Barredo vs.

Garcia and Almario

73 Phil. 607 (July 8, 1942)
Facts: A taxicab figured in a head-on collision with a carretela. The carretela overturned,
causing death to one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy. A criminal case was instituted by the
parents of the deceased against Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former reserved
the right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The driver of the taxicab was
convicted. Subsequently, the parents instituted the present civil action for damages against
Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver. Barredo contends that his liability rests only on the
provision of the penal code and hence, since no civil action has been filed against Fontanilla, he
too cannot be held civilly responsible.
Issue: Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against the employer of the taxicab driver
making him primarily and directly responsible under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?
Held: YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil responsibility arising from
criminal liability. Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, an employer is primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
There are two remedies available for the parents to choose:
The first is under Article 100 of the Penal Code wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable
for damages arising from the crime committed by his employees. If the
parents choose this remedy, the complainant must first exhaust the properties of the employee,
before the employer’s properties could be made answerable.
The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein
the negligent employer is held primarily liable, subject to the defense that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and engagement of his
employees.
In this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is more practical to file for
damages against the employer, who is more solvent than his employee.
NOTE: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the new
Civil Code. The principle enunciated in said case (that responsibility for fault or
negligence under a quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the negligence penalized under the
Revised Penal Code) is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the New Civil Code.
Elcano vs. Hill
77 SCRA 98 (May 26, 1977)
.
.
Facts: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the
occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and, under laws effective at the time, also legally
married. Reginald is still living and receives subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald
was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because of “lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake.”
Issues: (1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar the present civil action for damages? (2) Is
Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liable?
Held: 1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish his liability
arising from quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof required in the criminal case
differs from that required in a civil suit. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient.
The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of
the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil Code
provides that “Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.”
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
also criminally charged, to recover damages on both scores. And assuming awards made in the
two cases vary, he would be entitled only to the bigger award of the two.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability refers exclusively to the civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil liability arising from quasidelict
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted.
2. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation by marriage of the
minor, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living
with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. The minor may be emancipated, but
that does not mean that he is no longer under the responsibility of his parents.
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his
father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation
which is not unusual.
However, inasmuch as Reginald is now of age (at the time the case reached the Supreme Court),
it is a matter of equity that the liability of Atty. Hill should be declared merely
subsidiary to that of his son.
Note: In this case, there is no doubt that Reginald killed Elcano. His acquittal is based on “lack
of intent to kill, coupled with mistake” and not on the non-commission of the acts alleged.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
90 SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979)
Facts: On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a
vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver
Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section
3(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
“(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, unitl final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.”
The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
Held: Yes, the civil suit for damages brought by the petitioner is based on quasi-delict predicated
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action:
“Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.”
The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising
from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.

Baksh vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97336 (February 19, 1993)
Facts: Private Respondent Marilou Gonzales filed an action for damages against Gashem Baksh
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Gonzales is 22 years old,
single, Filipina, a pretty lass of good moral character and has a reputation duly respected in her
community; Baksh, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen and is an exchange student
taking a medical course in Dagupan City.
Gonzales alleges that before 20 August 1987, Baksh courted and proposed to marry her. She
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married after the end of the
school semester. In fact, Baksh visited Gonzalez’ parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval
to the marriage. In August 1987, Baksh forced her to live with him in an apartment.
According to Gonzales, she was a virgin before she began living with him. A week before the
filing of the complaint, Baksh’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and
threatened to kill her. During a confrontation in the barangay, Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore, saying further that he is already
married to someone else.
Issue: Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong, thus making Baksh
liable for damages.
Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se .
This notwithstanding, Article 21 of the Civil Code has expanded the concept of torts
or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or
omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. In the Philippine legal
system, as envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal
Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21,
would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.
Where a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause for the woman to give herself unto him
in sexual congress, and there is proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 is in order. The court
took notice that Gonzales’ is an innocent barrio lass and a typical Filipina, who under our
customs would not have gave in to sexual congress with Baksh much more lived-in with him,
were it not for his promise to marry.

Dulay vs. Court of Appeals

243 SCRA 220 (1995) [see infra]
Facts: An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big
Bang sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, in which Torzuela, a security guard in
the said carnival shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Torzuela’s
security agency. Petitioner Maria Benita Dulay, widow of the deceased Atty. Dulay filed
an action for damages against Torzuela and SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD security
agency, which were impleaded as alternative defendants being the employer/s of Torzuela.
Petitioner Dulay alleged in her complaint that “the incident resulting in the death of Atty. Dulay
was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants, Torzuela’s wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD”
SUPERGUARD filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Torzuela’s act of shooting was beyond
the scope of his duties and that the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), and therefore, the civil liability is governed by the Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. - Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, could not lie, since the civil liability under Art. 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Art. 365 of the RPC. The RTC upheld the arguments of SAFEGUARD.
Thus in their appeal, the Dulays allege that: “without stating the facts showing such
negligence are mere conclusions of law…x x x…Respondent judge also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Art.100 &103, RPC as
distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict.” The CA affirmed the decision of the lower
court, hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.
distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict.” The CA affirmed the decision of the lower
court, hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON, Article 2176 covers only acts of negligence
HELD: No. Contrary to the theory of SAFEGUARD, there is no justification for limiting the
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also those which are voluntary and intentional. ‘fault or negligence’, under the
article covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent”.

Garcia vs. Florido

G.R.No. L-35095 (August 31,1973)
Facts: Petitioners German C. Garcia, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
boarded a public utility car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. While the
car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway, it collided with an oncoming
passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant,
Pedro Tumala. As a result of the collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries
which necessitated medical treatment and hospitalization.
Petitioners filed for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of
the public utility car and the passenger bus.Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo
Vayson filed their answer admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way
of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the
bus driver.
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before
the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a criminal
case already for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence," by the Chief of Police. Hence, with the filing of the criminal case, no civil action
could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated.
Therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer
is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered
finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may recover damages under a separate and independent
action while a criminal case is pending.
Held: Yes. Petitioners may recover damages for liability arising from quasi-delict. Under Sec. 2
in relation to Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court, in the cases provided for
by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately.
But it should be noted, however, that neither Sec. 1 nor Sec. 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time
limit when such reservation shall be made.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has
the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of the accused.
Petitioners have two options from where they could recover damages from—that arising out of
the criminal act, and that under quasi-delict. Petitioners opted to recover damages under quasi-
delict, which in effect operated as their abandonment of their claim to damages under the
pending criminal case. Therefore, petitioners may still recover damages from their civil action
against the defendants.

Andamo vs. Court of Appeals

191 SCRA 195 (November 6, 1990)
Facts: Petitioner-spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances (including an artificial
lake) were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land;
caused a young man to drown; damaged petitioners' crops and plants; washed away costly
fences; endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons;
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Issue: Whether or not a corporation, which has built waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be
held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: A careful examination of the complaint shows that the action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present,
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action, if proven, constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that
each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third
person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.

16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910)
Facts: Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting
charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power plant. Fifteen year old
David Taylor is a son of a mechanical engineer. Two years before the incident David spent four
months at sea, as a cabin boy on an interisland transports. Later he took up work in his
father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It appears that he was a
boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and
physically than most boys his age.
David, along with Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the premises of the defendant without
permission. While playing, the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some pieces and
brought them home. In the presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl , The two boys made a series of
experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket
and obtained no result. Next, they tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance
they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys and to Jesse. This action
was brought by the plaintiff, through his father, to recover damages for the injuries which he
suffered.
Issue: Whether or not the company was liable for the injury sustained by plaintiff.
Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence of the defendant of
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury. When
the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own acts, he cannot
recover damages for the injury.
The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiff’s injury, was his own act in
putting a match to the contents of the cap. True, David Taylor may not have known
and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the
ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that his age and his experience qualified him to understand the necessity for
the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the
direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true
that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
NOTE for undergraduates: Read the analysis of US turn-table case in the original.
Tayag vs. Alcantara
98 SCRA 723 (July 23, 1980)
Facts: The Heirs of Tayag filed a complaint for damages against Phil Rabbit Bus lines alleging
among others that Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along McArthur highway on
his way home. He was hit by the bus driven by Villa which caused his death.
Philippine Rabbit filed motion to suspend trial on the ground that criminal case against Villa was
still pending. When Villa was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt,
Philippine Rabbit filed a motion to dismiss the civil case. The heirs opposed alleging that their
cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict. The Judge indeed dismissed the
case, hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of Villa in the criminal case will result to the dismissal of the
civil case based on quasi-delict.
Held: No. The acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for
damages based on quasi-delict. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission
charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from
other sources, like quasi delict. In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show
that petitioners' cause of action was based upon a quasi-delict, to wit:
That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by defendant
Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and
proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to
injuries to persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules
and regulation.
That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the death
of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred.
The essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission
constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage
caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act
or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.\

Padilla vs. Court of Appeals

129 SCRA 558
Facts: Petitioner Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedena, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanaoc, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Garrido, Ortega jr., Celestino, “Kamlon” and 14
Ricardo Does was charged of Grave Coercion. On Feb 1964 around 9 am at Camarines Norte,
The petitioners willfully and feloniously prevented Antonio Vergara and his family from
closing their stall at the Public Market. Petitioners forcibly opened the door of the stall and
brutally demolished the stall using axes then carrying away the goods and merchandise. Such
acts of the petitioners where said to be pursuant to an ordinance. The damage amounted to 30K
for actual damages and 20K for exemplary damages. Roy Padilla and company also took
advantage of their public position, being the Mayor of the said municipality and the others being
policemen. The CFI finds them guilty. The CA acquitted the accused but ordered them to
pay jointly and severally 9,600 as actual damages.
Issue: WON the order of payment for damages is valid notwithstanding the acquittal of the
accused.
Held: Yes it is valid. Civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. No separate civil action is
necessary considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established
in the criminal proceeding. To require a separate civil action would only clod the court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation. A separate civil action may be warranted
where additional facts have to be established.

Cruz vs. Court of Appeals

282 SCRA 188 (1997)
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Cruz is a surgeon at Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. She
examined Lydia and found the latter to have 'myoma' in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hsyterectomy operation. On the day of the operation, Lydia's daughter noticed how untidy the
hospital was. She asked that the operation be postponed but Lydia said that Dr. Cruz told
her she must be operated as scheduled.
During the operation, Lydia's family was asked to buy tagamet ampules. Later they were asked
to buy blood for Lydia at a blood bank. They were again asked to buy blood but
the blood bank already ran out of type A. They also saw Lydia gasping for breath as the oxygen
supply had ran out so they had to go and buy oxygen for Lydia again. Later that night,
Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia was brought to the San
Pablo Hospital however the doctors were not able to save her. She was announced dead at
3:00 AM the following day. Petitioner and her anaesthesiologist were charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. The MTC, RTC, and the CA all found petitioner guilty
(anaethesiologist was acquitted) on the ground that the clinic was untidy and they lack the
needed facilities like blood and oxygen which are essential for the continuity of the operations
they undertake.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide as a
consequence of medical malpractice is supported by the evidence on record.
Held: No. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an
act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place. The 4
th
element is lacking in the case at bar.
The material damage was not proved to be the result of the reckless imprudence. In litigations
involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and
the resulting death of his patient. As shown by the experts presented by both parties, the death of
Lydia may have been caused by DIC (clotting defect). Therefore, the cause of death
cannot be attributed to petitioner's fault or negligence.
Furthermore, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in
the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science. In the case at bar, no physician was asked to testify to show the standard
care that needed to be observed given the present circumstances. Therefore, the
conviction is not supported by the evidence.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

GR No. 147703 (2004)
Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to imprisonment.
The court further ruled that in the event of insolvency of accused, Philippine Rabbit, as its
employer, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment
against the accused had become final and executory. Admittedly, accused jumped bail and
remained at-large. It is worth mentioning that Section 8, rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
HELD: No. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to
the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed
to have waived the appeal. In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.
Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.
Petitioner admits helping the accused employee, hence, it participated in the proceedings before
the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process.
It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. To allow
employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating
the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with respect to the former’s civil liability, but also with as to
its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

People vs. Ligon

152 SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987)
Facts: Accused Fernando Gabat was riding a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and
driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. While waiting for the traffic light to change,
Fernando called a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. While the transaction
was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the car suddenly moved forward.
While the car was moving, Rosales was clinging to the window but lost his grip and fell down on
the pavement. The bystanders rushed Rosales to PGH where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries until his death.
Since Ligon did not stop the car, Castillo, a taxi-driver chased him and sought the assistance of
two police officers in an owner-type jeepney. At an intersection, Castillo was able
to overtake the car and blocked it, while the jeep pulled up right behind. The police officers drew
their guns and told them to alight from the car. They were brought to the police station.
Ligon was then charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. A charge of robbery with
homicide was likewise charged to Ligon and Gabat, since there was an allegation
that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box of the victim. Ligon however was never apprehended
after the police released him, so only Gabat was convicted by the RTC. An appeal was
then brought to the SC, which ruled that the guilt of the accused was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not accused may be held civilly liable despite the finding of the Court of
Appeals that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it does not follow that he is free from civil
liability, since only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. In the instant case, a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from
which the civil liability of Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat’s
willful act of calling the victim to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes
set the chain of events which led to the death of the victim. Through fault and negligence, Gabat
(1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed;
(2) failed to help the victim while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did
not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver’s act of
speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.

Virata vs. Ochoa

G.R. No. L-46179, January 31, 1978
FACTS
Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft
Avenue by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name
of Victoria Ochoa. An action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against
Maximo
Borilla in the CFI of Rizal.
• Atty. Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file separately the civil
action for damages against the driver for his criminal liability, which he later on
withdrew and presented evidence on the damages.
• The Heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil
action.
• They commenced an action for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver
Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the vehicle, Victoria Ochoa.
• Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another
action pending for the same cause.
• The CFI acquitted Borilla on the ground that he caused the injury by accident. The
motion to dismiss was granted.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• W/N the Heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages based
on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and
owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. IT IS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
• In negligence cases, the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.
• In this case, the petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent
act. Before the Criminal Case was decided, they manifested in the said case that they
were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the
passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict.
• Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or ‘culpa aquiliana’.
• The source of damages sought to be enforced in the Civil Case is quasi-delict, not an
act or omission punishable by law. Under Art. 1157 of the Civil Code, quasi-delict
and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
• Moreover, for petitioners to prevail in the Civil Case, they have only to establish
their cause of action by preponderance of evidence.

Banal vs. Tadeo

Fact:
Petitioner filed a case against the private respondent for violation of BP 22. After numerous
changes in the presiding judges, the public respondent assumed jurisdiction. Public respondent
then rejects the appearance of petitioner’s private prosecutor claiming that as the BP 22 Law do
not prescribe civil liability, only the criminal case may be prosecuted. Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether complainant in a BP 22 is entitled for civil indemnity?

Held:
Yes, Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Regardless,
therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may
be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part
of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime. Every crime gives rise to a penal
or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses
committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member
of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when
she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks
bounced.

Occena Vs. Icamina

G.R. No. 82146, January 22, 1990 | 181 SCRA 328

FACTS
• On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio — Belison, Province of
Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation
against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly, publicly and
maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga
Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated,
mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and
other words and statements of similar import which caused great and irreparable
damage and injury to his person and honor.
• Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action
for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
• After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral
Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded
to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of
the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral
damages."
•
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• W/N the decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-
Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of
private respondent's civil liability; and
• W/N petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered
by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court
in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil
liability of private respondent simply because said decision has not yet become final due
to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in
said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
• We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising from
crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelict,
the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human
Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.
• Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly
liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character:
(1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and
(2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves
the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil
liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be
compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. 3 In the ultimate
analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to
repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or
omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by
law. 4
• Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case
of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law establishes
the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the
guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is
likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
• It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication 5
subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.
• Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas
is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause him
embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame
and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. 6 It is patently
error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence and to conclude that
the "facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant
the awarding of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's
findings with respect thereto is not conclusive upon us.
• From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and
reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the
sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES

G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010
FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent
Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident
inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the
gun store.

On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and
caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun
owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a
drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers.
It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table.
Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to
return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting
the young Alfred in the head.

A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the
charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of
the RPC.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against
Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial,
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved
respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this
petition.

ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?

HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision reinstated.
YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article
1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil
liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an
independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their
claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an
independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s
employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.

**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and
direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular
No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in
the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security
and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be
suspended or canceled.

Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to
take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary
affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous
weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are
not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for
repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental
discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he
accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not
loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting
the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent
any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person,
until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which
authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of
a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as
would exempt him from liability in this case.

PEOPLE vs AMISTAD

FACTS:
 Itong Amistad was accused of the crime of Estafa. He sold a parcel of land, part of which
was already previously sold to Mercedes Javellana for P10, 000 and had already received
from her P5, 000.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said Javellana in the
amount of P5,000.
 The CFI acquitted Amistad holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in nature"
and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt."
 Petitioner appealed to CA insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. CA
dismissed the appeal merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant
from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a decision
acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's civil liability is
concerned.

HELD:
NO. Petition is DENIED.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch as the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, there
having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a waiver of the right to file one. She
had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect of the case, the
prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The
private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a
memorandum he filed, he also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite
which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the complainant.

We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the CA on the purely legal question of whether
the petitioner, as complainant in the case for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the
accused, because the trial court failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant,
which was allegedly proven by the evidence.

The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the
institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the
accused as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an
answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused
is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil
actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one
solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to
which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except on the
occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved in the civil action deemed
filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or waived, as so
expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from
law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as
expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance
of evidence would warrant.

The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and did
not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not only
by freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for
damages arising from the alleged crime of malicious mischief. The offended parties not
having reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal
covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of the
new Rules of Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance, as intended by
the offended parties, would reopen the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the
alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal
responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any review or re-examination of
the question of civil liability would perforce require a new determination of defendant's criminal
liability. But another trial upon defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his
previous acquittal in the justice of the peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice
of the peace court is not authorized by law.
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought
simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from
the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is
reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate
civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not
based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be
required.

Nevertheless, petitioner may not complain, as she does of being denied due process for
disallowing her appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come
under the category of quasi-delict or one arising from law, contract or any other known source of
civil liability, but certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already
been acquitted. It is but fair to require petitioner to take this course of action, not only because
she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she
seeks from respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also
for the respondent or defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as are open to him in a
separate civil action not otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with it the civil
action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil liability arising from the crime
charged

JARANTILLA vs CA

FACTS:
 Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle driven by Jarantilla and sustained physical
injuries as a consequence.
 Jarantilla was charged before the City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence in a criminal case. Kuan Sing did not reserve his right to institute
a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through
a private prosecutor.
 Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt"
 Kuan Sing then filed a complaint , a civil action that involved the same subject matter
and act complained of in the criminal case. Jarantilla alleged as a defense a lack of cause
of action on the part of Sing, and bar by prior judgment in the previous criminal case
even if there was a cause of action.
 The trial court deniedJarantilla's motion to dismiss, suggesting he take the case to the SC
via certiorari.
 After trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of Sing and ordered Jarantilla to
pay the former the sum for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, other actual expenses,
for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Kuan Sing could file a separate civil action arising from the criminal complaint
filed against Jarantilla when Jarantilla had been acquitted for reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes.

It is a settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private
respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a
delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence... Another consideration in
favor of Kuan Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement,
favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the
right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere
provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that
based on or arising from the criminal offense. The acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal
element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence
only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be
proved by mere preponderance of evidence. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the
failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in
the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.

HUN HYUNG PARK vs EUN WON CHOI

FACTS:
 Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP22, for issuing a PNB Check which was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
 MTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.
 Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC, contending that the dismissal
of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
 RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent’s
criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted
the appeal of Park.
 Upon Choi’sMR, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the
MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant Choi may adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case."
 Park’sMR of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA
which, dismissed his petition for Park’s failure to implead the People of the Philippines
as party-respondent in the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not failure to implead the People is fatal to the appeal.

HELD:
No.

Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court ruled:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the
People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is
the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is
the defendant.

The MeTC acquitted respondent. Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal
the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has
generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The real
parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case
including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action
has been waived or reserved.

For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to
the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of
evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the
criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence
so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same
evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable
doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of
evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case
generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it
the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the
case must perforce continue.

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, which is DIRECTED to forthwith set the
Criminal Case for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving evidence on the civil
aspect of the case

PEOPLE vs NAVOA

FACTS:
 Mario Navoa et al. was convicted by the trial court for murder and sentenced to reclusion
temporal. It was appealed to the IAC.
 On April 1984, the IAC affirmed the findings but modified the punishment to reclusion
perpetua, but refrained from entering judgment per RA 296 1 as amended pursuant to the
case of People vs Daniel, and certified the case to the SC, as it is within the SC’s
exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
 On June 1984, Navoa’s lawyer filed with the IAC the Death Certificate of Navoa who
died of heart attack, unaware that it was already certified to the SC.
 On July 1984, the SC affirmed the conviction and sentenced Navoa et al. to reclusion
perpetua and to pay the civil liability thereon.
 Navoa’s lawyer filed an MR questioning the conviction and arguing that the criminal and
civil liability of Navoa be extinguished because of his death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability will be extinguished.

HELD:
NO.Petition is partly granted.

In respect of the second contention, it appears that the accused, Mario Navoa, died on June 14,
1984 due to a cerebro-vascular attack as shown by the Death Certificate attached to the Motion
for Reconsideration. When counsel for the accused manifested the fact before the Appellate
1
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; ...
Court, on June 20, 1984. he was unaware that the latter had already certified the case to this
Court, which, in turn, promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1984 unaware of appellant Mario
Navoa'sdeath. The judgment of conviction will thus have to be set aside as against him.
However, the plea for extinguishment of the deceased's civil and criminal liability is without
merit. Only his criminal liability is extinguished by his death but the civil liability remains.

PEOPLE vs MANUEL BADEO

FACTS:
 A certain Cresencio was hacked to death.
 Eyewitness for the prosecution testified that she saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresencio to
death, helped by his father Esperidion, and two others.
 Defense of Manuel was self-defense, arguing that Cresencio drunkenly pointed a gun to
him. Defense of Esperidion however was that he was engaged in kaingin in the
mountains (a good 5 hr hike due to the heavy forest trail) corroborated by his wife.
 RTC convicted both Manuel and Espridion and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of Cresencio.
 Manuel and Espiridion appealed to the SC.
 During the pendency of the appeal, Espiridion died of pulmonary tuberculosis, such fact
was made known to the SC. SC dismissed the case against Espiridion, insofar as he died
without the conviction attaining finality. His criminal and civil liabilities were
extinguished.
 The OSG filed an MR on the dismissal of the civil liability of Espiridion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability will be extinguished.

HELD:
NO. Petition is partly granted.

We find merit in the motion for reconsideration. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment." In People vs. Alison, the Court, upon the
recommendation of the then Solicitor General who was required to comment on the information
that appellant Alison had died at the prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment
as yet, "the criminal and civil liability (sic) of Alison was extinguished by his death."

The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre similarly dismissing
the case against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate
Justice Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According to
Justice Aquino, the term "pecuniary penalties" (laspecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and
costs as distinguished from " pecuniary liability" (responsabilidadespecunarias) in Article 38
which include reparation and indemnity.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and
also to a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for
the losses whether the particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether
or not punishable by law, subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability
of an appellant is extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. In such case, the heirs of
the deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer
for his civil liability.

CALANG and PHILTRANCO vs PEOPLE

FACTS:
 At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, RolitoCalang was driving aPhiltranco Busalong
DaangMaharlika Highway in Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion of a
Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction.
 As a result of the collision, Cresencio, the jeep’s driver, lost control of the vehicle, and
bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the highway’s
shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) andtwo of the jeep’s passengers were instantly
killed, while the other passengers sustained serious physical injuries.
 The prosecution charged Calalang with multiple homicide, and damages before the
RTC.RTC convicted Calalang and held him and Philtranco jointly and severally liable for
the death indemnities and damages to the private complainants.
 CA affirmed the conviction and the solidary liability.
 The CA ruled that Calang failed to exercise due care and precaution in driving the
Philtranco bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was
traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was
on the side of the road. In addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that
he had already seen the jeep coming from the opposite direction when it was still half a
kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang demonstrated a reckless attitude when
he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from loose compression, hence,
not roadworthy.
 SC denied the petition. Hence this MR. Philtranco argues it cannot be held severally
liable as it was not a party in the criminal case for multiple homicide and damages before
the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Philtranco is civilly liable.

HELD:
NO. Petition is granted.

We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco
was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict,
both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang,
based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee
has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.

If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary by virtue of RPC 102 regarding civil
liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. As stated in RPC 103,
such subsidiary liability attaches also to the employers of an employee.

The provisions of the RPC on subsidiary liability are deemed written into the judgments in cases
to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. Nonetheless, before the
employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1)
they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4)
the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of
these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability,
criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice
to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

FRANCO vs IAC

FACTS:
 MacarioYuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus, he was driving to the left to avoid
hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented pavement of the
MacArthur Highway at Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus
driven by one MagdalenoLugue and making a collision between the two (2) vehicles an
unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.
 The two drivers died, while two of the minibus passengers died.
 The owner of the minibus, the wife of the deceased passenger, and wife of the minibus
driver sued spouses Franco for damages.
 Franco raised the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee Yuro, arguing that the case is for torts.
 RTC held them liable, holding that employers are liable for the criminal negligence of the
employees, regardless of due diligence
 CA upheld.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action was predicated on crime or tort.

HELD:
YES. However, due diligence is not proven.

Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and
the employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of RPC.
Under Article 103 of the RPC, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who
is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability
is to be based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is
imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence
or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the
employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103.

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who should stand as the
accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the damages suffered by private
respondents as a consequence of the vehicular mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability
has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's
primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible.

On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on culpa
aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject,
however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of his employees.

Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo, supra, where it was held that the
defense of observance of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of employees is not applicable to the subsidiary liability provided in RPC 102. It is
erroneous because the conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non
for the employer's subsidiary liability 10 and, at the same time, absurd because we will be faced
with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability
being previously established.

HOWEVER, factual considerations of the lower court are upheld, holding that there was no
concrete evidence of alleged supervision as to safety. Only the ticket inspectors at terminal

Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.

G.R. No. L-12191, 14 October 1918

FACTS:

Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He lived in the pueblo of San
Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company’s office in the city of Manila where he
worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company’s
trains free of charge.
During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way to the exit while the train is
still on travel. When the train has proceeded a little farther Jose Cangco step down into the
cement platform but unfortunately step in to a sack of watermelon, fell down and rolled under
the platform and was drawn under the moving car which resulting to his arm to be crashed and
lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and sued the company and the employee who put the
sack of watermelon in the platform.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that time of the year that
may we considered as season to harvest watermelon explaining why there are sacks of
watermelon in the platform. The plaintiff contends that it is the negligence of the Manila
Railroad Co. on why they let their employees put a hindrance in the platform that may cause
serious accident. The defendant answered that it is the lack of diligence on behalf of the plaintiff
alone on why he did not wait for the train to stop before alighting the train.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory negligence on behalf of the
plaintiff.

RULING:

There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court provides some
test that may find the contributory negligence of a person. Was there anything in the
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have
admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then
existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so
to desist was contributory negligence.

Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people
are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as
the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that
sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly
lit.

Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of that persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of the company to inform
their employees to not put any hindrance in the platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract
of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty,
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by
proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company is
liable for damages against Cangco.

Fores vs. Miranda

105 Phil 266 (March 4, 1959)
Facts: Miranda was riding a jeepney driven by Luga. While the vehicle was descending Sta.
Mesa bridge at high speed, the driver lost control. It swerved and hit the bridge wall,
resulting to injuries to the passengers and Miranda. Miranda broke some bones in his right arm.
The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced accordingly. Fores, owner of the jeepney, claimed that one
day before the accident, she sold the vehicle to a certain Sackerman. In the meantime,
Miranda prays for moral damages.
Issues:
Whether or not approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for the sale of a public
service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the
same.
Whether or not an award for damages is proper.
Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is still valid and binding between the
parties, approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for such sale, as provided for
1.
2.
by Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146).
As to the second issue, the award of moral damages is not proper. It has been held that moral
damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract of
transportation, in view of Art. 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases:
a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
quasi delicts causing physical injuries
ART. 2220. Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The exceptional rule in Article 1764 provides that where the injured passenger does not die,
moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or
bad faith. The mere carelessness of the carrier’s driver does not per se constitute or justify
an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier, as in the case at bar.
In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed that the lawmakers intended in article 2220
to limit recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. The fact
that negligence may be so gross as to amount to malice, must be shown in evidence, and a
carrier’s bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was
breached though negligence of the carrier’s employees. The award for moral damages is
eliminated.

Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals

241 SCRA 671 (February 23, 1995)
Facts: Private respondent Luis Luna applied for and was accorded a Fareastcard issued by
petitioner FEBTC. Upon his request, a supplemental card was issued to Clarita Luna. In
August 1988, Clarita lost her card and FEBTC was forthwith informed. Due to bank policy,
petitioner recorded the lost card, along with the principal card as a “hot card” or a “cancelled
card”. In October, Luis used his card to pay for lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila.
However, after verifying with the bank, the card was not honored and Luis had to pay cash. He
was embarrassed by this incident. Luis, through counsel, wrote to petitioner and asked for the
payment of damages. The VP of the bank wrote a letter to Luis and expressed his apologies
in their failure to inform the latter of the bank's security policy. Also, the VP sent a letter to the
hotel to assure the latter that the private respondents were very valued clients. Still feeling
aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for damages in the RTC. The RTC ruled in their
favor and ordered FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed the said
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
Held: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown
to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of contract. (Art. 2220 NCC)
While it is true that the bank was remiss in neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation, there is no finding that there was deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to
cause harm to Luis. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis
be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence
in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will. Thus, the award of moral damages is inordinate and substantially devoid of
legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages are awarded, in the case of quasi-delicts, if the defendant is
shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. And in
case of contracts and quasi-contracts, it is awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Thus, the award of
exemplary damages is improper.
1.
2.
NEVERTHELESS, the bank's failure to honor its credit card issued to Luis should entitle him to
recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

Air France vs. Carrascoso

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts: Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a ‘first class’ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in ‘first class’, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying because, in
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a ‘white man’ who, the Manager
alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his ‘first class’ seat, the plaintiff
refused, and told defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. A
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers
got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a
hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the ‘white man’ and plaintiff reluctantly gave his
‘first class’ seat in the plane.
Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of
the trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascos’s
plane ticket.
Issue: WON Carrascoso’s action is planted upon breach of contract, with the existence of bad
faith, entitling him to the award of damages.
Held: There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg. The said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok.
The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad
faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant’s Manager in Bangkok
went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him
thrown out of the airplane to give the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying to, again using
the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a ‘white man’ whom he (defendant’s manager) wished
to accommodate, and the defendant has not proved that this ‘white man’ had any ‘better
right’ to occupy the ‘first class’ seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for
which the corresponding first class ticket was issued.
The responsibility of an employer for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner’s manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
“ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
damage.”
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, held upon the provisions
of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Thus, “Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger’s check, it was a breach of
contract and tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her, that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection;
though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. Although the relation
of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature” the act that breaks the contract
may also be a tort”. And in another case, “Where a passenger on a rail-road train, when
the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a
lunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental
suffering of said passenger.
Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carasscoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court
ample to power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The
only condition is that defendant should have “acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner”. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
class seat fits into this legal precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.

PSBA vs. Court of Appeals

205 SCRA 729 (February 4, 1992)
Facts: Carlito Bautista, a student of PSBA, was stabbed while on the second floor of Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) by some elements from outside the school.
Carlito died. His parents, filed an action for damages against PSBA and the school authorities
(President, Vice-President, Treasurer/Cashier,Chief of Security and Vice Chief of
Security). Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of parents.
Issue: Whether or not PSBA and the school authorities can be held liable under 2176 and 2180
for quasi-delict.
Held: No. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that pupils or students of the educational
institution should have caused the damage.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the cases of Exconde, Mendoza,
Palisoc, and more recently, in Amadora vs. CA. In all such cases, it had been stressed that Article
2180 plainly provides that it is the students who must have caused the damage before
the educational institution can be held liable for quasi-delict. In the case at bar, the assailants
were not students or pupils of PSBA but were elements from outside the school.
Hence, PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable under Article 2180.
The circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista since they entered into a contract the moment Bautista enrolled in the
school. There being a contract, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, should
the act which breaches the contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21 as
ruled in the Air France case, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting quasi-delict.
In the case at bar however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be, a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The
negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21.
Therefore, PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable for quasi-delict under Art. 2180.

Syquia vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Memorial Park and Cemetery, Inc.
217 SCRA 624 (January 27, 1993)
Facts: Juan Syquia, father of deceased and the private respondent executed a Deed of Sale of a
memorial lot and an Interment Order, where the private respondent was authorized to bury
the remains of the deceased in accordance with its procedures.
Preparatory to transferring the remains to the newly-purchased lot also in Manila Memorial Park,
the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its
niche underground. It was then discovered that said vault has a hole and after one hour or less
water drained out of the hole.
Pursuant to the authority granted by the MTC the concrete vault was opened and it was
discovered that the interior walls of the concrete vault showed evidence of total flooding
and the coffin as well as the clothing and exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were entirely
damaged.
A complaint was filed by petitioners (parents and siblings of deceased) for quasi-delict, alleging
that there was breach of respondent’s contractual obligation to provide a sealed
vault. RTC dismissed the complaint since there was no guarantee in the contract that the vault
shall be waterproof and since there was a pre-existing contractual relation defendant cannot
be guilty of quasi-delict. The RTC also sustained the explanation given by the private
respondent, that the hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole the
vault will float and the grave would be filled with water. CA affirmed RTC’s decision hence the
instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of quasi-delict.
Held: No. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the
existence of a culpa aquiliana, SC find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court
finding that there was no negligence. Article 2176 provides that Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict . The agreement between the parties governed their relations
and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on
the part of the private respondent it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: Those
who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not
waterproof. In this regard SC held that there was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and
in the Rules and Regulations of the private respondent that the vault would be waterproof. “Seal"
is defined as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture
and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." It is therefore clear that
"sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof".
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time
and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the
diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a
good father of a family. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act
boring of the hole negate the allegation of negligence.
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
332 SCRA 356 (2000)
Facts: Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman at Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. She was given by the conductor an extension seat at
Facts: Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman at Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. She was given by the conductor an extension seat at
the backdoor of the jeepney at the rear end. On their way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger
off. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passengers, just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena which is owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney, which injured Sunga.
Sunga then filed action for damages against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage, in
failing to exercise the diligence required by him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva.
Issue: Whether or not Calalas can blame Francisco Silva as the proximate cause of the loss.
Held: No. There was a contract of carriage between the parties, which was violated, hence,
proximate cause is immaterial.
The Supreme Court found Calalas guilty of violating the contract of carriage as a driver failed to
transport Sunga safely to her destination, being negligent in (1) not properly
parking the jeepney; (2) taking more passengers, than the allowed capacity; and (3) the fact that
Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed.
The determination of the proximate cause of the damage incurred, whether it was the collision
between the jeepney and the truck or the negligence of the driver is immaterial.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions of quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
parties it is the parties themselves that create the obligation and the law will merely regulate the
relation created. (Since there was a contract of carriage here in the case at bar).

Case Digest: Singson vs BPI G.R. No. L-24837. 29 June 1968.

JULIAN SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS (Pres. Of BPI)G.R. No. L-24837. 29 June 1968.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Facts: Appeal by plaintiffs from a decision of the CFI Mla dismissing their complaint against
defendants.
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president,
Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
After appropriate proceedings, the CFI Mla rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon
the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict,
because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature.

Issue: WON the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar recovery of damages.

Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed holding defendant BPI to pay to the plaintiffs
nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart from the costs.
The SC have repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages
therefore.
In view, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance,
that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized
the mistake they had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount
of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of
P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.

So Ping Bun vs. CA

GR No. 120554 (September 21, 1999)
FACTS: In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a
lease agreement with Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI ) covering four stalls in Binondo.
The terms of the contract were initially for one year but after its expiry, they continued on a
month to month basis.
In 1976, Tek Hua Trading was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation
named Tek Hua Enterprises, with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. So
Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok (Managing director of defunct Tek Hua
Trading), occupied the same stalls for his own textile business under the name,
Trendsetter Marketing.
In 1989, the lessor, DCCSI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises advising that it will be increasing
rent. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While the
letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed,
the same were not rescinded. In 1991, Manuel Tiong (incorporator of Tek Hua Enterrises)
wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls:
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late grandfather Mr.
So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse
of
Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my stocks.
Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse.
You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that you have
the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure to protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid inconvenience on your part.
But instead of vacating the stalls, So Ping Bun was able to secure lease agreements in favor
Trendsetter Marketing from D.C. Chuan. Tek Hua Enterprises filed a suit for injunction and
pressed for the nullification of the
lease contracts between DCCSI and So Ping Bun and as well prayed for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference
of contract.
HELD: Yes. The elements of tort interference are (a) existence of a valid contract (b) knowledge
on the part of the third party of its existence (c) interference of the third party is
without legal justification or excuse. Since there were existing lease contracts between DCCI
and Tek Hua Enterprises, the latter had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of
Trendsetter in asking DCCSI to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.
As to the question of whether the interference may be justified, the Supreme Court stated that it
is sufficient that So Ping Bun’s conduct lies in a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives to conclude. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on the part of So Ping Bun. Hence, while there is tortuous
interference, this lack of malice precludes the award of damages.
But while the lower courts did not award damages. It does not relieve petitioner of the legal
liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The Court of
Appeals correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction
saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner’s interference. But due
to So Ping Bun’s action of interference, Tek Hua was forced to seek relief through the
Court and thereby incur expenses to protect his interests. Attorney’s fees are in order.

Light Rail Transit vs. Navidad

G.R. No. 145804 (February 6, 2003)
Facts: On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued
that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or
who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
Nicanor’s widow filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. The trial court rendered decision holding Prudent and Escartin jointly and
severally liable. On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent from any liability and, instead,
held the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
Issue: (1) Is LRTA liable? (2)Is Roman an employee of LRTA and also liable?
Held: (1)Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the
high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Prudent’s liability, If any, could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194
of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
However, the Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the
appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the
case.
(2) No. There being no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie
between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman;
thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

Consolidated Bank vs. Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 138569 (Sept. 11, 2003)
FACTS: LC Diaz and Co. (Diaz) is an accounting firm. Diaz has a savings account with
Consolidated Bank (the predecessor of Solidbank). In 1991, Diaz, through its cashier, Macaraya,
filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for PhP900.00 and check deposit slip for PhP50.00.
Macaraya instructed the firm’s messenger, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with
Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and
presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. Since the transaction
took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the
passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook,
Teller No. 6 informed him that “somebody got the passbook.” Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz
and reported the incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank. When Macaraya asked for the passbook,
Teller No. 6 told her that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to
whom she gave it to. Failing to g retrieve the passbook, Macaraya returned to LC Diaz and
reported the matter. The next day, L.C. Diaz’ CEO, Luis Diaz, called up the bank to stop any
transaction involving the stolen passbook. Diaz learned that an unauthorized withdrawal of
300,000 was made on same day the passbook was stolen. The withdrawal slip bore the
signatures of authorized signatories, who denied signing the same. A certain Noel Tamayo
received the PhP300,000.
In 1992, Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of his money. The trial court ruled in favor of
the bank, saying that possession of the passbook raises the presumption of
ownership and payments made upon production of the passbook shall have the same effect as if
made to the depositor. Noel Tamayo, at the time of the withdrawal, had possession of the
passbook and the withdrawal slip which bore signatures matching the specimen signatures in the
bank. The trial court, using the rules on contractual obligations, said that the bank acted
with care and observed the rules on savings account when it allowed the withdrawal , concluding
that Diaz’s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. The Court of Appeals
reversed, saying that the teller of the bank should have been more careful in allowing the
withdrawal. It said that although L.C. Diaz was negligent in allowing a messenger to make its
deposits and said messenger left the passbook, by applying the last clear chance doctrine, the
proximate cause of the loss is attributable to the bank.
Issue: Is the last clear chance doctrine applicable in this case? Who is the proximate cause
of the loss?
Held: The rules on simple loan or mutuum apply in this case, hence, the bank was liable for
breach of contract and not by virtue of a quasi-delict. Accordingly, the negligence of the bank
is classified as Culpa contractual AND NOT Culpa Aquilana, and therefore, the Last clear
chance doctrine is inapplicable. Because of a bank’s nature of business, a fiduciary relationship
is deemed written into every deposit agreement. This imposes a higher degree of diligence than
“a good father of a family”. While this does not convert the contract into a trust
agreement, the law requires of banks a higher standard of integrity and performance in
complying with its obligations under the contract.
While the passbook is in the bank’s hands, the law imposes a high degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves breach on the
part of the defendant, there is the presumption that the latter was negligent or at fault. The burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that he was not negligent. But in culpa aquiliana, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant’s negligence. Tellers must return the passbook
only to the depositor or his authorized representative. Solidbank is bound by the
negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior. And the defense of
exercising the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a completedefense
in culpa contractual unlike in culpa aquiliana. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the
impostor, the loss would not have occurred. Hence, the proximate cause of the
loss the bank’s negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre. But L.C. Diaz was guilty of
contributory negligence in allowing
withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus,
the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.

