AIMPA Journal - November - 2020

AIMPA
Safety & Securtiy
All India Maritime

Pilots’ Association
All India Maritime

ISSUE V Pilots’ Association
NOVEMBER 2020
From President’s Desk Personality of the month Strength of Pilot
Capt. Gajanan Karanjikar, President- AIMPA Capt. Dasonda Singh Ladders & Intermediate
Securing of Pilot Ladders:
Vessel Traffic Services & Pilotage -T Evans
AIMPA Pays Tribute to - supporting safe navigation Testing On Ladders:
Mr. William A. O’Neil Jillian Carson-Jackson Report on the webinar
Reconceptualising
Feedback and letters to editors: PILOT TRAINING-Learning from Indian Maritime Pilotage – Part-1
Achintya Dutta, V. Adm Giancarlo OLIMBO, incidents for - pilot and the bridge team Arie’s 1000 combinations
Sanjeev Vakil Capt Subhash Deshpande (of pilot ladders)
AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
INDEX
From President’s Desk

Capt. Gajanan Karanjikar, President- AIMPA .............................................. 02
AIMPA Pays Tribute to

Mr. William A. O’Neil .................................................................................03
Feedback and letters to editors:

Achintya Dutta, V. Adm Giancarlo OLIMBO, Sanjeev Vakil ...........................04
Personality of the month

Capt. Dasonda Singh .................................................................................06
Vessel Traffic Services & Pilotage - supporting safe navigation

Jillian Carson-Jackson............................................................................... 07
PILOT TRAINING-Learning from incidents for - pilot and the bridge

team
Capt Subhash Deshpande ..........................................................................11
Strength of Pilot Ladders and Intermediate Securing of Pilot Ladders:

An investigation into actual strength of ladders and intermediate securing methods used.
T Evans ..................................................................................................... 21
Testing On Ladders: ............................................................................... 24
Report on the webinar Reconceptualising Indian Maritime

Pilotage – Part-1............................................................................. 27
Arie’s 1000 combinations (of pilot ladders) ......................................... 33
ISSUE V NOVEMBER 2020

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
President's desk
Capt. Gajanan Karanjikar
President- AIMPA
No learning is done unless one wants to learn something new himself and from someone who has
done it before. That is what is learning from others' experiences. This was the gist of my conversations
with Capt Ravi Nijjer and Simon Mejyes on numerous zooms calls we had to learn about how Australia
brought about change in their entire pilotage system step by step from 1988. Actually found a lot to
learn and which can become our path as well to revamp the Indian Maritime pilotage. Ravi Nijjer has
developed an advanced Maritime pilotage course for Australian Pilots. Simon was a ex CEO of Reef
Pilot association and both of them put a lot of time together to formulate what is today known as
Pilotage Operations Safety Management System. Simon would just not let any safety concern
pass by unless it is addressed well to mitigate the risk, not just minimise. Such was the dedication in
the team to address each and every issue. Mere attending the BRM 3.0 course being conducted for
Australian Pilots, has changed the entire perspective of AIMPA for pilotage matters which is still
unknown to Indian Maritime Pilots.
Hence AIMPA decided to hear them into a larger audience having its first webinar on Indian Maritime
Pilotage and happy to announce the support from Maritime Fraternity and Interests to this webinar. It
was noticed and watched by all concern, applauded. AIMPA needs to take this to NSB/IPA and MOS
with action points with an agenda to implement the practices that were discussed. The webinar
deliberates the Pilot Ladder safety issues, Pilot Transfer procedures and Pilot Training which finally
culminate to the Safety of Navigation in port. After poll results indicated AIMPA to have a webinar
every quarter and more time to be allotted to discuss such topics concerning pilots in detail. Further
almost all participants wanted to be members of AIMPA.
This issue of AIMPA journal also covers the Pilot training article by Capt Subhash Deshpande on
learning from two of the most important incidents. Learnings have come on in the Human factor,
bridge resource management and training from these incidents. We have also published a n article
from our New Zealand Pilot Troy Evans on Pilot ladder testing as to take it to the next level. NI
president Ms Jillian who is an IALA expert on VTS, aids to navigation and E- Navigation. She also
appreciated AIMPA webinar for its content.
AIMPA itself had a lot of takes-aways from the webinar in the form of action points. Sanjiv Pande
painstakingly prepared the detailed account of the webinar which is being published in parts in AIMPA
journal. The take-away are being broken down in action points and then will be discussed in forums
appropriate for AIMPA as stakeholder to the harbourfront matters and Safety of Navigation in ports.
AIMPA will strive to bring in excellence in services mattering to the safety of Navigation in ports.
Capt Gajanan Karanjikar

President- AIMPA
All India Maritime Pilots Association
Email:aimpaofficial@gmail.com
ISSUE V 2 NOVEMBER 2020

AIMPA
All India Maritime
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AIMPA Pays Tribute to

Mr. William A. O'Neil
Mr. William A. O'Neil, Secretary-General Emeritus of the International Maritime Organization

(IMO) died on 29th Oct 2020, at the age of 93, we at AIMPA (All India Maritime Pilots'
Association) also express our sincere condolences to the Canadian Government, Mr. O'Neil's
remaining family, and the condolences of the entire IMO membership and staff.
As on of the past president of IMPA, Captain Michel Pouliot wrote in IMO news about his
remembrance of Mr Williams, “Mr William A. O'Neil has been a source of support and guidance
to me during the twelve years I served as President of the International Maritime Pilots
Association. He privileged many of our International Biennial conferences by accepting to deliver
the keynote address, always a source of inspiration on the many issues confronting safety in
general and marine pilotage in particular”. The maritime safety indeed has a new regime now
due to tireless efforts of Mr. William.
(Mr William's India Visit and welcome – Capt Achuthan in Back ground)
In one of his interviews he had said, it's been a very interesting 14 years and I think that, with
respect to the main objectives of the Organization – safety of life at sea and prevention of
pollution from ships – we have made gains which are quite signicant. Under IMO's leadership,
standards in shipping have been raised to unprecedented levels.
In the numerous keynote speeches, he made at IMPA's international conferences the community felt a
genuine support for the concerns with the unrelenting attacks on traditional Maritime pilotage.
(excerpts from IMO news Issue 4/2003)

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Feedback and letters

to editors:
Dear,
Capt. Gajanan Karanjikar,

Greetings from the IOMOU Secretariat.
I am sure that you with your family, friends and colleagues are keeping safe and fine during the of
unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic outbreak and the most difficult time we are passing through.
Thank you for your mail. The Indian Ocean MoU sincerely congratulates you and your colleagues for
successfully launching monthly publication of the AIMPA Journals on regular basis and that to, at the
time of COVID-19 Pandemic situation when the entire world is facing difficulties to keep the supply
chain of service on, in many ways, particularly in the shipping field. Role of the Pilots in India and
abroad is commendable in true sense and they deserve lots of applauses, appreciations and supports
from the various stake holders. We hope that all of your great service will rekindle the value of those
who hold close to our hearts.
Article on “Marine Pilots- the unsung Heroes of Maritime Shipping” is really very touching, which
states how efficiently Marine Pilots are supporting shipping industries in a very big way.
The magazine, as a whole, looks very smart and very informative in all aspects, particularly for those
people who are associated with shipping activities as stake holders.
IOMOU Secretariat once again conveys its Best Wishes to you and to the other members/well-wishers
of the All Indian Marine Pilot Association (AIMPA) for continuing with all the good work of all would be
doing for the successful and sustainable future shipping.
Regards,
Achintya Dutta
Secretary
IOMOU Secretariat

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
Dear,
Captain Karanjikar,
It's with great pleasure that I read your mail, not only for its content but even for the amazing
promptness you had in dealing with the subject.
Actually, this late gave me the chance of being informed on the vast array of maritime topics under
consideration in the Agenda of AIMPA's activities and I wholly agree that the Pilot ladder is one of the
key drivers to be addressed with the aim to increase the range of safety and security in the Pilot's daily
service, in particular during the critical phase of their transfer from the boat to the ships in bad
weather conditions.
As a matter of fact, the huge string of continuous accidents, the seriousness of some of them, witness
the need to better and deeply explore this topic, in view of finding new technological elements, which
could reduce the current associated risks and grant safer labour conditions.
In this respect Capt. Aiello, in his capacity of former and experienced pilot, has a long standing
commitment in studying the subject, realistically associating skills to the functionality and simplicity of
his ideas, covering at the same time the pilot ladders as well as the pilot's boat, with some minor
structural adjustments that could prevent bad occurrences to the pilot's life.
Best regards,
V. Adm Giancarlo OLIMBO

Vice President
European Boating Association
Dear,
The Editorial Team of AIMPA,
AIMPA Journal is a great initiative taken by you with rich contents. Pilot ladder accidents are
increasing and recently it was a shock to hear deaths of few senior pilots who have been in this
profession for decades. I happened to attend training session with Capt Gajanan and Capt Umesh
along with around 140 Post sea candidates of Masters, Mates, and 2nd Mates and it was certainly an
excellent session. Each participant would be able to save at least one accident or life and thus pilot
ladder training should be mandatory training requirement for all the mariners. We also have senior
Pilots who have been teaching at HIMT for years, and they too were happy to participate in this
educative session.
I wish AIMPA a great success in all endeavours ahead with the hope that they would do amazing work
with respect safety and security of Maritime Pilots.
All The best!
Regards,
Sanjeev Vakil
CEO,
Hindustan Institute of Maritime
Training (HIMT)

