EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

B
y gathering 39 local scholars, experts, and civil society activists specialized
in racism and human rights, the fourth edition of the European Islamophobia
Report addresses a still timely and politically important issue. All 34 country
reports included in this book follow a unique structure that is convenient, first, for com- EUROPEAN
ISLAMOPHOBIA
paring country reports and, second, for selected readings on a particular topic such as
politics, employment, or education with regards to Islamophobia across Europe.
The present report investigates in detail the underlying dynamics that directly or indirectly
support the rise of anti-Muslim racism in Europe. This extends from Islamophobic state-
ments spread in national media to laws and policies that restrain the fundamental rights
of European Muslim citizens. As a result, the European Islamophobia Report 2018 dis-
REPORT
cusses the impact of anti-Muslim discourse on human rights, multiculturalism, and the
state of law in Europe.
2018
This fourth edition of our report highlights how European societies are challenged by the
ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)
rise of violent far-right groups that do not only preach hatred of Muslims but also partici-
pate in the organization of bloody terror attacks. The rise of far-right terrorist groups such
as AFO (Action of Operational Forces) in France or the network Hannibal in Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland confirms EUROPOL’s alarming surveys on the growing danger
of right-wing terrorism.
This year, SETA worked in cooperation with the Leopold Weiss Institute, an Austrian NGO
based in Vienna dedicated to the research of Muslims in Europe. In addition, the Euro-
pean Union has funded the European Islamophobia Report 2018 through the program
“Civil Society Dialogue Between EU and Turkey (CSD-V)”.

ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)

About SETA
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) is a non-profit research
institute based in Turkey dedicated to innovative studies on national, regional and interna-
tional issues. SETA is the leading think tank in Turkey and has offices in Ankara, Istanbul,
Washington D.C. and Cairo. The objective of SETA is to produce up-to-date and accu-
rate knowledge and analyses in the fields of politics, economy, and society, and inform
policy makers and the public on changing political, economic, social, and cultural condi-
tions. Through research reports, publications, brain storming sessions, conferences and
policy recommendations, SETA seeks to guide leaders in government, civil society, and
business, and contributes to informed decision making mechanisms.

ANKARA • ISTANBUL • WASHINGTON D.C. • CAIRO • BERLIN • BRUSSELS

 EUROPEAN
ISLAMOPHOBIA
REPORT
2018

ENES BAYRAKLI • FARID HAFEZ (Eds)

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility
of the authors of the national reports; and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs-Directorate for EU Affairs.
COPYRIGHT © 2019 by SETA
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other
means, without permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN: XX

First Published in 2019

Cover: Erkan Söğüt

Proofreading: Dr. Eva Stamoulou Oral

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ABOUT EDITORS
Enes Bayraklı
Enes Bayraklı earned his BA, MA and PhD from the Department of Political Science
at the University of Vienna, and conducted research for his PhD thesis at the Uni-
versity of Nottingham in Britain between 2009 and 2010. He was a deputy director
at the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in London in 2011-2013. Bayraklı also
served as the founding director of the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers in Con-
stanta and Bucharest, Romania in August-December 2012. He has been a faculty
member at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the
Turkish-German University since 2013. Currently he is also the coordinator of SETA
Brussels office and director of European Studies at SETA Foundation. His fields of re-
search include Islamophobia in Europe, far-right movements in Europe, the transfor-
mation of Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy analysis, and German foreign policy.

Farid Hafez
Farid Hafez, PhD (Political Science, University of Vienna), is currently lecturer and
researcher at the University of Salzburg, Department of Political Science and So-
ciology and senior researcher at Georgetown University’s “The Bridge Initiative” at
the School of Foreign Service. He defended his habilitation thesis on “Islam-Politics
in the Second Republic of Austria” at the University of Salzburg. In 2017, he was a
Fulbright visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley and in 2014, he
was a visiting scholar at Columbia University, New York. Since 2010 he has been the
editor of Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, and since 2016 the co-editor of European
Islamophobia Report. Hafez has received the Bruno Kreisky Award for the “Political
Book of the Year” for his anthology Islamophobia in Austria (co-edited with John
Bunzl). He has more than 80 publications in leading journals such as Politics and
Religion, Patterns of Prejudice, and German Politics and Society. His latest publica-
tions are Islamophobia in Muslim Majority Societies (Routledge, co-edited with Enes
Bayrakli) and Feindbild Islam. Über die Salonfähigkeit von Rassismus (Böhlau).

For more information about the EIR:

www.islamophobiaeurope.com
islamophobia@setav.org
 ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

ISLAMOPHOBIA IN
SERBIA
NATIONAL REPORT 2018
IVAN EJUB KOSTIĆ

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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

716 setav.org
 ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

The Author
Ivan Ejub Kostić is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Uni-
versity of Belgrade, Serbia. He graduated from the Department of Oriental Studies,
Arabic Language, Literature and Culture at the Faculty of Philology, University of
Belgrade. He holds a Master’s degree in Islamic Studies awarded by the same depart-
ment. In the academic years 2011-2013, he was a lecturer at the Faculty of Media and
Communications at Singidunum University, Belgrade, where he taught the courses
“Middle Eastern Culture and History” and “Orientalism and Occidentalism.” He is
one of the founders of the Balkan Centre for the Middle East, and became its manag-
ing director in 2013. He co-authored the book Persecuted Islam, published in 2013,
and edited the textbook Modern Islamic Thought, which was published in 2019. He
is a member of the editorial board of the academic periodical Journal for Religious Sci-
ences – Kom and a regular contributor to the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe published
by Brill. He is also a member of the European Muslim Network seated in Brussels.
Kostić has written numerous academic papers and articles in the field of Islamic
Studies, and he is a regular contributor to leading media outlets in the country and
the region on issues related to the Middle East and Islam.

Disclaimer: Statements of fact and opinion in the national reports of the European
Islamophobia Report are those of the respective authors. They are not the expression
of the editors or the funding institutions and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the European Union and Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Directorate for EU Affairs.

To cite this report: Ivan Ejub Kostić: Islamophobia in Serbia: National Report 2018, in: Enes Bayraklı &
Farid Hafez, European Islamophobia Report 2018, Istanbul, SETA, 2019, pp. 715-734.