65 Crisostomo vs. CA | Ynares-Santiago

G.R. No. 138334, August 25, 2003 | 409 SCRA 528
FACTS
• Petitioner Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and
Tours International, to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing, and
accommodation in a tour called “Jewels of Europe.” She was given a 5% discount
and a waived booking fee because her niece, Meriam Menor, was the company’s
ticketing manager.
• Menor went to her aunt’s residence to deliver Crisostomo’s travel documents and
plane tickets and get her payment. Menor told her to be in NAIA on Saturday.
• When Crisostomo got to the airport on Saturday, she discovered that the filight she
was supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She complained to
Menor, and was urged by the latter to take another tour, instead  “British
Pageant.”
• Upon returning from Europe, Crisostomo demanded P61,421.70 from Caravan
Tours, representing the difference between the sun she paid for Jewels and the
amount she owed the company for British Pageant. Caravan refused.
• Thus, Crisostomo filed a complaint against Caravan for breach of contract of
carriage and damages. The trial court held in favor of Crisostomo, and ordered
Caravan to pay her, because it was negligent in erroneously advising Crisostomo of
her departure. However, Crisostmo is also guilty of contributory negligence (for
failing to verify the exact date and time of departure). CA declared that Crisostomo
is more negligent. As a lawyer and well-travelled person, she should have known
better. MR of Crisostomo was also denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• W/N respondent Caravan is guilty of negligence and is liable to Crisostomo
for damages.
o Crisostomo: Respondent did not observe the standard of care required of
a common carrier, i.e. extraordinary diligence in the fulfillment of its
obligation.
o Caravan: Menor was not negligent. The date and time of departure was
legibly written on the plane ticket and the travel papers were given 2 days
before the flight. It performed all obligations to enable Crisostomo to join
the group and exercised due diligence in its dealings with the latter.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
CARVAN NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
• A contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or
association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news
from one place to another for a fixed price.
• Respondent is not engaged in the business of transporting either passengers of
goods and is therefore not a common carrier. Respondent’s services as a travel
agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as
booking customers for tours.
• A common carrier is bound by law to carry as far as human care and foresight can
provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due regard for
all circumstances. But since Caravan is a travel agency, it is not bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligations.
• For them, the standard of care required is that of a good father of a family. This
connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person
would have observed when confronted with a similar situation.
• We do not concur with the finding that Menor’s negligene concurred with that of
Crisostomo. No evidence to prove Menor’s negligence.
• The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligations renders him
liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence
of an obligor consists in the his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the
performance of the obligation. The degree of diligence required depends on the
circumstances of the specific obligation and whether one has been negligent is a
question of fact that is to be determined in the case.
Petition denied. CA affirmed.

Picart vs. Smith

37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)
Facts: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando. He pulled his pony
over the bridge’s railing on the right instead of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly
approaching. His pony was unfortunately frightened when the automobile passed so close to
them. The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the
limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of
its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. Picart seeks to render the sum
of Php31,000 as damages. CFI- La Union absolved Smith.
Issue: Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last clear chance is
attributable to him?
Held: The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of last clear chance even
though the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the bridge. Defendant has had the
opportunity to avoid the accident after realizing that the negligence by the plaintiff could not
have placed him in a position of better safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was his duty to
bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the
bridge to take the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of doing
this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances,
the law is that the person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and rendered judgment that Picart
recover of Smith the sum of P200, with costs of both instances. The court held
that the sum awarded was estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of Picart,
the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole
to the date of this recovery.

PLDT vs. CA
G.R. No. 57079 (September 29, 1989)
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system. The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open
trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face,
leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. The
windshield of the jeep was also shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by Spouses
Esteban were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work. The trial court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas
the CA reversed the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Estebans can claim damages from PLDT.
Held: NO. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The jeep was running along
the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
accident mound. That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the
accident mound could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of
the accident mound. Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff
husband claimed. At that speed, he could have stepped on the brakes the moment it struck the
accident mound.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court of Appeals

179 SCRA 5 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, typhoon 'Gening'
buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte and brought heavy rains and flooding. Between 5:30-
6:00AM, Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) along with Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured
out of her house and traversed waist-deep flood to proceed to a store, which she owns to
check if her merchandise have been damaged. Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed 'ay!' and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help but fear dissuaded them because on
the spot where the deceased sank, they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana Belen but he turned
back because the water was grounded. Ernesto informed Antonio Yabes that his mother in law
had been electrocuted and together they went to the City Hall of Laoag to request the
police to ask INELCO to cut off the current. Subsequently, the search for the body began and
such was found two meters from an electric post.
In another place at about 4:00 A.M., Engineer Antonio Juan of the NAPOCOR noticed certain
fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated s such abnormalities as grounded
or short-circuited lines. He then went out for inspection and saw grounded and disconnected
lines which were hanging from posts to the ground. Since there were no INELCO linemen in
sight, he decided to go to the INELCO office but it was closed. On the way to INELCO, he
passed by Guerrero St. and saw and electric wire about 30 meters long and the other end of the
wire was seeming to play with the current of the water. At about 8:00 A.M., he went out for
inspection again and learned about the death of Nana Belen. He tried to help revive the
deceased but his efforts proved futile. He also noticed a hollow wound on the left palm of the
victim. In the afternoon, he went on an inspection trip again and the wire that he saw on
Guerrero St. earlier was no longer there.
Dr. Castro examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00 A.M. and noted that the skin was
grayish or cyanotic which indicated death by electrocution. The wound on the left
palm was an electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. The certificate of death prepared
by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as 'circulatory shock electrocution'.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. INELCO, through its officers
and employees who testified, claims that on and even before June 29, their
electric system did not suffer from any defect that might constitute hazard to life and property.
Moreover, it was alleged that the lines and devices were newly installed and they had
installed safety devices to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities. INELCO also alleged that they had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of
checking the areas assigned to them. Fabico Abijero even testified that in the early morning of
June 29, he passed by the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal streets and did not see any
broken wires. He said that what he saw were many people fishing out the body of the deceased.
INELCO also presented Dr. Briones who said that without an autopsy, no doctor or
medico-legal can speculate the cause of death. Moreover, he said that cyanosis (lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood) appears only in a live person. INELCO also said that the deceased
was negligent because she installed a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house
to the iron gate, thus charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
INELCO then conjectures that the switch must have been left on, causing the deceased
electrocution when she tried to open her gate.
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution. (2) Whether or not petitioner
INELCO may be held liable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan. (3) Whether or not the maxim
volenti non fit injuria can be applied in the case at bar.
Held:
(1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no
other conclusion than that they were burns and there was nothing else in the street where
the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of petitioner
company. In the issue of the burglar deterrent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch
was left on is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence.
(2) YES. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's
death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. As stated
by Engr. Juan in his testimony, he saw no INELCO lineman and that the office of
INELCO was closed. The SC held that in times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a
supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb. The petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public. Furthermore, the court held that when an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant (in this case the petitioner) to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission.
(3) NO. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. She went to her grocery store
to see to it that the goods were not flooded. It has been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or
when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as
the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, she was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent
as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-

appellant.
G.R. No. 131588
March 27, 2001

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

FACTS: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their
way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. On their way to
Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenn’s truck, hit, bumped, seriously wounded and
claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance run on a
highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on
the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained minor injuries.
At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as there was no moon.
Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of
the complex crime of multiple murders, multiple frustrated murders and multiple attempted
murders, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance.

HELD: Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result
of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicides with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries. 

The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless
imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate
offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed

ACUNA VS ALCANTARA (WAY AKO NAHANAP AYNA)

407 Phil. 126

VITUG, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint, dated 27 October 1998, complainant Evelyn Acuña charged
Rodolfo A. Alcantara, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,
with negligence and manifest partiality relative to his conduct in Civil Case No. V-0413 ("Mrs.
Gloria R. Ocampo vs. Mrs. Evelyn Acuña") for "recovery of sum of money with prayer for
preliminary attachment." The trial court, on 23 December 1997, granted the preliminary
attachment prayed for by plaintiff Ocampo. The writ was thereupon issued on the two flatboats
of herein complainant Acuña.

Complainant averred that, in implementing the writ, respondent sheriff had failed to take the
necessary precautions in protecting the attached property. Respondent entrusted the flatboats to a
relative of plaintiff Ocampo under whose care one of the flatboats submerged. Later, the
flatboats were turned over by respondent to the Philippine Coast Guard of Sual, Pangasinan, in
which custody the flatboats were totally damaged due to several typhoons that visited the area.

Respondent explained, when required to comment, that when he implemented the writ of
attachment, the flatboats were not seaworthy. Initially, he sought the assistance of the Philippine
Coast Guard of Sual, Pangasinan, in safekeeping the flatboats but the Coast Guard refused to
accept such custody without a court order. Meanwhile, respondent was constrained to dock the
flatboats at the Sual port, tied them to a bamboo post and entrusted them to a son of plaintiff
Ocampo although the keys were kept by the latter. Sometime in May, 1998, after being informed
that one of the flatboats had sunk, he asked for a court order to have the Philippine Coast Guard
take possession of the flatboats. The court directed accordingly. Respondent implemented the
order of the trial court, dated 05 June 1998, by hiring men at his own expense to lift the
submerged flatboat and by depositing the two flatboats with the Philippine Coast Guard in Sual,
Pangasinan. On 18 September 1998, respondent received a request from the Philippine Coast
Guard to transfer the flatboats to a safer place to prevent them from further deteriorating. Before
he could act on the request, however, typhoons "Gading," "Illiang" and "Loleng" struck the place
and destroyed the flatboats.

Respondent admitted having initially turned over the custody of the boats to the son of the
plaintiff but that he did so only because the Philippine Coast Guard had then refused to render
assistance to him; otherwise, he contended, he had taken all the necessary measures to protect the
attached property.

The case was referred by the Court to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for
evaluation, report and recommendation. Eventually, the OCA came out with its evaluation,
report and recommendation; it said:

"The complaint is partly meritorious.

"In Tantingco vs. Aguilar (81 SCRA 599, 604) this Court held that:

"`Having taken possession of the property under the writ of attachment, it was respondent's duty
to protect the property from damages or loss. The respondent was bound to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care for the preservation of the properties.'
"More to the point is the case of National Bureau of Investigation vs. Tuliao (270 SCRA 351,
356). In this case, this Court citing the case of Walker vs. McMicking (14 Phil. 688, 673) said:

"`xxx A verbal declaration of seizure or service of a writ of attachment is not sufficient. There
must be an actual taking of possession and placing of the attached property under the control of
the officer or someone representing him. (Hallester vs. Goodale, 8 Cann., 332, 21 Am. Dec., 674;
Jones vs. Hoard, 99 Ga., 451, 59 Am. St. Rep., 231)

`We believe that xxx to constitute a valid levy or attachment, the officer levying it must take
actual possession of the property attached as far as xxx practicable (under the circumstances). He
must put himself in a position to, and must assert and, in fact, enforce a dominion over the
property adverse to and exclusive of the attachment debtor and such property must be in his
substantial presence and possession (Corniff vs. Cock, 95 Ga., 61, 51 Am. St. Rep. 55, 61) Of
course, this does not mean that the attaching officer may not, under an arrangement satisfactory
to himself, put anyone in possession of the property for the purpose of guarding it, but he can not
in any way relieve himself from liability to the parties interested in said attachment.'
"Applying the above-quoted principle to the instant case, it is apparent that respondent was
negligent in taking care of the boats because he turned over possession thereof to the son of the
plaintiff. His reason that the Coast Guard did not accept the boats because he had no court order
can not exonerate him. In view of the Coast Guard's refusal, what respondent should have done
under the circumstances was to assign a disinterested party, at the expense of the plaintiff, to take
care of the boats. Even then, this error could have been rectified if respondent immediately asked
the court for an order to transfer custody of the boats to the Coast Guard. Respondent did this
only when one of the boats had already sunk. We, however, believe that this is the only extent of
respondent's liability. Respondent was able to eventually transfer the possession of the boats to
the Coast Guard in whose custody the boats were totally destroyed by storms. The loss of the
boats cannot thus be blamed entirely on respondent but it can not be denied that his initial action
may have contributed to the deterioration of the sea-worthiness of the boats."
The OCA recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 for negligence in
the performance of his duties.

The Court adopts the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.

The OCA did not err in holding that respondent sheriff was guilty of negligence. The refusal of
the Philippine Coast guard to initially take custody of the flatboats should have prompted him to
forthwith ask the trial court for an order to have the custody of the flatboats transferred to the
Philippine Coast Guard. He delayed in seeking for such a court order. But while respondent
failed to thusly implement the writ of preliminary attachment and to safekeep the property in his
custody,[1] it would appear that he exerted efforts to protect the flatboats. The eventual
deterioration and loss of the boats had, in fact, been caused by calamities beyond his control.
Given the circumstances, by and large extant from the records of the case, the Court deems it
appropriate to impose on respondent a fine but on the reduced amount of from P5,000.00
recommended by the OCA to P3,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court, finding Rodolfo A. Alcantara, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court
of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, guilty of simple negligence, hereby imposes upon him a
FINE of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS but warns that a repetition of the same or
like infraction will be dealt with severely.

SO ORDERED

BELGIAN OVERSEAS VS MV SHIPPING

Facts:

-    CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V Anangel Sky at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils
of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the
Philippine Steel Trading Corporation.
-    On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the subsequent
days, discharged the subject cargo. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order.
-    Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the
consignee Philippine Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as total loss.
-    Philippine First Insurance paid the claim of Philippine Steel and was thus subrogated.
-    Philippine First then instituted a complaint for recovery of the amount paid to the consignee
as insured.
-    Belgian claims that the damage and/or loss was due to pre-shipment damage, to the inherent
nature, vice or defect of the goods, or to perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or to
insufficiency of packing thereof, or to the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their
representatives. Belgian further argued that their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the
limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws. Finally, Belgian
averred that, in any event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to prevent
any damage/loss to said shipment.
-    The RTC dismissed the complaint.
-    The CA reversed and ruled that Belgian were liable for the loss or the damage of the goods
shipped, because they had failed to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
common carriers. As to the extent of Belgian’s liability, the CA held that the package limitation
under COGSA was not applicable, because the words "L/C No. 90/02447" indicated that a higher
valuation of the cargo had been declared by the shipper.

Issues:
-    Whether the notice of loss was timely filed. (Belgian claims that pursuant to Section 3,
paragraph 6 of COGSA, respondent should have filed its Notice of Loss within three days from
delivery. They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, but that respondent filed its
Notice of Claim only on September 18, 1990.)

Whether the package limitation of liability under COGSA is applicable. (Belgian contends that
assuming that they are liable their liability should be limited to US$500 per package as provided
in the Bill of Lading and by Section 4(5)of COGS

Held:

-    NO. Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their
arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence
against the carrier.
-    In this case, Belgian failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence. First, as stated
in the Bill of Lading, Belgian received the subject shipment in good order and condition in
Germany. Second, prior to the unloading of the cargo, an Inspection Report prepared and signed
by representatives of both parties showed the steel bands broken, the metal envelopes rust-
stained and heavily buckled, and the contents thereof exposed and rusty. Third, Bad Order Tally
Sheet issued by Jardine Davies Transport Services stated that the four coils were in bad order and
condition. Normally, a request for a bad order survey is made in case there is an apparent or a
presumed loss or damage.Fourth, the Certificate of Analysis stated that, based on the sample
submitted and tested, the steel sheets found in bad order were wet with fresh water. Fifth,
Belgian -- in a letteraddressed to the Philippine Steel --admitted that they were aware of the
condition of the four coils found in bad order and condition.

-    YES. First, the provision of COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the
state of the goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey.
Here, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection Report as to the condition of the goods was
prepared and signed by representatives of both parties. Second, as stated in the same provision, a
failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless filed
within one year. This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the
insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of lading.
-    A claim is not barred by prescription as long as the one-year period has not lapsed. In the
present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the Complaint51 was filed by
respondent on July 25, 1991, within the one-year prescriptive period.

-    YES. In this case, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading limiting the carrier's liability.
Neither did the shipper declare a higher valuation of the goods to be shipped. This fact
notwithstanding, the insertion of the words "L/C No. 90/02447 cannot be the basis for Belgian’s
liability.
-    First, a notation in the Bill of Lading which indicated the amount of the Letter of Credit
obtained by the shipper for the importation of steel sheets did not effect a declaration of the value
of the goods as required by the bill. That notation was made only for the convenience of the
shipper and the bank processing the Letter of Credit.
-    Second, a bill of lading is separate from the Other Letter of Credit arrangements. Thus,
Belgian’s liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and not on the per metric
ton price declared in the Letter of Credit.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987)

Facts: In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
some 2-1/2 meters away from his car.
The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the
oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the
street, partly blocking the way of incoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any socalled
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando Carbonel, its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be
carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a
result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the
dump truck driver.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the driver or the
negligence of Dionisio.
Held: It was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck
was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. , the collision of Dionisio's car
with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the
private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our
view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the
courts
TRIVIA: Did the headlights of Dionisio really turned off unexpectedly, as he claims?
Remember, this happened during Martial law years when curfews were in effect. It was
1:30 AM and Dinisio was drunk. Excellent

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

G.R. No. L-7644 (August 29, 1958)
Facts: Metropolitan Water District owns and operates three swimming pools in Balara, Quezon
City. It allows the public to use the pools for a fee.
Dominador Ong, a 14-year old boy, went to the pool with his two brothers. At about 4:35 p.m.,
Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining
building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio Ong went to the bigger
pool leaving Dominador in the small pool. Later that day, a bather reported that a person
was underwater for too long. Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to
retrieve Ong’s lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried to revive the boy.
Soon after, nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the
security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon
arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a
jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño
continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied
the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted.
The investigation revealed that the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in water. The
parents of Ong brought this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging
negligence on the selection and supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the
last clear chance to revive Ong.
Issue: Whether or not Metropolitan is negligent in operating the pool.
Held: NO, Metropolitan is not negligent. Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. The swimming pools are provided with a ring buoy,
toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottoms of the pools
are painted black so as to insure clear visibility. On display in a conspicuous place are
rules and regulations governing the use of the pools Metropolitan also employs six trained
lifeguards, all of whom were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have
two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a
male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there
are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the
pool, the employees of Metropolitan did everything possible to revive him. When
they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with
camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied
the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being
made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however
arrived late. All of the foregoing shows that Metropolitan has done all that is humanly possible
under the circumstances to restore minor Ong’s life. For that reason it is unfair to hold it
liable for his death
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. The
record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
swimming
pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of pool
regulations and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called and immediately exhausted all efforts to bring him back to life, it is clear
that there is no room for the application of the doctrine.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Civil Aeronautics Administration V. Court Of Appeals (1988)

G.R. No. L-51806 November 8, 1988

Lessons Applicable: Negligence

FACTS:
 December 13, 1968: Ernest E. Simke , Honorary Consul Geileral of Israel in the
Philippines, with several other persons went to the Manila International Airport to meet his
future son-in-law
 In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to
the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
 While walking on the terrace filled with other people, he slipped over an elevation about
4 inches high at the far end of the terrace.
 He fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
 December 14, 1968: he was operated for 3 hours
 RTC: favored Simke
 CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was negligent as the entity empowered
"to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport

HELD: YES.

 National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir
or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own
name.  The better practice there should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics
Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation.
 CAA as an agency is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a
private entity
 This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective
condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired through the years. It has
observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace, typical of many
government buildings and offices. Aside from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace,
pot holes cause by missing tiles remained unrepaired and unattented. The inclination itself is
an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it is neither a ramp because a ramp
is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding.
 Article 1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place."
 Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the
public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. 
 Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent
act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his
 injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being
the defendant's lack of due care -none here 

Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. 130068 (1998)
Facts: Supra
Held: It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly,
where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no
defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent rortfeasor.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that
the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors.
Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were
the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.

US VS BONIFACIO (WAY SAB AKO NAKITA HUHUH)

The appellant in this case was charged in the court below with homicidio por imprudcencia
temeraria (homicide committed with reckless negligence), and was convicted
of homicidio committed with simple negligence and sentenced to four months and one day
of arresto mayor and to pay
The information charges the commission of the offense as follows:
"On or about the 31st day of October of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of Santa Rita of the
municipality of Batangas, Batangas, the accused, being an engineer and while conducting the
freight train which was going to the municipality of Bauan, at about 10 o'clock in the morning of
the said day saw that Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was traveling along the railroad track, and as
the said Castillo did not get off of the said track in spite of the whistles or warnings given by the
accused, the accused did maliciously and criminally cause the said train to run over the said
Castillo, thereby killing him instantly; an act committed with violation of law."
On the 31st of October, 1913, Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, was run down and killed, while
attempting to cross the railroad track in the barrio of Santa Rita, Batangas, by an engine on
which the accused was employed as engineer. The deaf-mute stepped out on the track from an
adjoining field shortly before the accident, walked along one side of the track for some little
distance and was killed as he attempted, for some unknown reason, to cross over to the other
side.
When the accused engineer first saw the deceased, he was walking near the track, in the same
direction as that in which the train was running. The train, a heavy freight train, had just rounded
a curve, and the man in front was about 175 meters ahead of the engine. The engineer
immediately blew his whistle twice, and noticing, a few moments afterwards, that the man in
front did not respond to the warning by stepping aside from the track, he tried to slow down the
engine, but did not succeed in stopping in time to avoid running down the pedestrian. He did not
attempt to stop his engine when he first saw the man walking along the side of the track; but he
claims that he did all in his power to slow down a few moments afterwards, that is to say after he
had blown his whistle without apparently attracting the attention of the pedestrian, who, about
that time, turned and attempted to cross the track.
The only evidence as to the rate of speed at which the train was running at the time of the
accident was the testimony of the accused himself, who said that his indicator showed that he
was travelling at the rate of 35 kilometers an hour, the maximum speed permitted under the
railroad regulations for freight trains on that road.
There was a heavy decline in the track from the turn at the curve to a point some distance beyond
the place where the accident took place, and the undisputed evidence discloses that a heavy
freight train running at the rate of 35 miles an hour could not be brought to a stop on that decline
in much less than one hundred and fifty meters.
We think that the mere statement of facts, as disclosed by the undisputed evidence of record,
sufficiently and conclusively demonstrates that the death of the deaf-mute was the result of a
regrettable accident, which was unavoidable so far as this accused was concerned.
It has been suggested that, had the accused applied his brakes when he first saw the man walking
near the track, after his engine rounded the curve, he might have stopped the train in time to have
avoided the accident, as it is admitted that the distance from the curve to the point where the
accident occurred was about 175 meters.
But there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop. or even to slow down his engine, when he
sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unless there is something in the
appearance or conduct of the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the
possibility that such person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping
aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of an engine driver under such circumstances
is that he give warning of his approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is
assured that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train.
Of course it is the duty of an engine driver to adopt every measure in his power to avoid the
infliction of injury upon any person who may happen to be on the track in front of his engine,
and to slow down, or stop altogether if that be necessary, should he have reason to believe that
only by doing so can an accident be averted.
But an engine driver may fairly assume that all persons walking or standing on or near the
railroad track, except children of tender years, are aware of the danger to which they are
exposed; and that they will take reasonable precautions to avoid accident, by looking and
listening for the approach of trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is
directed to an oncoming train.
Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads so as to secure the expeditious
transportation of passengers and freight which the public interest demands. If engine drivers
were required to slow down or stop their trains every time they see a pedestrian on or near the
track of the railroad it might well become impossible for them to maintain a reasonable rate of
speed.  As a result the general traveling public would be exposed to great inconvenience and
delay which may be, and is readily avoided by requiring all persons approaching a railroad track,
to take reasonable precautions against danger from trains running at high speed.
There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim of the accident in the case at bar
which would have warned the accused engine driver that the man walking along the side of the
track was a deaf-mute, and that despite the blowing of the whistle and the noise of the engine he
was unconscious of his danger.  It was not until the pedestrian attempted to cross the track, just
in front of the train, that the accused had any reason to believe that his warning signals had not
been heard, and by that time it was too late to avoid the accident.  Under all the circumstances,
we are satisfied that the accused was without fault; and that the accident must be attributed
wholly to the reckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking the
necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from behind.
The trial judge, although he was satisfied that the accused was not guilty of reckless negligence,
held that he was guilty of homicide through simple negligence, accompanied by a breach of
speed regulations, and imposed the penalty prescribed for that offense in article 568 of the Penal
Code.
The only evidence as to the speed at which the train was running at the time of the accident was
the testimony of the accused himself, who said that before the accident occurred his indicator
showed that he was running at the rate of 35 kilometers an hour, the maximum speed authorized
under the railroad regulations. From this statement of the accused, taken together with the
evidence disclosing that the train was running on a down grade at the time when the accident
occurred, the trial judge inferred that the train must have been running at more than 35 miles an
hour at that moment, that is to say at a speed in excess of that allowed under the railroad
regulations.
We are of opinion, however, that the evidence does not sustain a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the train was running at more than 35 miles an hour at the time when the accident
occurred. We think that the statement of the accused engineer that the indicator on his engine
showed that he was running at 35 miles an hour before the accident referred to the time
immediately preceding the accident. Even if it were true, as the trial judge inferred from his
evidence, that the accused looked at the indicator several seconds before the accident, and before
the train entered on the down-grade some 175 yards from the place at which it occurred, it does
not necessarily follow that the speed of travel was increased thereafter beyond the limit
prescribed by regulations.  That would depend to some extent on the steam pressure maintained
on the engine, and perhaps upon other factors not developed in the record.
Mere conjecture, and inferences unsupported by satisfactory evidence, are not sufficient to
establish a material finding of fact upon which a finding of guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, can
be sustained.
Moreover, even if it were true that the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the limit
prescribed by regulations, just before the accident took place, that fact would not justify or
require the imposition of the penalty prescribed in article 568 of the Criminal Code, it
affirmatively appearing that the slight excess of speed had no possible causal relation to the
accident.
Granting it to be true, as found by the trial judge, that the train had gained some small addition in
speed beyond the authorized rate of travel, as a result of the fact that it was running on down
grade for about one hundred meters before the accident occurred, it affirmatively appears from
the statement of facts set forth above, that, under all the circumstances, the accident must have
taken place whether the speed had been slightly under rather than slightly over the limit
prescribed by regulation, and that it was due wholly to the negligent conduct of the deceased.
The provisions of article 568 of the Criminal Code under which the accused was convicted are as
follows:
*******
'Any person who, while violating any regulation, shall, by any act of imprudence or negligence
not amounting to reckless imprudence, commit an offense, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum degrees."
This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills another he is
criminally liable therefor, if at the moment he happens to be guilty of a violation of some petty
regulation (reglamento).  The injury or death must have resulted from some "imprudence or
negligence" (imprudencia o negligencia) on his part. True it need only be slight negligence, if
accompanied by ft violation of the regulations, but the relation of cause and effect must exist
between the negligence or imprudence of the accused and the injury inflicted. If it appears that
the injury in no wise resulted from the violation of the regulations, or the negligent conduct of
the accused, he incurs no criminal liability under the provisions of this article.
Viada, in his commentaries on this article of the Penal Code (vol. 3, p. 685), sets out the
following question and answer which clearly discloses that a conviction thereunder cannot be
maintained, unless there was culpable negligence in the violation of a duly prescribed regulation;
and unless, further, the latter was the proximate and immediate cause of the injury inflicted:
"Question No. 17. A pharmacist left his store forgetting and leaving behind the keys to the case
where the most powerful drugs were kept. During his absence his clerk filled a prescription
which he believed was duly made out by a physician but which, in fact, was signed by an
unauthorized person.  The prescription called for certain substances which were afterwards
employed to procure an abortion.  These substances, according to a medical report, were of a
poisonous and extremely powerful nature such as should be most carefully safeguarded and only
expended after ratification of the prescription in accordance with article 20 of the ordinance
relating to the practice of pharmacy. Under these circumstances would it be proper to consider
the pharmacist as guilty of the offense of simple imprudence with violation of the regulation of
the said faculty? The Supreme Court has decided this question in the negative on the ground that
the fact of the pharmacist having forgotten and left behind, during the short time he was out
walking, the key of the closet in which, in conformity with the pharmacy ordinances, he kept the
most powerful and active drugs, properly considered, does not constitute the culpable
negligence referred to in article 581 of the Penal Code, nor was it the proximate and immediate
cause of the said prescription being filled in his store without being properly ratified by the
physician who signed it, as required by the said ordinances.  The Court held, therefore, that the
trial court committed an error of law in holding the appellant liable.  (Decision of December 23,
1881; Official Gazette of April 14, 1882.)"
See also the recent decision of the Tribunal Supremo de Espana dated July 11, 1906, wherein the
doctrine is reaffirmed in a case involving the alleged negligence of certain railroad employees in
handling railroad cars.
Doubtless a presumption of negligence will frequently arise from the very fact that an accident
occurred at the time when the accused was violating a regulation; especially if the regulation has
for its object the avoidance of such an accident. But this presumption may, of course, be rebutted
in criminal as well as in civil cases by competent evidence. In the Federal Court of the United
States the rule is stated as follows:
"Where a ship at the time of collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent
collisions the burden is upon her of showing that her fault could not have been a contributory
cause of the collision." (7 Cyc, 370 and numerous other cases there cited.)
The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses that even if the train
was running at a speed slightly in excess of the maximum speed prescribed in the regulations,
that fact had no causal relation to the accident and in no wise contributed to it
The judgment convicting and sentencing the appellant in this case should be reversed, and the
accused acquitted of the offense with which he is charged in the information, and his bail bond
exonerated, with the costs of both instances de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Torres, J., see dissenting opinion.

Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024 (1996)
Facts: The petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela, was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Suddenly, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people
present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition,
she parked along the sidewalk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in
the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other
medical and related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected
earnings.
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li
guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
Issues: (1) Whether or not, the petitioner is guilty of contributory negligence? (2) Whether or
not, respondent’s employer, Alexander Commercial Inc, is liable for the acts of its
employee?
RULING: (1) The SC ruled that the Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be
considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a
sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken
all reasonable precautions.
(2) Likewise, the SC ruled that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of
respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that
of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the
bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, hence, the court
is of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable
for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.

Del Rosario vs. CA

G.R. No. 118325 (January 29, 1997)
Facts: In selling to the public roofing materials known as "Banawe" shingles, Metal Forming
Corporation (MFC) made representations on the durability of the product and the sturdiness
of its installation, characterizing the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and
that the "BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm
pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps". It prompted the Del Rosarios to buy the
"Banawe" shingles and have them installed at their residence.
Two months after installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios were blown away by the
typhoon "Ruping", and the same acted in parts (instead of as a single unit) when
strong winds blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off.
The Del Rosarios' filed a complaint on November 21, 1990, charging MFC with a violation of
Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc." After due proceedings, the DTI
rendered judgment sentencing MFC to pay an "administrative fine of P10,000.00".
MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. The spouses sought to
recover from MFC, damages resulting from the events just narrated, contending that aside from
the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical wiring,
ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. They reckoned their
actual damages at P1,008,003.00 and prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the
sum of P3,000,000,00, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and attorney's fees
in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
MFC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, alleging that it had no
contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the contract for the purchase and
installation of the roofing, upon which the latter's claims were based, was actually entered into
between it and another person, Jesus M. Puno (an engineer identified as the Del Rosarios'
contractor).
Judgment was rendered in favor of the Del Rosarios.
Issue: Are the Spouses entitled to moral damages?
Held: Yes. It is indisputable that (1) the tiles were delivered to the Del Rosarios and used in
fabricating the roof of their home, and (2) that it was the employees and workers of MFC
who (a) delivered the shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the Del Rosarios' home,
and (b) undertook and completed the installation thereof. These they did in bad faith, using
inferior materials and assembling them in a manner contrary to MFC's express representations in
its brochures and advertisements circulated and broadcast to the general public — which
representations had, in the first place, induced the Del Rosarios to choose the metal tiles in
question for their roofing. In fine, since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed
the express warranty made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe" tiles
brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and
thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity of the individual who actually dealt with
MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and installation is of little moment.
That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the
general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who
relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly
authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the
psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of
moral
damages is warranted. In Makabili v. Court of Appeals, the court held that:
It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven
during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to
defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are
in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not
to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are
allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v.
Magno, 21
SCRA 292 [1968])

Ylarde vs. Aquino

163 SCRA 697 (July 29, 1988)
Facts: Private respondent Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public
school in Tayug, Pangasinan, while Private respondent Aquino was a teacher therein.
During the happening of the events which led to the filing of the case, there were several
concrete blocks in the school which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in
World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, Sergio
Banez, also a teacher therein, started burying them. Aquino, in order to help, gathered
eighteen of his male pupils after class and ordered them to dig an excavation pit wherein the
stone can be buried. It was continued the following day by four of the original eighteen
pupils. Among them is the son of the petitioners, Novelito. When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left to
borrow a key to the workroom from Banez to get a rope, he instructed the pupils not to touch the
stone. Three of the four kids, including Novelito, playfully jumped into the pit. The other
kid, without any warning jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards
the opening.
Except for Novelito, the other kids were able to go out of the pit. The concrete block pinned
Novelito to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, he sustained injuries. Novelito
died 3 days after. Petitioner-parents filed a suit for damages against both private respondents.
Petitioners base their action against Aquino on Article 2176 NCC for his alleged negligence
that caused their son's death while the complaint against Soriano as the head of school is founded
on Article 2180 NCC. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work
Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that
the demise of Novelito was due to his own reckless imprudence. This was affirmed by CA on
appeal. Hence the present petition.
Issues: (1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for damages under Art. 2180. (2) Whether or not
Aquino is liable for damages under Art. 2176.
Held: 1. No. The Court based their ruling on the doctrine enunciated in the case of Amadora vs.
CA, Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. It provides
further that teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the
school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Thus, Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private
respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the
digging.
2. Yes. It is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when
he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead
utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone
which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit
even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be
easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge
stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on
the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance. These negligent acts have a direct causal connection to the death of Novelito.
A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site,
and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An
ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone"
is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his
company.
The defense that the digging done by the pupils was part of their Work Education was not
sustained, since the nature of the activity reveals a dangerous one and requires the
attendance of adult laborers and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. In fact, there was no showing
that it was included in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Further it is admitted
that Aquino decided all by himself to help his colleague.
The finding of the lower court that the injuries were caused by Novelito’s own reckless
imprudence was not sustained. The Court ruled that deceased was only 10 years old as
such his actuations were natural to a boy his age. The degree of care required to be exercised
must vary with one’s capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances.

Cullion Ice, Fish and Electric Company vs. Philippine Motors Corporation
GR No. 32611 (November 3, 1930)
Facts: Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co. Inc. owned a motor schooner named Gwendoline. H.D.
Cranston, the representative of Cuilion in Manila, decided to have the engine on the
Gwendoline converted from gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with
C.E. Quest, the manager of Phil. Motors, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding
that payment shall be made upon completion of the work.
The work began and conducted under the supervision of Mr. Quest, and chiefly by a mechanic
whom Quest took with him to the boat. Cranston also directed the members of the
crew of the Gwendoline to assist in the work, placing them under the command of Quest.
Upon inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed, hence one
was installed. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel.
A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from
the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a
piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the
tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped down into the engine
compartment. To paraphrase, a device was made where the engine can be converted from
gasoline to crude oil, switching back and forth.
Later, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was
dripping freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was
called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the
flooding would stop
The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the
first run, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. As the boat was coming
in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line
to get a new start. After this had been done, the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the
tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and
adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable
to subdue. A case for damages was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of
Quest.
Held: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation
from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic
pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This
was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back
fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into
flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material nearby.
The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation,
which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
precautions to avoid.
Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of
similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the
flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of
fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in
repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of
the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no
sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of
skill.

Cullion Ice, Fish and Electric Company vs. Philippine Motors Corporation
GR No. 32611 (November 3, 1930)
Facts: Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co. Inc. owned a motor schooner named Gwendoline. H.D.
Cranston, the representative of Cuilion in Manila, decided to have the engine on the
Gwendoline converted from gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with
C.E. Quest, the manager of Phil. Motors, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding
that payment shall be made upon completion of the work.
The work began and conducted under the supervision of Mr. Quest, and chiefly by a mechanic
whom Quest took with him to the boat. Cranston also directed the members of the
crew of the Gwendoline to assist in the work, placing them under the command of Quest.
Upon inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed, hence one
was installed. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel.
A temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from
the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a
piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the
tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped down into the engine
compartment. To paraphrase, a device was made where the engine can be converted from
gasoline to crude oil, switching back and forth.
Later, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was
dripping freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was
called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the
flooding would stop
The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the
first run, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. As the boat was coming
in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line
to get a new start. After this had been done, the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the
tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and
adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable
to subdue. A case for damages was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of
Quest.
Held: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation
from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic
pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This
was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back
fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into
flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material nearby.
The leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation,
which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
precautions to avoid.
Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of
similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the
flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of
fire. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in
repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of
the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no
sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of
skill.

E.M. Wright V Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.

28 Phil 122 (October 1, 1914)
FACTS: Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway.
Wright’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant’s tracks run. To enter
his premises from the street, Wright must cross defendant’s tracks.
One night, Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter the premises of his
home, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the Wright from the
vehicle, causing injuries. On the location where Wright crossed the tracks, the rails were above-
ground, and the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of
their depth out of the ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the
level of the street.
Manila Electric admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but it also claimed that
Wright was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and such intoxication was
the primary cause of the accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiff’s negligence was not as
great as defendant’s. It awarded Wright damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Wright contributed to the “principal occurrence” or
“only to his own injury.”
HELD: NO. Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered
with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. No facts, other than the fact that Wright
was intoxicated, are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The
conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the
facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle
under the conditions described.
A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves
aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle
crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a
person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such
circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a
conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. Wright was not negligent.
Nofacts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff
JARCO Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Aguilar
GR No. 129792 (December 21, 1999)
Facts: Petitioner Jarco is the owner of Syvel's Department Store in Makati City. Respondent
spouses are the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2
nd
floor of Syvel's. As Criselda was signing her credit card slip, she felt a sudden gust of wind and
heard a loud thud. She
looked behind her and saw her 6 yr. old daughter Zhieneth pinned down on the floor by the
store's giftwrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help. She was
rushed to the Makati Medical Center and was operated on. The next day, she lost her speech and
fourteen days after, she died. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she
sustained.
Spouses Aguilar demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical
bills, wake and funeral expenses but petitioners refused to pay. Spouses filed a
complaint for damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that the proximate
cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it. The court also held
that Criselda's negligence in allowing her daughter to freely roam around the store contributed to
the accident. In absolving petitioners from liability, the court reasoned that the counter
was situated at the end corner of the 2
nd
floor as a precautionary measure, hencce, it could not be considered as an attractive nuisance.
On appeal, CA reversed the judgment and found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a
structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted 'L' and
it was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported
by its narrow base. It was also established that 2 employees already requested the
management to nail the counter because it was shaky but the latter did not take any action. The
management insists that it has been there for 15 years and it has been stable. The Court of
Appeals also declared that Zhieneth was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. It also
absolved Criselda of any negligence, finding nothing wrong in momentarily allowing Zhieneth
to walk while she signed the document. Moreover, the allegation that Zhieneth clung to the
counter which caused the same to fall on her was denied by Gonzales in his testimony. He said
that when the doctor asked Zhieneth what she did, the child answered 'nothing, i did not come
near the counter, the counter just fell on me'. The CA awarded actual and compensatory
damages. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the court denied the same. Hence, this
appeal.
Issues:
Whether the death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence.
In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to the store management for
maintaining a defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
Held: An accident pertains to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
1.
2.
Held: An accident pertains to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
On the other hand, negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest
of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are
intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of
PICART V. SMITH, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The court held that Zhieneth's tragedy and
death can only be attributed to negligence.
The testimony of Gonzales pertaining to Zhieneth's statement formed part of the res gestae under
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. All that is required for their admissibility as
part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event
before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person
who testified in court. it is unthinkable for a child of tender age and in extreme pain to have lied
to a doctor whom she trusted with her life.
Zhieneth performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. However, petitioners did, through
their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, the court applied the rule that a child under nine years
of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as
a matter of law. And even if contributory negligence can be attributed to Zhieneth and assume
that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if the counter was stable
and sturdy. Criselda too, should be absolved from contributory negligence. Zhieneth held on to
her mother's hand, Criselda momentarily released the child's hand when she signed her
credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable for Criselda to let go of her child.
When the counter fell on her child, Criselda was just one foot away.

