6 Nieves v. Duldulao

9/6/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 720
G.R. No. 190276. April 2, 2014.*

EUFROCINA NIEVES, as represented by her attorney-in-
fact, LAZARO VILLAROSA, JR., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO
DULDULAO and FELIPE PAJARILLO, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Security of Tenure; Agricultural lessees,

being entitled to security of tenure, may be ejected from their
landholding only on the grounds provided by law.—Agricultural
lessees, being entitled to security of tenure, may be ejected from
their landholding only on the grounds provided by law. These
grounds — the existence of which is to be proven by the
agricultural lessor in a particular case — are enumerated in
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, otherwise known as the
“Agricultural Land Reform Code.
Same; Ejectment; Failure to Pay Leasehold Rentals; To eject
the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the leasehold rentals,
jurisprudence instructs that the same must be willful and
deliberate in order to warrant the agricultural lessee’s
dispossession of the land that he tills.—To eject the agricultural
lessee for failure to pay the leasehold
** Per Raffle dated 10 February 2014
* SECOND DIVISION.
438
rentals under item 6 of the above-cited provision, jurisprudence

instructs that the same must be willful and deliberate in order
to warrant the agricultural lessee’s dispossession of the land that
he tills.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Bare allegations, unsubstantiated
by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.—In the present case,
petitioner seeks the dispossession of respondents from the subject
land on the ground of nonpayment of leasehold rentals based on
item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844. While respondents indeed
admit that they failed to pay the full amount of their
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000174601824448a13cd65003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
respective leasehold rentals as they become due, they claim

that their default was on account of the debilitating effects of
calamities like flashfloods and typhoons. This latter assertion is a
defense provided under the same provision which, if successfully
established, allows the agricultural lessee to retain possession of
his landholding. The records of this case are, however, bereft of
any showing that the aforestated claim was substantiated by any
evidence tending to prove the same. Keeping in mind that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, the Court cannot therefore lend any
credence to respondents’ fortuitous event defense. Respondents’
failure to pay leasehold rentals to the landowner also appears to
have been willful and deliberate. They, in fact, do not deny — and
therefore admit — the landowner’s assertion that their rental
arrearages have accumulated over a considerable length of time,
i.e., from 1985 to 2005 but rely on the fortuitous event defense,
which as above-mentioned, cannot herein be sustained.
Agrarian Reform; Ejectment; Failure to Pay Leasehold
Rentals; Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844); Cases
covering an agricultural lessee’s nonpayment of leasehold rentals
should be examined under the parameters of item 6, Section 36 of
R.A. No. 3844 and not under item 2 of the same provisions which
applies to other violations of the agricultural leasehold contract or
the provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, excluding
the failure to pay rent.—While the failure to pay leasehold rentals
may be construed to fall under the general phraseology of item 2
— that is a form of noncompliance “with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code,” it
is a long-standing rule in statutory construction that general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally is so interpreted as to
439
embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not

applicable—lex specialis derogat generali. In other words, where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail. Thus,
consistent with this principle, the Court so holds that cases
covering an agricultural lessee’s nonpayment of leasehold
rentals should be examined under the parameters of item
6, Section 36 of RA 3844 and not under item 2 of the same
provision which applies to other violations of the
agricultural leasehold contract or the provisions of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, excluding the failure to
pay rent. In these latter cases, substantial compliance may — as
above-explained — be raised as a defense against dispossession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless caused by a fortuitous

event, or reprieved by virtue of a finding that the nonpayment of
leasehold rentals was not actually willful and deliberate, there
appears to be no credible justification, both in reason and in law,
to deny the agricultural lessor the right to recover his property and
thereby eject the agricultural lessee in the event that the latter fails
to comply with his rent obligations as they fall due.—The Court
never mentioned Section 50(c) of RA 1199 in De Tanedo. Thus, a
reading thereof only shores up the point earlier explained that the
substantial compliance defense is only available in cases where
the ground for dispossession is the agricultural lessee’s violation
of the terms and conditions of the agricultural leasehold contract
or the provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, and not
in cases where the ground for dispossession is the agricultural
lessee’s failure to pay rent. Verily, agricultural leasehold rentals,
as in rentals in ordinary lease contracts, constitute fixed
payments which the lessor has both the right and expectation to
promptly receive in consideration of being deprived of the full
enjoyment and possession of his property. Unless caused by a
fortuitous event, or reprieved by virtue of a finding that the
nonpayment of leasehold rentals was not actually willful and
deliberate, there appears to be no credible justification, both in
reason and in law, to deny the agricultural lessor the right to
recover his property and thereby eject the agricultural lessee in
the event that the latter fails to comply with his rent obligations
as they fall due. Indeed, while the Constitution commands the
government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and the
underprivileged whenever doubt arises in the interpretation of
the law, the jural postulates of
440
social justice should not sanction any false sympathy towards a

