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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 178454               March 28, 2011

FILIPINA SAMSON, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision 1 dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution 2 dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating
Section 4(b)3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission

with office at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.

Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera,
to have the latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System.
Petitioner said that the expenses would reach ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from
respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondent’s land. However,
petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out that the land is government
property. When petitioner failed to return the ₱50,000, respondent sued her for estafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and
suspended her from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner
failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the
government of the benefit of committed service when she embarked on her private interest to
help respondent secure a certificate of title over the latter’s land. 4

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order 5 dated March 15, 2004,
reduced the penalty to three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman,
petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer.
Her act fell short of the standard of personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
that public officials shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers
or peddlers of undue patronage. The Ombudsman held:

x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from the
[respondent] and even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic Engineer
to do the surveys.

While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government agencies
for the processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that her mere act
in accepting the money from the [respondent] with the assurance that she would work for the
issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of

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[R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.

xxxx

x x x [petitioner’s] act to x x x restore the amount of [₱50,000] was to avoid possible sanctions.

x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it was
agreed upon by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within which to
pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had available
money to pay and had been persistent in returning the amount of [₱50,000.00] to the
[respondent], she would have easily given the same right at that moment (on 19 October 2002)
in the presence of the Barangay Officials.6 x x x. (Stress in the original.)

The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman’s Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that
contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act
complained of is a private matter. The CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of
conduct required of her as a public officer when she demanded and received the amount of
₱50,000 on the representation that she can secure a title to respondent’s property and for
failing to return the amount. The CA stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 requires
petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her
role as a dispenser and peddler of undue patronage. 7

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a
government employee or where the act complained of is not related to the
performance of official duty?

2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively

liable despite the dismissal of the estafa case?

3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view
of mitigating circumstances?8

Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official
duty, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA for holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case
was dismissed upon a finding that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct
cannot be attributed to her. And even assuming that she is guilty of misconduct, she is entitled
to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such as the fact that this is the first charge against
her in her long years of public service.9

Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the
CA correctly resolved.10 She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that
public office is a public trust when she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and
received an amount for undelivered work.11

We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add,
however, that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.

On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between
them.12 Section 13(1),13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official
or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under
Section 1614 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance

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committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 19 15 of R.A. No.
6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to
acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of
the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the
act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official
duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.16

On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was
dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases
may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of
the criminal charges.17

For proper consideration instead is petitioner’s liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.

We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:

SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always

uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government
resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage
in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge

their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence
and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as
dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on
account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity
except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered
strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to

everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend

prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and
employees shall provide information on their policies and procedures in clear
and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public
consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions,
simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions
prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

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 (f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times
be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-
produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and
pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend
Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit

themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of
public accountability, and manifest by deed the supremacy of civilian authority
over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty
to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead
modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in
extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1)
observance of these standards including the dissemination of information programs and
workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited
number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their
observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on
measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising
the general level of observance of these standards.

Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section
4(A)(b) on professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that
characterize or mark a profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity
with great competence. Indeed, to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent,
efficient, experienced, proficient or polished. 18 In the context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No.
6713, the observance of professionalism also means upholding the integrity of public office by
endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any appearance of impropriety
affecting the integrity of government services. However, it should be noted that Section 4(A)
enumerates the standards of personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution
of official duties."

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of
professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn
public duty. The Ombudsman said that petitioner’s act deprived the government of her
committed service because the generation of a certificate of title was not within her line of
public service. In denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman said that it
would have been sufficient if petitioner just referred the respondent to the persons/officials
incharge of the processing of the documents for the issuance of a certificate of title. While it
may be true that she did not actually deal with the other government agencies for the
processing of the titles of the subject property, petitioner’s act of accepting the money from
respondent with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already
enough to create a perception that she is a fixer.

On its part, the CA rejected petitioner’s argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create
those "wrong perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law
enjoins public officers, at all times to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good customs, public order, public policy, public safety and public interest.
Thus, it is not the plurality of the acts that is being punished but the commission of the act
itself.

Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad
enough to apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one’s
office. We hold, however, that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b)
of R.A. No. 6713. The reason though does not lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at

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all related to petitioner’s discharge of her duties as department head of the Population
Commission.

In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized 19 the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No.
6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the
Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive and Rewards System for public officials and
employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit:

RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM

SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have
demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of
conduct laid down in Section 4 of the Code, namely:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x

(b) Professionalism. - x x x

(c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x

(d) Political neutrality. - x x x

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x

(g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x

(h) Simple living. - x x x

On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative
disciplinary action, as follows:

RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under
existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office
or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared
unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary
action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:

(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office. x x x.

(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee,

consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise
regulated, supervised or licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law;

(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law or regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official functions;

(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a
regular or pending official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or
referral is mandated by (1) law, or (2) international agreements, commitment and
obligation, or as part of the functions of his office;

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(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him

by reason of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private
interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;

(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in
connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of, his office. x x x.

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(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to
morals or public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the general public;

(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or

preference;

(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;

(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt,
except as otherwise provided in these Rules;

(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within
a reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules;

(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or
to act promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;

(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of
business interests and financial connections; and

(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30)
days from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to
divest himself of his shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty
(60) days from such assumption of public office when conflict of interest
arises: Provided, however, that for those who are already in the service and a conflict of
interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or divest himself of said
interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the
conflict of interest had arisen.

In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,20 this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to
abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its
implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action, to wit:

The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
provision commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said
provision merely enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by
public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy
and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713
adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to
officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the
mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the high

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standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same
favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have
to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only acts
"declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty
three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide
by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them.  (Emphasis
supplied.)

Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in
that case.

We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we

reverse the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b)
of R.A. No. 6713. In so ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its
implementing rules issued by the CSC under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to
stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in the law itself.
They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 21

But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary
action under R.A. No. 6713?

We also rule in the negative.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is
only simple.22 Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of
substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of grave misconduct because there was
substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies
as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules. 23 We have also ruled that complicity in the
transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple misconduct
only as there was failure to establish flagrancy in respondent’s act for her to be held liable of
gross misconduct.24 On the other hand, we have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly
rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, and grave misconduct, since the
complainant did not even indicate the particular acts of the judge which were allegedly violative
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.25

In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner’s violation of an established and definite
rule of action or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of
petitioner. In fact, respondent could merely point to petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the
mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that
belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.

True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that public office is a public trust. However, respondent’s allegation that petitioner
meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation.
Respondent did not even say what acts of interference were done by petitioner. Neither did
respondent say in which government agency petitioner committed interference. And causing
the survey of respondent’s land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs of another
government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population Commission. It does
not show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government agency. Even
the Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The survey shows only that petitioner contracted a
surveyor.1ihpwa1 Respondent said nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did.
The survey shows that petitioner also started to work on her task under their agreement. Thus,
respondent’s allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is not entirely

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correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the legal obstacle that
the land is government property.

However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative
liability.