US v. Pineda
37 Phil 456 (January 22, 1918)
Facts: Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and the owner of a drug store. Feliciano
Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription to Pineda. On other
occasions, Santos had given the medicine prescribed to his horses with good results. Under the
supervision of Pineda, the drugs were prepared and given Santos.
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate, placed two of the packages in
water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed
with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, who took the drugs, died
afterwards. Santos took the drug packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. It was
found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate (a poison). When
sued Pineda alleges that he did not intentionally sold the poison and that what the law (to
which he is indicted) forbids is the sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name”.
ISSUES: Whether or not Pineda can be held liable for the death of the horses, assuming he did
not deliberately sold poison.
HELD: Yes. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless sale
of poison and medicine, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes
any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake.
The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poison he sells. If were
we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to
prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that
it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any
knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the
purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known
principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would
leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and
vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor.
We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. The rule of caveat emptor
cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee in this case do
not stand at arm’s length as in ordinary transactions. It would be idle mockery for the customer
to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it
must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.
BPI v. CA
216 SCRA 51 (November 26, 1992)
Facts: A person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement
evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity
Facts: A person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market placement
evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity
value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to pre-
terminate the placement. However, Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money
Market Department, told her that "trading time" was over for the day (Friday). He suggested that
she call again the following week. The promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate
was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24,
1981.
Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before
had handled Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to
attend to the pretermination process.
The caller presenting herself as Ms. Fernando phoned again and made a follow-up with
Eustaquio the pretermination of the placement. Although Eustaquio was not familiar with
the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real
Eligia G. Fernando by "verifying" the details the caller gave with the details in "the
ledger/folder" of the account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled
Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife
office
to verify the request for pretermination.
Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value, the caller insisted on the
pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one for
P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks be delivered to her office at
Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested
pretermination as required by office procedure. From his desk, the papers, following the
processing route, passed through the position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and
documentation clerk, before the two cashier's checks were prepared. The two cashier's checks,
together with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preterminated
and the promissory note to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and Celestino
Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, in BPI's Treasury
Operations Department, both authorized signatories for BPI, who signed the two checks that very
morning. Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for delivery.
In the same morning when the checks were to be delivered, the caller changed the delivery
instructions; instead that the checks were to be delivered to her office at Philamlife,
she would pick the checks up herself or send her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up.
Eustaquio then told the caller that if her niece was going to get the checks, her niece would
have to being a written authorization from her. It was agreed that Rosemarie would pick the
checks up from the bank. Thus, Eustaquio hurriedly went to the dispatcher to inform him of
the new delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the
purchase order slip, writing thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to
pick up.”
It was, in fact Rosemarie who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery
receipt. As it turned out, the same person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando
and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of
Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to require the
surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that
Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter
authorizing Rosemarie to pick up the two checks was compared or verified with Fernando's
signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be forged although
there 0was a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando.
On a different day, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando applied at China
Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a current account. She was
accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion
whom Cuaso knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account. What Cuaso indicated
in the application form, however, was that Fernando was introduced by Valentin Co, and with
her initials on the form signifying her approval, she referred the application to the New
Accounts Section for processing. The application form shows the signature of "Eligia G.
Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax
account number, and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account
is indicated on the application form by the initials of the cashier, who did not interview
the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it.
The woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy.
Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's
specimen signature. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then
stamped on the two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared
on the same day. Two days after, withdrawals began.
The maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI came and the real
Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed
having preterminated her placement. She then executed an affidavit stating that while she was
the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never received nor endorsed them and that
her purported signature on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of
the original of the promissory note evidencing the placement which matured that day,
BPI issued her a new promissory note to evidence a roll-over of the placement.
BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC as supported by Eligia G. Fernando's
affidavit, for the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for
reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration
Committee.
The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former with
interest. - However, upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration, the Board of Directors of
the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI
while ordering it to pay CBC.
BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court which dismissed said petition
but modified the award by including a provision for attorney’s fees in favor of
CBC, among others. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES: Who between BPI and CBC should be held liable? Whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks made by the impostor?
HELD: In the present petition, Fernando’s name in the checks were forged. The checks are
"wholly inoperative" and of no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case
show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to who between the parties
should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks necessities the determination of
the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged
checks.
The records show that petitioner BPI, as drawee bank and CBC as representing or collecting
bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks.
The Arbitration Committee in its’ decision, analyzed the negligence of the employees of BPI
involved who are involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Fernando's
money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject checks. A) The impostor
could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which nobody in BPI
bothered to make to Fernando; b) The officer who used to handle Fernando's account did not do
anything about the account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification appears to have
been made on Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the
letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature was in BPI's file; and
d) the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was
supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled BPI's negligence
compared to that of CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the
subject checks to the impostor.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the
degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees
and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the
banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
supervision of their employees.
In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of
Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of
the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC
graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that BPI's negligence was
graver. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the
loss, we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how many
justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they
were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees.
The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged
checks by an impostor. BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance should
have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, where both
parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous, the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Applying these principles, BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from
liability is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's
employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement. Moreover,
Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G.
Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which CBC did, could not have resulted
in the discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to discover the fraud at
all. In fact, the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or implied, of
the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI.
BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of are the cause "that set into motion the actual
and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred." BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was "a gap, a
hiatus, an interval between the issuance and delivery of said checks by BPI to the
impostor and their actual payment of CBC to the impostor. BPI points out that the gap of one (1)
day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is material
on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage, according to BPI, there was yet no loss and the
impostor could have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to
the checks without negotiating them.
BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between
the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and
the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing the same
with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after
taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees, the
impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is
therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by
an impostor was due to the negligence of BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not
inclined to rule that BPI must solely bear the loss. Due care on the part of CBC could have
prevented any loss.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious
circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the
account was opened. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts
clearly showing negligence. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as
controlling in this case, still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which
befell both CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence
expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it.
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to
overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It
was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and
the subsequent loss. While it is true that BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of
the loss, CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in
encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179
of the Civil Code to the effect that while CBC may recover its losses, such losses are
subject to mitigation by the courts.

US vs. Baggay
20 PHIL 142 (September 1, 1911)
Facts: Several persons were assembled in Baggay's house to hold a song service called "buni."
The Non-Christian Baggay without provocation, suddenly attacked a woman named Billiingan
with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she died immediately. With the
same bolo, he likewise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan,
Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, Dioalan.
For this reason, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in court charging Baggay with murder.
After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the
judge exempted Baggay from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs of the
murdered woman. The Baggay's counsel and his heirs appealed to this court.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly
liable. (2) Can the heirs of Baggay be held civilly liable?
HELD: (1) YES. Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable
criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for
indemnification of the harm done.
Civil liability may arise from acts ordinarily punishable under the penal law, although the law
has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a
lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the
consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly. His fellows ought not to
suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts inspite of his unfortunate condition.
Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared
to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still
entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does
not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the
consequences of his acts.
(2) Yes. The persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile are those
who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that
there was no blame or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such
person be insolvent, the lunatic shall answer with his own property, excepting that
part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.

Marinduque vs.Workmen’s Compensation

99 PHIL 48 (June 30, 1956)
FACTS: A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to Marinduque Iron Mines, turned over
and hit a coconut tree resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other
laborers. Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased. He paid nothing, however, to the latter. Madador’s wife now seeks compensation
by Marinduque Iron Mines as the employer.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Mamador has a right to be compensated by Marinduque Iron
Mines. (2) Whether or not there was notorious negligence by Mamador for having violated the
employer’s prohibition on riding haulage trucks.
HELD: YES. Marinduque Iron Mines alleged that the criminal case sentencing Macunat to
indemnify the heirs of Mamador was a suit for damages against a third person, thereby having
the effect of releasing the employer from liability. The criminal case, however, was not a suit for
damages against third persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have
not received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, even if the case was against a third
person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosecution of the
"other person" does not affect the liability of the employer.
Marunduque also contended that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and
Macunat barred the widow's claim against the employer because she has already
elected one of the remedies. This contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived
was the offender's criminal prosecution and not all civil action for damages.
2. NO. Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It
couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Although the
employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute
negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of negligence.
Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because the prohibition had
nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. Notorious negligence means the same
as gross negligence which implies "conscious indifference to consequences,” or "pursuing a
course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury."

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

MARCH 26, 2011 ~ VBDIAZ

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

G.R. No. L-21291
March 28, 1969
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving
while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company
(MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the
Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day, while the
soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns.
In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that
the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and
attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own
miscalculation.

The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that
effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the
concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40.

ISSUE: WON the lower court’s decision is erroneous

HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.
NO

The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great
respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial
judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the
witness stand.”
But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under
obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that
MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is
the existence of negligence.

Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States
v. Barias. Cooley’ formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias
decisions. Thus: “Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to
be:

“The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person
suffers injury.”

There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ”

“Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of
care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.”
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of Corliss must
necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to
be fastened on MRC had not arisen.

Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the
peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must
be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.

39 Cusi v. PNR| Guerrero J.

G.R. No. L-29889 May 31, 1979
FACTS
• Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party
which broke up at about 11 o'clock that evening, the spouses proceeded home
in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the
railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that
there was no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train,
Cusi merely slack ened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same
time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision
between the two.
• This accident caused the spouses to suffer deformities and to lose the earnings
they used to enjoy as successful career people.
• The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross negligence of
Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the collision; that had he made a full
stop before traversing the crossing as required by section 56(a) of Act 3992
(Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the approach of the train,
and thus, there would have been no collision.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate cause of the
collision
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No.
• Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts as "the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
• All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that
care and diligence expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances.
• Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were
manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of guards provided for the
operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, and the other, the
3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena
was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that precise hour, the
warning devices were not operating for no one attended to them. Also, as
observed by the lower court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle,
thus: "... he simply sped on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his
whistle. That the train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that
notwithstanding the application of the emergency brakes, the train did not stop
until it reached a distance of around 100 meters."
• Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to
avoid injury to -himself and to others. We find no need for him to have made a
full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no
reason to anticipate the impending danger
The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of the existence of the
railroad crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before
proceeding to the party. At the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no
warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle from an oncoming
train. They safely traversed the crossing. On their return home, the situation at
the crossing did not in the least change, except for the absence of the guard or
flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for passage
as before, plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi merely slackened his speed and
proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of speed for going over
railroad crossings

Layugan vs. IAC

167 SCRA 363 November 14, 1968
FACTS: Pedro Layugan testified that while he and his companion were repairing the tire of their
cargo truck that was parked along the right side of the National Highway, Godofredo
Isidro’s truck, recklessly driven by Daniel Serrano bumped Layugan. As a result, Layugan had
his left leg amputated.
Defendant Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. Isidro said that
Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law of the
driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly, while being repaired was parked, occupying almost
half of the right lane right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the
failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before
leaving, he checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in
driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Layugan, while the same was at a stop. Serrano
also testified that, “When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with
round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have
(sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not
function.” Layugan, on the other hand, claims that a warning device consisting of the lighted
kerosene lamp was placed 3-4 Meters from the back of the truck.
Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it
would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there exists a presumption of negligence
on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent.
2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
HELD: 1. NO. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Applying the definition
and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the
road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning
established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the
road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning
device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked
cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident, Layugan sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot.
2. NO. In our jurisdiction, Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine
merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the
cause of the injury, or where there’s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident
and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the
actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved
and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of
defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence. In this case, it
is inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the
defendant driver.
(Note: The discussion in this case of res ipsa loquitur is merely stated in the obiter dictum.)

Ramos vs. CA
321 SCRA 584 (December 29, 1999)
Facts: Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due
to pains caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo
an operation for the removal of the stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of
examinations which included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery.
She and her husband, Rogelio, met Dr. Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, for the first
time. They agreed on the date of the operation and the doctor decided that she
undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. Erlinda was admitted in the hospital and was
accompanied by her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz. At the operating room, Cruz saw about two or
three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer the
anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital staff, Herminda Cruz introduced herself as the
Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center and was allowed to stay inside the
operating room.
Hours later, Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard somebody say “Dr.
Hosaka is already here.” As she held the hand of Erlinda, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, “ang hirap maintubate nito,
mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan”. Due to the remarks of Dr.
Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She noticed a bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of Erlinda. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an
order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived in
the operating room, Cruz saw him trying to intubate Erlinda. Erlinda’s nailbed became
bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately, thereafter, Cruz went
out of the operating room, and told Erlinda’s husband (her brother) “that something
wrong was happening”. Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw Erlinda was still in
trendelenburg position. On that fateful day, she saw Erlinda taken to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU).
Erlinda stayed for about four months in the hospital and has been in a comatose condition.
When asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient, Doctors Gutierrez and
Hosaka explained that the patient had bronchospasm. After being discharged from the
hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her
husband Rogelio incurring monthly expenses. She was diagnosed to be suffering from
“diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage.”
The Ramoses filed a civil case for damages against the private respondents alleging negligence
in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. (2) Whether or not
private respondents were negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the
operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of
Erlinda’s comatose condition. (3) Is the hospital liable?
Held: YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter
be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall
bladder operation presents a case for the application of the doctrine.
In holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the
doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under
anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and
scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as
merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. Mere invocation and application of the
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step
in the process of such proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following
requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1.The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality” which
caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the
defendant.
But it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence.
The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary
incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred. If there were such
extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is
called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
(2) YES. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part. Their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. Dr. Gutierrez failed to
properly intubate the patient. She admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of
the operation. And no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was
done by her. She was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. This is an act
of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.
Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to
Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to a drug
introduced into her system. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority
(as the “captain” of the operative team) in not determining, if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols. No evidence on record exists to show that Dr. Hosaka
verified if respondent Dr. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not
escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at
the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the
latter’s operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery.
(3) We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital. The unique practice (among private
hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting “consultants,” who are
allegedly not hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence
in medical malpractice cases. The truth is, Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for
the patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception
of the payment of wages.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is
found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not
only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity
only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity
concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs,
once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or
employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. Upon these
disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Batiquin vs. CA
258 SCRA 334 (July 5, 1996)
Facts: Mrs. Villegas consulted Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care. Dr. Batiquin, along with other
physicians and nurses, performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully
delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal
pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost appetite, so she consulted
Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed certain medicines for her. However, the
pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr.
Kho suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside,
an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus
behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber which appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This
was the cause of the infection of the ovaries the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas.
The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court. There were also doubts as to the
whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho’s
testimony: 1) that he sent it to a Pathologist in Cebu and (2) he threw it away. But aside from Dr.
Kho's testimony, the Medical Certificate, the Progress Record, the Anesthesia Record,
the Nurse's Record, an the Physician's Discharge Summary mentioned the piece of rubber. The
trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, since those
who prepared them did not testify in court.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision.
Issues: Whether or not Dr. Batiquin could be held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Held: While Dr. Batiquin claims that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Kho's testimony,
a reading of said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a
credible witness. Dr. Batiquin failed to impute any motive for Dr. Kho to state any untruth,
leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, the rule of res ipsa loquitur
comes to fore. In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine
are present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control
of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the Dr. Batiquin were bereft of direct evidence as to the
actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent
Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, Villegas underwent no other
operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it
stands to reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarean section performed by
Dr. Batiquin. Dr. Batiquin failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising
from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently
leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the
adverse effects thereof.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA

357 SCRA 249 (April 20, 2001)
Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A.
Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel
platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked
at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the
chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save
his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji,
Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove D.M. Consunji’s
negligence.
Held: YES. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in part upon the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows
the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no
such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to
rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is
present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources
that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant;
thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the
appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption
or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence to
rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA| Makalintal

G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 | 16 SCRA 448
FACTS
• A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of
the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread
to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them.
• The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the
station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).
• Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that
respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems
to be nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in
appropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such
docrtrine.”
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLIES. CALTEX LIABLE.
• Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in absence of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want
of care.
• The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is
applicable in this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known
how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
• The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the
driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into the
underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of
negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass
through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10
taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke
cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the
concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 . meters high at most and
cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable.

FF CRUZ vs. CA
G.R. No. L-52732 August 29, 1988 |SCRA
FACTS
o The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was situated
adjacent to the residence of the Mables.
o Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first
approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be
constructed between the shop and Mable’s residence. The request was
repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.
o In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruz’s shop.
Cruz’s employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but
their efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables’ house. Both the shop
and the house were razed to the ground.
o The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the
contents thereof.
o The Mables filed an action for damages against the Cruz’s.
o The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award of
damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA, therefore,
had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the Mables’.
o The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:
o Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),
Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
o The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint,
varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioner
or its employees was not merely presumed.
Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residence
of the Mables as required by a city ordinance

REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEEVEDORING

Facts:
1. Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant, LSC for brevity) was being
towed down the Pasig river by tugboats belonging to the same corporation.`
2. The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge,
smashing the posts and causing the bright to list. The river, at that time, was swollen and the
current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces.
3. Republic of the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and consequential damages caused
by its employees.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan
bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Ruling:

1. No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and
uncontrovertibly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively
controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the
part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary
course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper case is used. Res ipsa loquitur.

NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that it assigned two of its most
powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge, and (2) that it assigned to the task the more
competent and experienced among its patrons, (3) had the towlines, engines and equipment
double-checked and inspected; (4) that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions. These
very precautions, completely destroy the NLS’defense.

Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The more difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by
NSC prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was
not caso fortuito.

LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen steam and its swift current,
voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and
cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be
insufficient.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S.D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZA, plaintiffs-appellees
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:

 On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle
Real, Ermita, Manila, Philippines, when a delivery wagon belonging to William Van
Buskirk, came along the street in the opposite direction at a great speed, and run over to
carromata severely wounding Carmen Ong with a serious cut upon her head.
 Van Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a
safe and reliable cochero;
 That upon the delivery of some forage, the defendant’s cochero tied the driving lines
of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside the wagon
to unload the forage.
 While unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a
whip and made some other noise, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery
wagon and they ran away. The driver was thrown out from the wagon and was unable to
stop the horses resulting to a collision with the carromata.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment
against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th
day October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that
judgment.

ISSUE

 Whether or Not the defendant be liable for the negligence of his cochero?
HOLDING

 No. The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. This is because the
occurrence that transpired therein was an accident resulted from an ordinary acts of life.
The prima facie case was already destroyed from the start when the defendant presented
his evidence to the court by employing all the diligence of his cochero proving that the
latter was not a negligent. Hence, it proves that the defendant is not liable for any
accusations.
RULINGS

 It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in
the manner described by the evidence in this case. The act of defendant’s driver in leaving
the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts that the
performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into
custom, can not be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent. In fact, the very
 reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are beneficial rather than
prejudicial.
 It is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at
the time of the accident. Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant’s
cochero was not negligent in the management of the horse.

Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.

(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949)

Reyes, JBL:

In the afternoon of May 5, 1946while the plaintiff-appellee and other

companions were loading grass, an electric transmission wire, installed and
maintained by the defendant Philippine Power and Development Co., Inc.,
alongside the road suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head
of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result, plaintiff received
the full shock of 4,400 volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed through
his body and caused extensive and serious multiple burns from skull to eyes,
leaving the bone exposed in some parts and causing intense pain and wounds
that were not completely healed when the case was tried on June 18, 1947,
over one year after the incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence.

The appellate court, in overruling this defense, held: “While it is the rule, as
contended by the appellant, that in case of non-contractual negligence, or culpa
aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the proximate
cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized
principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured
person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not occur as if he having such control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.’ And the
burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that he had observed due
 diligence and care. This rule is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the
thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at
bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every night to be on the
highway, and the electric wire was under the sole control of the defendant
company. In the ordinary course of events, electric wires do not part suddenly
in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual strain and
stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision,
just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure
passers-by, unless someone is negligent (which is admittedly not present), the
fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of negligence
in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief
Baron Pollock “if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the
defendant to prove.”

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, respondents
No. L-44748.        August 29, 1986

Facts:

Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio Communiciations of the Philippines,
Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram sent through its Manila Office to the former, reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN

LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him wounded his
feelings, caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business because other
people have come to know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that the additional words
in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators, that they were not
addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram, and that
the Tagalog words are not defamatory.

The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person reading the same would
logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the
amount of P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ruling that the company was
negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating
incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is filed among other telegrams and open to
public is sufficient publication; however reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00

Issue:

Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising
from the criminal act of its employee.

Ruling:

Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil
Code, as well as on respondent’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its own employees. By
adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent, there is
a clear breach of contract; for upon payment of the fixed rate, the company undertakes to
transmit the message accurately.

In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer (master).

This is the master and servant rule. As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its
employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts
of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in
the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the
petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy.

In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However,

since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES
IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
The judgment of the CA is affirmed.

Manila Electric Co. vs Remonquillo

99 PHIL 117 (May 18, 1956)
Facts: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, to repair a leaking
“media agua.” The “media agua” was just below the window of the third floor of his
stepbrother’s house. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the
window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet
came into contact with the electric wire of Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua,
causing his death by electrocution.
Magno’s widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court
rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Magno’s widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court
rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles
on the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some two
years ago before Peñaloza’s house was constructed. During the construction of said house a
similar incident took place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained
to the defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the
wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from the building.”There was
no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not refuted).
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.
HELD: NO. It was the victim who was guilty of negligence. The liability of electric companies
for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence. Nevertheless such
companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.
The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the
too close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of
said illegal construction of the “media agua.”
The company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which
reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the
installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.
The violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely
contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act
of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do
so. He had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger
to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.

Bernardo vs. Legaspi

29 Phil 12 (December 23, 1914)
Facts: Due to a collision between the respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the
former filed an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car. Legaspi, on the
other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages.
The lower court found upon that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in
handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the
part of both as to prevent either from recovering.
ISSUE Whether or not the parties may recover damages
HELD: NO. Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street
corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers
thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining
causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.
Bernal vs. House
54 PHIL 327 (January 30, 1930)
Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter, Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to
attend the procession on Holy Friday. After the procession, accompanied by two other
persons, they passed along a public street. Purificacion was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends.
While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared
which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At
that time there was hot water running in the gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face
downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd
Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and
visceras of the chest & abdomen.”
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street with the
knowledge and consent of the authorities and that the cause of death was other than
the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.
The trial judge dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs
Held: NO. The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water
to flow through the public streets, endangering the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
street on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing a and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. . The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
result not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only in reduction of
the damages.

Bernal vs. House

54 PHIL 327 (January 30, 1930)
Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter, Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to
attend the procession on Holy Friday. After the procession, accompanied by two other
persons, they passed along a public street. Purificacion was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends.
While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared
which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At
that time there was hot water running in the gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face
downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd
Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and
visceras of the chest & abdomen.”
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street with the
knowledge and consent of the authorities and that the cause of death was other than
the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.
The trial judge dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs
Held: NO. The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water
to flow through the public streets, endangering the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
street on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing a and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. . The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
result not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only in reduction of
the damages.
PLDT vs. CA
G.R. No. 57079 (September 29, 1989)
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system. The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open
trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face,
leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. The
windshield of the jeep was also shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by Spouses
Esteban were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work. The trial court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas
the CA reversed the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Estebans can claim damages from PLDT.
Held: NO. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The jeep was running along
the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
accident mound. That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the
accident mound could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of
the accident mound. Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff
husband claimed. At that speed, he could have stepped on the brakes the moment it struck the
accident mound.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.

KIM vs. Philippine Aerial Taxi (case digest not found)

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim from the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, absolving the defendant Philippine Aerial Taxi Co., Inc., from the
complaint, which was dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns five alleged errors as committed by the trial court,
which we shall discuss in the course of this decision.
The following facts have been proven by a preponderance of evidence presented during the trial,
to wit:
On the morning of September 4, 1931, the plaintiff herein bought, in Manila, a passenger ticket
for a flight to Iloilo in one of the defendant company's hydroplanes starting from Madrigal Field
in Pasay. Inasmuch as the engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which he was to make the flight, was
not working Satisfactorily, the said plaintiff had to wait for some time. While the engine was
being tested, the plaintiff saw how it was started by turning the propeller repeatedly and how the
man who did it ran away from it each time in order not to be caught by the said propeller. Before
the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for the flight, the plane Taal arrived and it was decided
to have the plaintiff make the flight therein. The plaintiff and his companion were carefully
carried from the beach to the plane, entering the same by the rear or tail end, and were placed in
their seats to which they were strapped. Later, they were shown how the straps could be
tightened or loosened in case of accident and were instructed further not to touch anything in the
plane. After an uneventful flight, the plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait, in front of
Iloilo, and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom, when the plane stopped. The
pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe, permitting the engine, however, to continue to function until
all the gasoline was drained from the feed pipe and carburetor. This operation was necessary in
accordance with the established practice of aviation in order to avoid danger of fire which would
exist if the pipes and carburetor remained full of gasoline, and to prevent the sudden cooling of
the engine which might cause serious damage, especially to the valves.
When the pilot observed that a banca was approaching rapidly on the right hand side of the
plane, he arose signalled and shouted to the boatman to keep his banca at a distance from the
plane, inasmuch as there were waves and quite a strong current, and he feared that the banca,
which had a high prow, might collide with the plane and damage either the wing or the pontoon
thereof. While he was doing this, he heard the propeller strike something. He immediately turned
off the switch and, looking on the other side, he saw Bohn picking up the plaintiff out of the
water.
What really happened was that at the moment the pontoons touched bottom and while the pilot
was signalling to the banca, the plaintiff unfastened the straps around him and, not even waiting
to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon
and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller first grazed his
forehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so
injured that it had to be amputated.
Bohn and Garrett of Warner, Barnes & Co., consignees of the defendant in Iloilo, were on the
beach to meet the plane and to make arrangements for the disembarking of the passengers. Upon
seeing the plaintiff walking toward the propeller, they shouted frantically and motioned to him to
keep away from it, but the said plaintiff took no heed of them.
The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the propeller
stops, then turn the plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and thereof towards the
beach, and then take the passengers to shore in a banca. The pilot in charge of the plane has had
fourteen years experience, having first learned to fly during the World War. He is duly licensed
by the Department of Commerce of the United States and by the Department of Commerce and
Communications of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
The only question to decide in this appeal, which is raised in the first assignment of error, is
whether or not the defendant entity has complied with its contractual obligation to carry the
plaintiff-appellant Teh Le Kim safe and sound to his destination.
The contract entered into by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim and the defendant entity Philippine Aerial
Taxi Co., Inc., was that upon payment of the price of the passage, which the carrier had received,
the latter would carry the former by air in one of its hydroplanes and put him, safe and sound, on
the beach at Iloilo. After an uneventful flight, the hydroplane, which carried the plaintiff and his
companion, arrived at the Iloilo beach, as usual, with nothing more left to do but to take the
plaintiff and his companion, safe and sound, ashore. In order to do this, it was necessary to wait
for the propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore, take the
passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof, place them in a banca and take them
ashore. By sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a propeller, be it that of a ship
or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being
caught and injured thereby. He ought to know furthermore that inasmuch as the plane was on the
water, he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore. Notwithstanding the shouts and warning
signals given him from the shore by the representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff
herein, not being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the cabin of the plane, walked along
one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller, while the banca which was to take
him ashore was still some distance away and the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at a
safe distance from the plane. Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the
plaintiff-appellant acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still
in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That the plaintiff-appellant's
negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident, is so clear that it is not necessary to cite
authoritative opinions to support the conclusion that the injury to his right arm and the
subsequent amputation, thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his own imprudence and not
to the slightest negligence attributable to the defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he alone
should suffer the consequences of his act.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto,
with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals

178 SCRA 422 (September 22, 1957)
Facts: Genobiagon was driving a rig along T. Padilla St. in Cebu City. The petitioner's vehicle
was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because
he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him.
As an old woman was crossing the street, Genobiagon’s rig bumped her and caused her to fall in
the middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at
Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genobiagon reasoned out that he did not bump the old
woman and that it was the old woman who bumped him. The old woman was brought to
the hospital but she died 3 days after. Petitioner was charged and convicted with the crime of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability
from 6,000 to 12,000. Hence, this petition.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the court erred in the affirmation of conviction (2) Whether or not the
court unjustly increased the civil liability
Held: (1) No. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to
evade the effects of his own negligence.
(2) No. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is 30,000 (at present 50,000, this case was decided in 1989).

Rakes vs. Atlantic

G.R. No. 1719 (1907)
Facts: The plaintiff Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard
near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant Atlantic, has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon
which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails
lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to
prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either
in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its
part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting
it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect
and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the
failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge
below based his judgment.
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding
that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and
further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to operate
the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for
the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding
upon the instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor
upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get
hold upon the car.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Rakes.
Held: While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to
proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of
the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears
that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of
proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the
plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and
the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car
did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had
the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last
would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for
the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA (Lipana)

269 SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997)
Facts: Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with
the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection with its business of selling appliances. From
May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMC’s GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds
in the form of cash totaling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of
depositing said funds to RMC’s account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not
credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut's
husband, Bienvenido Cotas.
Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account
number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of
the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would validate and
stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy
despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene
Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of
RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written
thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made her company believe that
the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in fact, they
were being deposited in the account of her husband.
During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with monthly statements
showing its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was never the practice of
Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence to
PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from
petitioner bank the return of its money.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of RMC.
Held: In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private
respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault
or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.
Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and
presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself
in
its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the
testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and
now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he
never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner
bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate
cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners

Defenses (Fortuitous Event)

Juntilla vs. Fontanar
136 SCRA 624 (May 31, 1985)
Facts: Juntilla was a passenger of a public utility jeepney, being driven by Defendant Berfol
Camoro, enroute from Danao to Cebu City. The jeepney had fourteen (14) passengers in the
back and three (3) at the front, one of whom was Juntilla. Upon reaching Mandaue City, the right
rear tire of the jeepney exploded causing the vehicle to fall into a ditch and turn turtle.
As consequence, Juntilla was thrown out of the jeepney and sustained lacerations to his right
palm and suffered other injuries. Juntilla, still shocked, went back to Danao City for medical
help but on his way discovered that his watch is missing.
Juntilla then filed a case for breach of contract of carriage with damages before the City Court of
Cebu, which found the respondents (the driver, the franchise operator and
owner) liable for the accident ordering the latter to pay damages, including the value of watch
lost by petitioner during the incident. Upon appeal, the CFI, relying on a case decided by
the Court of Appeals (Rodriguez case), exonerated respondents on grounds that the blowing of
tire is a fortuitous event, and therefore beyond the control of the latter.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the blowing of the tire a fortuitous event (2) Whether or not the
respondents should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage.
Held: No. A fortuitous event has the following essential characteristics:
The cause of the unforeseen or unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the obligor to comply
with his obligation must be independent of human will.
The event must be impossible to foresee or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner.
The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation if the injury resulting to the
oblige
The Supreme Court held that the cause of the incident was NOT independent from human will.
The accident was caused EITHER by the negligence of the driver or because of the
mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed the
speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up, thus ensuring
the safety of the passengers at all times. In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that the
jeep was overloaded with passengers (17, excluding the driver), and was speeding. The
Court made the observation that a jeepney at a regular and safe speed would not have jump into a
ditch when the right rear tire blows up.
Neither can the driver and operator point liability to the manufacturer of the tire. The Supreme
Court, citing Necesito et. al. vs. Paras, held that:
xxx [A] passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a
defect in appliance (tire) purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears
that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care…
with regard to the inspection and application of the necessary tests…[T]he manufacturer is
considered… the agent or servant of the carrier as regards the work of the appliance (tire) xxx
Such rationale is based on the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the
carrier’s selection of the tire. Having no privity with the manufacturer or vendor of the tire, the
passenger has no remedy against the former, on the other hand, the carrier has. The sudden
blowing up of the tire may have beencaused by too much air pressure. The Source of the
common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of carriage. The carrier binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person, with due regard for all circumstances.

Hernandez vs. Commission on Audit

179 SCRA 39 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: At the time of the incident in question, Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge
and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism
Authority in Cavite. As such, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1,
1983 to encash two checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses
of the Project. He estimated that the money would be available by 10:00AM and that he would
be back in Ternate by about 2:00PM. For some reason, the processing of the checks was
delayed and was completed only at 3:00PM. Despite realizing that he would not reach ternate in
time to distribute the salary of the workers, Hernandez nevertheless decided to encash
them. He thought he had to do this for the benefit of the laborers, otherwise they would have to
wait until the following Tuesday, when the main office would reopen. And so, on the same
afternoon he collected the cash value of the checks and left the main office a substantial amount
of money.
Hernandez realized that had two choices, to (1) return to Ternate, Cavite, the same afternoon and
arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the money to his house in Marilao,
Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following morning. He opted for the
second, thinking it the safer one. And so, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
Bulacan.
While the vehicle was along EDSA, two persons boarded with knives in hand. One pointed his
weapon at the Hernandez’ side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took
the money he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the
initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio
Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. Hernandez sustained injuries in the lip arms and
knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty, but the robber who
had the money escaped.
On July 5, 1983, Hernandez filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section
638 of the Revised Administrative Code. Deespite favorable endorsement by
Philippine Tourism Authority and the NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
Philippine Tourism Authority and the NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
Hernandez’ request. According to Tantuico, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability
of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash
proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate, Cavite, immediately
after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is the normal procedure in the
handling of public funds.
Issue: Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding Hernandez
negligent.
Held: Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty. Notice to Auditor. When a
loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire,
theft, or
other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately
notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original
jurisdiction of the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or
provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with
the
available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
Applying the letter and spirit of the above-mentioned laws, and after considering the established
facts in the light of the arguments of the parties, this Court inclines in favor of the
petitioner.
It is pointless to argue that Hernandez should have encashed the vouchers earlier because they
were dated anyway on June 29, 1983. He was not obliged to encash the checks earlier and
then again there might have been any number of reasons why he did so only on July 1, 1983. The
point is that he did encash the checks on that date and took the money to Marilao and
not Ternate in view of the lateness of the hour. The question before us is whether these acts are
so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request
for relief from accountability for the stolen money.
It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motives when he encashed the
checks on July 1, 1983, so his co-employees in Ternate could collect their salaries and
wages the following day. Significantly, although this was a non-working day, he was intending
to make the trip to his office the following day for the unselfish purpose of
accommodating his fellow workers. The other alternative was to encash the check is on July 5,
1983, the next working day after July 1, 1983, which would have meant a 5-day wait for
the payment of the said salaries and wages. Being a modest employee himself, Hernandoz must
have realized the great discomfort it would cause the laborer who were dependent on their
wages for their sustenance and were anxious to collect their pay as soon as possible. For such an
attitude, Hernandez should be commended rather than faulted.
As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily
agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative
hazards in the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court
feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and
was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the
two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and
in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence
and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions,
something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and
did.
We find, in sum, that under the circumstances as above narrated, the petitioner is entitled to be
relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of July
1, 1983. To impose such liability upon him would be to read the law too sternly when it should
be softened by the proven facts.
Gotesco vs. Chatto and Lina Delza Chatto
210 SCRA 18 (June 16, 1992)
Facts: Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter, Lina, went to see the movie "Mother
Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They
bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats. Hardly ten (10) minutes after
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into
darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, the mother and daughter managed to
crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked
the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
Chatto filed a complaint for damages against Gotesco. Defendant tried to avoid liability by
alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was due to force majeure. The trial court
ordered Gotesco to pay the plaintiffs moral damages, actual damages, attorney's fees, plus the
cost of the suit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to an act of God or Force Majeure?
Held: No. The collapse of the ceiling was not due to Force Majeur. Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted
that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a
defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could
not have collapsed without a cause. The fact that Mr. Ong could not offer any
explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force
majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or
reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent
Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not
even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be
considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial
court, affirmed by the respondent Court that the collapse was due to construction defects. There
was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely
four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes
denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence
and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of
Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. The
fact that structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City
Engineer and that building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued, do not at all prove
that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause
of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because
it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from
Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from
any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of
negligence.
Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co
117 SCRA 832
Facts: Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board a vessel owned by Philippine
Steam Navigation cargoes consisting of 1,528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper
for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Bills of lading were issued by
Philippine Navigation. The cargoes were discharged in Negros Occidental Bureau of Customs
Warehouse as complete and in good order.
At about 2:00 PM of the same day, the Customs warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying the cargoes. The claims for the value of said goods were rejected
by Philippine Steam, herein respondent. Lower Court ordered Philippine Steam to pay Servando
damages, including legal interest from filing of the case. They also awarded damages to
Uy Bico the sum for the portion of the cargo which was not recovered by her. The legal basis of
the lower court for its decision if Article 1736:
Common carriers have the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods
are unconditionally placed in their possession until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice
to the provisions of Article 1738
It held that the delivery to the Bureau of Customs is not the constructive delivery as
contemplated in Article 1736, thus the common carrier continues to be responsible.
Issue: Whether or not FIRE is a fortuitous event, absolving Respondents of any liability?
Held: Yes. The burning of the warehouse was an extraordinary event independent of the will of
the respondents. The following characteristics of caso fortuito are present. 1. the
cause of the unforeseen event must be independent of the human will; 2. it must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must be free from any participation
impossible to avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. When the proximate cause of loss is a
fortuitous event or force majeure, the obligor is exempt from liability. This is provided for
by Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall
be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
It should also be pointed out that in the Bill of Lading (BOL) existing on the cargoes, the
responsibility of the carrier has been limited as provided by Clause 14.:
Not unless the loss or damage is caused by the negligence of the carrier, the common carrier
shall not be liable for such caused by force majeures, accidents of sea, war and
public enemies.
This is a mere reiteration of Article 1174.
Furthermore, the storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse while waiting withdrawal by
the petitioners was made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged
to and maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to Philippine
Steam, having no control over the same. There is also no proof or showing that the fire can be
imputable to the negligence of its employees. Judgment appealed is set aside.