certain class, nor be used to deny the landowner’s rights, as in
this case.
Same; Same; Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. No. 3844);
An action to enforce any cause of action under R.A. No. 3844 shall
be barred if not commenced within three (3) years after it accrued.
—The Court affirms the DARAB Decision granting the petition
for dispossession with the modification, however, on the amount
of rental arrearages to be paid considering that an action to
enforce any cause of action under RA 3844 shall be barred
if not commenced within three (3) years after it accrued.
Accordingly, respondents are held liable to pay petitioner only the
pertinent rental arrearages reckoned from the last three (3)
cropping years prior to the filing of the petition before the Office
of the PARAD on March 8, 2006 or from the May 2003 cropping

season, until they have vacated the subject land.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Bayani P. Dalangin for respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are
the Decision[2] dated June 4, 2009 and the Resolution[3]
dated November 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105438 which set aside the Decision[4]
dated December 13,
_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-35.
[2] Id., at pp. 39-50. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with
Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.
[3] Id., at pp. 52-53.
[4] Id., at pp. 84-90. Penned by Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, with
Undersecretary Renato F. Herrera and Assistant Secretaries Delfin B. Samson and
Edgar A. Igano, concurring.
441
2007 and the Resolution[5] dated March 13, 2008 of the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 14727, holding that the
tenancy relations between petitioner Eufrocina Nieves
(petitioner) and respondents Ernesto Duldulao (Ernesto)
and Felipe Pajarillo (Felipe) remain valid and enforceable.

The Facts
Petitioner is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice
land with an area of six (6) hectares, more or less, located
at Dulong Bayan, Quezon, Nueva Ecija (subject land).
Ernesto and Felipe (respondents) are tenants and
cultivators of the subject land[6] who are obligated to each
pay leasehold rentals of 45 cavans of palay for each
cropping season,[7] one in May and the other in December.
[8]
Claiming that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay their
leasehold rentals since 1985 which had accumulated to
446.5 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, petitioner filed
a petition on March 8, 2006 before the DARAB Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), seeking the ejectment of

respondents from the subject land for nonpayment of
rentals.[9]
Prior to the filing of the case, a mediation was conducted
before the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
and Legal Division in 2005 where respondents admitted
being in default in the payment of leasehold rentals
equivalent to 200 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively,
and promised to pay the same.[10] Subsequently, however,
in his answer to the
_______________
[5] CA Rollo, pp. 34-35. Penned by Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, with
Assistant Secretaries Delfin B. Samson, Edgar A. Igano, and Patricia Rualo-Bello,
concurring.
[6] Rollo, pp. 79 and 85.
[7] Id., at p. 46.
[8] CA Rollo, p. 140.
[9] Rollo, p. 79.
[10] See Mediation Report dated March 14, 2005 issued by Legal Officer III Pablo
C. Canlas; DAR Records, p. 1.
442
petition, Ernesto claimed that he merely inherited a

portion of the back leasehold rentals from his deceased
father, Eugenio Duldulao, but proposed to pay the
arrearages in four (4) installments beginning the dayatan
cropping season in May 2006.[11] On the other hand, Felipe
denied incurring any back leasehold rentals, but at the
same time proposed to pay whatever there may be in six (6)
installments, also beginning the dayatan cropping season
in May 2006.[12] Both respondents manifested their lack of
intention to renege on their obligations to pay the leasehold
rentals due, explaining that the supervening calamities,
such as the flashfloods and typhoons that affected the area
prevented them from complying.[13]
The PARAD’s Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated July 6, 2006, the PARAD
declared that the tenancy relations between the parties
had been severed by respondents’ failure to pay their back
leasehold rentals, thereby ordering them to vacate the
subject land and fulfill their rent obligations.
With respect to Ernesto, the PARAD did not find merit
in his claim that the obligation of his father for back
leasehold rentals, amounting to 446 cavans of palay, had
been extinguished by his death. It held that upon the death
of the leaseholder, the leasehold relationship continues
between the agricultural lessor and the surviving spouse or