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Personality of
the month
Capt. Dasonda Singh
Captain Dasonda Singh, probably the youngest active Maritime pilot in Indian waters as of
today, seventy plus and still going strong. No it's not a printing mistake, calling him oldest may
offend him.
Born to a family of farmers in Punjab he joined Indian Navy in 1967 as any other young Punjabi youth
who is eager to join defence forces. Of course serving Nation by joining armed forces is a matter of
pride but getting a chance to ride a Bullet at young age was not less of a attraction he smiles. Served
on various ranks including sub-lieutenant on special duty on Torpedo anti-submarine officer as well
as commanding Torpedo launch recovery vessel ,he took premature retirement in 1991 after serving
24 years Indian Navy.
Same year he started his second inning as Maritime pilot with Mumbai Port (Bombay Port then), the
profession gone so deep into my blood that it's almost impossible to separate myself from it, he says
with conviction.
A devoted Sardar who finds his spiritual fulfillment by serving and helping the needy through
Gurudwara service. All my children are married and well settled he says, in prayerful mood with
folded hands thanking the Almighty. Inspired by father
one of his daughter joined Indian Air Force as a pilot and
married to a pilot who is still flying with Indian Air Force,
he adds with humility.
Grandfather to many Capt. Singh says now I find no

difficulty to convince my grandchildren that it's the
Maritime pilot and not the flying Pilot, who came in
existence first, he laughs to the glory exposing his well
intact shining teeth. May lord bestow good health to you
and you continue guiding the ships who find a towering
Lighthouse in you for many more years to come.

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Vessel Traffic Services & Pilotage

- supporting safe navigation
Jillian Carson-Jackson,
M.Ed., FNI, FRIN
It is with some dismay that I look at all the technology and tools available to the modern navigator,
and yet, despite it all, the irrefutable fact remains that ships continue to run aground, have collisions
and allisions.
Humanity has been plying the seas since time immemorial, and the design of ships has gone through
many modifications to enhance safety. Ships are specialized tools that have been honed to the 'edge
of perfection' - strong, versatile, efficient…and yet?
The case studies of shipping accidents in confined waters, departing/entering port and in
navigationally complex coastal areas are too numerous to mention, and there seems to always be a
common point – the human element. Why is that?
Just for a moment, let's set aside all the technical equipment available to the bridge crew and
recognize the ship's crew, the maritime professionals, all trained in their respective roles. And, then
let's look at the additional human resources available for specified operations: Vessel Traffic Services
(VTS) and pilotage. These two services have a synergy, working with the same goal of safe, efficient
and pollution free transits. Both are identified as risk mitigators, and are carried out by qualified,
trained personnel.
Two services working towards the same goal
Pilotage has a very long history. There are 4 references to pilots in the Bible; Homer mentions the pilot
in the Iliad. Most coastal states have laws and regulations covering pilotage, and the IMO recognizes
the importance of pilotage services, including safety for the pilot transfer and training for pilots (more
on that later). The role of a pilot has been defined as “assisting the master of a ship, by providing local
knowledge of navigational and operational matters combined with specialist ship-handling
experience.” In the Australian Navigation Act 2012 a pilot is defined as 'a person who does not belong
to, but has the conduct of, a vessel'.
VTS is a relative newcomer to the scene, with its development from early coastal radar in 1948 (post
WWII). The initial implementation of Port Advisory Service has evolved to the current service
recognized by the IMO in the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, Chapter V, Regulation 12. The
current IMO resolution A.857(20) (1997) provides further guidance on VTS. Over the years the
International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) has been
instrumental in working to define VTS technical, operational and human aspects. Recognising the
changes in VTS over the decades, the IMO is in the process of finalizing a revised resolution
A.857(20). The revised resolution is now awaiting final approval from the Assembly.

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The existing Resolution defines VTS as “a service implemented by a Competent Authority, designed to
improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic” while the revised resolution builds on this “a service
implemented by a Government with the capability to interact with vessel traffic and respond to
developing situations within a vessel traffic service area to improve the safety and efficiency of
navigation, contribute to safety of life at sea and support the protection of the environment”.
Here are two different services available (in many cases, mandated) to assist in the safe transits of
vessels: both services with highly trained professionals working towards the same goal.
Risk Mitigation
We are well versed in risk – the probability that something 'bad' will happen, combined with the
consequences of it happening – and recognize that it is impossible to 'eliminate' risk. There are,
however, measures that can be put in place to 'mitigate' risk – either minimize the chances that
something will happen, reduce the consequences if it does happen, or a combination of both. Both
Pilotage and VTS are identified as risk mitigators.
Specifically, VTS is identified as an 'aid to navigation' “A device, system or service, external to vessels,
designed and operated to enhance safe and efficient navigation of individual vessels and/or vessel
traffic” (IALA Dictionary). IALA Guideline 1018 – Risk Management (edition 3, May 2013) – provides
an overview of the risk review and assessment process to be undertaken with regards to the provision
of VTS and aids to navigation (AtoN) (as identified in SOLAS V, Regulation 12 and 13). The
methodology presented in G-1018 is similar to the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology as
recommended by the IMO (MSC/Circ.1023/MEPC/Circ.392). The IMO SOLAS Regulations referred
to indicate the establishment of VTS and provision of AtoN where the 'volume of traffic and/or the
degree of risk justifies the provision of such services.’
While pilotage and VTS are, in their own right, individual mitigation measures they provide even
stronger mitigation when working effectively together. This was highlighted in the Independent safety
issue investigation into Queensland Coastal Pilotage carried out by the ATSB. The report noted that
[REEF]VTS was underutilized because many pilots “are not fully aware of the service's ship traffic
monitoring capability and limitations, and its value as an additional 'bridge resource'. (Reference:
ATSB report MI=2010-011 No. 282)
Training and assessment
Prior to the Manilla Amendments, the IMO STCW 1995 included a specific reference to Pilot and VTS
training in Resolution 10: “the International Maritime Organization to consider developing provisions
covering the training and certification of maritime pilots, vessel traffic service personnel and maritime
personnel employed on mobile offshore units for inclusion in the 1978 STCW Convention or in such
other instrument or instruments as may be appropriate.”
Based on this, and the outcomes of the 8th IALA VTS Symposium (Rotterdam, 1996) IALA developed a
recommended training and certification regime for VTS Operators.

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Initially called 'V-103' the recommendation and guideline on VTS Training has been revised under the
current IALA documentation structure, with the revised documents agreed by the VTS Committee to
be forwarded to the IALA Council for approval at their next session in December 2020.
The internationally agreed VTS training regime includes a series of model courses and an
accreditation process of the training organisations with approval of the training programs, as
provided in the related IALA guidelines (specifically, Guideline 1014).
Pilotage has similarly developed training documentation, through the publication of the IMO
Resolution A.960(23) with recommendations on training and certification, as well as operational
procedures, for maritime pilots other than deep-sea pilots.
The STCW Manilla Amendments revised Resolution 10, removing the reference to VTS and pilot
training, noting the training regimes had been developed.
Cooperation enhancing safety
In the conclusion of his dissertation on the interaction between pilots and VTS Andreas Bach notes that
there are issues of trust and competition between the two services, which may seriously degrade the
functionality and degree of cooperation between them. Combined training would save time, money,
and alleviate many of the cooperation issues experienced in so many marine incidents.
There is significant value in cooperative training, where procedures can be developed to support
conscious cooperation between VTS Operators and Pilots. While the pilot is focused on the safe
navigation of the vessel they are piloting, the VTS is focused on the safety of the waterway in which the
vessels are transiting. The two working effectively together have proven results, for example:
· Monitoring of continuous radius turns in critical areas (i.e. procedures implemented following
the grounding of the Vasco de Gama in South Hampton, UK).
· Close track monitoring of vessels proceeding through narrow channels using pre-agreed
reference points (i.e. procedures for monitoring vessels in the Hay Point channel in
Queensland, Australia).
In the Netherlands the Dutch pilots work closely with VTS, with the introduction of Shore Based Pilots
in the VTS centre. SBP-VTS have special training with examinations overseen by the VTS authority. In
most ports a Chief Pilot is stationed at a VTS centre 24/7 with pilot overseeing pilotage operations and
discussing operational matters with the VTS.