But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of ₱50,000
from respondent because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from
her.26 We find in the allegations and counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioner’s
house in Biñan, Laguna, and asked petitioner if she can help respondent secure a title to her
land which she intends to sell. Petitioner agreed to help. When respondent asked about the
cost, petitioner said ₱150,000 and accepted ₱50,000 from respondent to cover the initial
expenses.27

We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the
aborted transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by
the Ombudsman, if petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of ₱50,000 until the
preliminary investigation of the estafa case on September 18, 2003,28 there would have been no
need for the parties’ agreement that petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said
amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner’s belated attempt to return the amount was
intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of the estafa case against
her.

For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents
therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on
their promise to have pertinent documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service
Insurance System after the complainant’s rights over the subject property were transferred to
the sister of one of the respondents.29 Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J.
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming conduct means
improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method. 301avvphi1

This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for
public office shall not be countenanced.31 The Constitution categorically declares as follows:

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. 32

Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after
failing to accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent
sued her for estafa, thus reinforcing the latter’s suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her
money. Although the element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed
against the petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social and
ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer,
petitioner’s transgression could erode the public’s trust in government employees, moreso
because she holds a high position in the service.

As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-

Rodriguez. Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of ₱15,000 in lieu of the three months
suspension is proper. In imposing said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance
petitioner’s 37 years of public service and the fact that this is the first charge against
her.33 Section 5334 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And since
petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of ₱50,000 including interest, we find it
proper to order her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time
to rekindle their friendship.

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WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and
its Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January
6, 2004 and Order dated March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F,
and ENTER a new judgment as follows:

We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her
a FINE of ₱15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from
finality of this Decision.

We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of ₱50,000.00 with interest

thereon at 12% per annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191712, September 17, 2014

EDITA S. BUENO AND MILAGROS E. QUINAJON, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

NAPOLEON S. RONQUILLO, JR., EDNA G. RAÑA AND ROMEO G. REFRUTO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated November 4, 2009 and Resolution 2 dated March 18, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105925.  The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated January 22, 2007
of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-C-A-05-0065-B finding the petitioners Edita S.
Bueno (National Electrification Administration [NEA] Administrator) and Milagros E. Quinajon
(Director of NEA’s Institutional Development Department) guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 6713 otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.”

Factual Antecedents

On February 13, 1998, former Administrator Teodorico P. Sanchez of the NEA issued a
memorandum “Re: Consolidated Guidelines on the Candidacy of Coop Officials and Employees
in Local, National and Barangay Elections and Related Matters.” Said memorandum provided,
among others, that: (1) all board members, general managers and employees of electric
cooperatives shall be considered automatically resigned from their respective positions
effective upon filing of their Certificates of Candidacy; (2) directors who ran and lost in the
national and local elections shall not be eligible for re-appointment; and (3) in the event that
the spouse of an incumbent director runs and wins in these elections, the director shall be
considered automatically resigned when the spouse takes his/her oath of
office.4cralawlawlibrary

On the basis of the aforementioned memorandum of Administrator Teodorico P.  Sanchez,

petitioner Edita S. Bueno who was then NEA Deputy Administrator for Cooperatives
Development, issued on February 9, 2001 a memorandum addressed to all regional
electrification directors  on the subject “Candidacy of Electric Coop Officials and Employees in
the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections” stating, among others, that “[A]ll board

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members, general managers and employees of ECs shall be considered automatically resigned
from their respective positions effective upon filing of their Certificates of
Candidacy.”5cralawlawlibrary

On June 25, 2001, in reply to NEA Administrator Manuel Luis Sanchez’s letters, the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 115 6 stating that the subject
memoranda are not valid  rules and regulations, and hence have no force and effect on electric
cooperatives for the following reasons: (1) they have not been formulated, adopted and
approved by the NEA Board of Administrators which is the body vested by law with the power
to promulgate rules and regulations; and (2) they have not been filed with the University of the
Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987.  In the same opinion, NEA was advised to have the subject memoranda approved by the
NEA Board of Administrators and filed with the UP Law Center.

Under Resolution No. 56 issued on May 27, 2004, the NEA Board of Administrators approved
the subject memorandum issued by former NEA Administrator Teodorico P. Sanchez.  The said
memorandum was likewise published in the Official Gazette on March 21,
2005.7cralawlawlibrary

On December 7, 2004, private respondents Napoleon S. Ronquillo, Jr., Edna G. Raña and Romeo
G. Refruto filed criminal and administrative complaints before the OMB charging petitioner
Bueno (now the NEA Administrator) with “Gross Neglect of Duty and violations of the pertinent
provisions of RA 6713. Private respondents alleged:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

3.  That notwithstanding said advise from NEA’s statutory counsel respondent BUENO who was
fully aware of its existence being then the Deputy Administrator for Cooperatives Development
and thereafter as Chief Operating Officer of NEA and eventually as its Administrator continued
its implementation to the damage and prejudice of the 119 electric cooperatives nationwide;

4.  That its unlawful implementation specifically by respondents BUENO and QUINAJON had
caused and is still causing irreparable damage and injury to officers and employees of electric
cooperatives who happens to be victims of this null and void NEA Rules and Regulations, the
latest of which was the case of ALEJANDRO RANCHEZ, JR. of the Ilocos Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (INEC) who was unceremoniously and unlawfully removed as director of said
electric cooperative by respondents BUENO and QUINAJON using aforesaid memoranda as
basis, copies of the letter directives issued by them are hereto attached and marked as ANNEX
“D” and ANNEX “D-1” for ready reference and made integral parts hereof;

5.  Respondent members of the NEA Board of Administrators chaired by DOE Secretary
VINCENT PEREZ are being joined and included in this complaint by virtue of their tolerance and
inaction in relation to the implementation of said null and void Rules and Regulations
notwithstanding their acquiescence of its infirmities.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, complainants pray

that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) Pending hearing/investigation on the merits of this case respondents EDITA S. BUENO and
MILAGROS E. QUINAJON be placed under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION there being sufficient
grounds to warrant its issuance pursuant to the Ombudsman Act and pertinent laws herein
applicable;

b) That in aid of investigation that a subpoena duces tecum be issued to:

1. EDITA S. BUENO and MILAGROS E. QUINAJON for them to produce the

original copy of the advertive [sic] OGCC Opinion and the entire records
of ALEJANDRO RANCHEZ, JR. of INEC including the latest
recommendation of the NEA Legal Services Office issued a few days
before the NEA Board meeting on November 24, 2004 making a

10
 pronouncement as to the impropriety/illegality of aforesaid
memorandum;

2. NOLLIE B. ALAMILLO for him to produce copy of the Petition for Review
filed by ALEJANDRO RANCHEZ, JR.  with the NEA Board of Administrators
together with the action/s taken by him and the NEA Board of
Administrators specifically its board meeting dated November 24, 2004.

c) That after the determination of the existence of a PRIMA FACIE CASE against all the
respondents, that the corresponding INFORMATIONS be filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN
considering that they are holding positions from SALARY GRADE 26 and above;

d) That respondents be dealt with administratively by DISMISSING them from the service. 8

The administrative aspect of the above complaint was subsequently docketed as OMB-C-A-05-
0065-B for “Gross Neglect of Duty, RA 6713”, while the criminal aspect was docketed as OMB-C-
A-05-0062-B.