next of kin of the deceased as provided by law; hence, the
leasehold rent obligations subsist and should be paid.[15]
As for Felipe, the PARAD found that his unpaid
leasehold rentals had accumulated to 327 cavans of palay,
and that his
_______________
[11] See Answer dated March 27, 2006; id., at pp. 32-33.
[12] See Answer dated March 29, 2006; id., at pp. 36-37.
[13] Rollo, p. 42.
[14] Id., at pp. 79-83. Penned by Presiding Adjudicator Marvin V. Bernal.
[15] Id., at pp. 80-81.
443
refusal to pay was willful and deliberate, warranting his

ejectment from the subject land.[16]
Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the case on appeal.
The DARAB Proceedings
On April 16, 2007, the DARAB issued an Order[17]
deputizing the DARAB Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija
and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Talavera,
Nueva Ecija to supervise the harvest of palay over the
subject land. However, when the Sheriff proceeded to
implement the same on April 27, 2007, he found that the
harvest had been completed and the proceeds therefrom
had been used to pay respondents’ other indebtedness.[18]
On December 13, 2007, the DARAB issued a Decision[19]
affirming the findings of the PARAD that indeed,
respondents were remiss in paying their leasehold rentals
and that such omission was willful and deliberate,
justifying their ejectment from the subject land.[20]
Unperturbed, respondents elevated the matter to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated June 4, 2009, the CA granted
respondents’ petition for review, thereby reversing the
ruling of the DARAB terminating the tenancy relations of
the parties. While it found respondents to have been remiss
in the payment of their leasehold rentals, it held that the
omission was not deliberate or willful. Notwithstanding the
DARAB’s find-
_______________
[16] Id., at p. 82.
[17] DAR Records, pp. 162-163. Issued by Assistant Secretaries Augusto P.

Quijano, Edgar A. Igano, and Patricia Rualo-Bello.
[18] See Implementation Report dated April 30, 2007 issued by DARAB
Provincial Sheriff Delfin Acosta Gaspar; id., at p. 159.
[19] Rollo, pp. 84-90.
[20] Id., at p. 89.
[21] Id., at pp. 39-50.
444
ings with respect to the amounts of respondents’ rental

arrearages, the CA gave full credence to their assertions
and observed that Felipe failed to pay only 293 cavans of
palay or 16.28% of the total leasehold rentals due from
1985 to 2005, while Ernesto failed to pay only 107.5 cavans
of palay or 6% of the total leasehold rentals.[22] Relying on
the Court’s ruling in the case of De Tanedo v. De La
Cruz[23] (De Tanedo), the CA then concluded that
respondents substantially complied with their obligation to
pay leasehold rentals, and, hence, could not be ejected from
the subject land despite their failure to meet their rent
obligations as they became due.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution[24]
dated November 5, 2009, hence this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or
not the CA correctly reversed the DARAB’s ruling ejecting
respondents from the subject land.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure,
may be ejected from their landholding only on the grounds
provided by law.[25] These grounds — the existence of
which is
_______________
[22] Id., at pp. 46-47.
[23] 143 Phil. 61; 32 SCRA 63 (1970).
[24] Rollo, pp. 52-53.
[25] Section 7 of RA 3844 provides:
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation.—The agricultural
leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
445
to be proven by the agricultural lessor in a particular

case[26] — are enumerated in Section 36 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 3844,[27] otherwise known as the “Agricultural
Land Reform Code,” which read as follows:

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwith-

standing any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of
the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment
and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession
has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average
of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years; (as amended by RA 6389)
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with
any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding
for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices
as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement
thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the
agricultural lessee;
_______________
Section 37. Burden of Proof.—The burden of proof to show the existence
of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee shall rest
upon the agricultural lessor.
[27] Entitled “AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE AND TO
INSTITUTE LAND REFORMS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF TENANCY AND
THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL INTO INDUSTRY, PROVIDE FOR THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING
AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
446
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due: Provided, That if the nonpayment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-
five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the
nonpayment shall not be a ground for dispossession,
although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
(Emphases supplied)