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Conclusion
“… the fact that VTS has the overall view of the area and that the pilot is physically present on the ship
is deemed to be a circumstance that makes the two services complementary… both parties are
perceived to be service organizations with the intention to serve maritime traffic…”
-- Andreas Bach, WMU, 2009 (Dissertation)
The opportunity to support the 'shared mental model' with clear procedures for sharing of information
between the VTS and the Pilot is increasing – and this is an opportunity that should be fully exploited.
To do so requires recognition of the areas of expertise of both professions and identification of
coordinated operations, always with the focus on the common end goal – safe, efficient and pollution
free transits.
It would seem logical that cooperation is key to a positive outcome. If pilots and VTS personnel are
given the opportunity to train together in advance then, when difficult situations arise, we will have
allowed them a reasonable chance to have the tools and the trust to work smoothly together and
realise the mitigating power of a coordinated approach.
References:
· IMO – SOLAS Convention; STCW (1995); various relate Resolutions and Circulars (including
revised resolution on VTS which is before Assembly for approval – delayed due to Covid)
· IALA – various (VTS and Risk related)
· Andreas Bach, A qualitative study of the interaction between maritime pilots and vessel traffic
service operators (2009, World Maritime University dissertation)
· Australian Navigation Act 2012
· ATSB Report 'Independent safety issue investigation into Queensland Coastal Pilotage' (2010)
· Information from Arie Palmer and Harry Tabak regarding pilot/VTS operations
· Information from Remco Verhallen (a contact through Arie Palmers about Pilot Steenbank
About the author:

Jillian Carson-Jackson
President of Nautical Institute London.
Managing Director JCT consulting.
Over 30 years of experience in the maritime industry, she is an experienced Maritime Technical
Advisor, Presenter and Chairperson with a passion for communications technologies, education and
training, and vessel tracking. Skilled in Simulation Training, Vessel Traffic Services, Operations
Management, Government, Emergency Management, and International Shipping. IALA expert for
VTS, Aids to Navigation (AtoN) and E-navigation. she has a passion for diversity and inclusion,
including empowering women in maritime. A Fellow of both the Royal Institute of Navigation and the
Nautical Institute, she is currently the President of the Nautical Institute. Strong business
development professional with a M. Ed focused in Adult education / CBT and curriculum development
from University of Toronto.

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PILOT TRAINING-Learning from incidents

for - pilot and the bridge team
-By Capt Subhash Deshpande
Welcome aboard pilot !
In published AIMPA issues, policy statements and illustrated discussions about pilot ladder and pilot
safety have appeared prominently. Pilot ladder safety awareness training of seafarers has started.
General misunderstanding of pilot's job and non-recognition of the pilot's importance in the society
has been highlighted.
To contribute to this endeavor, from the safe pilot ladder, I have taken the pilot to the bridge.
The pilot is an inseparable, important member of the bridge team in port areas. The other members
being the master, officers, cadets, helmsman and the lookout. Bridge Team is defined differently by
different institutions. The NTSB includes pilot in the bridge team. The Pilot Association of USA does not
include the pilot as part of it but refers to pilot separately. The definitions are of no consequence to our
discussion. Harmonious interaction of all bridge team members including pilot finally achieving an
incident-free movement of ships is the only yardstick with which we can appreciate a pilot's great
contribution to shipping.
Getting a stranger pilot, who has just arrived on the bridge, many times out of breath, in to a
reasonable comfort zone and swiftly integrated into the bridge team, is an important attribute of the
team dynamics. Of course the procedures exist. The master-pilot exchange documents and the pilot-
card. But more important is the “hello”, the talk, the coffee, the welcome smile. Spoken words of
useful conversation, exchanging information. Pleasant, co-operative voice, firm and polite tone. This
is why it is called a relationship. Bridge team-pilot relationship. Not just a procedure.
The bridge team dynamics are well hammered into ships' officers through the BTM (Bridge Team
Management) and BRM (Bridge Resource Management) training courses. The STCW convention 2010
amendments of BRM and ERM (Engine room resource management) bring in for the first time issues of
situational awareness, leadership and most importantly “challenge and response”. These are the
major attributes of human element.
I am not so sure, however, if all marine pilots are exposed to these specialist training courses. Also,
there may be no refresher training for them as part of Safety Management Systems which, subsequent
to investigations of accidents in their ports, some ports have begun to adopt. Note the good sense
prevails only subsequent to accidents. Not before.
As per observations of U.K. P & I Club: 80% of collisions, groundings and contact damages are caused
due to human error. 80 % of them, with the master on the bridge at the time and 60 % with pilot on
board. 33% are caused directly due to pilot error. And at all times, even with pilot's incorrect advice,
the master is held responsible eventually, as the ship is navigated under a legal doctrine of “master's
orders and pilot's advice”.

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We cannot change the doctrine. How do we then improve the navigation performance of ships and
ports and reduce accidents? Refresher ship handling courses, port specific simulator training for
pilots? Value addition training for masters and bridge team? All this may help to a certain extent.
What else, then, can be done more?
To evolve the answer with you, I am placing before you, excerpts from conclusions of two in-depth
investigation reports – one each by MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) U.K. and NTSB
(National Transportation Safety Board) U.S.A. With heart-felt gratitude to these great institutions from
whom I continue to learn, I humbly offer some of my own:
Sea Empress story: Courtesy

MAIB and Nautical Institute U.K.
(For full story refer to the extensive
investigation report by MAIB
available from MAIB web-site.)
1. Milford Haven. VLCC Sea

Empress aground – rst grounding
- at position 3 in the chart. Severe
bottom damage. Serious pollution.
Ship grounds many more times
during the subsequent salvage and
anti-pollution operations. We will
only focus on events up to the rst
grounding.
2. Pilot boards 15 minutes later

than is usual for this size of vessel.
The tidal stream is already setting
ESE across the deep water Western
channel.
3. At Position 2, vessel is falling

outside the “Cone of safety” - the
dark colored conical shape of the
channel which becomes narrower
to the northeast.
4. From position 2, Pilot alters to

port by 5 degrees of course at a
time. Master does not interfere.
Vessel grounds at position 3.

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Comment on Ship - Manvrg. with POB
· Assuming all is well by

keeping ship within the
“Cone of safety ” was
dangerous. Both east and
west boundaries of the cone
are identied by visible
leading lights. Drift due to
cross current can more
reliably be noticed by
noting any one leading
transit lights, not by
keeping ship somewhere
between them.
· Altering course by 5
degrees? Should have
altered to port by large
helm angle rather than
compass angle.
· Misconception about
previous incident (See
below)
· No inputs / interference /
clarication by bridge team
with pilot except plotting
positions. Totally inactive
approach.
· Pilot was not fully qualied

by the port to handle ships
of the size of the Sea
Empress. Of course, the
master does not know
about that, and in normal
circumstances, will not
come to know if all goes well with the movement.

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Sea Empress: Comment on Human element and Training

1. This Bridge team did not function as one unit. C/O noted ship drifting outside planned course line
but did not report to or ask or inform pilot. No exchange between master & pilot. Pilot also did not
request / encourage bridge team's active assistance. Everyone is trained to do this as per STCW
competency requirements. May be they all have done BTM course as well. Then why not? Is it shyness?
“Nothing will happen” attitude? , “I have done it many times?” ,“Pilot will feel bad if I tell him?”.
2. Allowing for added risk: Any pilot who is aware that he is not fully qualied by port to handle
vessels of certain size, should be taking more precautions to ensure a successful rst job of that size.
For example, asking the bridge team to immediately alert him if ship is out of course line. Also, be
more aware of the drift himself by asking ofcers to do parallel indexing to spot the drift immediately.
Asking the master if we should go more to port …What does the master think?.. On that urgent query,
any master would have quickly suggested a greater helm angle than required to change compass
course by 5 degrees. Some masters would even give the order port 10 or port 15 themselves.
3. Misinterpretation of previous incident: Reason given by pilot for not altering quickly to port in
position 2, was the grounding in that area of ship Matco Avon. In the words of the report “Matco Avon
was found to be passing on the wrong side of the Mid Channel Rocks Light Buoy. (Close to position 2).
Full port helm and full astern pitch was applied. Subsequent full counter helm was ineffective, the swing
to port could not be arrested and this led to the grounding. The Matco Avon had a right-handed
controllable pitch propeller and the effect of full astern pitch with full port helm caused the loss of
control.” So, this astern movement of right handed controllable pitch was producing the “bow to
port” turn and preventing starboard turn. This is written in the MAIB report of the “sea Empress”.
4. Port's duty to share experience feedback: Point is, after the Matco incident, were the reasons
for ship not turning to starboard discussed / shared with all pilots? Did all pilots note the experience
feedback? Subsequent to casualties and near misses, do ports have procedures and interest in
updating of their pilots? The Sea Empress MAIB report indicates that relations between the port
administration and pilots were not cordial. Did this affect the process to update and improve pilots?
5. Learning from incidents and near misses is an important process of any safety management
system for ports. It requires documented procedure and improves risk control. Ports should be
adopting such systems based on a recognised QMS standard. Many are. This is going beyond
competency certication and is operator responsibility. This is true also for ships and bridge teams.
The mandatory ISM code element 9, requires the company to ensure reporting and analysis of non-
conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences (near misses) and taking preventive actions.
6. Knowledge Gaps: How many pilots and masters are fully aware of the manoeuvring intricacies of
controllable pitch propulsion? My teaching experience in value addition courses for masters tells me
only very few are. I also did not know them till I started teaching ship handling. Apart from transverse
thrust variation, there is the problem of default setting of pitch at the thrust box. There is a MGN notice

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on this issue. CPP propulsion is also part of some case studies such as the MAIB investigation of
“Moon Dance” grounding. Who learns from them and when?
5. Can this case study make a difference? Several such passive behaviours by bridge teams
and knowledge blind spots of pilots occur everywhere all the time. But there are no accidents
most of the time due to good luck and good procedures. So, when do master mariners and
pilots make a mental note of what happened here and what to do about it if it happens
to them? And why should a master, C/O or pilot or the VTS operator wait for the port or
the company to make a
Cosco Busan story: Courtesy investigation report

of NTSB USA. (For full story refer to the
comprehensive report on NTSB web-site.)
1. Container ship Cosco Busan was sailing out, in

fog, from berth 56, Oakland bound for Busan S.
Korea, with pilot on board. Ship allides with Delta
Tower of the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge.
Bunker tank ruptures. Serious pollution. Damage
to bridge. Massive claims.
3. Restricted visibility. Radar not operational.