Alejandro Ranchez, Jr. (Ranchez), who was mentioned in the complaint, was a duly elected
Director of the Ilocos Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (INEC) whose wife, Ms. Genaline Judith R.
Ranchez, was elected and sworn into office as a Sangguniang Bayan Member of Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte.  As per the letter dated July 20, 2004 of Quinajon, Ranchez was considered automatically
resigned as Director of INEC.  Ranchez sought reconsideration but NEA Administrator Bueno, in
her letter dated September 27, 2004, denied his request and asserted that the subject
memoranda shall be fully implemented unless and until declared illegal or unconstitutional by a
competent court.9cralawlawlibrary

In his letter dated November 18, 2004 Ranchez had requested from Quinajon for a copy of the
memorandum of the NEA Legal Office dated November 18, 2004 addressed to Quinajon. In
another letter dated November 3, 2004 addressed to Bueno, Ranchez sought deferment of
implementation by the Board of Directors of INEC of NEA’s decision on his disqualification as
Director pending resolution of his petition for review filed before the NEA Board of
Administrators.

On May 19, 2005, the OMB denied private respondents’ prayer for the preventive suspension
of petitioners.10cralawlawlibrary

In their position paper, petitioners denied having committed any neglect of duty in connection
with the implementation of the subject memoranda.  They explained that the February 13,
1998 memorandum of Administrator Teodorico P. Sanchez, the basis of Bueno’s February 9,
2001 memorandum have been duly ratified by the NEA Board of Administrators on May 27,
2004 under Resolution No. 56.  They also argued that the private respondents have no
sufficient interest in the controversy and filed the complaint in bad faith since private
respondent Ronquillo who is the Division Manager of NEA’s Legal Department should have
advised the private respondents on the proper remedies. 11cralawlawlibrary

Private respondents in their position paper again discussed the case of Mr. Ranchez which they
said belied petitioners’ averments in their counter-affidavit that they were not negligent in the
implementation of the subject memoranda declared as null and void by the OGCC.  Attached to
the position paper is the affidavit executed by Ranchez, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

4.  That sometime on the first week of October, 2004, I was accompanied by then INEC Director
Parado to the National Electrification Administration (NEA) and inquired from the NEA
Corporate Secretary if the Memorandum dated February 9, 2001 and the ELECTION GUIDELINES
which was made by NEA Administrator Bueno in removing me as a duly elected Director of INEC
had already been approved by the NEA Board of Administrators and eventually submitted to

11
the UP Law Center as required by the Administrative Code.  The NEA Corporate Secretary
informed me that there was no approval yet as of that date and hence it had not yet been
submitted to the UP Law Center;

5.  That relying on the pronouncement made by the NEA Corporate Secretary, I filed a Motion
[f]or Reconsideration with NEA on October 22, 2004 addressed to the NEA Board [o]f
Administrators inviting their attention on the legal infirmities caused by said Memorandum of
NEA Administrator Bueno, copy furnished the NEA Legal Department;

6.  That on October 29, 2004, the NEA Corporate Secretary Mr. Nollie Alamillo sent to me a
letter with the information that my request will be taken up in the next regular meeting of the
NEA Board of Administrators;

7.  That thereafter and when I made follow ups with the Office of the Corporate Secretary, Mr.
Alamillo informed me that upon instructions made by NEA Administrator Bueno, said request
for reconsideration was not included in the agenda for the Board Meeting and other meetings
of the Board that transpired;

8.  That on November 2004 I again prepared another letter communication addressed to
Administrator Bueno with the request that I be allowed to sit as Director pending resolution
and determination by the NEA Board of Administrators of my Motion [f]or Reconsideration;

9.  That I made several follow ups with NEA but I was only referred to its different Offices one of
which was the NEA Legal Office whom per information relayed by the Office of Administrator
Bueno was tasked to attend to my case;

10.  That the Legal Department made a favorable recommendation on my case and I was
instructed to follow up their recommendation with the Office of Director Milagros Quinajon;

11. That at the Office of Director whereby I was made to wait until 7:30 in the evening, I again
reiterated the issue on the legal infirmities of the aforesaid Memorandum and they had even a
telephone conversation with our local officials but Director Quinajon just told me to come back
the following day;

12.  That when I came back the following day, I was informed by her staff that she (Quinajon)
was on travel in the Province;

13.  That despite follow ups made, all efforts I had exerted resulted in futility because of the
uncalled for acts unbecoming of public servants demonstrated by Administrator Bueno and her
staff MILAGROS QUINAJON;

14.  That I ventilated this matter with the Office of the President thru the Malacañang Legal
Staff whereby my case had [already been] submitted for decision;

x x x x12

Ruling of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case against respondent officials except
petitioners, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocination, this Office finds, as

follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The complaint filed against former Secretary of the Department of Energy,

VINCENT S. PEREZ; and PABLO M. PAN III, WILFRED L. BILLENA and JOSEPH D.
KHONG HUN, all members of the Board of Administrators, NEA, is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of substantial evidence; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

12
 2. EDITA S. BUENO and MILAGROS E. QUINAJON, Administrator and Director,
respectively, National Electrification Administration (NEA) are hereby found
guilty of Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 in relation with
Section 3(a)(2), Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6713.  Absent
any showing of intent or bad faith on their part, they are accordingly meted the
penalty of REPRIMAND pursuant to Section 10(a), Rule III of Administrative Order
No. 7.  Further, the charge of Gross Neglect of Duty against them is hereby
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Energy
for his information and the proper implementation of the same, with the directive that he
should submit a compliance report to this Office within five (5) days from the implementation
of this Decision.

SO DECIDED.13chanrobleslaw

According to the Ombudsman, since the NEA Board of Administrators already passed its
resolution approving the subject memoranda as early as May 27, 2004, it cannot be said that
Secretary Perez and Board of Administrators members Pan, Billena and Khong Hun are remiss in
their duties or tolerated the problem.  It was found that said officials resolved to put an end to
the controversy after much deliberation and taking into consideration the advice given by the
NEA Legal Division through Atty. Hernandez.

However, as to petitioners, the Ombudsman found sufficient evidence for violation of Section
5(a) of RA 6713, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Records would show that the letter dated November 3, 2004 of Alejandro E. Ranchez was
received by the NEA Records Section on November 4, 2004 x x x.  It would appear however, that
on May 27, 2004 or almost six (6) months before the said letter of Ranchez, the NEA Board of
Administrator[s] had already passed Resolution No. 56.  Nonetheless, there is nothing in the
records that would show that the NEA administration exerted efforts to enlighten Ranchez of
the effect of Resolution No. 56 to his petition for review or reconsideration nor put an end to
the issues brought about by his petition for review or reconsideration.