To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the
leasehold rentals under item 6 of the above-cited provision,
jurisprudence instructs that the same must be willful and
deliberate in order to warrant the agricultural lessee’s
dispossession of the land that he tills. As explained in the
case of Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:[28]

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended,

coupled with the fact that the respondents are the complainants
themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee
rests upon the respondents as agricultural lessors. This proceeds
from the principle that a tenancy relationship, once established,
entitles the tenant to security of tenure. Petitioner can only be
ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by
law. Section 36 of the same law pertinently provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
xxxx
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease
rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
_______________
[28] 593 Phil. 108, 572 SCRA 463 (2008).
447
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the

extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a
fortuitous event, the nonpayment shall not be a ground

for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the
rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished;
xxxx
Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The
agricultural tenant’s failure to pay the lease rentals must
be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his
dispossession of the land that he tills.
Petitioner’s counsel opines that there appears to be no decision
by this Court on the matter; he thus submits that we should use
the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna. This is not correct. In an
En Banc Decision by this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et
al.,[29] we held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere
failure of a tenant to pay the landholder’s share does not
necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former
when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the
tenant to pay. This ruling has not been overturned.
x x x x[30] (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

In the present case, petitioner seeks the dispossession of
respondents from the subject land on the ground of
nonpayment of leasehold rentals based on item 6, Section
36 of RA 3844. While respondents indeed admit that
they failed to pay the full amount of their respective
leasehold rentals as they become due, they claim that
their default was on account of the debilitating effects of
calamities like flashfloods and typhoons. This latter
assertion is a defense provided under the same provision
which, if successfully established, allows the agricultural
lessee to retain possession of his landholding. The records
of this case are, however, bereft of any showing that the
aforestated claim was substantiated by any evidence
tending to prove the same. Keeping in mind that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evi-
_______________
[29] 111 Phil. 737, 1 SCRA 1106 (1961).
[30] Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, supra note 28 at pp. 130-131; p. 485.
448
dence, are not equivalent to proof,[31] the Court cannot

therefore lend any credence to respondents’ fortuitous
event defense.
Respondents’ failure to pay leasehold rentals to the
landowner also appears to have been willful and deliberate.
They, in fact, do not deny — and therefore admit[32] — the

landowner’s assertion that their rental arrearages have
accumulated over a considerable length of time, i.e., from
1985 to 2005 but rely on the fortuitous event defense,
which as above-mentioned, cannot herein be sustained. In
the case of Antonio v. Manahan[33] (Antonio), the Court,
notwithstanding the tenants’ failure to prove their own
fortuitous event theory, pronounced that their failure to
pay the leasehold rentals was not willful and deliberate.
The records in said case showed that the landowner
actually rejected the rentals, which amounted only to 2
years-worth of arrearages, i.e., 1993 and 2001, tendered by
the tenants therein due to their supposed poor quality. This
circumstance was taken by the Court together with the fact
that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up for the
rejected rentals through the payments made for the other
years. In another case, i.e., Roxas v. Cabatuando[34]
(Roxas), the Court similarly held that the tenants therein
did not willfully and deliberately fail to pay their leasehold
rentals since they had serious doubts as to the legality of
their contract with respect to their nonsharing in the
coconut produce, which thus prompted them to withhold
their remittances in good faith. In contrast to Antonio and
Roxas, the landowner in this case never rejected any rental
payment duly tendered by respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest. Neither was the legality of their
agricultural leasehold contract with the landowner ever
put into issue so as to intimate that they merely withheld
their remittances in good
_______________
[31] 542 Phil. 109, 122; 513 SCRA 111, 125 (2007).
[32] See Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
[33] G.R. No. 176091, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 190.
[34] Supra note 29.
449
faith. Thus, with the fortuitous event defense taken out of

the equation, and considering the examples in Antonio and
Roxas whereby the elements of willfulness and
deliberateness were not found to have been established, the
Court is impelled to agree with the DARAB that
respondents herein willfully and deliberately chose not to
pay their leasehold rentals to the landowner when they fell
due. The term “willful” means “voluntary and intentional,
but not necessarily malicious,”[35] while the term
“deliberate” means that the act or omission is “intentional,”
“premeditated” or “fully considered.”[36] These qualities the