Moving on ECDIS only. Pilot not sure about the
two conical symbols indicated (shown by yellow
An enlarged section of the electronic chart on board the Cosco Busan. Two
arrow). Pilot also was not sure about symbols on conical buoys, positioned on either side of the Delta tower, are displayed as red
ECDIS marking center of channel under the triangles on the electronic chart. (Courtsey : NTSB report). Yellow arrow shows
the buoy symbols.
bridge. He asked the master 3 times. Master
pointed at some symbol. Pilot headed for it. No
objections, no doubts , no clarications , no
assistance by master or any of bridge team. Hit
the bridge at 10.5 knots.
4. Some concerns identied by NTSB:
• Medical issue of the pilot on Cosco Busan;

• Knowledge of pilot;
• Guidance for vessel trafc service operators;
• Training and oversight of the Cosco Busan
crew
• Lack of participation in navigation activity by
ship's bridge team. Navigation chart of the accident area with the approximate intended course of
the Cosco Busan shown by the black dotted line. (Courtsey : NTSB report)

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4. The pilot was taking a drug

which could have had an effect on
the pilot's performance. A cause
identied was “the pilot's degraded
cognitive performance from his use
of impairing prescription
medications”. ( See below)
5. Despite the pilot's drug issue,

e f f e c t i v e M a s t e r- p i l o t i n f o .
e x c h a n g e a n d g o o d
communication could have
avoided this accident. Here, the
exchange only consisted of
documents such as pilot card. No
discussion between master, bridge
team and pilot. No doubts
expressed about visibility.
Pilot set his own settings on
the Radar. Master, in his
own mind, incorrectly
connected “port open and
port clased” theory with
visibility”. No clarications
sought. Uncomfortable
relationship atmosphere.
(See below). This tension
affected the “challenge and
response” activity under
BRM and made a critical
difference between safety
and accident, as it played
out later in the critical part
of the passage.
The Bay Bridge as displayed on the electronic chart on board the Cosco Busan. The chart display is from 0821:51, the approximate time the pilot
questioned the ship's master about the meaning of the red triangles at the bridge. (All picture and charts Courtsey : NTSB report)

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Cosco Busan: COMMENT ON HUMAN ELEMENT AND BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
1. Pilot's medical drugs issue: As per NTSB, the Pilot's performance was impaired by the prescribed
drug which he was taking. Of course, no master can ever know about this beforehand. Neither is a
pilot, ever, going to tell the master about his prescribed drugs and their effects. At least as a result of
Cosco Busan accident, the NTSB issued recommendations to USCG to ensure improved medical
oversights of pilots. This is because, although in this pilotage organization there was a system of
regular medical examinations and tness assessments of pilots, there was no provision for reporting
changes in medical information or condition which may happen between examinations. And this is
what happened in this case.
In another medical drug related case (spectacular video available) the vertical-lift overhead bridge 11
on the Welland canal, Ontario was lowered by mistake as the laker ship “Windock” was passing at
speed under it. It sliced off the ship's bridge and funnel and caused a re. By great good luck and
presence of mind of the master who ordered everyone on ship's bridge to run down, there was no
fatality. The Transport Safety Bureau investigation found that the sole bridge operator on duty was
fatigued and affected by an impairing drug called “Davron N”, a drug which causes signicant
behavioral / psychological effects on the central nervous system. In addition to the operator drug
issue, other issues that contributed were no refresher training, no competence checking and no
preventive procedures in the canal bridge procedures manual.
Three points emerge from these two cases. (1) How many accident investigation attempts are as
invasive and comprehensive as these? That's the rst point. (2) Secondly, how many of the world's
ports have policy and procedures of this medical oversight of pilots and tug masters and other critical
operators of bridges or VTS? And possibly an alcohol policy like for ship's ofcers also in place. (3)
Thirdly, Even here, in these instances, the advice for improved medical tness assessments has come
in after the accidents.
2. The ideal Master-Pilot communication and info. exchange:
(a) The Company Fleet Management Ltd's policy on master/pilot exchanges states, in part, . . “after his
arrival onboard… the pilot should be clearly consulted on the Passage Plan to be followed. The
general aim of the Master should be to ensure that the expertise of the Pilot is fully supported
by the ship's Bridge Team. In fog or other conditions of restricted visibility, Master should ensure
that the vessel proceeds at safe speed.”
(b) The NTSB report says “An effective master/pilot exchange includes discussion of the vessel's
navigational equipment, any limitations of maneuverability, available engine speeds, un-berthing
maneuvers, intended course and speed through the waterway, anticipated hazards along the route,
weather conditions, composition of the bridge team and deck crew both forward and aft including
bow lookout”. Almost the same thing is mentioned in IMO's Voyage planning resolution.
(c) The American Pilots Association's guidance with respect to master/pilot exchanges states that each
pilotage assignment should begin with a conference between pilot and master to share not only
the information that each needs, but to also establish an appropriate working relationship,

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and that pilot cards or similar documents should “supplement, not substitute for, the
master/pilot information exchange.”
Most important words: Discussion. Conference. Not just document exchange.
3. The actual Master-Pilot communication and info. Exchange: See the human interaction
atmosphere on the bridge of this ship which is about to navigate in restricted visibility. As the pilot later
said “I handed him (master) the pilot card document, and he took it, and I think he read it, but I don't
recall him discussing it with the mates or the helmsman. . . . I handed it to him and was expecting him
to read it. It says right on it, if you have any questions, ask.”
The master told investigators: “Normally as a captain I would welcome the pilot with my open arms,
enthusiastic, and I would show my hospitality in offering him if he need any food or coffee or tea, et
cetera. And then this pilot came on board with a very cold face. Some of them just don't want to
pay attention on us and some of them would not like to talk with us… doesn't want to talk. I
don't know if he had a hard day before or because he was unhappy because I was a Chinese. . .” The
master also said that he did not question the pilot, and the pilot did not discuss with the master the
plan to navigate the vessel from the berth to the pilot station.
The VDR playback showed no voice communication on important issues between the master and
pilot. The NTSB says “The interactions between the pilot and the master on the day of the allision were
likely inuenced by a disparity in experience between the pilot and the master in navigating the San
Francisco Bay and by cultural differences that made the master reluctant to assert authority over the
pilot.
Obviously the cultural issues and multi-national interactions on the bridge have no solution. But,
even with these issues existing, a smile, pleasantries, a friendly and co-operative
approach, offering a warm handshake by both the pilot and the master can create an
atmosphere of team spirit. A brief discussion, active participation, display of respect for
each other's and team's concerns and readiness and honesty in explaining and allowing for
any doubts raised can minimize effects of other issues like culture, nationality, an
inadequate knowledge.
We get paid for our professional services to act in a professional manner. We are not paid
for complacent attitude driven by false pride and excessive ego.
4. ECDIS Knowledge Gap: Inadequate ECDIS knowledge of both the pilot as well as the
master contributed to this accident. As the ship approached the bridge, according to pilot, the
radar became unreliable (which according to NTSB, may have been due the change of settings by the
pilot and to which the bridge team paid no attention), so the ship was navigating only with ECDIS as it
approached the bridge in restricted visibility at 10.5 knots. The pilot was confused about the 2 conical
buoys on the ECDIS display which actually marked the Delta tower and not center of channel (See
chart above). He asked the master. He also asked the master which is the center of the bridge. There
was some confusion about center of bridge and center of channel. Pilot said master showed him the
center of channel. Master said the pilot should know about the 2 conical buoys. Pilot said he headed
for what the master showed him.

