Pelle Primeau Joey Ryan Motion To Dismiss

Case 2:20-cv-09623-MWF-E Document 9-1 Filed 11/18/20 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:79
1 Jeffrey Lewis, Cal. Bar No. 183934

Sean C. Rotstan, Cal. Bar No. 316041
2 JEFF LEWIS LAW
3 609 Deep Valley Drive, Suite 200

Rolling Hills Estates, California 90274
4 Phone: (310) 935-4001
Fax: (310) 872-5389
5 Email: Jeff@JeffLewisLaw.com
6
Attorneys for Defendant
7 PELLE TSICHLIS AKA PELLE PRIMEAU
9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
12
JOSEPH R. MEEHAN ) Case No.: 2:20-cv-09623-MWF-E
13 )
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT PELLE TSICHLIS’
14 ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
15
vs. ) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
) MOTION TO DISMISS
16 PELLE TSICHLIS aka ) COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
PELLE PRIMEAU, ) FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
17 ) PROCEDURE 12(b)(2)
Defendant. )
18
) [NOTICE OF MOTION AND
19 MOTION; DECLARATION OF
PELLE TSICHLIS; AND
20 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT PELLE TSICHLIS’
21 MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF
22 COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
23 PROCEDURE 12(b)(2) FILED
CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH]
24
25
DATE: December 21, 2020
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
26 LOCATION: First Street Courthouse
350 West First Street
27 Courtroom 5A
Los Angeles, CA 90012
28
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... - 2 -
4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... - 3 -
5
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .......................................... - 5 -
6
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ - 5 -
7
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ........................ - 6 -
8
9 A. Claims and Damages Sought ..................................................... - 6 -
10 B. Factual Allegations .................................................................... - 7 -

11 C. Defendant’s Declaration .......................................................... - 10 -
12
D. Summary .................................................................................. - 11 -
13
III. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... - 11 -
14
A. Motion To Dismiss Legal Standards ....................................... - 11 -
15
16 B. Pelle Tsichlis is Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in the State

of California ............................................................................. - 12 -
17
i. General Jurisdiction is not applicable. .......................... - 13 -
18
19 ii. Specific Jurisdiction cannot be exercised...................... - 13 -
20 IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. - 23 -

