOH SROLF\´ ZLWKRXW
which denuclearization will be impossible. These statements for the record may impart
a longer term vision from the respective vantage points of both states. But they tell us
little about how to get from here to there, and such statements are almost infinitely
elastic. This leaves the two states free to test and explore, assuming that both are
prepared to entertain serious discussions.
The United States and the other participants in the Six-Party Talks have concluded
that there is no credible alternative to negotiations with Pyongyang, if the extant
nuclear dangers on the peninsula are to be capped, if not wholly eliminated. But are all
parties able to conceptualize a denuclearized peninsula that can be negotiated with the
current DPRK regime, one that has achieved a nuclear capability at such extraordinary
cost over the decades? Are the U.S. and others seeking largely to buy time in the
expectation of a longer-term transition to a different leadership that does not see its
fundamental identity and security interests deriving from nuclear weapons? Or are
there imaginable circumstances where Kim Jong Il would be prepared to definitively
forgo the capabilities that he and others have pursued so single mindedly? Indeed, the
LVVXHRIWKH1RUWK¶VYLDELOLW\DQGORQJ-term future hovers over this entire process. In
the final analysis, all involved parties confront more question marks than answers, with
all the attendant risks for the peace and well-being of the peninsula and of Northeast
Asia and for the future of non-proliferation as a whole.

18
For a detailed exposition of this argument, consult Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, Policy in
Context-Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007 (Stanford: Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, January 2008).
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 121
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-121

Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons

Yair EVRON1

Abstract. ,VUDHO¶VDPELJXRXVQXFOHDUSRVWXUHLVEDVLFDOO\DGLSORPDWLFILFWLRQEXW
it signals self restraint and caution. The main purpose of the Israeli nuclear image
has been deterrence; however, the policy has not in fact deterred armed violence
against the state, and it was only a secondary factor in inducing Arab regimes to
seek peace. The policy has not contributed significantly to regional stability, but
nor has it been a major factor in fostering instability. Currently, the probability of
situations requiring the actual exercise of Israeli nuclear deterrence is extremely
low. Iranian nuclearization will create a very different strategic environment, but
whether Israel will have to change its ambiguous posture as a result remains to be
seen.

Main Characteristics of the Israeli Nuclear Posture 2

Perception of Existential Threat

When Israel decided in the late 1950s on the development of a nuclear option, its
leadership perceived a continued existential threat. In addition, learning from the
outcomes of the Sinai Campaign (the Israeli part of the 1956 Suez campaign), the
leadership concluded that Israel cannot translate military victories into political
achievements. Israel therefore searched for a decisive deterrent against any future all-
out war.

Ambiguous Posture3

Due to the particular manner in which the nuclear project developed, the American and
international reactions, the internal opposition voiced by part of the Israeli political and
strategic leadership, and concern about Arab reactions, Israel adopted an ambiguous
nuclear posture. The ambiguity was not a calculated policy, but rather the result of a
gradual development under these particular constraints. Ultimately, the ambiguous
posture proved to be very successful in mitigating various counterproductive effects.
Because of the volume of international news and data on the Israeli nuclear capability
that has appeared over time, part of the opacity surrounding the project has been eroded.
As a result, there are currently no doubts internationally concerning the existence of a
capability comprising both the warheads and various delivery systems. However,
official details about these capabilities are still not in the public domain. Currently, the
ambiguous posture is basically a diplomatic fiction, in that Israel does not officially

1
Professor of International Relations and Tel Aviv University
2
For studies of the Israeli nuclear posture see inter alia Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994); Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press).
3
Ibid., See also Yair Evron ,"Israel and the Atom: The Uses and Misuses of Ambiguity," Orbis, 1974.
122 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons

recognize the existence of its nuclear capability and refrains from providing official
details about it. Israel also adheres to some basic understandings with the United States
regarding its nuclear behavior.
However, the posture of ambiguity is still an important one in several respects.
There is considerable difference between an explicit nuclear doctrine (and declared
deployment) and a posture of ambiguity. In addition, the posture of ambiguity also
signals self restraint and caution.

Tradition of Responsible Behavior

Over the years, Israel has faced several very serious security challenges. While from
time to time the nuclear factor was referred to implicitly, there was nevertheless a
deliberate policy of avoidance of relying on explicit nuclear deterrent threats. The only
time ± during the 1973 War, under conditions of great stress ± that the possibility of an
explicit nuclear threat was raised in internal debate, the Israeli "kitchen Cabinet"
rejected it.4
At the same time, continued efforts should be invested in "socializing" the Israeli
leadership and public in the intricacies of nuclear affairs and the need for control and
restraint.

Avoidance of Nuclear Coercive Diplomacy

One of the more dangerous uses of nuclear diplomacy (and historically in the
superpowers' context, also not effective) is political coercion, namely, the use of
nuclear threats in order to secure political objectives. Israel has avoided this tactic, and
in fact, precisely because of its relative regional political isolation (which has gradually
been changing) its ability to resort to nuclear coercion is inherently much more
constrained than that of other regional powers.

Effects on Deterrence ± A Brief Historical Account 5

The main purpose of the Israeli nuclear factor has been deterrence. However, an
account of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict does not suggest that the nuclear
image of Israel has indeed deterred armed violence against it. Of the five Arab-Israeli
wars, (not counting the 1969-70 War of Attrition and the 2006 Lebanon War) two ± the
1973 War and the Lebanon war of 1982 ± took place after it could have been assumed
by Arab leaders that Israel already had a nuclear capability. Since Israel initiated the
1982 Lebanon War, the relevant case of Israeli deterrence is the 1973 War.
Generally speaking, the outbreak of the war demonstrated the failure of Israeli
deterrence. It appears reasonable to assume that if Arab strategists made the "worst
case analysis," they should have considered the possibility of an Israeli nuclear reaction.
Whatever their analysis, the Israeli nuclear deterrent was not successful. Various
observers and analysts have suggested that the image of an Israeli nuclear capability
4
Seymour Hersh in The Samson Option (Faber & Faber, 1991), claims that Israel decided on nuclear
signaling in 1973 and this affected Egyptian behavior. I disagree with him. See Evron Israel's Nuclear
Dilemma.
5
See Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land (Michigan University Press, 2006); Evron, Israel's Nuclear
Dilemma.
 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons 123

did affect Egyptian and Syrian behavior during the war by inducing them to conduct a
limited war. However, an analysis of the war 6 demonstrates that the Egyptian and
Syrian strategic leaderships conducted a limited war because of their perception of
Israel's conventional superiority and not because of concern about a possible Israeli
nuclear capability.
Since the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement of 1979, the absence of Arab-initiated
wars against Israel has not been due to the existence of the Israeli nuclear deterrent but
rather to: a lack of concerted Arab interest in initiating a general war (due to Egypt's
and Jordan's lack of political interest therein); the political process between the sides;
and Israel's conventional capabilities.
While general wars were not launched against Israel, low-level violence (in
Lebanon and the Palestinian territories) occurred on a large scale. However, nuclear
deterrence is irrelevant to this level of war. This type of deterrence was also not
relevant to the Iraqi launching of surface-to-surface missiles armed with conventional
warheads against Israel in 1991.

Nuclear Weapons and the Peace Process

It has been argued that Israel's nuclear image was a determining factor in inducing
Arab regimes to seek peace with Israel. The evidence on that is not clear. The key to
the peace process was the Israeli-Egyptian dialogue from 1977-79 culminating with the
peace treaty. It appears that the two main factors that contributed to it from the
Egyptian side were the Egyptian realization of Israel's military victory in 1973 (though
after the initial Egyptian military success and difficult combat for both sides) and
Israel's readiness to return the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. Additional factors were
the weakening of pan-Arabism, Egyptian willingness to reorient politically towards the
US, and major Egyptian economic considerations. The nuclear factor might have
played a role as well but most probably only as a secondary factor.
The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement of 1994 had nothing to do with Israel's
nuclear capability. Israeli-Jordanian relations have long been characterized by the
understandings of both states of some important shared or coincidental strategic
interests. The actual formal peace came after a long period beginning in the mid 1970s
of peaceful coexistence and even cooperation in various areas, and ultimately became
possible with the beginning of the Oslo process.
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process beginning in 1993 had nothing to do with
Israel's nuclear capability.
Notwithstanding the existence of Israel's nuclear capability, Syria has continuously
refused to reach a peace agreement with Israel unless the latter agreed to return the
Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty. The political factor was thus the critical one in
Syria's position vis-à-vis Israel. At the same time, Syria has refrained from initiating
hostilities against Israel due to Israel's clear conventional superiority.
Finally, it is likely that the existence of Israel's nuclear capability is an additional
factor in various Arab leaderships' assessments of the costs/benefits involved in a
continued conflict with Israel. It could also serve as one of the arguments by Arab
leaders vis-à-vis extreme sectors within the populations calling for abrogation of peace
agreements and the overall peace process.

6
Ibid.
124 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons

The previous discussion on deterrence and the peace process leads to the
conclusion that Israel's nuclear posture has not contributed significantly to regional
stability. It has neither deterred wars, nor has it ± by itself ± led to the peace process. In
all, the basic and most fundamental regional developments occurred without any
reference to the nuclear factor.

Instability

There is a series of arguments that Israel's nuclear developments contributed to regional

instability. This relates primarily to two issues: further regional proliferation and the
outbreak of wars.

Nuclear proliferation

One of the recurrent themes in the debate about the possible effects of proliferation has
been the "chain reaction effect" namely, that states would "go nuclear" as a response to
adversaries' nuclearization. Since Egypt was the leading foe of Israel until the 1970s, its
expected reaction to Israel's nuclearization would have been a response in kind. In fact
however, Egypt, out of a combination of rational reasons, declined to invest its efforts
in a nuclear weapons project. The Iraqi nuclear effort might have been partly motivated
by the Israeli capability, but probably more so by several other factors: hegemonic
ambitions in the Gulf and the Middle East in general; the ongoing conflict with Iran,
and a belief that nuclear development is a key to overall modernization and regional
prestige.
The Iranian nuclear effort is motivated by a mix of threat perceptions and
aggressive foreign policy ambitions. The main security concerns that actually led to the
project were the war with Iraq and concern about Iraqi nuclear developments.
Following that was the concern as to American intentions. Altogether, Iran finds itself
in an environment in which several nuclear powers operate: the US, Israel, Russia, and
Pakistan. For Iran therefore, the Israeli nuclear capability is only part of a larger set of
security concerns. In addition, the fundamentalist regime in Tehran pursues an
aggressive foreign policy and clearly seeks a hegemonic position in the Gulf area and
possibly beyond it.
This account does not invalidate the general "chain reaction" argument. It does,
however, suggest that it should always be considered within the specific historical
context.