NAPOCOR vs. CA
GR Nos. 103442-45 (1993)
Facts: The controversy stemmed from separate complaints filed by several residents of
Norzagaray, Bulacan against petitioner, National Power Corp. The residents seek to recover
actual
and other damages for the loss of lives due to the inundation of their town. The flooding was
allegedly caused by NAPOCOR’s acts of negligently releasing water in the spillways of
Angat Dam (hydroelectric plant). NAPOCOR, in its defense, maintains that (1) they exercised
due care and diligence in maintaining the power plant; (2) petitioners duly notified the
residents about the impending release of water with the onset of typhoon kading and advised
them to take necessary precautions; and (3) that the damages incurred by private respondents
were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
The lower court dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA reversed the
decision and awarded actual and moral damages (plus litigation expenses) to the
residents. The judgment was based on a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence
and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the
hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all
but products of NAPOCOR’s headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting
flash flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank
would have been avoided had NAPOCOR prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining a
water elevation, which would allow room for the expected torrential rains.
The CA also rejected the NAPOCOR’s plea that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Issue: Whether or not the incident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Held: The SC rendered its decision based on the same errors in G.R. No. 96410, entitled
National Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al, according to the Court, the
proximate cause of the damage incurred by private respondents was due to negligence of the
NAPOCOR. The early warning notice was insufficient. The SC cannot rule otherwise
because its decision is now binding.
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 (Acts of God) of the Civil Code, the
following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable;
(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of
the injury to the creditor
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the
tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or
damage, the obligor cannot escape liability
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. Thus it has been held that
when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person
is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of
God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.
Southeastern College Inc. v CA
GR No. 126389 (July 10, 1998)
Facts: Private Respondents Dimaano are owners of a house in College Road, Pasay City while
petitioner Corporation, South Eastern College, owns a four-storey school building along
the same road. In October 1989, a powerful typhoon called “Saling” hit the Metro. Buffeted by
very strong winds, the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away,
landing and destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaano’s house. An ocular inspection was
conducted by a team of engineers. They found that one factor and perhaps, the most likely
reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the
trusses to the roof beams, thus recommending the building to be declared a structural hazard.
Respondents filed a complaint based on culpa aquiliana, alleging that the damage to their house
rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in other
houses. The Dimaanos sought to recover actual, moral and exemplary damages, including
attorney’s fees and costs from petitioners. In their answer, Southeastern averred that the
building withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past without its
roofing giving way, and that typhoon Saling was an act of God.
In giving credence to the ocular inspection, the Trial court ruled in favor of the Dimaanos and
ordered the Southeastern to pay the decreed damages sought. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the award of moral damages.
Issues: Whether or not the Southeastern College is liable for the damage.
Held: No. The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which
defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. In
order that a fortuitous even may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason which the loss may have been
occasioned
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous even, a natural occurrence which may
be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or
care. From these premises, we proceed to determine whether Southeastern was negligent, such
that if it were not the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been
avoided? At the outset it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely
by presumption or conclusions without basis of fact. The Dimaanos merely relied on the
ocular inspection, however by this basis, the relationship of cause and effect has NOT been
clearly shown.
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from private respondent’s city building official, Jesus
Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioner’s school building were
approved including the certificate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the least,
prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject school building.
approved including the certificate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the least,
prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject school building.
As to the damages, it is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually
proved with reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a
basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.

Afialda vs. Hisole

85 Phil 67 (November 29, 1949)
Facts: Loreto Afialda was employed by Hisole spouses as caretaker of their carabaos. While
tending to the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence. His
sister then filed a complaint against the spouses Hisole. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss,
which the court granted. Plaintiff now seeks to hold defendants liable under art. 1905 of the
Civil Code which states that “The possessor of an animal or the one who uses the same, is liable
for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
Issue: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its
caretaker.
Held: No. The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that
damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had
been negligent or at fault under art. 1902 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the animal was in
the custody of the caretaker. It was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal
from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences. There was no allegation of negligence on the part of the Hisole spouses.
Thus, they are not liable.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court of Appeals

179 SCRA 5 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, typhoon 'Gening'
buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte and brought heavy rains and flooding. Between 5:30-
6:00AM, Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) along with Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured
out of her house and traversed waist-deep flood to proceed to a store, which she owns to
check if her merchandise have been damaged. Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed 'ay!' and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help but fear dissuaded them because on
the spot where the deceased sank, they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana Belen but he turned
back because the water was grounded. Ernesto informed Antonio Yabes that his mother in law
had been electrocuted and together they went to the City Hall of Laoag to request the
police to ask INELCO to cut off the current. Subsequently, the search for the body began and
such was found two meters from an electric post.
In another place at about 4:00 A.M., Engineer Antonio Juan of the NAPOCOR noticed certain
fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated s such abnormalities as grounded
or short-circuited lines. He then went out for inspection and saw grounded and disconnected
lines which were hanging from posts to the ground. Since there were no INELCO linemen in
sight, he decided to go to the INELCO office but it was closed. On the way to INELCO, he
passed by Guerrero St. and saw and electric wire about 30 meters long and the other end of the
wire was seeming to play with the current of the water. At about 8:00 A.M., he went out for
inspection again and learned about the death of Nana Belen. He tried to help revive the
deceased but his efforts proved futile. He also noticed a hollow wound on the left palm of the
victim. In the afternoon, he went on an inspection trip again and the wire that he saw on
Guerrero St. earlier was no longer there.
Dr. Castro examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00 A.M. and noted that the skin was
grayish or cyanotic which indicated death by electrocution. The wound on the left
palm was an electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. The certificate of death prepared
by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as 'circulatory shock electrocution'.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. INELCO, through its officers
and employees who testified, claims that on and even before June 29, their
electric system did not suffer from any defect that might constitute hazard to life and property.
Moreover, it was alleged that the lines and devices were newly installed and they had
installed safety devices to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities. INELCO also alleged that they had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of
checking the areas assigned to them. Fabico Abijero even testified that in the early morning of
June 29, he passed by the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal streets and did not see any
broken wires. He said that what he saw were many people fishing out the body of the deceased.
INELCO also presented Dr. Briones who said that without an autopsy, no doctor or
medico-legal can speculate the cause of death. Moreover, he said that cyanosis (lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood) appears only in a live person. INELCO also said that the deceased
was negligent because she installed a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house
to the iron gate, thus charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
INELCO then conjectures that the switch must have been left on, causing the deceased
electrocution when she tried to open her gate.
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution. (2) Whether or not petitioner
INELCO may be held liable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan. (3) Whether or not the maxim
volenti non fit injuria can be applied in the case at bar.
Held:
(1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no
other conclusion than that they were burns and there was nothing else in the street where
the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of petitioner
company. In the issue of the burglar deterrent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch
was left on is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence.
(2) YES. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's
death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. As stated
by Engr. Juan in his testimony, he saw no INELCO lineman and that the office of
INELCO was closed. The SC held that in times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a
supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb. The petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the
general public. Furthermore, the court held that when an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant (in this case the petitioner) to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission.
(3) NO. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. She went to her grocery store
to see to it that the goods were not flooded. It has been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or
when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as
the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, she was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent
as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.

TRANSPORTO VS MIJARES

Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al

19 SCRA 289 (1967)
Facts: The car owned by Placido Ramos, while being driven by his son Augusto, collided with a
truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven by i Andres Bonifacio. Ramos filed a case
at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. CFI found Bonifacio negligent and declared that Pepsi Cola
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Pepsi and Bonifacio are held solidarily liable to pay P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000 moral
damages, P2000 exemplary damages and P1,000 Atty. fees.
CA affirmed the decision of CFI regarding Bonifacio but absolved Pepsi Cola from liability
stating that Pepsi has sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its
employees.
Issue: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver.
Held: Yes. When it was proven that the employer had carefully examined the erring driver as to
his qualifications, experience and record of service, such evidence is sufficient to show
that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the
driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the employer was negligent. Juan Anasco,
personnel manager of Pepsi stated that before Bonifacio was hired, his background, experience,
physical capacity was checked. Also, he was asked to submit clearance and also asked to
take theoretical and practical driving examination. Pepsi was also a member of the Safety
Council.
Petitioner can no longer assail the credibility of Anasco. Findings of CA are binding on SC. A
motion for reconsideration was made stating that respondents violated the Motor
vehicle law. It was said that the truck was overweight and running beyond the speed limit and
that it was not equipped with a rear vision mirror and with a helper. Such allegations failed
to show their basis. Patrolman Pahate did not affirm such allegations. Also, a special permit may
be granted for overweight trucks and the absence of such permit was not proven. In
Quasi delicts, the motor vehicle owner is not an absolute owner against all damages caused by its
driver. The owner’s responsibility ceases once it proves that it has observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damages.

Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) vs. CA

223 SCRA 521 June 21, 1993
Facts: Appellant Nenita Custodio boarded a jeepney driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and
owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo. The jeepney collided with an MMTC bus
at the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road. MMTC bus was driven by defendant
Godofredo Leonardo. Both drivers failed to slow down or blow their horns. As a result of
said incident, Custodio was thrown out through the windshield and sustained serious physical
injuries. She was sent to the hospital and regained consciousness only after a week.
Appellant, assisted by her parents, filed a complaint for damages. Defendants denied the material
allegations. MMTC for its part presented Milagros Garbo, its training officer,
and Christian Bautista, its transport supervisor, as two of its witnesses. Garbo testified that the
company's bus drivers undergo a series of training programs, examinations, clearances,
interviews and seminars for their selection. Bautista on the other hand, testified that he ensured
the drivers were in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations and fit to drive
before the start of duty.
The trial court found both drivers negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and
regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an
intersection. It however, absolved MMTC, stating that it was careful and diligent in selecting its
employees and strict and diligent in supervising them as shown by the evidence. The CA
modified the said ruling, holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants. According
to the CA, MMTC failed to substantiate its allegations that it exercised the diligence of
the good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. It pointed out the
fact that Garbo and Bautista failed to present documentary evidence to support their
claims, such as the clearances and test results of Leonardo or the written guidelines. As such, the
testimonies fall short of the required evidentiary quantum.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence of MMTC is sufficient to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Held: No. The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA.
In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff
who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollary, defendant must likewise prove its own
allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable. In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such
amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. In the case at bar,
petitioner's attempt to prove it diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. MMTC only
gave oral testimonies as its evidence, no documentary proof was submitted upon request to
further bolster its defense. The mere formulation of various company policies on saftey
without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from
liability arising from negligence of its employees.
The SC does not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the
diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, applying Art. 2180 in relation to
Art. 2176, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the other defendants.

Kramer vs. Court of Appeals

178 SCRA 518 (October 13, 1989)
Facts: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners was navigating
its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape
Santiago, the boat collided with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines, owned by the
private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The captains of both vessels filed their respective
marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast
Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause
of the maritime collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the
F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private
respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The
findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of
the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V
Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent in the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasidelict
like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their
Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint
filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Petitioners
contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with
special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry
can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued
only on April 29, 1982, the date of the decision of the board become final.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners holding that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime
collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such
collision, and that the Board was constituted precisely to answer the need. CA reversed the
decision, holding that it is clear that the cause of action of the petitioners accrued from the
occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and
sustained by the aggrieved party. It said that if the tolling of the prescriptive period
would hinge upon the discretion of a government agency, said alternative could entail hazards.
Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the action for quasi-delict is barred by prescription.
Held: Yes. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such
right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a
cause of action has arisen.
Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 526 (October 13, 1989)
Facts: In 1977, Joselito Yujuico obtained a loan from GEN BANK in the amount of PhP500,000
and as evidence, it issued a promissory note payable GEN BANK. At the time private
respondent incurred the obligation, he was a ranking officer of GENBANK and a member of the
family which owns the controlling interest in the bank. In 1980, the Central Bank issued
a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing further business. Four days after, another
resolution was issued ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. Later, ALLIED Bank acquired all
the assets and assumed all the liabilities of GENBANK, including the receivable due from
private Yujuico.
Upon Yujuico’s failure to pay, ALLIED Bank filed a complaint against private respondent for
the collection of a sum of money. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in a special
proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision
declared the liquidation of GENBANK null and void. It was then that Yujuico filed the third
party complaint for damages alleging that by reason of the tortious interference by the Central
Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from paying his loan.
Issue: Assuming that the Central Bank is guilty of tortious interference, has the claim of Yujuico
under the third party complaint prescribed?
Held: YES. An action for damages arising from quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference
should be filed within four (4) years from the day the cause of action accrued. Since the cause
of action accrued on 25 March 1980 (the time when Central Bank issued a cease and desist order
against GENBANK) and the third party complaint was filed only on June 17 1987, the
action has prescribed.
It is from the date the act or omission violative of the right of a party that the cause of action
arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. (Español
vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans)The third party complaint should not be admitted.
Causation (Proximate Cause)

Bataclan vs. Medina

G.R. No. L-10126 (1957)
Facts: Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, Mariano Medina, left the
town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by Conrado Saylon. Among
the passengers were Juan Bataclan. While the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst causing the vehicle to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the
bus, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the
driver, namely Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. These
men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fire started,
consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside. It would appear that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it,
and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it
on fire.
The heirs of the deceased brought an action to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of
the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers
who were unable to leave it.
Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and
soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the
driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Fernando vs. Court of Appeals and the City of Davao

G.R. No. 92087 (May 8, 1992)
Facts: Morta, market master of Agdao Public Market requested with the City Treasurer Office
the emptying of a Septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Bertulano, Catarsa, Bascon, Bolo and Suner. Bascon won the bid and signed the purchase order.
Prior to the signing of purchase order, Bertulano with four other companions- Liagoso,
Fernando and Fajardo Jr. was found dead inside the septic tank.
While, Garcia died in the Regional Hospital after being rescued by a fireman. Autopsy revealed
diminution of oxygen and intake of sulfide gas as cause of death. Investigation
by the City Engineer Office learned that the 5 victims entered and re-emptied the tank without
clearance and consent. The heirs of the deceased filed a case for damages contending that
it was the gross negligence of the City of Davao for failing to clean the septic tank for 10 years
which resulted in the accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas, and was therefore the
proximate cause of the death of the laborers. They further contend that the market master failed
to supervise the area where the tank was located as a further reflection of the public
respondent’s negligence. Petitioner’s also insisted on the application of Article 24 of the New
Civil code. Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties
is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Issue: WON proximate cause of death is the own negligence of the plaintiffs?
Held: Yes. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by and efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred.
While it may be true that the public respondent had been negligent in the re emptying of the
septic tank annually since 1956, the negligence is not a continuing one. The public
respondents have immediately responded to such issue upon invitation to bid on the service of
emptying the tank. Public Respondents have also shown in court that people in the market
have been using the toilet for their necessities and remained uninjured.
As proven by Respondents, the septic tank was air-tight as provided for by regulations. The
accident of toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes
its covers. The accident occurred because the victims have ontheir own and without authority
opened the tank. Bertulano who has offered his services to clean the septic tank is
presumed to know the hazards of his job. His and his men’s failure to take precautionary
measures for their safety is the proximate case of the accident. The Court also cited Culion vs.
Phil Motors Corp. “When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work he attempts to do.” Furthermore, the surreptitious way
the victims did the job without clearance from the market master and or the security jobs
goes against their good faith.
Moreover, Article 24 of the NCC is inapplicable as there is total absence of contractual relations
between the victims and City of Davao that will give rise to contractual
obligations as the victims did not win the bidding. It was not to Bertulano, but to Bascon, that the
contract to clean the septic tank was awarded.
Urbano vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-72964) (1988)
G.R. No. L-72964) (1988)
Facts: Petitioner, Filomeno Urbano quarreled with Marcelino Javier because the latter opened
the irrigation canal which caused the flooding of the place where Urbano's palay was
stored. Urbano hacked the right palm of Javier with a bolo and caused an incised wound that was
later treated. Urbano and Javier agreed on an amicable settlement and petitioner paid for
the hospital bills.
22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital, he had a locked jaw and was having convulsions,
caused by tetanus toxin. The doctor noticed that the wound was infected. The
next day, Javier died. Petitioner was charged with homicide and was later found guilty by the
trial court. The IAC affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial based on
the affidavit of the barangay captain that Javier was found catching fish on the irrigation canal,
10 days prior to his death.
Issue: Whether or not the inflicting of the wound by petitioner was only a remote, and not a
proximate, cause.
Held: The inflicting of the wound is only a remote cause and petitioner cannot be held liable
therefor. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause.
The incubation period of tetanus, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe
disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches
100 percent. (NOTICE that it took Javier 22 days, from the time of the hacking, before he
had symptoms of Tetanus)
In the case at bar, the evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the hacking. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of
the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound
was infected is not clear. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection (failure to take the necessary precautions against tetanus) may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death.

Pilipinas Bank v. CA
G.R. No. 105410 (1994)
Facts: As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued
postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation and Vicente Tui with due dates on
October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money
Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his
savings account therein and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then
Filman Bank), Biñan Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit. In
depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the current account
number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing.
He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current account number he placed on
the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES. Nothing
that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current Account
Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the
listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the
depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. On October 11, 1979, the October 10,
check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was
dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. On October 15, 1979, the
October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again dishonored. Likewise, the October 12,
1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that same date met the same
fate but was advised to try the next clearing. Two days after the October 10 check was
again dishonored, the payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment
of its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was
redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the check was drawn
against insufficient fund. Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank
and urged an immediate verification of his account. Upon verification, the bank noticed the error.
The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately
transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not
effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then
honored the October 12, 1979, check.
Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of deposit was due to the error of the
representative of Reyes
Held: No. For Article 2179
of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept
of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to
have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence." 4
In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the name
of another depositor who had a similar fi first name. As held by the trial court:
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to exercise the
degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee
posted the
cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio
stated
in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was
proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved
and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which is the credit standing
of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in the course
of
his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a
balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.

Quezon City Government vs. Fulgencio Dacara

G.R. NO. 150304 (June 15, 2005)
Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of herein respondent was driving the Toyota Corolla of his
father along Matahimik St. in Quezon City. While driving, the vehicle rammed into a pile of
earth (street diggings) as the street was being repaired by the Quezon City government. As result,
Dacara allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damages
when it turned turtled as it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the City Government but it yielded negative results. Dacara Sr.
on behalf of his minor son filed a complaint for damages against herein
petitioner (QCG). In its answer, QCG alleged that the diggings were provided with a mound of
soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it
which was visible during the incident. QCG claimed that they exercised due care by providing
the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Such claim was
disproved by the investigation report which stated that the deep excavation was without any
warning device. The RTC, on the basis of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment in
favor of Fulgencio Dacara and ordered QCG to pay the former actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not negligence of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was the proximate cause of the accident.
Whether or not award for moral damages is proper.
Whether or not award for exemplary damages is proper.
HELD: (1) NO. Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to
the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over
the same. Failure of the petitioner to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-
article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable.
Petitioner pointed out that Fulgencio was driving at the speed of 60kph which was above the
maximum limit of 30kph when he met the accident, so he can be presumed negligent based
on Art. 2185. Such a matter was not raised at any time during the trial and was only raised for the
first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. The SC held it was too late to raise such
issue .
(2) NO. Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts,
provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery or
moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. In the case at bar, Fulgencio
testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm. However, no other evidence such as a
medical certificate, was presented to prove such bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there
was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury inflicted on a person. Moral damages cannot
be awarded in the absence of proof that the person experienced emotional and mental
suffering. Mere allegations do not suffice, clear and convincing proof is necessary.
(3) YES. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, it is subject to the
discretion of the courts but cannot be awarded unless claimants show their entitlement to moral,
temperate or actual damages. In the case at bar, petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause
of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual damages. Art. 2231 NCC mandates
that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with
gross negligence. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. The City Government
failed to show the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected from them by the
constituents of the city. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street-digging in a side
street which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier city'.

Singapore Airlines vs. Pano

Gr No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Facts: Carlos E. Cruz accepted employment as Engineer Officer with Singapore Airlines on
August 30, 1974. His contract included a bond binding him for five years. He
signed the contract with B.E. Villanueva as surety.
Later on Singapore airlines claimed that Cruz had breached the contract by going on
unauthorized leave without pay without the requisite approval of his superiors. The airline
sought payment of liquidated damages of $53,968.00 or (P161,904.00); $883.91 or (P2,651.73)
as overpayment in salary; $61.00 or (P183.00) for cost of uniforms and accessories
supplied by the company plus $230.00, or (P690.00), for the cost of a flight manual; and
$1,533.71, or (P4,601.13) corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed of but to which he
was no longer entitled; exemplary damages attorney's fees; and costs.
Cruz argued that there could not be any breach of contract as he was not actually required to
serve for five years straight. He further posited that he had left the company on
valid grounds which was accepted by the company, and thus no damages may be awarded.
Villanueva on the other hand filled a cross-claim against Cruz for any damages the former
may be held liable against the airline. Villanueva argued that he was not a surety but a mere
guarantor.
may be held liable against the airline. Villanueva argued that he was not a surety but a mere
guarantor.
On October 28, 1977, Judge Pano dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for
lack of jurisdiction; stating that the issue stems from an employer-employee
relationship and thus jurisdiction is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiter as enunciated in
article 216 of the Labor Code. Singapore airlines filed for reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied, thus their recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the case is cognizable by the Civil Courts or the Labor Arbiter?
Held: The Civil Courts hold jurisdiction over the case at bar. The case is actually grounded on
the breach of contract by Cruz and not on his employer-employee relationship with the
airline. This was clearly manifested by Cruz’s refusal and failure to report for duty without just
cause and with malice and bad faith when he took his unauthorized leave which was in
contravention with the stipulations of his contract. It is evident that the complaint was anchored
on the effects of Cruz’s abandonment of work, which entitled the airline to damages.
Singapore Airlines does not seek the application of Labor laws but of the Civil Code regarding
liquidated damages for the breach of a contract. Secondarily, the assertion of
Villanueva that he is a mere guarantor is definitely a civil issue outside of the Labor Arbiter’s
jurisdiction.
Thus, the case must be remanded to the proper Regional Trial Court.

Syjuco vs. Manila Railroad (digest SCRIBD)

Subido vs. Custodio

L-21512 (Aug 31, 1966)
Facts: Agapito Custodio was a passenger of an LTB Bus. He was hanging on the left side of the
bus because it was full of passengers. A truck owned by Subido which was coming from
the opposite direction sideswiped the LTB bus and injured Custodio who died as a result thereof.
Both drivers were found negligent- the LTB bus driver for having allowed a passenger to
ride on the running board of the bus and the driver of the truck for running at a considerable
speed while negotiating a sharp curb and running on the middle instead of on the right side of
the road. The owner and the driver of the truck contended that the proximate cause of the death
of Custodio was the negligence of the driver of the LTB bus who allowed Custodio to ride
on the running board of the LTB bus.
Issue: Is there concurrent liability here in this case at bar? How does the negligence of both
parties affect the liability of both?
Held: Although the negligence of the carrier (LTB bus) and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the
proximate cause of death of Agapito Custodio. In fact the negligence of the first two(2) would
not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners herein (the owner and
driver of the truck). What is more, petitioner’s negligence was the last, in point of time, for
Custodio was on the running board of the carrier’s bus sometime before petitioner’s truck
came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense petitioner’s truck had the last clear
chance.” The owner and the driver of the truck were held jointly and severally liable, together
with the LTB bus and its driver, to the heirs of Custodio.

VINLUAN VS. CA (DIGEST SCRIBD)

Gabeto vs. Araneta

G.R. No. 15674 (1921)
Facts: On Aug. 4, 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano rode a carromata (horse driven
carriage) to go to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the city of Iloilo. Agaton Araneta stepped
out into the street and stopped the horse. Araneta protested to the driver that he was the first one
who called for the carromata. The driver Julio Pagnaya pulled on the reins (one which
control the horse) of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta. Due to the
rottenness of the reins, the bit (placed on the horse’s mouth for control) came out of the horse’s
mouth. Pagnaya got off the carromata and pulled over the same near the curb and fixed the bit.
While doing so, the horse moved forward and pulled one wheel of the carromata uo on the
sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya. The carromata struck a police telephone box and due to the
crashing sound, the horse got frightened and set out at full speed up the street.
Basilio Ilano was able to get off the carromata but Proceso Gayetano retained his seat and when
he jumped from the rig, he sustained injuries which caused his death.
Issue: Whether or not the act of Araneta is the proximate cause of the death of Gayetano.
Held: No. The mere act of Araneta of stopping the horse will not make him liable. Evidence
shows that when Pagnaya got out of the carromata to go the horse’s head and fix the bit, an
appreciable interval of time elapsed. The act of Araneta is too remote from the accident to be
considered as the proximate cause.
By getting off and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily
responsible for the control of the animal. Also, evidence shows that the bridle was old and the
leather is weak and easily broken.

Urbano vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-72964 (1988) INDAY HAE ANG FACTS INI NAGTAGO BAGAN
Facts: Supra
Held: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in
Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC and Casiano Pascua et al.

G.R. No. 66102-04 (August 30, 1990)
Facts: On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers boarded a jeepney bound for Pangasinan
via Dau. Manalo drove the jeep owned by Magune and Carreon. Reaching
Tarlac, the right wheel of the jeep was detached resulting to its 180 degree turn invading the
other lane with the jeep’s front facing south. The bus driven by Del Rosario collided with the
jeepney resulting in the death of three passengers and physical injuries to some. Manalo was
convicted of Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. Manalo did not appeal.
Three Civil Cases fro Damages docketed 1136; 39-40 was filed anchored on the contractual
liability of the jeepney owner and Philippine Rabbit’s liability based on quasidelict. Trial
court decided against the jeepney operator as well as the joint liability of his Insurance Agency
for Actual and Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its decisions on the following:
(1)Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver was running really fast. (2) Unrebutted
testimony of Police Inspector on the sharp angle track marks of the jeep; the observation
of the skid marks. (3) Manalo’s Conviction on the Criminal Compalint (4)Application of Res
Ipsa Loquitor, attesting to the collision happening on the right of way of the bus.
CA reversed decision. It ordered Plaintiff bus operator and driver to pay jointly and severally the
damages awarded. It based its decisions primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear
chance. 2.) presumption of the responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to avoid collision with
the vehicle in front. 3.) the substantial test concluding Bus driver negligent by not
making an effort to avoid accident and being the physical force causing the injury and death of
passengers.
Issue: Who has liability over the injuries and death of victims?
Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the jeepney operator for failure
to exercise precautions needed. The carrier is presumed to have been at fault
unless it is caso fortuito or that he has observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles
1733,55-56. Negligence was proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by the
trial court.
Last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not aride where a passenger demands responsibility
under culpa contractual. A negligent driver and its owner cannot be exempted
on the ground that the other party was likewise guilty of negligence. The substantial factor test is
testing whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another. THE FACT THAT THE ACTOR NEITHER FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE
FORESEEN THE EXTENT OF HARM OR MANNER IN WHICH THE EVENT
OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS LIABILITY. However, this test does not apply. The
court does not fault Reyes for not having avoided such sicne no other options are
available to him. The other lane even though empty was narrow and covered with tall grass. The
wheels of the bus were also clear of the roadwasy except the outher left that hit the jeep.
This clearly shows the attempt to hit the jeep. Inability to avoid the jeep must have been due to
the limitations of options.
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated with Modification that only the
Operator and the Insurance Company is liable for the victims and heirs. The
driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in Breach of Contract as
provided in Article 2180 and to make driver jointly and severally liable is to make the carrier’s
liability a personal one and not explicit
Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo (INDAY HAE NASAB ANG FACTS)
G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)
Facts: Supra
Held: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)

REMIGIO RODRIGUEZA ET AL. v. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, GR No. 15688,

1921-11-19
Facts:
in failing to exercise proper supervision over... the employees in charge of the locomotive;
secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without having
the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive
upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of... known inferior quality which, upon combustion,
produces sparks in great quantity.
Issues:
it is contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio
Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of... the Railroad Company, and that for
this reason the company is not liable.
Ruling:
With respect to the case of Remigio Rodrigueza it is to be inferred that his house stood upon this
ground before the Railroad Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no
proof that this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in... the act of
building his house.
Rather, he was... there at the sufferance of the defendant company, and so long as his house
remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have
resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with
ordinary care.
But... he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the
unlawful negligent acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself
against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use
the... care of the ordinarily prudent man.
Principles:
The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant
company and therefore in... dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent
condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be
imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that
condition was not created... by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by
the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even
supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in
negligently destroying... it.
Mckee vs. IAC
211 SCRA 517 (1992)
Facts: Supra
Issues: (1) Did Galang’s negligence cause the collision? (2) Were Tayag and Manalo liable for
damages?
Held: Yes. The lower court held that Jose Koh was negligent for improperly invading the lane of
the truck. This is unwarranted because it is manifest that no negligence can be imputed
to Koh. In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813) the Court held that:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and
caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
It is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was
running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established
through the testimony of Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the
testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper
measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate
cause of the resulting accident.
(2) Yes. It was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision
which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck
driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily
liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.

Teague vs. Fernandez

51 SCRA 181 (L-29745) (1973)
NOTE: To easily remember, c call this the “Maghulos dili” ka case.
Facts: Realistic Institute is a vocational school for hair and beauty culture owned and operated
by defendant. It is located at the 2nd
floor of Gil-Armi Building. A fire broke out 10 meters
away from the building. The students upon seeing the fire panicked. The six instructresses tried
to calm them down. Mrs. Prieto, one of the instructresses even slapped three students to
quiet them down. The panic could not be subdued, thereby causing a stampede. No part of the
building was burned. But after the panic was over, four students including Lourdes
Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs were found dead.
Deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Teague, as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute. CFI dismissed the case. CA reversed, and awarded
damages of P11,000. CA held that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of
Hernandez’ death. The negligence was primarily predicated on the violation of the city ordinance
of
Manila, which consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time
of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. Hence a petition
for review was filed in SC.
Issue: Are there independent causes/efficient intervening causes?
Held: None. The panic and stampede cannot be considered efficient intervening causes. It is true
that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance was ahead and prior to the other
events in point of time, in the sense that it was contemporaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to
evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in
which it happened was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.

St. Francis High School vs. CA

G.R. No. 82465, February 25, 1991
Paras, J.:

FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo was a freshman student then of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School. He
wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya,
Quezon. Ferdinand's parents did not allow their son to join but allowed him to bring food to the
picnic. But because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students
including Ferdinand came to her rescue. In the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned.
Respondent spouses filed a complaint contending that the death of their son was due to the
failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family. The trial
court ordered petitioners-teachers to jointly and severally pay respondents but dismissed the case
against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Both petitioners and
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the defendant school
and defendant school principal to be jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to
the case at bar; and
2. Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the
award of damages to the plaintiffs.

HELD:
1. NO.

Respondent CA committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under
this paragraph, it is clear that an employer may only be held liable for the negligence of
his employee if the act or omission occurred while an employee was in the performance
of his assigned tasks.

In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private
affair. The picnic had also no permit from the school head or its principal. Mere
knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students
and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to
the holding of the same.

2. NO.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C exercised diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both
P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and
swimming. Defendants brought life savers that time. The records also show that both
petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.
 PSBA vs. CA
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
Padilla, J.:

FACTS:
Carlitos bautista was stabbed while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA). At the time of his death, he was enrolled as a third year
commerce student at the PSBA. This prompted his parents to file suit against PSBA. However,
the assailants of Carlitos were not members of the school's academic community.

Consequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but the trial court denied it. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. The CA also denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PSBA should be held liable.

HELD:
The RTC is yet to determine the school’s liability.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. It had been stressed in the cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently,
in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals that Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. In this case, it does not exist as the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned rule does not exculpate petitioners from liability. When an
academic institution accepts students for enrollment, a contract is established between them. As
part of the contract, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises. And because there is a contractual relation, the rules on quasi-
delict does not govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-
delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.

Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations,
particularly Article 21, which provides: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage. In the case at bar, however, there is no finding yet that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. The contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of
the Civil Code.

As the trial court needs to determine the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the
court remanded the case back to the RTC.

Soliman vs. Tuazon

G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992
Feliciano, J.:

FACTS:
Jimmy Solomon, the duly appointed security guard under the supervision of his employer-
defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., shoot Soliman Jr. on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber
Revolver inside the premises of Republican Central Colleges. Petitioner at that time was taking
his morning classes. As per doctor's opinion, petitioner may not be able to attend to his regular
classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of three to
four months. Consequently, petitioner filed a civil complaint for damages against private
respondent Colleges, the security agency Inc. and Solomon.

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss. Respondent Judge granted it, as Solomon
was not an employee of the school. Petitioner subsequently filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when he adjudged that
Republican Central Colleges should not be held liable.

HELD:
YES.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one
against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for
acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held
vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are employers, teachers or heads
of establishments. In the case at bar, private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy
Solomon. The employer was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was just its client
or customer. The former was the one who recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards. Hence, liability for illegal or harmful acts attaches to the employer agency since
the client or customer of such agency has no hand in selecting and supervising the security
guards.

Nonetheless, petitioner invoked Article 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code that states that
teachers, professors and directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices shall
exercise substitute parental authority. In the instant case, Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil,
student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges. Hence, the school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon. But does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not
be held liable upon any other basis in law?

Acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach
of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he
supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss and
allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege.

Accordingly, the Court remands the case back to the RTC for further proceedings.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos

G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
Pardo, J.:

FACTS:
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of the Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. The group was riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva but driven by James Daniel II. Daniel was then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, Daniel drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the accident.

Spouses Carpitanos filed a claim for damages for the death of their son against against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy. Petitioner appealed. The CA reduced the actual damages.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages.

HELD:
YES.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Hence this applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students authorized by the school or its teachers.

Moreover, under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Respondents and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause
of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. No evidence was also
presented to the contrary. There was no evidence as well that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel, must be pinned on the
minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident.

Incidentally, the court held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets." Therefore, Villanueva shall
be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Phil. American Forwarders, Inc.
G.R. No. L-25142, March 25, 1975
Aquino, J.:

FACTS:
It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was
damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days.

Balingit, manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., was impleaded together with respondent.
Balingit filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he was not Pineda's employer. The lower
court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace the manager of a corporation owning
a truck.

HELD:
NO.

From the context of article 2180, the term "manager" is used in the sense of "employer". Hence,
no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., because he himself may be regarded as an employee of his employer, Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
Not originally alleged in their complaint, the bus company and its driver argue that Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit. This implies that the veil of
corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his
wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. But the court will not entertain such
argument as it was not raised in the lower court.

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120553, June 17, 1997
Davide, Jr., J.:

FACTS:
Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street of Calbayog City. Philtranco
bus driven by Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start itsengine; the
Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and the said Philtranco buswas heading in the
general direction of the said Gomez St.; as the bus was pushed, itsengine started thereby the bus
continued on its running motion and it occurred at the timewhen Acuesta who was still riding on
his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus; thebus bumped on Acuesta who, as a result
thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by thesaid bus; Acuesta died.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 2180, instead of Article 2194, is applicable.

HELD:
YES.

This is action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
against Manilhig and his employer, Philtranco, respectively. The liability of the registered owner
of a public service vehicle, like Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the
driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver This is based on Article
2194 that stipulates that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary.

Philtranco’s only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has
paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action
based on quasi-delict. This is in accordance with Article 2181 that provides that whoever pays
for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has
paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
 Castilex vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999
Kapunan, J.:
FACTS:
Between 1:30 to 2:00 am , Romeo Vazquez was driving a motorcycle while Benjamin Abad was
driving a pick-up owned by CAstilex. Instead of going around the Rotunda, he made a shortcut.
He traversed against the flow of traffic. As a reslt thereof, the pick-up collided with the
motorcycle resulting in the severe injuries of Vazquez. While in the hospital, Vazquez died.

ISSUE:
Whether or not as employer of Abad, Castilex should be held liable for the damage caused by its
employee.

HELD:
NO.

Under Article 2180, Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. In order for this paragraph to apply, it must be shown that
the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. Here it was not sufficiently
proven that such was the case.

It is the obligation of the plaintiff to prove that the employee is not acting within the scope of its
duty.Jurisprudence provides that, an employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for
the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where
the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee
for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer.
Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he
has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip.

In this case, Abad did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, and after he went out to grab
some dinner. It was when he left the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. Abad was
engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at
the time he figured in a vehicular accident.

Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA

G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992
Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He
was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to
take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon.

The place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of
Filamer Christian Institute.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a
sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.

According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy
jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the
direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.

Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha
reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he
drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was
intended by the petitioner school.

Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school
cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of
the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Filamer is liable as Funtecha’s employer.
HELD:
YES.

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation
arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over (him)."

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant
or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and
Allan.

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer. In the
present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would
prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official
driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another
employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than
the driver.

The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case
for damages. As far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it
was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is
enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that
Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of
the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus
been satisfactorily demonstrated.

NPC vs. CA
G.R. No. 119121, August 14, 1998
Romero, J.:

FACTS:
A convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left for
Iligan city. Enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured
in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3)
persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.

The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National Power Corporation
(NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO). The trial court absolved NPC. PHESCO appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The CA held Phesco is not liable as there was no employment
relationship between Phesco and driver Gavino Ilumba. Subsequently, NPC filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that NPC should be held liable as the latter is the
employer of the driver Ilumba.

HELD:
YES.

First and foremost, it is necessary to ascertain whether the contractual relationship between NPC
and PHESCO is one of employer and job (independent) contractor or one of employer and "labor
only" contractor. Job contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor
carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under
his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and
direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the
form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in
the conduct of his business. 5 Absent these requisites, what exists is a "labor only" contract under
which the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the
principal.

Taking into consideration the above distinction and the provisions of the "Memorandum of
Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, the court found PHESCO to be only
engaged in "labor only" contracting.

Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the "labor-only"

contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since
PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver
of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC.

However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract exists between it and
PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of
the employee of the "labor-only" contractor. The court did not agree. The action was premised on
the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is
the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code stipulates that employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In this regard, NPC's liability is
direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. If the judgment for damages is
satisfied by it, the NPC shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the
negligence which gave rise to the action.

Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad

G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003
Vitug, J.:

FACTS:
Drunk Nicanor Navidad entered the LRT station after purchasing a token. He was standing on
the platform when the security guar, Escartin, approached him. An altercation ensured that led to
a fist fight. Navidad fell on the tracks and got strucked by a moving train operated by Roman. He
died. A complaint for damages was filed against LRTA, Escartin, Roman and Prudent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not LRTA should be held liable.

HELD:
YES.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty is not only during the course
of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage.

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier
on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to
show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that
negligence must be proved.

In this case, the foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure
the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Mckee vs. IAC

 G.R. No. L-68102, July 16, 1992
Davide, J.:

FACTS:
Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision
took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Tayag and Manalo, driven
by Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, resulting in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh
McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice
weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to
Angeles City from San Fernando.

When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2
boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car moving back and
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his
lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane
of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge

As a result of the accident, 2 civil cases were filed for damages for the death and physical
injuries sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort; as well as a criminal case against
Galang

During the trial, evidence were presented showing that the driver of the Truck was speeding
resulting in the skid marks it caused in the scene of the accident.

The lower court found Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil cases were dismissed

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Galang, and reversed the decision in the civil
cases, ordering the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of the McKee family

On motion for reconsideration, the CA reversed its previous decision and ruled in favor of the
owners of the truck.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner and driver of the Truck were responsible for the collision.

HELD:
The proximate cause of the collision was the overspeeding of the truck.
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could
be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would
mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to
take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could
very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence"

Considering the sudden intrusion of the 2 boys into the lane of the car, the Court finds that Jose
Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the
above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence
was the proximate cause of the collision. Galang's negligence is apparent in the records. He
himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge
while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.
Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of
the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence
of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence
in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of
the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are
negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris
tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which they failed to do.
 Merrit vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
Trent, J.:
FACTS:
When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon
crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said
streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward
the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and
long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, whowas already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post place there. 

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr.
Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he
was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the
back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.

As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and
of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy
Chaco building.

As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is liable.

HELD:
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.

The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by
his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on
that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission
 of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of
such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals
in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor negligence can be presumed on the
part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment
of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its
part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a
private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as
a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations (Supreme Court
of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.).

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of
article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.

Mendoza v. De Leon
G.R. L-9596, February 11, 1916
Trent, J.:

FACTS:
Plaintiff was the grantee of an exclusive lease privilege under Act No. 1643 of the Philippine
Commission. After a little over one year, plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and pursuant to a
resolution adopted by the defendants-members of the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan.
Thus, plaintiff brought action against such individual members for damages. Act No. 1643
provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and
slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder
annually or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been previously
approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality or township is
located.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality is liable for acts of its officers or agents in the performance of
governmental functions.

HELD:
It depends. In this case, it is not liable.

When the acts of its officers come within the powers which it has as agent of the state, it is
exempt from liability for its own acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or agent
of the city are for the special benefits of the corporation in its private or corporate interest, such
officer is deemed the agent or servant of the city, but where the act is not in relation to a private
or corporate interest of the municipality, but for the benefit of the public at large, such acts by the
agents and servants are deemed to be acts by public or state officers, and for the public benefit.
Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the
municipal governments. The state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in
the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the
municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.