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-2-
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
Cases
3
Adina Design, Inc. v. Adina’s Jewels, Inc.
4 (C.D.Cal. Nov. 29, 2018, No. CV 18-5234-R)
2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 223297 .................................................................................. 20
5
Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc.
6 (9th Cir. 2017) 874 F.3d 1064 ................................................................ 13, 14, 15, 16
Bader v. Avon Products, Inc.
7
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 186 ................................................................................. 12, 13
8 Ballard v. Savage
(9th Cir. 1995) 65 F.3d 1495 .................................................................................... 19
9
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
10 (2017) 137 S. Ct. 1773 ............................................................................................. 13
11 Burdick v. Superior Court
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 13 [183 Cal.Rptr.3d 1] ............................................ 16, 17
12
Cousteau Soc’y, Inc. v. Cousteau
13 (C.D.Cal. June 19, 2019, No. CV 19-521 PA (MAAx))
2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 102828 .................................................................................... 6
14
Dangoor v. Peterson’s Stampede Dodge Chrysler Jeep, LLC
15 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 8, 2019, No. 2:19-cv-01793-SVW-JC)
2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 209404 .................................................................................. 18
16
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc.
17 (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1280 .................................................................................. 12
18 FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co.
(9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1439 .................................................................................. 21
19 Id 16
20 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) ............................................ 12
21
Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc.
22 (9th Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 1218 .................................................................................. 14
23 Rapiscan Sys. v. Garnett (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2019, No. CV 18-10780 PA (Ex)) 2019
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 38772 ....................................................................................... 12, 21
24
Walden v. Fiore
25 (2014) 571 U.S. 277 [134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12] .......................................... 13
Zheng v. Li
26
(C.D.Cal. Mar. 1, 2019, No. CV 18-8387 PA (JEMx))
27 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 34122 .............................................................................. 17, 18
Ziegler v. Indian River County
28
(9th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3d 470 ...................................................................................... 12
-3-
1 Rules
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, section 12 ................................................................ 11
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-4-
1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2
I. INTRODUCTION
3
4 Social media permits individuals to share their thoughts and opinions with
5 everyone everywhere, but the widespread dissemination of information does not lead
6
to the widespread exercise of personal jurisdiction. Such exercise would not be
7
8 constitutionally impermissible.
9 Plaintiff Joseph R. Meehan alleges that statements were made on Twitter and a
10
video was posted on YouTube by Defendant Pelle Tsichlis (“Tsichlis”). The
11
12 Complaint in this matter goes on for pages, but the basic alleged claim is simple:
13 Tsichlis made libelous statements over the Internet, Meehan suffered damages in
14
California, and Tsichlis should defend himself in California. The problem is that the
15
16 Complaint does not allege that Tsichlis has minimum contacts with the state of
17 California and is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this Court.
18
Meehan has contacts with California. He lives there. He alleges he operates a
19
20 business from California. He alleges he suffered damages in California. Those
21 contacts are Meehan’s contacts and not Tsichlis’ contacts. This Court cannot exercise
22
personal jurisdiction over Tsichlis based on Meehan’s contacts with the forum. The
23
24 United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the exercise of jurisdiction based
25 solely on the plaintiff’s connection with the forum and unequivocally stated the
26
exercise of jurisdiction must be based upon the defendant’s contact with the forum.
27
28
-5-
1 Meehan alleges that Twitter and other social media members and subscribers
2
are located worldwide. He alleges that Tsichlis knew that “the defamatory statements
3
4 would be read by hundreds to thousands of Twitter’s [worldwide] membership.”
5 Meehan further alleged that Tsichlis knew that Meehan’s “reputation would be
6
damaged in the community in California and the virtual community located in the
7
8 world-wide-web.” Despite these allegations that Tsichlis directed his activities
9 worldwide, Meehan wants to force Tsichlis to come to California. “This Court
10
[should decline] Plaintiff’s invitation to eviscerate the requirements for personal
11
12 jurisdiction by imposing personal jurisdiction in California for anyone who happens
13 to post something on [social media].” Cousteau Soc’y, Inc. v. Cousteau (C.D.Cal.
14
June 19, 2019, No. CV 19-521 PA (MAAx)) 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 102828, * 14.
15
16
17 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

18
A. Claims and Damages Sought
19
20 Plaintiff Joseph R. Meehan filed the present action on October 20, 2020
21 naming Pelle Tsichlis aka Pelle Primeau as Defendant. Plaintiff asserted the
22
following ten claims: libel, libel per se, trade libel, false light, intentional interference
23
24 with prospective economic advantage, negligent interference with prospective
25 economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction
26
of emotional distress, permanent injunction, and declaratory relief. Plaintiff seeks
27
28
-6-
1 economic damages in the amount of $200,000.00; noneconomic damages in the
2
amount of $5,000,000.00; and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000,000.00.
3
4 B. Factual Allegations
5 Allegations in the Complaint supporting personal jurisdiction are sparse.

6
Diversity jurisdiction is claimed on the basis that Meehan is a citizen of the state of
7
8 California and Tsichlis is a citizen of the State of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 1 and
9 ¶¶ 3-4.) Venue is alleged to be proper as “a substantial amount of the events and
10
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in the Central District of California.”
11
12 (ECF No. 1, ¶ 2.) No further explanation is forthcoming to delineate the nature of the
13 events and omissions; however, these events and omissions “otherwise were
14
knowingly directed at harming a citizen of the State of California and the citizen’s
15
16 ability to take part in his occupation within the State of California, as more
17 specifically pled, infra.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 2.)
18
Paragraphs five through seventeen of the Complaint are all directed to
19
20 describing Meehan’s history as a wrestler known as “Joey Ryan” and Meehan’s
21 business operations, with one exception. Meehan alleges that Tsichlis and “any and
22
all” other persons who know Meehan as his wrestling persona “Joey Ryan” know the
23
24 association with Bar Wrestling, which operates in Los Angeles, California. (ECF No.
25 1, ¶ 11.)
26
The allegations of the Complaint continue on to explain the workings of
27
28 Twitter. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 18-22.) Within these paragraphs, Meehan alleges Tsichlis has
-7-
1 his Twitter messages available to read by anyone who can access Twitter and his
2
retweets were volitional acts. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 18 and ¶ 21.) The next paragraph that
3
4 mentions Tsichlis simply alleges that his acts caused Meehan to suffer various
5 enumerated damages. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 30.)
6
Meehan then proceeds, in the next ninety-two paragraphs, to set forth all the
7
8 alleged statements that Tsichlis made using social medial. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 31-123.) Not
9 one of those ninety-two paragraphs allege that Tsichlis was in California at the time
10
the statements were made or that the statements were directly sent to any resident of
11
12 California. In fact, Meehan alleges that:
13 Prior to publishing the defamatory statement, defendant was