Triggering War

From the mid 1960s, the Israeli nuclear project became a subject of debate and concern
in Egypt (and to a lesser extent in Syria). President Nasser raised the possibility of
preventive war designed to destroy the Dimona complex. Several analyses of the 1967
crisis have suggested that one of the main reasons for the Egyptian escalatory moves
was the desire to destroy Dimona, or to force Israel by diplomatic means to abandon
the nuclear project. A recent study, Foxbats over Dimona,7 has even argued that the
war was planned by the USSR with the main objective of destroying the Israeli nuclear

7
See G. Remez , E. Ginor, Foxbats over Dimona, Yale University Press, 2007. 
 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons 125

project and that Soviet forces were deployed for an attack on Israel. If indeed this was
the case, then Dimona caused a major crisis and, in turn, a war.
However, a careful analysis of the crisis and its causes suggests that the roots of
the crisis were very different: inter-Arab competition; the Egyptian desire to correct the
results of the 1956 Sinai Campaign; escalation along the Israeli-Syrian border; and
Egyptian defense commitments to Syria. 8 Moreover, although Dimona did concern
Egypt, during the American-Egyptian diplomatic dialogue in 1965 on the Middle East
arms race, the Egyptians did not raise the issue. (It was actually the American side that
referred to it and tried to calm Egyptian concern about it). More significantly, in the
diplomatic negotiations during the 1967 crisis itself, Egypt did not raise the Israeli
nuclear development as one of the conditions for resolving the crisis. Finally, the
evidence presented in Foxbats over Dimona is clearly not persuasive and far from
substantiating its case. Thus, although Dimona caused concern in Egypt (and probably
the USSR as well), the 1967 crisis did not result from it.
Altogether, the Israeli nuclear project had only a relatively very limited impact on
either stability or instability in the region. The logic of political and strategic
developments was determined primarily by other factors.

Israel's Nuclear Doctrine

Because of the official Israeli strategy of ambiguity, no nuclear strategic doctrine has
ever been publicly articulated or presented. But indirect evidence, coupled with
observations and speculation based on rational analysis, leads to several assumptions
about it.

General Deterrence

The initial rationale for the nuclear development was deterrence of a general Arab
conventional attack constituting an existential threat. To a certain extent, this posture
could be defined analytically as part of a balance of power mechanism, but referring
only to its deterrence dimension. General deterrence does not involve direct and
specific deterrent threats.

Specific (or immediate) Deterrence

This refers to a range of possible specific crises threatening grave escalation.

Theoretically, nuclear threats could deter escalation from one level to the other.
Currently however, under conditions of Israeli conventional superiority, nuclear
deterrence is not relevant to such situations. Indeed, Israel presently enjoys "escalation
dominance" without invoking the nuclear component.

Deterrence against other types of WMD

It has been suggested that Israel's deterrent signals against the use of chemical (and
possibly biological) agents during the Gulf War of 1991 implied the counter use of

8
The literature on the 1967 War is very extensive. See Michael Oren, Six Days of War, Oxford
University Press, 2002.
126 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons

nuclear weapons, and this threat indeed deterred the said use. There is still a debate as
to what extent an implied Israeli nuclear threat indeed deterred Iraq, 9 but a mode of this
sort of Israeli deterrence has become widely perceived as part of the Israeli spectrum of
nuclear deterrence options.
There are, however, reasons why there should be a clearer distinction between the
different types of WMD and they should not be converged in one package. The most
obvious reason is that the respective effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons are very different. There might be situations in which nuclear deterrence
threats against the use of chemical and biological agents might therefore not be credible.
In addition, under conditions of wider regional nuclear proliferation the threat to
retaliate by nuclear weapons against the use of chemical and biological munitions
might increase motivation for first nuclear strikes.
Currently, the probability of situations requiring the actual exercise of Israeli
nuclear deterrence is extremely low. On the political level, Egypt and Jordan have
peaceful relations with Israel and most of the Arab countries (except possibly Syria)
have no interest in initiating hostilities against Israel. Moreover, due to many
developments, Israel maintains its conventional superiority over its potential
adversaries. Against this background, general deterrence could be based primarily on
conventional capabilities. Nuclear deterrence should be considered as an additional (but
important) general safeguard against major adverse changes in regional politics.

Effects of Possible Iranian Nuclearization on Israel's Nuclear Ambiguity

An assessment of the potential consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear power is, in

the nature of things, a speculative effort with many uncertainties. Furthermore, there
are difficulties in developing an analytical framework designed to assess the nature of
an Israeli-Iranian nuclear relationship. A possible approach is to consider the main
characteristics of the "central balance of nuclear deterrence" during the Cold War ± the
only historical example of a relatively stable and long nuclear relationship ± and
observe to what extent they affected stability. 10
Conditions contributing to stability can be divided into several subsets: historical
circumstances in which nuclear weapons were introduced; political relations between
adversaries; stability of societies; strategic doctrines; technical mechanisms; cognitive
issues. Central among them ± SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH VXSHUSRZHUV¶ FRQWH[W - have been:
bipolarity; stability of regimes; gradual learning and socialization in the nature of
nuclear affairs; second strike capabilities; efficient command and control systems;
elaborate mechanisms for decision making in nuclear affairs and especially during
crises; open channels of communications; arms control and various CSBM.
Many of these conditions will not exist in a potential nuclear relationship between
Israel and Iran, certainly not in the short or medium term. Measures to improve them
could of course take place, but might take long periods of time. Problems might arise
from potential instability in Iran (that might affect control of nuclear systems); lack of
"socialization" in nuclear affairs in Iran (and to a certain extent in Israel); major

9
See Shai Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence: The Test of the Gulf War," 1991; Evron, Israel's Nuclear
Dilemma, op. cit
10
Such an analysis is presented in Yair EvrRQ³$Q,VUDHOL-Iranian Nuclear Relationship: Would it be
6WDEOH"´SXEOLFDWLRQIRUWKFRPLQJE\,1663UHVV
 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons 127

problems of command and control systems ± both their technical and human
dimensions; lack of channels of communications; and lack of CSBM. As a result, there
is a high likelihood of misperceptions regarding adversaries' steps in crisis situations
and the danger of mistaken decisions. Because of these problems, a nuclear
relationship would be far from stable. Another major issue is the possibility of further
regional proliferation resulting from Iran becoming a nuclear power.
While Israel's nuclear posture has been aimed at deterring major conventional
attacks constituting an existential threat, Iranian nuclearization would refocus Israel's
nuclear deterrent to the deterrence of Iranian use of nuclear weapons. A possible
general conclusion from this is that Israel should develop a posture of escalation
dominance in which nuclear deterrence is limited only to deterrence against adversarial
use of nuclear weapons.

Effects on the posture of ambiguity

It could be argued that, were Iran to nuclearize, Israel should abandon its ambiguity
and adopt an explicit nuclear posture for four reasons: first, to emphasize Israel's
nuclear deterrent capability against Iranian nuclear threats; second, to develop an
explicit doctrine delineating thresholds for nuclear response; third, in order to allow for
an Israeli public debate concerning Israel's strategic doctrine and enhance Israel's
"socialization" in nuclear affairs; finally, in order to strengthen the public's self
confidence in Israel's deterrence credibility. What follows is a brief discussion of these
points without providing a definite answer.
First: in view of the long duration of the Israeli nuclear project and the estimates of
various respected international research organizations, there could not be any doubt
about Israel's extensive nuclear capability.11 The Iranian strategic leadership no doubt
must realize that Israel could cause unacceptable damage to Iran, including total
destruction of the regime even after an Iranian first strike.
The second point has more merit. Communicating "red lines" for a nuclear
response is important under some circumstances, and especially under conditions of
specific (or immediate) deterrence, that is, nuclear behavior in times of specific
impending crises or during them. This might inject a measure of certainty to deterrence.
It might be of particular importance under conditions of an escalation between Israel
and an adversary allied with Iran, namely, if Iran creates a situation of extended
deterrence. There is a need for in-depth analyses and the weighting of various possible
scenarios in order to formulate adequate responses for various nuclear challenges. It
should be noted that especially under conditions of great stress, decision makers tend to
rely on "standard operating procedures" that were formulated beforehand in shaping
their response in general and particularly in crisis situations. Hence, they should work
with a range of alternative strategic moves and their possible consequences.
A possible counter argument might be that an important component of the success
of deterrence depends precisely on an element of uncertainty. Moreover, decision
makers prefer to have a range of options for response and not be tied down to specific
ones, and this may not adversely affect the efficacy of deterrent threats.
The need for "socialization" in nuclear affairs is very important. This refers both
to a situation before Iranian nuclearization and much more so following it. The
distinctions between deterrence and "war fighting" and the dangers involved in

11
See The Military Balance, (annual), the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
128 Y. Evron / Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons

tendencies towards preemption and first strikes should be considered and discussed.
This however, does not necessarily entail a change in the posture of ambiguity.
In conclusion, Iranian nuclearization will create a very different strategic
environment for Israel. Whether Israel will have to change its ambiguous posture
remains to be seen, but in any event, the Israeli nuclear deterrent will probably have to
be refocused primarily on deterrence of the Iranian nuclear threat.
Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 129
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-129

,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU$UVHQDO3URVSHFWVIRU
Enlargement
Rajesh M. BASRUR1

Abstract. ,QGLD¶VUDSLGO\JURZLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOSURILOHKDVUDLVHGFRQFHUQVDERXW
the potential expansion of its nuclear capabilities, but such expectations are
unfounded. Indian strategic culture is minimalistic, the product of decades of slow
growth and a firmly grounded policy of non-deployment. Lack of doctrinal clarity
about the requirements of minimum deterrence does provide space for expansion.
A drive for nuclear enlargement could come from two sources: the military and the
technical bureaucracy. But the former is under tight civilian control, while the
latter is divided and lacks the kind of influence that will push policy-makers
toward significant growth.

Nearly a decade after InGLD¶VQXFOHDUWHVWVWKHUHLVFRQVLGHUDEOHDPELJXLW\RYHUWKH

IXWXUH RI LWV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV SURJUDPPH 7KRXJK LWV RIILFLDO GRFWULQH LV ³PLQLPXP
GHWHUUHQFH´QRWPXFKKDVEHHQVDLGDERXWZKDWWKLVPHDQVLQRSHUDWLRQDOWHUPV 2 The
future direction of its nuclear arsenal will certainly not be inhibited by resource
constraints. In January 2007, Goldman Sachs revised earlier estimates and projected
accelerated growth, which would enable India to overtake Japan in GDP terms by
about 2030 and the United States about a decade later.3 While such projections are not
always dependable, the broad trend is confirmed by other studies. 4 Military spending
can grow rapidly without necessitating a significant increase in expenditure as a share
of national resources. Will India expand its nuclear armoury significantly? In the
context of the still incomplete negotiating process following the India-US nuclear
agreement of March 2006, critics have claimed that the import of nuclear fuel will
enable India to divert its existing resources to produce more nuclear warheads, which
will in turn generate an India-Pakistan arms race.5 Against this, it has been argued that

1
Associate Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
2
For a detailed study of Indian nuclear doctrine, see Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and
,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU6HFXULW\ (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
3
7XVKDU3RGGDUDQG(YD<L³,QGLD¶V5LVLQJ*URZWK3RWHQWLDO´(FRQRPLFV3DSHU1R*ROGPDQ
Sachs, January 22, 2007, p. 5.
4
6XEEX 1DUD\DQVZDP\ DQG $GLO =DLQXOEKDL ³,QGLD¶V &RQVXPSWLRQ (YROXWLRQ´ Business Standard,
May 5, 2007; Jonathan Ablett et al, 7KH³%LUGRI*ROG´7KH5LVHRI,QGLD¶V&RQVXPHU0DUNHW, McKinsey
Global Institute, May 2007, pp. 13-14, 55-56.
5
'DU\O * .LPEDOO ³'DQJHURXV 'HDO ZLWK 1HZ 'HOKL´ Baltimore Sun, March 9, 2006; Michael
.UHSRQ ³$ *XLGH WR WKH 3HUSOH[HG 4  $ RQ WKH 86-,QGLD 1XFOHDU 'HDO´ +HQU\ / 6WLPVRQ &HQWHU
Washington, DC, April 24, 2006 <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=286>; Letter to Senators Lugar and
Biden and Congressmen Hyde and Lantos signed by six nonproliferation experts, April 5, 2006,
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington, DC <http://www.npec-
web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType= Single&PDFFile=
letter&PDFFolder=Letters>.
130 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement

India already has the capacity to produce more warheads. 6 This paper attempts to assess
the possibilities in light of Indian nuclear-strategic practice and thinking and the policy
process. It shows that some growth will take place, but that this will, in all probability,
not be very significant.