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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

Executive Summary
Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, who were among the most prominent ad-
vocates of the nationalist politics which resulted in the crimes during the nineties,
came to power in 2012 when they seized power from the pro-democratic political
parties that had ousted the nationalist regime of Slobodan Milošević back in 2000.
From 2012 to the present day, there is a process of systematic political rehabilitation
of people who played the most sinister role in the events during the 1990s, together
with the process of the reaffirmation of the nationalist ideology of Great Serbia.
In such an atmosphere, anti-Muslim sentiment and narrative are on the rise,
which is most evident in pro-government media and the rise of right-wing organi-
zations. Needless to say, in addition to the hate speech present in the media on a
daily basis, we are witnessing a resurgence of the most vicious Serbian Islamophobes
in various fields of the public sphere, championed by the same extremists from the
1990s.
Serbia’s cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and the prosecution of war crimes
suspects from the 1990s before local courts of law was on a very low level. Likewise,
in July 2018, the Court of Appeals in Belgrade upheld the acquittal of the members
of paramilitary unit “Sima’s Chetniks” for the demolition of the mosque and the
murder of 27 Roma Muslims in the village of Skočić, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
July 1992. Furthermore, those responsible for crimes committed in the 1990s in the
Serbian territory, i.e. in Sandžak, have not been prosecuted.
Ultimately, one of the crucial problems that Serbia is facing regarding Islam-
ophobia and tackling it is the lack of any available data on hate crimes. The report
from the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stressed their
concern resulting from the fact that Serbia has no available statistical data or any
other information regarding claims and appeals, investigations or outcomes in cases
of offences committed from religious, racial, national, or ethnic hatred. The conclu-
sions from this report refer to the lack of statistical information not only in cases of
particular physical assaults, but also in instances of hate speech in the public sphere,
the media, and the Internet. For the reasons mentioned in the committee’s con-
clusion it is actually impossible to provide accurate information regarding physical
assaults and verbal attacks against Muslims, or members of predominantly Islamic
ethnic groups, such as Bosniaks, Albanians, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians.

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Izvršni rezime
Tomislav Nikolić i Aleksandar Vučić jedni od najznačajnijih prtagonista velikosprske
nacionalističke politike koja je dovela do zločina tokom devedesetih godina došli
suponovo na vlast 2012. godine kada su smenili prodemokratske snage koje su 2000.
godine srušile s vlasti nacionalistički režim Slobodana Miloševića. Od 2012. Pa do
danas odvija se sistematična rehabilitacija ličnosti koje su imale najmračniju ulogu u
dešavanjima tokom devedesetih, kao i ponovna reafirmacija veliko srpske nacionalis-
tičke ideologije. U takvoj atmosferi dolazi i do izuzetnog porasta antimuslimanskog
narativa koji se pre svega ogleda u radu prorežimskih medija, kao i jačanju ultra-des-
ničarskih organizacija. Naravno, osim govora mržnje u medijima došlo je i do pop-
tunog povratka na javnu scenu najostrašćenijih srbijanskih islamofoba iz devedesetih
godina u najrazličitijim segmentima društva.
Osim toga, Evropska komisija je u izveštaju za 2018. godine ocenila saradnju
Srbije sa Haškim sudom, kao i procesuiranje osumnjičenih za ratne zločine tokom
devedesetih godina pred domaćim sudovima, veoma niskom ocenom. Takođe u julu
ove godine Apelacioni sud u Beogradu potvrdio je oslobađajuću presudu protiv pri-
padnika jedinice “Simini četnici” za rušenje džamije i za ubistvo 27 Roma muslima-
na u selu Skočić, u Bosni i Hercegovini, u julu 1992. godine. Isto tako, odgovorni
za zločine počinjene na samoj teritoriji Srbije – konkretno u Sandžačkoj regiji tokom
devedesetih godina – takođe nisu još uvek procesuirani.
Takođe, jedan od krucijalnih problema s kojim se Srbija suočava kada je reč o
islamofobiji i borbi protiv nje, jeste nepostojanje dostupnih podataka koji se tiču
zločina počinjenih iz mržnje. U svojim zaključnim zapažanjima iz decembra 2017.
godine Komitet za eliminaciju rasne diskriminacije pri Ujedinjenim nacijama izrazio
je zabrinutost jer Srbija ne raspolaže statističkim, niti bilo kakvim drugim podacima,
o pritužbama, istragama i ishodima za slučajeve koji su počinjeni iz verske, rasne
ili nacionalno-etničke mržnje. Zaključci se odnose na nepostojanje statističkih po-
dataka ne samo u slučajevima konkretnih fizičkih napada, već i na govor mržnje u
javnom, medijskom i virtuelnom prostoru. Posledicom toga nemoguće je dati tačne
podatke koji se odnose na fizičke i verbalne napada na muslimane, kao i na pripadni-
ke etničkih zajednica koje su predominantno islamske veroispovesti poput Bošnjaka,
Albanaca, Roma, Aškalija i Egipćana.

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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

Country Profile
Country: Serbia
Type of Regime: Democratic Republic
Form of Government: Parliamentary Republic
Ruling Parties: Serbian Progressive Party (populist conservative party)
Opposition Parties: See Below.
Last Elections: 2017 Presidential Election (Leader of Serbian Progressive Party Alek-
sandar Vučić won 55.08% of the vote against 16.36% of independent candidate
Aleksandar Saša Janković); 2016 Parliamentary Election (Populist Conservative Co-
alition around Serbian Progressive Party 131 seats, Socialist Party of Serbia [the party
which was led during the nineties by Slobodan Milošević] 29 seats, Far-Right Serbi-
an Radical Party 22 seats, Center-Left Coalition around Democratic Party 16 seats,
Neoliberal Movement “Enough is enough. Restart” 16 seats, Far-Right Movement
“Dveri” and Democratic Party of Serbia 13 seats, etc.)
Total Population: 7.03 million (in 2017)
Major Languages: Serbian
Official Religion: No state religion. The dominant Serbian Orthodox Church and
other “traditional” religious communities receive preferential status based on the
“Law on Churches and Religious Communities” adopted in 2006.
Statistics on Islamophobia: No official/unofficial statistics available.
Statistics on Racism and Discrimination: No official/unofficial statistics available.
Major Religions (% of Population): Orthodox Christianity (84.59%), Catholi-
cism (4.97%), Islam (3.10%), Protestantism (0.99%), No religion (1.11%), Others
(5.24%).
Muslim Population (% of Population): 222,829 people (3.1%) in 2011 (official
census). This number is without Albanians who boycotted the census as well as sig-
nificant number of Bosniaks. The reason why they boycotted the census is that they
didn’t have questionnaires in their mother tongue. Also, the number of Roma and
Ashkali Muslims is much higher, because of extremely poor conditions they don’t
posses any documents so they remain “unrecognized citizens”. The number of Mus-
lims living in Serbia is approximately around 400.000-500.000.
Main Muslim Community Organizations: Islamic Community in Serbia; Islamic
Community of Serbia.
Main NGOs Combating Islamophobia: There is no particular NGO that deals
with Islamophobia. Data and work is done only by certain individuals.
Far-Right Parties: Serbian Radical Party, Movement “Dveri”, Democratic Party of Serbia.
Far-Right Movements: Otadžbinski pokret Obraz, Srpski sabor Zavetnici, Srpski
narodni pokret “Naši”, Srpski narodni pokret “1389”, Nacionalni srpski front, Or-
ganizacija “Alternativa.”