A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or
proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be
regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or
in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be
collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in
precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals.
As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the
municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.

The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a
governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a
contract with the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect.

It cannot be said that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the
municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors
were honestly acting for the interests of the municipality. The defendants are liable jointly and
severally for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of
the ferry privilege in question.

Rosete vs. The Auditor General

G.R. No. L-1120, August 31, 1948
Feria, J.:

FACTS:
The buildings owned by petitioner were destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous
warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration (ECA) due to the negligence of a certain
Jose Frayno in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter near a five gallon drum into which
gasoline was being drained. He further claimed that ECA and its officers were guilty of
negligence in storing a highly combustible and inflammable substance in its warehouse on
bodega in Manila in violation of City Ordinances. Petitioner subsequently filed a claim for
damages against the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Insular Auditor erred in dismissing the appellant's claim.
HELD:
NO.

Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts
and omissions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible.

xxx     xxx     xxx

"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the
act performed, in which cast the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."

In the case of Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil., 311), the Court held
that the state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office. The
responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to
the exercise of the duties of his office. In the case at bar, the officers of the Emergency Control
Administration did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning
of that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA.

Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with the Insular Auditor,
and appeal by the private persons or entities from the latter's decision to the Supreme Court, does
not make any and all claims against the Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all
claims which may be filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman

G.R. No. L-55963, December 1, 1989
Paras, J.:

FACTS:
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651,
then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped
a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital
where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the
time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as
such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

This petition is an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-
spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of San
Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the accident.

The trial court rendered judgment which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration
to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. Respondent National
Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing
the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition
with this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NIA should be held liable.

HELD:
YES.

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180 read as follows: Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even the though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.The State is responsible
in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176
shall be applicable.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual
governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer
and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private
individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning
of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.)

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary

functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.Indubitably, the NIA is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a
corporate body performing non- governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage
caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part
of respondent NIA. Considering that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of
impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is
confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage. The supervisor of
the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed
speed limit within the city. This is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination
without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped.

City of Manila vs. Teotico

G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968
Concepcion, C.J.:

Facts:
Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole when he attempted to board a
jeepney at a "loading and unloading" zone. As a result of the fall, Teotico’s eyeglasses broke and
its shards pierced his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Aside from the lacerated wound in his left
upper eyelid, he also suffered from several contusions to his body and an allergic eruption caused
by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. His medical expenses amounted to
P1,400.00.

As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the
City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The
City of Manila and its officers contended that every time a report that a cover of a manhole is
missing, the Office of the City Engineer immediately had it replaced and that they were attentive
thereto.

The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the City of Manila but the Court of Appeals
sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages amounting to P6,750.00.

Issue:
Whether the City of Manila is liable for payment of damages to Teotico.

Held:
Between RA 409 (the Charter of Manila exempting the City from liability) and the Civil Code,
the Civil Code applies because its subject matter is more particular. RA 409 refers to liability
arising from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof. On the other hand, Article
2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is
based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

Even assuming that the incident took place in a national highway, it is not necessary for liability
to attach that the defective roads or streets belongs to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. What Article 2189 requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Republic Act No. 917 provides that the construction, maintenance and improvement of national,
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway
City Engineers.

Republic vs. Palacio,

G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
Handong Irrigation Association, Inc and Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) were sued. The complaint
alleged that the Irrigation Service Unit induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to
invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The Republic through the Solicitor
General moved for the dismissal claiming that Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality
to sue and be sued. The motion was denied on the ground that the said defendant, although a
mere agency of the Republic, is engaged in the private business of selling irrigation pumps and
construction materials on installment plan. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. No
subsequent appeal was undertaken.

The Solicitor General was served with copy of the writ of execution followed by an order of
garnishment. The Solicitor General filed with the lower court an urgent motion to lift the order of
garnishment but it was denied as well as of the motion for reconsideration. The CA sustained the
decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Irrigation Service Unit can be sued for inducing Handong Irrigation
Association.

HELD:
NO.

ISU was an office directly under the Department of Public Works and Communications. Based
on records, the sales of irrigation pumps to farmers by ISU are governed by the terms of the
Supplemental Agreement between the Philippine and the U. S. governments. The mere fact that
interests are being collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does not
convert this economic project of the government into a corporate activity. It was also provided
that the payments by the farmers' associations on conditional sales agreements will be considered
in the preparation and shall form part of the ISU annual budget and not for ISU’s private
interests.

The ISU liability, if there is any, thus arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties. There
being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor
its funds can be made liable therefor.

Araneta vs. De Joya

G.R. No. L-25172, May 24, 1974
Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:
Antonio de Joya was the general manager of the Ace Advertising. He proposed that an
employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies in television.
Although the board of directors failed to act on the proposal, Taylor was still sent to the US, with
the assurance that Taylor’s expenses would be defrayed by parties other than the company.

Taylor received his salaries while abroad through checks and vouchers signed by Luis Araneta
(vice-president), Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) or de Joya. The total costs of Taylor’s
travel and study expenses was P 5,043.20.

Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court for the recovery of the total amount disbursed to
Taylor since the travel and expenses were made without its knowledge, authority or ratification.
A third-party complaint was filed by de Joya against Vicente Araneta, Luis Araneta and Taylor.

Both Aranetas disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks covering
part of the travel expenses and payroll in good faith since they were approved by de Joya.

The trial court ruled that de Joya was liable for the amount disbursed by the company but
dismissed the third party complaint, while the Court of Appeals held that according to the facts
of the case, the two Aranetas were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate
moneys jointly with the appellant.

Issue:
Whether or not Luis Araneta is solidarily liable with de Joya and Vicente Araneta for payment of
the erroneously disbursed funds.

Ruling:
Luis Araneta is guilty of a quasi-delict. His allegations of good faith were not substantiated and
established. In fact, as vice-president of the company, Luis Araneta remained passive concerning
the unauthorized disbursement of corporate funds and approved three of the payroll checks for
Taylor’s salary. Luis Araneta evidently neglected to perform his duties as an officer of the firm.

Applying Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, it is proper that the other joint tortfeasors be made
solidarily liable and shoulder their proportional responsibility.

Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping

G.R. No. L-53064, September 25, 1980
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
Facts:
Salvador Mendoza, driver of Sy Bon Ping, recklessly and negligently rammed the residential
house and store or Felix Lanuzo. The total damage to his property was P13,000 and he was
deprived of his monthly income from the store of P300.

In a complaint for damages instituted by Lanuzo independently from the criminal action, the trial
court ruled that Sy Bon Ping and Mendoza were jointly and severally liable to pay Lanuzo P
13,000.00 as damages and P 300.00, representing Lanuzo’s monthly income, until the entire P
13,000.00 has been paid in full.

Issue:
Whether or not Sy Bon Ping, as employer, and Mendoza, as employee are solidarily liable for
payment of damages to Lanuzo

Held:
Plaintiff predicated his claim for damages on quasi-delict, which may proceed independently and
regardless of the result of the criminal case. Salvador Mendoza is evidently primarily liable for
his reckless driving resulting to the damage caused to Lanuzo under Article 2176 of the Civil
CodeSy Bon Ping, as employer, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
which explicitly provides:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

Sy Bon Ping failed to disprove the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and
supervision of this employee (Article 2180) and is primary and solidarily liable with Mendoza.
Nevertheless, Sy Bon Ping may demand reimbursement from Mendoza for whatever amount he
will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the claim for damages.

Malipol vs. Tan

G.R. No. L-27730, January 21, 1974

Facts:
Pantaleon Malijan was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante when he was hit by a
gasoline tanker, got thrown to the ground and was ran over by the tanker’s right wheel that got
detached. Although he was brought to the hospital, Malijan died that night from "possible
traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."

The gasoline tanker at that time was driven by Ernesto Labsan and was used and owned by Lily
Lim Tan for her gasoline business. The mother and minor siblings of Malijan filed a complaint
for damages against Tan and Labsan. The trial court ruled that Labsan was primarily liable to
pay the damages, and in case he would not be able to do so, Tan would be subsidiarily liable.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling Labsan as primarily liable for damages, and Tan as
subsidiarily liable.

Held:
The court ruled that the trial court correctly denied the motion to set aside order of default and
for new trial; however, the trial court erred in holding Tan subsidiarily liable.

The action was based on quasi-delict and not to demand civil liability arising from a crime, since
the complaint makes no mention of a crime. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of
the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their
employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary.

Therefore, the employer, Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily,
liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court, without prejudice to the right to
demand reimbursement from damages from Ernesto Labsan for whatever she would have to pay
the relatives of the deceased.

Madeja v. Caro
G.R. No. L-51183,December 21, 1983.
Abad-Santos, J.:

FACTS:
Dr. Eva Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto
Madeja after an appendectomy. Carmen L. Madeja, complaining witness,is the widow of the
deceased. The information states that Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil
action for damages. While the criminal case still pending, Carmen sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent judge erred in dismissing the civil case; and
2. Whether or not physical injuries of Article 33 encompass other bodily injury in its definition.

HELD:

1. YES.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The present case creates an exception to this rule when the offense
is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the
injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
 given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended
until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus
independent of the result of the civil action.

2. YES.
The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.

G.R. Nos 135306, March 25, 2004
Carpio-Morales, J.:

FACTS:
Emelita Despuig was working as a grant-in-aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office
worker at a government office in Quezon City. She was allegedly raped by her boss, Catalino
Arafiles. Afraid to lose her job and of being harmed, she chose to keep the ordeal to herself.

She was almost raped again by the same man. However, the bellboy and the security guard
noticed something suspicious as Emelita was fighting back while they were checking in the
Flamingo Hotel. This prompted the bellboy to follow them to their room. Arafiles rushed to
leave as soon as he paid money to the bellboy and the security guard in order not to report the
same.

Emelita reported the same information to the police. She was interviewed by Romy Morales, a
journalist of People’s Journal Tonight. The following day, the news was part of the headlines in
the aforementioned newspaper. After a year of publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for
damages arising from the said publication against the journalist and its employer. The RTC of
Quezon City ruled in favor of Arafiles. But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence they elevated it to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with malice, hence, must free
respondents of liability for damages.

HELD:
YES.

The complaint instituted by petitioner is one for damages. The governing provision is Article 33
of the Civil Code. It contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall
be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence
separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised
Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be construed as an
entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged,
explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends
upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.

The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item
give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained
of by Emelita. However, the succeeding paragraphs, in which petitioner and complainant Emelita
were eventually identified, sufficiently convey to the readers that the narration of events was
only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters. In determining the
manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be
attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da Wah

G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003
Bellosillo, J.:

FACTS:
Bulgar, a local tabloid, published an article in 1992 about the Muslim’s practical customs stating:

ALAM BA NINYO?Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay
hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay.
Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa
tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw
ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’."

Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines filed a complaint alleging the libelous statement as
insulting and damaging because words alluding to pig as the God of Muslims were with intent to
hurt the feelings, cast insult, and disparage the Muslims and Islam. The RTC dismissed their
case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Islamic Council was entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s feed, and costs of suit.

HELD:
NO.

According to Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno:

 Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander — the one being, in general,
written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name. The mere fact that the plaintiff's feelings and
sensibilities have been offended is not enough to create a cause of action for defamation.
Defamation requires that something be communicated to a third person that may affect
the opinion others may have of the plaintiff.

As a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of his prima

facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and
concerning the plaintiff.

In order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear
that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. If the
defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied
to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for
defamation. In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class
or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo
can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right
of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal
application and was so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where
the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out
of the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be maintained.

Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not
specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of
the alleged libelous publication.

A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an intentional tortious
act causing mental distress and not an action for libel. An "emotional distress" tort action is
personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his
emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant
case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar.

Moreover, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the
principle of relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the community in
the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm — which includes
injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. It is
thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational
harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which
the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.

To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
In this case, the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was the emotional
distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be expected
to endure it. There is no evidence on record that points to that result.

Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan

G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
Sarmiento, J.:

FACTS:
Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about
to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. accidentally fell into a manhole
located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. Petitioner filed an
action for recovery of damages. The trial court ruled in favor of her. On appeal by the respondent
City of Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the lower court findings. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in
effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.

HELD:
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians
from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for
the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. Control or supervision over it is enough to uphold liability.

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying
out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation
of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Boar.

The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries arising
from failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter cannot be used to exempt
the city. The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other
hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works."
Salta vs. De Veyra

Facts:
Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos branch. As such, his
duty was to grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of
the loan applied for. In the performance of this duty, he is supposed to exercise care and
prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner
indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner
characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate
with the amount of the loans. This is how the respondent bank found petitioner to have
discharged his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of
Manila on April 22, 1970 to recover losses the bank suffered and another case on September 23,
1972 . At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Bale 2 Civil Case at isang criminal case)

In the criminal case, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence).

With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two
civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule I I I of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. ...

Judge de Veyra opposed the MTD while Judge Purisima granted it. Judge de Veyra ruled that
the MTD must be denied for the reason that acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle
for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even
civilly the accused would not be liable-there is no such a finding. Apart from this, Plaintiff in this
present civil case bases its case either on fraud or negligence-evidence that only requires a
preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal cases.

Issue:

WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on
the basis of the same facts as alleged in the criminal case.

Held:

No.

The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under
the provision of Article 33 of the NCC. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the
main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision.
Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly
alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the
complaints. It needs hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner disputes,
particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil complaints. Definitely, We
hold that the following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do
contain sufficient averment of fraud

The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs. Alvendia is not only enlightening, but
authoritative. Thus —

". . . in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the criminal
case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirety irrelevant to the civil action. This seems
to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions 'entirely separate and distinct'
from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34 and 2177). Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107
Sec. l(d) does not apply. "

Under Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to
be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that
the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately
from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.

The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that
when the civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the
prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the interest of
the offended party. It is but just that when, as in the present instance, the prosecution of the
criminal case is left to the government prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or mishanding of the
case committed by the latter should not work to the prejudice of the offended party whose
interest would thus be protected by the measure contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 12
of the New Civil Code.

CAPUNO VS. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR. No. L-19331 / April 30,1965FACTS:
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3,1953 in
Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven byJon Elordi
and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the l a t t e r a s w e l l
a s t o h i s p a s s e n g e r s , t h e s p o u s e s F l o r e n c i o B u a n a n d R i z a l i n a Paras. Elordi
was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence
int h e   C F I .   T h e   i n f o r m a t i o n   w a s   s u b s e q u e n t l y   a m e n d e d   t o   i n c l u d e   c l
a i m s   f o r   damages by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case was
pending,the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action,
alsofor damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi. At that time the criminal casewas still
pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the a c c u s e d
Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or
o n September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action
for d a m a g e s   a g a i n s t the Pepsi-Cola. This is the action which, upon
a p p e l l e e s ' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its, from which order the
presentappeal has been taken. The grounds upon which appellees based their
motionfor dismissal is that the action had already prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action filed by petitioners based on quasi-delict
i s barred by prescription.

HELD:
The action filed is barred by prescription.T h e r e c a n b e n o d o u b t t h a t t h e p r e s e n t
a c t i o n i s o n e f o r r e c o v e r y o f   damages based on a quasi-delict, which action
must be instituted within four
(4)y e a r s   ( A r t i c l e   1 1 4 6 ,   C i v i l   C o d e ) .   W h e n   t h e y   c o m m e n c e d
t h e   c i v i l   a c t i o n o n September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that
appellantsthen chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise
thataction would have been premature and in any event would have been concludedby the
subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.The term "physical injuries" in
Article 33 includes bodily injuries causingdeath. In other words the civil action for
damages could have been commencedby appellants immediately upon the death of
their decedent. But the complaint here was filed only on after the lapse of more than five
years

Corpus v. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062 

Facts: 
the passenger bus driven by Felardo Paje collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia 
resulting to Clemente’s death and physical injuries to two other persons
 on December 23, 1956 in Lubao, Pampanga,. —A case was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga for
homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Paje was found guilty but he
appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA). —On November 21, 1961, while Paje
’
s appeal was pending decision in the CA, Corpus instituted in the CFI of Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case
No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Paje & Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc. — Corpus was claiming that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly and
separately the amounts of damages. —On November 9, 1962, CA promulgated its decision in the appeal of
Paje reversing the appealed judgement and acquitting him after finding that the reckless imprudence charged
against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident. On December 29, 1962,
Paje & Victory Liner filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by
the acquittal by the CA but the motion was denied. 
Issue:
 Whether or not Corpus could claim the damages from Paje & Victory Liner as per the civil case she filed. 
Ruling: 
—No. Corpus could not claim for any damages filed on the civil case as the CFI of Rizal dismissed 
the complaint on May 31, 1966 on the ground that Corpus’ action was based upon an act whereby a 
person, without malice, but by fault, negligence or imprudence not legally excusable, causes injury to another also
know as quasi-delict . As per Article 1146 of the Civil Code, upon a quasi-delict , the action must be instituted
within four years. Corpus filed a civil case against Paje on November 21, 1961 which was already
4 years & 11 months since the incident happened on December 23, 1956.

CARMEN L. MADEJA v. HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

FACTS:

- An information for homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja
after an appendectomy was filed by the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja,
against Dr. Eva A. Japson in the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar.
- The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to
file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
- While the criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case in the same court alleging that her husband died because of the
gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.
- Japzon filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by Judge Felix Caro invoking
Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action.

- According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules
of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
- Madeja now filed the instant petition which seekimg to set aside the order of the
respondent judge.
HELD:Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted herein below:

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto

-  This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action"
and "criminal prosecution.
- The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen
to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of
the State attorney.
- In a criminal prosecution, while the State is the complainant in the criminal case,
the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered
directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which
peculiarly affects him.

GR: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it
separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted.

XPN: Article 33, CC creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries.

 In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the

criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the
injured party
 The law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the
claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action
should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has
 been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent
of the result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense.

- It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not
only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.'

 Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no
specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means
of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud
must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the
laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.
 With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms
'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the
Code Commission would have used terms in the same article-some in their
general and another in its technical sense.
 Therefore, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily
injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are general terms

- Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them
merely concurred in the result.
- In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
- Petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no
special pronouncement as to costs.

RELATED PROVISIONS:
 Article 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
 Article 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

 Article 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. - A libel committed

by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

 Article 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication

for a compensation. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to
2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens
another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or
other members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer
to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money
consideration.

 Article 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of

official proceedings. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 20 to
2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or
manager or a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts
connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor,
virtue and reputation of said person, even though said publication be made
in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration
of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been
mentioned.

 Article 358. Slander. - Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor

in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it
is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

 Article 359. Slander by deed. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall
cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not
 of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.

Art. 33, CC.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Dulay v. CA GR No 108017 (1995)

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.

Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as
a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

The widow of Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against the employer and the
security guard and prayed to be awarded actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees. She alleges that the Secuity agency has concurrent negligence
as Torzuela, their employee: “

Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.”

SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefore is governed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

"ARTICLE 100.Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable."

1. However, petitioner contends further that Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall govern
and that it is independent from the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
2.That the act of Torzuela is actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code:

"ARTICLE 33.In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." homicide for Article 33 to apply in the
case

Issue: Whether or not the civil action is founded on quasi-delict and should the
employer be held jointly liable for damages. Whether or not physical injuries include
consummated homicide for Article 33 to apply in the case

Held: Yes to both issues. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Well-entrenched is
the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional.

Velayo v. Shell 100 Phil 186 (July 30, 1957)

Facts: Commercial Air Lines, Inc., referred to as CALI, is a corporation duly organized
and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws, and previously engaged in air
transportation business. The Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., is a corporation organized under
the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.

CALI’s operations needed fuel, thus it had a number of persons extending credit to said
corporation. However, on August 1948, CALI had financial difficulties and had to call on an
informal meeting of creditors because they were in the state of insolvency.

Soon thereafter, the big creditors present in the meeting discussed preferences of credit. The
creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue to order of
payment and to supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation while they
attempted to come to an understanding as a fair distribution of assets among them.

The committee consists of Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Agcaoili, and Atty. Sycip. Creditors agreed not
to file a suit. However, on the day of the meeting of the working committee, they received a
letter from Shell regarding its transfer of credit of CALI to the Shell Oil based in the US.

The American corporation, Shell, then sued CALI for the amount of the credit thus assigned.
A writ of attachment was issued against a C-54 PLANE in Ontario International Airport.
And on January 5,1949, a judgment by default had been issued by the American court against
CALI. The stockholders of CALI were unaware of this.

On December 17, 1948, Velayo filed for a writ of injunction to stop the foreign court from
prosecuting the claim, and in the alternative, he prayed for damages in double the amount of
the plane which was attached. The plaintiff having failed to restrain the progress of the
attachment suit in the US by denial of the application of the writ of injunction and the
consequences on execution of the C-54 plane in the state of California, USA, he confines his
action to the recovery of damages against the defendant.

The complaint was dismissed, hence this petition.

Issues: Whether or not Shell acted in bad faith and betrayed the trust and confidence of the
creditors of CALI. Whether or not by reason of betrayal of trust, Shell should be liable for
damages.

Held: Yes. Chapter 2 of the preliminary title of the Civil Code on Human relations provides:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

It is evident that Shell, upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and
that will all probability, it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the
preferred claims of other creditors, entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.

The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of
CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not
the entire amount of its credit, but the Supreme Court cannot countenance such attitude
at all,and much less from a foreign corporation to thedetriment of Philippine Government
and local business.

Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take
part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors
Shell’s transfer of credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take
part in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors
present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left
free to collect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and
were available to it. But then, such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to
an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary
insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell.

It may be said that article 19 only contains a mere declaration of principles and while
such statement is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by
Article 21 and the sequence of the same chapter, which prescribe the following:

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Saudi Arabia v. CA 297 SCRA 469 (October 8, 1998)

Facts: Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company.
During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members
Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While
there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She was saved by hotel security
personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them. The two
were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base
of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of
the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually
allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities
eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks
of detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to
Manila.

Two years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station
where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against the
two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to
catch a later flight out of Jeddah.

A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When
she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked
to sign a document written in Arabic . She was told that it was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear before the
court a week later . When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being
assured by Saudia’s Manila manager that the investigation was a routine and posed no
danger to her.

She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go,
however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been
forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again
confiscated.

A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge ,
to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes.
Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a
disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudi Arabian Air but
she was denied assistance of any kind . She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against
her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by Saudi Arabian Air without being informed of the cause.

She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudi Arabian Air and Mr. Al-Balawi,
its country manager. Saudi Arabian Air filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether or not Morada had a cause of action (2) Which law should govern, Phil. Law
or Saudi Law?

Held: YES, she has a cause of action. She aptly predicated her cause of action on
Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on
human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.”

Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions.

She was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and
violation of Islamic laws and tradition. Saudi Arabian Air may have acted beyond its
duties as employer in turning her over to Jeddah officials. Its purported act contributed to
or even proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private
respondent, Morada. Saudi Air allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of
Morada under the guise of petitioner’s authority as employer, taking advantage of the
trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of
Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these
capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which
petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.

2. Philippine Law should be applied. Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of
contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting
factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or
lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the SC finds
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.

The SC finds it necessary to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule,
which should be appropriate to apply given the factual context of the case. In applying
said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue:

(A) the place where the injury occurred;

(B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and;
(D) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
There is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. Private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the
“relationship” between the parties was centered here.

149. Globe Mackay v. CA 176 SCRA 778 (August 25, 1989)

Facts: Restituto M. Tobias, the private respondent, was employed by petitioner Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In
1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions
for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to Tobias it was him who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on
November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C.
Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.

However, his superiors twisted the facts and alleged that it was Tobias who was their
number one suspect. This led to the different investigations including a lie detector test
to make Tobias admit something he did not do. He was later on dismissed by Globe
Mackay. Unemployed, Tobias tried applying for a new job in RETELCO. However, the
petitioner, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that
Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias filed a civil case.
The RTC awarded damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed said judgment.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to
uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. Petitioners contend that
they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to
dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief
because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage. Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. The damage incurred
by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by
petitioners such as the filing of six criminal complaints which amount to malicious
prosecution.

150. Albenson v. CA G.R. No. 88694 (January 11, 1993)

Facts: Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries mild steel plates and as
payment, it was paid with a check amounting to P2,575 drawn against the account of
E.L Woodworks. The check was dishonored, Albenson, traced the origin of the check.
The result from the SEC shows that the president of Guaranteed Industries and the
owner of E.L Woodworks were one and the same with the name of Eugenio S. Baltao.

Albenson made extrajudicial demand but Eugenio Baltao denied that he issued a check,
urging the petitioner to file a complaint through Fiscal Sumaway for violation of BP 22.
Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have
waived his right.

Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed
with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not
true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation
conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson. The
complaint of Albenson was dismissed and Baltao’s complaint was given merit and the RTC
ruled in favor of him.

Issue: Whether or not Eugene Baltao is entitled to such damages for abuse of rights and
malicious prosecution.

Held: No, the SC found no cogent reason to award such damages in favor of Eugene Baltao.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.

The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible . . . ."
What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a
bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.

It appears however, that there was a mistake in identity as there were three (3) men
having the name Eugenio Baltao that were all doing business in the building where E.L
Woodworks was situated. It was most probably the son, Eugene Baltao III who issued the
check to Albenson, which Mr. Eugene Baltao never during the investigation.

The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution. An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted
where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his
legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

Nor is he entitled to compensatory damages because he did not present proof of the cost
of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business
caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court
cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual
proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.

There is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless,
or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong
Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).The award of
attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated
(Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]).
Moreover, there was no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees
cannot be awarded him on that ground.

151. Amonoy v. Gutierrez 351 SCRA 731 (2001)

Facts: The house of spouses Gutierrez was situated in a lot foreclosed and bought by
Sergio Amonoy. In April and May 1986, an Order of Demolition of the house was
issued by the trial court but was enjoined by a temporary restraining order (TRO) granted to
respondents on June 2, 1986. In 1988, the TRO was made permanent by the Court, but
the house of respondents had already been destroyed. The Court of Appeals held
petitioner liable to respondents for P250,000.00 for actual damages thereof. Hence, the
appeal to the SC where petitioner asserted the principle of damnum absque injuria.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the Amonoy was
liable to the respondents for damages

Held: Yes. Amonoy invokes the principle of damnun absque injuria, the maxim that
damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury
for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely exercises one's rights
does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.

The SC finds damnum absque injuria not applicable to this case. Amonoy did not heed
to the TRO issued by the Court. He was already in bad faith when he continued the
demolition despite the issuance of a TRO. The demolition of respondents' house by
petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful
exercise of such demolition despite the issuance of a TRO. The demolition of respondents'
house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right.

Amonoy’s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

152. UE v. Jader G.R. No. 132344 (2000)

Facts: Romeo Jader, a law student enrolled in the University of the East, failed to take the
regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete
grade in the 1st semester of his last year (1987-1988). After completing his 2nd
semester, Jader filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him
by Professor Carlos Ortega. This was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after paying the
required fee. He took the examination, and on May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade, a five (5).

Deliberations were held, with Jader’s name appearing in the tentative list of candidates
for graduation, but annotated with his deficiencies. Invitations were also made, with
Jader’s name appearing as one of the candidates, albeit annotated as to the tentative
nature of the list.

Jader attended the said graduation ceremony, vested with all the rites symbolic of his
graduation from law school. Believing he had successfully graduated, he took a leave of
absence without pay to prepare for the bar examination. Upon his enrollment in the pre-
bar review of the Far Eastern University, however, Jader learned of his deficiency, dropped out
of the same and ultimately did not take the bar examination. Jader sued UE for damages
for suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights arising from the latter’s negligence. Awards of
moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit were also
prayed for.

UE denied liability, arguing that it never led Jader to believe that he completed the
requirements for a Law degree when his name was included in the tentative list of
graduating students. Trial ensued, with the lower court ruling in favor of Jader, ordering
UE to pay 35,470 with legal rate of interest, and 5,000 for attorney’s fees and cost of
suit. This was modified by the CA to the effect of requiring UE to pay Jader an additional
50,000 for moral damages.
Issue: Is UE liable to Romeo Jader, despite the former’s allegation that the proximate
and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred arose out of his own negligence in
not verifying the result of his removal exam?

Held: UE is still liable to respondent Jader. In a contract of education, since the

contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal
with the formers agents, although nothing prevents either professors or students from
sharing with each other such information. It is the contractual obligation of the school to
timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as
to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment
of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will graduate.

In belatedly informing Jader, UE cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of
good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved
party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the
forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of
facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.

The school exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors with
respect to the submission of reports involving the students standing, with “exclusive
control” meaning that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which
caused the damage or injury.

Being a university engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates
in its students, specifically the principle of good dealings in Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, the former provision intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs, impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.

UE failed to act seasonably and cannot feign ignorance that Jader will not prepare
himself for the bar exams, since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation
of an LL.B. graduate. Liability arose from its failure to promptly inform him of the exam
results and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all course
requirements.

While UE was guilty of negligence and liable to Jader for actual damages, he should
not have been awarded moral damages. At the very least, it behooved on Jader to verify
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure
that all his affairs were in order. The Court fails to see how he could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes
and not being able to take the bar exams. If Jader was indeed humiliated, he brought
this upon himself by not verifying all the requirements including his school records,
before preparing himself for the bar examination.
153. Garciano v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 96126 (1992)

Facts: Esteria Garciano was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. Before the school year ended,
she applied for an indefinite LOA because her daughter was taking her to Austria, her
daughter’s place of employment. The application was recommended for approval by the
school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's Board
of Directors. On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the Garciano, stating
that by way of the decision of school founder, Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the president of the
PTA and the school faculty, they have decided to terminate her services due to: a)
absence of a written contract of employment due to Garciano’s refusal to sign one, and
b) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would
accept the position without a written contract. Upon Garciano’s arrival from Austria, and
after several inquiries about the matter, the Board of Directors without the consent of
the school founder signed a letter, reinstating Garciano to her former position, with a
statement declaring the previous communication received had been declared null and void
for not bearing the sanction or authority of the Board. Subsequently, the president, vice
president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors resigned from their
positions "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's
deliberations for the reinstatement of Garciano.

A complaint for damages was filed in the RTC-Cebu against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo,
and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal
dismissal. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Garciano, ordering Wiertz and
Co. to pay 200,000 as moral damages, 50,000 exemplary damages, 32,400 as lost
earnings for 9 years and 10,000 as litigation and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the
Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the lower court, dismissing the complaint and
absolving Wiertz and Co. Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Garciano
seeks redress in the High Court.

Issues: Did the CA err in absolving Wiertz and Co. from liability by faulting Esteria
Garciano for her failure to report back to work? Should they be held liable for damages?

Held: The High Court ruled in the negative. It held that the board of directors of the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers
and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the Garciano, but merely directed her
to report for work. While the Wiertz and Co. sent her a letter of termination through
her husband, as discovered by the CA, Wiertz and Co. were aware of their lack of
authority to do so. The letter of termination they sent to Garciano through her husband
had no legal effect, and did not prevent her from reporting for work. There was no reason
why she could not continue with her teaching in the school.

No evidence had been presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from
reporting for work. An acidic reaction made by Wiertz and Co. can be seen as nothing
more than a reaction to what they perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It
would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job
in the school and has no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants. They
actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by
the school's Board of Directors.

With regard to damages, liability under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises
only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good
customs or public policy.

Given that Garciano's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice, whatever loss
she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit
injuria. With respect to Garciano's claim for moral damages, since the right to recover
them under Article 21 is based on equity, he who comes to court to demand equity
must come with clean hands. In this case, Garciano is not without fault. Her indefinite
leave of absence, followed by her failure to report in time for the opening of classes, as
well as her refusal to sign a written contract of employment and her ignorance of the
Board’s order to return to work are reflections of her fault.

154. Barons vs. CA G.R. No. 126486 (1998)

Facts: Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. (PDPI), appointed Barons Marketing, Corporation
(BMC) as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. The latter was given 60 days
credit for its purchases of plaintiff's electrical products, to be reckoned from the date of
delivery by Phelps Dodge of its products.

For the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, BMC purchased, on credit,
from PDPI various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.30,
which were subsequently sold to MERALCO. Sales invoices issued by PDPI to BMC
stipulate a 12% interest on the amount due for attorney’s fees and collection. On
September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 out of its total
purchases, leaving an unpaid account on the aforesaid deliveries of P3,802,478.20.
Demand for payment was made several times by PDPI, which was responded to by BMC
with a request that it be able to pay its obligation in monthly installments of 500,000 at
1% interest per annum. The offer was rejected by PDPI, who reiterated its demand for full
payment.

A complaint was filed by PDPI before the Pasig RTC against BMC for the recovery of
the unpaid balance for made deliveries worth 3,108,000, as well as interest, exemplary
damages of at least 100,000, the cost of the suit, as well as attorney’s fees at the rate
of 25% of the amount demanded. In response, BMC, although admitting that the said
purchases were theirs, disputed the amount claimed by PDPI, asserting that the acts were
perpetrated to induce humiliation and in abuse of PDPI’s rights.

After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of PDPI, ordering BMC to pay for the
unpaid balance of their purchases at 12% interest per annum, attorney’s fees at 25% of
the preceding obligation, exemplary damages worth 10,000 and the cost of the suit.
On appeal, the judgment was modified to adopt the original amount of unpaid deliveries
(3,802,478.20) at 12% per annum and 5% of the said obligation as attorney’s fees.

Issue/s: Is PDPI guilty of abuse of right? If not, can PDPI recover interest and attorney’s
fees?

Held: The Court held that BMC’s theory that PDPI abused its rights by rejecting the
former’s offer of settlement, subsequently followed by the filing of the present complaint
was untenable. To invoke Article 19 of the Civil Code, the defendant must act with bad
faith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. Quoting Tolentino, abuse of right exists “when it
is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.“

Given this premise, the Courts held that PDPI’s act of rejecting BMC’s offer to settle
was not made to prejudice or injure BMC. It is also a fundamental rule that good faith
is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same. BMC, in this case, has failed to prove the bad faith of PDPI. On the contrary, the
Court finds the reasons of PDPI to be legitimate. As pointed out, the corporation had its own
"cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations."

With this in mind, BMC’s prayer for moral and exemplary damages must also be rejected, in
lieu of Article 2219 (10).

As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the stipulation provided constitutes a penal
clause, and thus, BMC is required to pay interest, attorney’s fees and collection fees.
However, given the power of the courts to reduce the penalty whenever it is found to
be iniquitous or unconscionable, the Court believes that 10% of the principal amount is
adequate to cover both attorney’s and collection fees.

155. BPI vs. CA G.R. No. 120639 (1998)

Facts: Ricardo Marasigan, a lawyer by profession, was a complimentary member of the

BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC) from February 1988 to February 1989. Said
corporation issued him Credit Card No. 100-012-5534 with a credit limit of P 3,000.00.
Said membership to BECC was renewed until February 1990 at an increased credit limit
of P 5,000.00. The contention arose when Marasigan failed to timely pay his account for
October 1989 amounting to P8,987.84. Through Marasigan’s secretary, BECC informed
him that they are demanding immediate payment of his balance, the deposit of a P
15,000.00 to cover his future bills, and threatened to suspend his credit card. A
postdated check was issued by Marasigan from the Far East Bank and Trust, Co. and
was received by BECC’s co-employees on November 23, 1989. The same was forwarded
to the collection department a week later. 5 days after receipt, BECC served Marasigan a
letter informing him of the temporary suspension of his credit card privileges and the
inclusion of his account number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from
further use of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that his
membership will be permanently cancelled unless he settles his outstanding account with
the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter. Marasigan, however, did not
receive the letter before December 8, 1989, the day wherein he entertained several guests
at Café Adriatico. Upon presentment of his credit card to foot the bill of P 735.32, said
card was dishonored. One of his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her
own credit card.

Correspondence was sent out by Marasigan, seeking that he be sent the exact bill due him
as of December 15, 1989, to withhold the deposit of his postdated check, and return the same
due to his instruction to stop payment. No reply was given by BECC, prompting
Marasigan to send another letter reminding the BECC that he had long cancelled
whatever arrangement he entered into with the Corporation and requested for his correct
billing, less improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within 5 days from
receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989 despite assurance by
defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise court action shall be filed to hold defendant
responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by him. In turn, final demand
was sent to Marasigan dated March 21, 1990 requiring him to pay in full his overdue
account, including stipulated fees and charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or face
court action, as well as replace the postdated check with cash within the same period or
face criminal suit for violation of the B.P. 22. Marasigan, in turn, demanded BECC’s
compliance with his earlier request, or face court action.

A complaint for damages against BECC was filed before the Makati RTC. After trial,
the lower court ruled in favor of Marasigan, finding BECC had abused its right in
contravention of Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ordered BECC to pay a) 100,000 as
moral damages, b) 50,000 as exemplary damages and c) 20,000 as attorney’s fees. On
the other hand, the lower court ordered Marasigan to pay for his outstanding obligation worth
14,439.41.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed but modified, ordering BECC to pay a) 50,000 as moral
damages, b) 25,000 as exemplary damages and c) 10,000 as attorney’s fees.

Issue: In canceling Marasigan’s credit card, did BECC abuse his right under the terms and
conditions of their contract?

In order to maintain an action for the injury, one must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which a defendant owed to a plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.

156. Ruiz v. Secretary of National Defense G.R. No. L-15526 (1963)

Facts: Allied Technologists, Inc. (ATI) and the Republic of the Philippines entered into a
contract for the construction of the Veterans Memorial Hospital in September 11, 1950.
Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders of ATI. The construction of the said hospital was
halted in 1955, followed by the filing of 2 civil cases in succession by Ruiz and
Herrera against ATI, the Secretary of National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez, the head of
the Engineering Group of the DND and Pablo Panlilio, as Auditor of the DND.

The first case (CC No. 23778) was dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954 as
affirmed by the high Court on July 7, 1955. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed
on September 13, 1955. On appeal, the high Court reversed the order of dismissal, under
the impression that the real controversy was confined merely between Panlilio, Ruiz and
Herrera over the 15% of the contract price, which was retained by the DND, which was
originally made to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the
construction. Civil Case No. 26601 was remanded to its court of origin for further
proceedings.

Panlilio and ATI filed their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by the
DND was already paid to ATI, as sought for by the Ruiz and Herrera in their
complaint. In view of this development, the trial court invited the parties to a conference,
in which the Ruiz and Herrera indicated their conformity, to the dismissal of the
complaint with respect to the retention of the 15% of the contract price; but insisted
upon the hearing of the second question, which sought the declaration and recognition of
Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three architects of the hospital. The trial court dismissed
the complaint, for being moot and academic.

Issue: Did the lower court err in ordering the dismissal of the case?

Held: The trial court made no error. Ruiz and Herrera contend that the only ground relied
upon by the trial court to dismiss the case without trial is the allegation that the amount
retained by the DND had already been paid, yet except for this bare allegation, no
evidence was adduced to prove the truth of the same. Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the same is true, nevertheless the first part of the first cause of action
still remains, for which they had insisted upon a hearing to establish their right to be
recognized as two of the three architects of the hospital; that because the pleadings do
not show any ground which might legally justify the action taken by the lower court,
the latter should not have ordered the dismissal of the entire case but should have
ordered only the striking out of the moot portion of appellants' first cause of action, based
upon Article 21 of the Civil Code

This cannot be given merit. As found by the trial court, Ruiz and Herrera’s first cause
of action is composed of: a) judicial declaration or recognition that Ruiz and Herrera,
together with Panlilio, were the architects of the Veterans Hospital; and b) injunction
restraining government officials paying Panlilio the sum retained, as per stipulation contained
in the contract.

By discarding the Secretary and other officials of the DND, as defendants, Ruiz and
Herrera could not expect the trial court to order them to recognize and declare them co-
architects in the construction of the hospital. And, as the amount retained by the
Department on the contract price, which retention was authorized by the contract, was,
as sought by the appellants, already paid to the ATI, there is nothing more for the trial
court to decide, even without first ruling on the special defenses of Panlilio and ATI.