Nuclear Practice and Doctrine

Practice

,Q RUGHU WR MXGJH ZKHUH ,QGLD¶V QXFOHDr programme is going, it is necessary to know
where it is coming from. 7 A brief review of the slow process of its acquisition of
nuclear weapons shows that it went through four stages. In the first stage, from 1947 to
1964, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons,
but kept the door open to weapons development in case the need should arise. In the
second stage, between 1964 and about 1989, nuclear weapons capability was
unhurriedly attained ± and a successful test carried out in 1974 ± but no effort was
made to build weapons. In the third stage, India became a covert nuclear power,
producing a few warheads but making little or no effort to operationalize its capability.
Finally, it came out of the closet in 1998, when it tested again and declared itself a
nuclear weapons power. Thus was crystallized a strategic culture ± a pattern of thought
and action ± that was minimalistic in its (reluctant) acceptance of nuclear strategy and
incrementalist in acting upon it.
Subsequent to its becoming a nuclear power, India has remained slow to
operationalize its capability. Some four years after the 1998 tests, India announced in
early 2003 the creation of a Nuclear Command Authority. This consists of a Political
Council chaired by the Prime Minister which has the authority to command the use of
nuclear weapons, and an Executive Council headed by the National Security Advisor
which is tasked with implementation. A new tri-service Strategic Forces Command
(SFC) under the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, was also created in January
2003, but funds were allotted to it only ten months later. 8 In mid-2004, the SFC still did
not have adequate manpower or even its own headquarters. 9 Alternate command
centres were announced in October 2003 EXW RIILFLDOV DGPLWWHG WKHUH ZHUH ³RQO\ DG
KRF V\VWHPV LQ SODFH´10 The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was set up in November
2001, but does not appear to have played a significant role in integrating the three main
arms of the military. 11 A proposal in 2001 to create the position of Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS) lies unimplemented. Reasons for the delay include inter-service rivalry,
resistance from the civilian bureaucracy, and, above all, residual suspicion of the
military. The end result is that operational readiness for the complex and highly

6
Ashley J. Tellis, Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian &LYLOLDQ 1XFOHDU &RRSHUDWLRQ DQG ,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU
Arsenal (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 13-14.
7
Basrur, 0LQLPXP'HWHUUHQFHDQG,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU6HFXULW\, ch. 3.
8
-RV\ -RVHSK ³,QGLD
V 1XFOHDU ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH 1HDUO\ 5HDG\´ Rediff.com, October 10, 2003
<http://us.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/10spec.htm>.
9
5DMDW3DQGLW³1XFOHDU)RUFH&KLHI6HWWR5HWLUH´Times of India, June 1, 2004 .
10
-RVHSK³,QGLD
V1XFOHDU,QIUDVWUXFWXUH1HDUO\5HDG\´
11
5DKXO %HGL ³$ &UHGLEOH 1XFOHDU 'HWHUUHQW"´ Frontline, March 29-April 11, 2003
<http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2007/stories/20030411003009700.htm>. This was admitted as much by
WKH&KLHIRI ,QWHJUDWHG'HIHQFH6WDII/LHXWHQDQW*HQHUDO36-RVKL6HH5+7DKLOLDQL³&DOOLQJIRr the
Tri-6KDNWL6SLULW´Indian Express, October 28, 2004.
 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement 131

specialized function of nuclear deterrence is limited. The underlying reason for this
apparently lackadaisical approach is that the political leadership simply does not view
nuclear weapons operationally, but tends to conceive of them as political instruments
that are essentially unusable beyond their basic deterrence function.
This conception of the deterrent is evident in other ways. After 1998, the
government has announced and observed a moratorium on warhead testing. Though
this means it has limited assurance as to the reliability of its warheads, the policy has
been consistently supported by political leaders, military officials, the technical
bureaucracy and strategic experts. There have been strong objections to the Henry J.
Hyde Act (2006), under which the US Congress mandates an end to civilian nuclear
cooperation if India tests. But critics in India have resisted the India-US deal not on
military-strategic grounds but on political grounds, arguing that it is unacceptable for
,QGLD¶V WHVWLQJ RSWLRQV WR EH YLUWXDOO\ FORVHG SHUPDQHQWO\ E\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV 0RUH
remarkable is the fact that, despite three major crises with Pakistan in 1990, 1999 and
2001-02, India has not deployed its nuclear weapons. These are kept in non-deployed
mode, with missiles and warheads unmated. The warheads themselves are unassembled,
with the nuclear cores being stored separately. The overall picture, then, is of an
approach to deterrence that is political rather than operational and does not give
admittance to a need for large, usable forces.

Doctrine

While the practice of deterrence has been minimalist, the picture is less clear-cut with
respect to doctrine. Official enunciations of doctrine have been few and far between.
Although a Draft Nuclear Doctrine was publicly circulated in 1999, it was neither
official nor clear in its direction as it tried ineffectively to satisfy the very diverse
opinions of the members of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) who
produced it.12 A laconic statement of doctrine appeared in January 2003, announcing
OLWWOHPRUHWKDQFRPPLWPHQWWR1R)LUVW8VH1)8WKHWKUHDWRI³PDVVLYH´UHWDOLDWLRQ
against a first strike from nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and an abiding
interest in arms control. 13 The most elaborate statement on doctrine was made in a
newspaper interview in November 1999 by Jaswant Singh, then Minister for External
Affairs.14 ,QWKLVKHKHOGWKDW³SDULW\LVQRWHVVHQWLDOIRUGHWHUUHQFH´WKDW,QGLDZLOOQRW
engage in arms racLQJWKDWPLQLPXPGHWHUUHQFHLVRQO\DTXHVWLRQRI³DGHTXDF\´QRW
numbers; that retaliation need not be instantaneous; that there is no need for Indian
QXFOHDUIRUFHVWREHRQDOHUWWKDW³ZHGRQRWVHHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDVZHDSRQVRIZDU
ILJKWLQJ´DQGWKDWDWULDGLVQRWD³SUH-UHTXLVLWHIRUFUHGLELOLW\´
2QWKHRWKHUKDQG6LQJKDOVRGHFODUHGWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRI³PLQLPXP´FDQQRWEHD
³IL[HGSK\VLFDOTXDQWLILFDWLRQ´EXWLVD³G\QDPLFFRQFHSW´WKDWLV³ILUPO\URRWHGLQWKH
strategic environment, technologLFDO LPSHUDWLYHV DQG QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ QHHGV«´ 7KLV
perspective tends to keep the requirements of a minimum deterrent force open-ended.
The difficulty is pervasive in Indian strategic thinking. The ubiquity of the term

12
+DUVK 9 3DQW ³,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU 'RFWULQH DQG &RPPDQG 6WUXFWXUH ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU &LYLO-Military
5HODWLRQVLQ,QGLD´Armed Forces and Society, 33, 2 (January 2007), p. 246.
13
³7KH&DELQHW&RPPLWWHHRQ6HFXULW\5HYLHZV2SHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQRI,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU'RFWULQH´3UHVV
Release, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 4, 2003
<http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2003/01/04pr01.htm> (accessed on Sep 30, 2007).
14
³,QGLD1RWWR(QJDJHLQ$1XFOHDU$UPV5DFH-DVZDQW´,QWHUYLHZHindu, November 29, 1999, p.
1.
132 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement

³FUHGLEOH´LQGLVFXVVLRQVRQGRFWULQe, derived uncritically from American discourse, is

deeply problematic. Its derivatives are of two kinds: material and psychological. The
PDWHULDOKDVWRGRZLWKWKHNLQGVDQGQXPEHUVRIZHDSRQVUHTXLUHGWRREWDLQ³DVVXUHG
second-VWULNH FDSDELOLW\´ 7KH PRst minimalist of deterrence thinkers base their
thinking on this concept. The late K. Sundarji, perhaps the most articulate of early
Indian thinkers on nuclear weapons, holds that credible deterrence must rest on a
³JXDUDQWHHG VHFRQG VWULNH´15 The logical extension of this requirement is that Indian
IRUFHVPXVWEH³VXUYLYDEOH´-DVMLW6LQJKDQRWKHUOHDGLQJWKLQNHUDUJXHVVLPLODUO\WKDW
survivability is an essential prerequisite for second strike capability.16 This brings in the
QRWLRQRIEDODQFHWKH³G\QDPLFFRQFHSW´-DVZDQW6LQJKUHIHUVWR7KLVLQWXUQOHDGV
to assuring survivability not only by protected and mobile basing of missiles, but also
to ensuring that a wider variety of delivery vehicles is available. For maximum
survivability, the submarine-launched ballistic missile becomes essential. 17 The same
logic may be applied to warhead requirements. Thus, K. Subrahmanyam, the doyen of
contemporary Indian deterrence thinkers, increases his estimate of the size of a
minimum nuclear force for India from 60 (pre-1998) to 150 (post-1998) warheads
without doctrinal justification.18
On the psychological aspect, credibility is indeed a problem if the adversary has to
EH ³FRQYLQFHG´ RI RQH¶V DELOLW\ WR UHWDOLDWH LQ VXIILFLHQW QXPEHUV DQG ZLWK VXIILFLHQW
power and accuracy. 19 Thus, the Draft Nuclear Doctrine places great emphasis on
³ZLOO´ DQG RQ FRPPXQLFDWLQJ WKDW ZLOO DVVHUWLQJ WKDW ³DQ\ DGYHUVDU\ PXVW NQRZ WKDW
India FDQ DQG ZLOO UHWDOLDWH´ 20 Both the material and psychological aspects of
credibility have no basis in the practice of deterrence in South Asia. For all its risks,
deterrence worked through three South Asian crises without the active deployment of
nuclear weapons, which remained recessed. No one quite knew what the capabilities of
the two sides were except that they were limited and apparently lacking in the material
EDVLVRI³FUHGLELOLW\´1RUEDUULQJWKHRFFDVLRQDOVLJQDOOLQJE\ZD\RIPLVVLOHWHVWVDQG
oblique assertions of resolve, did much have to be done to convey the will to use them.
Neither side deployed its weapons. The crises came and went without the nuclear
shadow assuming concrete proportions. In short, there was a mismatch between
practice and theory.

