October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Marjorie Natividad

Facts
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the
evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT
station. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between
the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.

Issue
WON the petitioners are liable for the death of the NICANOR
NAVIDAD, JR.

Ruling
YES. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using

the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for
so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought
to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death

of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of
its employees or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982
model Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection
with a bus service which they operated in Manila. The couple had a
driver, Porfirio J. Cabil.

On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World

Christian Fellowship, Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the
transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from
Manila to La Union and back.

The group embarked on their trip. Petitioner Cabil drove the

minibus. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen,
Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so
petitioner Cabil, was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-
ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan.

That night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the

highway. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the
bus, to skid to the left road shoulder, coming to a full stop only after a
series of impacts. Several passengers were injured.

Issue
WON petitioners are liable for the injuries.

Ruling
YES. Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his
negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the
Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of
their employee. Due diligence in selection of employees is not
satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional
driver’s license.

The employer should also examine the applicant for his

qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in
supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with the rules.

As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise

“extraordinary diligence” for the safe transportation of the passengers
to their destination. Common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the
former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.(Article. 1759)
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.

Facts
Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of Transorient Container
Terminal Services, Inc, petitioner entered into a contract with San
Miguel Corporation for the transfer of 114 reels of semi-chemical
fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in
Manila to SMC’s warehouse at the Tabacalera Compound,
Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent
UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. On July 14, 1990, the shipment in
question, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board
“M/V Hayakawa Maru” and, after 24 hours, were unloaded from the
vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services,
Inc. From July 23 to July 25, 1990, petitioner, pursuant to her contract
with SMC, withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and
delivered it to SMC’s warehouse in Ermita, Manila. On July 25, 1990,
the goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who found that
15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn”
and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn. The damage was
placed at P93,112.00. SMC collected payment from respondent
UCPB under its insurance contract for the aforementioned amount. In
turn, respondent, as subrogee of SMC, brought suit against petitioner.

Issue
WON petitioner is a common carrier

Ruling
YES. Article 1732. defines common carriers as “Common carriers
are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the
public” Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services
to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and
one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population.

The concept of “common carrier” under Article 1732 may be seen

to coincide neatly with the notion of “public service. Because the
transportation of goods is an integral part of her business. To uphold
petitioner’s contention would be to deprive those with whom she
contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding
the fact that the obligation to carry goods for her customers, as already
noted, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for

reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case

(Article. 1733)
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
Respondent Ernesto Cendaña, a junk dealer, Upon gathering
sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring
such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler
trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. For his
service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower
than regular commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970,
petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant, contracted with respondent
for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse
in Makati, Rizal, to petitioner’s establishment in Urdaneta on or
before 4 December 1970. Accordingly, on 1 December 1970,
respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to his trucks: 150
cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent himself; while
600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by
Manuel Estrada, respondent’s driver and employee. Only 150 boxes
of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600
boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck which carried these
boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in
Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its
driver, his helper and the cargo.

Issue
WON respondent is responsible for the value of the undelivered
cargo

Ruling
NO. Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods which they carry, “unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
5. and Order or act of competent public authority.”

Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to

constitute a species of force majeure, fall within the scope of Article
1735, which provides as follows: “In all cases other than those
mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the
goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in

Article 1733.

Under Article 1745 (6) , a common carrier is held responsible —

and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility—
even for acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such
thieves or robbers in fact acted “with grave or irresistible threat,
violence or force.” We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty
of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
attended by “grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”
In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss
must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the
common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is
necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute
insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are
not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Bascos vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise
(CIPTRADE for short) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair
Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul
the latter’s 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes Drive,
Del Pan, Manila to the warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in
Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through
Rodolfo Cipriano, subcontracted with Estrellita Bascos (petitioner) to
transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal worth
P156,404.00 from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna at the
rate of P50.00 per metric ton. Petitioner failed to deliver the said
cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping
Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with the contract

Issue
WON the relationship between the private respondent and
petitioner is of carriage of goods

Ruling
YES. Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as
“(a) person, corporation or firm, or association engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.” The test to determine a common carrier is “whether the given
undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which
he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the
quantity or extent of the business transacted.

Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between

a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

Corporation

Facts
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver
on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators
aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the
plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., in Alabang, Metro Manila, to
the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was
traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in
Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified
truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment,

paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes
in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the
rights and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought
reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS.

Issue
WON respondent GPS may be considered as a common carrier

Ruling
YES. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no
other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier.
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation,
offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general
or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis.
The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or
goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its
transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS
scarcely falls within the term “common carrier.”
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Planters Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
On 17 May 1974, or prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on
the vessel M/V “Sun Plum” pursuant to the Uniform General Charter
2 was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and
KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo, Japan. Before loading the fertilizer
aboard the vessel, four (4) of her holds 4 were all presumably
inspected by the charterer’s representative and found fit to take a load
of urea in bulk pursuant to par. 16 of the charter-party.

After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by

and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed
with heavy iron lids, covered with three (3) layers of tarpaulin, then
tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed
throughout the entire voyage. 5 Upon arrival of the vessel at her port
of call on 3 July 1974, the steel pontoon hatches were opened with the
use of the vessel’s boom. Petitioner unloaded the cargo.

It took eleven (11) days for PPI to unload the cargo, from 5 July to
18 July 1974 (except July 12th, 14th and 18th). A private marine and
cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI), was
hired by PPI to determine the “outturn” of the cargo shipped, by
taking draft readings of the vessel prior to and after discharge. 11 The
survey report submitted by CSCI to the consignee (PPI) dated 19 July
1974 revealed a shortage in the approximating 18 M/T was
contaminated with dirt. The same results were contained in a
Certificate of Shortage/Damaged Cargo dated 18 July 1974 prepared
by PPI which showed that the cargo delivered was indeed short of
94.839 M/T and about 23 M/T were rendered unfit for commerce,
having been polluted with sand, rust and dirt.

Issue
WON a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a
charterparty

Ruling
NO. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V “Sun Plum”, the
ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of
the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct
supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the charterer, a
stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his
cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in
doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that the
steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the determination of
the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were
screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner.

It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as
in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at
least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is
concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for
the moment, be the property of the charterer.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act
No. 387, as amended, to contract, install and operate oil pipelines. The
original pipeline concession was granted in 1967 and renewed by the
Energy Regulatory Board in 1992. Sometime in January 1995,
petitioner applied for a mayor’s permit with the Office of the Mayor
of Batangas City. However, before the mayor’s permit could be
issued, the respondent City Treasurer required petitioner to pay a local
tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the
Local Government Code.

In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the tax under
protest in the amount of P239,019.01 for the first quarter of 1993.

Issue
WON petitioner is a common carrier

Ruling
YES. A “common carrier” may be defined, broadly, as one who
holds himself out to the public as engaged in the business of
transporting persons or property from place to place, for
compensation, offering his services to the public generally.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a “common carrier” as “any

person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.”

The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of

goods is:
 He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others
as a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to
engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a
business and not as a casual occupation;
 He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his
business is confined;
 He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business
is conducted and over his established roads;
 and The transportation must be for hire.

There is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in

the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum
products, for hire as a public employment.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport

Venture, Inc.

Facts
On September 25, 1991, SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from
the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V “Alexander Saveliev”
545 hot rolled steel sheets in coil weighing 6,992,450 metric tons. The
cargoes, which were to be discharged at the port of Manila in favor of
the consignee, Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), 4
were insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance Company Ltd.
(Industrial Insurance) The vessel arrived at the port of Manila on
October 24, 1991 and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it
a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor.
Schmitz Transport, whose services the consignee engaged to secure
the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and
to deliver them to its (the consignee’s) warehouse at Cainta, Rizal.

By 12:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991 during which the weather

condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the
unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. At around
5:30 a.m. of October 27, 1991, due to strong waves, the crew of the
barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge pitched
and rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing the 37
coils into the sea.

Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and
Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile.