landowner herein had successfully established in relation
to respondents’ default in this case. Accordingly, their
dispossession from the subject land is warranted under the
law.
At this juncture, the Court finds it apt to clarify that
respondents’ purported substantial compliance — as
erroneously considered by the CA to justify its ruling
against their dispossession — is applicable only under the
parameters of item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844, which is a
separate and distinct provision from item 6 thereof. Item 2,
Section 36 of RA 3844 applies to cases where the
agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with
any of the terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure; whereas item 6 refers to cases
where the agricultural lessee does not pay the
leasehold rental when it falls due, provided that the
failure to pay is not due to crop failure to the extent
of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event.
As the present dispute involves the nonpayment of
leasehold rentals, it is item 6 — and not item 2 — of
the same provision which should apply. Examining
the text of item 6, there is no indication that the
agricultural lessee’s
_______________
[35] BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 7th ed. (1999), p. 1593.
[36] Id., at p. 438.
450
substantial compliance with his rent obligations could be

raised as a defense against his dispossession. On the other
hand, item 2 states that it is only the agricultural lessee’s
“failure to substantially comply” with the terms and
conditions of the agricultural leasehold contract or the
provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code which is
deemed as a ground for dispossession. Thus, it may be
reasonably deduced that the agricultural lessee’s
substantial compliance negates the existence of the ground
of dispossession provided under item 2. While the failure to
pay leasehold rentals may be construed to fall under the
general phraseology of item 2 — that is a form of
noncompliance “with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code,”[37] it is a
long-standing rule in statutory construction that general

legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only
cases in which the special provisions are not applicable —
lex specialis derogat generali.[38] In other words, where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail.[39]
Thus, consistent with this principle, the Court so holds that
cases covering an agricultural lessee’s nonpayment
of leasehold rentals should be examined under the
parameters of item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844 and not
under item 2 of the same provision which applies to
other violations of the agricultural leasehold
contract or the provisions of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, excluding the failure to pay rent. In
these latter cases, substantial compliance may — as above-
explained — be raised as a defense against dispossession.
In this relation, the Court observes that the CA’s
reliance in the De Tanedo ruling was altogether misplaced
for the
_______________
[37] See item (2), Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
[38] See Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013,
698 SCRA 742, 762.
[39] Id.
451
simple reason that the substantial compliance defense in

that case was actually invoked against a violation of a
peculiar term and condition of the parties’ agricultural
leasehold contract, particularly requiring the payment of
advance rentals “pursuant to [the agricultural lessee’s]
agreement with the landholders,”[40] and not his mere
failure to pay the leasehold rentals regularly accruing
within a particular cropping season, as in this case.
In fact, the Court, in De Tanedo, applied the substantial
compliance defense only in relation to Section 50(b) of RA
1199,[41] otherwise known as the “Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines,” which is the predecessor provision of
item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844. Section 50(b) of RA 1199
states that:

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant.—Any of

the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a
tenant from his holdings:
xxxx
(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any
of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions
of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not
apply when the tenant has substantially complied with the
contract or with the provisions of this Act.

On other hand, the predecessor provision of item 6,
Section 36 of RA 3844 is Section 50(c) of RA 1199, which
reads as follows:

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant.—Any of

the following shall be a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a
tenant from his holdings:
xxxx
_______________
[40] De Tanedo, supra note 23 at p. 63; p. 64.
[41] Entitled “AN ACT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDHOLDERS AND
TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS (LEASEHOLDS AND SHARE TENANCY).”
452
(c) The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the
landholder’s share: Provided, however, That this shall not apply
when the tenant’s failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure.
The Court’s application of the substantial compliance defense
in relation to Section 50(b) of RA 1199, as well as the agricultural
lessors’ failure to actually raise in their ejectment complaint the
ground of failure to pay leasehold rentals, is evident from the
following excerpt of the De Tanedo Decision:[42]
In the decision appealed from as well as in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals forwarding this case to us, it has been found that
the rentals for the agricultural years 1958 to 1961, inclusive, had
all been fully satisfied, although not in advance as agreed upon.
This is admitted by the petitioners-appellants. We agree with
the Court a quo that the delay in payment does not justify
the drastic remedy of ejectment, considering Section 50(b)
of Republic Act 1199, which states that while violation by
the tenant of any of the terms and conditions of the
tenancy contract shall be a ground to eject him, yet this
provision shall not apply where there has been substantial
compliance. With reference to the rental for the crop-year
1962-63, failure to pay the same was not alleged in the
original or amended complaints below, and hence may not