15
. 6XQGDUML ³,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU :HDSRQV 3ROLF\´ LQ -¡UQ *HOVWDG DQG 2ODY 1M¡OVWDG HGV Nuclear
Rivalry and International Order (Oslo: PRIO; & London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage, 1996), p. 176.
16
-DVMLW 6LQJK ³$ 1XFOHDU 6WUDWHJ\ IRU ,QGLD´ LQ -DVMLW Singh, ed., Nuclear India (New Delhi:
Knowledge World, 1998), pp. 321-323.
17
&8GD\%KDVNDU³6WD\LQJRQ&RXUVH6XEV+DYH9LWDO5ROHLQ'HWHUUHQFH´Times of India, August
31, 2000, p. 10; Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal (New Delhi: Knowledge World,
2001), pp. 131-133; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: the Realist Foundations of
Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 585-591; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi,
Thousand Oaks & London: Sage, 2000), pp. 224-227.
18
7KHILUVWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQLVLQ.6XEUDKPDQ\DP³1XFOHDU)RUFH'HVLJQDQG0LQLPXP'HWHUUHQFH
6WUDWHJ\ IRU ,QGLD´ LQ%KDUDW .DUQDG HG Future Imperilled (New Delhi: Viking, 1994); the second in K.
6XEUDKPDQ\DP³$&UHGLEOH'HWHUUHQW/RJLFRIWKH1XFOHDU'RFWULQH´Times of India, October 4, 1999.
19
Kanwal, Nuclear Defence, p. 133.
20
³'UDIW5HSRUWRI1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\$GYLVRU\%RDUGRQ,QGLDQ1XFOHDU'RFWULQH´
 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement 133

Implications

7KHIXWXUHVKDSHDQGVL]HRI,QGLD¶VDUVHQDOGHSHQGVRQKRZWKHFRQWUadiction between
practice and theory will play out. The political leadership clearly has an extremely
minimalist understanding of nuclear deterrence. On the other side, professional
strategists base much of their rather inchoate thinking on concepts that are open to
expansion. If the political leadership were to accept the thinking of the strategic
community that credible and survivable forces are necessary, then we could see a shift
toward a more operational conception of nuclear deterrence than has hitherto been the
case. Critics have argued that by default political decision makers have allowed a
PLOLWDUL]HGDSSURDFKWRQXFOHDUZHDSRQVWROHDGWKHZD\)RULQVWDQFHWKHOHDGHUVKLS¶V
LQWHUHVW LQ ³OLPLWHG ZDU´ DIWHU WKH  FULVLV UHIOHFWHG PLOLWDU\ WKLQNLng on the
feasibility of such a war to punish Pakistan for backing terrorists. 21 This tells us
something about the conditions under which a dominant civilian leadership might adopt
a militaristic outlook. On the other hand, the fact that Indian strategic practice during
the crisis of 2001-02 remained highly cautious despite the rhetoric accompanying its
massive mobilisation and threat to go to war tells us the lesson was quickly learned that
a militarised approach does not really work. 22
Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider whether Indian leaders might depart from
their minimalistic practice in conditions where risks are less serious. Might they permit
WKH XQFRQWUROOHG H[SDQVLRQ RI ,QGLD¶V QXFOHDU DUVHQDO IRU UHDVRQV RWKHU WKDQ VHFXULW\"
Scott Sagan has attributed security, domestic politics and prestige as three kinds of
motivations for a state to go nuclear (or not). 23 One might usefully extend this
analytical framework to asking why states might expand their nuclear capabilities
beyond the requirements of deterrence. The security model is not very useful once
deterrence has been obtained. Unfortunately, as observed earlier, many Indian strategic
thinkers, like their counterparts elsewhere, do tend to espouse a redundant balance-of-
SRZHU ORJLF ,I ,QGLD¶V security environment were to deteriorate, arguments for the
expansion of its arsenal would almost certainly appear even though its own experience
(and that of other nuclear rivals) shows that neither extensive capability nor
demonstration of will is required for deterrence to operate. Yet, as we know, Indian
policy-makers have adhered to minimalism at the worst of times, which is a source for
optimism.
The prestige/norms model is interesting and may apply. The fact that all the
nuclear powers continue to retain significantly large arsenals in the post-Cold War era
suggests that, though nobody is about to admit as much, there may be something to it.
As symbols of modernity, power and status, they retain a certain appeal, particularly
among their possessors, and India as an aspiring great power might be tempted to build
an armoury commensurate with the big players. But this would involve a significant
shift in the belief system of a leadership that, regardless of party affiliation, has
displayed a consistent disinterest in making nuclear weapons the centrepiece of
national security strategy. In this context, it is particularly significant that the most
hardline of the major political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was at

21
0LFKDHO5\DQ.UDLJ³7KH3ROLWLFDODQG6WUDWHJLF,PSHUDWLYHVRI1XFOHDU'HWHUUHQFHLQ6RXWK$VLD´
India Review, 2, 1 (January 2003), pp. 1-48.
22
On Indian caution during the crisis of 2001-02, see Basrur, 0LQLPXP'HWHUUHQFHDQG,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU
Security, ch. 4.
23
6FRWW ' 6DJDQ ³:K\ 'R 6WDWHV %XLOG 1XFOHDU :HDSRQV" 7KUHH 0RGHOV LQ 6HDUFK RI $ %RPE´
International Security, 21, 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86.
134 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement

the helm of power when India-Pakistan relations were at their worst (1998-2004),
remained disinclined to push for a proactive nuclear posture.
It remains to discuss domestic politics as a potential driver of nuclear expansion.
Here, an understanding of the policy process with respect to nuclear weapons is
necessary.

The Policy Process

Policy-making on nuclear issues is not greatly institutionalised. In 2000, a Group of

Ministers (GoM) was tasked to report on national security in order to begin
restructuring the entire system.24 But implementation has been limited. It is generally
known that the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSAB have not played a
significant role in decision making.25 With political leaders showing little attention to
the nitty gritty of doctrine and force posture, and the bureaucracy unfamiliar with the
intricacies of doctrine, policy has drifted along without clear direction. The two major
groups with an interest in nuclear weapons issues are the military and the strategic
technocracy. Their inputs into the policy process might conceivably make a difference
WRWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU,QGLD¶VQXFOHDUDUVHQDOWRJURZ

The Military

While the political leadership does not give much thought to nuclear weapons, the
military does. Much of the strategic thinking in India is done by military officers, often
after retirement.26 They are by no means ambitious or expansionist in their thinking,
and most have cast their lot with minimum deterrence. But the discourse, as I have
shown above, fails to create a minimalist basis for deterrence and leaves the door open
to expansion. The nature of civil-military relations is crucial here. There is no question
that the Indian military is firmly under civilian control. Yet the relationship is a
peculiar one. The civil-PLOLWDU\³EDUJDLQ´ in India is one where the civilian leadership
has maintained unchallenged authority, but has allowed the military to determine its
needs with a high degree of autonomy. 27 This has created a broad problem of military
effectiveness in the search for security which remains unresolved as the Indian Army
has not always been able to respond appropriately to changing circumstances and
needs.28 In short, the actual functioning of civil-military relations is such that nuclear
doctrine and the acquisitions ensuing from it may continue to be guided by the
requirements of the military. On the other hand, there is in-built restraint because the
broader political consensus limits the extent to which operational necessities as
perceived by the military can hold sway. The armed forces are themselves unlikely to
have an enduring interest in weapons systems that will almost certainly not be used and

24
Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Reforming the National Security System:
Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, n.d. <http://mod.nic.in/newadditions/rcontents.htm> (accessed
August 18, 2005)
25
'6K\DP%DEX³,QGLD¶V1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLO6WXFNLQWKH&UDGOH"´ Security Dialogue, 34, 2
(June 2003), pp. 215-230.
26
Among the notable writers are Gurmeet Kanwal (army), Raja Menon (navy), Vijai K. Nair (army),
Jasjit Singh (air force), and K. Sundarji (army).
27
6XQLO 'DVJXSWD ³7KH ,QGLDQ $UP\ DQG WKH 3UREOHP RI 0LOLWDU\ &KDQJH´ LQ 6ZDUQD 5DMDJRSDODQ
ed., Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions, and Initiatives (New Delhi: Routledge, 2006).
28
5DMHVK 0 %DVUXU ³,QGLD ,PEDODQFH XQGHU &LYLOLDQ &RQWURO´ LQ 7KRPDV %UXQHDX DQG +DUROG
Trinkunas, eds., Global Determinants of Defense Reform (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement 135

DUHOLNHO\WRUHPDLQXQDUPHG8OWLPDWHO\WKHFLYLOLDQV¶GHVLUHWRPDLQWDLQWLJKWFRQWURO
over nuclear weapons is likely to keep that system limited to what from their
perspective would be manageable proportions.

The Nuclear Technocracy

6RPHVFKRODUVKDYHDWWULEXWHGFRQVLGHUDEOHLQIOXHQFHWRD³VWUDWHJLFHQFODYH´FRQVLVWLQJ
PDLQO\ RI DWRPLF HQHUJ\ WHFKQRFUDWV LQ LQIOXHQFLQJ ,QGLD¶V Quclearization.29 Much of
the early focus was on the attainment of nuclear capability. In the aftermath of the 1998
tests, the bomb makers conceded that there was no more need to test. Though there has
been occasional criticism from retired nuclear scientists, the atomic energy
HVWDEOLVKPHQW DV D ZKROH KDV EHHQ VXSSRUWLYH RI WKH ,QGLDQ WHVW PRUDWRULXP ,QGLD¶V
position on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) also favours a cut-off
that would prohibit the future production of fissile material, which means it is not
interested in keeping its option to produce more warheads open-ended.30 The nuclear
scientists are no longer at the forefront of weapons policy. They have certainly played a
prominent role in shaping the Indian position on the India-US nuclear deal, but that has
involved no more than keeping Indian testing options open unless a universal regime is
created to disallow them. There is no pressure for more or better bombs.
The technical experts now pressing for expansion are the engineers of the Defence
Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and its subsidiaries, which are
developing a range of nuclear, dual-use and conventional missiles. The Prithvi-I land-
based short-range ballistic missile (150 km) has been inducted into the army, while air
and sea versions are being developed. The medium-range Agni-I (700 km) and Agni-II
(2000 km) are said to have been inducted as well, but their operational status is not
certain.31 The Agni-III intermediate-range missile (3,000+ km) was first successfully
tested in April 2007 and is expected to be ready for induction by 2010. 32 The BrahMos
short-range cruise missile (290 km) is officially dubbed a conventional weapon, but is
reported to have the potential to carry a small nuclear weapon. 33 This capability could
be enlarged. While it has been inducted into the Army, air and naval versions are under
development. A longer range cruise missile is also being developed. 34 It is reported that
an extended-range (5,000 km) version of the Agni-III (possibly to be called Agni-IV) is
also being developed.35 Also planned is the Nirbhay (1,000 km) medium-range missile
for land, air and sea platforms. Testing is slated to begin by 2009, though the DRDO is
still looking for engines. 36 8QGHU WKH ³6DJDULND´ SURJUDPPH D VXEParine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) of 800 km range has been tested thrice and a sea-launched
cruise missile (SLCM) is being developed, though readiness is not anticipated for