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The ECDIS being used on the Cosco Busan was a standard, widely used chart with symbols that were
the same as those used on ECDIS–certied S-57 charts, with which the pilot should have been
familiar. Given the pilot's waterway experience, the NTSB did not nd it credible that the pilot would
never have seen these particular symbols. Further, the major features on the ECDIS, principally Yerba
Buena Island and the Bay Bridge, would have been recognizable to even the most inexperienced
mariner. Also, the pilot knew that red-over-green buoys were stationed on either side of the Delta
tower of the bridge, and by location alone he should have immediately recognized them on the chart.
The master also should have visualized the passage on the chart along with the ECDIS
symbols as part of his preparations for the passage. If he had done so while approving of
ship's passage plan, before the pilot boarded. Masters should be doing this as standard
practice.
5. Challenge and Response : The master, if not himself sure about the symbols and center of
channel, should have taken the help of his ofcers on the bridge. He did not do that. May be they knew
better. Should the ofcers intervene themselves if they knew? Of course yes, they must bring their
concern to master's / pilot's attention quickly. Why didn't they? Shyness? No culture of monitoring and
questioning / expressing doubt?
So we see here a complete failure of “challenge and response”- an important error-

monitoring concept taught in the BRM course. Pilot asked his doubt. Two possibilities. Master
pointed to the wrong center of channel. Did the pilot verify? No. Did any of bridge team cross-
check? No. Second possibility - master showed the correct center but pilot misunderstood. Still,
when the pilot headed the ship for the tower and not the center of channel, master / bridge team
should have been monitoring and the master quickly pointing to the mistake. No one monitored.
If they did, they did not raise doubts. One can cle
SEA EMPRESS AND COSCO BUSAN: COMMENTS ON TRAINING AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS.
a) Pilot: The pilot commission (Cosco Busan) reviewed its training contract to to include enhanced
training in advanced electronic navigation instruments. Such endeavors are worthy of initiation by
ports and pilot associations. It should be noted that simulators is not the end solution for lack of
knowledge. It is at best a supplement. Checking effectiveness of training periodically of “what did
you learn” is the key. That should be done as standard procedure. Ship maneuvering upgrades
should also include modules on Hydrodynamic Interaction, CPP, bridge team dynamics and study
of casualties / near misses of various ports.
b) Medical issues: With reference to section 1 (Cosco Busan) in this article, ports can consider
assessment of tness for duty of pilots, tug crews, VTS operators, bridge operators and trafc
controllers. This can consist of medical examination, reporting between examinations as well as
consideration of impairment due to fatigue.
c) VTS: As the ship was nearing the bridge, the VTS did check on the Cosco Busan's movements and
intended course through the pilot. However, apparently, there was a 30 degree difference

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between the ship's course as observed and mentioned by VTS and what the Cosco Busan was
actually steering. Pilot admitted later that this caused a confusion in his mind. It's possible the VTS
was talking to this pilot but was mistaking another ship for the Cosco Busan or reading its course
wrongly. After the Cosco Busan incident, the Coast Guard's chief of Vessel Trafc Services,
accelerated the formulation of “VTS National Standard Operating Procedures,” or VTS NSOP to
standardize operations, personnel training and certication and unit operation evaluation at all
VTCs operated by the USCG.
Ports should look at increasing / improving training and periodical assessment of VTS operators,
especially the technical and electronics related areas to which they are continually exposed during
their work. Also VTS operators should address communication using not only pilot's identier but
also ship's name so that bridge team can understand the communication.
d) Company: NTSB recommended the Fleet Management Ltd. to give BRM (Bridge Resource
Management) training to its ofcers as the bridge team did not function as one cohesive unit,
although everyone had the necessary STCW qualications. Other companies should do this to
avoid such lack of basic knowledge as well as remove misunderstanding about responsibilities as
team members.
e) Master: The master told investigators that he believed that he had little input into the decision to
depart in the restricted visibility conditions. From his previous experience he assumed that port
authorities would close ports in the type of weather conditions that existed at the time. The
absence of such closure in San Francisco led him to conclude, erroneously, that vessel operations
were approved by that authority—in this instance, the Coast Guard. Rightly the company is
advised to refresh master's compliance obligations of SMS. I have noted this “port closed, port
open” misunderstanding from several sailing masters. Companies can set things right in seminars,
debriengs and on board training, by reiterating and clarifying what is stated in SMS manuals
including “overriding authority” of the master. “Visualization” technique by master should be
included in any refresher training to be used when master is checking passage plans. The main
training area for masters is the BRM course. CPP related cases (Sea Empress) may also be added.
Effectiveness of training: Value addition courses done. Certicates issued. Company is

happy. Ofcers happy. Vetting inspectors and PSCOs happy. Three months after the
course there should be the rst effectiveness check by the company. Ofcers can also do
a self-check of effectiveness. How much do I remember? Go point by point. How many points
have I encountered in practice? Refresh. Add to the course manual. Make my own notes to add to
it. There should also be an annual check. Quizzes based on courses done should be given during
seminars and debriengs. Monitoring / ensuring effectiveness of training imparted is also so
correctly advocated in the ISO 9001 standard of QMS.

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Strength of Pilot Ladders and

Intermediate Securing of Pilot Ladders:
An investigation into actual strength of ladders and intermediate securing methods used.
- T Evans
Introduction / Preamble:
I decided to look into pilot ladder strength and intermediate securing arrangements after MNZ
put out what I felt was a confusing and unclear document about securing of pilot ladders.
Looking for information about why lashings were preferred got me nowhere; all sources just said
they were best.
The discussions went along the line of the following:

Me – “So a piece of rope is not going to damage another piece of rope, but shackles are?”
Expert – “No the shackles put load on the step fixtures, lashings do not”
Me – “But the rope lashings do put load onto the step fixtures”
Expert - “No they do not”
Me – “look at these images”
Expert –“…….”
As you can see in the images the lashings are on the step fixtures.
Some of the reasons given against the use of choking shackles: Comments:
Some manufacturers recommend against the use of them, Why and what testing has been carried out?
Some authorities recommend against them Why and what testing has been carried out?
Some manufactures claim the choking shackles cause chaff damage. Why and what testing has been carried out?
Some authorities claim the shackles place load on the crimps /

Have they tested the lashings?
steps xtures, whereas the lashing using a rolling hitch does not
What do people mean by this and is there
The term “Shackle fatigue” has come into use
such a thing as lashing fatigue?
Shackles have no give. True

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So Rolling hitch lashings versus …. Choking shackles and other methods, and along with that the
strength of ladders – are they as strong as some people think?
Some say traditional seamanship skills are disappearing / gone,
Or is it crew have found a “quicker” way of doing the job with other gear?
How to test?
Load / destruction test.
Where / how can I do that? In the Barn, certified load cell + hydraulic pulling ram system +
testbed structure + assorted shackles + time + rope + ladders…. As another pilot says “Easy
peasy”
Onto investigating intermediate securing methods and strengths of ladders.
Testing Intermediate Securing of Pilot Ladders:

Methods investigated included the rolling hitch lashing, choking shackles, shackles between
sideropes, endless slings, and “deck tongues”
To determine the actual strength of ladders top end securing was tested as well.
The investigation into methods started with assessing the traditional method – rope lashings using
rolling hitches.
Rope Lashings
Average breaking strength of Manila rope used for lashings = 2516kg (24.67kN), samples were
taken at random from the different parcels received from the supplier. Eyes were spliced in each
end then tested to destruction.
Rolling hitch and other assorted knots

First step was to determine if lashings, in particular the rolling hitch, place any load on the crimps
/ step xtures.
To determine if lashings would put load onto the xtures a number of knots where tested on a
mock siderope;
- The knots were tied and rmed up manually with block and tackle,
- Then a single 200mm pull using a hydraulic pulling ram was applied,
The peak reading was taken to determine the best performing knot.

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Knot Avg min comments
right hand knot in "how

384 302
to rig a pilot ladder
rolling hitch right left 542 380
left knot in "how to… 432 392
rolling hitch right right 572 452 This is the conventional rolling hitch
Caused the most damage to mock

Rolling hitch left left 726 510
side rope
Craig S - knot 4 half hitches 553 520
All the knots shifted more than 150mm with the manual load placed on them - this mean the
knots would have slid onto the step xtures.
To make it clear - If the knots were tied onto a pilot ladder rather than a mock side rope
with no step xtures every single knot would have come up on the xtures with less than
200kg load, nearly all with less than 100kg. In all tests using knots on actual ladders
this was found to be true.
As a pilot climbs a ladder the load on either side of the ladder will alternate depending upon the
climbing technique, so 100kg of force a side is not hard to achieve when including the ladder
weight.
Chaff damage - Chaff on the mock side ropes ranged from minor to moderate or worse.