Issue
WON petitioner is a common carrier

Ruling
YES. It is settled that under a given set of facts, a customs broker
may be regarded as a common carrier. in Calvo v. UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc., this Court held that as the transportation of goods
is an integral part of a customs broker, the customs broker is also a
common carrier. For to declare otherwise “would be to deprive those
with whom [it] contracts the protection which the law affords them
notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for [its]
customers, is part and parcel of petitioner’s business.”
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the
services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to
arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a
tour dubbed “Jewels of Europe”. The package tour included the
countries of England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein,
Switzerland and France.

Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunt’s residence on

June 12, 1991—a Wednesday—to deliver petitioner’s travel
documents and plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full
payment for the package tour. Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two hours before
her flight on board British Airways. Without checking her travel
documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to
take the flight for the first leg of her journey from Manila to Hong
Kong. To petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the flight she was
supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She learned
that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991.
She thus called up Menor to complain.

Issue
WON respondent is a common carrier

Ruling
NO. A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil
Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
lane, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public. It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not
an entity engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or
goods and is there fore, neither, a private nor a common carrier.
Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to
another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as a travel agency
include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as
well as booking customers for tours.

At most, respondent acted merely as an agent of the airline, with

whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe.
Respondent’s obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply to see
to it that petitioner was properly booked with the airline for the
appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination,
meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Sps. PEREÑA vs Sps. ZARATE

Facts
The Pereñas were engaged in the business of transporting students
from their respective residences in Parañaque City to Don Bosco in
Makati City, and back. In June 1996, the Zarates contracted the
Pereñas to transport Aaron to and from Don Bosco. On August 22,
1996, as on previous school days, the van picked Aaron up around
6:00 a.m. from the Zarates’ residence. Considering that they were
already running late because of the heavy vehicular traffic on the
South Superhighway, Alfaro took the van to an alternate route at
about 6:45 a.m. by traversing the narrow path underneath the
Magallanes Interchange that was then commonly used by Makati-
bound vehicles as a short cut into Makati.

At about the time the van was to traverse the railroad crossing,
PNR Commuter No. 302 (train), operated by Jhonny Alano (Alano),
was in the vicinity of the Magallanes Interchange travelling
northbound. As the train neared the railroad crossing, Alfaro drove the
van eastward across the railroad tracks, closely tailing a large
passenger bus. Alano applied the ordinary brakes of the train. He
applied the emergency brakes only when he saw that a collision was
imminent. The train hit the rear end of the van, and the impact threw
nine of the 12 students in the rear, including Aaron, out of the van.
Aaron died due to the incident.

Issue
WON petitioners are common carriers

Ruling
YES. The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or
extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and character
of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the undertaking is
a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to
the general public as his business or occupation. If the undertaking is
a single transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation
engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general public, the
individual or the entity rendering such service is a private, not a
common, carrier. The question must be determined by the character of
the business actually carried on by the carrier, not by any secret
intention or mental reservation it may entertain or assert when
charged with the duties and obligations that the law imposes.

There is no question that the Pereñas as the operators of a school

bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as
a business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

passengers over established roads by the method by which the

business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee.
Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the Pereñas operated as a
common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school
living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
On July 17, 1974, plaintiff National Steel Corporation (NSC) as
Charterer and defendant Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSI) as Owner,
entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired
VSI’s vessel, the MV ‘VLASONS I’ to make one (1) voyage to load
steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor,
Manila. The vessel arrived with the cargo at Pier 12, North Harbor,
Manila, on August 12, 1974. The following day, August 13, 1974,
when the vessel’s three (3) hatches containing the shipment were
opened by plaintiff’s agents, nearly all the skids of tinplatesand hot
rolled sheets were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. The cargo was
discharged and unloaded by stevedores hired by the Charterer.
Unloading was completed only on August 24, 1974 after incurring a
delay of eleven (11) days due to the heavy rain which interrupted the
unloading operations.

Issue
WON NSC contracted VSI as a common carrier

Ruling
NO. Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special
agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry goods for
the general public. The most typical, although not the only form of
private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime contract by which the
charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use and service
of all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or
voyages.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its
services to the general public.

In Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc., vs. Court of

Appeals and Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation, the Court ruled: in
a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their
duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them.
Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does
not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the
Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot
justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a
private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is
not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or
remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common
carriers.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
On June 13, 1990, 3,150 metric tons of Better Western White
Wheat in bulk, valued at US$423,192,35 4 was shipped by Marubeni
American Corporation of Portland, Oregon on board the vessel M/V
NEO CYMBIDIUM V-26 for delivery to the consignee, General
Milling Corporation in Manila. The shipment was insured by the
private respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.

On July 25, 1990, the carrying vessel arrived in Manila and the
cargo was transferred to the custody of the petitioner Asia Lighterage
and Shipping, Inc. The petitioner was contracted by the consignee as
carrier to deliver the cargo to consignee’s warehouse at Bo. Ugong,
Pasig City. On August 15, 1990, 900 metric tons of the shipment was
loaded on barge PSTSI III, for delivery to consignee. The cargo did
not reach its destination. It appears that on August 17, 1990, the
transport of said cargo was suspended due to a warning of an
incoming typhoon. On August 22, 1990, the petitioner proceeded to
pull the barge to Engineering Island off Baseco to seek shelter from
the approaching typhoon. PSTSI III was tied down to other barges
which arrived ahead of it while weathering out the storm that night. A
few days after, the barge developed a list because of a hole it
sustained after hitting an unseen protuberance underneath the water.

September 6, 1990, the towing bits of the barge broke. It sank

completely, resulting in the total loss of the remaining cargo.

Issue
WON petitioner is a common carrier

Ruling
YES. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the
definition of common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes
no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity. We also did not distinguish between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we ruled that Article 1732
does not distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
general public, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population. In the case at bar,
the principal business of the petitioner is that of lighterage and
drayage and it offers its barges to the public for carrying or
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

transporting goods by water for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a

common carrier.

In the case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the

business of shipping and lighterage, 26 offering its barges to the
public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods
by water for compensation.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Air France vs. Carrascoso

Facts
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48
Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958:
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in 'first class', but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man',
who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right' to the seat. When
asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be
expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G, Cuento, 'many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out
that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white
man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man.

Issue
WON the petitioner violated its contract of carriage

Ruling
YES. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind
and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of
the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground
for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public

duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Singson vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
On 24 May 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino
Tiongson bought from Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), at
its Metro Manila ticket outlet two (2) open-dated, identically routed,
round trip plane tickets for the purpose of spending their vacation in
the United States. Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons. The
procedure was that at the start of each leg of the trip a flight coupon
corresponding to the particular sector of the travel would be removed
from the ticket booklet so that at the end of the trip no more coupon
would be left in the ticket booklet.

On 6 June 1988 CARLOS SINGSON and Crescentino Tiongson

left Manila on board CATHAY’s Flight No. 902. They arrived safely
in Los Angeles and after staying there for about three (3) weeks they
decided to return to the Philippines. On 30 June 1988 they arranged
for their return flight at CATHAY’s Los Angeles Office. While
Tiongson easily got a booking for the flight, SINGSON was not as
lucky. It was discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight
coupon No. 5 corresponding to the San Francisco-Hongkong leg of
the trip.

Issue
WON there is a breach of the contract of carriage

Ruling
YES. CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract
when it refused to confirm petitioner’s flight reservation back to the
Philippines on account of his missing flight coupon. Interestingly, it
appears that CATHAY was responsible for the loss of the ticket. One
of two (2) things may be surmised from the circumstances of this
case: first, US Air (CATHAY’s agent) had mistakenly detached the
San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon thinking that it was the San
Francisco-Los An-geles portion; or, second, petitioner’s booklet of
tickets did not from issuance include a San Francisco-Hongkong
flight coupon. In either case, the loss of the coupon was attributable to
the negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the proximate cause of
the non-confirmation of petitioner’s return flight on 1 July 1988. It
virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the
carrier’s obligations under the contract. Hence, to hold that no
contractual breach was committed by CATHAY and totally absolve it
from any liability would in effect put a premium on the negligence of
its agents, contrary to the policy of the law requiring common carriers
to exercise extraordinary diligence.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

BA Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
The question of petitioner’s responsibility for damages when on
March 6, 1983, an accident occurred involving petitioner’s Isuzu ten-
wheeler truck then driven by an employee of Lino Castro is the thrust
of the petition for review on certiorari now before Us considering that
neither the driver nor Lino Castro appears to be connected with
petitioner.