29
Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1998); George
Perkovich, ,QGLD¶V1XFOHDU%RPE7KH,PSDFWRQ*OREDO3UROLIHUDWLRQ (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
University of California Press, 1999).
30
Siddharth VaradarajaQ³)LVVLOH0DWHULDO%DQ7DONV,QFKWRZDUGV&RQVHQVXV´Hindu, July 2, 2007.
31
5REHUW 6 1RUULV DQG +DQV 0 .ULVWHQVHQ ³,QGLD¶V 1XFOHDU )RUFHV ´ Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 63, 4 (July/August 2007), p. 76.
32
³'5'2&KLHI&RQILUPV%DOOLVWLF0LVVLOH5HDG\´Indian Express, July 8, 2007.
33
³,QGLD 'HYHORSLQJ 6XEPDULQH /DXQFKHG %DOOLVWLF 0LVVLOHV´ International Herald Tribune,
September 11, 2007.
34
<0DOOLNDUMXQ³'5'2%HJLQV:RUNRQ$JQL-,9´Hindu, August 9, 2007.
35
Ibid.
36
1HHODP 0DWKHZV ³,QGLa Plans to Test New Medium-5DQJH 0LVVLOH LQ ´ 1HZ.HUDODFRP
September 24, 2007 <http://www.newkerala.com/july.php?action=fullnews&id=48537>.
136 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement

another three to four years. 37 In any case, the launch platform for missiles based
undersea, the nuclear submarine envisaged under the Advanced Technology Vessel
(ATV) project, is not expected to be ready till 2010 or 2012. 38 In an indication of still
JUHDWHUDPELWLRQVWKH'5'2¶V9.6DUDVZDWVSHFXODWHGLQ$XJXVWWKDWWKHQHed
might arise for a 10,000 km-range missile in the future.39
These expansive efforts might be taken with a pinch of salt. The only missile
actually in operational readiness is the Prithvi-I, with which the Army is not happy on
account of its inaccuracy and ³VHULRXV WHFKQRORJLFDO LVVXHV DIIHFWLQJ ODXQFK
SUHSDUHGQHVV´40 The Agni-I and Agni-,,DUHDOVRVDLGWREH³ULVN\´RZLQJWRLQDGHTXDWH
testing. 41 Thus, a mere adding up of claims emanating from the DRDO does not
indicate a rapidly expanding cache of missiles. Given past experience with such
forecasts, the expected dates of readiness may not be realistic.
$ PRUH LPSRUWDQW TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU WKH WHFKQRFUDWV DUH WKH GULYHUV RI ,QGLD¶V
nuclear weapons programme. While they have been influential in the past ± and it
FHUWDLQO\ QHHGVWREHUHPHPEHUHGWKDW,QGLD¶VODVW3UHVLGHQW $EGXO.DODP ZDVIURP
the DRDO and a national icon to boot ± that does not mean that they have a decisive
role in policy-making. The patriarch of the Indian nuclear programme, Homi Bhabha,
could not persuade Prime Minister Nehru to think seriously of weaponizing. 42 Indira
Gandhi changed her decision to test in 1982 without consulting the so-FDOOHG³VWUDWHJLF
HQFODYH´43 In 1995, Narasimha Rao rebuffed strong technocratic pressures to test. 44 In
1996, even the relatively weak Prime Minister Deve Gowda rejected the atomic energy
WHFKQRFUDWV¶GHPDQGVIRUWHVWLQJ 45 It may also be noted that the scientists who played a
powerful role in the lobbying that shaped the Indian stand on the India-US nuclear deal
were from the virtually autonomous Department of Atomic Energy, whereas the
engineers of the DRDO fall under the Ministry of Defence, which is controlled by the
civil service. The missile makers are respected, but do not enjoy the same status or
political influence as the bomb makers.

Conclusion

While the analysis presented here shows that there is not much pressure for a
VLJQLILFDQW H[SDQVLRQ RI ,QGLD¶V QXFOHDU DUVHQDO LW LV QHYHUWKHOHVV XVHIXO WR FRQVLGHU
whether changes in threat perception might produce a different result. India does not
perceive major strategic threats that would make the addition of more arrows to its
nuclear quiver vital. The relationship with Pakistan has already tumbled through a
series of crises and, like other nuclear rivalries in the past, has got down to the serious

37
5DMDW3DQGLW³1-6XEPDULQHV:LOO0DNH,QGLD¶V'HWHUUHQFH&UHGLEOH´Times of India, September 24,
2007.
38
OQHUHSRUWLELGJLYHVWKHGDWHDV$QHDUOLHURQHVD\V5DMDW3DQGLW³1-Submarine May
%H2SHUDWLRQDOE\´Times of India, March 18, 2007.
39
0DOOLNDUMXQ³'5'2%HJLQV:RUNRQ$JQL-,9´
40
$PLWDY5DQMDQ³$UPHG)RUFHV:DLW$V6KRZSLHFH0LVVLOHV$UH8QJXLGHG:D\2II0DUN´Indian
Express, November 13, 2006.
41
Ibid.
42
Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 88-89.
43
Ibid., 260-261.
44
Ibid., p. 393.
45
Ibid., p. 397.
 R.M. Basrur / India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement 137

business of negotiating stability. 46 A renewed deterioration in relations is possible, but

that does not translate into nuclear expansion. As a dissatisfied power, Pakistan has
tended to take risks, but only at the level of low-intensity conflict.47 Its nuclear posture
has been low-NH\ OLNH ,QGLD¶V 3ROLWLFDOO\ ,QGLD LV FOHDUO\ JURZLQJ RXW RI LWV RQFH-
K\SKHQDWHG UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK 3DNLVWDQ ZKLFK VKDUSO\ HURGHV WKH ODWWHU¶V RSWLRQV 7KH
India-China relationship, despite a border dispute and a history of war, has been
growing warmer over the past decade. Trade has accelerated rapidly from $5 billion in
 WR RYHU  ELOOLRQ LQ  DQG &KLQD LV QRZ ,QGLD¶V ODUJHVW WUDGLQJ SDUWQHU 48
Besides, there are no fundamental problems between them since they have lived with
their differences for four decades. The last major episode of tension occurred two
decades ago when their armies confronted each other on the border, an event that
passed off peacefully after negotiations.49 There are no other foreseeable threats.
,QVXPFXUUHQWWUHQGVLQ,QGLD¶VVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWGRQRWSURYLGHPXFKVFRSH
IRU ,QGLD¶V ORQJ-established nuclear minimalism to be discarded. With neither the
military nor the technocracy in a position to exert much influence, there is nothing
UHVHPEOLQJD³PLOLWDU\-LQGXVWULDOFRPSOH[´WRFRQMXUHDQGSURSHOH[DJJHUDWHGVHFXULW\
requirements. The civilian leadership, content with basic capability, is not inclined to
think operationally about nuclear weapons and therefore unlikely to tolerate the
building of a large infrastructure which would inevitably give a bigger role to the
military. Historically, India has been more inclined to keep its nuclear options open
than to exercise them. The search for more extensive capabilities should be viewed in
this respect.

46
For a detailed study of the India-Pakistan relationship in a comparative perspective, see Rajesh M.
Basrur, 6RXWK $VLD¶V &ROG :DU 1XFOHDU :HDSRQV DQG &RQIOLFW LQ &RPSDUDWLYH 3HUVSHFWLYH (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2008).
47
2Q3DNLVWDQ¶VULVN-taking, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
48
Sino-,QGLDQ 7UDGH *URZLQJ &RQFHUQ´ Hindu $XJXVW   &KLQD (PHUJHV ,QGLD¶V /DUJHVW
7UDGH3DUWQHU´India Post, March 24, 2008.
49
9 1DWDUDMDQ ³7KH 6XPGRURQJ &KX ,QFLGHQW´ %KDUDW 5DNVKDN 0RQLWRU  QR  1RYHPEHU-
December 2000), <www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/natarajan.html> (accessed October 1,
2007).
138 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-138

Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear

Security
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vadim GRECHANINOV1

Abstract. The catastrophic acts of terrorism against the USA in September 2001
FOHDUO\ GHPRQVWUDWHG WKH OLPLWV RI WKH 81¶V FDSDFLW\ RU HYHQ WKH DELOLWLHV RI WKH
USA as the only global superpower to ensure international security. Like-minded
middle-range powers, among which the Ukraine might be considered, can to a
certain degree compensate for what the UN, the USA and Russia lack, and thereby
PDNH D FRQWULEXWLRQ WRZDUGV VWDELOL]LQJ WKH ZRUOG VHFXULW\ VLWXDWLRQ  8NUDLQH¶V
disarmament experience can serve as a positive example for the world today.

The security environment after the well-known September 2001 events in the USA
has clearly demonstrated the limits of UN capabilities and even of the abilities of the
USA as the only global superpower. At the same time, like-minded middle-range
powers with similar intentions could, to a certain degree, compensate for what the UN,
the USA and Russia are lacking, and create the conditions necessary for the
stabilization of the security situation in the whole world.
Characterizing Ukraine as among the group of the middle-range countries might
raise questions from the point of view of relative power but we still insist on it, as
Ukraine possessed the third-largest nuclear forces only ten years ago, which it managed
to eliminate almost bloodlessly. This experience could help today in the sphere of
DFKLHYLQJQXFOHDUDUPV¶OLPLWDWLRQDJUHHPHQWVZLWKPDQ\FRXQWULHV
,Q WRGD\¶V Ukraine, the process of forming the idea of national security and its
necessity as an attribute of a mature political nation and a modern European state has
not been completed yet. The insufficient attention given to this issue may be an
inadmissible mistake.
The formation of Ukrainian statehood had coincided with complex democratic
transformations, the establishment of market economic relations, and the development
of a new social structure with corresponding interests and values. These reforms
advanced slowly, falling behind the social changes which resulted in the political
fragmentation of Ukrainian society and its significant frustration. Thus, the
extraordinary parliamentary elections of September 30 had shown a large percentage of
WKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VPLVWUXVWLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW)RUWKHILUVWWLPH in the elections of the
supreme legislative body, 2.9% of WKH HOHFWRUDWH FKRVH WKH ³DJDLQVW DOO´ RSWLRQ DQG
voter turnout at the polling stations was only 62.51%.
The internal situation in Ukraine is also characterized by the negative heritage of
the enduring system crisis, uncompleted processes of economic transformation, as well
as the social and political polarization of the society. Hereto it may be also mentioned
that the absence of the clearly formulated long-WHUPDLPVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW

1
President of the Atlantic Rada of Ukraine
 V. Grechaninov / Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security 139

hampers the consolidation of the society, and the formation and implementation of state
policy.

Overcoming Inconsistencies

There are certain approaches that the Ukrainian authorities renewed after the
6HSWHPEHU   HOHFWLRQV WR VWDUW ³UHSDLULQJ´ WKH VLWXDWLRQ LQ WKH FRXQWU\ 7KLV LV
essential because LQWRGD\¶V8NUDLQHa permanent inconsistency of perspectives of the
VWDWH¶VGHYHORSPHQWKDVH[LVWHGXQWLOQRZ,QDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKWKH3UHVLGHQWGHFODUHV
pro-Western ways in alignment with the EU and NATO, while the Verchovna Rada is
elaborating a new legislative act on the non-bloc status of Ukraine - all taking place
under the tacit patronage of the Cabinet of Ministers - the assertion that all branches of
SRZHU VKDUH XQDQLPRXV YLHZV RQ WKH VWUDWHJLF GLPHQVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ 8NUDLQH¶V IXWXUH
outlook is, to put it mildly, highly unlikely.
At the same time, within Ukrainian society itself, the processes of interest
definition and reconciliation, as well as the formation of new social relations typical in
the parliamentary democratic state, take place.