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 ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

Far-Right Terrorist Organizations: N/A

Limitations to Islamic Practices
− Hijab Ban: No
− Halal Slaughter Ban: No
− Minaret Ban: No (depends on local decision)
− Circumcision Ban: No
− Burka Ban: No
− Prayer Ban: No

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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

Introduction
It is not possible to understand the current status of Muslims in Serbia without
referring to the nationalist ideology of Great Serbia, which was formed back in the
19th century, in the times of liberation from the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The
perception of Muslims as the archetypical enemy, that is, the epitome of the Other,
is probably one of the key factors that constitute the Serbian nationalist identity. It
is precisely on that basis that on several occasions in the 20th century, the Serbs per-
petrated ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Muslim population living in the
territories of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The last in a series
of crimes against the Muslim population was carried out in the wake of the disinte-
gration of the former Yugoslavia, and it took place in the territories of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the Republic of Kosovo. During that period, the Serbian forces
held Sarajevo under siege for three years, and were responsible for mass killings in
the locality of Prijedor Municipality, the genocide against Muslims in Srebrenica,
as well as ethnic cleansing committed against the Albanian population in Kosovo.
Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, who were among the most prominent ad-
vocates of the nationalist politics which resulted in those crimes, came to power in
2012 once again, when they seized power from the pro-democratic political parties
that had ousted the nationalist regime of Slobodan Milošević back in 2000.1 From
2012 to the present day, there is a process of systematic political rehabilitation of
people who played the most sinister role in the events during the 1990s, alongside
the process of reaffirmation of the nationalist ideology of Great Serbia. In such an
atmosphere, anti-Muslim sentiment and narrative are on the rise, which is most
evident in pro-government media and the rise of right-wing organizations. Needless
to say, in addition to the hate speech present in the media on a daily basis, we are
witnessing a resurgence of Islamophobia in various fields of the public sphere, cham-
pioned by the same extremists from the 1990s - an issue that will be addressed in
more detail later in this report.
The main features of the Serbian national identity are best described in a recent
Pew Research Center study published in 2018 entitled Eastern and Western Europeans
Differ on Importance of Religion, Views on Minorities, and Key Social Issues. As much
as 78% of the Serbian citizens believe that religion (in this case, Orthodox Christi-
anity) is the key aspect of their national identity. Likewise, 78% of Serbs believe that
“their culture is superior to other cultures,” a fact that positions them among the

1.Tomislav Nikolić was vice-president and Aleksandar Vučić secretary general of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical
Party, which sent volunteers to war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From its foundation to the present day, the leader
of this right-wing party has been Vojislav Šešelj who was found guilty at The Hague Tribunal and sentenced to 10
years in prison for instigating crimes with his nationalist speeches, given in Vojvodina back in 1992, during the war.
Moreover, one of the most notorious statements given by Aleksandar Vučić, currently the Serbian president, dating
from that period came barely a few days after the genocide in Srebrenica, when at the National Parliament he pub-
licly said, “For every Serb killed, we will kill 100 Muslims.”

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 ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

top-rated nations in that respect. Within the context of their views on Islam, namely
when asked if they would accept a Muslim as a member of their family, only 43%
answered positively.2 This statistical data undoubtedly testifies to the exclusivist and
racist nature of Serbian national identity.
However, it is important to point out that the current opposition parties,
which led to the toppling of the regime of Slobodan Milošević back in 2000, are
largely pro-nationalist as well. It is precisely this fact that best explains why there
has basically been no fundamental political change after the fall of Milošević, and
consequently no coming to terms with the past and the crimes committed. In oth-
er words, one of the greatest problems in Serbian politics is the current lack of any
significant alternative force which could result in the affirmation of a civic identity
open to the inclusion of members of other ethnicities and different religious de-
nominations and confessions.

Discussion of Islamophobic Incidents

and Discursive Events
Physical and Verbal Attacks
In the conclusion of their report from December 2017, the UN Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stressed their concern resulting from the
fact that Serbia has no available statistical data or any other information regarding
claims and appeals, investigations or outcomes in cases of offences committed from
religious, racial, national, or ethnic hatred. The conclusions from this report refer to
the lack of statistical information not only on cases of particular physical assaults, but
also on instances of hate speech in the public sphere, the media, and the Internet.3
For the reasons mentioned in the committee’s conclusion it is actually impossible to
provide accurate information regarding physical assaults and verbal attacks against
Muslims, or members of predominantly Islamic ethnic groups, such as Bosniaks,
Albanians, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. Therefore, for the requirements of this
report, it was necessary to conduct a series of interviews with representatives of var-
ious non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Belgrade Centre for Human
Rights, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers’ Committee for Human
Rights, Roma Center for Women and Children “Daje”, Sandžak Committee for
Human Rights, the NGO Lighthouse (Svetionik) from Novi Pazar, as well as official
representatives from the Bosniac National Council, Roma National Council, Egyp-

2. This number should be taken with due caution, given that there are some public opinion polls that claim this
percentage is significantly lower if the question is defined in terms of ethnicity. In general, Bosniaks, Roma, and
Albanians are the least wanted as family members.
3. The report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is available at: https://tbinternet.
ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/SRB/CERD_ C_SRB_CO_2-5_29702_E.pdf (Access date: 2
September 2019).

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EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

Human Rights, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Roma Center for Women and Children
“Daje”, Sandžak Committee for Human Rights, the NGO Lighthouse (Svetionik) from Novi
Pazar, as well as
tian National official and
Council, representatives from the
Ashkali National BosniacI National
Council. Council,
also talked Roma National
with representa-
Council, Egyptian
tives of two IslamicNational Council,
communities and
active Ashkalithat
in Serbia, National
is, the Council. I also talked
Islamic Community of with
Serbia and theofIslamic
representatives Community
two Islamic in Serbia.
communities activeThe most brutal
in Serbia, that is,physical assault
the Islamic took of
Community
place on
Serbia and7the
October,
Islamic in Novi Sad,inwhen
Community twoThe
Serbia. young
most men
brutalofphysical
Albanian ethnicity
assault were on 7
took place
beaten up
October, by four
in Novi Sad,men
whenoftwo
Serbian
youngethnicity. As a consequence
men of Albanian ofbeaten
ethnicity were this attack, the men
up by four
life of one of the Albanians was in danger, but he was given adequate medical assis-
of Serbian ethnicity. As a consequence of this attack, the life of one of the Albanians was in
tance and eventually his condition became stable. One of the young men who were
danger, but he was given adequate medical assistance and eventually his condition became
attacked said that they were assaulted when a group of young men standing nearby
stable. One of the young men who were attacked said that they were assaulted when a group of
heard him speak to his friend in Albanian. This incident also provoked an official
young
reactionmen
by standing nearby
the Albanian heard him
National speakintoSerbia.
Council his friend
4 in Albanian. This incident also
provoked an official reaction by the Albanian Foundation in Serbia.4

Figure 1: Left: followers of the Serbian Radical Party start to gather in front of the Orthodox Saint Sava Church. Middle:
Figure 1: Left: followers
Vojislav of theofSerbian
Šešelj, leader Radical
the Serbian Party
Radical start
Party. to protesters
Right: gather in front of the
clash with theOrthodox Saint Sava Church.
police forces.
Middle: Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party. Right: protesters clash with the police forces.

