Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 12/09/2020 09:07 AM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by S. Bolden,Deputy Clerk

l Robert W. Thompson, Esq. (SBN: 250038)

THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
2
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
3 Burlingame, CA 94010
Tel: (650) 513-6111 / Fax: (650) 513-6071
4
Brian D. Kent, Esq. (Pro Hae Vice)
5
M. Stewart Ryan, Esq. (Pro Hae Vice)
6 LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
7 Philadelphia, PA 19102
Tel: (215) 399-9255 / Fax: (215) 241-8700
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9 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - UNLIMITED CIVIL JURISDICTION
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CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC Case No.: 19STCV29458
13 BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
BOBETTE RIALES; AND JANE DOE #2, PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
14 IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
15 Plaintiffs, MOTIONS TO COMPEL RELIGIOUS
ARBITRATION
16 V.

17 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS
18 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE
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INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCA VIGE;
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1 -25,
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21 Defendants.

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PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 I. THE CONTRACTS AT ISSUE DO NOT EVIDENCE TRANSACTION
INVOLVING COMMERCE, LET ALONE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
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a. No Evidence of Transactions Involving Interstate Commerce Has Beet
Produced
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The intra-state religious service agreements at issue do not evidence transactions involvin
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commerce, let alone interstate commerce. Nor do they encompass criminal conduct that occurre
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after Plaintiffs left Scientology. To be clear, no Defendant has produced any evidence concernin
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any transaction involving commerce relating to the religious services contracts at issue. The phras
8 "involving commerce" in the FAA is the functional equivalent of"affecting commerce." Shepar
9 v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, l 097. Accordingly, "althoug
10 Congress's power to regulate commerce is broad, it does have limits ... [A] relatively trivia

11 impact on interstate commerce cannot be used as an excuse for broad regulation of state or privat·
activities." Id. at 1099; see also United States v. Lopez (1995) 514 U.S. 549, 558-559.
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Asserting FAA preemption, Defendants bear the burden to present evidence establishing
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contract with an arbitration provision that affects interstate commerce, and failure to do so render
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the FAA inapplicable. Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676
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687; Hoover v. American Income L{fe Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; rVoolls v.
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Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197, 211. Thus, the claims and agreements at issue mus
17 have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v.
18 Dobson, ( 1995) 513 U.S. 265 (FAA does not apply without "showing that petitioner whil
19 performing his duties under the employment contract was working 'in' commerce, was producin

20 goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce"). Defendants mus
further demonstrate the transaction at issue involved commerce in fact, not merely that commerc
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may have been contemplated. Id. This determination is a question of fact. Goodwin v. Elkins
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Co., (1984) 730 F.2d 99, 109.
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Here, the claims involve criminal conduct committed long after Plaintiffs left Scientology
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Defendants also fail to cite a single case where the FAA was found to have covered a purporte
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contract for intra-state religious services. And as required by the Lane, Woolls, Hoover an
26 Shepard decisions, Defendants failed to cite any evidence that the purported religious service
27 agreements fit within an activity "that Congress may regulate under the commerce power" such a
28 activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Shepard, 148 Cal.App.4th at 1098.

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 Instead, Defendants' solely claim that its use of a multimedia communications center i1
2 Los Angeles and Scientologists making donations to Defendants somehow turns these claims o

3 criminal conduct into "transactions effecting intrastate commerce." See Supplemental Declaratio

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of Lynn Famy, Dec. 2, 2020. Criminal conduct by its very nature cannot be considered
"transaction," nor can it be considered a "transaction effecting intrastate commerce." Defendant_
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also fail to cite to any aspect of the agreements at issue whereby these Plaintiffs "committed'
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themselves to participate in any form of interstate commerce, let alone to support some apparen
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"multimedia" operation meant to spread the word of Scientology. In fact, Defendants have no
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and cannot produce any evidence that the religious services agreements at issue involved an)
9 commercial transaction whatsoever, such as Plaintiffs providing money, collateral, etc., i
IO exchange for receiving religious services.
11 The agreements at issue simply belie Defendants' claims that the agreements substantiall

