RAJU V. STATE OF M. P.

2009
1. Evidence of the testimony of the prosecutrix, though believable on a par with an
injured witness cannot always be presumed to grospel truth. Possibility of
exaggeration, embellishment or false implication cannot be rules out. Plausibility of
immoral past of the prosecutrix, in the presence of evidence, can be considered.

ANURAG SONI V. CHATTISGARH 2019 CrLJ 2508

Facts:

Though the accused was to marry another girl Priyanka Soni, the accused continued to talk of
marriage with the prosecutrix and continued to give the promise that he will marry the
prosecutrix. The prosecutrix initially refused to have physical relation, but then the appellant
allured her with a promise to marry and had physical relation with her. thereafter the
prosecutrix called the accused number of times asking him about the marriage, however, the
accused did not reply positively.

1. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault
on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. As observed by this Court in a catena of
decisions, while a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a rapist
degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces a woman to an
animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape victim be called
an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim. Rape is a crime
against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim. Being the most
hated crime, rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman,
and offends both her esteem and dignity. 

2. If it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the
promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the
prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the
accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained
on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in such a case, such a consent
would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the
rape as defined under Section 375 IPC and can be convicted for the offence under
Section 376 IPC.
 3. In the present case, Considering Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, there is a
presumption and the court shall presume that she gave the consent for the physical
relationship with the accused relying upon the promise by the accused that he will
marry her. As observed hereinabove, from the very inception, the promise given by
the accused to marry the prosecutrix was a false promise and from the very beginning
there was no intention of the accused to marry the prosecutrix as his marriage with
Priyanka Soni was already fixed long back and, despite the same, he continued to give
promise/false promise and alluded the prosecutrix to give her consent for the physical
relationship. The accused had no intention to marry the victim and that he had mala
fide motives and had made false promise only to satisfy the lust.

4. Consent given in the present was on misconception of fact. therefore, the same cannot
be said to be a consent so as to excuse the accused for the charge of rape as defined
under Section 375 IPC. Both the courts below have rightly convicted the accused for
the offence under Section 376 IPC.

KAINI RAJAN V. KERALA 2013 9 SCC 113

1. CONVICTION ON SOLE TESTIMONY. Conviction can be based solely on the
testimony of the proscutrix if her version does not arouse doubt in the mind of the
court. When facts and circumstances cast a doubt on the veracity of the testimony of
the prosecutrix then it would be unsafe to convict the accused on the sole testimony in
the absence of corroborated evidence.
2. “AGAINST HER WILL” “CONSENT”-MEANING”. The expression “against her
will” means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman.
An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of
the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It
denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of an act
complained of. “Consent”, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary
participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the
significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice
between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained
only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. 
 3. S. 90 defines what is not consent. Consent given pursuant to a false representation that
the accused intends to marry, could be regarded as consent given under misconception
of fact. But a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to
“misconception of fact” within the meaning of Section 90 IPC. Acuused’s intention
behind promise to marry should be ascertained. Consent would not be considered if
the promise was given as a false representation of his intention.

DEEPAK GULATI V. HARYANA

1. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, as it is an
assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. While a murderer destroys the
physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless
female. Rape reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By
no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on
the life of the victim, and therefore a rape victim is placed on a higher pedestal than
an injured witness. Rape is a crime against the entire society and violates the human
rights of the victim. Being the most hated crime, rape tantamounts to a serious blow to
the supreme honour of a woman, and offends both, her esteem and dignity. It causes
psychological and physical harm to the victim, leaving upon her indelible marks.
2. Sexual indulgence by accused with the victim where she gave consent under a
misconception of fact is rape. Consent obtained from the victim by making false
promise of marriage which amount to cheating or deception leading to misconception
of fact. But distinction should be made between not fulfilling a false promise and a
mere breach of promise due to circumstances beyond his control. Court must be
assured that the accused from the very beginning acted with malafide intention of
seducing the prosecutrix by making false promise of marriage and by not keeping his
promise. Mere breach of promise without malafide intention cannot amount to
deception.
3. Prosecutrix gave consent in lieu of promise made by the accused of marrying her and
indulged in sexual acts with him despite being capable of fully understanding the
significance and morality associated with such acts and being conscious that marriage
may not take place due to various factors. It was held that though there was no
evidence showing that the accused never intended to marry her, merely because the
accused could not keep up his promise due to unavoidable circumstances, prosecutrix
 cannot be said to be giving her consent under misconception of fact arising from any
false promise of marriage. Hence accused cannot be convicted of rape.