ThereThere
was another case which
was another shouldshould
case which be mentioned. It was a Itseries
be mentioned. was aofseries
incidents related to the
of incidents
festival
related “Miridita, Hello”
to the festival organized
“Mirdita, by theorganized
Hello” Youth Initiative
by thefor Human
Youth Rights.for
Initiative TheHuman
festival was
focused
Rights. on
Thethe Kosovar
festival was cultural
focused scene
on theand the works
Kosovar of Albanian
cultural scene andartists, with of
the works theAl-
aim of
banian artists,
normalizing the with the aim
relations of normalizing
between Kosovo andthe relations
Serbia. Two between Kosovo
days before and Serbia.
the festival was to take
Two days
place, before the right-wing
ultranationalist festival wasparliamentary
to take place,party
ultranationalist
Dveri and theright-wing parliamen-
Democratic Party of Serbia
tary partyaDveri
organized street and theunder
protest Democratic Party
the slogan of Serbia
“Miridita, organized
Goodbye.” a street
This protest
protest under
was held without
the slogan “Mirdita, Goodbye.” This protest was held without any major incidents.
any major incidents. However, on the day the festival was inaugurated there was another protest
However, on the day the festival was inaugurated there was another protest which
which was organized by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by convicted war criminal
was organized by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by convicted war criminal
Vojislav Šešelj, which prompted police forces to intervene in order to protect the participants
Vojislav Šešelj, which prompted police forces to intervene in order to protect the
at the festival at
participants from
thethe protesters.
festival from During the incident
the protesters. numerous
During cases ofnumerous
the incident hate speechcases
occurred
based
of hateonspeech
racial occurred
and religious
baseddiscrimination. This led to
on racial and religious legal charges This
discrimination. against
ledthe offenders
to legal
charges
being againstwhich
pressed, the offenders being pressed,
will be commented which
in more willfurther
detail be commented in more detail
on in this report.
further on in this report.
In addition to the assault mentioned above, there were also other incidents that
4
“Dva Albanca pretučena u Novom Sadu, jedan životno ugrožen”, Danas, 7 October 2018,
took place at sports events. One of the major incidents was when during the basket-
https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/dva-albanca-pretucena-u-novom-sadu-jedan-zivotno-ugrozen/, (Access date: 3
ball game2019).
September played by their club against Olympiakos from Greece, the Red Star fans
displayed a banner which read, “Shqiptars, Croats, Balija ain’t no brothers of mine.”
This was a protest because the club had just signed Alen Omić, a player of Bosniak

4. “Dva Albanca pretučena u Novom Sadu, jedan životno ugrožen”, Danas, 7 October 2018, https://www.danas.rs/
drustvo/dva-albanca-pretucena-u-novom-sadu-jedan-zivotno-ugrozen/, (Access date: 3 September 2019).

724 setav.org
 “Shqiptars, Croats, Balija ain’t no brothers of mine.” This was a protest because the club had
In addition
justtosigned
the assault mentioned
Alen Omić, a playerabove, there ethnicity.
of Bosniak were alsoDuring
other the
incidents thatRed
game, the tookStarplace
fansatalso
sports events. One of the major incidents was when during the basketball game playedINbySERBIA
their
displayed another banner which read, “We thank the management for all the joy and trophies,
ISLAMOPHOBIA

club against Olympiakos from Greece, the Red Star fans displayed a banner which read,
but don’t count on us while there are unwanted players,” which was a clear message that they
“Shqiptars, Croats, Balija ain’t no brothers of mine.” This was a protest because the club had
just signedwould
Alenboycott
Omić, the gamesofasBosniak
a player long as Muslim player
ethnicity. Omićthe
During played
game,forthe
theirRed
club.Star fans also
ethnicity. During the game, the Red Star fans also displayed another banner which
read, “Wedisplayed
thank the another read,all“We
banner whichfor
management thethank the management
joy and trophies, for
butalldon’t
the joycount
and trophies,
on us
while therebutare
don’t count on usplayers,”
unwanted while therewhich
are unwanted
was aplayers,” which wasthat
clear message a clear
theymessage
would thatboy-
they
cott the games
would as longtheasgames
boycott Muslim player
as long Omić
as Muslim played
player Omićfor their
played for club.
their club.

Figure 2: Banner displayed during the game played between Red Star and Olympiakos, which reads, “Shqiptars,
Croats and Balija (derogative term for Turks and South Slavs who accepted Islam) ain’t no brothers of mine.”5
Figure 2: Banner displayed during the game played between Red Star and Olympiakos, which reads, “Shqiptars,
Figure
Croats and Balija2:(derogative
Banner displayed
term during theand
for Turks gameSouth
playedSlavs
between
who Red Star and
accepted Olympiakos,
Islam) which reads,
ain’t no brothers “Shqiptars,
of mine.”5
Croats and Furthermore, it has
Balija (derogative termbecome quite
for Turks andcommon thatwhoderogatory
South Slavs graffitiain’tis sprayed
accepted Islam) across
no brothers houses
of mine.”5
in
Furthermore,
Furthermore,it ithas
which has become
Muslim families
become quite
quitelive. common
Following
common that the that derogatory
football
derogatory match
graffitiplayed graffiti
between
is sprayed is houses
sprayed
Switzerland
across inand
across houses in which Muslim families live. Following the football match played
which Muslim families
Serbiaand live.Cup
at theSerbia
World Following
in Russia, the
when football match
the Swiss played
player between Switzerland
Xherdan and
between Switzerland at the World Cup in Russia, whenShaqiri celebrated
the Swiss scoring
player
Serbia at celebrated
Xherdan Shaqiri the World Cup in Russia,the when the which
Swiss player Xherdan Shaqiri celebrated
against scoring
the goal whichscoring
sealed the victorygoalagainst Serbiasealed
by makingthethevictory
sign of two-headed Serbia
eagle, the
by makingthe
thegoal which
sign sealed the victory
of two-headed against
eagle, theSerbia
emblem by making
fromthe thesign of two-headed
Albanian flag, eagle,
the wallthe
of the Alomerović emblem
family fromhouse
the Albanian
in flag, the wall
Belgrade was the Alomerović
ofsprayed with family
the house in Belgrade
graffiti “Kosovo was
emblem from the Albanian flag, the wall of the Alomerović family house in Belgrade was
and Metohija aresprayed
Serbian lands.”
with the graffiti Around
“Kosovo andthe samearetime,
Metohija Serbian eggs
lands.”were
Around thrown
the same at the
time, eggs
sprayed with the graffiti “Kosovo and Metohija are Serbian lands.” Around the same time, eggs
house of another family living in the same Belgrade vicinity.
wereatthrown
were thrown at theofhouse
the house anotherof another
family family
living living
in theinsame
the same Belgrade
Belgrade vicinity.
vicinity.

Figure 3: Wall surrounding the Alomerović family house in Belgrade.6

Figure
Figure3:3:Wall
Wallsurrounding
surroundingthe Alomerović family family
the Alomerović house inhouse
Belgrade. 6
in Belgrade.6

Employment
5
“Delije’ Brutalno Dočekale Omića: ‘Šiptar, Hrvat, Balija Nisu Moja Bratija!”, Novosti, 26 January, 2018,
As in the case of physical and verbal assaults, there are no official statistics or infor-
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/sport.295.html:708442-DELIJE-BRUTALNO-DOCEKALE-OMICA-Siptar-Hrvat-
mation regarding cases of (Access
Balija-nisu-moja-bratija, discrimination in2019).
date: 2 September employment on a religious, racial, na-
6 5
“Delije’
The photograph Brutalno
of the Dočekale
Alomerović Omića:
family ‘Šiptar,
house Hrvat, Balija
was provided to theNisu
author the familyNovosti,
MojabyBratija!”, members.26 January, 2018,
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/sport.295.html:708442-DELIJE-BRUTALNO-DOCEKALE-OMICA-Siptar-Hrvat-
5. “Delije’ Brutalno Dočekale Omića: ‘Šiptar, Hrvat, Balija Nisu Moja Bratija!”, Novosti, 26 January, 2018, http://
Balija-nisu-moja-bratija, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
www.novosti.rs/vesti/sport.295.html:708442-DELIJE-BRUTALNO-DOCEKALE-OMICA-Siptar-Hrvat-Bali-
6
The photograph
ja-nisu-moja-bratija, (Access of the Alomerović
date: 2 September 2019).family house was provided to the author by the family members.
6. The photograph of the Alomerović family house was provided to the author by the family members.