14 fully aware that Twitter and the other social media websites
used to publish defendant’s defamatory statements described
15 above and incorporated by reference herein had members
16 and subscribers located worldwide and were connected to
the professional wrestling industry, because defendant was
17 users [sic], subscribers [sic], account holders [sic] of Twitter
18 and had Twitter handles and thus understood how Twitter
and social media websites worked.
19 (ECF No. 1, ¶ 128(emphasis added).)
20
21 Further indications of the widespread dissemination of the alleged statements

22
can be found in the allegations of Tsichlis’ knowledge that “the defamatory
23
24 statements would be read [and heard] by hundreds to thousands of Twitter’s
25 membership.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 129 and ¶ 130.) Apparently, those “hundreds to
26
thousands” of readers would be located worldwide.
27
28
-8-
1 Meehan also alleges that Tsichlis was aware Meehan “lived in Los Angeles,
2
California . . . was a professional wrestler and promoter in the State of California, . . .
3
4 was a principle of Bar Wrestling and that Bar Wrestling promoted Wrestling matches
5 in Los Angeles, California.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 131.) Tsichlis also apparently was aware
6
that his statements would have a negative effect on Meehan as a wrestler and
7
8 wrestling promoter and that damage to Meehan’s “reputation would be damaged in
9 the community in California and the virtual community located in the world-wide-
10
web that were related to Plaintiff’s [sic] as a professional wrestler and wrestling
11
12 promoter.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 132 (See also, ¶ 139(2) for similar allegations of worldwide
13 damage to Plaintiff).) Obviously, “the virtual community located in the world-wide-
14
web” consists of individuals who are located in places other than California. Meehan
15
16 also alleges that Tsichlis’ statements would be indiscriminately disseminated to other
17 individuals by verbal and electronic means. (ECF No. 1, ¶140.)
18
Meehan seeks damages for his loss of employment and income. (ECF No. 1, ¶
19
20 141.) Further damages are alleged to include the following:
21 Defendant’s defamatory statements caused Plaintiff’s

22 California and virtual community to shun him, avoid him
and hate him and further caused Plaintiff’s California and
23 virtual community to stop being his friend, stop following
24 him, or otherwise end any, [sic] and all, [sic] connection and
association to Plaintiff.
25 (ECF No. 1, ¶ 142(emphasis added).)
26
27
28
-9-
1 The allegations regarding worldwide dissemination of the statements and

2
worldwide damage continue throughout the Complaint. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 150-152, ¶
3
4 154, ¶ 161(2), ¶ 162, ¶ 164, ¶¶ 173-175, ¶ 177, ¶ 184(2), ¶ 185, and ¶ 187.) The
5 remaining sixty-two paragraphs of the Complaint do not set forth any allegations
6
establishing that Tsichlis had contact with the state of California.
7
8 C. Defendant’s Declaration
9 The sworn statements in Tsichlis’ Declaration also establish that the exercise
10
of personal jurisdiction over him is not proper. Tsichlis resides in the state of
11
12 Pennsylvania. (Declaration of Defendant Pelle Tsichlis, ¶ 3.) Tsichlis never lived in
13 the state of California; never physically entered the state of California; and does not
14
own any real property in the state of California. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.) No economic activity
15
16 was conducted by Tsichlis in California. He was never employed in California; never
17 engaged in a professional wrestling match in the state of California; nor did he ever
18
derive any income from any source in the state or intend to attempt to derive any
19
20 income from any source in the state. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5 and ¶8.)
21 Tsichlis did not directly send any emails or any fabricated emails to a resident
22
of the state of California regarding any activity by Joseph R. Meehan that occurred in
23
24 the state of California or any other state. (Id. at ¶ 9.) He did not send direct messages
25 on social media or text messages about Joseph R. Meehan to any resident in the state
26
of California; nor did he send any fabricated direct messages or text messages about
27
28 Joseph R. Meehan to any resident in the state of California. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