NARAYANAMMA V. KARNATAKA 1994 SCC Cr 1573

1. MEDICAL EVIDENCE: The absence of spermatozoa on the vaginal smear does not
falsify the version of the prosecutrix. Penetration does not necessary lead to the
discovery of spermatozoa. Its absence may be due to various other factors such as
faulty taking of the vaginal smear, its preservation, quality of the semen, etc.
2. TWO-FINGER TEST. According to the doctor hymen of the prosecutrix was
ruptured, admitted two fingers, bled on touch, was reddish in colour, and was painful
and tender. On this basis, the doctor opined that these were signs of rape. The ability
of admission of two fingers and the hymen being ruptured was viewed by the High
Court as if the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse. The factum of
admission of two fingers could not be held adverse to the prosecutrix for it would
depend upon the size of the fingers inserted. Experience tells us that when medical
experts try to opine about the medical condition of a woman used to sexual
intercourse, it is described as admission of two fingers easily, but here the doctor
qualified her statement by saying that it was painful and bleeding on touch. The
doctor was thus clear in her opinion that rape had been committed on the prosecutrix.
There was no occasion for the High Court in holding it to the contrary.
3. NO INJURIES FOUND. Rape on minor girl i.e. 14 years of age, the accused cannot
escape liability because of the fact that there were no injuries on her person
suggesting resistance since she was below the age of consent.

U.P. v. PAPPU AIR 2005 SC 1248

1. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of
rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be
acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than
an injured witness. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the
prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the
context of an accomplice, would do.

2. Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not
a determinative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to be adjudicated
was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is
hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in
law give licence to any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the
victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour
earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and
everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by
anyone and everyone.

NARENDRA KR. V. NCT DELHI AIR 2012 SC 2281

1. Minor inconsistencies, discrepancies, or contradictions in the testimony of the
prosecutrix’s statement is inconsequential. But if her statement suffers from serious
inconsistencies and deliberate improvements on material points then no reliance can
be placed thereon.
2. If the testimony of the prosecutrix doesn’t attract confidence of the court then it may
look for evidence either direct or circumstantial for corroboration. Court must
appreciate the evidence in its entirety and with utmost sincerity.
3. The onus of proof is on the prosecution to establish each ingredient of the offence
beyond reasonable doubt based on cogent evidence and material on record.
Prosecution cannot establish its case merely on the grounds of suspicion and moral
belief, howsoever strong it may or by taking support from the weaknesses of the
defence case.
4. Character of the prosecutrix is not relevant unless it is itself in issue. Her testimony
cannot be discarded merely on the ground of her being of easy virtue or of loose
character. But if such is the case then her testimony should be appreciated cautiously.
Such a woman also has right to dignity and right to refuse to submit to sexual
intercourse has full play in case of every woman.

RAJU V. KARANTAKA 1994

1. Merely because the prosecutrix was simple enough to repose confidence in accused
persons and stayed with them in a hotel, it cannot be held that she was a consenting
party.

DEELIP SINGH V. BIHAR AIR 2005 1 SC 88

1. Court examined the meaning and content of the expression “without her consent” in
Section 375 IPC as well as
2. whether the consent given by a woman believing the man's promise to marry her, is a
consent which excludes the offence of rape?
3. This Court endorsed the principle that a misrepresentation as regards the intention of
the person seeking consent i.e. the accused, could give rise to the misconception of
fact. While applying this principle to a case arising under Section 375 IPC, this Court
held that the consent given pursuant to a false representation that the accused intends
to marry, could be regarded as consent given under misconception of fact. But a
promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to “misconception of fact”
within the meaning of Section 90 IPC. If on facts it is established that at the very
inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the intention
of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the
consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate
him from the ambit of [the second clause of Section 375 IPC.
4. The Court noticed that she was fully aware of the moral quality of the act and the
inherent risk involved and that she considered the pros and cons of the act. This shows
that the sexual act was done “without her consent” and not “against her will”.