FOR-1-CG-0263-EN - A.

AIRWORTHINESS OPERATOR MESSAGE

Date: 9 November 2020 Ref AOM: 2020/13 issue 3

AIRCRAFT MODELS: ATR42 ATA: 27 – 31

SUBJECT : Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – EASA AD 2020-

0221

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS: Yes No

APPLICABILITY
ATR 42-200/-300/-320 all MSN.

REASON
Events of suspicious spurious activation of the stall warning system have been reported to ATR. Such
activation can lead to one or a combination of the following:
 Autopilot disconnection,
 Stick pusher activation,
 Stick shaker activation,
 Aural Stall warning (Cricket audio alert),
 Master CAUTION lights flashing amber,
 STICK PUSHER green lights ON,
 FLT CTL amber light on CAP,
 Stick PUSHER/SHAKER pushbutton FAULT amber light illumination,
 Whooler audio alert.
Investigation evidenced that wiring damage on the wire bundle between an AOA probe and the Crew
Alerting Computer (CAC) can trigger the above sequence.
To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR has developed a one-time inspection, in Appendix 1.
This AOM is revised to issue 2 to inform operators that EASA released, on 13 October 2020, the
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-0221 addressing this issue.
This AOM is revised to issue 3 to correct a typo on page 9.

ACTIONS
ATR requires all concerned operators to comply with the actions set within the EASA AD 2020-0221:
 Before 27 December 2020 inclusive: to perform the inspection of the wire bundles as per
instructions provided in Appendix 1,
AOM 2020/13 issue 3 Page 1/18
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 FOR-1-CG-0263-EN - A.2
 Within 30 days after the inspection: to provide ATR with a feedback whatever the inspection
result is. This feedback shall be done by filling the reporting form attached in Appendix 2 of this
AOM.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
EASA AD 2020-0221 dated 13 October 2020, attached to this AOM.

ATTACHMENT
 Appendix 1: Inspection instructions of the wire bundles between LH and RH Angle of Attack
probes and the CAC

 Appendix 2: Accomplishment report of the inspection

APPROVAL
The technical content of this document is approved under the authority of the DOA ref. EASA.21J.044

D. CAILHOL
ATR Head of Continued Airworthiness
Email: continued.airworthiness@atr-aircraft.com

AOM 2020/13 issue 3 Page 2/18

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© ATR - 2020
 FOR-1-CG-0263-EN - A.2

Appendix 1

Wire routing inspection

AOM 2020/13 issue 3 Page 3/18

This document belongs to ATR. It may not be disposed to third parties and/or reproduced without prior written permission from ATR and its contents cannot be disclosed.
© ATR - 2020
 AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

1. PLANNING INFORMATION

A. INSPECTION FLOWCHART
The following flowchart presents the work to be done in a simplified way, details are
described in paragraphs "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS".

Inspection of LH/RH AOA

probe electrical routing

Is there at least one of the

following findings?

YES - electrical routing damaged NO

- conduit damaged or missing
- presence of any FOD
- electrical routing and conduits
not properly attached

Contact ATR No further action

before next flight
AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

B. MANPOWER

Manhours
Mechanic None
Electrician 10

Total manhours 10
Elapsed time (hours) 5

The above estimates are only provided for general guidance in operator's modification
planning.

NOTE: This inspection assumes that the aircraft has been placed in the appropriate
maintenance configuration. The manhours/elapsed time estimates do not include
preparation for the inspection, non-productive elapsed time or administrative
functions.

C. REFERENCES

The following publications have to be used during accomplishment of this inspection:

MP: ATR-A-24-4X-XX-00ZZZ-561Z-A
ATR-A-24-4X-XX-00ZZZ-761Z-A
ATR-A-25-11-10-00ZZZ-520Z-A
ATR-A-25-11-10-00ZZZ-720Z-A

2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS

A. GENERAL
The following instructions assume that work will be accomplished when the aircraft is in the
appropriate maintenance configuration.

B. JOB SET-UP

(1) De-energize the aircraft electrical network and connect the aircraft to ground as per MP
ATR-A-24-4X-XX-00ZZZ-561Z-A.