- 10 -
1 Tsichlis agrees that “Twitter and other social media websites” have “members
2
and subscribers located worldwide” as stated in Paragraph 128 of the Complaint. (Id.
3
4 at ¶ 11.) Further, none of the alleged statements set forth in the Complaint were
5 directed or aimed by him to the state of California; rather the alleged statements were
6
available for viewing worldwide. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
7
8 D. Summary
9 In essence, Meehan’s Complaint sets forth multiple redundant claims, both

10
intentional and negligent, seeking an exorbitant amount of damages for alleged
11
12 defamatory statements made by Tsichlis throughout the world. Meehan’s Complaint
13 has not set forth sufficient allegations to establish that this Court has personal
14
jurisdiction over Tsichlis. In fact, taking Meehan’s allegations to their illogical
15
16 conclusion, Meehan could bring suit against Tsichlis anywhere in the world. Perhaps
17 he seeks to establish a new jurisdictional doctrine that confers worldwide personal
18
jurisdiction for dissemination of opinions over the world-wide-web? Fortunately,
19
20 constitutional restraints prohibit this doctrine.
21
22
III. ARGUMENT
23
24 A. Motion To Dismiss Legal Standards

25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a complaint may be
26
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Meehan has the burden of establishing
27
28 that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Tsichlis. Ziegler v. Indian River
- 11 -
1 County (9th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3d 470, 473 (internal citation omitted). Only a prima
2
facie showing is required if the Court does not hear testimony or make factual
3
4 determinations. Id. In the event of an evidentiary hearing or determination at trial,
5 Meehan must establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
6
Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1280,
7
8 1285 (citation omitted).
9 California exercises personal jurisdiction to the extent permissible by the due

10
process clause of the U.S. Constitution. Bader v. Avon Products, Inc. (2020) 55
11
12 Cal.App.5th 186, 193 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10). Tsichlis’ contacts with
13 California must be “sufficiently substantial so as to comport both with the
14
Constitution and with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Int’l Shoe
15
16 Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). Rapiscan
17 Sys. v. Garnett (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2019, No. CV 18-10780 PA (Ex)) 2019
18
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 38772, * 5-* 6.
19
20 B. Pelle Tsichlis is Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in the State of

21 California
22
A court may find an out-of-state defendant subject to the jurisdiction of the
23
24 court if either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction exists. The United States
25 Supreme Court addressed the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction in
26
a number of cases in recent years confirming the continued viability of International
27
28 Shoe and its progeny.

- 12 -
1 i. General Jurisdiction is not applicable.

2
General jurisdiction exists in the state where the defendant is at home and,
3
4 consistent with constitutional requirements, the defendant is subject to jurisdiction for
5 all claims asserted against him, without regard to the location of the events. Bader, 55
6
Cal.App.5th at 193 (citation omitted). Meehan and Tsichlis agree that Tsichlis is a
7
8 citizen of the state of Pennsylvania. Thus, he is not subject to the general jurisdiction
9 of this Court.
10
ii. Specific Jurisdiction cannot be exercised.
11
12 Determination that a defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction still leaves
13 open the question of whether a defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction. The
14
United States Supreme Court addressed the nature of specific jurisdiction explaining
15
16 that “In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the suit must aris[e]
17 out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Bristol-Myers Squibb
18
Co. v. Superior Court, (2017) 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (internal quotations and citations
19
20 omitted.) The defendant himself must create the contacts with the forum itself, not the
21 forum’s residents. Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277 [134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d
22
12]. “The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum” and
23
24 this is true even if the face of allegations of intentional acts. Id. “It follows that ‘a
25 defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an
26
insufficient basis for jurisdiction.’” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc. (9th
27
28 Cir. 2017) 874 F.3d 1064 (citing Walden at 1123).

- 13 -
1 The three requirements supporting the exercise of specific jurisdiction are:

2
(1) the defendant must either ‘purposefully direct his
3 activities’ toward the forum or ‘purposefully avail [] himself
4 of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum’; (2)
‘the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
5 defendant’s forum-related activities’; and (3) ‘the exercise of
6 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.’ Dole Food Co., Inc. v.
7 Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002).
8 Axiom Foods, Inc. at 1068.
9 A purposeful direction analysis is applied in cases alleging tortious conduct.