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 725

EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

tional, or ethnic basis in Serbia. However, there is no doubt that it is the Roma, Ash-
kali, and Egyptians who definitely face discrimination the most. Representatives of
their respective national councils said that they actually face “double discrimination”:
firstly based on their skin color, and secondly based on their religion.7 Moreover, the
situation described in the previous annual report regarding unemployment in areas
with predominantly Muslim population, such as Sandžak (Bosniak population) and
the Preshevo Valley (Albanian population) has remained the same. It is important to
point out that the average salary in Sandžak, in particular in the town of Novi Pazar,
is the lowest in entire Serbia. In January 2018, the average salary in Serbia amounted
to RSD 50,048 (approximately EUR 425), whereas in Novi Pazar it only amounted
to RSD 38,423 (approximately EUR 325).8 In addition to this imbalance in income,
another problem stressed by all the representatives of councils of Islamic ethnic mi-
norities is the fact that there is inequality with regard to the percentage of employees
at state institutions with national structure. This is indirectly related to the number
of employees in the police and judiciary.

Education
With regard to the issue of education, members of Islamic ethnic minorities face
significant problems. In the first place, there is a problem with the textbooks for
primary and secondary schools in the languages of the respective ethnic minorities,
as well as the formation of classes for Bosniak and Albanian children. Talking to
the representative of the Bosniac National Council, we were informed that they are
under constant pressure by school principals and teachers for their children not to
enrol in Bosniak classes. Moreover, there are no textbooks in minority languages for
vocational secondary schools such as ones for medicine, economics, and art design.
Likewise, since its introduction back in 2001, classes of religious education
at schools are a huge problem for Muslims. Representatives of the Islamic com-
munity stated that Muslims face systematic discrimination and a whole range of
practices aimed at hindering the implementation of the law on religious education
for Muslim children.9
Nevertheless, as is the case with other issues, it is the children from Roma,
Ashkali, and Egyptian ethnic minorities who are least favored and find themselves
in the worst situation. Only 6% of Roma children enroll in preschool institutions,
and 46% of them complete obligatory primary school education, while barely 13%
finish high school, with the number of girls being half that of boys. These figures are

7. In conversation with representatives of the Ashkali community, we were informed that in the case of this ethnic
group unemployment rate hovers around 90%.
8. S. Novosel, “Novopazarske plate na začelju”, Danas, 27 March, 2018, https://www.danas.rs/ekonomija/novo-
pazarske-plate-na-zacelju, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
9. For more information about Islamic religious education in Serbia see Ivan Ejub Kostić, “Serbia”, Yearbook of
Muslims in Europe, ed. Scharbrodt, O., Volume: 8, (Leiden: Brill, 2017), p. 603.

726 setav.org
 ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

actually even lower in the case of Ashkali and Egyptian children who are not guaran-
teed affirmative actions as their Roma counterparts.
Meanwhile, the problem with history textbooks that was highlighted in the
previous year’s report on Serbia remains unchanged. The main problems are the
completely “distorted representations of the Ottoman period and the depiction of
the basics of Islamic faith and culture.”10 These textbooks are widely in use not only
among Serbian Orthodox children but among Albanian, Bosniak, and Roma chil-
dren as well.
As regarding halal food in Serbian schools, preschool institutions and primary
schools do not provide such meals for Muslim children.

Politics
As we already pointed out in the introduction, the biggest problem in the political
arena is the revival of the political actors who held the power in the 1990s. At the
moment, the ruling party in Serbia is the Serbian Progressive Party, which emerged
from the extremist right-wing Serbian Radical Party, which was the most aggressive
advocate of the nationalist ideology of Great Serbia. Moreover, the Serbian Progres-
sive Party holds power in the coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia, which ruled
the country during the 1990s, and whose president was Slobodan Milošević. The
ruling Serbian Progressive Party and the media under its influence use many occasions
to spread narratives that are not necessarily openly anti-Muslim, but in general refer
positively to events from the past when Muslims in the territory of the former Yu-
goslavia were expelled or murdered for their religion or ethnicity.11 Serbian Muslims,
who are also mostly members of ethnic minorities such as Bosniak, Albanian, Roma,
Ashkali, and Egyptian, feel insecure and threatened due to the re-emergence of such
a political climate.
The most blatant instance of hate speech in the political arena in 2018 was
when Vjerica Radeta, MP from the Serbian Radical Party, referring to the death
of Hatidža Mehmedović, president of the civic association Mothers of Srebrenica,
whose husband and two sons were murdered in the Srebrenica Genocide, posted
on her Twitter profile: “I heard that the head of the Srebrenica businesswomen’s
association Hatidža Mehmedović died. Who is going to bury her? Her husband
or her sons?” 12

10. Ivan Ejub Kostić, “Islamophobia in Serbia: National Report 2017”, European Islamophobia Report 2017, ed. Enes
Bayraklı & Farid Hafez, (SETA, Istanbul: 2018), p. 548.
11. The reasons that most often serve as motive for hate speech include Serbia-Kosovo negotiations, as well as seces-
sionist acts and the constant efforts to undermine the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out by Milorad
Dodik, currently chairman and Bosnian Serbs’ representative at the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12. For more about this tweet: Tony Wesolowsky, “Death of Outspoken Srebrenica Mother Mocked by Top Serbian
Official”, Radio Free Europe, 25 July 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbian-parliament-deputy-speaker-mocks-sre-
brenica-mother-s-death/29390764.html, (Access date: 2 September 2019).

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 727

 president of the civic association Mothers of Srebrenica, whose husband and two
murderedREPORT
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA in the2018
Srebrenica Genocide, posted on her Twitter profile: “I heard that t
the Srebrenica businesswomen’s association Hatidža Mehmedović died. Who is goi
her? Her husband or her sons?” 12

Figure 4: Vjerica Radeta’s tweet.

Figure 4: Vjerica Radeta’s tweet.