(2) In cockpit, remove captain and first officer seats as per MP ATR-A-25-11-10-00ZZZ-520Z-
A.

(3) In cockpit, remove panels 211MZ, 212SZ, 212MZ, 212DW.

(4) In forward cargo compartment, remove panels 222FZ, 222CZ.

AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

C. INSPECTION

NOTE: During accomplishment of this inspection, fill the enclosed Accomplishment Report
and send it to the address mentioned on the Accomplishment Report
NOTE: When reaching a step requiring to contact ATR, provide ATR with pictures.

CAUTION: DURING INSPECTION, MAKE SURE THAT:

- THERE IS NO FOD IN INSPECTED AREAS,
- ELECTRICAL ROUTING AND CONDUITS ARE PROPERLY ATTACHED.

IF THERE IS ANY FOD OR IF ELECTRICAL ROUTING AND CONDUITS ARE NOT PROPERLY
ATTACHED, PLEASE CONTACT ATR BEFORE NEXT FLIGHT.

(1) In cockpit, zone 211, inspection of electrical routing of LH AOA probe harness.

(a) Visual inspection of conduit around LH AOA probe harness.

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
1, sheet 1 area 1
1 Conduit - A.R.
1, sheet 2
INSPECTION OBJECT:
Check the presence and integrity of LH AOA probe ACTION TO BE
RESULT
harness conduit between connector (FIN7WW-A) PERFORMED
and FR9
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is conduit missing or is there damage on the
paragraph
conduit?
2.C.(1)(b)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(1)(b)
AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

(b) Visual inspection of each wires of LH AOA probe harness.

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
LH AOA probe 1, sheet 1 area 2
2 - A.R.
harness 1, sheet 2
INSPECTION OBJECT:
ACTION TO BE
Check the integrity of each wires of the LH AOA RESULT
PERFORMED
probe harness between FR8 and FR10.
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is there damage on wires of LH AOA probe harness? paragraph
2.C.(2)(a)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(2)(a)

(2) In cockpit, zone 212, inspection of electrical routing of RH AOA probe harness.

(a) Visual inspection of conduit on RH AOA probe harness.

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
3 Conduit - A.R. 2, area 1
INSPECTION OBJECT:
Check the presence and integrity of RH AOA probe ACTION TO BE
RESULT
harness conduit between FR9 and below 702VU PERFORMED
panel.
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is the conduit missing or is there damage on the
paragraph
conduit?
2.C.(2)(b)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(2)(b)
AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

(b) Visual inspection of each wires of RH AOA probe harness.

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
RH AOA probe
4 - A.R. 2, area 2
harness
INSPECTION OBJECT:
ACTION TO BE
Check the integrity of each wires of the RH AOA RESULT
PERFORMED
probe harness between FR7 and FR10.
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is there damage on wires of RH AOA probe
paragraph
harness?
2.C.(3)(a)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(3)(a)

(3) In cockpit, on 93VU shelf, inspection of electrical routing around connectors (FIN 934VC,
934VC-A, 937VC and 937VC-A).

(a) Visual inspection of LH AOA wires connected to connectors (FIN 937VC, 937VC-A).

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
- Wires - A.R. 3
INSPECTION OBJECT:
Check the integrity of wires connected to ACTION TO BE
RESULT
connectors (FIN 937VC and 937VC-A) pins 6, 7 and PERFORMED
11 thru 16.
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is there damage on wires? paragraph
2.C.(3)(b)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(3)(b)
AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

(b) Visual inspection of RH AOA wires connected to connectors (FIN 934VC, 934VC-A).

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
- Wires - A.R. 3
INSPECTION OBJECT:
Check the integrity of wires connected to ACTION TO BE
RESULT
connectors (FIN 934VC and 934VC-A) pins 2, 4 and PERFORMED
14 thru 19.
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is there damage on wires? paragraph
2.C.(4)(a)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(4)(a)

(4) In cockpit, on 91VU shelf, inspection of electrical routing around connectors (FIN 918VC,
918VC-A, 971VC and 971VC-A).

(a) Visual inspection of LH AOA wires connected to connectors (FIN 971VC, 971VC-A).