10
Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 1218, 1228. The
11
12 inquiry focuses on “whether a defendant ‘purposefully direct[s] his activities’ at the
13 forum state,” and applies the ‘effects’ test that is, “the forum in which the defendant’s
14
actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum.”
15
16 Id. (citation omitted)(internal citations omitted). The effects test,
17 requires that ‘the defendant allegedly must have (1)

18 committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the
forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is
19 likely to be suffered in the forum state.’ Brayton Purcell, 606
20 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206).
Id.
21
22 The jurisdictional allegations of Meehan’s Complaint include the assertion that

23 Tsichlis knew Meehan and Bar Wrestling were located in California and the assertion
24
that Meehan was harmed in California. These allegations are insufficient to
25
26 constitutionally permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Tsichlis. “Following
27 Walden, we now hold that while a theory of individualized targeting may remain
28
- 14 -
1 relevant to the minimum contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the exercise
2
of specific jurisdiction, absent compliance with what Walden requires.” Axiom
3
4 Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d at 1070 (citations omitted).
5 The facts in Axiom Foods further illustrate the lack of personal jurisdiction
6
over Tsichlis. Plaintiffs were suppliers and producer of organic foods doing business
7
8 in California and defendant was a company located in the United Kingdom. Id. at
9 1066. Defendant emailed 343 newsletters containing two logos for which plaintiffs
10
subsequently filed copyright applications. Id. Only ten of the newsletters were sent to
11
12 California businesses. Id. Plaintiffs filed a complaint for copyright infringement and
13 defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
14
In affirming the lower court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
15
16 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that prior decisions “held that
17 ‘individualized targeting’ (alleg[ing] that a defendant ‘engaged in wrongful conduct
18
targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state’)
19
20 satisfies the express aiming requirement.” Id. at 1069 (citations omitted). The Court
21 then held that after Walden individualized targeting alone was insufficient to confer
22
jurisdiction and proceeded to consider whether the factual allegations conferred
23
24 personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1070.
25 Plaintiffs argued that 55 companies in California received the newsletter;

26
however, the Court determined that this allegation did not support jurisdiction as the
27
28 contact had to be with the forum state itself, not individuals who reside in the forum
- 15 -
1 state. Id. Nor did the fact that 144 of the email addresses allegedly belong to “‘actual
2
or potential partners, customers, or suppliers’” support jurisdiction, reasoning that
3
4 foreseeability of harm in a forum is constitutionally insufficient to support
5 jurisdiction. Id. The Court concluded that California was not the “focal point” of the
6
actions, sending newsletters, and the alleged harm. Id. at 1070-1071.
7
8 Additional precedent exists to support the conclusion that the Court does not
9 have personal jurisdiction over Tsichlis. In addressing the use of social media as the
10
basis for the required contacts, the Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate
11
12 District, held:
13 We hold that posting defamatory statements about a person

14 on a Facebook page, while knowing that person resides in
the forum state, is insufficient in itself to create the minimum
15 contacts necessary to support specific personal jurisdiction
16 in a lawsuit arising out of that posting. Instead, it is necessary
that the nonresident defendant not only intentionally post the
17 statements on the Facebook page, but that the defendant
18 expressly aim or specifically direct his or her intentional
conduct at the forum, rather than at a plaintiff who lives
19 there.
20 Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 13 [183
Cal.Rptr.3d 1].
21
22 The Burdick Court recognized that “[m]ost courts have agreed, nonetheless,
23 that ‘merely asserting that a defendant knew or should have known that his
24
intentional acts would cause harm in the forum state is not enough to establish
25
26 jurisdiction under the effects test.’” Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
27
28
- 16 -
1 Of particular significance to the case sub judice was the recognition by the
2
Court that the “Facebook page was ‘publicly-available,’ but that fact would mean it
3
4 would have been less likely Burdick had intentionally targeted California as opposed
5 to any other jurisdiction.” Id. at 25. Posting alleged defamatory statements on social
6
media without expressly aiming at not only the plaintiff, but also the forum is
7
8 insufficient to create minimum contacts to support specific personal jurisdiction. Id.
9 at 13.
10
Courts have refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants even
11
12 when a plaintiff alleges intent to harm the plaintiff’s business interests in California.
13 See, Zheng v. Li (C.D.Cal. Mar. 1, 2019, No. CV 18-8387 PA (JEMx)) 2019
14
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 34122. In Zheng, the plaintiffs alleged: plaintiffs and defendant were
15
16 competitors in the wholesale retail fashion business; plaintiffs’ primary customers
17 were California retailers; plaintiffs had been in business for five years and developed
18
a good reputation; defendant used defendant’s social media network to claim
19
20 plaintiffs’ products were not genuine; defendant targeted plaintiffs’ primary
21 customers; and, defendant intended to harm plaintiffs’ business. Id. at * 1-*2.
22
Additional allegations included defendant’s awareness “that the majority of
23
24 Plaintiffs’ customers are California residents.” Id. at * 11. The Court rejected this
25 basis as support for the exercise of jurisdiction: “However, ‘[s]everal courts that have
26
directly considered whether personal jurisdiction extends to Internet-based
27
28 defamation by out-of-state tortfeasors have concluded that mere knowledge of the