Although it may be argued that the subject Resolution itself would be enough to answer the
query posited by Ranchez, the above-quoted provision is clear that there is a need for the
agency to give a definite answer on the said letter/s of Ranchez. 14chanrobleslaw

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that they cannot be found guilty of an
offense which was not even charged in the complaint.  They claimed that they attended to all
the queries of Ranchez through the letters dated November 18, 2004 and November 19, 2004
sent by Quinajon, attaching copies thereof to the motion. 15cralawlawlibrary

In denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman pointed out that in all the
directives sent to petitioners, it is very clear that the charge of violation of RA 6713 was always
indicated.  In addition, the complaint couched their charge in general terms: “xxx for GROSS
NEGLECT OF DUTY and violations of pertinent provisions of the Code of Ethical Standards for
Government Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713).”  Further, it was explained that even if the
charge does not appear or is not explicitly written in the complaint, the Ombudsman is not
precluded from charging and finding the respondents guilty of RA 6713 based on (a) the
allegations of the complaint itself and the facts appearing in the records of the case; and (b) the
administrative charge of Neglect of Duty as defined, means a failure on the part of a public
officer to do and perform some of the duties of this office, and hence Section 5(a) would fall
under this category.16cralawlawlibrary

As to the alleged letters sent to Ranchez by Quinajon, the Ombudsman found that there was no
proof presented that Ranchez indeed was furnished copy of the said documents and the same

13
were never submitted in evidence or attached to their counter-affidavits or position
papers.17cralawlawlibrary

Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in holding that the petitioners were properly informed of the
charge against them and that they were guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, there is no proof that Ranchez received the
November 19, 2004 letter.  Furthermore, even if such letter was indeed received by Ranchez,
under the circumstances, such letter fails to address the situation.  It bears repeating that, at
the time the alleged November 19, 2004 letter was made, the Board of Administrators of NEA
had already approved the questioned memorandum.  Thus, the Petitioners should have, at the
very least, notified Ranchez of such a fact instead of merely stating that [they] are evaluating
[his] position in coordination with the NEA Legal Department.  While this Court will not
characterize the acts of the Petitioners as deliberately misleading, they have certainly withheld
crucial information which would have answered the query of Mr. Ranchez once and for
all.18chanrobleslaw

In their motion for reconsideration, 19 petitioners stressed that Ranchez is not the complainant
in the case before the OMB but only private respondents; hence, it is incorrect for the OMB to
have found petitioners administratively liable.  They also contended that it is legally presumed
that Ranchez received the November 19, 2004 letter of NEA addressing his queries.  The CA
denied the said motion.

Petitioners’ Argument

Petitioners aver that the CA failed to consider the fact that the Ombudsman erroneously found
them administratively liable notwithstanding that Ranchez, who was the subject of the
purported nonfeasance, was not even a complainant in the case before the Ombudsman. 
Citing Section 20, paragraph 4 of RA 6670 (Ombudsman Act), petitioners argue that private
respondents have no sufficient personal interest in the violation which have been committed.

It was also asserted that the dispositive portion of the Ombudsman’ decision stating the
absence of proof that petitioners’ act was intentional or tainted with bad faith, even validates
such lack of substantial evidence of violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713.  Thus, the penalty of
reprimand imposed on petitioners is not justified.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute illegal and unjust acts of those
who are in the public service emanates from no less than the 1987 Constitution.  Section 12 of
Article XI states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 12.  The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations,  and shall,  in  appropriate  cases,  notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof.

As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, The Ombudsman Act was enacted in line with the

state’s policy of maintaining honesty and integrity in the public service and take effective
measures against graft and corruption.20   Section 15 (1) of said Act
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
14
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.  It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

xxxx

There is clearly no question on the legal standing of private respondents to file the
administrative complaint against petitioners before the Ombudsman. Indeed, the Office of the
Ombudsman is mandated to “investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” The Ombudsman can act on
anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or
omissions from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper.  Thus, any complainant may be entertained
by the Ombudsman for the latter to initiate an inquiry and investigation for alleged
irregularities.21cralawlawlibrary

It must also be mentioned that while Ranchez was not joined as complainants before the
Ombudsman, he executed an affidavit attesting to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
that petitioners failed to respond to his letters in connection with his pending motion for
reconsideration with the NEA Board of Administrators and inform him of the status of the
subject memoranda.  This affidavit was submitted by the private respondents before the
Ombudsman in support of their charge of gross neglect of duty and violations of RA 6713
against the petitioners.

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman erred in not dismissing the administrative complaint as
there was no showing of sufficient personal interest on the part of private respondents,
pursuant to Section 20(4) of RA 6770 and this Court’s ruling in Baltazar v. Hon.
Ombudsman22 where an administrative complaint was dismissed due to want of personal
interest in the subject matter.  They point out that as admitted by them in their sworn
complaints, private respondents were former employees who were replaced upon the
reorganization of NEA and have not been candidates to any elective position in any electric
cooperative in the Philippines. Private respondents thus do not even stand to be affected by the
subject memoranda which were declared null and void by the OGCC.

We disagree.

Section 20 of RA 6770 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 20. Exceptions.  – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary

investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1)  The complainant has adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;

(2)  The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(3)  The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;

(4) The complaint has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or

(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.  (Emphasis supplied.)

In Filipino v. Macabuhay,23 the Court interpreted the fifth exception under the above provision,
as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

15
The use of the word “may” clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as
petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer
discretion; while the word “shall” is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether
or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by
prescription.24   (Emphasis supplied.)

According to petitioners, the foregoing ruling is not applicable because it pertains to Section
20(5) and the issue therein was prescription of the administrative offense, whereas the present
petition concerns the legal standing of complainants under the Section 20(4).

Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that Section 20(4) is a bar to the Ombudsman’s
investigation into their acts or omissions in the case of Ranchez based on the supposed lack of
personal interest on the part of private respondents who are the complainants in OMB-C-A-
0065-B.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,25 the Court noted that Section 20 of RA 6770
has been clarified by Administrative Order No. 1726 (AO 17), which amended Administrative
Order No. 07 (AO 07), otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Section 4, Rule III 27 of the amended Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 4. Evaluation. – Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to
determine whether the same may be:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) dismissed outright for any grounds stated under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770,
provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on
the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned;

b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public Assistance
Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2 , Rule IV of this Rules;

c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, R.A. 6770 for the
taking of appropriate administrative proceedings;

d) referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation; or

e) docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the

Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied.)

Thus, even if the ground raised is the supposed lack of sufficient personal interest of
complainants in the subject matter of the grievance under Section 20(4), the dismissal on that
ground is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint.

In this case, the Ombudsman proceeded to investigate and decide the complaint filed by
private respondents, and even assuming the latter may have no sufficient personal interest in
Ranchez’s grievance mentioned in their complaint, such was deemed irrelevant and not enough
basis for outright dismissal of the complaint.  The Ombudsman in this case cannot be faulted for
exercising its discretion under Section 20 of RA 6670, which allows the Ombudsman to decide
not to conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of,
if it believes that the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of
the grievance.

Petitioners’ reliance on the ruling in Baltazar v. Hon. Ombudsman28 is likewise misplaced.  The
Court therein clarified at the outset that there was no question on petitioner’s legal standing
“[i]n so far as the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is concerned”

16
but that the filing of the petition for review on certiorari before this Court, after the
Ombudsman, upon re-investigation, ordered the dismissal of the criminal complaint, is another
matter.  Thus, applying the rule on real party-in-interest under Section 2, 29 Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner in said case was found to be a stranger and not
an injured private complainant in a criminal complaint who has direct interest in the outcome
of the criminal case.

On the finding of petitioners’ administrative liability, we find no reversible error committed by

the Ombudsman.

