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Double Jeopardy

DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD SET IN:

G.R. No. 172777               October 19, 2011

BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner,


vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 172792

RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner,


vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.

The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of
Rights (Article III) contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.37 However, jurisprudence
allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made
on motion of the accused, to wit:

(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits
and operates as an acquittal.

(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.38

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double
jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a
sham.39 For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely
terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the
information for insufficiency of evidence;40 and (2) where the case was dismissed at a
time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.41

In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid
information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the
institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not
guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the
prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s
Double Jeopardy

order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double
jeopardy.

As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not


appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be
subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY DID NOT SET IN:

June 27, 2018 G.R. No. 196015

RURAL BANK OF MABITAC, LAGUNA, INC., represented by MRS. MARIA CECILIA


S. TANAEL, Petitioner vs. MELANIE M. CANICON and MERLITA L. ESPELETA,
Respondents

We recognize, nevertheless, that in addressing the issue above, the petition essentially
questions the dismissal of the case against Espeleta and seeks reinstatement of the
November 15, 2006 Resolution. This, in turn, results in the revival of the original
information and reinclusion of Espeleta as an accused. Thus, before proceeding, we first
determine whether the present petition will place Espeleta in double jeopardy.

The 1987 Constitution and its predecessors guarantee the right of the accused against
double jeopardy.  Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court strictly adheres to the
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constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provides for the requisites in order
for double jeopardy to attach:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.

Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court
of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4)
the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.   The absence of any of the requisites hinders the attachment of the first
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jeopardy.
Double Jeopardy

The first to third elements are non-issues in this petition. There is no dispute that the
original information is valid and was filed with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a court of
competent jurisdiction. Espeleta was arraigned under this original information. The
contentious element in this case is the fourth one, i.e., whether the dismissal was with
express consent of Espeleta. To recall, Espeleta was dropped as an accused when the
RTC, in its September 17, 2003 Order, allowed the amendment of the original information
after reinvestigation of the public prosecutor. After she was reinstated as an accused by
virtue of the RTC's November 15, 2006 Resolution, Espeleta filed a motion for
reconsideration. This resulted in the issuance of the October 23, 2007 Order which, for
the second time, dropped her as an accused. As such, there is a need to examine
whether in both instances of dismissal, jeopardy had attached.

As a rule, where the dismissal was granted upon motion of the accused, jeopardy will not
attach. In this case, Espeleta's filing of the urgent motion for reinvestigation did not
amount to her express consent. We have held before that the mere filing of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot be equated to the accused's express consent.  However, we still
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find that Espeleta gave her express consent when her counsel did not object to the
amendment of the information.  As we have held in People v. Pilpa,  the dismissal of the
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case without any objection on the part of the accused is equivalent to the accused's
express consent to its termination, which would bar a claim for violation of the right
against double jeopardy:

We hold that the oral manifestation at the hearing made by the counsel of the accused
that he had no objection to the dismissal of the case was equivalent to a declaration of
conformity to its dismissal or to an express consent to its termination within the meaning
of section 9 of Rule 117. He could not thereafter revoke that conformity since the court
had already acted upon it by dismissing the case. He was bound by his counsel's assent
to the dismissal (People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672; People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249, 1269-70).

In Pendatum vs. Aragon, 93 Phil. 798, 800 the prosecution filed a motion for the
provisional dismissal of the complaints for physical injuries and slander against Aida F.
Pendatum. At the bottom of that motion, her lawyer wrote the words: "No objection". The
court granted the motion.

Later, the cases were revived. The accused contended that the revival of the cases
would place her in double jeopardy. That contention was rejected because the
provisional dismissal did not place the accused in jeopardy. There was no jeopardy in
such dismissal because the words "No objection" conveyed the idea of full concurrence
with the dismissal and was equivalent to saying "I agree. "52

Likewise, when the October 23, 2007 Order reinstated the September 17, 2003 Order,
the first jeopardy did not attach because it was prompted by Espeleta's motion for
reconsideration of the November 15, 2006 Resolution.

The rule that the dismissal is not final if it is made upon accused's motion, of course,
admits of exceptions such as: (1) where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a
judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal; and (2) where the dismissal is
made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which is in effect a failure to prosecute.  However, the foregoing are neither applicable
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nor raised in this case.


Double Jeopardy

Considering that the first jeopardy did not attach when the case was previously dismissed
as to Espeleta, this petition will not expose Espeleta to double jeopardy. We thus
proceed with disposing of the third issue.

G.R. No. 127772       March 22, 2001

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP., respondents.

The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioner's cases, double jeopardy had set in so
that petitioner's constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused


has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had leaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint
or information.

x       x       x

Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court,
(3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.8

In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial
was made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the
instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally,
the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of
the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial
of the right to speedy trial.9 Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings have been
prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.10
Double Jeopardy

Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so
that violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it
must be recalled that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.11 Both the trial court and the appellate court noted
that after pre-trial of petitioner's case was terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous
trial was set in the months of December 1994, and January and February of 1995. The
scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding judge was promoted to
the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not immediately appointed,
nor another judge detailed to his sala. 1âwphi1.nêt

Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to
the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon
motion of the private prosecutor without objection from petitioner's counsel. The hearing
set on July 24, 1995 was reset, despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel,
because of lack of proof of service of notice to co-accused Dante Duldulao and the
spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz.12

As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances
beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court. The first and third postponements
were clearly justified on the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or
counsel. Another was made without objection from petitioner's counsel. However, on
September 8, 1995, counsel for petitioner moved for dismissal of this case, because of
the absence of the private prosecutor due to a severe attack of gout and arthritis,
although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to the court.13 All in all, there were
only three re-setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive
events, the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for valid
grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against
petitioner,14 which order the appellate court later sustained.

That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the
chronology of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers.
Petitioner could not refute the appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to speedy
trial had not been violated. As both the trial and appellate courts have taken pains to
demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial.
Hence, there was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial as there were no
unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of
time.15

There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably


sought, we concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner's
right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial
had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.

It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy
when that order was reconsidered seasonably.16 For as petitioner's right to speedy trial
was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy - that the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused - was not met. The trial court's initial order of
dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel, hence made with the express consent
of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double
jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244
SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste,17 where we overturned an order of dismissal
by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial -
Double Jeopardy

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the
accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their
right against double jeopardy.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed
reinstatement of the cases against petitioner.

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