Ruiz and Herrera’s reliance on Article 21 of the Civil Code is unfounded. They contend that
the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate right or property,
but also to honor or credit. However, although this article envisions a situation where a
person has a legal right which is violated by another in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy, it presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which
one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that damages
were ever asked in connection with this case, predicated upon the said article. Under the
facts and circumstances in this case, one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the
failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.

157. Wassmer vs. Velez G.R. No. L-20089 (1964)

Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September
2, 1954 Velez left Wassmer with a note stating that the wedding must be postponed, as
Velez’s mother opposes it. He also asked Wassmer not to fuss. The following day,
however, Velez sent Wassmer another telegram, stating that nothing has changed, and he
shall return very soon. Velez was never seen by Wassmer nor heard from again after that.

Wassmer filed a suit for damages against Velez. Velez filed no answer and was declared
in default. Judgment was rendered in favor of Wassmer, ordering Velez to pay P2,000.00
as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's
fees; and the costs of the suit. Velez filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Plaintiff moved to strike it out,
but the Court ordered the parties to explore at this stage of the proceedings the
possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.

Following a series of failed attempts to amicably settle the matter, the court issued an
order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Hence, Velez’s appeal to the high Court. In
support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the
judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. As stated in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, “…a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.”

Issue: Should the lower court’s decision be set aside, removing Wassmer’s right to claim
damages?

Held: The lower court’s decision must be affirmed, as what was done by the high Court
in this case. The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract marriage,
set a wedding day for September 4, 1954, Printed and distributed wedding invitations to
relatives, friends and acquaintances, purchased dresses and other apparel for the important
occasion and the like. And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply left.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Velez also contends that the moral damages awarded were excessive, and should be
totally eliminated. This argument, however is devoid of merit. Under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner." The high Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable award.

158. TANJANCO vs. SANTOS G.R. No. L-18630 (1966)

Facts: Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, the former expressing and professing
his undying love and affection for her who also, in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings. In consideration of Tanjanco’s promise to marry Santos, she consented to
Tanjanco’s pleas for carnal knowledge, as a result of which Santos conceived a child.
To avoid embarrassment and social humiliation due to her pregnancy, Santos resigned
from her job in IBM, Philippines as a secretary, thereby unable to support herself and
her baby. Tanjanco, on the other hand, refused to marry Santos, as well as recognize
their unborn child, prompting her to file suit to compel Tanjanco to recognize the
unborn child she was bearing, to give her support of not less than P430.00 a month, plus
P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages and P10,000.00 attorney's fees. Tanjanco, in
turn, filed a motion to dismiss.

The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On
appeal, the CA held that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child
as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of
action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code. It set aside the lower
court’s decision and directed the same to proceed with the case. This prompted Tanjanco to
appeal to the high Court.

Issue: Is Tanjanco correct in pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction?
Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Appellate court erred by relying upon a
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support
the original draft of the Civil Code, which provided this example:

"A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or cannot be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article (now Article 21), she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Indeed, the CA overlooked the fact that the memorandum referred to a tort upon a
minor who has been seduced, which connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded.

Given the circumstances of this case, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
Tanjanco with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea
of seduction. There is voluntariness and mutual passion in this case, for had the she
been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions
and wiles of the Tanjanco, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less
for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill
his promises.

Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. The dismissal, however, must be understood to be
without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of Tanjanco. On that
point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here
involved.

159. Bunag vs. CA G.R. No. 101749 (1992)

Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida Cirilo, after reaching a hotel/motel and having
sexual intercourse, went to Pamplona in Las Piñas, where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days, even filing an application for a marriage license in Cavite. Bunag, Jr.,
however, withdrew the application on October 1, 1973.

Cirilo’s version of the case recites that she and Bunag were lovers. She also states was
brought to the hotel/motel against her will where Bunag succeeded in raping her, and
that thereafter, she was allowed to go home only after they were married. They then
went to Bunag’s grandmother’s house in Las Piñas where they lived as husband and
wife, but on September 29, 1973, Bunag left and never returned, bringing Cirilo
humiliation and shame because of Bunag’s deception. This was corroborated by Cirilo’s
uncle, Vivencio, who added that Bunag’s father, Bunag, Sr. wanted to settle things and have
the couple wed. Bunag, Jr., on the other hand, insists that he did not rape Cirilo. In fact,
he and Cirilo had plans to elope and get married. However, due to bitter disagreements
over money and threats to his person, Bunag, Jr. broke off the engagement.

A complaint for damages was filed by Cirilo for Bunag, Jr.’s broken promise of
marriage. In finding that Bunag, Jr. had forcibly abducted and raped Cirilo, the trial
court ruled for Cirilo ordering Bunag, Jr. to pay P80,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Conrado Bunag, Sr.
was absolved from any and all liability. On appeal, the CA ruled to affirm the decision
of the lower court. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Is Bunag, Jr. correct in asserting that since the action involved breach of promise to
marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages?

Held: The high Court held that while it is true that in this jurisdiction, the time-honored
rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise.

The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those

provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code,
in relation to Article 2219 (10), any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in
the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes.

Under the prevailing circumstances, the acts of Bunag, Jr. in forcibly abducting Cirilo
and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry
her in order to escape criminal liability, only to renege on such promise after cohabiting
with her for twenty-one days, constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These
are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which justify the award of moral
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10,
Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Further, the dismissal of the criminal
case against Bunag, Jr. for rape did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

160. Constantino vs. Mendez G.R. No. 57227 (1992)

Facts: Amelita Constantino worked as a waitress at Tony’s Restaurant in Sta. Cruz,
Manila. It was here where she met Ivan Mendez. Following their first meeting, Mendez
invited her to dinner at the Hotel Enrico. While dining, Mendez professed his love for
Constantino. Constantino asked to be brought home, to which Mendez agreed, on the pretext
of getting something in return. Promising to marry her, Mendez succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with Constantino, then after confessing that he was a married man.
This continued on to the months of September and November. Constantino eventually got
pregnant, and asked for help from Mendez to support the child, but this plea fell on
deaf ears. Constantino was forced to leave her work as a waitress, as a result. This
prompted Constantino to file for acknowledgment, support and the payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages. In response, Mendez denied having sexual relations with
Constantino and prayed for the dismissal of the case. He further prayed for the payment
of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the
malicious complaint.

The lower court ruled in favor of Constantino, ordering Mendez to pay P8,000.00 by
way of actual and moral damages; and P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees, as
well as the costs of the suit. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration, with the
trial court finding merit in Constantino’s motion, amending its decision by ordering
Mendez to pay for actual and moral damages, hospital expenses of P200.00, permanent
monthly support of P300.00, P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to recognize Michael
Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez. On appeal, the CA dismissed the
amended decision.

Issue: Is Amelita Constantino entitled to damages in this case?

Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. Amelita's claim for damages, which is based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, sits on the theory that through Ivan's
promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity. The high Court, however, agrees with the
Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery of
damages. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse was not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire.

At the time Amelita met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, she was already 28 years old and
admitted that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction is the reason why she surrendered
her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage,
she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after
their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated
their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage
was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.

161. Quimiguing vs. Icao G.R. No. 26795 (1970)

Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao. The parties were
neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations. Icao, although
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Quimiguing several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant, despite
efforts and drugs supplied by Icao, forcing her had to stop studying. Hence, she now
claims support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Icao, on the other
hand, moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born. After hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Quimiguing moved to amend the
complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a
baby girl; but the court, sustaining Icao's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Hence the appeal directly
to this Court.

Issue: Was the trial court correct in sustaining Icao’s motion?

Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. A conceived child, although as yet unborn,
is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code. Therefore, an unborn child has a right to
receive support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere."

Further, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as
averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights
of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused, as mandated by
Article 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2219 (3,10).

Hence, Quimiguing herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of her
complaint, and the dismissal of the same constitutes an error on the part of the lower court.

162. Pe vs. Pe G.R. No. L-17396 (1962)

Facts: The case originates from the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe, who
had gone missing on April 14, 1957 and at that time, was a single, 24 year old woman.
Sometime in 1952, Alfonso frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each
other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. Eventually, Lolita’s parents found out and
forbade Alfonso from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their
residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared
from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked her things and found
that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of
paper inside Lolita's aparador. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police
authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

This prompted the filing of the current action with the CFI-Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive
of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Defendant, after denying some allegations
contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if
true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.

The lower court, finding that Alfonso had carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe, being
a married man himself, declared that Alfonso cannot be held liable for moral damages, it
appearing that Lolita’s relatives failed to prove that Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried
to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.

Issue: May the parents and siblings of Lolita Pe recover damages based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing
them injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy?

Held: The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Conversely, the
trial court considered the complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to
prove that Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.

The high Court refused to align itself to this view. The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it
was he who seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him, as
shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits
to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative
and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each
other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac.

Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that Alfonso,
through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family
is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

163. Lao vs. Associated Anglo American Tobacco G.R. No. 47013 (2000)

Facts: The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (AATC) entered into a "Contract
of Sales Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agreed to sell cigarettes
manufactured and shipped by the AATC to his business address in Tacloban City. Lao would
in turn remit the sales proceeds to AATC. For his services, Lao would receive commission
depending on the kind of cigarettes sold, fixed monthly salary, and operational allowance. As
a guarantee to Lao's compliance with his contractual obligations, his brother Jose and his
father Tomas executed a deed of mortgage1 in favor of AATC in the amount of P200,000.00.

Lao regularly remitted the proceeds of his sales to AATC, generating, in the process, a
great deal of business. However, in February 1968 and until about seven (7) months
later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales report. He was reminded of his enormous
accounts and the difficulty of obtaining a tally thereon despite Lao's avowal of regular
remittances of his collections. Sometime later, Esteban Co, the vice-president and general
manager of AATC, summoned Lao to Pasay City for an accounting where it was established
that Lao's liability amounted to P525,053.47. And so, Lao and his brother Lao Y Ka, enlisted
the services of the Sycip Gorres and Velayo Accounting Firm (SGV) to check and reconcile
the accounts.

Subsequently, AATC discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction business so
much so that it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales to finance his
business. In the demand letter of April 15, 1979,counsel for AATC sought payment of
the obligations of Lao, warning him of the intention of AATC to foreclose the mortgage.
Attached to said letter was a statement of account indicating that Lao's total obligations duly
supported by receipts amounted to P248,990.82.

Ngo Kheng was sent by AATC to supervise the sales operations of Lao in Samar and
Leyte. It was discovered that, contrary to Lao's allegation that he still had huge
collectibles from his customers, nothing was due to AATC from Lao's clients. From then
on, Lao no longer received shipments from AATC which transferred its vehicles to
another compound controlled by Ngo Kheng. Shipments of cigarettes and the corresponding
invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo Kheng.

On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for accounting and
damages with writ of preliminary injunction against AATC before the then CFI of Leyte
On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for accounting and
damages with writ of preliminary injunction against AATC before the then CFI of Leyte
in Tacloban City. The lower court ordered AATC to undergo a court-supervised
accounting and to pay Lao: a) P180,000 representing actual loss of earnings, b) moral
damages in the amount of P130,000.00, c) exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, d) attorney's fees in the amount of P40,000.00, e) the compensation of the
commissioners pro-rata and f) the cost of the suit. Upon conclusion of the accounting,
the lower court revised its ruling, declaring Andres Lao's accountability to AATC in the
amount of P167,745.20 and ordering him to pay same to AATC. On appeal, AATC was
ordered by the CA to pay plaintiffs P150,000.00 actual damages for loss of earnings,
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. The
supplemental decision issued by the lower court, further, was reversed and set aside.

During the pendency of civil case, Esteban Co, as vice-president of AATC filed a
criminal case for estafa against Lao. Without awaiting the determination of the criminal
case, Lao lodged a complaint for malicious prosecution. The court ruled in favor of Lao
declaring that the estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice and
ordered AATC and Esteban Co to jointly and severally pay Lao: a) P30,000 as actual
damages, b) P150,000.00 as moral damages, c)P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and, d)
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

Issue: Is AATC liable for malicious prosecution?

Held: No. A reading of the complaint reveals that the complaint for malicious
prosecution was founded on the filing of estafa against Lao. As such, it was prematurely
filed and it failed to allege a cause of action.

The Court ruled that the complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or
on Articles 20 and 21 should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. The
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court. It should be stressed,
however, that the dismissal of subject complaint should not be taken as an adjudication on
the merits, the same being merely grounded on the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action.

Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other
proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.

164. Que vs. IAC G.R. No. L-66865 (1989)

Facts: The origin of this dispute goes back to when Que and Nicolas were still in
amicable terms. In July and August of 1975, Nicolas ordered from Que certain amounts
of canvass strollers which were delivered to and accepted by Nicolas, who issued five
checks therefore to Que worth P7,600. Nicolas, however, ordered the bank to stop
payment because of defects in the articles sold which Que had not corrected. Que for his
part argued that the allegedly defective articles were never returned to him until after he
had filed the charge for estafa and that Nicolas had earlier merely ignored his complaints
about the dishonored checks.

Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas in the office of the city fiscal of Caloocan
City for the issuance of several dishonored checks upon presentment. The charge was
dismissed for lack of merit, the investigating fiscal holding that the controversy was an
accounting matter that did not necessarily involve deceit on the part of Nicolas.
Subsequently, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que with the CFI-
Bulacan, for what he claimed was his malicious prosecution by the latter. Que now
claims harassment. In his counterclaim, he averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the
complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City; that the private
respondent was really indebted to him in any case and that it was he who had suffered
damages as a result of the unwarranted suit.

Originally, the lower court held in favor of Antonio and awarded him the total amount
of P80,500.00 in moral, exemplary, and nominal damages plus a P4,000.00 attorney's fee
and the costs of the suit, finding was that Que had acted maliciously in filing the estafa
charge and in alleging that the plaintiff had issued the dishonored checks with deceit.
Que’s motion for reconsideration was denied. A second motion for reconsideration was
filed after a motion to stay the running of the period of appeal was filed. This second
motion found merit, and reversed the original decision, awarding Que 10,000 as moral
damages.

On appeal, the IAC reinstating the original decision of the trial court in favor of Nicolas.

Issue: Had Magtanggol Que instituted a malicious prosecution against Antonio Nicolas?

Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. It is evident that Que was not motivated by
ill feeling but by anxiety to protect his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for
estafa with the fiscal's office. If he averred that the Antonio had no funds in the bank
when he issued the postdated checks and intended to cheat him, it was because the
circumstances of the case as Que saw them led him to this conclusion. Even if the fiscal
found that no deceit was involved and that the petitioner's claim was unfounded, the
mistaken charge was nonetheless, in the legal sense, not malicious. As previously held in
Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, “To constitute malicious prosecution, there
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.”

The criminal complaint filed by the petitioner was not a mere ploy to enforce the
payment of his account by Nicolas. There was here a genuine protest over the abrupt
and suspicious order to stop the encashment of the checks issued to him by the private
respondent. On the contrary, there is a stronger suggestion of malice on the part of
Nicolas when he filed his suit for damages against Que in Bulacan, notwithstanding that
the place of business was in Caloocan. However, inasmuch as good faith is presumed,
and applying this presumption both to the petitioner and the private respondent, we hereby
rule that, absent sufficient rebuttable evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice in their
mutual relations.

165. Drilon vs CA G.R. No. 107019 (March 20, 1997)

Facts:Drilon and company seek the reversal of the C.A. resolution affirming the orders
of Judge Macli-ing denying their motion to dismiss the complaint of malicious
prosecution filed by Homobono Adaza.

General Renato de Villa on March 20, 1990 requested the DOJ to order the investigation
of several individuals, including Adaza, which he believed participated in the fail
December 1989 coup d’état. Such was referred to the Special Composite Team of
Prosecutors for inquiry. Said team from sufficient basis for Adaza’s prosecution and their
report became the basis for the filing of a complaint for the crime of rebellion with
murder and frustrated murder on April 18, 1990 before the RTC of Quezon City.
Adaza then filed a complaint for damages on July 11, 1990 alleging that the information
filed against him was a clear case of wilful and malicious prosecution and that the
crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder was non-existent in the statute books.

Drilon and company filed a Motion to Dismiss Adaza's complaint on the ground that it
states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action on October 15, 1990. On
February 8, 1991, Judge Macli-ing denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.

Drilon and Company then filed on June 5, 1991 a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the Court of Appeals; alleging Judge Macli-ing had committed a grave abuse of
discretion in denying their motion to dismiss Adaza’s complaint on the ground that the later
had sufficient cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not Adaza’s complaint has sufficient cause of action.

Held: No, Adaza’s complaint does not have a sufficient cause of action. In fact his
complaint suffers a fatal infirmity as it does not state a cause of action on its face and
must thus be dismissed.

Malicious prosecution has been defined in the Philippine jurisdiction as, “An action for
damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere
purpose of vexation or injury” (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).

The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in
the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly
Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To prove malicious
prosecution the all the following elements must be proven and concur: (1) the fact of
the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and
that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or
impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.

None of the above requisites were shown in the complaint of Adaza, thus rendering it
dismissible under Sec. 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. The fact that
Adaza was granted bail on account of a writ of habeas corpus is not sufficient ground for
the filing of his complaint.

Moreover a complaint for malicious prosecution can only be filed if legal prosecution
has been carried out without probable cause. Probable cause has been proven by the
special composite team of prosecutors, and thus malicious prosecution has not been
committed. The prosecutors’ decision not to apply the doctrine enunciated in the case of
People vs. Hernandez which enunciates that murder and common crimes committed as a
necessary means for rebellion must be complexed, cannot be held as malicious as the
prosecutors’ believed that the case against Adaza could be differentiated. The
prosecutors believe that said acts of murder and frustrated murder committed by Adaza were
not necessary for the rebellion.

Adaza’s error of failing to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for
malicious prosecution on the face of his complaint should have been painfully obvious to
Judge Macli-ing. The judge’s failure to notice such and denying the motion to dismiss the
said complaint for said reason is indeed a grave abuse of discretion.

166.
Patricio vs. Leviste
G.R. No. L-51832
(April 26, 1989)

Facts:Fr. Rafael Patricio, director general of the 1976 town fiesta of Pilar, Capiz was
was slapped in public by Bienvenido Bacalocos, who was then the president of the
association of barangay captains of Pilar, Capiz. The incident occurred on May 16, 1976
at about 10 p.m. during the benefit dance at the public auditorium. Bacalocos was then
drunk and hand injured his hand after smashing his bottle of alcohol on the table.
Bacalocos then approached Fr. Patricio and suddenly hit the latter’s face with his bloodied
hand.

A criminal complaint for slander by deed was filed, but was subsequently dismissed. Fr.
Patricio then filed a complaint for damages which was decided in his favor on April 18,
1978 resulting in the award of moral damages of P 10,000, exemplary damages of P
1,000 and attorney’s fees of 2,000. Fr. Patricio filed for a motion of execution of
judgement on June 9, 1978, but was informed that such could not be done as a pending
motion for reconsideration was apparently filed. Fr. Patricio then replied that the filing
of said motion was without notice to him nor was there proof of service, thus the case had
become final and unappealable. Bacalocos replied stating that a copy of the motion had been
served by ordinary mail to the petitioner.

On August 3, 1979 the trial court ordered the dismissal of Fr. Patricio’s complaint
stating that the motion for reconsideration must be given due course and that the award
of moral and exemplary damages was not proper as compensatory or actual damages
have not been proven. Fr. Patricio then filed this petition for review on certiorari,
contenting that he had not been served notice of the motion for reconsideration, nor was
there proof of such service, that the sending of the copy of said motion by regular mail
did not cure said defect and finally that actual damages need not be proven before moral
damages are given. Bacalocos replied that the order of the court a quo worked to
inform Fr. Patricio of the motion and gave the latter opportunity to be heard; curing the
defect. Bacalocos also reasoned that moral damages cannot be given as his act of
slapping the priest was an accident cause by drunkenness and is absent of any bad faith.

Issue:Whether Bacalocos is liable for damages?

Held: Yes, he is liable for damages. With respect to the deficiency in the notice for the
motion of reconsideration, the court deems the defect cured. Despite the fact that the
notice was mailed via regular service and not registered mail, such technicality may be
set aside because ultimately Fr. Patricio was able to appear before the court and have
his side heard. Such is the spirit and purpose of the rule on notice and hearing.

As regards to the complaint for damages, the lower court’s theory that moral damages
may only be awarded when actual damages are proven is untenable. Moral damages
may be awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the
Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that physical injury was caused
upon the complainant. There is no question that moral damages may be recovered in
cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury; as is, in the case at bar.

Bacaloco’s assertion that bad faith was not present when he hit the priest is also
wanting, due to the fact that it was proven that a long time feud existed between their
families. Further, Bacalocos cannot hide behind the fact that he was drunk as he should be
held responsible for all his actions.

Thus, Fr. Patricio may be awarded moral and exemplary damages, together with
attorney’s fees for Bacaloco’s acts which are violation of article 21 in relation to article
2219 of the New Civil Code.

167.
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino
Gr No. L-48250
(December 28, 1979)

Facts: Jose J. Espino a civil engineer and an executive at Proctor and Gamble was
shopping at South Supermarket in Makati on the morning of August 22, 1970. He had
picked up a “rat tail” file from one of the shelves, placed it in his shirt pocket, with a
good part of it exposed, and forgot to pay for it when he got to the cashier. As he
and his wife and daughters were leaving the supermarket with their shopping bags, a
security guard of the store approached Espino and informed him that he had an item in
his pocket which he did not pay for. Espino immediately apologised and started to walk
towards the cashier to pay for the item. He was then stopped by the guard and asked
to go to the back of the supermarket to write an incident report as this was supposedly
the procedure of the establishment.

Espino stated on the report that he put the item in his pocket as he was talking with
his helper while in the store and that he merely forgot to present it to the cashier.
Espino was then lead into the Supermarket and the report was given to Nelia Santos-
Fandino who was seated at a desk beside the first checkout counter. Nelia after reading
the report remarked that this was another case of theft, to which Espino explained that
he merely forgot the “”rat tail” in his pocket and that he had the intention to pay for it.
Neilia then replied to the effect that that was the same thing all shoplifters say when
they are caught. This was done while people were lining up and paying for the items
they shopped. Espino was then made to pay a fine of 5 pesos, which Nelia reasoned
was a prize for the guard who apprehended him.

Espino then paid the fine and was made to line up at the cashier to pay for the item.
As he waited in line he was stared at and people were talking about him. Extremely
humiliated by the incident he immediately left the premises after paying. Espino filed a
complaint on October 8, 1970 founded on article 21 in relation to article 2219 of the
New Civil Code and prayed for damages. The CFI of Pasig, Rizal dismissed the
complaint; but the Court of Appeals reversed such. Espino was granted moral damages
at P 75,000, exemplary damages of P 25,000 Pesos, attorney’s fees at P 5,000 and the
return of the P 5 fine. Grand Union Supermarket now appeals said decision citing that
Espino was guilty of theft and that their action of apprehending and fining him was
merely an exercise of their right to protect their property as enunciated in article 429 of
the New Civil Code. They also stated that there was probable cause for his
apprehension, that it was not done with malice or bad faith and the proximate cause for
such was Espino’s own actions. They also argued that even if damages were in order, the
amounts awarded were unconscionable.

Issue: Whether the act of apprehending Espino in such a manner would render the supermarket
liable?

Held:Yes, such actions do render the supermarket liable. The court believes Espino
committed an honest mistake when he forgot to pay for his item. This was proven by
the fact that he put it in his pocket while he was preoccupied and that he apologised
and immediately moved to pay for such at the instance the guard alerted him. The fact
that he was an engineer, an executive of Proctor and Gamble, an esteemed member of
society and a regular customer of the supermarket also belies motive to steal an item of
an insignificant amount, which he was more than capable of paying for. Further, he was
also in the company of his family, a deterrent from criminal activity.

It is also evident from the facts of the case that Espino was falsely accused of being a
shoplifter in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy and thus may
be awarded damages. His being identified as a shoplifter in the incident report, being called
such by Nelia and being made to pay a fine with a threat to call the police and report the
incident if he would not do so, truly caused him humiliation and embarrassment.

However, the amount of damages should be modified. Espino’s forgetfulness was the
proximate cause of the incident, and such contributory negligence would work to reduce
the damages awarded, as enunciated in article 2214 of the New Civil Code. The court
also considers the fact that the presence of shoppers in the premises was merely
coincidental as it is a public place and their presence was not actively called for by the
management in order to humiliate Espino. The court also believes that the
management’s policy to have Espino brought to the back of the supermarket to make a
report and to present him to one of the officers was not intentionally done to humiliate
him because the supermarket’s business success would be compromised if it was seen
that their public relations with customers were intentionally such. Moral damages are
reduced to P 5,000, exemplary damages are deleted, attorney’s fees are reduced to P 2,000
and the P 5 fine must be returned.

168.
Singapore Airlines vs. Pano
Gr No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts: Carlos E. Cruz accepted employment as Engineer Officer with Singapore Airlines
on August 30, 1974. His contract included a bond binding him for five years. He
signed the contract with B.E. Villanueva as surety.

Later on Singapore airlines claimed that Cruz had breached the contract by going on
unauthorized leave without pay without the requisite approval of his superiors. The
airline sought payment of liquidated damages of $53,968.00 or (P161,904.00); $883.91 or
(P2,651.73) as overpayment in salary; $61.00 or (P183.00) for cost of uniforms and
accessories supplied by the company plus $230.00, or (P690.00), for the cost of a flight
manual; and $1,533.71, or (P4,601.13) corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed
of but to which he was no longer entitled; exemplary damages attorney's fees; and costs.

Cruz argued that there could not be any breach of contract as he was not actually
required to serve for five years straight. He further posited that he had left the
company on valid grounds which was accepted by the company, and thus no damages
may be awarded. Villanueva on the other hand filled a cross-claim against Cruz for any
damages the former may be held liable against the airline. Villanueva argued that he was
not a surety but a mere guarantor.

On October 28, 1977, Judge Pano dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim
for lack of jurisdiction; stating that the issue stems from an employer-employee
relationship and thus jurisdiction is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiter as
enunciated in article 216 of the Labor Code. Singapore airlines filed for reconsideration,
which was subsequently denied, thus their recourse to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the case is cognizable by the Civil Courts or the Labor Arbiter?

Held:The Civil Courts hold jurisdiction over the case at bar. The case is actually
grounded on the breach of contract by Cruz and not on his employer-employee
relationship with the airline. This was clearly manifested by Cruz’s refusal and failure to
report for duty without just cause and with malice and bad faith when he took his
unauthorized leave which was in contravention with the stipulations of his contract. It is
evident that the complaint was anchored on the effects of Cruz’s abandonment of work,
which entitled the airline to damages.

Singapore Airlines does not seek the application of Labor laws but of the Civil Code
regarding liquidated damages for the breach of a contract. Secondarily, the assertion of
Villanueva that he is a mere guarantor is definitely a civil issue outside of the Labor
Arbiter’s jurisdiction.

Thus, the case must be remanded to the proper Regional Trial Court.

169.
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
G.R. No. L-59825
(September 11, 1982)

Facts:On December 20, 1977 at about 1 in the afternoon Cosme de Aboitiz, the
president and chief executive officer, went to the Pepsi-Cola plant in Muntinlupa and
shouted at Ernesto Medina, the former plant manager and Jose G. Ong, the former plant
comptroller. De Aboitiz did so in front of all the employees, exclaiming:

“GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE
BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED (Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(Ong)”

Medina and Ong filed a joint complaint for oral defamation on January 9, 1978 but the
judge dismissed the complaint during the preliminary investigation on the ground that
such expletives were said not as an insult or to cause humiliation, but merely as an
expression of anger and displeasure on the part of de Aboitiz. Medina and Ong
subsequently filed a petition for review which reversed the earlier resolution. Apparently de
Aboitiz was angry because the Muntinlupa plant had been delayed in the use of
promotional crowns. Medina reasoned in his complaint that his plant was not that only
one which was delayed and thus there was no cause for his humiliating dismissal.
Further he opined that such removal was calculated in order to bring about the most
humiliation as it was done in front of all of his subordinates hours before the Christmas
party; the dismissal was executed by de Aboitiz himself and not another lower ranking
officer, that it was made just after they were awarded loyalty rings for their long service
with the company and that it was done just five days before Christmas.

The court awarded Medina and Ong P 300,000 in moral damages, P 100,000 in
exemplary damages, P 5,000 in litigation expenses and P 10,000 and P 200 per
appearance as attorney’s fees. De Aboitiz moved to dismiss said complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, but was subsequently denied because the case was declare
to be a civil case for damages and not one regarding their employer-employee relationship,
which would in the latter case be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.
On January 23, 1981 de Aboitiz again filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground
that P.D. No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Batasan
Pambansa Bldg. 70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of the Labor
Code vested exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiter and included Art. 248, thereof ...
"which may include claims for damages and other affirmative reliefs." Thus, the case
was regarded by the court a quo as now being within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. Said court also ruled that because said presidential decree was a curative statute,
it could be applied retroactively and thus the case was dismissed.

Issue:Whether the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 did indeed remove the case from the
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts?

Held: No, said law did not do so. The Labor Code has no relevance in the case as it
does not provide the reliefs sought for by Medina and Ong. Said reliefs could only be
granted by the Civil Code as it is an action for torts and damages. Medina and Ong
did not allege any unfair labor practice in their complaint. Thus this case is governed
by the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. The petition is granted and the case reinstated
to be decided on the merits.

170.
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
Gr No. L-14986
(July 31, 1962)

Facts:On October 5, 1958 Jose amaro was assaulted and shot near the city government
building of Silay, Negros Occidental by a police officer. He, together with his father
and witnesses went to the office of Ambrosio Sumanguit, the chief of police of the city
to complain. However instead of gaining assistance they were harassed terrorized and
were forced to give up prosecuting the crime. Amaro still persisted and obtained the aid
of the city attorney who was about to file an information for the illegal discharge of
firearm against one of the police officers. Because of this, the harassment by the chief
of police continued, trying to force the Amaros to give up and sign prepared affidavits
exculpating the police from dereliction of duty with regard to the above said crime.

The complaint was dismissed upon Sumanguit’s motion, on the ground that it does not it
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint was dismissed
upon Sumanguit’s motion, on the ground that it does not it does not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.

Issue:Whether such dismissal is valid on such ground?

Held:No, such dismissal was invalid. Although the complaint did not specifically allege
so, it was an action predicated on articles 21 and 27 of the Civil Code. The facts
presented although vague do constitute an actionable dereliction of duty as enunciated in
article 27 as the chief of police refused to give them assistance without just cause, when
it was said officer’s duty to perform such.

Although the complaint was imperfectly drafted, ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain, such
are not grounds for dismissal of the case under Rule 8. The proper procedure would be
to ask for a bill of particulars under Rule 16 to fix said curable defects.

The Amaros have recourse to file their complaint for illegal discharge of firearm directly
with the city attorney and/or file an administrative complaint against the chief of police.
Both of which do not preclude an action for damages under article 27 of the Civil
Code. Thus, the dismissal is set aside and the case remanded to the appropriate court
for further proceedings.

171.

St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. C.A.

GR No L-46061
(November 14, 1984)

Facts: St. Louis Reality Corp. caused to be published on the December 15, 1968 Sunday
Times an advertisement featuring the house of Dr. Conrado J. Aramil. Said
advertisement was entitled “Where the Heart is”, showed a picture of Dr. Aramil’s house
but with the family of Arcadio S. Acradio depicted as the owners. It also had written
text stating that the Arcadios had purchased such house in Brookside Hills village at an
affordable rate. Such was done without the permission of Dr. Aramil.

Upon seeing a reprint of the advertisement on the same paper on January 5, 1969, Dr.
Aramil immediately wrote said reality corporation stating that the latter did not obtain
permission to post his house in the advertisement and depict it as being owned by
another family. Dr. Aramil explained that it has caused him humiliation as his
colleagues and friends who recognize his house or have been to such have uttered
remarks questioning the ownership of his house, his integrity, if he rented the house
from the Arcadios and even that his wife was that of another husband. He then warned
the corporation that he would pursue legal action if such acts were not explained
satisfactorily to him within one week of receipt of the letter.

Said letter was received and answered by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of said corporation
who was in charge of advertising. He immediately stopped its publication and contacted
Dr. Aramil to apologise. However no rectification or apology was ever published. Dr.
Aramil’s counsel demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages of P 110,000 from the
corporation on February 20, 1969. The corporation answered by claiming that it was an
honest mistake and that a rectification will be made.

The corporation published a new advertisement on March 18, 1969 which again
portrayed the Arcadio family, but this time with their real house. However no apology
or rectification was included. This led to the filing of a complaint for damages against
the said corporation on March 29, 1969. The lower court and appellate court ruled in
favor of Dr. Aramil; awarding him P 8,000 as actual damages, P 20,000 as moral damages
and P 2,000 for attorney’s fees.

Issue: Whether the case is covered by article 26 of the Civil Code?

Held:Yes, the case falls under said article which warrants the award of damages to Dr.
Aramil. Said article provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy
of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief". Such
article was violated when the corporation released an advertisement depicting Dr. Armil’s
home to be that of another, without Dr. Aramil’s permission. Further, bad faith and
negligence was evident as the corporation refused to publish a rectification or apology despite
demands.

The damages awarded are proper being enunciated by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the
Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 26.

171.
Concepcion v. CA
Gr No 120706
(January 31, 2000)

Facts:Nestor Nicolas and family were leases of an apartment owned by Florence Conception
located at San Joaquin, Pasig City. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying office
equipment, appliances and other fixtures to government agencies. He had convinced Florence
to join in by inputting capital in exchange for an equal division of profits earned.
The problem started when Florence’s deceased husband’s brother, Rodrigo Conception,
suddenly confronted Nestor at his apartment on the second week of July 1985. He
accused Nestor of being an adulterer, receiving P 100,000 from Florence to go to
Baguio with his family, but secretly returning to Manila to have a tryst with Florence.
Nestor even accompanied Rodrigo to ask the relatives whom the rumor allegedly came
from, they however denied any knowledge. Rodrigo again accused Nestor of being an
adulterer when they met Florence at the terrace of her residence when the two confronted
her about the rumor. Both Nestor and Florence denied such. Rodrigo continued to
harass Florence via phone, even saying that he would kill her if anything should happen to
his mother.

As a result Nestor felt ashamed and embarrassed to face his neighbors as they had heard
or had been present during Rodrigo’s confrontation. His business was also in decline as
Florence discontinued her capital input. Moreover, his wife, Allem started to distrust
him and constant fighting ensued due to the rumor spread by Rodrigo. Nestor then
demanded that Rodrigo make a public apology and pay damages. Rodrigo refused to do
so and reasoned that he was only protecting his family’s reputation. The RTC and
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor, awarding him P 50,000 for moral damages,
P25,000 for exemplary damages, P 10,000 for attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

Issue:Whether the awarding is with basis or not?

Held: Yes, such decision is with legal and factual basis. First, Rodrigo’s claim that the
awarding was without legal basis is bereft of merit. His actions of confronting Nestor
in the latter’s apartment and hurling accusations that Nestor was an adulterer within view
and hearing range of the public is indeed a violation of articles 26 and 2219 of the
Civil Code as such an act is indeed a form of defamation and intrudes into the privacy
of Nestor’s home and family life. Further, under article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral
damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Such was manifest when
Nestor was so humiliated that he could not face his neighbours, his constant quarrels with
his wife and the decline of his business.

Rodrigo’s second contention that the facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly
overlooked misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if considered,
would change the verdict. The court sees no such error. The totality of the evidence
and facts presented truly show that Rodrigo had defamed Nestor. The minor
inconsistencies of the testimonies and affidavits of witnesses do not debunk Nestor’s case;
in fact they are a badge of its authenticity as experience would dictate that minor
inconsistencies are to be expected.

Rodrigo’s final contention is that the appellate court did not take into account the fact
that the lower court’s judge who penned the decision was not the original judge who
heard his case; and is thus not in a position to properly weigh the facts and
circumstances of the case leading to a flawed decision. The court finds this untenable.
First off the Supreme Court as a rule respects the finds of the lower court and shall not
disturb such unless it finds good reason to do so. No such reason in this case exists or
has been proven. The mere fact that the lower court judge who penned the decision
was not the one who heard the case does not destroy the presumption of regularity of
the judge’s performance. The judge is presumed and held to have made his decision after
reviewing the facts and circumstances which are kept in the records of the case. Thus the
totality of the facts and circumstances lead the court to believe that indeed Rodrigo had
defamed Nestor and is thus liable for damages. The damages previously

Thus the totality of the facts and circumstances lead the court to believe that indeed
Rodrigo had defamed Nestor and is thus liable for damages. The damages previously
awarded are affirmed.

173.
People vs. Ballesteros
285 SCRA 438
(January 29, 1998)

Facts: Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo and Ronnel Tolentino along with Vidal
Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid
went to the barangay hall to attend a dance. The group did not stay long because they
sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them
dagger looks. The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall,
their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left
two people dead (Eduardo and Jerry) and four others injured.

Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of
Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued for the crime of double murder with multiple
frustrated murder. The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, qualified by treachery awarding the heirs of Eduardo and Jerry:

1. Compensatory damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00

2. Moral damages in the amount of PhP20,0000
3. Actual damages in the amount of 61,785.00 (Jerry) & P35,755.00 (Eduardo)

Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in the award of damages?

Held: As to moral and to actual damages, yes. As to compensatory damages, no.

Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for
an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences, which the law
imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.

Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense

for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral
shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of
the offender's wrongful act or omission.

Before actual or compensatory damages could be granted, the party making a claim for such
must present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as
corroborated by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the
victims is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts
accumulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is
proper.

However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and
Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way
of indemnity , and not as compensatory damages. As regards moral damages, the trial
court in its discretion may determine the amount of psychological pain, damage and
injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable. Hence, we see no reason
to disturb its findings as to this matter.

174.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 483
(February 9, 1996)

Facts: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an apartment in Interior P. Burgos St.,
Taguig, Metro Manila. There were tenants occupying the apartment at the time of
purchase. Taking P. Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left side going to
Mabasa’s apartment, the row of houses are as follows: That of Custodio, then of Santos,
then that of Mabasa. On the right side is that of Morato and a septic tank. The first
passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St. is through these houses. The second
passageway goes through the septic tank, with a width of less than 1 meter.

Sometime later, one of the apartment’s tenants vacated it. Mabasa checked the premises
and saw that the Santoses built an adobe fence, making the first passageway narrower.
Morato also built an adobe fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. Then the remaining tenants vacated the area. Santos claimed that she built the
fence because of an incident involving her daughter and a passing bicycle. She also
mentioned that some drunk tenants would bang their doors and windows. The RTC
granted a right of way and damages in favor of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA
modified it, ordering an award of damages to Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way
and award of damages in the SC.

Issue: Whether or Not the award of damages is proper.

Held: Firstly, the Custodios are barred from questioning the grant of the right of way,
because they failed to appeal the decision. The decision has become final. As to the
award of damages, the CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents
Mabasa. The mere fact that Mabasa suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by Custodio, and damage resulting to Mabasa. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong. In the case at bar, there were no previous easements existing in favor of
Mabasa . The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and enjoyment of one’s
property in a general and ordinary manner. Nobody can complain of being injured, because
the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community
life.

175.
HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: vs. COURT OF APPEALS The records show that plaintiffs-appellants (petitioners)
are the heirs of Simeon Borlado whose parents were Serapio Borlado and Balbina Bulan.
The original owner of the lot in question, Lot No. 2097 of the Pontevedra Cadastre,
Maayon, Capiz, was Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners.

On 15 April 1942, Serapio sold the lot to Francisco Bacero for Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00). After the death of Francisco on 26 February 1948, his widow Amparo
Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, in her capacity as legal guardian of her minor children,
namely: Nicolas, Valentin and Luzviminda, all surnamed Bacero and forced heirs of
Francisco Bacero sold it (the lot) to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion
Borbon, through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 August 1954

Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale and even prior thereto, actual possession of Lot
No. 2057 was with the vendees-spouses Bulans in view of a loan obtained by Francisco
Bacero from them in December 1947. Exercising their right of ownership under the Deed
of Sale, Salvacion Borbon Vda. de Bulan declared the lot in her name in 1900 for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2232 Salvacion and her co-
defendantsappellees' possession of the lot was continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse
and exclusive until November 4, 1972, when petitioners forcibly entered and wrested
physical possession thereof from them.