Section 5(a) of RA 6713 explicitly mandates as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees.–In the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are under obligation to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a)  – All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public.
The reply must contain, the action taken on the request.

xxxx

Records showed that despite Ranchez’s written and verbal requests made between September
and November 2004 in connection with his pending petition for review/reconsideration on his
disqualification on the basis of the subject memoranda and its approval by the NEA Board of
Administrators, petitioners did not respond to his queries or at the very least inform him that as
early as May 27, 2004, the NEA Board of Administrators had already approved the subject
memoranda.  Notably, Ranchez had invoked the OGCC’s Opinion declaring the subject
memoranda to have no binding force and effect on electric cooperatives which is contrary to
petitioner Bueno’s stance that the said regulations remain valid until declared illegal by a
competent court.  Moreover, despite constant follow ups, Ranchez was not informed as to
when the NEA Board of Administrators will take up or its action on his petition for
reconsideration.  In any event, petitioners clearly failed to disclose crucial information sought
by Ranchez within fifteen working days, in violation of Section 5(a) of RA 6713.

We note that the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees emphasizes promptness in attending to requests made upon
government offices or agencies.  Rule VI, Sections 1 and 3(2)
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1.  As a general rule, when a request or petition, whether written or verbal, can be
disposed of promptly and expeditiously the official and employee in charge to whom the same
is presented shall do so immediately, without discrimination, and in no case beyond fifteen (15)
working days from receipt of the request or petition.

x x x x

SEC. 3.  In case of written requests, petitions or motions, sent by means of letters, telegrams, or
the like, the official or employee in charge shall act on the same within fifteen (15) working days
from receipt thereof, provided that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(b)  If the communication is within the jurisdiction of the office or agency, the official and
employee must:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) x x x

(2)  Where the matter is non-routinary or the issues involved are not simple or ordinary, write a
note or letter of acknowledgment, informing the interested party, petitioner or correspondent
of the action to be taken or when such requests, petitions or motions can be acted upon.  
Where there is a need to submit additional information, requirements, or documents, the note
or letter of acknowledgement shall so state, specifying a reasonable period of time within which

17
they should be submitted, and the name of the particular official or employee in charge
thereof.  When all the documents or requirements have been submitted to the satisfaction of
the department or office or agency concerned, the particular official or employee in charge
shall inform the interested party, petitioner, or correspondent of the action to be taken and
when such action or disposition can be expected, barring unforeseen circumstances. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioners violated the above mandate and presented no proof whatsoever that they made a
written reply to Ranchez’s requests within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days. This
constituted neglect of duty which cannot be countenanced.30   Petitioners should be reminded
that as government officials and employees they are expected to adhere to the standards set by
law in the discharge of their official duties, among others, commitment to public service,
professionalism, justness and sincerity and responsiveness to the public. 31cralawlawlibrary

Under Section 52 (C) (13) and (15), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, petitioners’ infraction is classified as a light offense.

SEC. 52.  Classification of Offenses. – x x x

xxxx

C. The following are Light Offenses with corresponding penalties:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

13. Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt x x x
1st Offense – Reprimand
2nd Offense – Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense – Dismissal
xxxx
15.  Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or act
promptly and expeditiously on public transactions
1st Offense – Reprimand
2nd Offense – Suspension 1-30 days
3rd Offense - Dismissal

This being petitioners’ first offense, the penalty of reprimand imposed by the Ombudsman was
thus proper. As to the Ombudsman’s pronouncement in the fallo of its decision that petitioners
have not been shown to have acted in bad faith and with malice, this will not exculpate them
from administrative liability. There is nothing in RA 6713 or its implementing rules that requires
a finding of malice or bad faith in the commission of the administrative offense defined under
Section 5.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The Decision dated November 4, 2009
and Resolution dated March 18, 2010 of the Court of Appeals  which upheld the Decision dated
January 22, 2007 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-05-0065-B are
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.cralawred

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

3
[G.R. NO. 166116 : March 31, 2006]

18
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. FLORENTINA SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review of the decision dated June 22, 2004 and resolution dated
November 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Ombudsman
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty, violation of Sec. 4 (c) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
67131 and grave misconduct, and penalizing her with dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of benefits equivalent to twelve (12) months salary and temporary disqualification for re-
employment in the government service for one (1) year.

This case arose from a complaint filed by Estrelita L. Gumabon, Teacher III, Lagro Elementary
School, against the school Principal, respondent Florentina A. Santos, before the Office of the
Ombudsman on September 29, 1997. The complaint alleged that respondent falsified her daily
time record as her entries therein did not match the entries of the school's security guard in
their logbook. In particular, on August 20, 1997, respondent indicated in her daily time record
that she reported for work at Lagro Elementary School the whole day, but she actually went to
Golden Child Montessori Dela Costa III Annex at 9:00 a.m., and later at 11:30 a.m. to its Carissa
II Annex. She left the premises of said school around one in the afternoon. The complaint also
pointed out that respondent was one of the owners/incorporators of Golden Child Montessori
and held the position of President/Chairman of the Board. It was further alleged that
respondent exhibited rude and oppressive behavior not only to the teachers and personnel of
Lagro Elementary School, but also to the parents of their pupils. 2 In a supplemental complaint
dated April 1, 1998, Gumabon also charged respondent with taking several pieces of galvanized
iron sheets used in the construction and repair of some rooms and toilets at Lagro Elementary
School. Respondent allegedly ordered one Jose Sabalilag to take the galvanized iron sheets and
deliver them to her house, and even asked school janitress Pia Amparo to accompany Sabalilag
to show him the direction to respondent's house.3

Answering the charges, respondent explained that it was her daily routine upon arrival at the
school to inspect its outer premises before entering the school grounds, to see if the school
fence is clean and garbage-free. The security guard only logs in the time of respondent's entry
into the school grounds as her arrival time. As regards the incident on August 20, 1997,
respondent stated that she sought permission from Mrs. Paz T. Quejada, District Supervisor,
School District X, to attend an activity at Golden Child Montessori. She said that Mrs. Quejada
did not object to her request. Respondent also admitted being an owner/incorporator of
Golden Child Montessori, but argued that it did not violate any existing law. She denied all the
other allegations in the complaint. With respect to the taking of the galvanized iron sheets,
respondent explained that they were excess materials from the construction projects in the
school and they were sold to her by the project contractor at cost.4

Hearings were conducted before Graft Investigation Officer Joselito P. Fangon at the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman.

Gumabon appeared to identify her affidavit, as well as the affidavits of her witnesses, and the
documentary evidence consisting of the photocopy of respondent's daily time record for the
months of February, March and August 1997,5 copy of the logbook of security guard Willy
Casauay,6 copy of the memo issued by respondent to the Principals of the various annexes of
Golden Child Montessori,7 the letters of several parents of Lagro Elementary School pupils
complaining about the attitude of respondent towards them, and the copy of the police receipt
showing that the police recovered several galvanized iron sheets from Jose Sabalilag.