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Testing On Ladders:
4 different makes of ladder were tested, 2new, 2 old
As it only takes the failure of one side of a ladder for a pilot to fall the majority of tests were
carried out on one side only.
The following may affect the results:
- Less distortion occurs when one side gets loaded than both (results possibly higher)
- Testing was inline versus uneven setups onboard ship ( results possibly higher)
- Unless clearly stated, all rope lashings tied onto actual ladder side ropes have an eye
spliced in one end and are used for one test only. (results possibly higher) Many lashings
ropes used onboard use a knot to secure to a strong point
- Testing has no deck edge feature (results possibly lower)
Side rope strength testing: Side rope with no ttings

Thimbles were used to allow for a better D/d1.
Single
part
of line
Old crimped avg result = 741kg

Old Seized avg result = 1970kg
New crimped avg result = 2002kg Removing crimps possible damage to the rope.
Doubled
part
of line
Old Seized avg result = 3592

New crimped avg result = 3269kg Removing crimps possible damage to the rope.
Sideropes with steps crimp / seizings and chocks/widgets

- a section of ladder was modied to have two tops so that the side ropes would be loaded
and no load placed on any steps, chocks or crimps except by the sideropes
One side of a
ladder loaded;
Old Seized avg result = 2012kg

New crimped avg result = 2755kg

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Both sides were loaded;
- Failure of the ladder was deemed to have occurred when one side of a ladder failed
- 3 makes of ladder were tested
Results:
Old Seized = 3020
New crimped =4110
Ratios:
New Crimped Old Seized
One side Both sides One side Both sides
2755 4110 2012 3020
One side : both sides1:1.49 One side : both sides1:1.50
Step testing - wood only:

Strength of timber steps.
Longitudinal pull -
Remove side ropes from step.
Test 1 Fit shackles to side rope holes - one shackle at each end
Test 2 Fit shackles to side rope holes - Two shackles at each end

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Result Test 1 Failure occurred at 2600kg

Test 2 Stopped test at 4800kg, after removing shackles noted that the holes had elongation
of approx 1mm in all four side rope holes
Step strength – transverse - loading on tread

Remove side ropes from 2 steps - upper step is there as a spreader.
Fit synthetic line in place of sideropes.
Test 1 sling in centre of step - no spreading of load
Test 2 sling in centre of step - timber tted cross grain to avoid crush damage
Test 3 Block tted to place load closer to side rope holes
Result Test 1 Failure occurred at 1730kg

Test 2 Failure occurred at 1760kg
Test 3 Failure occurred at 2910kg
Test 1 shows the likely strength of a wooden step if a pilot boat were to come down on one.
Test 3 shows the timber step strength when use on a deck tongue - see results for deck tongue.

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Report on the webinar Reconceptualising

Indian Maritime Pilotage – Part-1
The need to hold a webinar on the topic of “Reconceptualising Indian Maritime Pilotage” was felt from
the interaction over several months of AIMPA members through its President,
Capt. Gajanan Karanjikar, with stalwarts in the field in India as well as abroad – especially from
Australia and the UK. Based on these exchanges AIMPA felt that the topics of Pilot Ladders, Pilot
Transfer Procedures and Pilot Training would be good place to begin its formal efforts for improving
the safety of not just its pilots but also that of navigation and all harbour front matters in Indian port
waters.
th
The webinar was held on 24 Oct 2020 on a platform graciously provided by the Institute of
Marine Engineers of India (IMEI).
As many as seven accomplished experts in the field of maritime pilotage management were
requested to share their views. Two moderators, each a very accomplished maritime professional,
were also empanelled.
The intent of the webinar was to spark ideas and opinions which, after some analysis and moderation,
could be put up by AIMPA as a set of recommendations
for both policy as well as decision makers in India to
consider.
The response to the webinar was very encouraging. As
many as 500+ persons registered. For students in
various maritime training institutes in India as well the
wider public too, the webinar proceedings were
streamed live via Facebook and Youtube.
The panellists had so much to share. AIMPA is grateful

to the panellists and the viewers for the enthusiasm
shown. The question and answer time after each of the
two sessions was lively, but curtailed due to time
constraints. Then again, a lot of suggestions, reactions
and questions were posted by attendees via the chat-
box. It went to show that attendees were following each
speaker's presentation keenly. AIMPA will be looking at the webinar chat-box record and endeavour
to reply to questions posted. As well as take into consideration suggestions and points made when
formulating its recommendations.

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The Master of Ceremonies, Capt. Rajesh Nambiar, welcomed all the panellists and participants.
Thereafter Capt. Karanjikar, as webinar host, made his opening remarks. He said the process to
create the AIMPA was triggered by the sad demise of Capt.V.K.Gupta, Mumbai Pilot, in July 2019.
Several pilots at various Indian ports took the initiative to right away initiate some practical steps to
improve safety during pilot transfers. This was the beginning of AIMPA. Capt. Karanjikar said that he
was encouraged by the views and support of industry organizations involved in ship owning &
management, maritime education and training, professional organizations like the Company of
Master Mariners of India, The Nautical Institute, London, the independent human factor incident
reporting program “CHIRP Maritime, UK. “And not to forget the enthusiastic and generous support of
each of the panellists and moderators.
Capt Karanjikar ended his opening address saying AIMPA looked forward to industry support for its
follow up efforts on the submitted proposals. On that note, the webinar's first session, moderated by
Capt. Ravi Nijjer, commenced.
The first session began with the moderator, Capt Ravi Nijjer confessing he had been swept
along, same as most others participating in the seminar, by the infectious energy and
enthusiasm of Capt. Karanjikar. He proceeded to give a broad outline of how pilotage
needs to be viewed by ports so that good systems are created and maintained. He then
introduced the panel of speakers Capt Simon Meyjes, Capt Jeanine Drummond, Capt
Sansarchandra Choubey and Capt Santosh Rangan and then started the presentations by
the speakers.
“Pilot Ladder Safety and Transfer Procedures”

Capt. Meyjes, as ex-CEO of the Australian Reff Pilots Association, spoke
out of his deep experience from establishing the very high standards of
operations for the Australian Reef Pilots Association. The system he was
instrumental in establishing kept the pilot firmly at its centre. It took a
holistic approach ensuring its components were - People, Programs,
Processes, Work Environment, Organisation and Equipment. With the
objective of the system being the prevention of personal injuries, damage
to port assets during pilot transfer operations. He suggested port
managements take the “Safety Case” approach when designing their
systems of pilotage. A 'safety case' is analogous to that which, post a serious
incident, the management of a port facility would have to make to satisfy a
court of law, that its workplace arrangements and systems were as safe as could reasonably be
expected. He emphasized that every port will need to create a system that meets its own specific needs
and so its design should reflect this. A pro-active “safety case” approach should be taken for each
area of the port's operations so that hazards and risks are identified – in advance. While performing
such an analysis, experience of other ports, incident reports and guidelines should be researched and
taken into account. Even when concluding his presentations, Capt Meyjes made two extremely
relevant points. He said the best thing a pilot can do when faced with pilot ladder issues is to say
“NO”. That is, refuse to board until the issues are rectified by the ship. He said that this would occur
only if the work culture in that port supported such a stance. And, establishing and maintaining such a
culture lies with top management of the port and of the ship as well.

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“Pilot Transfer Initiatives that are a Must for a Port”

Capt. Jeanine Drummond, shared her thoughts on the extensive review
and revision of the existing procedures that led to a set of initiatives being
launched at the port of Newcastle and Yamba, NSW of which she is the
Harbour Master. These new initiatives were in the aftermath of an incident
at Newcastle when a pilot was badly injured when he fell off a pilot ladder
and fell onto the pilot boat. She expressed sadness that it takes an incident
to bring in such changes. She shared an important thought that occurred to
her while upgrading the port's pilotage system. It was that, what were
thought to be tried and tested procedures, needed so much improvement
post the incident.
The important takeaways of the incident was to incorporate a formal system
of review of incidents. And for incidents of a certain category their initial investigation being led by an
expert accident investigator.
The review of the port's pilot transfer procedures lead to some interesting initiatives.
A “traffic light” system was adopted for pilot transfer. Where a red light means a “no go” and the
transfer is abandoned; a yellow light means the transfer is conditional on additional safety measures
and factors being taken into account and, a green light means all is okay and the transfer can proceed
as planned. To set up this traffic light system, a detailed analysis was first needed to precisely describe
each condition that would be used in the decision matrix. [Reporter's comment: the advantage of such
an analysis is that it greatly reduces the scope for errors in judgement by the personnel involved].
Some other examples of initiatives she mentioned were: Improving the friction on the surface of pilot
boat's deck by applying a different deck coating. Better suited footwear. Incorporating a system of
tethering personnel when on deck outside the boat's cabin. Incorporating processes for testing and
maintaining the physical fitness of pilots against defined requirements. Incorporating processes for
training pilots in best techniques for climbing on or off the ladders to avoid physical problems building
up over the long term from poor techniques. There were many more but which could not be shared for
paucity of time.
“Pilot Boats and Pilot Boat Crew from a Port's Perspective”

Capt. Sansarchandra Choubey, Vice President, Mundra Port and an ex-
Pilot, listed some categories of challenges affecting pilot transfer seen from
the perspective of the crew of a pilot boat and that of the port. Challenges
with respect to vessels, weather conditions, pilot boats and their crew, the
pilots themselves and ways to improve work procedures to counter these
challenges. To avoid repeating what the previous speakers had already
covered, Capt Choubey instead elaborated on the practice, adopted at his
port, of regularly using a tug as a pilot boat. The reasons were such a
practice was found to be safe, practical, and efficient. In heavy weather,
pilots found tugs far more comfortable for the trip to and from a ship,
especially if that trip was for a longer duration and the port management
supported this in spite of the extra operational costs.

