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The first five of the above were considered particularly important. However,
there is paucity of information on the occurrence of hybrid backcrossing
(believed to be a central step in introgression) and how different
transgenes may possibly influence gene flow to wild or weedy relatives.
(a) whether gene flow can take place from transgenic to wild relatives or
weeds growing in the vicinity?
(b) whether hybrids derived from gene dispersal are capable of survival
and establishment?
Researchers who firmly believe that there is a strong opportunity for escape
of engineered genes feel that the key question about the release of
transgenic crops is not whether the transgenes will escape, but rather the
adaptive nature of genes themselves. They emphasize that the risk of
transgene escape via crop/congener hybridization must be considered when
releasing transgenics in countries where native populations of that crop
plant exist.
Argument that say “Transgenics pose little or no risk through gene flow
• McPartlan and Dale (1994) provided evidence that the extent of gene
dispersal from transgenic to nontransgenic potatoes fall markedly with
increasing distance, and was negligible at 10 m. There was also no
evidence of transgene movement from potato to wild species, Solanum
dulcamara and S. nigrum, under field conditions.
TRAP CROP. Use of trap crops, which are non-transgenic varieties of the same crop, planted
adjacent to the transgenic plot, can cleanse emigrating pollinators of transgenic pollen, thus
preventing gene flow. An experiment conducted by M/ s Calgene Ine. in California and Georgia with
transgenic canola/rapeseed (B. napus), using kanamycin resistance marker, showed that effectiveness
of the trap crop depends on the width of the isolation zone; gene escape was reduced when the two
varieties were separated by 8 m, but escape increased across a 4 m isolation zone.
MALE STERILITY. Introduction of male sterility so that engineered crops produce no pollen, or
pollen that is inactive, is another suggested mechanism to prevent gene flow from transgenic to
sexually compatible species through pollen. Linking of the engineered gene to a gene that is lethal in
pollen is a mechanism that can provide effective male sterility (Hernould et at., 1993) ..
OTHER STRATEGIES. Also proposed were strategies such as (i) removal of flowers from
transgenic plants, and (ii) removal of sexually compatible species. But, these manual strategies may
not find much applicability at a commercial level. A highly potential strategy that may be widely
applied in future to effectively circumvent the problem of gene flow is 'plastid transformation' or
'cWoroplast transformation', where the gene construct is introduced into chloroplasts and a selection
strategy is adopted that allows cells to retain only transformed chloroplasts (Maliga, 1993). This is in
contrast to 'nuclear transformation', which has so far led to development of various transgenic
varieties that have been commercialized. Since chloroplasts are inherited through cytoplasm, and
since pollen
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• Are the products of marker genes, such as nptIL which confers kanamycin
resistance to the transgenic plant, toxic. to human and animal health?
• Will the spread of the marker genes from genetically modified plants to
other living organisms in that . environment, be it plants through gene
flow or even bacteria through horizontal gene transfer, cause
unacceptable damage?
strategies that can make use of a selectable marker gene till the
transformants are identified, followed by removal of selectable marker from
identified transformants.
The general theory behind this concern is that genetic modification can
lead to crops with enhanced invasiveness, persistence or weediness.
'Invasiveness' or 'weediness' means tendency of the plant to spread beyond
the field where first planted, causing undesirable ecological changes. This
issue would seem particularly relevant to new crops or old crops introduced
into new areas. The classic example is 'kudzu', a plant which was introduced
into the southeastern United States to control soil erosion, and has -now
become a major invasive weed in the region (Cook, 2000).
In contrast, Crawley et at. (1993) have contended that transgenic lines are
less invasive and less persistent than their conventional counterparts. They
arrived at this conclusion through an experiment to assess whether genetic
engineering for herbicide tolerance affects the likelihood of rapeseed
Creation of 'Super-Weeds'
Herbicide resistance is currently one of the most successful as well as
highly controversial applications of agricultural biotechnology. A large
proportion of the transgenic varieties under commercial cultivation (see chapter
4) has herbicide resistance. Environmental organizations believe that weeds
will become more resistant through the use of new herbicide resistant
transgenic cultivars, and their commercialization, even otherwise, is not
consistent with sustainable agriculture (Bijman, 1994). Wrubel et at. (1993)
have expressed concern that farmers will apply high doses of herbicides over
several seasons, rather than limiting their use or using them in rotation with
other herbicides, thus increasing chances of development of herbicide-
resistant weeds. Hill (1991) also was of the opinion that crops engineered for
herbicide resistance might increase herbicide use.
reported that plants could be grown in soils with high residual levels of
sulfonylurea, and there was no yield penalty in the presence or absence of
herbicides. Dixon (1995) also argued that transgenic plants will require less
chemical use than nontransgenic plants, and that use of herbicide-resistant
plants will lead to more sustainable agronomic practices when used in
commercial farming.
Creation of 'Super-Viruses'
There is a fear expressed that new virulent virus strains may emerge
from using virus-resistant transgenics, basically through two mechanisms -
heteroencapsidation and recombination.
Food Safety
In the context of modern agricultural biotechnology the term biosecurity has two components,
biosafety, the safety of genetically engineered (GE) organisms and/or their products to humans and
animals as food, feed and medicine; and environmental safety, the safety of non-target organisms,
soil and water. The terms biosecurity and biosafety are often used incorrectly as synonyms.
Biosecurity issues raised to oppose GE crops by anti-tech activists are relevant even to products of
classical agricultural biotechnology, but were never made an issue in that context.
It was the international scientific community, not the anti-tech activists, who have identified the
possible biosecurity risks from the transgenic crops and devised testing and mitigation protocols.
Science has reasonable peer reviewed experimental evidence to answer biosecurity concerns. The
regulatory process in every country ensures that all questions are answered reasonably satisfactorily
before commercialization is permitted. Most of those who raise biosecurity issues to voice their
opposition to GE crops have no locus standi in terms of scientific knowledge and expertise to trash
the combined global scientific wisdom.
Biosafety of Bt
Bt being a universally occurring soil bacterium, all species of plants and animals in agricultural and
other situations, and those that use plants as food have been exposed to Bt and Bt proteins for
centuries. Bt proteins are transient in the environment, the toxicity of Bt proteins is pest specific,
dependent upon a set of biological pre-requisites. The use of Bt as a conventional pesticide for over
60 years has demonstrated that it is safe to a variety of non-target organisms. Cry proteins were
shown to be harmless to vertebrates, including mammals and humans, even at high doses, by
ingestion, inhalation or injection.