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
- Wires - A.R. 3
INSPECTION OBJECT:
Check the integrity of wires connected to ACTION TO BE
RESULT
connectors (FIN 971VC and 971VC-A) pins 6 and 75 PERFORMED
thru 77.
Contact ATR
before next flight
and continue
YES
inspection as per
Is there damage on wires? paragraph
2.C.(4)(b)
Inspection as per
NO paragraph
2.C.(4)(b)
AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

(b) Visual inspection of RH AOA wires connected to connectors (FIN 918VC, 918VC-A).

Inspect all the parts listed in the following table.

INSPECTION
Item Description Part Number Qty Figure
- Wires - A.R. 3
INSPECTION OBJECT:
Check the integrity of wires connected to ACTION TO BE
RESULT
connectors (FIN 918VC and 918VC-A) pins 13 and 53 PERFORMED
thru 55.
Contact ATR
YES
before next flight
Is there damage on wires?
Perform
NO
paragraph 2.E

D. TESTS

None.

E. CLOSE-UP

(1) In cockpit, re-install panels 211MZ, 212SZ, 212MZ, 212DW.

(2) In forward cargo compartment, re-install panels 222FZ, 222CZ.

(3) In cockpit, re-install captain and first officer seats as per MP ATR-A-25-11-10-00ZZZ-
720Z-A.

(4) Re-energize the aircraft electrical network and disconnect the aircraft from ground as
per MP ATR-A-24-4X-XX-00ZZZ-761Z-A.
 AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

MAIN VIEW

CONNECTOR (FIN 7WW-A) DISCONNECTED FROM AOA PROBE

FR9 ITEM 1

AREA 1: INSPECTION OF
AREA 2: INSPECTION OF
CONDUIT.
EACH WIRES OF LH AOA
SEE SHEET 2 FOR PROBE HARNESS
CONNECTOR (FIN 7WW-A)
CONNECTED TO AOA
PROBE AND DETAILS ITEM 2

ITEM 1

CONNECTOR (FIN 7WW-A)

DISCONNECTED FROM AOA PROBE

FWD
In cockpit, zone 211, inspection of LH AOA probe harness

Figure 1, sheet 1 of 2
 AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection
FR9
FWD

CONNECTOR (FIN 7WW-A)

CONNECTED TO AOA PROBE

ITEM 2

ITEM 1

In cockpit, zone 211, inspection of LH AOA probe harness

Figure 1, sheet 2 of 2
 AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection
ITEM 3
FR7 FWD FR9
FR8

AREA 1: INSPECTION
OF CONDUIT AREA 2: INSPECTION
OF EACH WIRE OF RH
AREA 2: INSPECTION AOA PROBE HARNESS
OF EACH WIRE OF RH
AOA PROBE HARNESS ITEM 4

CONNECTOR (FIN 8WW-A)

ITEM 4

ITEM 3

In cockpit, zone 212, inspection of RH AOA probe harness

Figure 2
 AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

A
CONNECTOR (FIN 937VC)
A B
91VU
93VU
CONNECTOR (FIN 971VC)

CONNECTOR (FIN 934VC) CONNECTOR (FIN 918VC)

In cockpit, on 91VU and 93VU shelves, inspection of electrical routing on connectors (FIN 934VC, 937VC, 971VC and 918VC)

Figure 3
 FOR-1-CG-0263-EN - A.2

Appendix 2

Accomplishment report of the inspection

AOM 2020/13 issue 3 Page 15/18

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© ATR - 2020
AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT

Send this report to: TECHDESK

1 ALLEE PIERRE NADOT 31712

BLAGNAC CEDEX FRANCE
phone : +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21
e-mail : techdesk@atr-aircraft.com
ATRactive : www.atractive.com

Aircraft identification

Aircraft MSN:

Aircraft registration number:

Flight cycles:

Flight hours:

Accomplishment date of this inspection:

AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

Inspection results

Tick ( ) the appropriate box

(1) For LH AOA probe harness

YES NO

(a) Is conduit missing?

(b) If the conduit is not missing, is it damaged?

(c) Is there damage on wires between FR8 and FR9?

(2) For RH AOA probe harness

YES NO

(a) Is conduit missing?