- 17 -
1 plaintiff’s residence is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.’ Xcentric
2
Ventures, LLC v. Bird, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074-75 (D. Ariz. 2010).” Id.
3
4 Specific personal jurisdiction was found not to be constitutionally permissible
5 when the defendant made numerous phone calls to the California plaintiff; knew that
6
California was plaintiff’s residence; and knew that the harm would be suffered in
7
8 California. Dangoor v. Peterson’s Stampede Dodge Chrysler Jeep, LLC (C.D.Cal.
9 Aug. 8, 2019, No. 2:19-cv-01793-SVW-JC) 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 209404, * 6. The
10
Court found that these actions did not meet the purposeful direction requirement as
11
12 plaintiff’s allegations were “too expansive under Walden.” Id. at * 8-* 9.
13 Tsichlis’ alleged actions using various forms of social media cannot result in
14
the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the state of California solely on the basis that
15
16 Meehan claims to have suffered damages in the state of California. Walden
17 unequivocally determined that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction on this
18
basis would be unconstitutional. Subsequent cases interpreting Walden have adhered
19
20 to the principles set forth therein and have refused to exercise jurisdiction in cases
21 with even more contact with a state than Tsichlis had with California. Meehan alleged
22
Tsichlis’ statements were read and heard “worldwide” by “hundreds to thousands” of
23
24 individuals. In effect, Meehan admitted that Tsichlis did not purposely direct his
25 actions to the state of California and this admission prevents the exercise of specific
26
personal jurisdiction.
27
28
- 18 -
1 Even if this Court would find purposeful direction existed, Meehan’s

2
allegations do not satisfy the requirements of the “but for” test. The test is
3
4 consistently formulated as but for defendant’s contacts with the state, would
5 plaintiff’s claims against defendant have arisen? See, Ballard v. Savage (9th Cir.
6
1995) 65 F.3d 1495, 1500. Meehan alleges that his damages include the loss of
7
8 followers on his Twitter and Instagram accounts; lost venues for Bar Wrestling
9 promotions; lost revenues from merchandising, Patreon account, Cameo account,
10
Twitch account; Wrestling Performance Bookings; and YouTube. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 30
11
12 and ¶ 213.) Meehan also alleges that his “personal and professional reputation were
13 harmed.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 143, ¶ 165, and ¶ 188.) Further damage allegations include
14
the termination of business relationships by PWE (Professional Wrestling
15
16 Entertainment) and ECWA (East Coast Wrestling Association) and the termination of
17 his contract by Impact Wrestling. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 212 and ¶ 227.) Meehan also seeks
18
damages for emotional distress. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 235 and ¶ 241.) His last two claims are
19
20 for injunctive and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 242-249.)
21 These alleged damages only tangentially relate to the state of California. All
22
social media and other internet sites are worldwide. Meehan does not allege that any
23
24 of the wrestling companies with which he did business are incorporated in the state of
25 California or have systemic contacts with the state of California. Meehan does not
26
identify all the locations of the Bar Wrestling venues that he lost, that is, whether any
27
28
- 19 -
1 of them were outside the state of California. His claims of emotional distress have no
2
relationship with California, other than the fact that it is his residence.
3
4 Meehan’s claims are conducive to an analysis by analogy to claims of
5 trademark infringement. (See e.g., Adina Design, Inc. v. Adina’s Jewels, Inc.
6
(C.D.Cal. Nov. 29, 2018, No. CV 18-5234-R) 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 223297.) In
7
8 Adina, plaintiff and defendant were both in the jewelry industry. Id. at * 1. Plaintiff
9 was located in California and defendant was located in New York. Id. Plaintiff filed
10
suit in California for trademark infringement and defendant moved to dismiss for lack
11
12 of personal jurisdiction. Id. at * 1-* 2.
13 After finding that defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction due to the
14
lack of direct targeting to California, the Court went on to address the “but-for” test.
15
16 Finding that the test was not met, the Court reasoned that as the “primary focus of the
17 Complaint” was the allegation of the use of a similarly confusing trademark, thus,
18
any contacts that defendant may have had with “the use of celebrities and social
19
20 media influencers” located in California for promotion of defendant’s business was
21 not “an essential act giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at * 6-* 7. The “primary
22
focus” of Meehan’s Complaint is the worldwide indiscriminate dissemination of
23
24 alleged defamatory states and Meehan’s location in California is not “an essential act
25 giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims.”
26
Finally, if this Court finds that the first two prongs are satisfied, then a
27
28 determination must be made as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be