What is more, The Hague Tribunal is currently conducting a legal procedure
against Vjerica What
Radetaisbecause
more, The Hague
during Tribunal
the trial againstisVojsilav
currently conducting
Šešelj a legal procedure again
she influenced
court witnessesRadeta becauseorduring
by threatening bribingthethemtrial against
in order to Vojsilav
change theirŠešelj she influenced court wi
statements
or to drop theirthreatening
charges. In this year’s report,
or bribing them the European
in order Committee
to change criticized the
their statements or to drop their charg
Serbian government because of their unwillingness to arrest Vjerica Radeta and to
year’s report, the European Committee criticized the Serbian government becau
send her to The Hague Tribunal, and their failure to dismiss her from the National
Parliament.13 Inunwillingness to arrest
addition to this, VjericaVjerica
RadetaRadeta
was alsoand
thetomost
sendvocal
her toinThe Hague Tribunal, and th
the call
to prevent the festival “Mirdita,
to dismiss Hello”
her from thefrom takingParliament.
National place, which13isInwhy the Belgrade
addition to this, Vjerica Radeta w
Center for Human Rights pressed criminal charges against her based on a number
most vocal in the call to prevent the festival “Miridita, Hello” from taking place, wh
of her statements.
The speechthebyBelgrade Center
Aleksandar VučićforonHuman Rights pressed
9 September at Lake criminal
Gazivode,charges
locatedagainst her based on
on the territoryofofher Kosovo, is exceptionally important.14 During his speech, among
statements.
other things, President Vučić said to the gathered Serbs that “Milošević was a great
The speech by Aleksandar Vučić on 9 September at Lake Gazivode, located on the
Serbian leader, his intentions were certainly best, but the results were bad.” Such a
14
Kosovo, Vučić
statement by President is exceptionally
clearly showsimportant. During
his stance on his speech, among
the ultra-nationalist pol- other things, Presid
itics of SlobodansaidMilošević,
to the gathered
as well asSerbs that that
his view “Milošević was aofgreat
the sufferings Serbian leader, his inten
the Muslim
population during the 1990s
certainly best,can
but be
theunderstood
results wereas bad.”
“best intentions.” Likewise,
Such a statement this
by President Vučić clearly
statement makes it evident that he is only sorry that things turned out bad for “us”
(Orhodox Serbs). stance
15 on the ultra-nationalist politics of Slobodan Milošević, as well as his vie
In additionsufferings
to Presidentof Vučić’s
the Muslim population
controversial during
speech theoccasion,
on that 1990s can be understood as “best i
in which
he actually rehabilitated Milošević’s politics and relativized its effects, in an interview
for Deutsche Welle, Prime Minister Ana Brnabić explicitly denied that there was a
12
For more about this tweet: Tony Wesolowsky, “Death of Outspoken Srebrenica Mother Mocked by
Official”, Radio Free Europe, 25 July 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbian-parliament-deputy-spe
srebrenica-mother-s-death/29390764.html, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
13
“Serbia http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/eu_dokumenta/go-
13. “Serbia 2018 Report”, European Commission, 2018 Report”, European C
http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/eu_dokumenta/godisnji_izvestaji_ek_o_napretku/ec_prog
disnji_izvestaji_ek_o_napretku/ec_progress_report_18.pdf, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
18.pdf, (Access date: 2 September 2019).
14. When considering 14 this speech by President Vučić we must bear in mind that in 1989 Slobodan Milošević gave
When considering
his famous speech at Gazimestan, thishistorians
which, as many speech believe,
by President
augured Vučić we mustbloody
the forthcoming bear disintegration
in mind that in 1989 Slobodan Mi
of Yugoslavia. his famous speech at Gazimestan, which, as many historians believe, augured the forthcom
disintegration of Yugoslavia.
15. Gordana Knežević, “Vucic’s ‘Great’ Milosevic Remark Evokes Ghost of ‘Greater Serbia”, Radio Free Europe, 12
September 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/vucic-s-great-milosevic-evokes-ghost-of-greater-serbia-/29486327.html,
(Access date: 1 September 2019).

728 setav.org
 ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SERBIA

genocide in Srebrenica.16 Moreover, this instance of genocide denial by the prime

minister was only one in a series of statements aiming to minimize the crimes com-
mitted during the 1990s, made by high-ranking officials from the ruling Serbian
Radical Party, which bore no consequences for such claims.
The situation is no better among the so-called democratic opposition, which
united in 2018 in the newly formed Alliance for Serbia. Political parties and move-
ments united in this alliance also include the far-right clero-fascist movement Dveri,
as well as the right-wing People's Party. In their public statements, representatives of
the Serbian Movement Dveri usually deny the genocide in Srebrenica, while openly
claiming that Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić are in a class with the greatest
“heroes” in the entire Serbian history.17
Furthermore, the Serbian Movement Dveri staunchly advocates anti-immigrant poli-
cies. The most radical example of such a stance was the statement made by Srđan Nogo, MP
from the ranks of the Dveri Movement, who said, referring to Prime Ministers' signature
on the Dublin Regulation, that “she (Prime Minister Ana Brnabić) should be immediately
hanged on Terazije Square. With (President) Aleksandar Vučić by her side.”18
The attitude of the state authorities toward the legal status of the Islamic com-
munity still remains a moot point. Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, there has been
a number of Islamic communities active in Serbia. Since the Law on Churches and
Religious Communities was passed back in 2006, the question of recognizing the
legitimacy of a single Islamic community remains open. As a result of this situation,
the restitution of property of the Islamic community is simply not possible, nor the
exercise of rights guaranteed under the law.19 Regarding this issue, the European
Commission in its aforementioned annual report stated that ”the lack of transparen-
cy and consistency in the registration process of religious communities remains one
of the main obstacles preventing some religious groups from exercising their rights.”20

16. “Serbian PM Ana Brnabic: Srebrenica ‘a Terrible Crime,’ Not Genocide”, Deutsche Welle, 15 November 2018,
https://www.dw.com/en/serbian-pm-ana-brnabic-srebrenica-a-terrible-crime-not-genocide/a-46307925, (Access
date: 1 September 2019).
17. Xenophobic views advocated by Boško Obradović are most evident on the debate television show which fea-
tured Obradović and Vojislav Šešelj and aired on the TV channel Studio B during the campaign for the election
of Belgrade mayor. Војвода Шешељ, ТВ ДУЕЛ: Проф. др Војислав Шешељ - Бошко Обрадовић - Студио
Б - 24.02.2018, Youtube, 24 February 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDFdk9iKzo0, (Access date: 2
September 2019).
18. Srđan Nogo - Anu Brnabić treba obesiti na terazijama, YouTube,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8s_jBW7axzU, (Access date: 1 September 2019).
19. No property confiscated after World War II claimed by the Islamic community has been returned. So far, the Is-
lamic community has filed 56 requests for the restitution of property. In the cases of other religious communities and
churches, the situation is far better. For instance, the Jewish community was given back 91% of its land and 67% of
its buildings, whereas the Serbian Orthodox Church was given back 77% of its land and 28% of its buildings, and
so on. For more information about the property returned until the end of 2018, see Jelena Calija, “Crkvama vraćeno
90 odsto oduzete imovine”, Politika, 28 October 2018, http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/414387/Crkvama-vrace-
no-90-odsto-oduzete-imovine, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
20. “Serbia 2018 Report”, European Commission, http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/eu_dokumenta/go-
disnji_izvestaji_ek_o_napretku/ec_progress_report_18.pdf, (Access date: 2 September 2019).