Hermelina de Vera, former Principal of Golden Child Montessori Dela Costa III Annex, testified
that respondent attended the Linggo ng Wika celebration at their campus in San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan on August 20, 1997. Respondent arrived at said campus around nine in the
morning.8

19
Zaida Zayde, Corporate Secretary and Principal of Golden Child Montessori Dela Costa II Annex,
testified that respondent is also one of the incorporators of said school, and that respondent
handles its finances, signs checks, keeps bank accounts, and issues and signs memoranda for
and in behalf of the school. She also stated that she and respondent visited the Dela Costa III
Annex of Golden Child Montessori during the Linggo ng Wika celebration.9

Juan S. Gambol, Police Inspector, Lagro Police Station, stated that on February 13, 1998,
Gumabon reported the alleged missing pieces of galvanized iron at Lagro Elementary School.
They recovered around 40 pieces of galvanized iron sheets from Jose Sabalilag on February 23,
1998 and issued a receipt therefor.10

Jeorgia Loperez, one of the incorporators of Golden Child Montessori, testified that respondent
is the President and Chairman of the Golden Child Montessori, and that she handles the
finances, keeps the bank account, signs checks and issues memoranda for and in behalf of the
school.11

Fructuosa C. Gavilan, Grade School Teacher, Lagro Elementary School, testified that respondent
has the habit of scolding her even in front of other people. She also testified to an incident
where she was marked absent despite being present, albeit late on the particular date. 12

Sophia Amparo, Janitress at Lagro Elementary School, testified that on February 10, 1998, she
was instructed by respondent to bring to the latter's house several pieces of galvanized iron
sheets.13

Didith Sacueza testified that she used to sell food to the teachers at the Lagro Elementary
School. She said that she had an agreement with respondent that she would be allowed to sell
food in the school but she was required to give a certain amount to the school. Then, one day,
without any notice, Sacueza was refused entry into the school. The guard informed her that it
was the Principal's order. She wrote respondent asking why she was no longer allowed to sell
food in the school, but she did not get any response.14

Vicente Cue, Security Guard at Lagro Elementary School, testified that on September 5, 1999,
his wife made an emergency call at the school but respondent refused to give the call to him. 15

Willy Casauay, also a Security Guard at Lagro Elementary School, testified that a certain Jose
Sabalilag went to the Lagro Elementary School and, upon instruction of respondent, took
several pieces of galvanized iron sheets. Accompanied by Pia Amparo, Sabalilag brought the
same to respondent's residence. The incident was noted in his logbook. 16

Jose Sabalilag, Benedict Guantero and Erlinda Dela Rosa, on the other hand, testified for
respondent.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Jose Sabalilag stated that sometime in February 1998, he was tasked to renovate a comfort
room at Lagro Elementary School. He used about forty (40) pieces of galvanized iron sheets for
the construction. There was an excess of about eight (8) pieces of galvanized iron sheets which
respondent ordered to be taken to her house. He also said that he removed around forty-one
(41) pieces of used galvanized iron sheets which he took to their storage (bodega), but which he
also returned to the school the next day upon instruction of a Commission on Audit (COA)
personnel. While they were unloading the returned materials, Gumabon arrived, took some
pictures, and reported the incident to the police. Gumabon also made him sign an affidavit
stating that respondent was the one who ordered the taking of the galvanized iron sheets. 17

Benedict Guantero, an employee of the COA, testified that respondent sought his advice
concerning the salvageable materials taken from two (2) school toilets which underwent
renovation.18

Erlinda Dela Rosa, former Officer-in-Charge of Golden Child Montessori, testified that Golden
Child Montessori and its branches were being managed by their respective Principals. She also

20
testified that the payment of rentals for the school, the payment of salaries of teachers and
financial management of the school were undertaken by the respective administrators. 19

On July 23, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of
dishonesty, violation of Sec. 4 (c) of R.A. 6713 and grave misconduct. It imposed upon
respondent the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits equivalent to
twelve (12) months salary and temporary disqualification for re-employment in the government
for one (1) year from the finality of said decision.20

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It held that the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman were not supported by substantial evidence.21

Hence, this petition. Petitioner raised the following arguments:

1. Contrary to the appellate court a quo's [sic] ruling, the extant evidence on record constitutes
more than substantial evidence to establish the administrative guilt of respondent.

2. Findings of fact of an administrative agency are generally accorded not only respect but at
times finality.22

The petition is impressed with merit.

Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in
an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As
defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.23

A reading of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and a thorough examination of the
records of this case show sufficient evidence to prove respondent's administrative liability. In its
decision, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Graft Investigation Officer Joselito P. Fangon,
cites the pieces of evidence that support its ruling. It discussed its findings thus:

Respondent FLORENTINA A. SANTOS stands administratively charged with, among others, the
falsification of her Form 48; of being one of the Owners/Incorporators of a private school; of
having oppressed and harassed school teachers and employees; and of theft of school property.

With respect to the first charge, the complainant adduced as evidence the Daily Time Record
(Civil Service Form No. 48) of respondent SANTOS for the month of August 1997 (Exhibit B, p.
0191, Records). Marked as Exhibit "B-1" (supra.) is the entry for August 20, 1997 showing that
respondent SANTOS reported for work at Lagro Elementary School, Quezon City, at 6:45 in the
morning and departed at 7:15 in the evening. Likewise adduced as evidence is the testimony of
Hermelina de Vera x x x x

On the basis of the foregoing, it has been substantially established that respondent SANTOS
actually reported for work at the Lagro Elementary School in Quezon City. However, evidence
shows that said respondent, instead of rendering the required number of hours of work, went
to a private school (to attend a school function) in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. It is therefore
clear that the respondent deliberately made it appear that she reported for work on 20 August
1997, when in truth, she attended a private function and was physically absent from school.
The respondent's act of punching her Daily Time Record constitutes Dishonesty for making it
appear that she was present for work when in fact she was absent therefrom.

As against these, the respondent failed to present any evidence to counter the same, and as
such, her guilt has been adequately shown.

21
As to the charge against respondent of being an Owner/Incorporator of the Golden Child
Montessori School, we find the evidence to be inadequate to establish any administrative
liability.

Although the evidence tend to prove that the respondent is an Owner/Incorporator of the said
school, still, the complainant failed to show any conflict of interest on the part of the
respondent. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that being an Owner/Incorporator
of a private school amounts to a violation of any law. Verily, the charge against respondent on
this score should be dismissed.

On the charge of Oppression/Harassment, witness VICENTE CUE testified that on 8 September

1997, his wife made an emergency call at Lagro Elementary School where he works as a
Security Guard. However, despite his presence thereat, respondent SANTOS refused to give the
call to him. On cross-examination, the testimony of witness CUE was not rebutted by any
evidence.

Hence, it has been fairly established that the respondent committed an oppressive act against
Vicente Cue. Her actuations definitely runs [sic] counter to the established norms of conduct
and ethical standards for public officials who, "must act with justice and shall not discriminate
against anyone". Moreover, her action violates the standard of personal conduct, which
mandates all civil servants to "respect the rights of others, and to refrain from doing acts
contrary to good morals and customs". Accordingly, respondent SANTOS appears to be liable
for violation of Republic Act No. 6713.

The respondent was also accused of having misappropriated government property. On this
point, Sophia Amparo, janitress, Lagro Elementary School, testified x x x x

It is clear from the foregoing that at the instance of the respondent, several galvanized iron
sheets which appear to be the property of the government were taken out of Lagro Elementary
School and delivered to the residence of the respondent.