On 23 November 1972, respondents filed with the Municipal Court of Maayon, Capiz a
complaint for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No. A-1, against petitioners.

The ejectment case was decided in favor of the respondents whereby the petitioners, their
agents, tenants, privies and members of their families were ordered to vacate Lot No.
2079 and deliver possession to the respondents together with all improvements and
standing crops; to pay said respondents One Hundred (100) cavans of palay annually
from 1972 to the present or in the total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100)
cavans of palay; and to pay the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as
reimbursement for the amount respondents had paid their lawyer to protect their rights;
and, the costs of suit (Exh. "57", pp. 256-261, id.). Instead of appealing the adverse
decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November 1983, petitioners filed
the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City, docketed as Civil
Case No. V-4887.

ISSUE: The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents
were the owners of the lot in question.

HELD: DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: This case was dismissed for lack of cause
of action in a decision, the decretal portion of which was quoted earlier. DECISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS: the Court of Appeals affi trial court, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of cause of

action and ordering as vacated the restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in this case; and "1. Plaintiffs to be jointly and solidarily liable to defendants the
quantity of one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until plaintiffs
vacate the premises of the land in question;
"2. Declaring defendants as owner of the land and entitled to possession;
"3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay sum of P5,000.00 as l defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as
itigation expenses; and
"4. To pay the costs of the suit.
"SO ORDERED.
"Roxas City, Philippines, March 18, 1988.
"(Sgd.) attorney's fees and the JONAS "Judge"

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT: A. ABELLAR We deny the petition. The issue
is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, we may not review the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by
this Court, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.

Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. The Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event.
Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court
and are not proper for its consideration.

Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
holding petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every
year from 1972 until they vacate the premises of the land in

The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as question. a form of damages. We the award.

"Palay" is not legal tender currency in El Fallo del Tribunal the Philippines. cannot sustain
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 18980 with modification that petitioners' liability to pay
respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until petitioners
vacate the land in question is deleted, for lack of basis. No costs. SO ORDERED.

176.
Lazatin vs. Twano
GR No. L-12736
(July 31, 1961)

Facts: Properties of appellant Lazatin were levied and sold in public auction to satisfy a
judgment in favour of herein appellees Twaño and Castro. Lazatin deposited the redemption
price with the Sheriff before the expiration of the redemption period. To ensure payment of
claim in the present action, Lazatin secured a writ of attachment on the amount deposited.
Issue: Whether the estate of Lazatin is liable to pay damages for the alleged malicious
attachment

Held: The defendants, Twaño and Castro, are not entitled to moral damages. The law on
damages is found on Title XVII of the Civil Code but rules governing damages laid
down in other laws, and the principles of the general law on damages are adopted in so far
as they are not in consistent with the Code. Moral damages may be recovered, among
others, in cases of malicious prosecution. But in order that moral damages may be
recovered in connection with a writ of attachment, malice must exist. The Rules of Court
requiring the attachment plaintiff to provide a bond from which the costs and all
damages are to be enforced should the court find that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
attachment merely provides recovery on the bond based on the undertaking and not from
any tortious act. Consequently, the appellees may recover only the actual damages and not
moral damages.

177.
Board of Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw
20 SCRA 987 (1967)

Facts: Maximo Kalaw was a general manager and chairman of the board of NACOCO
(National Coconut Corp.) Defendant Juan Bocar and Garcia were members of Board.
After the passage of a law that empowers NACOCO to buy, sell, barter, export their
products, NACOCO embarked on Copra trading Activities. Kalaw executed contracts.
However, due to the typhoons, the copra industry was affected, resulting to impending
financial losses on the contracts executed by Kalaw. A meeting was held with the board
of directors and the disclosure of the impending loss was communicated to the members
but no action was taken thereafter.

Some of the buyer like Louis Dreyful and Co. filed a suit against the Corporation for
damages due to undelivered copra. Settlement was made with the buyer. NACOCO on
the other hand seeks recovery from Kalaw and the other directors charging them with
negligence under Art 2176 with bad faith or breach of trust for having approved the contracts.

Issue: Whether or not Kalaw is liable for damages.

Held: Kalaw had authority to execute the contracts without need of prior approval due to
the nature of his position as general manager. Also, doubts were only thrown when the
contracts turned out to be unprofitable for NACOCO.

Rightfully had it been said that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of wrong; it means breach of a known duty thru some motive or interest or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud. Applying this precept to the given facts herein, we find that
there was no "dishonest purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of
wrong," or "breach of a known duty," or "Some motive or interest or ill will" that "partakes
of the nature of fraud."

Nor was it even intimated that the NACOCO directors acted for personal reasons, or to serve
their own private interests, or to pocket money at the expense of the corporation. As the trial
court correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of
damage and wrong is absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the
other is wanting.

178.

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

253 SCRA 483
(February 9, 1996)

Facts: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an apartment in Interior P. Burgos St.,
Taguig, Metro Manila. There were tenants occupying the apartment at the time of
purchase. Taking P. Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left side going to
Mabasa’s apartment, the row of houses are as follows: That of Custodio, then of Santos,
then that of Mabasa. On the right side is that of Morato and a septic tank. The first
passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St. is through these houses. The second
passageway goes through the septic tank, with a width of less than 1 meter.

Sometime later, one of the apartment’s tenants vacated it. Mabasa checked the premises
and saw that the Santoses built an adobe fence, making the first passageway narrower.
Morato also built an adobe fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. Then the remaining tenants vacated the area. Santos claimed that she built the
fence because of an incident involving her daughter and a passing bicycle. She also
mentioned that some drunk tenants would bang their doors and windows. The RTC
granted a right of way and damages in favor of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA
modified it, ordering an award of damages to Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way
and award of damages in the SC.

Issue: Whether or Not the award of damages is proper.

Held: Firstly, the Custodios are barred from questioning the grant of the right of way,
because they failed to appeal the decision. The decision has become final. As to the
award of damages, the CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents
Mabasa. The mere fact that Mabasa suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by Custodio, and damage resulting to Mabasa. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong. In the case at bar, there were no previous easements existing in favor of
Mabasa . The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and enjoyment of one’s
property in a general and ordinary manner. Nobody can complain of being injured, because
the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community
life.

179.

Algarra vs. Sandejas

GR No L-8385
(March 24, 1914)

Facts: Plaintiff filed a civil action against defendant for injuries resulting from an
automobile collision due to the latter’s fault. At the time of the accident, plaintiff sold
the products of a distillery and made an average of P50 per month. As a result of the
collision, plaintiff incurred medical expenses, and suffered business losses with only four
out of his twenty regular customers remaining.

The lower court refused to grant plaintiff’s claim for injuries to his business due to his
enforced absence therefrom. Issue: Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for injuries to his
business Held: An action for damages is based on Article 1902, which provides:

“A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another where there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.”

Actual damages include not only loss already suffered, but loss of profits which may not
have been realized. Under both American Law and the Spanish Civil Code, actual
damages for a negligent act or omission include those foreseen at the time of the injury
or its necessary consequence. Evidently, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages resulting
from his actual incapacity. With respect to the damage to his business the court ruled
that “the profits of an established business may be considered in calculating the measure
of damages for an interruption of it”.

180.

PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. CA| Romero

G.R. No. 107518,
October 8, 1998 | 297 SCRA 402

FACTS
• The M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation collided
with the vessel Petroparcel which at that time was owned by Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC).
• The Board of Marine Inquiry declared Petroparcel to be at fault. After unsuccessful
demands on LSC, Marie Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain before the
CFI. It prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the
fishing nets, boat equipment, and cargoes.
• During the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC sought to be substituted in the place
of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of Petroparcel. Meanwhile, Maria Efigenia
sought to amend its complaint by also claiming for the amount of P600,000.00 as the
value of the vessel, and alleging that it had also incurred unrealized profits and lost
business opportunities.
• The lower court ordered PNOC to pay Maria Efigenia, based on some documentary
evidence presented by the latter (in the form of price quotations). The CA affirmed in
toto. Hence the instant recourse.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS • W/N the award of actual damages was proper.

RULING:
AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IMPROPER FOR LACK OF EVIDENTIARY BASIS
THEREFOR. HOWEVER, THE AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES IS IN ORDER.

• Under Article 2199 of the NCC, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense
of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate
for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty.
• In actions based on torts and quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds: one is
the loss of what a person already possesses (dano emergente), and the other is the failure
to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
• In the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the
chattel as to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this
means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending
engagements.
• If the value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost,
since it would compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is
valued without reference to its actual future engagements, then it may be necessary to
add to the value the anticipated profit. • To enable an injured party to recover actual or
compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Damages cannot be presumed
by the courts, in making an award it must point out specific facts that could afford a
basis for measuring such damages.
• In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of Maria
Efigenia’s general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. The price
quotations are ordinary private writings, and should have been proffered along with the
testimony of the authors thereof. In the absence of which, they partake of hearsay
evidence. Damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
• Nonetheless, if there is lack of sufficient proof as to the actual damages suffered, the
complainant is entitled to nominal damages.

181.
Integrated Packaging Corp. vs. CA
GR No. 115117
(June 8, 2000)

Facts:
Petitioner, Integrated Packaging, and private respondent, Fil-Anchor Paper Co., Inc.,
entered into a contract whereby private respondent would deliver 3450 reams of printing
paper on specified schedules to be paid within a maximum period of ninety days.
Private respondent delivered 1097 out of 3450 reams to petitioner, but the latter failed to
pay the amount due causing private respondent to file a collection suit against petitioner.

In its counterclaim petitioner contends that by reason of respondents failure to deliver the
3450 reams as agreed upon, it was unable to complete its printing obligation with
Philacor resulting to actual damages and unrealized expected profits.

Issue: Whether private respondent is liable for petitioner’s breach of contract with Philacor.

Held: Private respondent was justified in suspending its deliveries when petitioner failed
to pay within ninety days from receipt of the goods as agreed upon. Neither may private
respondent be held liable for the breach of contract committed by petitioner against Philacor
when respondent was not a party thereto.

Indemnification for damages includes loss suffered or actual damages (damnum emergens)
and profits which the obligee failed to obtain or compensatory damages (lucrum cessans);
however, it is necessary to prove actual amount of loss. The court ruled that it was
erroneous to conclude that petitioner would have earned a profit of P 790, 324.30 since
these were based on speculation and were hypothetical. Neither is petitioner entitled to moral
damages in the absence of bad faith, or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

182.
DBP v. CA
G.R. No. 118342
January 5, 1998

FACTS
• Lydia P. Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease the Government; She obtained several
loans from the Development Bank of the under the terms stated in the Promissory Notes;
As security for said loans, Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold
Rights;
• Cuba failed to pay her loan on the scheduled dates thereof in accordance with the
terms of the Promissory Notes; Without foreclosure proceedings, whether judicial or extra-
judicial, DBP appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question;
• After DBP has appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in
question, DBP, in turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in
favor of Cuba over the same fishpond in question;
• In the negotiation for repurchase, Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager DBP,
Dagupan City. DBP thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a letter addressed to
Cuba;
After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor of Cuba , a new Fishpond
Lease Agreement was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in favor of Cuba
only, excluding her husband; • Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the
Deed of Conditional Sale; After Cuba failed to pay the amortization as stated in Deed
of Conditional Sale, she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in
consideration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale,
Cuba promised to make certain payments;
• DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru Notarial Act, and which was received
by Cuba ; After the Notice of Rescission, DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights
of the fishpond in question;

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

• W/N Cuba is entitled to recover damages

RULING:

YES Article 2199 provides: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
• That after DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question,
DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant Agripina
Caperal through a public sale; Thereafter, Caperal was awarded Fishpond Lease
Agreement.
• Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof
that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of
the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. In the present case, the
trial court awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages consisting of
P550,000 which represented the value of the alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500
which represented the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in 1979
when DBP first ejected CUBA from the fishpond and the adjoining house. This award
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find that the alleged loss of personal
belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence. Other than the testimony of
CUBA and her caretaker, there was no proof as to the existence of those items before
DBP took over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was not
"inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is normal in a project which
sometimes, if not most often, is left to the care of other persons." Neither was a single
receipt or record of acquisition presented.
Curiously, in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included "losses of property" as
among the damages resulting from DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in
September 1985 when her son and a caretaker went to the fishpond and the adjoining
house that she came to know of the alleged loss of several articles. Such claim for
"losses of property," having been made before knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was
therefore speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere afterthought or subterfuge
to justify her claim for actual damages. With regard to the award of P517,000
representing the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which died when DBP
took possession of the fishpond in March 1979, the same was not called for. Such loss
was not duly proved; besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From 1979
until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985, CUBA did not bring to the
attention of DBP the alleged loss. The award of actual damages should, therefore, be
struck down for lack of sufficient basis.

In view, however, of DBP's act of appropriating CUBA's leasehold rights which was
contrary to law and public policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry
of Agriculture and Natural Resources that it had "foreclosed the mortgage," an award of
moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is in order conformably with Article 2219(10),
in relation to Article 21, of the Civil Code. Exemplary or corrective damages in the
amount of P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or correction for the
public good. 20 There being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also
recoverable. JON LINA Page 374 of 528

183 .
FUENTES VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
At four o clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo
Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento,
Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter
saying, “Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair.”[2] Suddenly
petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground
and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the
gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.

Rulings of the Trial Court and Court of Appeals

- The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of
prision mayor
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal
as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00
and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.
-Court of Appeals affirmed

SSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

1. Whether or not the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and
categorically identified asthe killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgnment of conviction 2.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of
the victim.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “(t)he declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted
in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be
true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons.” The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness.There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must
concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable
that a motive to falsify existed.In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against
penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule. We are not unaware of
People
Toledo,[12] a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to reexamine
the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists
Holgado and Morales engaged in a bob duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who
was seriously wounded gave a sworn.

statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought
there was nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the
Court was agreed that Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow,
should be exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the
admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample
testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second group considered Exh. 1 as part of the
res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which
Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the
statement of a fact against penal interest. For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness
behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the
Toledo
case cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual
scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted
to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim
because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the
acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-
appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his
uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of
such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, “shocking to the sense of justice. Let
us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted
accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being
confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely
nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement.But more importantly, the far weightier
reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the
declarant is not “unable to testify.” There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere
absence from the jurisdiction does not make him
ipso facto
unavailable under this rule.[14] For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every
piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other
than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted
having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open
to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the
probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it
is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least,
exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in
Toledo
-The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the
extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In
other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their
untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. The Court of Appeals as well as the
trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The suddenness of
the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of
Malaspina treacherous. However, the courta quo
erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Since aside from treachery qualifying the crime to
murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the medium period of the penalty, i.e.
reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner. Petitioner maintains that assuming
that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages
on the basis of the mere testimony of the victim’s sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible
document to support such claim. This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant
is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves
the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and
on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. The award by the court a quo of
P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the
testimony of the victim’s elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in
connection with the death of Malaspina.However, no proof of the actual damages was ever
presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give
credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in
connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same
cannot be granted. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO
FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina
in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty
imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is
deleted. SO ORDERED.

184.

PNOC vs.CA, supra – DUPLICATE

185.

Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al

19 SCRA 289 (1967)

Facts: The car owned by Placido Ramos, while being driven by his son Augusto,
collided with a truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven by i Andres Bonifacio.
Ramos filed a case at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. CFI found Bonifacio negligent
and declared that Pepsi Cola failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. Pepsi and Bonifacio are held solidarily liable to pay
P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000 moral damages, P2000 exemplary damages and P1,000
Atty. fees.

CA affirmed the decision of CFI regarding Bonifacio but absolved Pepsi Cola from
liability stating that Pepsi has sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its
employees.

Issue: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver.

Held: Yes. When it was proven that the employer had carefully examined the erring
driver as to his qualifications, experience and record of service, such evidence is
sufficient to show that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection of the driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the employer
was negligent. Juan Anasco, personnel manager of Pepsi stated that before Bonifacio was
hired, his background, experience, physical capacity was checked. Also, he was asked to
submit clearance and also asked to take theoretical and practical driving examination. Pepsi
was also a member of the Safety Council.

Petitioner can no longer assail the credibility of Anasco. Findings of CA are binding on
SC. A motion for reconsideration was made stating that respondents violated the Motor
vehicle law. It was said that the truck was overweight and running beyond the speed
limit and that it was not equipped with a rear vision mirror and with a helper. Such
allegations failed to show their basis. Patrolman Pahate did not affirm such allegations.
Also, a special permit may be granted for overweight trucks and the absence of such
permit was not proven. In Quasi delicts, the motor vehicle owner is not an absolute
owner against all damages caused by its driver. The owner’s responsibility ceases once it
proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damages.

Gatchalian v. Delim

Facts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus
owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping
sound” was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned
turtle and fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills
were paid by respondent’s spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents.
Petitioner was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner
filed a claim to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities,
mental suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead.
Respondents raised in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The
trial court upheld the validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate
court ruled that the waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to
damages.

Issues:

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver

(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of
her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective,
must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not
explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of
the vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she
too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained
by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary
diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common
carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger,
under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the
standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to
render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public
policy.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had]
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised
extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence
imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the
driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton
disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the
part of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost
any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages
on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead,
is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.
Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have
suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

Crismina Garments v. CA (1999)

FACTS:

During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, Crismina Garments, Inc. contracted the
services of D’Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of assorted girls denims for
P76,410. At first, the respondent was told that the sewing of some of the pants were defective.
She offered to take them back, but then she was later told by the petitioner’s representative that it
was good already and asked her to return for her check of P76,410. However, the petitioner
failed to pay her the aforesaid amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel who, on
November 12, 1979, wrote a letter to the petitioner demanding payment of the aforesaid amount
within ten days from receipt thereof.

On February 7, 1990, the petitioner’s vice-president-comptroller, wrote a letter to respondent’s

counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans sewn by her, numbering 6,164 pairs, were
defective and that she was liable to the petitioner for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the
value of the damaged pairs of denim pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount.

On January 8, 1981, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner with the trial court.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay the sum of
P76,140 with 12% interest per annum. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper to impose 12% interest rate per annum for an obligation that does not
involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties.

RULING:

No. The amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or
forbearance of money. Hence, the legal rate of interest shall be 6% per annum, computed from
the time of the filing of the Complaint in the trial court until the finality of the judgment. If the
adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate
shall be 12% per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until
it is fully satisfied.
Cerrano v. Tan (1918)
FACTS:

January, 1916: Tan Chuco owner of casco No. 1033 rented it to Vivencio

Cerrano for P70/month payable at the end of each month. No duration was
stipulated.

May, 1916: Tan notified Cerrano that it was necessary to repair it at

Malabon.  Cerrano was interested to rent it after the repair but Tan told him
that it was already for P80/month.

A week before the end of the repair, Tan sold it to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new
owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were obliged to bring an action of replevin
against Santos for the recovery of the possession of their casco

The sheriff took possession of the casco under a writ of replevin, but

redelivered it to Santos upon a delivery bond and his wife as sureties. After
the casco had been in possession of Santos for some three months, the replevin suit
held that casco was the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time of the suit was
commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of the casco by Santos had caused
damages of  P457.98 to Siy Cong Bieng & Co.

Cerrano paid the judgment in favor of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. and the
attorney's fees of Santos which shows that Santos was only a nominal
defendant in the replevin suit,which was entirely controlled by Cerrano.

CFI: casco was rented 10 months at the rate of P60, P457.98 for damages
and P500 for attorney's fees

ISSUE: W/N the contract of rent is broken by Tan Chuco's act as proximate
cause making him liable to Cerrano for damages

HELD: NO. Article 1581 of the Civil Code provides that when no definite
agreement has been made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is
deemed to have been made from day to day, from month to month, or from
year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be
paid.

Reasonable presumption that one who agrees to pay a monthly rent intends
that his tenancy is to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit
renewals at the end of each month as long as the arrangement is agreeable
to both parties
Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits
may be recovered as damages.

Article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages recoverable for
the breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were
or might have been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. 

It is unquestionable that defendant must be deemed to have foreseen at the

time he made contract that in the event of his failure perform it, the plaintiff
would be damaged by the loss of the profit he might reasonably have
expected to derive from its use

GR: plaintiff may recover compensation for any gain which he can make it
appear with reasonable certainty the defendant's wrongful act prevented him
from acquiring

o plaintiff would have earned a net profit of P50 from the use of
the casco in the month during which he was entitled to its
possession
o damages resulting from avoidable consequences of the breach of
a contract or other legal duty are not recoverable
 It is the duty of one injured by the unlawful act of another
to take such measures as prudent men usually take under
such circumstances to reduce the damages as much as
possible.
 burden of proof rests upon the defendant to show
that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages -
none in this case
o The contract of lease or hiring does not create a right in rem in
favor of the lessee, except in the case of a recorded lease of real
estate  
 Santos' attempt to retain possession of it against the
lawful owners by whom he had been placed in charge of it,
was unlawful
 if Cerrano is unable to recover from Santos the
money paid by him will not justify us in imposing the
burden of repaying this money to him
 damages suffered by reason of his voluntary
assumption of the liability incurred by Santos by
reason of his unlawful attempt to withhold
possession of the casco from its owners, by whom he
was put in charge of it, are not attributable to
Cerrano and he is not responsible for them -NOT
 proximate cause (proximate cause is Cerrano's own
imprudence)

Kierulf v. CA (1997)
FACTS:

February 28, 1987 7:45 pm: Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost

control and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the
east-bound lane of EDSA.  The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu
pickup driven by Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting physical injury
to Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were treated at the Quezon
City General Hospital

The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA

Despite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion
rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and
gasoline dispensing equipment

RTC: proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's

driver. Pantranco North Express, Incorporated to pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor
Kierulf for the damages of the Isuzu pick-up and Porfirio Legaspi

CA: Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to pay

costs

ISSUE: W/N both Lucila should be awarded moral damages

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.  The award of moral damages

to Lucila and Legaspi is hereby INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00
respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to P200,000.00. 
Legaspi is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00

Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she
is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to
his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. 
The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and
unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from
that of the injured person. Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to
consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by
the evidence on record.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding
moral damages.  

o no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no

"supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful
reference" was given her
o awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing

Proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings

o She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs.  She
lost all her teeth.  She had to undergo several corrective
operations and treatments.  Despite treatment and surgery, her
chin was still numb and thick.  She felt that she has not fully
recovered from her injuries.  She even had to undergo a second
operation on her gums for her dentures to fit.  She suffered
sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
accident.

Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior

that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by
public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender

o discretion of the court

o (1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only
in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may
be awarded to the claimant;
o (2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temporate, liquidated or compensatory damages; and
o (3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner."exemplary damages awarded increased to P200,000
o The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe that
Legaspi, being also a victim of gross negligence, should also
receive exemplary damages
 Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
 injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of
defendant
o Porfirio that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and that
during said period he did not have any income
 P16,500 as compensation for loss of earning capacity for
the period is amply supported by the records and is
demandable under Article 2205 of the Civil Code
 Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven
o A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary
loss actually suffered and duly proved
 Mere proof of Lucila's earnings consisting of her 1983 and
1984 income tax returns would not suffice to prove
earnings for the years 1985 and 1986.  The incident
happened on February 28, 1987.
 An estimate, as it is categorized, is not an actual expense incurred or
to be incurred in the repair.  The reduction made by respondent court
is reasonable considering that in this instance such estimate was
secured by the complainants themselves
 in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading
and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. 
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court it is nevertheless essential that the claimant
should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.  This is so
because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
 Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of  the defendant's
culpable action.
 Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.  Since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining
the proper amount.  The yardstick should be that the amount awarded
should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate
that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial judge.  Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs
salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.
Miranda-Ribaya v. Carbonell (1980)
FACTS:

April 23, 1968: Mrs. Josefina Roco-Robles, agent of Mrs. Ribaya, told her
that Marino Bautista, a millionaire logger was interested to buy diamonds.
Mrs. Ribaya went to the spouses Bautista's home to sell 10 pieces of jewelry
for P224,000 which was haggled down to P222,000. 

A receipt was signed by Marino Bautista and he issued in exchange of

2 Equitable Banking Corporation checks of P112,000 and P110,000.  Mrs.
Ribaya then issued a voucher evidencing the check payment 

April 24, 1968: Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by Ms. Narcisa Gosioco requested

the check of P110,000 to be divided since some were owned by her. 4
checks of Bank of America with amounts of P64,000 to Mrs. Ribaya
and P34,000 to Gosioco postdated on June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya also sold 4
more pieces of jewelry for P94,000 in exchange for four checks by Bank of
America.  This was transacted at the office of Mr. Bautista at Bank of
Philippine Islands Building

May 15, 1968: Mrs. Ribaya wanted to replace the 3 pieces sold by her
because the owners want them back.  She left it at the Bautista's residence
but instead of returning the 3 pieces, Mr. Bautista issued her a check
of P45,000 by Bank of America since the 3 pieces were already given as gifts
to bank officers.

When the maturity dates came, she tried to contact Mr. Bautista but failed
because he was on a logging concession so she deposited the checks to her
account and it was dishonored due to closed accounts.  She also discovered
that her jewelries were pawned to different pawnshops in Manila in the name
of the driver, secretary of the daughter of Bautista and a certain Balagot.
Some of which were pawned the same day it was bought.

Mrs. Ribaya was able to retrieve one-by-one the pawn tickets of the
jewelries she sold and other 3 tickets of jewelries not owned by her.  In
order to retrieve them, she had to close down her shop.  But there is still a
balance of P125,460.79 excluding those of Ms. Gosioco.  Mrs. Ribaya also
promised her attorney 25% of the unpaid obligation.

RTC: favored Mrs. Ribaya for P125,460.79 plus 25% attorney's fees but did
not grant moral and exemplary damages
CA: affirmed RTC

ISSUE: W/N Mrs. Ribaya should be entitled to moral and exemplary

damages

HELD: YES. further awarded moral and exemplary damages 25% of

P125,460.79

In awarding moral damages, there should be pleading and proof of moral

suffering, mental anguish, fright does not need to be the precise legal terms
or "sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings or moral shock" and the like.

Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the moral shock and suffering she
underwent as a result of respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and
confidence.

Petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta suffered

"extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a clear
demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety
and similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that show her
to be clearly entitled to moral damages having established the moral
damages are entitled in addition thereto, to exemplary damages

The wantonness and malevolence through which respondents defrauded

petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of their just
liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of
example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent
to the commission of similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction
were viewed as a breach of civil contract

Here, of course, there was more than wanton refusal to pay a plainly valid
and just contractual debt, but a malicious defraudation and gross abuse of
petitioners' good faith, whereby petitioners were wantonly "paid" with
bouncing postdated checks and besides not being paid what was due them,
had to undergo trauma and travail to redeem with their own and borrowed
funds from the pawnshops some of the jewelries in order to return them to
their owners
Del Rosario v. CA (1997)

FACTS:

Metal Forming Corp. advertised there metal shingles as "STRUCTURALLY

SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a
single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on
its overlaps."  The Spouses Del Rosario through their contractor Engineer
Puno purchased believing their representation.

The proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's

brochures and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to
the roof panels should be by 2 self-drilling screws for 1 metal cleat but
instead what was attached was metal cleats with only 1-inch ordinary nail
each and others were fastened with only 1 wood screw each so the roof was
blown by Typhoon Ruping 2 months later

MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year

warranty on the materials and their installation. Esteban Adjusters and
Valuers, Inc. hired by the Spouses Del Rosario determined that only with a
single wood screw or a combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail
was used 

DTI: charged MFC administrative fine of P10,000 otherwise its registration

will be deemed suspended and its establishment closed until the fine was
fully paid

Office of the President: affirmed

MFC declining to concede to liability for the other damages to its electrical

wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and
furniture, the Spouses Del Rosario filed in the RTC for total damage
of P1,008,003 also praying for moral and exemplary damages

RTC: favored Spouses Del Rosario Actual damage P1,008,003, Moral

Damages P500,000, Exemplary Damages P300,000 and Attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation P150,000

CA: reversed holding there is no privity bet. the Spouses Del Rosario and
MFC
ISSUE: W/N the Spouses Del Rosario should be awarded damages

HELD: YES. REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with the modification that the

award of actual damages and attorney's fees is deleted, and the moral and
exemplary damages awarded are reduced from P500,000.00 to
P100,000.00, and from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.

Since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed the express
warranty made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe"
tiles brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied
on the warranty, and thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity
of the individual who actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make
such delivery and installation is of little moment

Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly

proved and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. 

Relied only on the report of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.
which contains no statement whatever of the amount of the
damage therefore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an award of
actual damages

Law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of

contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."

There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and

mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of
moral damages is warranted

Article 2229 of the Civil Code 

o damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for

the public good, While exemplary damages cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. 
o Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions
 moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or
injury suffered
  Since the judgment does not say why attorney's fees are awarded,
there is no basis for such award, which should consequently be
removed
 It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather
than the rule and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a
party wins. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture.
Where granted. the court must explicitly state in the body of the
decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal
reason for the award of attorney's fees.

RAAGAS VS. TRAYA

FACTS
The complaint filed by the spouses Melquiades Raagas and Adela Laudiano Raagas against
Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido Canciller, alleges in essence that the latter was
"recklessly" driving a truck owned by his co-defendants along the public highway, the said
vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous death. The
plaintiffs ask for actual damages in the sum of P10,000, moral, nominal and corrective damages
in a sum to be determined by the court, Pl,000 as attorney's fees, Pl,000 for expenses of
litigation, plus costs.
The court sentenced the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, Pl,000
actual damages, Pl,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs.

ISSUE
Is the trial court correct?

HELD
NO. The trial court erred. Actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on
"speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount
(Tomassi v. Villa-Abrille; Suntay Tanjangco v. Jovellanos; Delfin v. Court of Agrarian Relations).
In Malonzo v. Galang, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential that the
claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
relation to defendant's acts."
Enervida v. de la Torre

DOCTRINE
In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, can not
be recovered, except: x x x (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against plaintiff.
As the case at bar is clearly an unfounded civil action, the respondents may recover attorney’s fees.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Article 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the
claimant, satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Article 2217) and its causal
relation to defendant’s acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Algara v. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 284).

FACTS
Roque Enervida filed a complaint against the Lauro de la Torre and Rosa de la Torre praying that the
deed of sale by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead
Patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years. For
her, it was in violation of the provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Law. He further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the
legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father. In due time, defendants filed their answer, stating
among others that the plaintiff has no cause of action against them as his father, Ciriaco Enervida, is
still living and also that it is not true that plaintiff is the only son of Ciriaco Enervida as he has also other
living children, namely, Juan, Filomena, Nieves and Antonio, all surnamed "Enervida"; and that the sale of
the property in question did not take place within the prohibited period provided for in Section 118 of the
Public Land Law, the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified and acknowledged
on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public. Summary judgment was rendered in favor of the spouses.

ISSUE
Whether or not Enervida is liable to the de la Torre spouses for the unfounded suit she filed.

HELD
Yes. It was clearly shown at the pre-trial conference that Enervida’s father, Ciriaco Enervida, the
patentee, is still living; that petitioner is not the sole heir as he has other brothers and sisters who were
also living, contrary to his allegations in the complaint under oath, that he was the sole heir. As the
patentee is still living, plaintiff-appellant could not have, on his own right, sought the repurchase of the
land as it would be violative of Section 119 of the Public Land Law.

This Court, through now Chief Justice, Makalintal, previously ruled that where the vendor is still living, it
is he alone who has the right of redemption. It is clear, therefore, that the complaint is without basis
and there is no cause of action and the plaintiff-appellant has no legal capacity to sue. As the case at bar
is clearly an unfounded civil action, the respondents may recover attorney's fees. However, with regard
to the award of TWO THOUSAND PESOS "in concept of actual, moral and exemplary damages...", the
same is not proper for it would ran counter to the decision of this Court.

Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,
the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential
that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its
causal relation to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both
seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondent were sued without any legal foundation
entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the
supposed moral damages suffered consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty,
which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be.
Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplary damages.

We affirm the dismissal order of the Court of First Instance of Davao but modify the award of damages
by eliminating moral damages.

PEOPLE vs. RODELIO BUGAYONG

Case:
 The accused RODELIO BUGAYONG is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness committed on October 15, 1994 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and of the crime of Rape he
committed in 1993 for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 Hence, this appeal filed directly before this Court.[5]

Facts:

“Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan got married on May 14, 1978.  Out of this marital union
they begot three (3) children, namely: ALBERT, HONEYLET and ARLENE[,] the private
complainant herein. The spouses Alberto and Leticia Cauan separated way back in
1983.  Albert and Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia while Honeylet stayed with her
grandmother Anita Yu

Later, Alberto and Leticia started living together with another woman and another man
respectively, [with whom each of them] raised another family xxx. Leticia cohabited with the
accused RODELIO BUGAYONG and had one (1) child, a minor by the name of CATHERINE
BUGAYONG.  

“In October 1994, RODELIO BUGAYONG had ARLENE hold his penis inside the room he
share[d] with Leticia.  At that time CATHERINE BUGAYONG who was six (6) years old was also
inside the same room and her father, the accused was letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened
to maim Arlene if she [did] not hold his penis.  When the penis was already hard and stiff, he
placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out from the penis.  The young
girl CATHERINE BUGAYONG saw this incident. Arlene testified that her stepfather had been
doing the same act when she was still in Grade 3 and was nine years old. She also said that
there were occasions when BUGAYONG played first with his penis then touched her vagina
with his penis until a white substance [came] out [of] it and that was the time BUGAYONG would
pull back his penis, or in the words of Arlene “idinidikit at pag may lumabas saka
inilalayo.”  When asked to explain what she meant by “idinidikit”, Arlene said that the penis of
BUGAYONG partly entered [her] vagina and she got hurt. The trial court held that the accused
raped the victim in 1993, not in 1994.  Damages was awarded to the plaintiff.

Issue: WON damages may be awarded without “basis” or specific proof for such award.
Held: Yes.

 The trial court correctly convicted him of statutory rape under Article 335 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, appellant is also guilty of acts of lasciviousness
committed on October 15, 1995.
 The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is
automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence other than
the fact of the commission of rape.
 Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to pay the
victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.  In People v. Prades,
[23]
 the Court resolved that “moral damages may additionally be awarded to the
victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without
the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice.”
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Rodelio Bugayong is ordered to
pay Complainant Arlene Cauan P50,000 as indemnity and the additional amount
of P50,000 as moral damages, or a total of P100,000.  Costs against the appellant.

Francisco v. GSIS (1963)

FACTS:

 October 10, 1956: Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in

the amount of P400,000 out of which the sum of P336,100 was
released to her, mortgaged in favor of the Government Service
Insurance System a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square
meters within 10 years in monthly installments of P3,902.41, and with
interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.
 January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage
 February 20, 1959: Trinidad's father Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a
letter to the general manager of GSIS propsing to pay P30,000 and
pay the balance from the P5,000 monthly rentals less P350 for the
necessary expenses. 
o GSIS Board approved the request
 February 28, 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted a check for P30,000 and
an official receipt was issued
 March 4, 1960: Trinidad remitted P44,121.29 and soon, P24,604.81.
All were issued a receipt
 Then the System sent 3 letters asking for a proposal for the payment
of her indebtedness since the 1-year redemption period has expired
 Atty. Francisco sent a letter of protest requesting the proper
corrections since their proposal have already commenced
  GSIS contends that for the foreclosure done, Francisco should
pay attorney's fees of P35,644.14, publication expenses, filing fee of
P301.00, and surcharge of P23.64 so remittances were not enough
 GSIS filed for specific performance
 RTC: Atty. Francisco's offer was unqualifiedly accepted, and was
binding
o called attention to the unconscionability of defendant's charging
the attorney's fees, totalling over P35,000.00; and this point
appears well-taken, considering that the foreclosure was merely
extra-judicial, and the attorneys' work was limited to requiring
the sheriff to effectuate the foreclosure

ISSUE: W/N Francisco should be awarded Moral damages where there is

breach of contract regarding the redemption proposal but no malicious intent

HELD: NO. Affirmed.

 Nor was there error in the appealed decision in denying moral

damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the
witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings,
anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of
contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does
not warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the
Civil Code
 There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this
species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which have been
allowed in this case, for reasons herein before discussed
 As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view
of the absence of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to
satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the other grounds
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a
recovery. The award of attorneys' fees is essentially discretionary in
the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown. 

Bernal vs. House

54 PHIL 327 (January 30, 1930)
Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter, Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to
attend the procession on Holy Friday. After the procession, accompanied by two other
persons, they passed along a public street. Purificacion was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends.
While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared
which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At
that time there was hot water running in the gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face
downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd
Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the Brain and
visceras of the chest & abdomen.”
The defense was that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street with the
knowledge and consent of the authorities and that the cause of death was other than
the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence. The trial judge dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the action should be dismissed due to the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs
Held: NO. The death of the child was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water
to flow through the public streets, endangering the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
street on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing a and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. . The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any,
does result not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only in reduction of
the damages.

PLDT vs. CA
G.R. No. 57079 (September 29, 1989)
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system. The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face,
leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. The
windshield of the jeep was also shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by Spouses
Esteban were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be
held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work. The trial court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas
the CA reversed the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Estebans can claim damages from PLDT.
Held: NO. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The jeep was running along
the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
accident mound. That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the
accident mound could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south
of the accident mound. Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff
husband claimed. At that speed, he could have stepped on the brakes the moment it struck the
accident mound.
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right
to recover damages.

Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals

178 SCRA 422 (September 22, 1957)
Facts: Genobiagon was driving a rig along T. Padilla St. in Cebu City. The petitioner's vehicle was
going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because
he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him.
As an old woman was crossing the street, Genobiagon’s rig bumped her and caused her to fall
in the middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at
Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genobiagon reasoned out that he did not bump the
old woman and that it was the old woman who bumped him. The old woman was brought to
the hospital but she died 3 days after. Petitioner was charged and convicted with the crime of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability
from 6,000 to 12,000. Hence, this petition.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the court erred in the affirmation of conviction (2) Whether or not
the court unjustly increased the civil liability
Held: (1) No. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to
evade the effects of his own negligence.

Rakes vs. Atlantic

G.R. No. 1719 (1907)
Facts: The plaintiff Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard
near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant Atlantic, has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon
which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails
lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to
prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either
in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on
its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting
it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect
and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the
failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the
judge below based his judgment.
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding
that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and
further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to operate
the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary
for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding
upon the instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor
upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get
hold upon the car.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Rakes.
Held: While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to
proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of
the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears
that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction
of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the
plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and
the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car
did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had
the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last
would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible
for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA (Lipana)

269 SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997)
Facts: Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with
the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection with its business of selling appliances. From
May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMC’s GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds in
the form of cash totaling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of
depositing said funds to RMC’s account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not
credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut's
husband, Bienvenido Cotas.
Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account
number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name
of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would validate and
stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy
despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene
Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC
in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written
thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made her company believe that
the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in fact, they
were being deposited in the account of her husband.
During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with monthly statements
showing its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was never the practice of
Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence to
PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from
petitioner bank the return of its money.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of RMC.
Held: In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private
respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault
or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.
Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent
in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and
presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself
in
its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the
testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank
and
now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he
never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's
validation procedures.
It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner
bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate
cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash
to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Juntilla vs. Fontanar
136 SCRA 624 (May 31, 1985)
Facts: Juntilla was a passenger of a public utility jeepney, being driven by Defendant Berfol
Camoro, enroute from Danao to Cebu City. The jeepney had fourteen (14) passengers in the
back and three (3) at the front, one of whom was Juntilla. Upon reaching Mandaue City, the
right rear tire of the jeepney exploded causing the vehicle to fall into a ditch and turn turtle.
As consequence, Juntilla was thrown out of the jeepney and sustained lacerations to his right
palm and suffered other injuries. Juntilla, still shocked, went back to Danao City for medical
help but on his way discovered that his watch is missing.
Juntilla then filed a case for breach of contract of carriage with damages before the City Court
of Cebu, which found the respondents (the driver, the franchise operator and
owner) liable for the accident ordering the latter to pay damages, including the value of watch
lost by petitioner during the incident. Upon appeal, the CFI, relying on a case decided by
the Court of Appeals (Rodriguez case), exonerated respondents on grounds that the blowing of
tire is a fortuitous event, and therefore beyond the control of the latter.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the blowing of the tire a fortuitous event (2) Whether or not the
respondents should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage.
Held: No. A fortuitous event has the following essential characteristics:
A. The cause of the unforeseen or unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the obligor to
comply with his obligation must be independent of human will.
B. The event must be impossible to foresee or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible
to avoid.
C. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner.
D. The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation if the injury resulting
to the oblige

The Supreme Court held that the cause of the incident was NOT independent from human will.
The accident was caused EITHER by the negligence of the driver or because of the
mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed the
speed limits and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up, thus ensuring
the safety of the passengers at all times. In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that the
jeep was overloaded with passengers (17, excluding the driver), and was speeding. The
Court made the observation that a jeepney at a regular and safe speed would not have jump
into a ditch when the right rear tire blows up.
Neither can the driver and operator point liability to the manufacturer of the tire. The Supreme
Court, citing Necesito et. al. vs. Paras, held that:
xxx [A] passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a
defect in appliance (tire) purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears
that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of
care…with regard to the inspection and application of the necessary tests…[T]he
manufacturer is considered… the agent or servant of the carrier as regards the work of the
appliance (tire) xxx
Such rationale is based on the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over the
carrier’s selection of the tire. Having no privity with the manufacturer or vendor of the tire,
the passenger has no remedy against the former, on the other hand, the carrier has. The
sudden blowing up of the tire may have been caused by too much air pressure. The Source of
the
common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of carriage. The carrier binds itself to carry the
passengers safely as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, with due regard for all circumstances.