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 729

EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

Media
Since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power, traditional media such as televi-
sion and the press became significantly less independent. The vast majority of TV
channels with national frequencies (like TV Pink, Radio-Television of Serbia, Happy
TV, TV Prva, etc.) are under direct or indirect control of the ruling power struc-
tures.21 As regarding the contents of its program, the most disreputable TV channel
is undoubtedly the privately owned Happy TV. Its director is Milomir Marić, a jour-
nalist who also hosts the talk show “Cyrillic,” in which he often interviews Vojislav
Šešelj, as well as other war criminals such as Veselin Šljivančanin, Vladimir Lazarević,
and others. What is more, in November 2018, the morning show on Happy TV had
a live broadcast of Ratko Mladić, who is responsible for the genocide in Srebrenica,
while Vojislav Šešelj was in the TV studio. Mladić finished his appearance on this
talk show by saying, “Kisses to all of you from Grandpa Ratko.”

Figure 5: Ratko Mladić live from The Hague on the air in the morning show hosted by Milomir Marić.22
Figure 5: Ratko Mladić live from The Hague on the air in the morning show hosted by Milomir Marić
Just like in the previous year, tabloid newspapers, most flagrantly the daily In-
former, Just like in
regularly the previous
publish year,
stories and tabloid
articles with newspapers,
the most vulgar most of hatethe daily Informer,
flagrantly
examples
speech. On a daily basis, its front pages feature headlines full of derogatory terms for
publish stories and articles with the most vulgar examples of hate speech. On a daily
the members of Albanian ethnicity, while openly sabre rattling and warmongering,
front pages feature headlines full of derogatory terms for the members of Albanian
21. Gjeraqina Tuhina, “Izveštaj EK: Srbija nije napredovala u ključnim oblastima”, Radio Free Europe, 15 Novem-
ber 2018,while openly sabre rattling and warmongering, constantly scaring the readers that
https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/evropska-komisija-interni-dokument-srbija-bez-napretka/29602334.
html?fbclid=IwAR0dq_8k9Km7hOE4I80Ik9L6CXEDGOKAICHZylMurZxXdf15cHPstbBx-Tk, (Access date: 1
Septemberthreatened
2019). by the Jihadists. To illustrate this, I enclose several photos of its front pag
22. Jutarnji Program TV HAPPY, EKSKLUZIVNO - Telefonsko ukljucenje Ratka Mladica iz Haga!!! - DJS - (TV
Happy 16.11.2018), Youtube, 16 November 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILHfcl_YtuI, (Access date:
2 September 2019).

730 setav.org
Figure 5: Ratko Mladić live from The Hague on the air in the morning show hosted by Milomir Marić.22

the daily Informer,

Just like in the previous year, tabloid newspapers, most flagrantlyISLAMOPHOBIA regularly
IN SERBIA

publish stories and articles with the most vulgar examples of hate speech. On a daily basis, its
front pages feature headlines full of derogatory terms for the members of Albanian ethnicity,
while openly sabre rattling and warmongering, constantly scaring the readers that Serbia is
constantly scaring the readers that Serbia is threatened by the Jihadists. To illustrate
threatened by the Jihadists. To illustrate this, I enclose several photos of its front pages below.
this, I enclose several photos of its front pages below.

Figure 6: Left: “ISIS Is Preparing a Massacre of Serbs in Kosovo.” (11.10.2018) Middle: “Serbia under Al Qaeda’s Siege.”
(27.09.2018)
Figure 6: Left:Right:
“ISIS“ISIS Has 46 Cellsa in
Is Preparing Bosnia and
Massacre of Kosovo.
Serbs inThey Are Preparing
Kosovo.” to Launch
(11.10.2018) an Attack
Middle: on Republic
“Serbia under Al Qaeda’s
Siege.” (27.09.2018) Right: “ISIS HasSrpska and Serbia.
46 Cells ”(07.08.2018)
in Bosnia and Kosovo. They Are Preparing to Launch an Attack
on Republic Srpska and Serbia.”(07.08.2018)

22
Jutarnji Program TV HAPPY, EKSKLUZIVNO - Telefonsko ukljucenje Ratka Mladica iz Haga!!! - DJS - (TV
Happy 16.11.2018), Youtube, 16 November 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ILHfcl_YtuI, (Access
date: 2 September 2019).

Figure 7: Left: “They Put a Knife to My Throat. They Shouted: Allahu Akhbar, and Cursed at My Mother, Serbia, Vučić,
Figure 7: Left: “They
etc.” (28.03.2018) Middle:Put a Knife
“Thaçi to My
Threatens: Throat.
We’re Gonna They
Kill All Shouted: Allahu
Serbian Soldiers. Akhbar, and
” (31.03.2018) Cursed
Right: at My
“Shqiptars WantMother, Serbia,
Vučić, etc.” (28.03.2018) Middle: “Thaçi aThreatens: We’re Gonna Kill All Serbian Soldiers.” (31.03.2018) Right:
War.” (8/9.09.2018)
“Shqiptars Want a War.” (8/9.09.2018)
Justice System
In its 2018
Justice report, the European Commission assessed that Serbia’s cooperation with
System
The Hague Tribunal and the prosecution of war crimes suspects from the 1990s be-
In its 2018 report, the European Commission assessed that Serbia’s cooperation with The
fore local courts of law was at a very low level.23 Likewise, in July 2018, the Court of
Hague Tribunal and the prosecution of war crimes suspects from the 1990s before local courts
Appeals in Belgrade upheld the acquittal of the members of paramilitary unit “Sima’s
23
of law wasfor
Chetniks” at the
a very low level.
demolition of theLikewise, in July
mosque and the 2018,
murdertheofCourt
27 Romaof Appeals
civiliansin Belgrade
upheld
in the acquittal
the village of the
of Skočić, inmembers
Bosnia andof paramilitary
Herzegovina,unit “Sima’s
in July Chetniks”
1992. 24 for the demolition
Furthermore,
of the mosque and the murder of 27 Roma civilians in the village of Skočić, in Bosnia and
24
Herzegovina,
23, in JulyEuropean
“Serbia 2018 Report”, 1992. Commission,
Furthermore, those responsible for crimes committed in the 1990s
http://www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/eu_dokumenta/go-
disnji_izvestaji_ek_o_napretku/ec_progress_report_18.pdf, (Access date: 3 September 2019).
in the Serbian territory, i.e. in Sandžak, have not been prosecuted. In view of this fact, in June
24. Fonet, “Simini četnici’ oslobođeni za ubistvo 27 romskih civila”, Novosti, 5 July 2018, http://www.novosti.rs/
2018, the Sandžak Committee for Human Rights in Novi Pazar held a conference
vesti/naslovna/dosije/aktuelno.292.html:736619-Simini-cetnici-oslobodjeni-za-ubistvo-27-romskih-civila, (Access under the
date: 4 September 2019).
title “Attitude of the State toward Crimes Committed in Sandžak in the 1990s.”
Moreover, historical revisionism of World War II is still in progress. On the other hand, the
islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR
court ruling which rehabilitated 731responsible
the notorious Chetnik commander Nikola Kalabić,
for crimes against Roma Muslims, among other things, was referred back for retrial, while the
EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

those responsible for crimes committed in the 1990s in the Serbian territory, i.e. in
Sandžak, have not been prosecuted. In view of this fact, in June 2018, the Sandžak
Committee for Human Rights in Novi Pazar held a conference under the title “Atti-
tude of the State toward Crimes Committed in Sandžak in the 1990s.”
Moreover, historical revisionism of World War II is still in progress. On the
other hand, the court ruling which rehabilitated the notorious Chetnik commander
Nikola Kalabić, responsible for crimes against Roma Muslims, among other things,
was referred back for retrial, while the motion to rehabilitate Milan Nedić, quisling
prime minister of the Serbian government during World War II, was rejected.
In addition, a court sentence to five members of the Youth Initiative for Human
Rights for interrupting a panel discussion held by the Serbian Progressive Party, on
which the audience was addressed by Veselin Šljivančanin, convicted war criminal
already mentioned above, also testifies to the current rehabilitation of those respon-
sible for war crimes and the readiness of the state and the ruling party to allow them
to freely take part in social and political life.