The respondent then presented her witnesses, namely: JOSE SABALILAG and BENEDICT
GUANTERO, to rebut the allegation of theft, however, the same proved insufficient to counter
the evidence against her.

xxx

It is therefore clear from the testimony of JOSE SABALILAG that at least eight (8) galvanized iron
sheets (which were purportedly new) were taken by the respondent and which remain
unaccounted for. This bolsters the finding that the respondent was responsible for having taken
several galvanized iron sheets which were government property.

With respect to BENEDICT GUANTERO, a witness for the respondent, the basis for his
testimony, which is a purported Affidavit was not formally offered as evidence in the present
case. Hence, the allegations therein can not be possibly considered in the resolution of the
instant case.

All told, it has been substantially established that the respondent took government property for
her own personal benefit which constitutes Grave Misconduct, and for which the respondent
may be held liable. (citations omitted)24

As a general rule, factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded great respect by this
Court. We do not see any reason to depart from this policy, except as regards respondent's
liability for holding the position of President/Chairman of the Board of Golden Child Montessori
and managing the affairs of said school. Contrary to the Ombudsman's ruling that such act does
not violate any provision of law, Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 prohibits all public officials and
employees from engaging in the private practice of their profession, thus:

22
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. ' In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel,
broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by
their office unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

The rule is that all public officers and employees are prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. The exception is when such private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or law. However, even if it is allowed by law or the Constitution, private practice of
profession is still proscribed when such practice will conflict or tends to conflict with the official
functions of the employee concerned. Indeed, public servants are expected to devote their
undivided attention to their public duties, to give the tax payers the competent and excellent
service that they deserve. In fact, Section 4 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees enjoins said officials and employees to always uphold public
interest over and above personal interest. By actively participating in the management of
Golden Child Montessori, a private school, while serving as Principal of Lagro Elementary
School, a government school, respondent has transgressed the provisions of Section 7 (b) (2) of
R.A. 6713.

We affirm all the other findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. The testimonial and
documentary evidence contained in the records constitutes substantial evidence to prove the
administrative liability of respondent, as discussed by the Ombudsman.

We now go to the penalty. Section 11 of R.A. 6713 provides that violations of Section 7 of said
law shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court, disqualification to
hold public office. Hence, we deem it appropriate to impose a fine of five thousand pesos
(P5,000) upon respondent in addition to the penalty imposed upon her by the Office of the
Ombudsman.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-98-
0307 dated July 23, 2001 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that an additional FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) is imposed upon respondent.

SO ORDERED.

23
G.R. Nos. 105965-70           August 9, 1999

GEORGE UY, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., Special Prosecution Officer III,
Office of the Special Prosecutor, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution 1 of the
Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's motion to quash the six (6) informations charging him with
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and to permanently enjoin the
respondents from proceeding with the criminal cases insofar as petitioner is involved.

At times material hereto, petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was
designated by his immediate supervisor, Captain Luisito F. Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff for Comptrollership, to act on the latter's behalf, during his absence, on matters relating to
the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG. This included the authority to sign
disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the Philippine
Navy.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official documents and
one (1) information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were filed with
the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and nineteen (19) co-accused, namely: (Ret.) Bgen. Mario
S. Espina (then Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, Department of National
Defense), (Ret.) Rear Admiral Simeon M. Alejandro (then Flag Officer in Command, Philippine
Navy), CDR Rodolfo Guanzon, CDR Erlindo A. Erolin, CAPT. Manual Ison (then Commander of
the Naval Supply Center, Philippine Navy), CAPT. Andres Andres, LCDR Gilmer B. Batestil, LCDR
Jose Alberto I. Velasco, Jr., LTSG Edgar L. Abogado, LT. Teddy O. Pan, LT. Ronald O. Sison,
Reynaldo Paderna (Chief Accountant), Antonio Guda (Supply Accountable Officer, Fort San
Felipe, Cavite, Philippine Navy), Loida T. Del Rosario (Typist), Marissa Bantigue (owner of MAR
GEN Enterprise), Avelina Avila (owner of Avelina Avila General Merchandise), Jenis B. Bantigue
(owner of JAB GEN Merchandise), Maria M. Capule (owner of MM Capule Enterprise) and
Andrea C. Antonio (owner of AC Antonio Enterprise).

On September 20, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order 2 directing a comprehensive re-
investigation of the cases against all the twenty (20) accused.

After conducting the re-investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued an Order 3 dated November
14, 1991 recommending that the informations for estafa through falsification of official
documents be withdrawn and in lieu thereof, informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A.
No. 3019, as amended, be filed against eleven (11) accused, 4 which included the petitioner.

In a Memorandum5 dated December 5, 1991, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto reduced

the number of those to be charged under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to five (5), 6 including
petitioner.

Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused, the
Special Prosecutor issued an Order7 dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more
names8 from the five (5) officers recommended for prosecution, and recommending that six (6)
separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, as amended, be filed against the
petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo Guanzon and LT. Teddy Pan. Except for the variance in the Purchase
Order numbers involved and the Payees, 9 the six (6) amended informations 10 filed by Special
Prosecutor Officer III Roger C. Berbano, Sr. recite identical allegations, viz:

That on or about November 1985, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, CDR. Rodolfo Guanzon, being then the Procurement Officer,
Philippine Navy, LCDR. George Uy, being then the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff

24
 Comptrollership, Philippine Navy and Lt. Teddy O. Pan, being then the Naval Group
Inspector, Philippine Navy, all public officials, and committing the offense in relation to
their office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, through evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to the Government, and in the
exercise of their separate official functions, to wit: accused Guanzon initiated/prepared
the Abstract of Canvass and Recommendation of Awards, Certificate of Emergency
Purchase and Reasonableness of Price, signed the PO, DV, validated PO No. . . ., accused
Uy signed the DV in behalf of the Assistant Chief of Naval Comptrollership, accused Pan
as N6 conducted the pre-audit and affixed his signature on the same P.O., the Sales
Invoice and Technical Inspection Report — which documents said accused had the duty
to check/verify/examined, thereby "acting or omitting to act" in a situation where there
is a duty to act, in that only 100 seal rings were ordered at a unit price of P98.70, yet
1,000 pieces appear to have been sold with total price of P98,700.00, hence there was
gross error in multiplication as shown on the face of the aforesaid PO and other
supporting documents, resulting to an overpayment of P88,930.00 to . . ., thereby
depriving the Government/Philippine Navy of the use thereof until its remittance/return
to the Government/Philippine Navy by . . . in December, 1991.

On April 21, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash 11 the
informations on the following grounds:

1. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused.

2. The officer who has filed the informations had no authority to do so.

3. The facts charged do not constitute an offense.

4. More than one (1) offense is charged.

On June 10, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued the now-assailed Resolution denying petitioner's
motion to quash for lack of merit. It passed upon the grounds set forth by petitioner in this
wise:

On the first issue raised by accused-movant, we are not inclined to rule that this Court
has no jurisdiction over the person of accused-movant or over the offenses charged
herewith. As intimated by the prosecution, this Court has several cases pending before
it involving crimes committed by military officers in relation to their office. Unless and
until the Highest Tribunal rules otherwise, this Court has no judicious recourse but to
entertain and try the various criminal cases filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor
involving military officers and men accused of committing crimes "in relation to their
office," and those involving violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Be that as it may, being prosecuted
for violation of R.A. 3019, as amended, accused-movant axiomatically is subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court.