The Process of Ukrainian Nuclear Disarmament

In the interests of analysis of the Ukrainian nuclear security problem, one should take a
quick look at the 1990s, when Ukraine was, in fact, a nuclear state. Indeed, Ukraine as
a Soviet republic played a significant role in creating the USSR nuclear-missile shield.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there remained 222 units of strategic weapons
(warheads), including 176 ICBMs and 46 heavy bombers and the co-related nuclear
equipment (approximately 2,000 nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs, cruise missile
and nuclear bombs for heavy bombers) on Ukrainian territory. Several hundred units
of the tactical nuclear warheads were also left in Ukraine.
7KH QHZ 8NUDLQH ZKLFK KDG LQKHULWHG WKH ZRUOG¶V WKLUG-largest nuclear arsenal
(after the USA and the Russian Federation) was confronted with the question of its
future. The solution to this question became one of the top-priority tasks of the political
leadership of the state.
From the viewpoint of theory and practice of settling the situation concerning the
possible use of strategic nuclear weapons which emerged at that time, it was necessary
to resolve the military-political contradiction, which lay in the following. On the one
hand, for technical reasons, Ukraine could realize this nuclear potential only with
assistance and control from Russia. On the other hand, the political course which
Ukraine had chosen prevented it from orienting strategic weapons against the countries
ZKLFKKDGEHHQVHWDVWDUJHWVHDUOLHUE\5XVVLD8NUDLQH¶VSROLWLFDOFRXUVHKDGFKDQJHG
and most importantly ± it became different from the Russian one. In this case, the
politics had won and the military-technical side of the problem yielded to it.
Another reason to dwell on WKLVSUREOHPVHSDUDWHO\LVWKDWWKHSURFHVVRI8NUDLQH¶V
QXFOHDUGLVDUPDPHQWPD\EHLQVWUXFWLYHIRUWKHVROXWLRQRIVLPLODUSUREOHPVLQWRGD\¶V
world. So it happened that in the 1990s the author was holding the post of Deputy
Minister of Defense on Military Policy (there was such office in the newly established
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense). Thus, the entire disarmament process, particularly its
first stage, involved a direct participation. There were many interesting circumstances.
140 V. Grechaninov / Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security

Both Russia and the United States adopted various approaches towards the
Ukrainian political and military leadership, including persuading Ukraine that
disarmament was in its own interest. Everything was in play, including diplomacy, big
money and many other promises - in particular the solution of the housing problem for
the discharged military personnel -. The larger part of the promises had been fulfilled
(meaning the official agreements, not the private deals here). The similarity between
the circumstances of that time and the present situation in which there are ongoing
negotiations in the world with those who do not want to disarm their nuclear potential
or to stop testing, is connected by the fact that the Ukrainian leaders and even experts
at that time repeatedly doubted whether disarmament was the right decision. The
decision remains controversial as most people today, not only those under the
Ukrainian authorities, consider the disarmament steps in Ukraine to have been a
mistake. But we believe that the steps taken on nuclear weapons had been quite right!

Challenges to Ukrainian Security

Despite all the difficulties of development, Ukraine is learning to be an independent

state today and assesses the threats to its national security in the following way.
First, there are the phenomena which are typical to many states, namely the
struggle for energy resources, man-caused catastrophes, international and inter-
religious conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and corruption, illegal
migration, human trafficking, demographic problems etc.
A particular threat is the tendency toward consolidation of national and
international criminal groups, and the integration of organized crime amongst
nationalist and extremist groups.
Second, the geopolitical position of Ukraine results in its high dependency on
external influences which are of contradictory character and demand significant efforts
for their harmonization. The main potential threats to Ukraine in the international arena
stem from economic, political, cultural and informational pressure. The absence of
public consent on the key strategic issues of public management and the consequential
vulnerability to external pressure hampers the effective implementation of foreign and
domestic policy of the state.
The clash between certain political forces over national, linguistic and religious
issues in combination with shortcomings in the principal administrative decision-
making in the national security sphere (for example, failure to adopt a common
political course of state development), and existing economic disparities in
development between the Ukrainian regions, result in the unsafe tendencies of
interregional tensions and the emergence of potential threats to the state integrity.
3ROLWLFDOJDPHVDURXQG³IHGHUDOLVP´ZKLFKKDGEHHQ realized in the course of the last
two election campaigns were not inconsequential.
These tendencies are not conducive to the coordinated operative actions of the
governmental structures aimed at the weakening and neutralization of economic,
political, technological and other security challenges. And though the Ukrainian nation
preserves its identity, integrity and potential for further development, and the scale of
the listed challenges has a definitive local character, it is very unsafe not to take into
consideration the existing risks.
As to the military risks and threats, the assessments conducted to date testify to the
absence of a direct military threat to Ukraine in the form of broad aggression or the use
 V. Grechaninov / Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security 141

of military-coercive measures against it by a single country or a coalition of states. At

the same time, the potential sources of military threats include the radical Islamic
movements trying to expand their influence in Ukraine, negative consequences of the
potential claims of certain neighboring states, military conflicts near the Ukrainian
borders, and the danger of terrorist attacks against Ukraine.
Among these, as one might say, commonly acknowledged risks and threats to
nuclear security, another distinctive feature of the situation in Ukraine should be
emphasized. This is the attitude of the authorities and the society towards this problem
± the memory and consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. It may be noted that
IAEA expert missions regularly visit the Chernobyl atomic power station. For example,
the aim of the IAEA visit in August 2007 was connected not only with the physical
security of the nuclear power plant but also with teaching and training the personnel to
make the energy blocks of the power plant non-operational. It turned out that before the
Chernobyl disaster, the questions of disabling the atomic power stations in Ukraine had
not been studied; therefore the plant operators are pioneers in this sphere and the
experience they gained is very important for other nuclear power stations. In parallel
ZLWK WKHVH DFWLYLWLHV WKH GLIILFXOW SURFHVV RI UHEXLOGLQJ WKH ³8NU\WLH´ IDFLOLW\ as an
environmentally safe system is being carried out. Thus, the administration of the station
faces the difficult tasks of managing these processes as well as searching for the
optimal administrative structure of the whole Chernobyl power station complex, taking
into account the fact that the international projects on building the facilities for storage
and utilization of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive materials remain unfinished here.
,QWRGD\¶VZRUOG8NUDLQHLVTXLWHQDWXUDOO\UHJDUGHGDVDQRQ-nuclear state which
had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already in 1994. As is known,
8NUDLQH¶VQREOHGLVDUPDPHQWDFWGLGQRWSOD\DSRVLWLYHUROHLQZLQQLQJRYHUIROORZHUV
Over the past years, the nuclear club has instead expanded. These and other
circumstances connected with ensuring national security as well as simple populism
contribute to the revival of attitudes VXSSRUWLQJ 8NUDLQH¶V UHWXUQ LQWR WKH QXFOHDU
powers club. However, it should be stipulated that Ukraine had never been a member
of this club. It seems that to put these proposals to a referendum allegedly with the aim
RI PDWFKLQJ ³WKHDPELWLRQVRIWKHDXWKRULWLHV ZLWKWKHLQWHUHVWVRISHRSOH´ LVFORVH WR
adventurism in politics.

State Control of the Nuclear Industry

Can one think that in the non-nuclear Ukraine all norms of ensuring nuclear security
are being observed? Although it is a word play, it seems that the question is put
correctly. In 2006, the government made the long-awaited decision to consolidate all
enterprises of the atomLFSRZHULQGXVWU\LQWRRQHEXVLQHVVJURXS³8NUDWRPSURP´7KH
business group included almost all enterprises engaged in the creation of the nuclear-
fuel cycle or other activities in this field, as well as the research institutions of the
atomic industry. TKH KHDG RI 8NUDWRPSURP EHFDPH WKH OHDGHU RI 8NUDLQH¶V DWRPLF
power industry ± 11(*& ³(QHUJRDWRP´ 6XFK D GHFLVLRQ KDG EHHQ ORQJ-awaited by
the experts; it proved that the Ukrainian government was finally taking this dangerous
industry under the state control.
At the same time, Russia invited Ukraine to take part in the project on international
uranium enrichment in Angarsk. This raises the question: what does this have to do
with Ukraine? Apparently, in this case, apart from the pure commercial profits, Russia
142 V. Grechaninov / Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security

as a member of the nuclear club plays the role of the non-proliferation controller over
Ukraine.
The analysis of the corresponding situation in Ukraine compared with the world
rates, in which 73 companies run 450 nuclear reactors, is characterized by the
following statistics. The Ukrainian Energoatom is the sixth-largest nuclear company in
WKHZRUOG2Q8NUDLQH¶VWHUULWRU\DSDUWIURPWKHVDGO\NQRZQ&KHUQRE\OSRZHU plant,
operate the Rovensk, South-Ukrainian, Khmelnitsky and Zaporozhye plants. Ukraine
either possesses produced nuclear energy technologies or is capable of acquiring the
necessary technologies in the shortest possible time as it has both the developed
research-and-production base in this sphere and its own highly qualified specialists.
Ukratomprom intends to attract investment for the development of the branch,
primarily for the production of nuclear fuel cycle elements. Ukraine itself extracts
uranium and is capable of enriching it on its own; however the quantity of this uranium
is insufficient even to cover the needs of Energoatom. In order to increase the uranium
extraction it is necessary to invest big money, and Ukraine intends both to increase the
mining and to attract the financial resources.
Ukraine plans to continue the construction of new nuclear power plants8NUDLQH¶V
Energy Strategy determines that 20 new units should be built by 2030. That is, of
course, very hard to believe.

Public Support for Nuclear Power

In the conditions of a non-nuclear Ukraine, it makes sense to assess the formation of

the public attitude towards nuclear energy within the context of ensuring the national
security.
The results of social research on the attitude of citizens toward the state and
development of nuclear energy in Ukraine could have been better. Although 30% of
respondents regard nuclear energy as the main source of electric energy in Ukraine at
present and for the future, more than 50% are opposed to the building of new reactors
and 40% think that the Ukrainian nuclear power plants are environmentally unsafe. The
main drawback here is that more than 80% of the population has practically no
information about the prospects and plans of atomic energy development. In light of
the existing situation in which the programs of nuclear energy development in the non-
nuclear states can advance only with the support of the population, it is essential that
the public should participate in the decision-making concerning the construction of
atomic power stations and feel certain that the nuclear technologies are under reliable
control. To achieve this end, the informing of the people should be systematic,
exhaustive and comprehensible.
In discussing the role of the society and its understanding of the nuclear energy
situation, it should be pointed out that one of the main reasons for the low public
acceptance of nuclear energy as a reliable, cheap and environmentally safe source of
energy is the deep-rooted fear of radioactivity ± radiophobia. It is a question of the
H[FHVVLYH VRPHWLPHV DFXWH FKURQLF FKDUDFWHU RI SHRSOH¶V IHDU IRU WKHLU KHDOWK WKDW LV
the consequence of the lack of knowledge and the misinformation regarding the affect
of small doses of ionizing radiation.
The epidemic of radiophobia is widely spread across the country. So far the
science rarely challenged the deep-rooted dogmas which had become entrenched
within public opinion over many years. At the same time, the radiology scientists take
 V. Grechaninov / Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security 143

an active role in countering radiophobia and propose to improve education among the
population and mass media on the impact of small dozes of radiation.

Conclusions

1. Due to various factors, Ukraine cannot yet be considered to be part of the

group of like-minded middle-range powers with analogous intentions.
+RZHYHU8NUDLQH¶VGLVDUPDPHQWH[SHULHQFHFDQEHXVHGfor positive purpose
in the world today.
2. Can Ukraine be regarded as a secure state as far as nuclear issues and the
existing domestic and foreign problems are concerned, even taking into
account the Chernobyl experience? Probably, it can!
3. There are hopes that the new leaders who came to power after the
extraordinary parliamentary elections will be able to ensure progress in
Ukraine, both in the development of atomic energy and in ensuring nuclear
security.
144 Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.
doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-144

The Present and the Future of Nuclear

Doctrines
Alexander NIKITIN and Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV1

Abstract. The nuclear doctrines and strategies of the nuclear weapons states
remain mired in Cold War thinking and are based on a deterrence principle that is
obsolete in the atmosphere of the declared partnership between Russia and the
West. The provisions of these nuclear doctrines and strategies cannot provide an
effective defense against modern threats and challenges, particularly, terrorism and
the proliferation of WMD. In the face of these threats, a new level of cooperation
between states is needed. This will be impossible to achieve without a broad and
public cooperative discussion and at meeting of the minds among politicians and
experts of the concerned countries concerning threat perceptions and the adequacy
of nuclear strategies in the context of modern geopolitical realities.