Internet
On the Internet, there is huge number of Facebook pages that spread xenophobic,
nationalist, and extremist right-wing views and values. In addition to Facebook,
YouTube is the main channel for promoting such ideas and contents. There are
many YouTube channels where conversations with exponents of the far-right are
posted and promoted. In the first place, such views are championed by the news
channel Balkan Info, which in 2018 hosted many politicians, intellectuals, and
public figures who advocate extreme anti-Islamic opinions. The most prominent
of them are certainly Prof. Dr. Darko Tanasković, Prof. Dr. Miroljub Jevtić, Dr.
Srdja Trifković, Dragan Vanja Bokan, Dževad Galijašević, and many others. Peo-
ple such as Darko Tanasković, Miroljub Jevtić, and Srdja Trifković have already
been extensively written about by Norman Cigar in his book The Role of Serbian
Orientalists in Justifying the Genocide against the Muslims in the Balkans (Institut
za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, Sarajevo, 2000).
For the purposes of this report, I will mention only some of the titles of the shows
which have hosted some of the aforementioned individuals: “Europe Is Swallowed
by Islam, Is There Salvation?”; “Muslims Are Ready to Do Anything to Conquer
the World”; “The Concept of Green Transversal Is Worse than Great Albania”;
“Jews Are Massively Leaving France Because of Muslims”; “American-Islamic An-
ti-Serb Jihad”; “Turkey Is Pursuing the Politics of Neo-Ottomanism and Expan-
sion in the Balkans”; and so on.
However, it is very important to call attention to the deeply Islamophobic
contents on the Radio Free Europe (RFE) Facebook page “Not in My Name.”
This page is a project carried out by the RFE through social media with the aim of

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“fighting various forms of extremism.” However, although its aim is declaratively

to fight all forms of extremism, the attention that this Facebook page pays to other
forms of extremism is in significant disproportion to the emphatic condemnation
of “Islamic” extremism. This is especially worrisome in light of the fact that “Is-
lamic” extremism is just an incidental phenomenon compared to the abundance
of right-wing clero-fascist groups in the region. Furthermore, this Facebook page
often has negative comments on the role Turkey has in this region, using language
identical to the extremist, far-right groups. For instance, RFE warns about the
process of re-Islamization of the Balkans and the imminent threat of “neo-Otto-
manism.” In addition, contents posted on this Facebook page usually promote a
highly Orientalist perspective of the Middle East by selectively presenting the most
negative examples so its readers get the picture of Islamic societies as retrograde,
patriarchal, aggressive, and militant.

Central Figures in the Islamophobia Network

The greatest responsibility for the negative attitude toward Muslims surely lies with
the Serbian policymakers and officials who pursue the Serbian ultra-nationalist
agenda, which portray “Muslims” as the archetypical enemy. Of course, there are
several factors which make up this network. The first of these consists of a number of
factions within the Serbian Orthodox Church which have been doing their best for
many decades to impose the mythical notion of Muslims as “converts who betrayed
their forefathers’ faith.” Apart from the Church, an important role is played by the
nationalist intellectual elite which provides academic validation to such mythical
notions and phantasms, as well as political organizations aiming to implement this
exclusivist nationalist agenda in reality.25 Needless to say, racist and xenophobic
ideas and values are also massively spread and popularized by right-wing groups and
movements which mostly target younger generations, as well as the ultras of various
football clubs.26

Observed Civil Society and

Political Assessment and Initiatives
There were no significant initiatives in 2018 that targeted Islamophobia as such.

25. Previously, those intellectuals used to flock around the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, but that is not
solely the case anymore. Now, they hold functions and positions within various institutes and faculties (mostly in the
humanities). As regarding the political parties, this is primarily the case of the parliamentary Serbian Radical Party
and the Serbian Movement Dveri, as well as non-parliamentary Democratic Party of Serbia.
26.Apart from the political parties mentioned above, there is a number of right-wing groups and organizations such
as the Zavetnici (Oath-Takers), Srpska čast (Serbian Honor), Nacionalna avangarda (National Vanguard), Obraz
(Face), and Pokret Naši (Our Movement), as well as many others that are very active in that respect. Some of these
groups also have (in) direct contacts with the Serbian Orthodox Church and with some right-wing political parties.

islamophobiaeurope.com • @islamophobiaEIR 733

EUROPEAN ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT 2018

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In the fight against Islamophobia, the most important form of engagement cannot
be framed solely in terms of the situation of Muslims, but instead must aim at raising
the awareness about the benefits of a civil society which would be inclusive of every-
one. Only then it can be possible to stand up against the Serbian nationalist political
ideology and confront it in the political arena. In this respect, it is necessary to work
with the Muslims themselves in order to improve their capacities and enable them to
take a much more active part in social, political, and public life, and to work actively
on achieving cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslim organizations and in-
dividuals who are active in the development of a pluralist, multicultural, multi-con-
fessional civil society.
Furthermore, it is crucial that Muslim organizations start to collect unofficial
data of hate crimes and reach out to those who have suffered discrimination on the
basis of belonging to the Muslim community, and to offer them legal, moral, and
any other help that they need.
Also it is of utmost importance that civil society as a whole and international or-
ganizations pay close attention to the rise of far-right movements in Serbia and start
to address more openly and directly the problems of anti-Muslim hatred. They also
must reach out to the Muslim organizations and help them build their capacities.

Chronology
• 26.01.2018: Red Star fans displayed a banner which read “Shqiptars, Cro-
ats, Balija ain’t no brothers of mine” in protest to the club which had just
signed Alen Omić, a player of Bosniak ethnicity.
• 30.05.2018: A series of incidents related to the festival “Miridita, Hello”
organized by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights.
• 05.07.2018: Court of Appeals in Belgrade upheld the acquittal of the
members of the paramilitary unit “Sima’s Chetniks” for the demolition of
the mosque and the murder of 27 Roma civilians in the village of Skočić, in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1992.
• 25.07.2018: Instance of most blatant hate speech by Vjerica Radeta MP
from the Serbian Radical Party regarding the death of Hatidža Mehmetović.
• 04.09.2018: The morning show on Happy TV broadcasted Ratko Mladić
live from The Hague; Mladić is convicted for the genocide in Srebrenica.
• 09.09.2018: Speech given by President Aleksandar Vučić at Lake Gazivode,
Republic of Kosovo.
• 07.10.2018: Brutal physical assault in Novi Sad on two young men of
Albanian ethnicity who were beaten up by four men of Serbian ethnicity.

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