We cannot likewise sustain accused-movant's stance that the officer who has filed the
informations in the cases at bar had no authority to do so. Both the offense charged and
the person of accused-movant being within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, it
stands to reason that the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the instant
criminal charges belong to, and are the exclusive prerogatives of, the Office of the
Ombudsman, as provided for in Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770.

Neither are we impressed with the asseveration that the acts charged in the amended
informations at bar do not constitute an offense. Such a claim cannot stand in the face
of unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court, thus:

The fundamental rule in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the
averments of the information are not sufficient to constitute the offense charged

25
 is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential
elements of the offense, as defined in the law. (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil.
1162).

As a general proposition, too, a motion to quash on the ground that the

allegations in the information do not constitute the offense charged, or of any
offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations
whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. (People v. Navarro, 75
Phil. 516).

The general rule is that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or
information, the facts alleged therein should be taken as they are. This is
especially so if the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute offense, but he court may consider additional facts
which the fiscal admits to be true. (People v. Navarro, supra).

In consonance with the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements, the quashal of the

informations at bar cannot be sustained since they are sufficient in form and substance
to charge indictable offenses. Parenthetically, some of the arguments relied upon by
accused-movant refer more to evidentiary matters, the determination of which are not
yet legally feasible at this juncture and should only be raised during the trial on the
merits.

Finally, We find no merit in the argument that more than one offense is charged in the
criminal informations at bar. Precisely, the prosecution split the original information into
six (6) distinct amended informations pertaining to six (6) criminal violations of Section 3
(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended. Such is but proper under the premises considering that
the acts subject of the criminal cases at bar were allegedly committed on six (6) different
purchase orders and there is no showing that they were committed on similar dates or
singular occasion.

In the instant petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or
the person of the petitioner;

2) Whether or not the respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor have the
authority to file the questioned amended information;

3) Whether or not the act or omission charged constitutes an offense.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that it is the court-
martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner. Emphasizing the
fundamental doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action, they claim that at the time the amended
informations were filed on July 2, 1991, the controlling law on the jurisdiction over members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines is P.D. 1850, "Providing for the trial by courts-martial of
members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-
martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (which took effect on October 4,
1982), as amended by P. D. 1952 (which took effect in September of 1984), more particularly
Section 1(b) thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the
Armed Forces. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, (a) uniformed
members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable
by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and
in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the
Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited
Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-

26
 martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either
of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper
civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has
prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or
court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National
Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active
service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided
by law: Provided, further, that the President may, in the interest of Justice, order or
direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate
civil court.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall
refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards. (emphasis ours).

Since petitioner is a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he falls squarely
under Article 2 of the Articles of War (C.A. 408, as amended) mentioned in the aforecited
Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850. Article 2 reads:

Art. 2: Persons subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these
Articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military
law" or "person subject to military law; whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the
Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
instruction; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to
duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the
terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same; . . . .

Petitioner and the Solicitor General concede the subsequent passage of Republic Act No. 7055,
"An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the
jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
other persons subject to military law, and the members of the Philippine National Police,
repealing for the purpose certain presidential decrees" (which took effect on July 13, 1991)
which expressly repealed P.D. 1850. Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 reads:

Sec. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal
law, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-
accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or judicial persons, shall be
tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before
arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be
tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes
or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those

defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
laws, or local government ordinances.

They nonetheless argue that petitioner's case falls within the exception provided for in said
Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055, and, therefore, still cognizable by courts-martial, since the alleged
commission of the offense for which petitioner is charged with is "service-connected ."

27
We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of the filing of
the informations, and as now prescribed by law.

Republic Act No. 8249,12 the latest amendment to P. D. 1606 13 creating the Sandiganbayan
(otherwise known as the "Sandiganbayan Law"), provides the prevailing scope of the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law
read:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

xxx     xxx     xxx

(d.) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

xxx     xxx     xxx

It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the
position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can
validly take cognizance of the case.

In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019, as
amended, which is an offense covered by Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, his position as
Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.) of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than "naval captains
and all officer of higher rank" as prescribed under sub-paragraph (d) of Section 4. Under the
Promotions System in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the hierarchy in the position/rank of
the officers of the Philippine Navy is as follows:

1. Admiral

2. Vice-Admiral

3. Rear Admiral

4. Commodore

5. Captain

6. Commander

7. Lieutenant Commander

8. Lieutenant Senior Grade

9. Lieutenant Junior Grade

10. Ensign

Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over
petitioner is vested in the regular courts pursuant to the provision of Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that "In cases where none of
the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,

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exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

Consequently, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged. Under
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, the commission of any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment
for not less than SIX YEARS AND ONE MONTH or FIFTEEN YEARS. The indictment against
petitioner cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts because under Republic Act No. 7691 which amended
certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by expanding the jurisdiction of said inferior
courts, they "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof . . . ." This
draws the case into the domain of the regional trial courts which, under Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, "shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively
taken cognizance of by the latter."

It is not correct that under R. A. No. 7055, the courts-martial retain jurisdiction over petitioner's
case since the offense for which he is charged is "service-connected." The second paragraph of
Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 limits the nature of "service-connected crimes or offenses" to those
defined only in Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92 and 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended,14 to wit: Fraudulent enlistment, making Unlawful Enlistment, False Muster, False
Returns, Desertion, Advising or Aiding Another to Desert, Entertaining a Deserter, Absence
Without Leave, Disrespect towards the President, Vice-President and National Assembly,
Disrespect towards Superior Officer, Mutiny or Sedition, Failure to Suppress Mutiny of Sedition,
Quarrels; Frays; Disorders, Breaking an Arrest or Escaping from Confinement, Refusal to Receive
and Keep Prisoners, Failure to make a Report of Prisoners Received, Releasing prisoners
without proper authority, Failure to Deliver offenders to Civil Authorities, Misbehavior Before
the Enemy, Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender, Improper Use of Countersign,
Forcing a Safeguard, Neglect or Wrongful Appropriation of Captured Property, Dealing in
Captured or Abandoned Property, Relieving, Corresponding with, or Aiding the Enemy, Spies,
Damage/Wrongful Disposition of Military Property, Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military
Property, Drunk on Duty, Misbehavior of Sentinel, Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions,
Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions, Good Order to be Maintained and Wrong
Redressed, Provoking Speeches or Gestures, Dueling, Fraud against the Government Affecting
Matters and Equipment, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman, and All Disorders and
Neglects to the Prejudice of Good Order and Military Discipline and All Conduct of a Nature of
Bring Discredit Upon the Military Services. None of these offenses relates to acts or omissions
constituting a violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, as amended which reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx     xxx     xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.

29
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. 15

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 10, 1992 in Criminal Cases Nos.
16905-16910, is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Sandiganbayan is
ordered to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 16905-16910, and to inform this Court of the action
taken hereon within fifteen (15) days from finality of this decision.1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

30