(b) If the conduit is not missing, is it damaged?

(c) Is there damage on wires between FR8 and FR9?

(3) For connectors on 93VU shelf

YES NO

(a) Is there damage on wires connected to 934VC?

(b) Is there damage on wires connected to 934VC-A?

(c) Is there damage on wires connected to 937VC?

(d) Is there damage on wires connected to 937VC-A?

(4) For connectors on 91VU shelf

YES NO

(a) Is there damage on wires connected to 918VC?

(b) Is there damage on wires connected to 918VC-A?

(c) Is there damage on wires connected to 971VC?

(d) Is there damage on wires connected to 971VC-A?

AOM 2020/13 Issue 3 – Risk of spurious activation of stall warning system – Wire routing inspection

Remarks:
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________

Maintenance organisation identification

Maintenance organisation name:

Name & Signature:

Date:
 EASA AD No.: 2020-0221

Airworthiness Directive
AD No.: 2020-0221
Issued: 13 October 2020
Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation
(EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third
countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which
an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I,
Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 71 exemption].

Design Approval Holder’s Name: Type/Model designation(s):

ATR-GIE AVIONS DE TRANSPORT REGIONAL ATR 42 aeroplanes

Effective Date: 27 October 2020

TCDS Number(s): EASA.A.084
Foreign AD: Not applicable
Supersedure: None

ATA 31 – Instruments – Angle of Attack Probe Electrical Routing – Inspection

Manufacturer(s):
ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional, formerly EADS ATR - Alenia, Aerospatiale Matra ATR -
ALENIA, Aerospatiale - Alenia, Aerospatiale – Aeritalia

Applicability:
ATR 42-200, ATR 42-300 and ATR 42-320 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Definitions:
For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

The AOM: ATR Airworthiness Operators Message (AOM) 2020/13 Issue 1.

Affected wiring: Electrical wire routing of the left-hand and right-hand side Angle of Attack (AOA)
probes.

Reason:
Several events have been reported by ATR 42 operators of experiencing spurious activation of the
stall warning system. Such activation can lead to one or a combination of the following events:
 Autopilot disconnection
 Stick pusher activation
 Stick shaker activation

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 EASA AD No.: 2020-0221

 Aural stall warning (cricket audio alert)

 Master CAUTION light flashing amber
 STICK PUSHER green light ON
 FLT CTL amber light on CAP
 Stick PUSHER/SHAKER pushbutton ‘FAULT’ amber light illumination
 Whooler Audio alert

Subsequent investigation results indicated that wiring damage on the wire bundle between an AOA
probe and the Crew Alerting Computer can trigger the above scenario.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane during
take-off and landing phases.

To address this potential unsafe condition, ATR issued the AOM to provide inspection instructions.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a one-time visual inspection of the affected
wiring and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s). This AD also
requires reporting to ATR of the inspection results.

This AD is considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

Inspection(s):
(1) Within 2 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish a visual inspection of the
affected wiring in accordance with the instructions of the AOM.

Corrective Action(s):
(2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, discrepancies are detected as
identified in the AOM, before next flight, contact ATR for approved repair instructions and
accomplish those instructions accordingly.

Reporting:
(3) Within 30 days after the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, report the results
(including no findings) to ATR. This can be accomplished in accordance with the instructions
of the AOM.

Ref. Publications:
ATR AOM 2020/13 Issue 1 dated 28 September 2020.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance
with the requirements of this AD.

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 EASA AD No.: 2020-0221

Remarks:
1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of
Compliance for this AD.

2. Based on the required actions and the compliance time, EASA have decided to issue a Final AD
with Request for Comments, postponing the public consultation process until after publication.

3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Programming and Continued
Airworthiness Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.

4. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be
similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on
a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the EU aviation safety
reporting system. This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than
those covered by the design to which this AD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or
may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be
installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate
(STC) or other modification.

5. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please
contact: ATR - GIE Avions de Transport Régional, Continued Airworthiness Service,
Telephone: +33 (0)5 62 21 62 21, Fax: +33 (0) 5 62 21 67 18;
E-mail: continued.airworthiness@atr-aircraft.com.

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