Hernandez vs. Commission on Audit

179 SCRA 39 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: At the time of the incident in question, Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge
and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism
Authority in Cavite. As such, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1,
1983 to encash two checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses
of the Project. He estimated that the money would be available by 10:00AM and that he would
be back in Ternate by about 2:00PM. For some reason, the processing of the checks was
delayed and was completed only at 3:00PM. Despite realizing that he would not reach ternate
in time to distribute the salary of the workers, Hernandez nevertheless decided to encash
them. He thought he had to do this for the benefit of the laborers, otherwise they would have
to wait until the following Tuesday, when the main office would reopen. And so, on the same
afternoon he collected the cash value of the checks and left the main office a substantial
amount of money.
Hernandez realized that had two choices, to (1) return to Ternate, Cavite, the same afternoon
and arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the money to his house in Marilao,
Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following morning. He opted for the
second, thinking it the safer one. And so, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
Bulacan.
While the vehicle was along EDSA, two persons boarded with knives in hand. One pointed his
weapon at the Hernandez’ side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took
the money he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the
initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio
Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. Hernandez sustained injuries in the lip arms and
knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty, but the robber who
had the money escaped.
On July 5, 1983, Hernandez filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section
638 of the Revised Administrative Code. Deespite favorable endorsement by
Philippine Tourism Authority and the NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
Philippine Tourism Authority and the NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
Hernandez’ request. According to Tantuico, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability
of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the cash
proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate, Cavite, immediately
after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is the normal procedure in the
handling of public funds.
Issue: Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding Hernandez
negligent.
Held: Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty. Notice to Auditor. When a
loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire,
theft, or
other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately
notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original
jurisdiction of the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor,
or provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for relief,
with the
available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
Applying the letter and spirit of the above-mentioned laws, and after considering the
established facts in the light of the arguments of the parties, this Court inclines in favor of the
petitioner.
It is pointless to argue that Hernandez should have encashed the vouchers earlier because they
were dated anyway on June 29, 1983. He was not obliged to encash the checks earlier and
then again there might have been any number of reasons why he did so only on July 1, 1983.
The point is that he did encash the checks on that date and took the money to Marilao and
not Ternate in view of the lateness of the hour. The question before us is whether these acts
are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request
for relief from accountability for the stolen money.
It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motives when he encashed the
checks on July 1, 1983, so his co-employees in Ternate could collect their salaries and
wages the following day. Significantly, although this was a non-working day, he was intending
to make the trip to his office the following day for the unselfish purpose of
accommodating his fellow workers. The other alternative was to encash the check is on July 5,
1983, the next working day after July 1, 1983, which would have meant a 5-day wait for
the payment of the said salaries and wages. Being a modest employee himself, Hernandoz must
have realized the great discomfort it would cause the laborer who were dependent on their
wages for their sustenance and were anxious to collect their pay as soon as possible. For such
an attitude, Hernandez should be commended rather than faulted.
As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily
agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative
hazards in the trips to the two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court
feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and
was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the
two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and
in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his
imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said
provisions,
something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and
did.
We find, in sum, that under the circumstances as above narrated, the petitioner is entitled to
be relieved from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of July
1, 1983. To impose such liability upon him would be to read the law too sternly when it should
be softened by the proven facts.

Gotesco vs. Chatto and Lina Delza Chatto

210 SCRA 18 (June 16, 1992)
Facts: Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter, Lina, went to see the movie "Mother
Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They
bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats. Hardly ten (10) minutes after
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into
darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, the mother and daughter managed to
crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked
the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
Chatto filed a complaint for damages against Gotesco. Defendant tried to avoid liability by
alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was due to force majeure. The trial court
ordered Gotesco to pay the plaintiffs moral damages, actual damages, attorney's fees, plus the
cost of the suit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to an act of God or Force Majeure?
Held: No. The collapse of the ceiling was not due to Force Majeur. Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted
that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a
defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It
could not have collapsed without a cause. The fact that Mr. Ong could not offer any
explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force
majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or
reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the
respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had
not
even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be
considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial
court, affirmed by the respondent Court that the collapse was due to construction defects.
There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely
four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes
denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of
the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence
and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of
Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.
The fact that structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City
Engineer and that building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued, do not at all prove
that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause
of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because
it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from
Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from
any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of
negligence.

Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co

117 SCRA 832
Facts: Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board a vessel owned by Philippine Steam
Navigation cargoes consisting of 1,528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper
for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. Bills of lading were issued by
Philippine Navigation. The cargoes were discharged in Negros Occidental Bureau of Customs
Warehouse as complete and in good order.
At about 2:00 PM of the same day, the Customs warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying the cargoes. The claims for the value of said goods were rejected
by Philippine Steam, herein respondent. Lower Court ordered Philippine Steam to pay Servando
damages, including legal interest from filing of the case. They also awarded damages to
Uy Bico the sum for the portion of the cargo which was not recovered by her. The legal basis of
the lower court for its decision if Article 1736:
Common carriers have the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods
are unconditionally placed in their possession until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738
It held that the delivery to the Bureau of Customs is not the constructive delivery as
contemplated in Article 1736, thus the common carrier continues to be responsible.
Issue: Whether or not FIRE is a fortuitous event, absolving Respondents of any liability?
Held: Yes. The burning of the warehouse was an extraordinary event independent of the will of
the respondents. The following characteristics of caso fortuito are present. 1. the
cause of the unforeseen event must be independent of the human will; 2. it must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must be free from any participation
impossible to avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. When the proximate cause of loss is a
fortuitous event or force majeure, the obligor is exempt from liability. This is provided for
by Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
It should also be pointed out that in the Bill of Lading (BOL) existing on the cargoes, the
responsibility of the carrier has been limited as provided by Clause 14.:
Not unless the loss or damage is caused by the negligence of the carrier, the common carrier
shall not be liable for such caused by force majeures, accidents of sea, war and
public enemies.
This is a mere reiteration of Article 1174.
Furthermore, the storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse while waiting withdrawal by
the petitioners was made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged
to and maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to Philippine
Steam, having no control over the same. There is also no proof or showing that the fire can be
imputable to the negligence of its employees. Judgment appealed is set aside.

NAPOCOR vs. CA
GR Nos. 103442-45 (1993)
Facts: The controversy stemmed from separate complaints filed by several residents of
Norzagaray, Bulacan against petitioner, National Power Corp. The residents seek to recover
actual
and other damages for the loss of lives due to the inundation of their town. The flooding was
allegedly caused by NAPOCOR’s acts of negligently releasing water in the spillways of
Angat Dam (hydroelectric plant). NAPOCOR, in its defense, maintains that (1) they exercised
due care and diligence in maintaining the power plant; (2) petitioners duly notified the
residents about the impending release of water with the onset of typhoon kading and advised
them to take necessary precautions; and (3) that the damages incurred by private respondents
were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
The lower court dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA reversed the
decision and awarded actual and moral damages (plus litigation expenses) to the
residents. The judgment was based on a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence
and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the
hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are
all but products of NAPOCOR’s headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting
flash flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank
would have been avoided had NAPOCOR prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining a
water elevation, which would allow room for the expected torrential rains.
The CA also rejected the NAPOCOR’s plea that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Issue: Whether or not the incident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Held: The SC rendered its decision based on the same errors in G.R. No. 96410, entitled
National Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al, according to the Court, the
proximate cause of the damage incurred by private respondents was due to negligence of the
NAPOCOR. The early warning notice was insufficient. The SC cannot rule otherwise
because its decision is now binding.
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 (Acts of God) of the Civil Code, the
following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation
in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of
the injury to the creditor
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the
tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or
damage, the obligor cannot escape liability
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. Thus it has been held that
when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person
is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of
God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been
occasioned.

Southeastern College Inc. v CA

GR No. 126389 (July 10, 1998)
Facts: Private Respondents Dimaano are owners of a house in College Road, Pasay City while
petitioner Corporation, South Eastern College, owns a four-storey school building along
the same road. In October 1989, a powerful typhoon called “Saling” hit the Metro. Buffeted by
very strong winds, the roof of petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away,
landing and destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaano’s house. An ocular inspection was
conducted by a team of engineers. They found that one factor and perhaps, the most likely
reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the
trusses to the roof beams, thus recommending the building to be declared a structural hazard.
Respondents filed a complaint based on culpa aquiliana, alleging that the damage to their
house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in other
houses. The Dimaanos sought to recover actual, moral and exemplary damages, including
attorney’s fees and costs from petitioners. In their answer, Southeastern averred that the
building withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past without its
roofing giving way, and that typhoon Saling was an act of God.
In giving credence to the ocular inspection, the Trial court ruled in favor of the Dimaanos and
ordered the Southeastern to pay the decreed damages sought. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the award of moral damages.
Issues: Whether or not the Southeastern College is liable for the damage.
Held: No. The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which
defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. In
order that a fortuitous even may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason which the loss may have been
occasioned
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous even, a natural occurrence which
may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or
care. From these premises, we proceed to determine whether Southeastern was negligent,
such that if it were not the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been
avoided? At the outset it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence
of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely
by presumption or conclusions without basis of fact. The Dimaanos merely relied on the
ocular inspection, however by this basis, the relationship of cause and effect has NOT been
clearly shown.
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from private respondent’s city building official, Jesus
Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioner’s school building were
approved including the certificate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the least,
prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject school building.
approved including the certificate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the least,
prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject school building.
As to the damages, it is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually
proved with reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a
basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.

Afialda vs. Hisole

85 Phil 67 (November 29, 1949)
Facts: Loreto Afialda was employed by Hisole spouses as caretaker of their carabaos. While
tending to the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence. His
sister then filed a complaint against the spouses Hisole. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss,
which the court granted. Plaintiff now seeks to hold defendants liable under art. 1905 of the
Civil Code which states that “The possessor of an animal or the one who uses the same, is liable
for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
Issue: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its
caretaker.
Held: No. The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and
that damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had
been negligent or at fault under art. 1902 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the animal was in
the custody of the caretaker. It was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal
from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal was
one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must
take the consequences. There was no allegation of negligence on the part of the Hisole spouses.
Thus, they are not liable.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court of Appeals

179 SCRA 5 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, typhoon 'Gening'
buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte and brought heavy rains and flooding. Between 5:30-
6:00AM, Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) along with Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured out
of her house and traversed waist-deep flood to proceed to a store, which she owns to
check if her merchandise have been damaged. Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed 'ay!' and
quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help but fear dissuaded them because
on
the spot where the deceased sank, they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving
in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana Belen but he turned
back because the water was grounded. Ernesto informed Antonio Yabes that his mother in law
had been electrocuted and together they went to the City Hall of Laoag to request the
police to ask INELCO to cut off the current. Subsequently, the search for the body began and
such was found two meters from an electric post.
In another place at about 4:00 A.M., Engineer Antonio Juan of the NAPOCOR noticed certain
fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated s such abnormalities as grounded
or short-circuited lines. He then went out for inspection and saw grounded and disconnected
lines which were hanging from posts to the ground. Since there were no INELCO linemen in
sight, he decided to go to the INELCO office but it was closed. On the way to INELCO, he passed
by Guerrero St. and saw and electric wire about 30 meters long and the other end of the
wire was seeming to play with the current of the water. At about 8:00 A.M., he went out for
inspection again and learned about the death of Nana Belen. He tried to help revive the
deceased but his efforts proved futile. He also noticed a hollow wound on the left palm of the
victim. In the afternoon, he went on an inspection trip again and the wire that he saw on
Guerrero St. earlier was no longer there.
Dr. Castro examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00 A.M. and noted that the skin was
grayish or cyanotic which indicated death by electrocution. The wound on the left
palm was an electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. The certificate of death prepared
by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as 'circulatory shock electrocution'.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. INELCO, through its officers
and employees who testified, claims that on and even before June 29, their
electric system did not suffer from any defect that might constitute hazard to life and property.
Moreover, it was alleged that the lines and devices were newly installed and they had
installed safety devices to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural
calamities. INELCO also alleged that they had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of
checking the areas assigned to them. Fabico Abijero even testified that in the early morning of
June 29, he passed by the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal streets and did not see any
broken wires. He said that what he saw were many people fishing out the body of the
deceased. INELCO also presented Dr. Briones who said that without an autopsy, no doctor or
medico-legal can speculate the cause of death. Moreover, he said that cyanosis (lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood) appears only in a live person. INELCO also said that the deceased
was negligent because she installed a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main
house to the iron gate, thus charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on.
INELCO then conjectures that the switch must have been left on, causing the deceased
electrocution when she tried to open her gate.
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution. (2) Whether or not petitioner
INELCO may be held liable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan. (3) Whether or not the maxim
volenti non fit injuria can be applied in the case at bar.
Held:
(1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no
other conclusion than that they were burns and there was nothing else in the street where
the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of petitioner
company. In the issue of the burglar deterrent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch
was left on is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence.
(2) YES. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's
death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. As
stated by Engr. Juan in his testimony, he saw no INELCO lineman and that the office of
INELCO was closed. The SC held that in times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a
supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that
might imperil life or limb. The petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to
the general public. Furthermore, the court held that when an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant (in this case the petitioner) to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission.
(3) NO. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to
leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. She went to her grocery store
to see to it that the goods were not flooded. It has been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or
when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as
the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.
Furthermore, she was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's
consent as
she was on her way to protect her merchandise.

Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al

19 SCRA 289 (1967)
Facts: The car owned by Placido Ramos, while being driven by his son Augusto, collided with a
truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven by i Andres Bonifacio. Ramos filed a case
at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. CFI found Bonifacio negligent and declared that Pepsi Cola
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Pepsi and Bonifacio are held solidarily liable to pay P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000 moral
damages, P2000 exemplary damages and P1,000 Atty. fees.
CA affirmed the decision of CFI regarding Bonifacio but absolved Pepsi Cola from liability stating
that Pepsi has sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its
employees.
Issue: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver.
Held: Yes. When it was proven that the employer had carefully examined the erring driver as to
his qualifications, experience and record of service, such evidence is sufficient to show
that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the
driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the employer was negligent. Juan Anasco,
personnel manager of Pepsi stated that before Bonifacio was hired, his background, experience,
physical capacity was checked. Also, he was asked to submit clearance and also asked to
take theoretical and practical driving examination. Pepsi was also a member of the Safety
Council.
Petitioner can no longer assail the credibility of Anasco. Findings of CA are binding on SC. A
motion for reconsideration was made stating that respondents violated the Motor
vehicle law. It was said that the truck was overweight and running beyond the speed limit and
that it was not equipped with a rear vision mirror and with a helper. Such allegations failed
to show their basis. Patrolman Pahate did not affirm such allegations. Also, a special permit may
be granted for overweight trucks and the absence of such permit was not proven. In
Quasi delicts, the motor vehicle owner is not an absolute owner against all damages caused by
its driver. The owner’s responsibility ceases once it proves that it has observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damages.

Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) vs. CA

223 SCRA 521 June 21, 1993
Facts: Appellant Nenita Custodio boarded a jeepney driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and
owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo. The jeepney collided with an MMTC bus
at the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road. MMTC bus was driven by defendant
Godofredo Leonardo. Both drivers failed to slow down or blow their horns. As a result of
said incident, Custodio was thrown out through the windshield and sustained serious physical
injuries. She was sent to the hospital and regained consciousness only after a week.
Appellant, assisted by her parents, filed a complaint for damages. Defendants denied the
material allegations. MMTC for its part presented Milagros Garbo, its training officer,
and Christian Bautista, its transport supervisor, as two of its witnesses. Garbo testified that the
company's bus drivers undergo a series of training programs, examinations, clearances,
interviews and seminars for their selection. Bautista on the other hand, testified that he
ensured the drivers were in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations and fit to
drive
before the start of duty.
The trial court found both drivers negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and
regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an
intersection. It however, absolved MMTC, stating that it was careful and diligent in selecting its
employees and strict and diligent in supervising them as shown by the evidence. The CA
modified the said ruling, holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants. According to
the CA, MMTC failed to substantiate its allegations that it exercised the diligence of
the good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. It pointed out the
fact that Garbo and Bautista failed to present documentary evidence to support their
claims, such as the clearances and test results of Leonardo or the written guidelines. As such,
the testimonies fall short of the required evidentiary quantum.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence of MMTC is sufficient to show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Held: No. The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA.
In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff
who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollary, defendant must likewise prove its own
allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable. In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or
defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial
such
amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. In the case at bar,
petitioner's attempt to prove it diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. MMTC only
gave oral testimonies as its evidence, no documentary proof was submitted upon request to
further bolster its defense. The mere formulation of various company policies on saftey
without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from
liability arising from negligence of its employees.
The SC does not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the
diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, applying Art. 2180 in relation to
Art. 2176, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the other defendants.

Kramer vs. Court of Appeals

178 SCRA 518 (October 13, 1989)
Facts: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners was navigating its
way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape
Santiago, the boat collided with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines, owned by the
private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The captains of both vessels filed their respective
marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast
Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate
cause of the maritime collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the
F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the
private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The
findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of
the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V
Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent in the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasidelict
like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their
Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint
filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. Petitioners
contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons
with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry
can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued
only on April 29, 1982, the date of the decision of the board become final.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners holding that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime
collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such
collision, and that the Board was constituted precisely to answer the need. CA reversed the
decision, holding that it is clear that the cause of action of the petitioners accrued from the
occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon
and sustained by the aggrieved party. It said that if the tolling of the prescriptive period
would hinge upon the discretion of a government agency, said alternative could entail hazards.
Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the action for quasi-delict is barred by prescription.
Held: Yes. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such
right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a
cause of action has arisen.
Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 526 (October 13, 1989)
Facts: In 1977, Joselito Yujuico obtained a loan from GEN BANK in the amount of PhP500,000
and as evidence, it issued a promissory note payable GEN BANK. At the time private
respondent incurred the obligation, he was a ranking officer of GENBANK and a member of the
family which owns the controlling interest in the bank. In 1980, the Central Bank issued
a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing further business. Four days after, another
resolution was issued ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. Later, ALLIED Bank acquired all
the assets and assumed all the liabilities of GENBANK, including the receivable due from private
Yujuico.
Upon Yujuico’s failure to pay, ALLIED Bank filed a complaint against private respondent for the
collection of a sum of money. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in a special
proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision
declared the liquidation of GENBANK null and void. It was then that Yujuico filed the third
party complaint for damages alleging that by reason of the tortious interference by the Central
Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from paying his loan.
Issue: Assuming that the Central Bank is guilty of tortious interference, has the claim of Yujuico
under the third party complaint prescribed?
Held: YES. An action for damages arising from quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference
should be filed within four (4) years from the day the cause of action accrued. Since the cause
of action accrued on 25 March 1980 (the time when Central Bank issued a cease and desist
order against GENBANK) and the third party complaint was filed only on June 17 1987, the
action has prescribed.
It is from the date the act or omission violative of the right of a party that the cause of action
arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. (Español
vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans)The third party complaint should not be admitted.

Bataclan vs. Medina

G.R. No. L-10126 (1957)
Facts: Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, Mariano Medina, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by Conrado Saylon. Among
the passengers were Juan Bataclan. While the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst causing the vehicle to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the
driver, namely Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. These
men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fire started,
consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside. It would appear that as the
bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around
it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it
on fire.
The heirs of the deceased brought an action to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of
the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers
who were unable to leave it.
Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the
reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and
soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the
driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Fernando vs. Court of Appeals and the City of Davao

G.R. No. 92087 (May 8, 1992)
Facts: Morta, market master of Agdao Public Market requested with the City Treasurer Office
the emptying of a Septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Bertulano, Catarsa, Bascon, Bolo and Suner. Bascon won the bid and signed the purchase order.
Prior to the signing of purchase order, Bertulano with four other companions- Liagoso,
Fernando and Fajardo Jr. was found dead inside the septic tank.
While, Garcia died in the Regional Hospital after being rescued by a fireman. Autopsy revealed
diminution of oxygen and intake of sulfide gas as cause of death. Investigation
by the City Engineer Office learned that the 5 victims entered and re-emptied the tank without
clearance and consent. The heirs of the deceased filed a case for damages contending that
it was the gross negligence of the City of Davao for failing to clean the septic tank for 10 years
which resulted in the accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas, and was therefore the
proximate cause of the death of the laborers. They further contend that the market master
failed to supervise the area where the tank was located as a further reflection of the public
respondent’s negligence. Petitioner’s also insisted on the application of Article 24 of the New
Civil code. Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties
is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Issue: WON proximate cause of death is the own negligence of the plaintiffs?
Held: Yes. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by and efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred.
While it may be true that the public respondent had been negligent in the re emptying of the
septic tank annually since 1956, the negligence is not a continuing one. The public
respondents have immediately responded to such issue upon invitation to bid on the service of
emptying the tank. Public Respondents have also shown in court that people in the market
have been using the toilet for their necessities and remained uninjured.
As proven by Respondents, the septic tank was air-tight as provided for by regulations. The
accident of toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes
its covers. The accident occurred because the victims have ontheir own and without authority
opened the tank. Bertulano who has offered his services to clean the septic tank is
presumed to know the hazards of his job. His and his men’s failure to take precautionary
measures for their safety is the proximate case of the accident. The Court also cited Culion vs.
Phil Motors Corp. “When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work he attempts to do.” Furthermore, the surreptitious way
the victims did the job without clearance from the market master and or the security jobs
goes against their good faith.
Moreover, Article 24 of the NCC is inapplicable as there is total absence of contractual relations
between the victims and City of Davao that will give rise to contractual
obligations as the victims did not win the bidding. It was not to Bertulano, but to Bascon, that
the contract to clean the septic tank was awarded.

Urbano vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-72964) (1988)
Facts: Petitioner, Filomeno Urbano quarreled with Marcelino Javier because the latter opened
the irrigation canal which caused the flooding of the place where Urbano's palay was
stored. Urbano hacked the right palm of Javier with a bolo and caused an incised wound that
was later treated. Urbano and Javier agreed on an amicable settlement and petitioner paid for
the hospital bills.
22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital, he had a locked jaw and was having
convulsions, caused by tetanus toxin. The doctor noticed that the wound was infected. The
next day, Javier died. Petitioner was charged with homicide and was later found guilty by the
trial court. The IAC affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial based on
the affidavit of the barangay captain that Javier was found catching fish on the irrigation canal,
10 days prior to his death.
Issue: Whether or not the inflicting of the wound by petitioner was only a remote, and not a
proximate, cause.
Held: The inflicting of the wound is only a remote cause and petitioner cannot be held liable
therefor. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause.
The incubation period of tetanus, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe
disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches
100 percent. (NOTICE that it took Javier 22 days, from the time of the hacking, before he
had symptoms of Tetanus)
In the case at bar, the evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the hacking. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms
of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound
was infected is not clear. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection (failure to take the necessary precautions against tetanus) may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death.
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987)
Facts: In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his
boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
some 2-1/2 meters away from his car.
The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc.
("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the
oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the
street, partly blocking the way of incoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any socalled
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando Carbonel, its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be
carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a
result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the
dump truck driver.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the driver or the
negligence of Dionisio.
Held: It was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck
was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. , the collision of Dionisio's car
with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the
private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not
been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna
Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our
view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence
and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by
the courts
TRIVIA: Did the headlights of Dionisio really turned off unexpectedly, as he claims? Remember,
this happened during Martial law years when curfews were in effect. It was
1:30 AM and Dinisio was drunk. Excellent!

Pilipinas Bank v. CA
G.R. No. 105410 (1994)
Facts: As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued
postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation and Vicente Tui with due dates on
October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money
Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his
savings account therein and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then
Filman Bank), Biñan Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit. In
depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the current account
number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing.
He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current account number he placed
on the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES. Nothing
that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current
Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the
listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the
depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. On October 11, 1979, the October 10,
check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of
Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was
dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. On October 15, 1979, the
October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again dishonored. Likewise, the October 12,
1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that same date met the
same fate but was advised to try the next clearing. Two days after the October 10 check was
again dishonored, the payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash
payment of its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was
redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the check was
drawn against insufficient fund. Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the
bank
and urged an immediate verification of his account. Upon verification, the bank noticed the
error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately
transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not
effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then
honored the October 12, 1979, check.
Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of deposit was due to the error of the
representative of Reyes
Held: No. For Article 2179
of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept
of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to
have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury
complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence." 4
In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the
name of another depositor who had a similar fi first name. As held by the trial court:
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to exercise the
degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee
posted the
cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio
stated
in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was
proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved
and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which is the credit
standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in
the course of
his business were dishonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a
balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.

Quezon City Government vs. Fulgencio Dacara

G.R. NO. 150304 (June 15, 2005)
Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of herein respondent was driving the Toyota Corolla of his
father along Matahimik St. in Quezon City. While driving, the vehicle rammed into a pile of
earth (street diggings) as the street was being repaired by the Quezon City government. As
result, Dacara allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damages
when it turned turtled as it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the City Government but it yielded negative results. Dacara Sr.
on behalf of his minor son filed a complaint for damages against herein
petitioner (QCG). In its answer, QCG alleged that the diggings were provided with a mound of
soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it
which was visible during the incident. QCG claimed that they exercised due care by providing
the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Such claim was
disproved by the investigation report which stated that the deep excavation was without any
warning device. The RTC, on the basis of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment in
favor of Fulgencio Dacara and ordered QCG to pay the former actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not negligence of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was the proximate cause of the accident.
Whether or not award for moral damages is proper.
Whether or not award for exemplary damages is proper.
HELD: (1) NO. Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over
the same. Failure of the petitioner to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-
article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable.
Petitioner pointed out that Fulgencio was driving at the speed of 60kph which was above the
maximum limit of 30kph when he met the accident, so he can be presumed negligent based
on Art. 2185. Such a matter was not raised at any time during the trial and was only raised for
the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. The SC held it was too late to raise such
issue .
(2) NO. Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts,
provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery or
moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. In the case at bar, Fulgencio
testified that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm. However, no other evidence such as a
medical certificate, was presented to prove such bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there
was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury inflicted on a person. Moral damages cannot
be awarded in the absence of proof that the person experienced emotional and mental
suffering. Mere allegations do not suffice, clear and convincing proof is necessary.
(3) YES. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, it is subject to the
discretion of the courts but cannot be awarded unless claimants show their entitlement to
moral, temperate or actual damages. In the case at bar, petitioner's negligence was the
proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual damages. Art. 2231 NCC
mandates
that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with
gross negligence. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. The City Government
failed to show the modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected from them by the
constituents of the city. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street-digging in a side
street which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier city'.

Gabeto vs. Araneta

G.R. No. 15674 (1921)
Facts: On Aug. 4, 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano rode a carromata (horse driven
carriage) to go to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the city of Iloilo. Agaton Araneta stepped
out into the street and stopped the horse. Araneta protested to the driver that he was the first
one who called for the carromata. The driver Julio Pagnaya pulled on the reins (one which
control the horse) of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta. Due to the
rottenness of the reins, the bit (placed on the horse’s mouth for control) came out of the
horse’s
mouth. Pagnaya got off the carromata and pulled over the same near the curb and fixed the bit.
While doing so, the horse moved forward and pulled one wheel of the carromata uo on the
sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya. The carromata struck a police telephone box and due to the
crashing sound, the horse got frightened and set out at full speed up the street.
Basilio Ilano was able to get off the carromata but Proceso Gayetano retained his seat and
when he jumped from the rig, he sustained injuries which caused his death.
Issue: Whether or not the act of Araneta is the proximate cause of the death of Gayetano.
Held: No. The mere act of Araneta of stopping the horse will not make him liable. Evidence
shows that when Pagnaya got out of the carromata to go the horse’s head and fix the bit, an
appreciable interval of time elapsed. The act of Araneta is too remote from the accident to be
considered as the proximate cause.
By getting off and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily
responsible for the control of the animal. Also, evidence shows that the bridle was
old and the leather is weak and easily broken.

Urbano vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-72964 (1988)
Facts: Supra
Held: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. 130068 (1998)
Facts: Supra
Held: It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need
not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly,
where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability
because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is
no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from
his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
rortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although
under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were
the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the Civil Code.

Subido vs. Custodio

L-21512 (Aug 31, 1966)
Facts: Agapito Custodio was a passenger of an LTB Bus. He was hanging on the left side of the
bus because it was full of passengers. A truck owned by Subido which was coming from
the opposite direction sideswiped the LTB bus and injured Custodio who died as a result
thereof. Both drivers were found negligent- the LTB bus driver for having allowed a passenger
to
ride on the running board of the bus and the driver of the truck for running at a considerable
speed while negotiating a sharp curb and running on the middle instead of on the right side of
the road. The owner and the driver of the truck contended that the proximate cause of the
death of Custodio was the negligence of the driver of the LTB bus who allowed Custodio to ride
on the running board of the LTB bus.
Issue: Is there concurrent liability here in this case at bar? How does the negligence of both
parties affect the liability of both?
Held: Although the negligence of the carrier (LTB bus) and its driver is independent, in its
execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the
proximate cause of death of Agapito Custodio. In fact the negligence of the first two(2) would
not have produced this result without the negligence of petitioners herein (the owner and
driver of the truck). What is more, petitioner’s negligence was the last, in point of time, for
Custodio was on the running board of the carrier’s bus sometime before petitioner’s truck
came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense petitioner’s truck had the last clear
chance.” The owner and the driver of the truck were held jointly and severally liable, together
with the LTB bus and its driver, to the heirs of Custodio.

Bataclan vs. Medina

102 Phil 181
Facts: supra
Held: There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The
only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the
bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the
fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still
alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries
suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume
38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief.
It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after
looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the
vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate
to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when
the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted
torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably,
by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected
and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part
be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and
soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the
driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the
carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759
and 1763.

Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC and Casiano Pascua et al.

G.R. No. 66102-04 (August 30, 1990)
Facts: On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers boarded a jeepney bound for
Pangasinan via Dau. Manalo drove the jeep owned by Magune and Carreon. Reaching
Tarlac, the right wheel of the jeep was detached resulting to its 180 degree turn invading the
other lane with the jeep’s front facing south. The bus driven by Del Rosario collided with the
jeepney resulting in the death of three passengers and physical injuries to some. Manalo was
convicted of Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. Manalo did not appeal.
Three Civil Cases fro Damages docketed 1136; 39-40 was filed anchored on the contractual
liability of the jeepney owner and Philippine Rabbit’s liability based on quasidelict. Trial
court decided against the jeepney operator as well as the joint liability of his Insurance Agency
for Actual and Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its decisions on the following:
(1)Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver was running really fast. (2)
Unrebutted testimony of Police Inspector on the sharp angle track marks of the jeep; the
observation
of the skid marks. (3) Manalo’s Conviction on the Criminal Compalint (4)Application of Res Ipsa
Loquitor, attesting to the collision happening on the right of way of the bus.
CA reversed decision. It ordered Plaintiff bus operator and driver to pay jointly and severally the
damages awarded. It based its decisions primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear
chance. 2.) presumption of the responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to avoid collision
with the vehicle in front. 3.) the substantial test concluding Bus driver negligent by not
making an effort to avoid accident and being the physical force causing the injury and death of
passengers.
Issue: Who has liability over the injuries and death of victims?
Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the jeepney operator for
failure to exercise precautions needed. The carrier is presumed to have been at fault
unless it is caso fortuito or that he has observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles
1733,55-56. Negligence was proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by the
trial court.
Last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not aride where a passenger demands
responsibility under culpa contractual. A negligent driver and its owner cannot be exempted
on the ground that the other party was likewise guilty of negligence. The substantial factor test
is testing whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another. THE FACT THAT THE ACTOR NEITHER FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE FORESEEN THE
EXTENT OF HARM OR MANNER IN WHICH THE EVENT
OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS LIABILITY. However, this test does not apply. The court
does not fault Reyes for not having avoided such sicne no other options are
available to him. The other lane even though empty was narrow and covered with tall grass.
The wheels of the bus were also clear of the roadwasy except the outher left that hit the jeep.
This clearly shows the attempt to hit the jeep. Inability to avoid the jeep must have been due to
the limitations of options.
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated with Modification that only the
Operator and the Insurance Company is liable for the victims and heirs. The
driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in Breach of Contract as
provided in Article 2180 and to make driver jointly and severally liable is to make the carrier’s
liability a personal one and not explicit.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

148 SCRA 353 (Mar 10, 1987)
Facts: Supra
Held: Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause"
of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the
defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense
of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since,
as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.
The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has
done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the
defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect
liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a
month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest
in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is
not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause.

Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo

G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)
Facts: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of his stepbrother to repair a "media agua" said
to be in a leaking condition. The "media agua" was just below the window of the third
story. Magno received from his son thru that window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the
leaking portion, turned around and in doing so, the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact
with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company. He died by electrocution.
His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the electric company.
Issue: Were the acts of Magno the proximate or the remote cause of the incident.
Held: Magno’s acts were the proximate cause. It is clear that the principal and proximate cause
of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the
reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
without taking any precaution. Magno was expected, as a person who is deemed a
professional in his line of work, to have looked back toward the street and at the wire to avoid
contacting with the iron sheet, the same being length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of
the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, the following citation is
helpful:
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act
or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C. J.
pp.
931-332.).
Furthermore, the owner of the house disregarded a city ordinance, declaring illegal the length
of less than 3 feet distance between a building and the electric pole. And added to this
violation, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. The electric
company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which
reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after finding that said
distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to
preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on
the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to
preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on
the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to
condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions.
Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the "media
agua" was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. And
contrary to the case of Astudillo vs. Manila electric, in the case at bar, the construction cannot
be said to be a public place as it is a private construction. The deceased person was also a
person of age who is expected to be more careful and knowledgeable as to what he is doing.

Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co.

G.R. No.15688 (November 19, 1921)
Facts: Manila Railroad Co. operates a line through the district of Daraga. As one of its trains
passed over the line, sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire
was communicated to four houses nearby, and they were entirely consumed. All of these
houses were of light construction except that of Rodrigueza’s, which was of strong materials,
though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the
passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing it. It doesn’t appear whose house caught
fire first, though Manila railroad claimed that it was first communicated to Rodrigueza’s house
and spread to the others. The plaintiffs claim that Manila Railroad was negligent in the
following manners: a. in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in charge of
the locomotive; b. in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated
without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; c. in using in its
locomotive Bataan fuel, a fuel of known inferior quality which upon combustion, produces
sparks in great quanity. Manila Railroad, on the other hand, argued that Rodrigueza’s house
stood partly within the limits of the land owned by it, thogh exactly how far away from the
company’s track does not appear. It also claimed of notifying Rodrigueza to get his house off
the land of the company, and that Rodrigueza did not comply.
Issue: Who should be liable?
Held: Manila Railroad should be liable. Whether or not the fire may have been communicated
through Rodrigueza’s house, or directly from the locomotive is immaterial. With regards to
the position of Rodrigueza’s house, there is no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon
the railroad’s property in the act of building his house. Rodrigueza may have assumed the
risk of loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant’s locomotives if
operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of
any damage that might result from the unlawful negligent acts of Manila Railroad. Nobody is
bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. The
circumstances cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of
action because, a) that condition was not created by himself, b) his house remained on the
ground by toleration and therefore with the consent of the Railroad co., and c) even supposing
the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant company in
negligently destroying it.

McKee vs. IAC

211 SCRA 517 (68102) (1992)
Facts: A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang and owned by private respondents Tayag and
Manalo was travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for
Manila. On the other hand, a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, was on its way to Angeles City
from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and
into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back.
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted
to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision
occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. The said
collision resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and physical
injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort. In the statement of Ruben Galang to the investigating police
officers immediately after the accident, he admitted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour
(48 kph).
Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga. The first civil case was for
damages for the death of Jose Koh. The second civil case, on the other hand, was
for the damages for the death of one and a half year old Kim Koh McKee and the physical
injuries sustained by George and Araceli. About a month later, a charge of reckless imprudence
resulting to multiple homicide, physical injuries and damage to property was filed against
Ruben Galang and was raffled in the same court where the second civil case was assigned. In
their Answer with Counterclaim for the first civil case, private respondents asserted that it was
the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped the lane of the truck driven by Ruben
Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of attorney's fees, actual and liquidated
damages, moral damages and business losses.
In the second civil case, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
pendency of another action and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben
Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with the first civil case
pending before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. Both
motions were denied by Judge Capulong. In the criminal case, a judgment of conviction was
rendered against Ruben Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two
(2) civil cases and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction but it was affirmed.
Plaintiffs (McKee) on the other hand, appealed the dismissal of the civil cases to the appellate
court.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The decision is anchored principally
on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or
reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as employers of
Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a
good
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. Private respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of facts and on the basis of which,
respondent court affirmed the trial court's decision in dismissing the civil cases. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Koh's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Held: NO. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of
the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the
driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the
immediate
and proximate cause of the collision.
This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that
the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of
the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his
mind at that time, a greater peril-death or injury to the two boys. Such act can hardly be
classified as negligent. No negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary
prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side
of
the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." Although it may
be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening cause, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was
the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to
slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing
down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
Moreover, the truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to
avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here.
Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided
the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the
last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof

Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo

G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)
Facts: Supra
Held: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
Teague vs. Fernandez
51 SCRA 181 (L-29745) (1973)
Facts: Realistic Institute is a vocational school for hair and beauty culture owned and operated
by defendant. It is located at the 2nd
floor of Gil-Armi Building. A fire broke out 10 meters
away from the building. The students upon seeing the fire panicked. The six instructresses tried
to calm them down. Mrs. Prieto, one of the instructresses even slapped three students to
quiet them down. The panic could not be subdued, thereby causing a stampede. No part of the
building was burned. But after the panic was over, four students including Lourdes
Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs were found dead.
Deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Teague, as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute. CFI dismissed the case. CA reversed, and awarded
damages of P11,000. CA held that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of
Hernandez’ death. The negligence was primarily predicated on the violation of the city
ordinance of
Manila, which consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time
of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction. Hence a petition
for review was filed in SC.
Issue: Are there independent causes/efficient intervening causes?
Held: None. The panic and stampede cannot be considered efficient intervening causes. It is
true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance was ahead and prior to the other
events in point of time, in the sense that it was contemporaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to
evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in
which it happened was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.
Urbano vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-72964 (1988)
Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was
wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
Held: Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease. In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took
place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980,
he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected
with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day
after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil.
1038).
Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)
Facts: Supra. Note: This is the first time the doctrine of last clear chance was introduced in
Philippine Jurisprudence.
Held: The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was his
duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the
bridge to take the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of
doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances,
the law is that the person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.