12 affect interstate commerce subjecting them to arbitration under the FAA. See e.g. Exhibit 1 t

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Defendant CSI Motion to Compel Religious Arbitration filed April 1, 2020. These agreement
specifically dictate that eve1y Scientology church, mission, or organization is "totally and legally
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independent" and therefore the religious "service" at issue is controlled and supervised by th
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church where the service takes place. This means the agreement is between one individual an
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one church, not any interstate or international organization as claimed. See Ex. 1 1 6. Th
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agreements also clearly implicate services "with the intention of self-improvement and spiritua
18 advancement" designed "to give spiritual aid." See Ex 1 ,r,r
4-5. There is nothing in the agreement
19 or anything put forth by Defendants to demonstrate any kind of"commercial transaction." On thi
20 basis alone the Motions must be denied.

21 b. The Contracts at Issue Do Not Involve Secular Transactions Falling Under th

FAA 's Intended Purview
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The use of"transaction involving commerce" in the FAA, 9 U.S.C.A. § 2, and laterjudicia
interpretation show that the FAA was created to resolve secular disputes, not religious ones
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"[T]he fundamental canon of statutory interpretation is to 'give meaning to every word and phrase
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in the statute to accomplish a result consistent with the legislative purpose."' Pettus v. Cole ( 1996
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PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 49 Cal. App. 4th 402, 428. Nothing in the text of the Federal Arbitration Act or later caselav,
2 reflects a goal to include claims growing out of purely religious agreements in the FAA's scope. 1

3 Here, the question is not whether the parties participate in commerce, but whether th

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agreement is religious in nature, or secular in nature. 2 Even if the Defendants are capable o
pmiicipating in commerce or entering into secular agreements, this is simply not a case involvin
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a secular "transaction involving commerce" for the purposes of the FAA. It is a case involvin
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criminal conduct committed by Defendants.
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The legislative history of the FAA clearly demonstrates it was aimed at secular
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commercial disputes. See Wilson, J-fowthe Supreme Court Thwarted the Pw7Jose of the Federa
9 Arbitration Act 63:1 CASEW. L. REV. 91, 92 n.5 (2012); Moses, M., Arbitration Law: Who's i
Charge? 40 SETONHALLL. REV. 147, 147 n.1. The drafters and supporters of the FAA made i
11 plain that Congress was contemplating only secular disputes when considering the FAA.

12 Even if the Federal Arbitration Act were intended to apply to religious services agreement

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(excluding business and employment), that application would violate the First Amendment'
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Serbian East. Orthodox Diocese v. Nlilivojevich (1976) 426 U.S
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696, 708-1 O;Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem. Presbyterian Church (1969
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393 U.S. 440, 449. Extending the FAA to non-commercial religious agreements for religiou
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services would create a presumption favoring religious institutions who endeavor to keep neutra
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1
20 See generally 9 U.S.C.A. § I, et seq. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (2019) 586 U.S.--, 139 S.Ct
524 (secular antitrust violations); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (20 I0) 561 U.S. 63 (secular employmen
21 contract); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (2006) 546 U.S. 440 (secular loan agreements); Circuit Cit)
Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. l05 (secular employment contract); Dobson, supra, 513 U.S. 265 (1995
22 (secular termite prevention contract); Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. I (secular franchisee agreement)
Craft v. Campbel/ 's Soup Co. (9th Cir. 1998) 177 F.3d 1083 (secular employment contract) overruled by Circuit Cit)
23 Stores, 532 U.S. at 113; Scott v. Yoho (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 392 (secular medical procedure); Ngz(ven v. Appliec
Med. Res. Corp. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 (secular employment agreement): Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enter., Inc
24 (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092 (secular real estate purchase agreement); Giuliano v. Inland Empire Pers., Inc. (2007
149 Cal.App.4th 1276 (secular employment contract); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52 (secula
25 debt-restructuring agreement); United States v. Rayborn (6th Cir. 2002) 312 F.3d 229 (secular arson statute); Camp,
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town ofHarrison (1997) 520 U.S. 564 (secular tax exemption statute).
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2
The recently decided Garcia v. Church of Scientolo 6>y Flag Service Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 201
27 WL 3439638 (M.D. Fla., Jul. 17, 2018), cited by Defendants is inapposite. There, application of the FAA wa
uncontested prior to arbitration and this repmied decision involved only the scope of review of an arbitration awar
28 under the FAA.