Analysis of the existing nuclear doctrines and strategies reveals a number of

systematic drawbacks. The nuclear doctrines in their present form remain mired in
Cold War thinking, especially in that they are based on the principle of nuclear
deterrence. The nuclear doctrines and strategies are still mostly aimed at countering
\HVWHUGD\¶V WKUHDWV ± deterring former opponents -- at a time when new threats to
national security are becoming dominant.
As in Cold War times, the two largest nuclear arsenals remain aimed at each other
and are constantly modernized in the USA and in Russia, the successor country of the
Soviet Union. The paradox of this dichotomy is in the fact that the two sides view each
other as the main potential threat despite partnership relations having been officially
declared between Moscow and Washington.
There are certain grounds on both sides for such a situation. One of the principle
factors on the Russian side is the feeling that its concerns about some important aspects
of Western policy were not taken into consideration. One of these concerns is clearly
NATO enlargement, which has been considered by Russian experts and politicians
from the very beginning as a Washington initiative.
5XVVLD¶V RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKLV SURFHVV ZDV QHYHU DGHTXDWHO\ DGGUHVVHG E\ 1$72
bureaucrats and Western leaders. All attempts by Russian representatives to start a
serious discussion on these matters were answered by revived talking points (such as
WKDW 1$72 HQODUJHPHQW PHDQV WKH ³HQODUJHPHQW RI GHPRFUDF\´ DQG WKDW LW LV QRW
aimed against Russia and in no way threatens Russian national security interests).
Receiving no positive answer to its concerns, Russia perceived this part of Western
policy with great disquiet. It would not be an exaggeration to say that NATO expansion
inflicted the most damage to Russian-Western relations.

1
Alexander Nikitin is Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of
International Relations and President of the Russian Political Science Association. Sergey Oznobishchev is
Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments.
 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines 145

+HQFHLWLVQRWVWUDQJHWKDWLQWKH5XVVLDQ³&RQFHSWRI1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\´WKHOLVW
RI ³SULQFLSOH WKUHDWV LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VSKHUH´ LQFOXGHV LQ WKLUG SODFH ³WKH
strengthening of the military political blocks and unions, in the first place the NATO
HQODUJHPHQWWRWKH(DVW´ 2 ,QWKH³0LOLWDU\'RFWULQH´RIWKH5ussian Federation, among
WKH ³SULQFLSDO H[WHUQDO WKUHDWV´ OLVWHG RQH ILQGV LQ IRXUWK SRVLWLRQ WKH PHQDFH IURP
1$72 EHLQJ GHVFULEHG DV DQ ³HQODUJHPHQW RI PLOLWDU\ EORFNV DQG XQLWLHV ZLWK
SUHMXGLFHWRWKHPLOLWDU\VHFXULW\RIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ´ 3
Also it is not a coincidence that then-President Vladimir Putin, in his famous
VSHHFKDWWKH0XQLFK&RQIHUHQFHLQ)HEUXDU\HPSKDVL]HGWKDW³1$72LVSXWWLQJ
LWV IRUFHV DW WKH IRUHIURQW RI RXU VWDWH ERUGHUV´  +H DOVR VDLG ³WKH SURFHVV RI 1$72
enlargement has nothing to do with the modernization of the alliance itself and to the
providing of security in Europe. Quite on the contrary ± this is the seriously provoking
factor, diminishing the level of mutual confidence. And we have the fair right to ask
candidly ± DJDLQVWZKRPLVWKLVHQODUJHPHQWPHDQW"´4
It is also not a coincidence that just a year later, on February 8, 2008, Putin
returned to the same topic in his speech before the State Council, which was considered
by many observers to be his political testament before the presidential election less than
a month later. It is very illustrative that, in this address to the Russian political elite,
Putin in rather decisive words again addressed the threat emerging from NATO, which
KHGHVFULEHGDV³HQODUJLQJ EULQJLQJLWVPLOLWDU\LQIUDVWUXFWXUHFORVHUWRRXUERUGHUV´5
7KH SHUFHLYHG WKUHDW IURP WKH ³1$72 PLOLWDU\ EORFN´ DQG LWV PLOLWDU\ VWUDWHJ\
including its nuclear aspect, serve as one of the arguments in favor of preserving the
Russian nuclear arsenal and deterrence strategy in a practically unchanged form. Of
course, certain provisions of the NATO Strategic Concept are also taken into
consideration.
$QRWKHUVWURQJDUJXPHQWLQIDYRURINHHSLQJQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFHLQWDFWLV5XVVLD¶V
concern about its own national security in light of the US policies of striving for world
leadership, interfering in the internal affairs of other states, and breaching international
law. Moscow very decisively opposed the way Washington started the Iraq military
campaign, for example.
Among the Russian expert political community there was a widely held
assuredness, witnessed at that time by the authors, that if it was going to be impossible
WRUHWXUQWKH,UDTLVLWXDWLRQWRWKH³OHJDOILHOG´LHXQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRIWKH81WKen
Russia would be unable to proceed in building partnership-like relations with the US.6
Although US activity in Iraq was legitimized when the UN gave it the status of an
operation held under UN guidance, the Iraq case nevertheless served as a serious
turning point in undermining the US-Russian partnership.

2
Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation (approved by the Decree of the President
of the Russian Federation of December 17, 1997, # 1300, in the edition of the Decree of the President of the
Russian Federation of January 10, 2000, # 24), (http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/decree/2000_24_1.shtml).
3
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation of December of April 21, # 706), (http://www.mil.ru/articles/article3923.shtml).
4
President of Russia. Official Internet site. Presentation and Discussion at the Munich Conference on
Security Policy. February 10, 2007.
http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/02/10/1737_type63374type63376type63377type63381type826
34_118097.shtml
5
President of Russia. Official Internet site. Presentation at the Enlarged Meeting of the State Council
"On the Strategy of the Development of Russia towards the Year 2020" (as translated from Russian)..
http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/02/159528.shtml
6
S. Oznobishchev, "Revenge for the Humiliation," Trud Newspaper, April 23, 2003.
146 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines

The factors of NATO expansion eastward and of the US ambition for world
leadership, aggravated by its policy in Iraq with all the negative consequences for
Russian interests, are frequently mentioned in Russian military security documents, and
in the assessments of experts and politicians as being among the principle threats to
national security. These arguments assuredly influence the Russian nuclear outlook.
One of the examples is the provisions oI 5XVVLD¶V &RQFHSW RI 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\
The beginning of the document points out two concepts which contradict each other.
One of them, which Russia definitely follows, is aimed at the creation of a multi-polar
world. The other one, which no doubt was brought to life by Washington, is the attempt
WR³FUHDWHDVWUXFWXUHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDRIGRPLQDWLRQLQWKH
international community of developed Western countries with US leadership and
reckoning upon one-sided solutions, primarily based on military force, to the key
SUREOHPVRIZRUOGSROLF\FLUFXPYHQWLQJWKHIRXQGDWLRQDOQRUPVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´ 7
Not too much has changed since the time of the Cold War in the nuclear relations
of the principle players. Moreover, most of the components of the well-developed
security system vis-a-vis each other of the Cold War years remain untouched. Having
in mind that the principle nuclear players are still Russia and US, a set of factors
explaining this may be enumerated. The key actors of the bilateral character include:
- Inertia of Cold War thinking ± preservation of the old stereotypes in judging
WKHDFWLYLW\RIRQHDQRWKHUIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRI³UHVLGXDOFRQIURQWDWLRQ´
- Inertia of approaches and strategic concepts, conditioned by the existence of
WKH ³PLOLWDU\ PDFKLQH´ RI WKH &ROG :DU LQ WKH ILUVW SODFH RI WKH VWUDWHJLF
nuclear potentials), which ensured the confrontation between the USA and the
USSR, and of the West and the East, for the whole post-War period;
- The residual and the new ³LGHRORJL]DWLRQ´ RI WKH ELODWHUDO UHODWLRQVKLS
whereby any proposals and activity of the other side are invariably put under
doubt and considered as challenging or threatening the interests of the other
side; and
- Serious differences in the perception of principle threats and challenges.

On the Russian side, these factors include:

- Perceptions of the activities of the US and the other Western countries which
are considered by Moscow as targeting Russian interests (such as NATO
enlargement and NATO military activity in Kosovo in the former
Yugoslavia);
- Perceptions of US actions aimed at promoting the idea of a uni-polar world,
ignoring international law (examples include the war in Iraq and recognizing
Kosovo sovereignty in 2007);
- An evaluation by the overwhelming majority of the Russian political
community and decision-makers that the US policy line is aimed at
³JHRSROLWLFDO ULYDOU\´ ZLWK 5XVVLD IRU LQVWDQFH :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ
Central Asia and in the Caucasus); and
- Perspectives of the US ballistic missile defense deployments in Europe.

On the US side, the perceptions include factors relating to:

- Uncertainty about the long-term stability of Russia;
- Uncertainty about the democratic development of Russia;

7
&RQFHSWRIWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\RIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ«RSFLW
 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines 147

- Unpreparedness of the part of the American political elite to look upon Russia
as a competitor that is growing stronger; and
- Perceptions of Moscow activity in the close-abroad as a revitalization of neo-
imperialistic policy.

These perceptions undermine the partnership that was declared between the
Russian and US presidents. They also serve as a basis for preserving nuclear arsenals as
status symbols and the means to provide an independent policy and means of last resort
in time of war. The presence of nuclear arsenals and military doctrines tightly
connected with them make the possibility of genuine partnership even less possible.
The focus on nuclear deterrence, presupposed by the provisions of the doctrines, is
drawing attention and resources away from countering the new threats and challenges,
principally terrorism and proliferation. Deterrence is impotent against terrorists and
their activity. The strongest country in the world ± the US -- could not avoid the most
disastrous terrorist attack in history in its own territory. Nuclear deterrence, which
VHUYHVDVDQ³LGHRORJLFDOEDVLV´RIPRGHUQQXFOHDUGRFWULQHVFDQQRWGHWHUDQGGRHVQRW
ZRUN SURSHUO\ DJDLQVW ³URJXH VWDWHV´ ± authoritarian regimes posing a threat to
international security. In turn, the existence of nuclear deterrence greatly increases
mistrust and impedes a collective response to these challenges.
Nuclear doctrines and strategies in their contemporary form do not encourage the
nuclear states to fulfill their disarmament obligations as formally undertaken under
Article IV of the NPT ± i.e. that the parties to the treaty undertake to pursue
negotiations relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.
Moreover, the present crisis in US-Russian bilateral arms control is added to by
almost full non-involvement of other principal nuclear powers in nuclear arms control.
The absence of a clear-cut intention among the nuclear states to engage actively in
negotiations on nuclear disarmament serves as a considerable argument for some non-
nuclear countries to consider the perspective of acquiring nuclear weapons.
Collective efforts to oppose nuclear proliferation are being undermined by the lack
of confidence between the principle states-parties of this process. This deficit of
confidence will be very difficult to overcome within the existing orientation of the
contemporary nuclear strategies and doctrines.
It is clear that the role of nuclear deterrence is dramatically diminishing, which
SRVHVWKHTXHVWLRQRILWV³UDWLRQDO´DGHTXDF\WRWRGD\¶VUHDOLWLHV7RGHDOZLWKWKHQHZ
geopolitical realities, a new level of partnership is demanded. The achievement of this
goal is impeded by the mere philosophy of the policies based on nuclear deterrence.
The only "rational" explanation left is that deterrence is still required by Russia
and the West to serve as a last defense if worst-case scenarios begin to develop in the
bilateral relationship. It is still a rather wide-spread argument in discussions among
experts that "now Russian-American relations are going well, but no one may
guarantee that they will not deteriorate in the future." This lingering dichotomy was
never addressed by officials and was never seriously discussed at the intergovernmental
level.
The recent harsh reaction of Russian leaders, experts and the political community
to the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in Europe serves as a
clear-cut illustration that Russia and the US feel themselves to still be within the mode
of nuclear deterrence. Despite all the American explanations, Russian authorities
148 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines

FRQVLGHU WKHVH GHSOR\PHQWV WR EH D GLUHFW WKUHDW RU DW OHDVW D FKDOOHQJH WR 5XVVLD¶V
national deterrent potential. This is despite the fact that the Cold War ended twenty
years ago and replaced by a declared partnership policy.
This deterrence is still considered both in Moscow and Washington as part of the
US-Russia strategic equilibrium. President Putin emphasized that the US European
ABM system is "not simply a defensive system. This is part of the American system of
nuclear weapons". Moreover the future limited ABM system was characterized as a
"system of the American nuclear strategic complex" whose appearance, for Russia, is
³HTXDO WR WKH GHSOR\PHQW RI 3HUVKLQJ PLVVLOHV 7KH WKUHDW LV DEVROXWHO\ WKH VDPH 8
Senior Russian officials, including President Putin, have never recognized a bilateral
"deterrence formula" in connection with the ABM system; instead they have
emphasized that Russia for a long time already has had at its disposal effective systems
to overcome the antimissile defense.9
There are some other worrisome features of the modern attitude to nuclear
weapons: they are increasingly considered not as political instruments but as combat
weapons. In the Russian Concept of National Security, the possibility to apply all
forces and means, "including nuclear weapons" at the disposal of the Russian
Federation, is presupposed in case of the necessity to rebuff, military aggression if "all
other means to solve the crisis situation are exhausted and appear to be ineffective". 10
This presupposes in fact an acknowledgement of the feasibility to be the first to use
nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear conflict. Another symptomatic acknowledgement is
the declaration of the task "of providing deterrence in the interests of prevention of
aggression of any scale". A similar vision has long been typical of the US official
"nuclear documents".
Another part of the same Russian document discusses the necessity of the Russian
Federation having at its disposal "nuclear forces capable to inflict in a guaranteed way
predetermined damage to any aggressor state or to a coalition of states under any
conditions".11 This in its turn means an acknowledgement of the feasibility of a limited
war, the mere impossibility of which for long time was being accepted by Soviet
scientists. Again, similar provisions may be seen in American documents.
The military-technical possibility of a limited strike is supported by the fact that
Russia and the USA have at their disposal a still unknown number of tactical nuclear
missiles. The limitation proposals of President George H. W. Bush and the "responsive
steps and the counterproposals" of Presidents Michael Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in
1991-1992 were made in the form of oral declarations and thus were never put on paper
or formulated as an agreement. As a result, both sides now possess an additional
unknown nuclear potential of tactical missiles and artillery shells.
At the same time the presence of tactical nukes in the arsenals of the powers makes
the use of nuclear weapons to be a more realistic prospect. This prospect will be even
more real if Russian threats to abrogate the INF Treaty come true.
One more worrisome feature of the present nuclear doctrines lies in the vision of
military use. According to the analysis of prominent specialists to whom the practical

8
President of Russia. Official Internet site, Statement for the press and responses to the questions at
the results of the Russian-Czech negotiations, April 27, 2007. Pershings were US medium-range nuclear-
armed missiles deployed in Europe in the time of the Cold War in 1983.
(http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/04/27/2055_type63377type63380_125771.shtml)
9
http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2001/12/13/putin1/
10
&RQFHSWRIWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\«RSFLW
11
Ibid.
 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines 149

state of the "nuclear realities" is well-known, "although nuclear deterrence does not
require the concept of launch-on-warning attacks, which has (nevertheless) been
adopted by both the United States and Russia".12 A very peculiar proof that "launch-on-
warning thinking" exists appeared in connection with the perceived threat by Moscow
of the US plans to deploy the European-based ABM.
General Yury Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian Armed Forces' General Staff,
declared that the "launch of an American anti-missile may provoke a responsive
intercontinental ballistic missile strike ". He said: "the configuration of the anti-missile
itself, the trajectory and the direction of its flight is akin to the ICBM. Hence the false
qualification made towards the launch of the antimissile from the territory of Poland
may provoke a responsive strike" because "if Iran wanted to strike the USA, the
antimissiles launched from Poland will fly in the direction of Russian territory". In this
connection, General Baluyvsky acknowledged that Russia has an automated early
warning system which qualifies missile launch in an automatic regime with minimal
human participation.13
Hence, paradoxically, but in present nuclear doctrinal documents and rhetoric, one
can see much more accentuation of nuclear weapons than during Cold War times.
What changes in the nuclear doctrines and nuclear policies could be recommended
to the main nuclear parties in order to provide more stability, predictability and move in
the direction of a nuclear-weapon-free world? Such changes could be summarized as
follows:

x The SORT agreement (as the only agreement in the strategic area which will
remain valid after 2009) should clearly be made irreversible and extended in
its time-frame, possibly by an additional protocol (otherwise the ceilings it
imposes will formally cease after 2012).
x The system of START-I verification, inspections and data exchange measures
should be extended as a package, at least for the period 2009-2012 (after the
end of the START-I limit and until the end of the time frame of SORT).
x A further significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear weapons should
be planned down to a level comparable with the level of the three other
established nuclear powers (at the level of hundreds, instead of the level of
thousands) with some stringent deadlines.
x Withdrawn or decommissioned warheads and delivery systems should be
destroyed, and the fate of accumulated reserve arsenals made subject to a
VHSDUDWH OLQH RI QHJRWLDWLRQV DLPHG DW DQ ³H[FHVVLYH ZDUKHDGV HOLPLQDWLRQ´
agreement.
x All possible efforts should be made to prevent dissolution of the INF Treaty
and the re-introduction into Russian and American arsenals of short- and
intermediate-range nuclear (and conventional) missiles. Such a reintroduction
would lead to the emergence of numerous regional misbalances and a
heightening of stakes and risks in many regional conflicts. Among other

12
Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin. Beyond Nuclear Deterrence (Transforming the U.S. ± Russian
Equation). Wash., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. p. 108 [Arbatov was Deputy
Chairman of the Committee of Defense in the State Duma ± Russian Parliament, General Dvorkin ± former
Director of the 4th Institute of Strategic Forces ± auth.]
13
³U.S. antimissile launch may provoke counterattack - army chief,´ Agency RIA-Novosti, December
15, 2007.
(http://www.rian.ru/politics/foreign/20071215/92598395.html)
150 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines

consequences, Russian potential withdrawal from the INF could lead to the
reintroduction in Europe of large quantities of US sub-strategic weapons.
x Tactical nuclear weapons have only been withdrawn and reduced for now by
unilateral measures. As a first step towards opening the line of negotiations on
such weapons, initial declarations on general quantities and composition by
types of tactical nuclear arsenals possessed by both sides should be extended.
Transparency, even if only relative and partial, regarding the tactical nuclear
weapons of the two major nuclear powers may have an important influence on
the willingness and readiness of smaller and newer nuclear powers to enter in
principle into arms control and limitation multilateral dialogue.
x The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should enter into force as a critical way
of preventing further vertical proliferation. This depends primarily on the
decision of the United States to rescue the treaty. Efforts should be made to
motivate India, Pakistan and North Korea to follow Israel in acceding to the
CTBT.
x A Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) should be discussed and
negotiated in a short time, as far as overproduction of weapons-grade fissile
materials in the world is obvious and extremely dangerous in view of the risk
of nuclear terrorism. Urgent conclusion of an FMCT may become a shared
priority for Russia and the West exactly in the situation of new security
concerns regarding the risk of nuclear terrorism.
x The smaller nuclear powers should also contribute to the disarmament agenda.
0RGHUQL]DWLRQRIQXFOHDUIRUFHV&KLQHVHIRUFHVUHQHZDORI³7ULGHQW´LQWKH
UK, etc.) should be indefinitely postponed, although this only could be
achieved through individual decisions of those nuclear powers and not
imposed by major nuclear powers.
x Non-GHSOR\PHQW RI D FRXQWU\¶V RZQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV EH\RQG LWV ERUGHUV on
RWKHU FRXQWULHV¶ WHUULWRULHV VKRXOG EHFRPH D OHJDOO\ ELQGLQJ QRUP RI
international relations. Only American nuclear forces are currently deployed
outside national territory (in European NATO countries). Being insignificant
in quantity for NATO strategic tasks, these residual American weapons on
European soil create an unnecessary precedent for other official or de-facto
nucleDUSRZHUVZKRPLJKWGHFLGHWR³VKDUH´WKHLUQXFOHDUZHDSRQVZLWKDOOLHV
creating dangerous unbalances and de-facto proliferation.
x The nuclear powers should agree with no reservation to respect proposals for
establishing nuclear=weapon-free zones, and commit to respect the zones
already established.
x Reliance on nuclear weapons in national security strategies should be
manifestly reduced. Nuclear weapons should be all de-alerted, and a strategy
of launch-on-warning avoided.
x De-facto nuclear powers are also expected to contribute to the disarmament
agenda, by acceding to relevant existing arms control treaties, by converting
some arms control mechanisms (like INF) to multilateral agreements, by
respecting the basic NPT constraints, and by stopping further nuclear
modernization and plans for future development of nuclear weapons.

To clear the way to a new level of cooperation and partnership needed in the 21st
century, the principle issues of nuclear strategy and the whole scope of factors
formulating these strategies and the related documents should be urgently discussed.
 A. Nikitin and S. Oznobishchev / The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines 151

Such discussions should be undertaken on both an official and unofficial expert level
and be executed cooperatively by the representatives of different states. The results of
such discussions should be implemented in drastic changes to nuclear doctrines,
strategies and practices, making them much more transparent and responsive to the
demands of the modern world.
Unfortunately it is difficult to expect a break-through to occur in this sphere in a
period when the political leadership is being changed in Russia and the USA and when
these elites still do not rule out the other side again becoming a potential adversary.
However, a window of opportunity could be created if political leaders understand the
seriousness of the world security problems and the obsolete character of the present
nuclear arsenals and the nuclear doctrines furnishing them.
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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies 153
M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008
© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Author Index
Basrur, R.M. 129 Oznobishchev, S. v, 144
Cirincione, J. 30 Pikaev, A. 99
Dunn, L.A. 25 Pollack, J.D. 113
Evron, Y. 121 Romashkin, P. 70
Fitzpatrick, M. v, 92 Rűhle, M. 58
Grechaninov, V. 138 Smith, H. 7
Ifft, E. 16 Stocker, J. 64
Khyrapin, A. 1 Teng, J. 79
Mizin, V. 39 Zolotarev, P. 87
Nikitin, A. 144
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