- 20 -
1 reasonable. Rapiscan Sys. v. Garnett, 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 38772, at * 9-* 10. The
2
relevant factors are:
3
4 (1) The extent of purposeful interjection into the forum state;
5 (2) The burden on the defendant of defending in the forum;

6
(3) The extent of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant’s
7 state;
8
(4) The forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute;
9
10 (5) The most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
11 (6) The importance of the forum to plaintiff’s interest in

convenient and effective relief; and
12
(7) The existence of an alternative forum.
13
14
Id. (citations omitted.)
15 As fully addressed herein, Tsichlis did not purposefully interject any of his
16
statements into California; rather the statements were available worldwide. The
17
18 burden on Tsichlis of defending against Meehan’s allegations in California is great.
19 Tsichlis resides in Pennsylvania and the costs of travel across the country are
20
weighty. The lack of purposeful interjection adds to the burden of defense and tips
21
22 the scales in Tsichlis’ favor despite the availability of technological advances in
23 communication and travel. See, FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1987)
24
828 F.2d 1439, 1444.
25
26 Further, Pennsylvania has a profound interest in adjudicating conduct that
27 occurs within its borders and ensuring that any attempt to restraint a citizen’s speech
28
- 21 -
1 is constitutionally permissible and not overbroad. California, of course, has an
2
interest in ensuring that its citizens are compensated if a tortious act is committed, but
3
4 that compensation can just as easily be awarded by a Pennsylvania Court if it is
5 warranted. Judicial efficiency does not weigh in favor of either party. Meehan has
6
evidence in California and Tsichlis’ evidence would be located in Pennsylvania. As
7
8 the claims involve statements made over the internet, the number of live witnesses,
9 other than the parties, would be limited and therefore not impose undue burdens on
10
Meehan.
11
12 Meehan’s ability to obtain convenient and effective relief if he prevailed in his
13 claims would exist whether the action was pending in California or Pennsylvania
14
with the only caveat being that Meehan would have to travel to Pennsylvania.
15
16 Clearly, Meehan’s goal in filing multiple separate California lawsuits seeking
17 compensation for the same damages is to be relieved of the burden of seeking his
18
millions of dollars in separate states. Considering the amount of damages claimed
19
20 and the adverse financial effects on Tsichlis if Meehan were successful, less weight
21 should be given to Meehan’s convenience. Lastly, Pennsylvania is an alternative
22
forum.
23
24 Based upon the fact that Tsichlis has not purposely interjected himself into the
25 state of California and the difficulty and expense for Tsichlis in defending himself in
26
California, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would be unreasonable.
27
28 This conclusion is further supported by the ability of Pennsylvania courts to

- 22 -
1 adjudicate this matter in the same manner as a California court. Tsichlis never
2
anticipated being haled into court in California for alleged actions that would have
3
4 occurred in Pennsylvania.
6
IV. CONCLUSION
7
8 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Pelle Tsichlis respectfully requests that
9 this Court grant his Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
10
Procedure 12(b)(2).
11
12
13 DATED: November 18, 2020 JEFF LEWIS LAW