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
He said using tugs as pilot boats worked as their tugs had a clear work deck on the raised bow area of
the tugs with suitable hand holds for the pilots and the assisting crew. At some places, the run from the
boarding point to the place for taking the tugs was rather short. In such areas of the port it made sense
to use a tug for pilot transfer as, after boarding the pilot, that tug could quickly make fast to the vessel
or assume her allotted position.
He said pilot boat crews should be trained and equipped to respond to emergencies that may occur
during pilot transfer like – the pilot falling from the ladder onto the pilot boat or into the water. Moving
on, Capt Choubey agreed with Capt Meyjes' advice that pilots and pilot boat crews as well, should just
say NO when faced with certain kinds of unacceptable boarding arrangements.
Some challenges faced by pilot vessels were: the ability of a vessel to provide a good lee at the
nominated transfer position, excessive DSAhead speeds of some vessels, lack of proper care and
seamanship of shipcrew resulting in non-compliant ladder rigging, design issues with the vessel's
boarding arrangements, of language constraints in communicating last minute issues t ship's crew to
address- especially with multinational crews. The need to train pilot boat crew to cope with the
challenges posed by head on seas and by poor visibility.
Capt Choubey said pilot boats need to be better designed. In fact, designed to a set of
standard guidelines. These guidelines would include improved speeds and seakeeping,
recommend a standard set of navigation equipment and safe deck arrangements. He pointed out that
the risk of falling onto the boat is unavoidable when disembarking.
Concluding, Capt Choubey dwelled on human factors that come into play in the course of a port's
pilot transfer operations. Factors like fatigue, monotony, a perceived lack of appreciation shown for
their work and the physical fitness of pilots. He ended his presentation saying ports should specify a
minimum set of PPE requirements for their pilots and pilot boat crew.
“The Master's Perspective on Master-Pilot

Information Exchange and Pilot Transfer”
Capt. Rangan began by saying that as a sailing master on chemical
tankers on short sea trades, he engaged in pilot transfers on a frequent
basis at a variety of ports in a variety of conditions. It was obvious to
listeners that the views he was about share were from this rich and varied
experience on pilot transfers.
He said that information exchange with the pilot, on the pilotage to be

performed, was absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, many ports tended to
make a rather perfunctory exercise of this – reducing it to a mere filling up
and signing of mindlessly prepared checklists. Ideally, the port would send,
as early on as possible, a list of pre-arrival information needed from the ship. Basis which the port
would send a pilotage plan well in advance (at least 2 days?) of arrival which would include the plan
for the key manoeuvres likely to be performed, method of ordering for the pilot, boarding
instructions, the required boarding arrangements for the pilot, recommended tug assistance, an

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
overview of the allotted berth's location and a passage plan from the pilot station to the berth giving
the distance to be covered, speed restrictions, channel depths and dimensions and tide and weather
restrictions. Such information would help get the pilot and the entire bridge team on the same page
very quickly. The current situation at many ports is that the plan followed by the pilot is at great
variance with that prepared by the ship mainly because the ship does not have all the required and
updated information. [Reporter's comment: This has the serious defect of the bridge team as well as
the pilot loosing situational awareness while mental models of the pilotage plan are being aligned].
Capt Rangan agreed and expressed concern that a lack of care and good seamanship on the part of
vessel crews were resulting in ladders so commonly being rigged in a non-compliant manner.
Training and re-training of vessel crew was necessary. He expressed the hope that, at least in new
buildings, certain arrangements that would easily address safety concerns, could be made quite
easily. For example, incorporating a secondary support system (like preventer wires?) for
combination ladders should the primary one fail. Securing points for securing ladders at
intermediate lengths. [Reporter's remark: This last is such a common sense suggestion. That it still
needed to be said is a poor reflection on the ship building industry as well as ship managers]. Capt
Rangan alluded to the “grandfathering” clause that ship owners and managers take advantage of. He
hoped ship owners and managers would proactively, at scheduled dry-dock / layups, carry out the
necessary modifications to the transfer arrangements in order to bring them in line sooner rather than
later with the updated design specifications.
Capt Rangan then moved on to aspects of pilot transfer that lie outside the vessel. Like searoom at the
boarding position designated by the port, the capabilities of pilot boats as regards boarding speeds
and seakeeping, last minute changes to boarding time or boarding position or changes in the order of
boarding when several vessels are lined up for pilot transfers at the same position. (Reporter's remark:
Obviously, quite a few ports are not giving it much thought when designating a transfer position).
He felt that ports should properly consider the risks and difficulties vessels face in complying with last
minute changes in transfer times, transfer locations or sequence of transfer for a line-up of
vessels. It could be inferred from his further remarks that transfer positions where it is practically
impossible to change heading to make a better lee are rather common.
He suggested that more pilotage areas provide their pilots with Personal Pilotage Units (PPU's). These
devices he felt, helped improve the quality (margins of safety, reliability) of the manoeuvres
performed by the pilot. They also created a record of the whole pilotage. This would be useful for
analysis towards improving skills and providing a training resource for other pilots. Useful for vessels
too, to share with others in the fleet that may call the port in the future.
In his concluding remarks, Capt Rangan pointed out that using a language other than English to
communicate with tugs and linesmen is a source of creating gaps in the situational awareness of the
bridge team. He urged pilots to not disembark from the vessel before all fast or, when sailing out,
board after the vessel had singled up her mooring lines.

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
Here are some of the questions asked relating to the presentations of this session and their answers by
the panellists:
1. Capt. Sudhir Subhedar asked as to why the process for improvement of pilotage in our
ports was so incremental. The moderator requested Capt Choubey, who, being deeply involved in
his port's marine operations, to answer. Replying, Capt Choubey said that the main reason for an
incremental approach in some ports in India was because its operating methods did not consider
getting its pilots involved in any manner. He used the phrase “the pilots are not visible” (at such
ports). Such port managements view their port as a place for the mere transit of goods. Goods come in
and goods go out. So, after the vessel berths the pilots go back to their quarters. They emerge only
when called out for the next pilotage move. As a result, pilots have no way of conveying many of their
concerns regarding pilotage operations to the top management and as such these remain
unaddressed. Raising the profile of pilots within a port's operation system should be a goal of AIMPA
remarked Capt.Nijjer. Listening in, Capt Karanjikar agreed. Capt Nijjer went on to say just 30 or so
years ago, in his country, Australia, the situation in her ports was not much different. With some
efforts, India's ports too could soon reach where Australia's are in terms of standards of marine
operations.
2. The use of tugs as “pilot boats”. Again, it was Capt Choubey who answered saying at most times
tugs were the preferred choice of pilots at his port for their comfort as well for reasons of being
required very soon after boarding. However, for transfers involving low freeboard vessels, pilot boats
were definitely the safer choice.
3. Several question related to as to whether any standards of health and fitness existed for
pilots in India. Capt Karanjikar responded, saying that this matter depended more on a port's
internal policies. But it was encouraging to see such questions being raised.
st
Before the 1 session ended, Capt Nijjer remarked that in Australia too, for many years, the pilot
ladder didn't fall under any domestic law. It was only after the provisions of the Workplace Health &
Safety Act were extended to include pilot ladders as part of a pilot's workplace that ensured a far
stricter compliance with the safe rigging standards. Hinting that perhaps Indian ports should go this
way too?
With that the 1st session ended.

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Embarkation platform
Safety & Securtiy
Arie’s 1000 combinations

(of pilot ladders)
Another version of a combination bottom platform (i.e. embarkation platform),
arrangement we see quite often on bigger the pilot ladder and manropes shall be rigged
vessels, mostly container vessels, is a so- through the trapdoor extending above the
called embarkation platform (aka trapdoor). platform to the height of the handrail.
Rather recently a drawing popped up on the Mind you: manropes are optional and shall
#dangerousladder page showing how a only be rigged on request of the pilot (SOLAS
compliant embarkation platform should be ch.V reg. 23 7.1.1)
rigged:
A lot of vessels do not comply with these
regulations and refer themselves as being
built before 2012; 2012 was the year SOLAS
ch.V reg. 23 first came into force. Basically
what they are saying is: we don't have to be
safe… because of some grandfather clause..
SOLAS ch.V reg. 23 clearly states in 2.1: All
arrangements used for pilot transfer shall
efficiently fulfil their purpose of enabling pilots
to embark and disembark safely… seems
quite easy to me that when people get will
hurt or worse using non-compliant
embarkation platforms, they don't really
follow this rule, but… yes yes grandfather
clause.. SOLAS ch.5 reg. 23 was preceded by
resolution MSC 99(73) (renumbering reg.17
as reg.23) which came into force July 2002.
This rule states the same in 2.1, no changes
We see on this image the ladder has been have been made, well that makes things a bit
rigged through the trapdoor fitted in the easier.
platform and is resting firmly against the ships
hull. The ladder runs up past the platform to
the height of the handrail. This way the guy
climbing the ladder will have an unobstructed
climb and once he reaches the platform, all
he has to do is step sideways. A safe way to
board the vessel imho.
Rules concerning these pba's have been in
force since at least 1979:
SOLAS ch. V reg. 23, 3.3.2.1: ….In the case
of a combination arrangement using an
accommodation ladder with a trapdoor in the