be considered for the first time on appeal. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In any case, the Court never mentioned Section 50(c) of
RA 1199 in De Tanedo. Thus, a reading thereof only shores
up the point earlier explained that the substantial
compliance defense is only available in cases where the
ground for dispossession is the agricultural lessee’s
violation of the terms and conditions of the agricultural
leasehold contract or the provisions of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, and not in cases where the ground for
dispossession is the agricultural lessee’s failure to pay rent.
Verily, agricultural leasehold rentals, as
_______________
[42] De Tanedo, supra note 23 at p. 63; pp. 64-65.
453
in rentals in ordinary lease contracts, constitute fixed

payments which the lessor has both the right and
expectation to promptly receive in consideration of being
deprived of the full enjoyment and possession of his
property. Unless caused by a fortuitous event, or reprieved
by virtue of a finding that the nonpayment of leasehold
rentals was not actually willful and deliberate, there
appears to be no credible justification, both in reason and in
law, to deny the agricultural lessor the right to recover his
property and thereby eject the agricultural lessee in the
event that the latter fails to comply with his rent obligations
as they fall due. Indeed, while the Constitution commands
the government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and
the underprivileged whenever doubt arises in the
interpretation of the law, the jural postulates of social
justice should not sanction any false sympathy towards a
certain class, nor be used to deny the landowner’s rights,[43]
as in this case.
In fine, the Court affirms the DARAB Decision granting
the petition for dispossession with the modification,
however, on the amount of rental arrearages to be paid
considering that an action to enforce any cause of
action under RA 3844 shall be barred if not
commenced within three (3) years after it accrued.
[44] Accordingly, respondents are held liable to pay
petitioner only the pertinent rental arrearages reckoned
from the last three (3) cropping years prior to the filing of
the petition before the Office of the PARAD on March 8,

2006[45] or from the May 2003 cropping season, until they
have vacated the subject land.
_______________
[43] See Perez-Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 562, 586; 494 SCRA 66, 93
(2006).
Section 38. Statute of Limitations.—An action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years
after such cause of action accrued.
[45] See Petition dated October 18, 2005; CA Rollo, p. 127.
454

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 4, 2009 and the Resolution dated
November 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 105438 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated December 13, 2007 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No.
14727 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION ordering respondents Ernesto Duldulao
and Felipe Pajarillo to pay petitioner Eufrocina Nieves the
pertinent rental arrearages reckoned from the May 2003
cropping season, until they have vacated the landholding
subject of this case.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez,

JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Note.—The law provides that nonpayment of lease

rental, if proven, is a valid ground to dispossess the tenant
from the landholding. (Galope vs. Bugarin, 664 SCRA 733
[2012])
——o0o——
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9/6/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 720

G.R. No. 190276. April 2, 2014.*

Agrarian Reform; Security of Tenure; Agricultural lessees,

** Per Raffle dated 10 February 2014

rentals under item 6 of the above-cited provision, jurisprudence

respective leasehold rentals as they become due, they claim

embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not

Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless caused by a fortuitous

social justice should not sanction any false sympathy towards a

of the PARAD on March 8, 2006 or from the May 2003 cropping

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

2007 and the Resolution[5] dated March 13, 2008 of the

Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), seeking the ejectment of

petition, Ernesto claimed that he merely inherited a

between the agricultural lessor and the surviving spouse or

refusal to pay was willful and deliberate, warranting his

[17] DAR Records, pp. 162-163. Issued by Assistant Secretaries Augusto P.

ings with respect to the amounts of respondents’ rental

to be proven by the agricultural lessor in a particular

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwith-

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended,

payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the

fortuitous event, the nonpayment shall not be a ground

dence, are not equivalent to proof,[31] the Court cannot

They, in fact, do not deny — and therefore admit[32] — the

faith. Thus, with the fortuitous event defense taken out of

“premeditated” or “fully considered.”[36] These qualities the

substantial compliance with his rent obligations could be

long-standing rule in statutory construction that general

simple reason that the substantial compliance defense in

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant.—Any of

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant.—Any of

TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS (LEASEHOLDS AND SHARE TENANCY).”

original or amended complaints below, and hence may not

in rentals in ordinary lease contracts, constitute fixed

the petition before the Office of the PARAD on March 8,

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez,

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

Note.—The law provides that nonpayment of lease

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