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 principles of general applicability out of court. No federal law may dictate intraorganizationa
2 religious disputes. Instead, this Court must consider neutral principles of general applicability

3 embodied in the claims of this case. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; Employment Div. v. Smith (1990) 49

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U.S. 872, 878-79.
n. THE CLAIMS IN THIS CASE DO NOT ARISE OUT OF THE AGREEMENT
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AT ISSUE NOR DOES THE FAA APPLY TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT THA
6 TAKES PLACE AFTER AN INDIVIDUAL LEAVES THE FAITH

7 Arbitration of a claim is appropriate "only where the court is satisfied that the parties agree
8 to arbitrate that dispute." Moritz v. Universal Studios, LLC (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 238, 246 citin

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Granite Rock Co. v. Int'! Broth. ofTeamsters(2010) 561 U.S. 287,297, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 17
L.Ed.2d 567. An arbitration agreement is tied to the underlying contract containing it and applie,
"only where a dispute has its real source in the contract. The object of an arbitration clause is t
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implement a contract, not to transcend it." Moritz, 54 Cal.App.5th at 246, citing Litton Fin.
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Printing Div. v.NLRB(1991)501 U.S.190,205, 111 S.Ct.2215, 115L.Ed.2d 177(Litton).
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Plaintiffs have a right to exit a religious affiliation. In re Marriage of Weiss ( 1996) 4
14 Cal.Rptr.2d 339, 347; Abbo v. Briskin (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) 660 So. 2d 1157, 1159; Zummo v.
15 Zummo (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 574 A.2d 1130, 1146-48. All claims alleged by Plaintiffs occurre
16 after Plaintiffs left Scientology and therefore do not arise from the agreements which covere
17 Plaintiffs' religious services when they were members. 3 Moreover, courts may not enforc

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contracts if any part of a contract is illegal. Civil Code § 1608. Here, it is illegal for Defendants t
create an agreement to cover the criminal behavior at issue here. Gatti v. Highland Park Builder
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(Cal. 1946) 166 P.2d 265, 266. Even so, Plaintiffs did not contract to arbitrate criminal conduc
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after they left; they entered the agreements "exclusively for ... self-improvement and spiritua
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advancement." See Ex 1 114-5, supra. Thus, the issues do not arise out of the transactions and i
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would be illegal for the Defendants to contract to cover their criminal conduct under the FAA 01

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26 If this Court were to conclude that the criminal conduct committed by Defendants over a decade after Plaintiffs lef
the religion that fo1111 the basis of their claims at issue did somehow arise from the religious services agreements, th
27 Defendants themselves have admitted, in COJTespondence with Jane Doe # 1, that such litigation is not subject t
arbitration under the FAA but rather may be litigated by way of a lawsuit. See Declarations of Robert W. Thompson
28 Exhibits A.

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION
 otherwise. As stated below, FAA has broad reach, but it may not be used to shield criminal actor
2 from the accountability of neutral laws of general applicability in court.

3 HI. CONCLUSION

4 For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request Defendants' Motions b
5 denied.
6 DATED: December 8, 2020 THO~SON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
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II
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[(/wftt ~e---/---
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Robert W. Thompson, Esq.
9 Attorneysfor Plaint(!{.<;

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PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

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