Issue
WON petitioner is responsible for the damages

Ruling
YES. The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience
is liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by
passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle,
even though the same had been transferred to a third person.

The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing

with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has
the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual
owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the
actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles
being negligently operated if the public should be required to prove
who the actual owner is.

Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle,

even if not used for a public service, should primarily be responsible
to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Benedicto vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts
On 15 May 1980, Cruz in the presence and with the consent of
driver Licuden, supervised the loading of 7,690 board feet of sawn
lumber with invoice value of P16,918.00 aboard the cargo truck.
Before the cargo truck left Maddela for Valenzuela, Bulacan, Cruz
issued to Licuden Charge Invoices Nos. 3259 and 3260 both of which
were initialed by the latter at the bottom left corner.

Cruz instructed Licuden to give the original copies of the two (2)
invoices to the consignee upon arrival in Valenzuela, Bulacan and to
retain the duplicate copies in order that he could afterwards claim the
freightage from private respondent’s Manila office. On 16 May 1980,
the Manager of Blue Star called up by long distance telephone
Greenhills’ president, Henry Lee Chuy, informing him that the sawn
lumber on board the subject cargo truck had not yet arrived in
Valenzuela, Bulacan. The latter in turn informed Greenhills’ resident
manager in its Maddela sawmill of what had happened. In a letter
dated 18 May 1980, Blue Star’s administrative and personnel
manager, Manuel R. Bautista, formally informed Greenhills’ president
and general manager that Blue Star still had not received the sawn
lumber which was supposed to arrive on 15 May 1980 and because of
this delay, “they were constrained to look for other suppliers.”

Issue
WON the registered owner of the carrier, should be held liable for
the value of the undelivered or lost sawn lumber.

Ruling
YES. The prevailing doctrine on common carriers makes the
registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations
of the carrier, even though the specific vehicle involved may already
have been transferred to another person. This doctrine rests upon the
principle that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public
Service Law, the public has the right to assume that the registered
owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof. It would be very difficult
and often impossible as a practical matter, for members of the general
public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries
inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be
required to prove who the actual owner is.

The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving

the identity of the alleged transferee. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

claim, private respondent is not required to go beyond the vehicle’s

certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier.

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

Facts
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor
rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo located at Pier
18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed.
Pinned to death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent
Myrna Tamayo’s son, Reniel Tamayo, and Respondent Felix
Oledan’s daughter, Felmarie Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan
himself, Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent
Lucita Suyom.

Issue
WON petitioner should be held liable for the damges

Ruling
YES. because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time
of the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has consistently ruled
that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner
is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for
the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.

The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any

vehicle does not use it for public service.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by
defendant, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for
Manila. On May 12, 1975, said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor,
Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked, a gangplank having
been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of
using said gangplank, Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck
which was on the level with the pier. After said vessel had landed, the
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of
the cargoes loaded on said vessel.

The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its
crane operator Alejo Figueroa.. While the crane was being operated,
Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel
obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in
the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing
to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the
vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where
he later expired.

Issue
WON Ancelito Vianas is still considered as a passenger 1 hour after
he disembarked from the ship

Ruling
YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of
destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the
carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the
carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within
this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure.
The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact
that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for
example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his
baggage.
 October 23, 2020, Delizo, Mark Alvin B.

. That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the

attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of commom
carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so
forth,and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per
se without taking into account such other factors.

It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner’s

business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer
period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the
number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of
accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity
of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need
at least an hour as is the usual practice.

A carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to

their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim
their baggage.