14
15 By: s/ Jeffrey Lewis

Jeffrey Lewis
16 Sean C. Rotstan
17 Attorneys for Defendant
18 PELLE TSICHLIS AKA PELLE
PRIMEAU
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 23 -

Pelle Primeau Joey Ryan Motion To Dismiss

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Pelle Primeau Joey Ryan Motion To Dismiss

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Case 2:20-cv-09623-MWF-E Document 9-1 Filed 11/18/20 Page 1 of 23 Page ID #:79

1 Jeffrey Lewis, Cal. Bar No. 183934

3 609 Deep Valley Drive, Suite 200

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... - 3 -

9 A. Claims and Damages Sought ..................................................... - 6 -

10 B. Factual Allegations .................................................................... - 7 -

16 B. Pelle Tsichlis is Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in the State

19 ii. Specific Jurisdiction cannot be exercised...................... - 13 -

20 IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. - 23 -

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, section 12 ................................................................ 11

1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

17 California and is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in this Court.

20 business from California. He alleges he suffered damages in California. Those

4 would be read by hundreds to thousands of Twitter’s [worldwide] membership.”

8 world-wide-web.” Despite these allegations that Tsichlis directed his activities

9 worldwide, Meehan wants to force Tsichlis to come to California. “This Court

12 jurisdiction by imposing personal jurisdiction in California for anyone who happens

13 to post something on [social media].” Cousteau Soc’y, Inc. v. Cousteau (C.D.Cal.

17 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

24 with prospective economic advantage, negligent interference with prospective

25 economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction

1 economic damages in the amount of $200,000.00; noneconomic damages in the

5 Allegations in the Complaint supporting personal jurisdiction are sparse.

9 ¶¶ 3-4.) Venue is alleged to be proper as “a substantial amount of the events and

17 specifically pled, infra.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 2.)

20 describing Meehan’s history as a wrestler known as “Joey Ryan” and Meehan’s

5 enumerated damages. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 30.)

12 California. In fact, Meehan alleges that:

13 Prior to publishing the defamatory statement, defendant was

21 Further indications of the widespread dissemination of the alleged statements

24 statements would be read [and heard] by hundreds to thousands of Twitter’s

25 membership.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 129 and ¶ 130.) Apparently, those “hundreds to

8 wrestling promoter and that damage to Meehan’s “reputation would be damaged in

13 damage to Plaintiff).) Obviously, “the virtual community located in the world-wide-

16 also alleges that Tsichlis’ statements would be indiscriminately disseminated to other

17 individuals by verbal and electronic means. (ECF No. 1, ¶140.)

20 141.) Further damages are alleged to include the following:

21 Defendant’s defamatory statements caused Plaintiff’s

1 The allegations regarding worldwide dissemination of the statements and

12 Pennsylvania. (Declaration of Defendant Pelle Tsichlis, ¶ 3.) Tsichlis never lived in

16 was conducted by Tsichlis in California. He was never employed in California; never

28 Joseph R. Meehan to any resident in the state of California. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

9 In essence, Meehan’s Complaint sets forth multiple redundant claims, both

12 defamatory statements made by Tsichlis throughout the world. Meehan’s Complaint

17 he seeks to establish a new jurisdictional doctrine that confers worldwide personal

20 constitutional restraints prohibit this doctrine.

24 A. Motion To Dismiss Legal Standards

4 determinations. Id. In the event of an evidentiary hearing or determination at trial,

5 Meehan must establish personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.

8 1285 (citation omitted).

9 California exercises personal jurisdiction to the extent permissible by the due

13 California must be “sufficiently substantial so as to comport both with the

17 Sys. v. Garnett (C.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2019, No. CV 18-10780 PA (Ex)) 2019

20 B. Pelle Tsichlis is Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in the State of

25 Supreme Court addressed the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction in

28 Shoe and its progeny.

1 i. General Jurisdiction is not applicable.

4 consistent with constitutional requirements, the defendant is subject to jurisdiction for

12 Determination that a defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction still leaves

25 defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an

28 Cir. 2017) 874 F.3d 1064 (citing Walden at 1123).

1 The three requirements supporting the exercise of specific jurisdiction are:

9 A purposeful direction analysis is applied in cases alleging tortious conduct.

12 inquiry focuses on “whether a defendant ‘purposefully direct[s] his activities’ at the