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
To understand that quite a lot of vessels are that the ladder does not run to the height of
not complying with the rules, we must get into the handrails. It has been put under the
some regulations, not the most exciting stuff platform, hanging at the beam. Why is this
to read, but to get clear understanding of the dangerous? When you reach the top of the
situation, it is necessary to do so……. Better ladder, you have to lean back and grab some
get out the reading glasses now!! pieces of steel (slippery when wet) on the
upward side of the platform (in this case even
IMO A.1045(27) states in 3.7: The trapdoor the trapdoor itself) then you have to pull
should open upwards and be secured either yourself on your arms up through the gap
flat on the embarkation platform or against (whilst loosing grip with your feet) turning
the rails at the aft end of the outboard side sideways as you attempt this and get your
and should not form part of the handholds. body onto the platform.. all of this 5-7 meters
above the surface of the water in all possible
weather… going down on this particular
setup, I had to sit on the platform with my feet
through the gap, hold on to pieces of steel
with my hands and lower myself through the
gap until I felt the first step of the pilot
ladder… sounds lovely doesn't it??
Also because the ladder is hanging under the
beam, it is not resting firmly against the ship's
hull and basically moves all over the place.
In the photo above, you can clearly see that

the trapdoor opens the wrong way. Basically
you are hanging at this trapdoor which has
been secured with 2 small metal pins..
Let's continue with IMO A.1045(27) 3.7:" ….
And the pilot ladder should extend above the
lower platform to the height of the handrail
and remain in alignment with and against the
ship's side." We can clearly see on the photo
Non compliant embarkation platform

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
In the setup above it seems like the ladder is In 1979 IMO A.426 came into force and
running through the trapdoor as required, but stated in rule number 9: if a trapdoor is fitted
look closely: it's 2 pieces of ladder…one is in the lower platform the aperture should be
hanging under the beam and the other 3 not less than 750mm x 750mm. in this case
steps above the platform are between top the after part of the lower platform should
railing and bottom beam. Again a very unsafe also be fenced as in paragraph 6 (stanchions
practice!! Beem also obstructing your climb.. and handrails (ap)) and the pilot ladder
should extend above the lower platform to the
Back to some rules:
height of the handrail.
IMO A.1045(27) was preceded by IMO A.
So after having looked at the regulations that
889(21) from 1999 until 2012 and states in
have been in force even since 1979, we can
3.7: if a trapdoor is fitted in the lower
conclude that 41 years of regulations
platform to allow access from and to the pilot
regarding embarkation platforms have not
ladder, the aperture should not be less than
resulted yet in compliant pilot boarding
750mm x 750mm. in this case the platform
arrangements. We can now also conclude that
should also be fenced as specified in par 3.5
vessels referring to the 2012 grandfather
(stanchions and handrails etc (ap)) and the
clause basically are full of bullocks to put it as
pilot ladder should extend above the lower
politely as I possibly can…. When most of us
platform to the height of the handrail.
were still playing with our toy cars, these old
So even in 1999 they concluded that the rules were already simple and in force….
ladder had to go through the gap to the
height of the handrail but wait… it will get
even worse when we go back a little bit
further in time….
And another one…it's like a pest… Some hybrid between combination &
embarkation platform, non-compliant.

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
A good one!! (courtesy of kees koppejan)
Here we see a modified embarkation

platform. The beams are gone, and the ladder
runs through the trapdoor, is secured 1,5 m
above the platform. The ladder is running
even up to the deck where it has been
secured to strongpoints. This is not the typical
'trapdoor'system but seems more like a hybrid
Ok, last one..(courtesy of Kevin Vallance) between standard combination and
embarkation platform. Imho this is a lot safer
By reading all text above you might get the than securing the ladder to the embarkation
feeling it's a rather disastrous: dangerous pilot platform itself: the wires of the embarkation
boarding arrangements, people dying on platform don't
them, one bad photo after another, but luckily
have to deal with strong forces should the
it is not all misery now!
pilot launch hit the ladder. Rules concerning
One of the leading companies, I shall not embarkation platforms are not clear on this
reveal their name, but main office in Geneva, matter. Nowhere it is mentioned how and
and the vessels are black (lol) has taken where the ladder must be secured. This also is
serious steps to modify each vessel in their the case with a single pilot ladder; no rule is
fleet that still has a non-compliant explaining how and where the ladder must be
embarkation platform. This is a big task and secured. Only in IMO A.1045 ch. 7, that deals
will take some time. with pilot ladder winch reels, it has been

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
mentioned that the ladder should be secured to ban the non-compliant embarkation
to strongpoints on deck. In my opinion a platforms by changing them into correct ones,
serious omission in the regulations. Basically a big task lies ahead of most companies.
all rules concerning pilot boarding Some companies (will not reveal their name)
arrangements need a full and thorough still show a stubborn behavior and refuse to
revision without escape clauses. Rules need to change their systems. All they say is: class
be made simple and clear and not multi approved…. We know class approved doesn't
interpretable! mean compliant in accordance with IMO and
SOLAS regulations.
Also a lot of pilots just keep climbing them

without making remarks and of course as long
as we keep climbing, they'll keep coming and
captains then wonder why some pilots
complain: mr. pilot you are the first one to
complain…
Luckily a lot of pilot associations are also
publishing letters, memo's and articles
concerning non-compliant embarkation
platforms:
http://www.americanpilots.org/APA_Request%
20-%20dangerous%20trapdoors.pdf
https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-
marine-news/pilots-death-leads-to-demands-
Compliant!
(courtesy of #dangerous ladders) that-imo-crack-down-on-dangerous-ladders/
The photo above again shows a compliant https://www.marine-pilots.com/article/15291

embarkation platform. The ladder in this case
runs through the trapdoor to the height of the
handrails. We also see that the ladder is firmly
attached to the ship's hull. This is a safe way
of boarding a vessel: when you reach the
platform, all you must do is take a small step
sideways, very nice to see. Manropes also
have been rigged, but we know they are
optional and to be rigged on request of the
pilot.
More and more companies are following up

AIMPA
All India Maritime
Safety & Securtiy
Epilogue
After reading this article I can only hope you everything that can be misinterpreted, will be.
are more aware about the do's and don't
I am looking forward to your remarks and
concerning combinations and embarkation
feed back on this article, please do not
platforms.
hesitate to contact me, should you have any!
Basically this article was only about a few
For now please stay safe and have a good
rules from SOLAS ch V reg 23: rule 3 in total
watch!
and IMO A.1045(27) rule 3 in total. Of course
all the rules I have mentioned in previous Kind regards
articles are applicable to these systems but as
Arie Palmers (reg. pilot)
you saw the focus was on these few simple
rules this time. As I have stated before, the
rules must be revised to make them easier
and more understandable, because

AIMPA
Safety & Securtiy
All India Maritime

AIMPA
wishes all seaferers,
maritime pilots and port ofcials a very
Happy Deepavali
and
safe new year ahead.

AIMPA Journal - November - 2020

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AIMPA

Safety & Securtiy

All India Maritime

All India Maritime

From President’s Desk

AIMPA Pays Tribute to

Feedback and letters to editors:

Personality of the month

Vessel Traffic Services & Pilotage - supporting safe navigation

PILOT TRAINING-Learning from incidents for - pilot and the bridge

Strength of Pilot Ladders and Intermediate Securing of Pilot Ladders:

Testing On Ladders: ............................................................................... 24

Report on the webinar Reconceptualising Indian Maritime

Arie’s 1000 combinations (of pilot ladders) ......................................... 33

ISSUE V NOVEMBER 2020

Capt Gajanan Karanjikar

ISSUE V 2 NOVEMBER 2020

AIMPA Pays Tribute to

Mr. William A. O'Neil, Secretary-General Emeritus of the International Maritime Organization

(excerpts from IMO news Issue 4/2003)

ISSUE V 3 NOVEMBER 2020

Feedback and letters

Capt. Gajanan Karanjikar,

ISSUE V 4 NOVEMBER 2020

V. Adm Giancarlo OLIMBO

All The best!

ISSUE V 5 NOVEMBER 2020

Grandfather to many Capt. Singh says now I find no

ISSUE V 6 NOVEMBER 2020

Vessel Traffic Services & Pilotage

Two services working towards the same goal

ISSUE V 7 NOVEMBER 2020

Training and assessment

ISSUE V 8 NOVEMBER 2020

Cooperation enhancing safety

ISSUE V 9 NOVEMBER 2020

About the author:

ISSUE V 10 NOVEMBER 2020

PILOT TRAINING-Learning from incidents

Welcome aboard pilot !

ISSUE V 11 NOVEMBER 2020

Sea Empress story: Courtesy

1. Milford Haven. VLCC Sea

2. Pilot boards 15 minutes later

3. At Position 2, vessel is falling

4. From position 2, Pilot alters to

ISSUE V 12 NOVEMBER 2020

Comment on Ship - Manvrg. with POB

· Assuming all is well by

· Pilot was not fully qualied

ISSUE V 13 NOVEMBER 2020

Sea Empress: Comment on Human element and Training

ISSUE V 14 NOVEMBER 2020

Cosco Busan story: Courtesy investigation report

1. Container ship Cosco Busan was sailing out, in

3. Restricted visibility. Radar not operational.

4. Some concerns identied by NTSB:

• Medical issue of the pilot on Cosco Busan;

ISSUE V 15 NOVEMBER 2020

4. The pilot was taking a drug

5. Despite the pilot's drug issue,

ISSUE V 16 NOVEMBER 2020

Cosco Busan: COMMENT ON HUMAN ELEMENT AND BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT