G.R. No.
L-64279 April 30, 1984 We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City
Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now
presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S.
MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette
of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25,
1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos
transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu
ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from
Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of
Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree
No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle
issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of
inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not
included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock
inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the
mayor of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while
passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V.
Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda,
provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive
Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a
farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the
recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The
replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge
Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to
Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25
of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than
two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank
of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated
Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the
Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation
and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate
that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the
Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230
and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the
respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having
general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every
order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section
551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and
orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See
Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines
Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were
unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to
be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the
Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are
now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor
Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the
carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of
the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered
to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners
are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot,
Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of each carabao
which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable
rental for each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The farmers should
not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.
G.R. No. L-62243 October 12, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO,
JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Anacleto T. Lacanilao and Carmelino M. Roque for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales,
presided by respondent judge. The information reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, guaranteeing the authenticity and genuineness of the same and with intent to
defraud one Filipinas Tan by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient
funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Island, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine Island Check No. D-
357726 in the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing
that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the Philippine Island and upon
presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for
the reason that the said accused has no sufficient funds with the said bank and despite
repeated demands made by Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or
pay the amount of P200,000.00, said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the
said check or to pay the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of said Filipinas Tan
in the aforementioned amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency. (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the
information on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out
that at the alleged commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May
1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect.
The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the
dishonor of the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of
the offense; and that assuming that the effectivity of the law — Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 — is on June 29, 1979, considering that the offense was committed on September
26, 1979, the said law is applicable.
In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
penalizes is not the fact of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing
and issuing a check without sufficient funds or credit.
Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of
the accused. In its order of August 23, 1982, respondent judge said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for
bouncing checks prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 although the
check may have matured after the effectivity of the said law. No less than the Minister
of Justice decreed that the date of the drawing or making and issuance of the bouncing
check is the date to reckon with and not on the date of the maturity of the check.
(Resolution No. 67, S. 1981, People's Car vs. Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3, 1981; Resolution
No. 192, S. 1981, Ricardo de Guia vs. Agapito Miranda, March 20, 1981).
Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for swindling
(Estafa, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code), the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot
be given a retroactive effect to apply to the above entitled case. (pp. 49- 50, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent
judge's dismissal of the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979
issue of the Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or
several days before respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the
second week of May 1979; and that respondent judge should not have taken into
account the date of release of the Gazette for circulation because Section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the date of
effectivity of a law that needed publication, "the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be
published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue."
Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was
published in the Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was
released only on June 14, 1979 and, considering that the questioned check was issued
about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.
We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the
private respondent.
The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat,
Copy Editor of the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating-
têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official
Gazette was officiallyreleased for circulation on June 14, 1979. (p. 138, Rollo)
It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June
14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979
was the date of publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be
bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the
people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties. For, if a statute had not
been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to
be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act
shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term
"publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to
make known to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make
the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in determining the
effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special
effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the
Information as criminal, in May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act.
Following the special provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only
on June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated and,
consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any violation thereof.
With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on
September 26, 1979 when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored
by the bank, suffice it to say that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and
issuance of a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor. The title of the law
itself states:
AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A
CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds ... shall be punished ...
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to
keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds ... . (Emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, Actg. C.J., concurring:
I concur on the ground that actual publication of the penal law is indispensable for its
effectivity (Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174).

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as
Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179,
184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355,
358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486,
491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281,
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471,
474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-
544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-
857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50,
51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-
433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright
on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal
personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of
a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
 rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns
a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual,
as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports
the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous
to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind
the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances
the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which
surround this case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no
other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the
law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding,
it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638
provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of
the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled:
"Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con
las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in
the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's
declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior
to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-
with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences
which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can
be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter
may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86675 December 19, 1989
MRCA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge, Regional
Trial court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES
DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and
EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer and Sanvicente for private respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioner prays this Court to set aside the decision promulgated on January 18,
1989 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 15745, affirming the order of the
Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees
as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it
from the defendants, but left them "to the discretion of this Honorable Court" or "to be
proven during the trial."
Invoking the decision of this Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, the private respondents (defendants in Civil Case No.
55740 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, entitled MRCA, Inc. vs.
Spouses Domingo Sebastian, Jr., et al." filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on July
15, 1988. The petitioner opposed the motion, but the trial court granted it in its order of
August 10, 1988 (p. 54, Rollo). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, hence, this
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the
Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that
said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its
non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it
should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial
court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee,
unlike the Manchester case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the
body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.
Petitioner's argument regarding the need for publication of the Manchester ruling in the
Official Gazette before it may be applied to other cases is not well taken. As pointed out
by the private respondents in their comment on the petition, publication in the Official
Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a
new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the
court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not
affect or change vested rights." (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508). In a later
case, this Court held thus:
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable
to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As
the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it
is applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but
it can not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the
decision had become final before said resolution became effective. In
this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was
denied on July 17, 1944, and a second motion for re-hearing or
consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of
fifteen days from promulgation of the order or judgment deducting
the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court
(Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired before the
adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the Court
cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any pleading or
motion in the present case." (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 765- 766.)
The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs.
Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 7993738, February 13, 1989, a case that was already
pending before Manchester was promulgated.
The complaint in this case was filed on March 24, 1988, or ten months after Manchester
was promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence, Manchester should apply except for the fact
that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where we ruled that the court may allow
payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
prescriptive or reglementary period." We quote:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. (p. 80, Rollo.)
Intent to cheat the government of the proper filing fees may not be presumed from the
petitioner's omission to specify in the body and prayer of its complaint the amounts of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees that it claims to have suffered and/or
incurred in its transaction with the private respondents. The petitioner might not have
computed its damages yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove them at the
time it filed its complaint. In accordance with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
the petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in
terms of pesos, how much it claims as damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees
therefor, provided its right of action has not yet prescribed. This the petitioner is ready
to do.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.

The Order of the Regional Trial Court is hereby set aside. The complaint in Civil Case
No. 55740 (MRCA, Inc. vs. Domingo Sebastian, Jr. and Lilia Tioseco Sebastian) is
reinstated and the petitioner is allowed to amend the same by specifying the amounts of
damages it seeks to recover from the defendants (private respondents) and to pay the
proper filing fees therefor as computed by the Clerk of Court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84111 December 22, 1989
JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN, VICENTE D.
YUTANGCO, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition questions the power of automatic review of the Commissioner of Customs
over the decision of the Collector of Customs in protest and seizure cases.
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar,
which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the
custody of the Bureau of Customs.
The petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo (Annex A,
Petition) to prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The District Collector of
Customs, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar.
On June 3 and 6, 1988, show-cause hearings were conducted. On June 7, 1988, the
District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the sugar as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered subject Nine Thousand (9,000)
sacks/bags of refined sugar are hereby ordered released to Mr. Jimmy
O. Yaokasin, consignee/claimant and the immediate withdrawal of
Customs Guard within its bodega's premises. (p. 276, Rollo.)
On June 10, 1988, the decision, together with the entire records of the case, were
transmitted to, and received by, the Commissioner of Customs (Annex H, Petition, p.
277, Rollo).
On June 14, 1988, without modifying his decision, the District Collector of Customs
ordered the warehouse, wherein the bags of sugar were stored, to be sealed.
On June 19, 1988, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (Annex I, Petition, p. 278, Rollo), for "further hearing on
the merits" (p. 279, Rollo), based on evidence that the seized sugar was of foreign
origin. Petitioner opposed the motion for being merely pro forma and/or that the same
was, in effect, a motion for new trial.
Hearing Officer Paula Alcazaren set the Motion for reconsideration for hearing on July
13, 1988.
But before that, or on July 4, 1988, the Commissioner of Customs by "2nd
Indorsement" returned to the District Collector of Customs the:
... folder of Tacloban S.I. No. 06-01 (R.P. vs. 9000 bags/sacks of
refined sugar, MR. JIMMY YAOKASIN, consignee/claimant),
together with the proposed decision, for hearing and/or resolution of
the government is motion for reconsideration ... . (p. 437, Rollo,
Emphasis Ours.)
On the same date, July 4, 1988, petitioner applied for and secured a writ of
replevin from the Regional Trial Court of Leyte (CC 7627, Branch VII), through a
Petition/Complaint for certiorari Prohibition with Replevin and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order (Annex L, Petition, p. 288, Rollo).
On July 12, 1988, respondent District Collector of Customs filed an Answer assailing
the court's jurisdiction. On the same day, the District Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs filed in the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order to annul the
July 4, 1988 — "Order Granting Replevin with Temporary Restraining Order" (CA-
G.R. SP NO. 15090; p. 396, Rollo).
On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reconsidered his June 7, 1988 decision, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the undersigned hereby reconsiders his Decision,
finds that the 9,000 bags/sacks of refined sugar in question are of
foreign origin, smuggled into the country, and declares them forfeited
in favor of the government.
Considering the provision in the quoted Customs Memorandum
Order, especially the latter part thereof prohibiting the release of the
articles in question to the claimant, and considering also that the said
sacks of sugar are presently stored in the bodega of claimant, and
considering further that there are no facilities for storage in Tacloban
City, for security reasons, the Honorable Commissioner of Customs is
respectfully and earnestly urged to order the immediate transfer of
the sugar from the said bodega to any Customs Warehouse,
preferably in Manila and to this end to order the setting aside of such
sum of money in order to effectively accomplish this purpose." (p. 11,
Rollo.)
Also, on the same day, the Court of Appeals: (a) gave due course to respondent's
petition; and (b) restrained Judge Pedro S. Espina, Regional Trial Court, Leyte, from
further proceeding in Civil Case No. 7627, and from enforcing his Order of July 4,
1988.

It is petitioner's contention that the June 7, 1988 decision of the District Collector of
Customs became final and executory, in view of the absence of an appeal therefrom by
the "aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Hence, the release of the 9,000 bags of sugar must be
upheld.

On the other hand, the District Collector and the Commissioner of Customs argue that
since the June 7, 1988 decision is adverse to the government, the case should go to the
Commissioner of Customs on automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No.
20-87, dated May 18, 1987, of former Acting Commissioner of Customs Alexander
Padilla, which provides:

CUSTOMS MEMORANDUM ORDER

NO. 20-87

TO: All Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned

Effective immediately, you are hereby directed to implement strictly

the following —

Decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure

and protest cases are subject to review by the
Commissioner upon appeal as provided under
existing laws; provided, however, that where a
decision of the Collector of Customs in such seizure
and protest cases is adverse to the government it
shall automatically be reviewed by the
Commissioner of Customs. (PD. No. 1, Annex C.)

In view thereof, no releases in any seizure or like cases may be

effected unless and until the decision of the Collector has been
confirmed in writing by the Commissioner of Customs.

For immediate and strict compliance.

(
S
g

(p. 436, Rollo; Emphasis Ours)
The memorandum order implements Section 12 (Art. IV, Part. IV, Vol. I) of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan (hereafter, "PLAN") which provides:
12. The Collector of Customs at each principal port of entry shall be
the official head of the customs service in his port and district
responsible to the Commissioner. He shall have the authority to take
final action on the enforcement of tariff and customs laws within his
collection district and on administrative matters in accordance with
Chapter III, Part II of this Plan. Decisions of the Collector of Customs
in seizure and protest cases are subject to review by the
Commissioner upon appeal as provided under existing
laws; provided, however, that where a decision of a Collector of
Customs in such seizure and protest cases is adverse to the
government, it shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner
of Customs which, if affirmed, shall automatically be elevated for
final review by the Secretary of Finance; provided, further that if
within thirty days from receipt of the records of the case by the
Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance, no decision is
rendered by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of
Finance, the decision under review shall become final and executory.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, former President Marcos
decreed and ordered that the Plan be (4 adopted, approved, and made as part of the law
of the land." Under the 1987 Constitution, "[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or
revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII). While some provisions of the Plan have ceased to be
operative because of subsequent reorganizations, other provisions, such as Section 12
have not been repealed by subsequent legislation.
Section 12 of the Plan applies to petitioner's shipment of 9,000 bags of sugar. Taxes
being the lifeblood of the Government, Section 12, which the Commissioner of
Customs in his Customs
f Memorandum Order No. 20-87, enjoined all collectors to
follow strictly, is intended to protect the interest of the Government in the collection of
taxes and customs C duties in those seizure and protest cases which, without the automatic
review provided utherein, neither the Commissioner of Customs nor the Secretary of
Finance would probably
s ever know about. Without the automatic review by the
Commissioner oft Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a collector in any of our
country's far-flung
o ports, would have absolute and unbridled discretion to determine
whether goods seized
m by him are locally produced, hence, not dutiable or of foreign
origin, and therefore
s subject to payment of customs duties and taxes. His decision,
unless appealed by the aggrieved party (the owner of the goods), would become final
with 'the no one the wiser except himself and the owner of the goods. The owner of the
goods cannot be expected to appeal the collector's decision when it is favorable to him.
A decision that is favorable to the taxpayer would correspondingly be unfavorable to
the Government, but who will appeal the collector's decision in that case certainly not
the collector.
Evidently, it was to cure this anomalous situation (which may have already defrauded
our government of huge amounts of uncollected taxes), that the provision for automatic
review by the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance of unappealed
seizure and protest cases was conceived to protect the government against corrupt and
conniving customs collectors.
Section 12 of the Plan and Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code do not conflict
with each other. They may co-exist. Section 2313 of the Code provides for the
procedure for the review of the decision of a collector in seizure and protest cases upon
appeal by the aggrieved party, i.e., the importer or owner of the goods. On the other
hand, Section 12 of the Plan refers to the general procedure in appeals in seizure and
protest cases with a special proviso on automatic review when the collector's decision is
adverse to the government. Section 2313 and the proviso in Section 12, although they
both relate to the review of seizure and protest cases, refer to two different situations —
when the collector's decision is adverse to the importer or owner of the goods, and when
the decision is adverse to the government.
The decision of the Court in the case of Sy Man vs. Jacinto (93 Phil. 1093 [19531]),
which the petitioner invokes as precedent, is riot in point. In the present case the Acting
Commissioner, in issuing the memorandum circular, was directing strict compliance
with an existing provision of law, which mandates automatic review of decisions of
collectors in seizure and protest cases which are adverse to the government. On the
other hand, in Sy Man, the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of Customs
directed the elevation of records in seizure and forfeiture cases for automatic review
even if he had not been expressly granted such power under the then existing law.
The objection to the enforcement of Section 12 of the Plan and CMO No. 20-87 on the
ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette, is not well taken. The
Plan, as part of P.D. No. 1, was "adopted, approved and made as part of the law of the
land" and published in Volume 68, No. 40, p. 7797 of the Official Gazette issue of
October 2, 1972.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette,
does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the
Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates. the customs collectors.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official
Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public natureof the Congress of the
Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be
published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general applicability." CMO
No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan,
is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the
customs collectors). "It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been
circularized to all concerned" (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27).

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The temporary
restraining order which we issued in this case is hereby made permanent. Cost against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE
PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum
Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003.
Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the
following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat
would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food
grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of
the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to
cover the tariff differential.6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of
the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade
supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having
imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the
shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution
was violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers
for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was
confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective
for twenty (20) days from notice.9
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for
a judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory
relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not
legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature,
because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They
likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that
they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that the
action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid
until declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the
main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision11 without having to
resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject
Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or
anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from enforcing the
said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised
by respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated
that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the
proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and
that the latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future
transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not
followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-
2003. It likewise held that petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination
of the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The lower court pointed
out that a classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the
due process rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising
the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however,
dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of
petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of
notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.15 We
find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these
requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.
This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of
Finance Secretary,17 we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge
of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three
inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative
agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative
judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to
judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the
validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court,
when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the
rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some
intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners
are summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the
implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular
importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from
China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it
would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the
imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus,
respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade
wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have
to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its
time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing
wheat, each and every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will
result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the
CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty
will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is
shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings
filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed
because the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their
own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency. We believe and so find
that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it
with standing to file this petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because
litigation is inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not
included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers.
Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports
food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of
respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied
the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to
wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that
date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall,
as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation
at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what
the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
– no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised
Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional
for being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it
must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country
it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have
imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a
classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers
listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made
to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore,
does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat
importations and thus prevent their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003
shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The
application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are
excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an
assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first
case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their wheat
imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the
powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when
it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the
proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power
to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.23
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of
CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal
protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs
officer to examine and assess imported articles.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
limited the customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and
Customs Law, as amended. The law provides: SO ORDERED.

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise
Imported Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise
imported articles shall determine whether the packages designated for examination and
their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other
pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the
articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He
shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so and when
such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into
the Philippines of imported articles.

Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are
usually bought and sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section
201 of this Code.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to
the penalties prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1

The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the
classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO
23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia
reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of
Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as
Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area
of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known
as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent
Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it
open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino)
issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the
same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort
Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General
Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB),
primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig,
Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed
for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of
SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable
land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the
Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the
distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc.
(WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as
those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering
Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the
President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it
could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus,
Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No.
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative
power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that
pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case.
Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that
there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as
it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the
published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to
encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied
by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed
Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP
Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further,
pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective
Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY
PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY
PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED
THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO
RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE
EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E.
MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject
lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable
public land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No.
2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable
lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has
the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days
following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not
imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as
pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if
the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it
but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only
of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
 xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette
shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos
intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put,
the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law
when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled
that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This
does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the
law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues,
but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law
‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925
dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order
dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent
in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and
IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of
Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil
case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and
void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners
of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother
Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendant-
petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements
thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay
to the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from
the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-
complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-
petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel
certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue
in lieu thereof another certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their
brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all liens and
incumbrances except those expressly provided by law, without special pronouncement
as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced
the aforesaid civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of
the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio
under patent No. 16074 issued on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No. 325
issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section
122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and identified in the cadastre of the
municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the petitioner pay to
them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which he received from
the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its
possession to the respondents; that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of
the case, from conveying or encumbering the land and its improvements; that the
registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu thereof
another in favor of the respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by
way of special defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was
receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him
and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified by a
notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of
P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the deceased owed him and that,
should the respondents be declared to have a better right to the possession of the land,
that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the improvements
which he introduced upon the land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following
public deed:
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between
Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L.,
hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age,
married to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L.,
hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with
each other as follows:
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of
a parcel of land in the barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of
Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead certificate of title No.
325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No.
285 of the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record
No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M.
No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E.
104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6";
N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º 42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning,
"Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5,
stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by property
claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by Alangan River and
property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property claimed by Jose
del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections
12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of
Lands, by Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on
February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of
the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated under Article
trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6) boñga trees. IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.

ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day
value of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 and year first herein before written.
of the municipality of Limay, Bataan.
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of second part to the party of (Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the party of the first
part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the
Signed in the presence of:
improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements
the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of
the first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second (Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th day of November,
1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution of this
instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at
12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become null and void; PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss.
otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, and BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
subject to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount
due thereunder, with costs and also attorney's fees in the event of such Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by
foreclosure.lawphil.net reason of her sex, to me known and known to me to be the person who signed
the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed the same
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and as her free and voluntary act and deed.
assessments which are or may become due on the above described land and
improvements during the term of this agreement. I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this
page of the acknowledgment and that each page thereof is signed by the parties
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this to the instrument and the witnesses in their presence and in the presence of
agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of each other, and that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one
First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of Homestead parcel.
Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in
lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal,
Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901. this 16th day of May, 1932.

ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of (Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to Notary Public
redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the
property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.

ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII
hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall
 Doc. No. 178
Page 36 of my register
Book No. IV
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass
that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on
the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into
another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the
payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract, the petitioner entered upon the
possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the
loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on
May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on March 6, 1936 the
assessed value of the land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the
conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out
in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its
improvements. And upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect the
entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the
parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and
severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of
the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land
and its improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of
the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law
between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if
the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to
be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.
The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be interpreted in accordance with these rules.
As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted
according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties
in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in
the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory
contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the
parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In
other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the
land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and
the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio
was to pay, within four and a half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with
interest thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI
the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of
the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII it was covenanted
that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a
motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be
cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties
agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated
period of four years and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in
favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan of P1,000
including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be
presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the contract of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would
subsist in all its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than
those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law,
morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when
such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which
expresses the will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of
the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his views as
follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no
difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the question is as to what
extent they may produce the nullity of the principal obligation. Under the view
that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go to its essence,
a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider
the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case
where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of the
parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition,
juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.
(Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.)
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following
words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several
promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to be
done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or the promise, so far as
it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful
promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an
unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration,
and this rule applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory
provision, unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication declares the
entire contract void. . . . (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co.
v. Gray, 239 U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law.
ed., 1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v.
 Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 Law.
ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas
Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl., 428.)
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit
1, we stated that the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage
of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that
the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law. The second, or the
mortgage of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874,
as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall
they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should
Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and
a half years, by paying the loan together with interest, she would execute in favor of the
petitioner an absolute deed of sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest
stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after
the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take possession of the
land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the
payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a
contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article
1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance
burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of
error is well-founded and that error was committed in holding that the contract entered
into between the parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvements and
that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In the second assignment of error the petitioner contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the Public Land
Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The assigned error is vague and not
specific. If it attempts to show that the said document is valid in its entirety, it is not
well-founded because we have already said that certain pacts thereof are illegal because
they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal
agreement entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been
accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in the fourth and last assignment of error the
same petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in bad
faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof,
resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the improvements
introduced by him.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties
entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take
possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements
thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he
would assume payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt
of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,
are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the contract of antichresis is
a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The
Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the
land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an
absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is
prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not expressly define what is meant by
bad faith, but section 433 provides that "Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his
title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a
possessor in good faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are
deemed possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code, covered by Chapter II
relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that "Good
faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We
do not have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not
squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad
faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition,
by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the
petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be
noted that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found
established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the
petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from
the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether
good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on
article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon
an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the
parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and even established by
appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies against the
qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such
circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far
exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law,
the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not
infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing,
to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible and
excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of
conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better
still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the
intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and
appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation
of doubtful doctrines. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code.
Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis
of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the
petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession
thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of
the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good
faith. We do not give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which
consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act
may only be considered as a sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the
fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of
the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good
faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the
Civil Code and having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the
provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents
are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner the
value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the respondents
may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be
fixed by the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay
them the sum of P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the
petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court
denying the claim or indemnity for damages, being of the same opinion as the trial court
that the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the respondents have not
established such damages. Under the verbal contract between the petitioner and the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would take
possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on
condition that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would attend
to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount to the
stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of the fruits of the land to the
payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the
elements characterizing the contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code.
It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits be also
applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing remained after
paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120
per annum, whereas the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly
reached said amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements
was, according to the decision, P860. To this should be added the fact that, under the
verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay
the annual land tax. We mention these data here to show that the petitioner is also not
bound to render an accounting of the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements
for the reason stated that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the secured
indebtednes.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby
adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is
valid and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties
is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a null and without effect;
(3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to
have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value
thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the
improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the
court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the
possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the
respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner
within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off
by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and
in default thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the
purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without
special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA,
DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-
appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson
against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado,
Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left
the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his
widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands
thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria
Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby
they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation,
Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced
her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death
(Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession
of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is
likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was
merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four
illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background,
it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow
Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death"
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had
entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that
future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1
Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not
entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in
force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and
article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for
the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article
2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that
rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this
is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same
origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in
this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise
thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided
said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same
origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old
Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of
the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in
a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor
children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their
mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them,
this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the
opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real
property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be
valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same
document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential
formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has
no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. 75082 January 31, 1989
JOSE F. PUZON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ALEJANDRA ABELLERA, substituted by TOMASA D. DOMONDON, oppositor-
appellee.
De Guzman, Florendo & Apolinar Law Office for petitioner-appellant.
Sixto A. Domondon and Hector D. Domondon for oppositor-appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the then First Civil Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court ** in AC-G.R. CV No. 04690, dated 13
March 1986, affirming in toto the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet, Branch IV, sitting as a Land Registration Court, in Administrative Case
No. 2091. It is the contention of petitioner that:
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THAT LANDS
WITHIN THE BAGUIO TOWNSITE RESERVATION WHOSE
TITLES HAVE BEEN ISSUED IN CIVIL RESERVATION CASE
NO. 1, G.L.R.O. RECORD NO. 211 PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC
ACT 931, AS AMENDED, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REALTY
TAX. (Petition, p. 7, Rollo)
The oppositor-appellee (now deceased and substituted by her only child Tomasa
Domondon) was the registered owner of the land in question, a two-hectare lot known
as Lot 1-B subdivision plan (LRC) PSU-33174, Res. Sec. 2, Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio
City and covered by TCT No. 8103. The said land was part of a bigger tract of public
land but titled in a judicial reopening proceeding pursuant to the provisions of RA 931,
as amended, entitled "An act to authorize the filing in the court, under certain
conditions, of certain claims of titles to parcels of land that have been declared public
land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceeding the
approval of this act' (now inoperative).
Subsequently, in a case entitled Republic, et al. v. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, et al., 29 SCRA
517 (1969), We declared all titles issued under RA 931 null and void since the said Act
was applicable only to places that were covered by cadastral proceedings, not to the
City of Baguio which was covered by a townsite reservation under Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 filed before the enactment of Cadastral Act No.
2259 on 11 February 1913. This was followed by another case also entitled Republic v.
Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 (1973), where We reiterated the above ruling. The ruling in
these case was subsequently enacted into law as incorporated in Presidential Decree No.
1271 which took effect on 22 December 1977 with the title "An act nullifying decrees
of registration and certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 pursuant to Republic Act No. 931, as
amended, but considering as valid certain titles of such lands that are alienable and
disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes." Hence, the lot in question
was reverted to the public domain.
On 10 October 1977, certain real properties in Baguio City, which included two (2)
properties of the oppositor-appellee, one of which is the land involved in this appeal,
were auctioned off. Allegedly, the real property taxes on the land in question for the
years 1971 to 1977 had not been paid. Having been previously informed of the
scheduled auction sale of tax delinquent properties in Baguio City, petitioner Puzon
gained interest in the property in question. He examined the title of said land and all
other documents evidencing transactions over the same. At the auction sale petitioner
Puzon was declared winner in the bidding over the lot in question, being the lone
bidder, and paid to the City Treasurer a total sum of only P3,253.95 which included his
bid and other petty sums.
One year after the tax sale, petitioner Puzon was given a certificate of sale over the
parcel of land sold to him. He went to the Registry of Deeds in order to register said
certificate and to secure a new title in his name but was advised to first go to court for
an order confirming said sale. Hence, petitioner filed this suit to consolidate his
ownership over the property.
In the meantime, while trying to avail of the provisions of PD 1271 in oppositor-
appellee's behalf, Tomasa Domondon found out that the two lands of the former had
been auctioned off for alleged tax deliquencies for the years 1971 to 1977, one of which
is the land purchased by petitioner Puzon Domondon then arranged a meeting with the
latter to discuss the matter with him. But when the latter failed to appear at the
appointed time and place. Domondon consigned with the Court the amount of
P4,780.00 after having verified that Puzon paid only P3,252.95 for a two-hectare land
which could have commanded a very much higher price. She then filed her opposition
to petitioner Puzon's petition for consolidation. The lower court ruled in favor of the
then oppositor, declaring null and void the aforesaid auction sale and illegal the
assessment made. This ruling was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC), hence this present petition. As stated by the lower court and adopted by the IAC,
the issues are "whether the (property) involved herein can be considered tax
(delinquent) and, if, so, has there been a valid tax sale of the same as to place the Court
under no recourse but to confirm said (sale) and order the (title) thereof transferred in
the name of petitioner Jose F. Puzon . ." (p. 23, Rollo).
In concluding that the assessments made for the years 1971 to 1977 were legal,
petitioner contends that PD 1271 is curative in nature. Section 1 of the said Decree
states in part:
 SECTION 1. All orders and decisions issued by the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the proceedings
for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No.
21 1, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, and
decreeing such lands in favor of private individuals or entities, are
hereby declared null and void and without force and effect;
PROVIDED, HOWEVER that all certificates of titles issued on or
before July 31, 1973 shall be considered valid and the lands covered
by them shall be deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the
registered owners upon a showing of, and compliance with, the
following conditions.. . (74 O.G. No. 19, pp- 3583-3584).
The petitioner submits that: 'upon compliance with certain requirements the titles so
issued are validated and deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple.... The validation
of the title retroacts to the very day the title was originally issued' (pp. 45, Rollo). We
agree with the petitioner. The intent of the law necessarily makes such titles valid from,
the time they were issued. The ninth "whereas" clause of PD 1271 states:
WHEREAS, there are holders of titles who, before the promulgation
of the decision of the Supreme Court on July 31, 1973, had acted in
good faith and relied, although mistakenly, on the indefeasibility of
torrens certificates of titles and who had introduced substantial
improvements on the land covered by the certificates. (74 O.G. No.
19, p. 3583)
The foregoing necessarily implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of
certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons with torrens titles issued in their
favor before the cut-off date stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired the
lands. And such would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31
July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these
titles would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are
met. Hence, the phrase "upon a showing, and compliance with, the following
conditions," (Sec. 1, PD 1271)
While it may be argued that Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive
application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions.
As We have held in the case of Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, "a statute
operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implications." As pointed out above, PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions.
Considering, however, that during the years 1971-1977 the land in question was still
part of the public domain, the oppositor-appellee could not, in those years, obviously be
held liable for real property taxes over the land in question. Since the validity of her title
would take effect retroactively only after having complied with the conditions set in PD
1271, only then could she be held liable for taxes for the period starting 1971 to 1977. It
would be absurd then to hold the oppositor-appellee liable for taxes over a piece of land
which she did not own (it being public land) or use. Consequently, the tax sale was
prematurely conducted. The oppositor-appellee should have first been given the
opportunity to settle the taxes assessed for the years 1971-1977 after having complied
with PD 1271.
As to the validity of the auction sale, We reiterate that it was prematurely held, hence,
null and void for the above reasons. But even on the evidence presented by the parties,
assuming that the sale was properly and seasonably held, it has been clearly shown by
the trial court and the IAC that the oppositor-appellee was not properly notified. The
holding of the tax sale despite the absence of the requisite notice was tantamount to a
violation of her substantial right to due process. As held by the IAC,
. . . Under these provisions (referring to Secs. 59, 65, 73 and 76 of PD
464, the Real Property Tax Code) notice to the delinquent owner is
required as a prerequisite to a valid tax sale.
Failure to notify the registered owner shall vitiate the sale.' (Cabrera
v. Prov. Treasurer, 75 Phil. 780)
Tax sales are administrative proceedings. And-
Administrative proceedings established for the sale of private lands
for non-payment of taxes being in personam (Pantaleon v. Santos, L-
10289, July 31, 1957), it is essential that there be actual notice to the
delinquent, otherwise the sale is null and void although preceded by
proper advertisement or publication." (Vivencio v. Quintos, CA-G.R.
No. 44697, Jan. 23, 1975, 72 O.G. No. 11, March 15, 1975.)
(Decision of the IAC, 13 March 1986, pp. 27-28, Rollo)
We do not see the above findings of fact of the trial court, as adopted by the IAC, to be
contrary to the evidence presented nor tainted with partiality or indiscretion. Hence, We
accord them great respect (Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation v. IAC, 141
SCRA 432; Vda. de Roxas v. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic v. IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decisions is hereby MODIFIED accordingly, that is the
land should really be considered owned by the respondent and her title thereto must not
be disturbed BUT she must pay the real property taxes thereon for the years 1971-1977.
As to the other matters raised, We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the
lower court and, thus, AFFIRM the same.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44466 January 30, 1989
MAGDALENA V. ACOSTA, JULIANA V. ACOSTA and ROSITA V.
ACOSTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela, Branch II, HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and BERNARDINO
MAGDAY, respondents.
Florentino E. Estillore for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
The only issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the petitioners' appeal
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela in Civil Case No. 1201, may
be dismissed for tardiness in submitting their record on appeal.
On January 8, 1962, the petitioners filed an accion publiciana (Civil Case No. 1201) in
the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the private respondent Bernardino
Magday. After the defendant had filed his answer, the complaint was amended on
August 25, 1971, to implead the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Bureau of Lands as additional defendants. Magday filed an amended answer. The
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands filed separate
answers to the amended complaint.
After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, upon plaintiffs' motion
for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, which the defendant did not
oppose, rendered judgment on October 3, 1975, dismissing the complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs (Annex F, pp. 35- 46, Rollo).
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex G, p. 47, Rollo) of the decision.
It was denied by the respondent Judge on December 12, 1975 (Annex H, p. 50, Rollo).
On December 22, 1975, they filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers (Annex J, p.
52, Rollo) and on December 23, 1975, they filed a notice of appeal (Annex I, p. 51,
Rollo). The trial court granted on January 19, 1976 their motion to appeal as paupers
(Annex K, p. 55, Rollo).
Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they
waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals
as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. On June 16, 1976, respondent
Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal (Annex L, p. 56, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration (Annex M, p. 57, Rollo) of the dismissal order was filed
by the appellants on July 26, 1976. On August 10, 1976, they mailed their record on
appeal to the Court. On August 23, 1976, the lower court denied their motion for
reconsideration (Annex 0, p. 60, Rollo). Hence, this petition for certiorari by the
appellants raising the lone legal question of whether for the perfection of an appeal by a
pauper litigant, the timely submission of a record on appeal is required.
Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed required to be
filed by a pauper appellant although it did not have to be printed. As argued by the
Solicitor General in his brief.
Petitioners contend, however, that having been allowed by the lower court to appeal as
paupers, they are not required to file a record on appeal since the entire record of the
case shall be transmitted to the appellate court and the case shall be heard upon the
original record so transmitted without printing the same.
Sec. 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper. — Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the
satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of
prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount
involved, or the nature of the questions raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the
appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper.
The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the
evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the
appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.'
(Emphasis types supplied.)
'It is clear that even a pauper litigant is required to file a record on appeal. What is not
required of him is the filing of a printed record on appeal, and, of course, an appeal
bond, since the cited Rule is designed to help the pauper litigant who may not be able to
pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal. In contrast, Sec. 17 of the same Rule 41
which refers to appeals in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
employee's liability cases categorically provides that 'the original record of the case
shall be transmitted to the appellate court in lieu of the record on appeal.' In other
words, appeals in special civil actions do not require record on appeal; they are
perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal (Embroidery and Apparel Control
and Inspection Board vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 517 [1967]).
'Indeed, records on appeal have been filed by pauper litigants as a matter of course
(Tiozon vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 284 ,[1976]).' (pp. 7-9, Brief for the
Respondents; p. 109, Rollo.)
However, under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided,
a record on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This new rule
was given retroactive effect in Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 where We Ruled:
The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 is now in full force and effect. A record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking
an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provisions
may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that extent.' (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764).' (Cited in Palomo
Building Tenants Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 168;
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 731; and Lagunzad vs. Court of Appeals,
154 SCRA 199.)
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 3, 1975, of the trial court and its orders of
June 16, 1976 and August 23, 1976 are hereby set aside. The trial court is hereby
ordered to forward the entire records of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Court of Appeals for
the determination and disposition of the petitioners' appeal on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom
Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies
(Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement"
that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for
the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket
No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No.
XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order
No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors,
and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies,
may be filed with the docket section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of
Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special
Panel for assignment and distribution to panel members, per Department Order No. 84
dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group
of Companies in your respective offices with the exemption of the cases filed in
Cagayan de Oro City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should
be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149, Department of
Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of
Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182
violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and
their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for
syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated
their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate
petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and
merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly
to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without
tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing
of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.4 An undue disregard of this policy
against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v.
Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness
of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are
also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to
deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why the Court
stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally
be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional
Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the
policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants
and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and
sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by
the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against
taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It
is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by
the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence
to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according
to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion
of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended
precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court
corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1
xxxx
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and
evidence of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will
require a more strict observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum
from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court
is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings
the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should
ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is
explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided
by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court,
the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.6
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was
permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.7"The sole office of the writ of certiorari," according to Delos
Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion
must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites
must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must
have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on
petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they
merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would
appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his
questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency
and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving
the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make
it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.
Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature.
Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a
quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body
quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than
a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards
and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have
the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect
whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged
with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s
orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not
see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what
point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not
infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition
transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the petition could not be one for
mandamus, which is a remedy available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court."12 The main objective of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue
to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of
conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary
of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and
where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its
validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the
presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued
by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until
they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of
Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to
"administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010)
and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of
Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became
incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by
showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice
to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must
further show that the performance of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative
Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the
assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in
any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the
Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like
them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for
the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution
attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation
and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or
oppressively against petitioners.
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No.
182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of
the equal protection of law.17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to
wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were
filed with your office against officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering
the distance of the place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby
exempted from the directive previously issued by the undersigned requiring prosecution
offices to forward the records of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the
Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and
to file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in
court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.18 Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification
stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan
de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila,
where the preliminary investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also
took into account that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of
complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully
justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO
No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was
really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the
exemption upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them would
cause them some inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy
disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would be
considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant
transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy disposition of their cases."20
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution
guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a
flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not determinant of the concept.23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously
to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them.
Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during
the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of
the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public
resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases
reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties.
Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases
should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the
delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights
nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of
petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain
that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with
retroactive effect.
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and
one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create
new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation of already existing rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted
obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was
unfounded.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to
assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the
prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of
Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city
prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions;
and administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and
regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and functions.
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his
authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may
feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the
invalidation or nullification of the rules and regulations issued by, as well as other
actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus for lack of merit.
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988 xxx xxx xxx

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, 5. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to pay plaintiff in the amount of
vs. P8,000.00 as damages in the concept of litigation expenses and
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK respondents. attorney's fees suffered by plaintiff as a result of the failure of the
defendant bank to restore to his (plaintiffs) account the amount of
Pacis & Reyes Law Office for petitioner. U.S. $1,000.00 and to return to him (plaintiff) the U.S. $3,000.00 cash
left for safekeeping.
Ernesto T. Zshornack, Jr. for private respondent.
Costs against defendant COMTRUST.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 47-48.]

CORTES, J.:
Undaunted, the bank comes to this Court praying that it be totally absolved from any
liability to Zshornack. The latter not having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the
The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and the Commercial Bank
issues facing this Court are limited to the bank's liability with regard to the first and
and Trust Company of the Philippines [hereafter referred to as "COMTRUST."] In
1980, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed second causes of action and its liability for damages.
COMTRUST through a corporate merger, and was substituted as party to the case.
1. We first consider the first cause of action, On the dates material to this case, Rizaldy
Zshornack and his wife, Shirley Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon City
Rizaldy Zshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by filing in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal — Caloocan City a complaint against COMTRUST alleging four Branch, a dollar savings account and a peso current account.
causes of action. Except for the third cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of
Zshornack. The bank appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the On October 27, 1975, an application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V.
CFI decision absolving the bank from liability on the fourth cause of action. The Garcia, Assistant Branch Manager of COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain
pertinent portions of the judgment, as modified, read: Leovigilda D. Dizon in the amount of $1,000.00. In the application, Garcia indicated
that the amount was to be charged to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings
account of the Zshornacks; the charges for commission, documentary stamp tax and
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as
others totalling P17.46 were to be charged to Current Acct. No. 210465-29, again, the
follows:
current account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the
purchaser of the dollar draft.
1. Ordering the defendant COMTRUST to restore to the dollar
savings account of plaintiff (No. 25-4109) the amount of U.S
On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V.
$1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn interest together with the
Garcia, issued a check payable to the order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US
remaining balance of the said account at the rate fixed by the bank for
$1,000 drawn on the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication that it was
dollar deposits under Central Bank Circular 343;
to be charged to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109.
2. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he
amount of U.S. $3,000.00 immediately upon the finality of this
demanded an explanation from the bank. In answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso
decision, without interest for the reason that the said amount was
value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of Rizaldy,
merely held in custody for safekeeping, but was not actually
on October 27, 1975 when he (Ernesto) encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check
deposited with the defendant COMTRUST because being cash
currency, it cannot by law be deposited with plaintiffs dollar account for P8,450.00 issued by the Manila Banking Corporation payable to Ernesto.
and defendant's only obligation is to return the same to plaintiff upon
demand; Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, this Court finds no reason to disturb the
ruling of both the trial court and the Appellate Court on the first cause of action.
Petitioner must be held liable for the unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from
private respondent's dollar account.

In its desperate attempt to justify its act of withdrawing from its depositor's savings
account, the bank has adopted inconsistent theories. First, it still maintains that the peso
value of the amount withdrawn was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr. when the
latter encashed the Manilabank Cashier's Check. At the same time, the bank claims that
the withdrawal was made pursuant to an agreement where Zshornack allegedly
authorized the bank to withdraw from his dollar savings account such amount which,
when converted to pesos, would be needed to fund his peso current account. If indeed
the peso equivalent of the amount withdrawn from the dollar account was credited to
the peso current account, why did the bank still have to pay Ernesto?

At any rate, both explanations are unavailing. With regard to the first explanation,
petitioner bank has not shown how the transaction involving the cashier's check is
related to the transaction involving the dollar draft in favor of Dizon financed by the
withdrawal from Rizaldy's dollar account. The two transactions appear entirely
independent of each other. Moreover, Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., possesses a personality MR. RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK
distinct and separate from Rizaldy Zshornack. Payment made to Ernesto cannot be
considered payment to Rizaldy. &/OR MRS SHIRLEY E. ZSHORNACK

As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was such an agreement, the Sir/Madam:
evidence do not show that the withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record
reveals that the amount withdrawn was used to finance a dollar draft in favor of We acknowledged (sic) having received from you
Leovigilda D. Dizon, and not to fund the current account of the Zshornacks. There is no today the sum of US DOLLARS: THREE
proof whatsoever that peso Current Account No. 210-465-29 was ever credited with the THOUSAND ONLY (US$3,000.00) for
peso equivalent of the US$1,000.00 withdrawn on October 27, 1975 from Dollar safekeeping.
Savings Account No. 25-4109.

2. As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that
on December 8, 1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US
$3,000.00 cash (popularly known as greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the
agreement was embodied in a document, a copy of which was attached to and made part
of the complaint. The document reads:

Makati Cable Address:

Philippines "COMTRUST"

COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

of the Philippines

Quezon City Branch

 transaction. Hence,
. it is claimed, the bank cannot be liable under the contract, and the
) personal to Garcia.
obligation is purely

Before we go into V the nature of the contract entered into, an important point which
I
arises on the pleadings, must be considered.
R
G
The second cause of action is based on a document purporting to be signed by
I
COMTRUST, a copy of which document was attached to the complaint. In short, the
L
second cause of action was based on an actionable document. It was therefore
I
incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny under oath the due execution of the
O
document, as prescribed under Rule 8, Section 8, if it desired: (1) to question the
authority of Garcia to bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its capacity to enter into
V
such contract. [See, E.B. Merchant v. International Banking Corporation, 6 Phil. 314
.
(1906).] No sworn answer denying the due execution of the document in question, or
questioning the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the bank's capacity to
G
enter into the contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to have admitted not
A
only Garcia's authority, but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract in question.
R
C
In the past, this Court
I had occasion to explain the reason behind this procedural
requirement. A

It was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the bank refused to return the
money.
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso
current account at prevailing conversion rates.
It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny specifically under oath the
authenticity and due execution of the above instrument.
During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 Zshornack indeed delivered to
the bank US $3,000 for safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on
May 10, 1976, COMTRUST explained that the sum was disposed of in this manner:
US$2,000.00 was sold on December 29, 1975 and the peso proceeds amounting to
P14,920.00 were deposited to Zshornack's current account per deposit slip
accomplished by Garcia; the remaining US$1,000.00 was sold on February 3, 1976 and
the peso proceeds amounting to P8,350.00 were deposited to his current account per
deposit slip also accomplished by Garcia.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's current
account at prevailing conversion rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat private
respondent's claim. It now argues that the contract embodied in the document is the
contract of depositum (as defined in Article 1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not
enter into. The bank alleges that Garcia exceeded his powers when he entered into the
The reason for the rule enunciated in the foregoing authorities will,
we think, be readily appreciated. In dealing with corporations the
public at large is bound to rely to a large extent upon outward
appearances. If a man is found acting for a corporation with the
external indicia of authority, any person, not having notice of want of
authority, may usually rely upon those appearances; and if it be found
that the directors had permitted the agent to exercise that authority
and thereby held him out as a person competent to bind the
corporation, or had acquiesced in a contract and retained the benefit
supposed to have been conferred by it, the corporation will be bound,
notwithstanding the actual authority may never have been granted
... Whether a particular officer actually possesses the authority which
he assumes to exercise is frequently known to very few, and the proof
of it usually is not readily accessible to the stranger who deals with
the corporation on the faith of the ostensible authority exercised by
some of the corporate officers. It is therefore reasonable, in a case
where an officer of a corporation has made a contract in its name, that
the corporation should be required, if it denies his authority, to state
such defense in its answer. By this means the plaintiff is apprised of
the fact that the agent's authority is contested; and he is given an
opportunity to adduce evidence showing either that the authority
existed or that the contract was ratified and approved. [Ramirez v.
Orientalist Co. and Fernandez, 38 Phil. 634, 645- 646 (1918).]
Petitioner's argument must also be rejected for another reason. The practical effect of
absolving a corporation from liability every time an officer enters into a contract which
is beyond corporate powers, even without the proper allegation or proof that the
corporation has not authorized nor ratified the officer's act, is to cast corporations in so
perfect a mold that transgressions and wrongs by such artificial beings become
impossible [Bissell v. Michigan Southern and N.I.R. Cos 22 N.Y 258 (1860).] "To say
that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts is only to put forth a very plain
truism but to say that such bodies have no power or capacity to err is to impute to them
an excellence which does not belong to any created existence with which we are
acquainted. The distinction between power and right is no more to be lost sight of in
respect to artificial than in respect to natural persons." [Ibid.]
Having determined that Garcia's act of entering into the contract binds the corporation,
we now determine the correct nature of the contract, and its legal consequences,
including its enforceability.
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by
the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of
the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to
Zshornack at a later time, Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May
10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives
a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is
not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some
other contract.
Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign
exchange. Hence, the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20,
Restrictions on Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions, promulgated on December 9,
1949, which was in force at the time the parties entered into the transaction involved in
this case. The circular provides:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them
of whatever nature, including, where applicable their exportation and
importation, shall NOT be effected, except with respect to deposit
accounts included in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph,
when such deposit accounts are owned by and in the name of, banks.
(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held
through, in, or with banks or banking institutions
located in the Philippines, including money, checks,
drafts, bullions bank drafts, deposit accounts
(demand, time and savings), all debts, indebtedness
or obligations, financial brokers and investment
houses, notes, debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons,
bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other
rights in the nature of security, expressed in foreign
currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the
currency in which they are expressed, and
belonging to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or
other unincorporated body or corporation residing
or located within the Philippines;
(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or
described in subparagraph (a) above, whether or not
held through, in, or with banks or banking
institutions, and existent within the Philippines,
which belong to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or
other unincorporated body or corporation not
residing or located within the Philippines;
(c) Any and all assets existent within the
Philippines including money, checks, drafts,
bullions, bank drafts, all debts, indebtedness or
obligations, financial securities commonly dealt in
by bankers, brokers and investment houses, notes,
debentures, stock, bonds, coupons, bank
acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other
rights in the nature of security expressed in foreign
currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the
currency in which they are expressed, and
belonging to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or
other unincorporated body or corporation residing
or located within the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to
the Central Bank by those authorized to deal in foreign exchange. All
receipts of foreign exchange by any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated
 body or corporation shall be sold to the authorized agents of the
Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the
receipt of such foreign exchange. Any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated
body or corporation, residing or located within the Philippines, who
acquires on and after the date of this Circular foreign exchange shall
not, unless licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign
exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor
delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is customary;
Provided, further, That within one day upon taking ownership, or
receiving payment, of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons
and entities shall sell such foreign exchange to designated agents of
the Central Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and
any person, firm or corporation, foreign or domestic, who being
bound to the observance thereof, or of such other rules, regulations or
directives as may hereafter be issued in implementation of this
Circular, shall fail or refuse to comply with, or abide by, or shall
violate the same, shall be subject to the penal sanctions provided in
the Central Bank Act.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281,
Regulations on Foreign Exchange, promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its
coverage to Philippine residents only. Section 6 provides:
who alleged in his complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not
intended to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt.
Otherwise, the contract of depositum would never have been entered into at all.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank
within one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB
Circular No. 20, it must be considered as one which falls under the general class of
prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having
been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly,
it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other. "When the nullity
proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes
a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action
against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf
of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second cause of action.
3. Lastly, we find the P8,000.00 awarded by the courts a quo as damages in the concept
of litigation expenses and attorney's fees to be reasonable. The award is sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is ordered
to restore to the dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of
US$1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for
dollar savings deposits. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent the
amount of P8,000.00 as damages. The other causes of action of private respondent are
ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm,

company or corporation shall be sold to authorized agents of the
Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the
receipt of such foreign exchange. Any resident person, firm, company
or corporation residing or located within the Philippines, who
acquires foreign exchange shall not, unless authorized by the Central
Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor
receive less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership thereof
except as such delay is customary; Provided, That, within one
business day upon taking ownership or receiving payment of foreign
exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such
foreign exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.

As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they
intended the bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack,
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972 Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator- Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA,
MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of
Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972 approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I,
in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. Borja, Administrator".
VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant. same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II,
in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja,
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972 Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".

TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of
Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the
vs. Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not
Tangco, defendant-appellant. a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said
hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in
L-28040 Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.

Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6
October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was
probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate
estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took
unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana
instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in
1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to
Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has
been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar,
some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate
of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order
to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer,
Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and
settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies,
claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of
the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed
voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute this
agreement under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala
properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more
specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de
la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la
Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte
Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur
con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el
Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount
of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which
represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-
rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed
de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment
and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc.
No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and
to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late
Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter
Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken
from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment
of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in
favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development
Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and
also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance
taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of
P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of
Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and
paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the
heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized
to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of
the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement
(approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury
warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de
Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for
themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators,
and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive,
remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions,
cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money,
 accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in
equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against each
other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-
Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI
Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case
filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release
each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all
liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the
administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as
heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the
payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de
Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de
Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall
issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of
the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this
agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise,
the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL
AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their
hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12
October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866;
and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special
Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances.
The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court
declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case
No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval
(G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963
is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the
ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on
the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3)
that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and
the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara.
74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will
for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the
basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is
likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a
decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left
no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been
submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement
was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de
Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing
provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he
left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara
vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have
already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is
a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the
probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is
apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum
of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as
the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not
applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate
of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja
and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is
ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the
contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous
agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the
Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered
settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court,
gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious
reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco
de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the
present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament
and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a
previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not
apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de
Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one
hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction
was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract,
even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil
Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A
expressed no definite period for its performance, the same
was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its
effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a
limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms
entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de
Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja,
except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition,
Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the
following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation
of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the
total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner
heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said
property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the
purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty
(60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and
void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a
party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been
finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963";
and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so
done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the
compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore
transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco,
P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all
surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in
Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit
Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and
supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence,
the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated
in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover
manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made
within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex
1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco
for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until
authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it,
and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality
of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the
contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to
approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was
not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she
was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding
No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant,
since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of
her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she
owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar
her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in
favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided
for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
 Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a
coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is
void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late
Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the
agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the
text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of
her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832
(Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of
13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its
execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964,
had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that
Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order
and motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963,
which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized.
What the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had
unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise agreement, pleading various
reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on
Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the
allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not
preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this
Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting
Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which
objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's
attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement
before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step
might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to
reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to
Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No.
28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion
of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory
compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original
compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court
order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which,
as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120
days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and,
therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has
affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of
P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is
that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest
was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had
formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the
devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561,
30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties
of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first
wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second
spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial)
partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio
Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil
Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de
Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court
in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of
Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de
Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between
the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees,
its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally
acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and
their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration
Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54
Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners:
the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de
Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja
(V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E.
Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay;
containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of
Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above
described declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer
defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his
parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the
Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and
exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that
the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late
Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be
entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda
in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly
admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in
the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July
1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also
filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda.
de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an
inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the
"Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once
more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in
Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted
therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under
the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain
admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of
his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts,
supporting the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below
declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the
private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the
following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado
(equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal
y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire
Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount
P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that
upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the
sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo)
wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo
issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would
represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by
Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived
from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n.,
pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the
admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since
probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property,
but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his
share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can
not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer,
pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
 xxx xxx xxx

(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of

the husband.

We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness
Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his
share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was
merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of
ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were
already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable,
since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how
and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of
artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.

As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page
14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de
Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits
3 and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de
Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of
1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which
of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly
self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.

It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3",
"4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question;
but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such
of much greater probative weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit
"F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda
de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by
proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco.

No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for
damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the
settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from
this Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-
28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
 [G.R. No. 186550 : July 05, 2010]
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
VS. SPOUSES CESARIO GRAVADOR AND NORMA DE VERA AND
SPOUSES EMMA CONCEPCION G. DUMIGPI AND FEDERICO L. DUMIGPI,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the June 10, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 83197, setting aside the April 5, 2004 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 9, Bulacan, as well as its subsequent Resolution[3] dated February 11,
2009, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation
(ACFLC) extended a loan of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00)[4] to
respondent Cesario Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma Concepcion
Dumigpi as co-makers. The loan was payable in sixty (60) monthly installments of
P24,400.00 each. To secure the loan, respondent Cesario executed a real estate
mortgage[5] over his property in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-29234.[6]
Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999. However, they were
unable to pay the subsequent ones. Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondents
received a letter demanding payment of P1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from receipt
thereof. Respondents requested for an additional period to settle their account, but
ACFLC denied the request. Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage with the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan.
On April 7, 2000, respondents filed a suit for annulment of real estate mortgage and
promissory note with damages and prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that the real estate
mortgage is null and void. They pointed out that the mortgage does not make reference
to the promissory note dated October 22, 1999. The promissory note does not specify
the maturity date of the loan, the interest rate, and the mode of payment; and it illegally
imposed liquidated damages. The real estate mortgage, on the other hand, contains a
provision on the waiver of the mortgagor's right of redemption, a provision that is
contrary to law and public policy. Respondents added that ACFLC violated Republic
Act No. 3765, or the Truth in Lending Act, in the disclosure statement that should be
issued to the borrower. Respondents, thus, claimed that ACFLC's petition for
foreclosure lacked factual and legal basis, and prayed that the promissory note, real
estate mortgage, and any certificate of sale that might be issued in connection with
ACFLC's petition for extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null and void. In the
alternative, respondents prayed that the court fix their obligation at P800,000.00 if the
mortgage could not be annulled, and declare as null and void the provisions on the
waiver of mortgagor's right of redemption and imposition of the liquidated damages.
Respondents further prayed for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees, and for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin ACFLC from foreclosing their property.
On April 12, 2000, the RTC issued an Order,[7] denying respondents' application for
TRO, as the acts sought to be enjoined were already fait accompli.
On May 12, 2000, ACFLC filed its Answer, denying the material allegations in the
complaint and averring failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action, as
defenses. ACFLC claimed that it was merely exercising its right as mortgagor; hence, it
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action. Sustaining the validity of the promissory note and the real estate mortgage, the
RTC held that respondents are well-educated individuals who could not feign naiveté
in the execution of the loan documents. It, therefore, rejected respondents' claim that
ACFLC deceived them into signing the promissory note, disclosure statement, and deed
of real estate mortgage. The RTC further held that the alleged defects in the promissory
note and in the deed of real estate mortgage are too insubstantial to warrant the
nullification of the mortgage. It added that a promissory note is not one of the essential
elements of a mortgage; thus, reference to a promissory note is neither indispensable
nor imperative for the validity of the mortgage. The RTC also upheld the interest rate
and the penalty charge imposed by ACFLC, and the waiver of respondents' right of
redemption provided in the deed of real estate mortgage.
The RTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudence
applicable thereto, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the
above-entitled case for want of cause of action as well as the counterclaim of
[petitioner] Asian Cathay Finance & Leasing Corporation for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees for abject lack of proof to justify the same.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On June 10, 2008, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision, reversing the RTC. It held that the amount of P1,871,480.00
demanded by ACFLC from respondents is unconscionable and excessive. Thus, it
declared respondents' principal loan to be P800,000.00, and fixed the interest rate at
12% per annum and reduced the penalty charge to 1% per month. It explained that
ACFLC could not insist on the interest rate provided on the note because it failed to
provide respondents with the disclosure statement prior to the consummation of the loan
transaction. Finally, the CA invalidated the waiver of respondents' right of redemption
for reasons of public policy. Thus, the CA ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Affirming the amount of the principal loan under the REM and Disclosure Statement
both dated October 22, 1999 to be P800,000.00, subject to:
a. 1% interest per month (12% per annum) on the principal from November 23, 1999
until the date of the foreclosure sale, less P24,000.00 paid by [respondents] as first
month amortization[;]
b. 1% penalty charge per month on the principal from December 23, 1999 until the date
of the foreclosure sale.
2) Declaring par. 14 of the REM as null and void by reason of public policy, and
granting mortgagors a period of one year from the finality of this Decision within which
to redeem the subject property by paying the redemption price as computed under
paragraph 1 hereof, plus one percent (1%) interest thereon from the time of foreclosure
up to the time of the actual redemption pursuant to Section 28, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure.
The claim of the [respondents] for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
ACFLC filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on February 11, 2009.
ACFLC is now before us, faulting the CA for reversing the dismissal of respondents'
complaint. It points out that respondents are well-educated persons who are familiar
with the execution of loan documents. Thus, they cannot be deceived into signing a
document containing provisions that they are not amenable to. ACFLC ascribes error
on the part of the CA for invalidating the interest rates imposed on respondents' loan,
and the waiver of the right of redemption.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is true that parties to a loan agreement have a wide latitude to stipulate on any interest
rate in view of Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982, which suspended the
Usury Law ceiling on interest rate effective January 1, 1983. However, interest rates,
whenever unconscionable, may be equitably reduced or even invalidated. In several
cases,[10] this Court had declared as null and void stipulations on interest and charges
that were found excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable.
Records show that the amount of loan obtained by respondents on October 22, 1999
was P800,000.00. Respondents paid the installment for November 1999, but failed to
pay the subsequent ones. On February 1, 2000, ACFLC demanded payment of
P1,871,480.00. In a span of three months, respondents' obligation ballooned by more
than P1,000,000.00. ACFLC failed to show any computation on how much interest was
imposed and on the penalties charged. Thus, we fully agree with the CA that the
amount claimed by ACFLC is unconscionable.
In Spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro v. Angelina de Leon Tan, Sps. Concepcion T.
Clemente and Alexander C. Clemente, Sps. Elizabeth T. Carpio and Alvin Carpio, Sps.
Marie Rose T. Soliman and Arvin Soliman and Julius Amiel Tan,[11] this Court held:
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if
knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a
repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common
sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or in the human
conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as
righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.
Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are
contrary to morals, if not against the law. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these
contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the
right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived. The nullity of the stipulation on
the usurious interest does not, however, affect the lender's right to recover the principal
of the loan. Nor would it affect the terms of the real estate mortgage. The right to
foreclose the mortgage remains with the creditors, and said right can be exercised upon
the failure of the debtors to pay the debt due. The debt due is to be considered without
the stipulation of the excessive interest. A legal interest of 12% per annum will be
added in place of the excessive interest formerly imposed.[12]The nullification by the CA
of the interest rate and the penalty charge and the consequent imposition of an interest
rate of 12% and penalty charge of 1% per month cannot, therefore, be considered a
reversible error.
ACFLC next faults the CA for invalidating paragraph 14 of the real estate mortgage
which provides for the waiver of the mortgagor's right of redemption. It argues that the
right of redemption is a privilege; hence, respondents are at liberty to waive their right
of redemption, as they did in this case.
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place, be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of
a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Additionally, the
intention to waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly.[13] Unfortunately, ACFLC failed to convince us that respondents waived
their right of redemption voluntarily.
As the CA had taken pains to demonstrate:
The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was contained in a statement made in fine print
in the REM. It was made in the form and language prepared by [petitioner]ACFLC
while the [respondents] merely affixed their signatures or adhesion thereto. It thus
partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion. It is settled that doubts in the
interpretation of stipulations in contracts of adhesion should be resolved against the
party that prepared them. This principle especially holds true with regard to waivers,
which are not presumed, but which must be clearly and convincingly
shown. [Petitioner] ACFLC presented no evidence hence it failed to show the efficacy
of this waiver.

Moreover, to say that the mortgagor's right of redemption may be waived through a fine
print in a mortgage contract is, in the last analysis, tantamount to placing at the
mortgagee's absolute disposal the property foreclosed. It would render practically
nugatory this right that is provided by law for the mortgagor for reasons of public
policy. A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for being
subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing.[14]

In fine, when the redemptioner chooses to exercise his right of redemption, it is the
policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat his right.[15] Thus, we affirm the CA in
nullifying the waiver of the right of redemption provided in the real estate mortgage.

Finally, ACFLC claims that respondents' complaint for annulment of mortgage is a

collateral attack on its certificate of title. The argument is specious.

The instant complaint for annulment of mortgage was filed on April 7, 2000, long
before the consolidation of ACFLC's title over the property. In fact, when respondents
filed this suit at the first instance, the title to the property was still in the name of
respondent Cesario. The instant case was pending with the RTC when ACFLC filed a
petition for foreclosure of mortgage and even when a writ of possession was
issued. Clearly, ACFLC's title is subject to the final outcome of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83197 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget &
Management, HON. ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National
Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,1 while
the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.2
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled
"Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight
Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled
"Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of
the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines
may bring this suit where a constitutional issue is raised.3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has
personality to restrain unlawful expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31
of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement
for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the
repeal or amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of
the legislative body and not this Court.
In Gonzales,5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of
certain provision particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990,
R.A. No. 6831. This Court, in disposing of the issue, stated —
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and
that charge being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable
controversy between the Upper House of Congress and the executive
department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court.
The questions raised in the instant petition are —
I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION
1990 BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION?6
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may
properly take cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver —
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
 (5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to
education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful
share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the
great and sincere piety professed by every President and every
Congress of the Philippines since the end of World War II for the
economic welfare of the public schoolteachers always ended up in
failure and this failure, he stated, had caused mass defection of the
best and brightest teachers to other careers, including menial jobs in
overseas employment and concerted actions by them to project their
grievances, mainly over low pay and abject working conditions.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February
Revolution, especially keen among public schoolteachers, which at
present exacerbate these long frustrated hopes.
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that
tried vainly to respond to the needs of the teachers, the central
problem that always defeated their pious intentions was really the one
budgetary priority in the sense that any proposed increase for public
schoolteachers had to be multiplied many times by the number of
government employees in general and their equitable claims to any
pay standardization such that the pay rate of teachers is hopelessly
pegged to the rate of government workers in general. This, he stated,
foredoomed the prospect of a significant pay increase for teachers.
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the
highest priority for public schoolteachers, and by implication, for all
teachers, would ensure that the President and Congress would be
strongly urged by a constitutional mandate to grant to them such a
level of remuneration and other incentives that would make teaching
competitive again and attractive to the best available talents in the
nation.
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching
competed most successfully against all other career choices for the
best and the brightest of the younger generation. It is for this reason,
he stated, that his proposed amendment if approved, would ensure
that teaching would be restored to its lost glory as the career of choice
for the most talented and most public-spirited of the younger
generation in the sense that it would become the countervailing
measure against the continued decline of teaching and the wholesale
desertion of this noble profession presently taking place. He further
stated that this would ensure that the future and the quality of the
population would be asserted as a top priority against many
clamorous and importunate but less important claims of the present.
(Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the
1990 budget. It plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for debt services is
inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, viod (Art. 7, New Civil Code).7
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This
is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS
AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS
MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN
BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS
 OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE
INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES, provides:
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding
interests, which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur
under this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing
at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred: Provided,
however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under
this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of
the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal
year thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other
currencies.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the
opening of every regular session, to report to the Congress the
amount of loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as
the guarantees extended, and the purposes and projects for which the
loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees
extended, as well as such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino
owned or controlled corporations and similar purposes.
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of
any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
cover the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits
or indebtedness as and when they shall become due.
However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending
Section 6, thus:
Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in
order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
under the authority of this Act, the proceeds of which are deemed
appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized from the
projects financed by such loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of indebtedness, shall
be turned over in full, after deducting actual and necessary expenses
for the operation and maintenance of said projects, to the National
Treasury by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation concerned, which is
hereby appropriated for the purpose as and when they shall become
due. In case the revenue realized is insufficient to cover the principal,
interest and other charges, such portion of the budgetary savings as
may be necessary to cover the balance or deficiency shall be set aside
exclusively for the purpose by the government office, agency or
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation
concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a deficiency, such
amount necessary to cover the payment of the principal and interest
on such loans, credit or indebtedness as and when they shall become
due is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the national treasury
not otherwise appropriated: . . .
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. –– All expenditures for (a)
personnel retirement premiums, government service insurance, and
other similar fixed expenditures, (b) principal and interest on public
debt, (c) national government guarantees of obligations which are
drawn upon, are automatically appropriated; Provided, that no
obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus
automatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular
budgetary allotments.
and PD 1967, which provides:
Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be
necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic loans, or foreign
or domestic loans whereon creditors make a call on the direct and
indirect guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines, obtained by:
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which
were relent to government-owned or controlled corporations
and/or government financial institutions;
b. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or
government financial institutions the proceeds of which were
relent to public or private institutions;
 c. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or
financial institutions and guaranteed by the Republic of the
Philippines;
d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by
government-owned or controlled corporations and/or
government financial institutions.
Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for
whose account advances were made by the National Treasury will
revert to the General Fund.
Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the
advances made out of the appropriation provided therein, the
Treasurer of the Philippines shall make the proper recommendation
to the Minister of Finance on whether such advances shall be treated
as equity or subsidy of the National Government to the institution
concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program of the
Government.
In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year
1990," which accompanied her budget message to Congress, the
President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
Sources Appropriation
The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require P132.1
billion of new programmed appropriations out of a total P155.3 billion in new
legislative authorization from Congress. The rest of the budget, totalling
P101.4 billion, will be sourced from existing appropriations: P98.4 billion
from Automatic Appropriations and P3.0 billion from Continuing
Appropriations (Fig. 4).
And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed
for debt service. In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside
the said amount of P98.4 Billion with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3 Billion to
be determined and fixed by Congress, which is now Rep. Act 6831.9
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of
then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986;
that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos,
the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the
Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by
Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not
approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the
1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be
enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII
which provides ––
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."
(Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article
VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President,10 then a law must be passed by
Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said
decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows
––
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation,11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that
"All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers
to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be
recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with
the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the
amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans,
including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when
they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of
separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are
incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the
Solicitor General as he argues —
. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a
favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and
borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments,
or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden
debt-to-equity, debt to asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the
automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing
arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The
annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are
based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, "basket" of
foreign exchange and interest rate assumptions which may significantly differ
from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the
assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine
Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the
time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which
in the meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also,
delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our
debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned
upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative
power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen
to subsist with or without the person of Marcos.13
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the
requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the
Constitution which requires, among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing
increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is
untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing
laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public
money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative million
The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to
"bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the
intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their
decision in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon.
Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs.
Ericta,14 this Court had this to say ––
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws
and to alter and repeal them;the test is the completeness of the statute in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which legislative process can go
forward . . .
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy . . .
The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as whole . . .
In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches
him except enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement
unless they are first filled, the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step
in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to
repair the omissions. This is invalid delegation.16
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential
terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order
to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by
it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating
funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government
to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit
standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid,
necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The
Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or
security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by
virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive
implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the
Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four
major phases as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive
Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination
of budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed
by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired
priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of
Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget
estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set
by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic
projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of
domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of
budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal
payments for the year for all direct national government borrowings and other
liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in
the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulatesan appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since
authorization therefor already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended
and PD 1967. Precisely in the fight of this subsisting authorization as
embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not
concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely
with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as part of the
whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has
spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on
whose part lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget
process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment
of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the
regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules,
and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of
the Treasury for allotments from the Department of Budget and Management,
one quarter in advance of payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments. The
Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official billings from the creditors, remits
payments to creditors through the Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund
established for government security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual
performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred,
personnel hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at
the time the agency budgets were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown,
petitioners insist nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue
delegation of legislative power to the executive on the alleged ground that the
appropriations therein are not exact, certain or definite, invoking in support
therefor the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution under which the case of
State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the
Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitution does not require
a definite, certain, exact or "specific appropriation made by law." Section 29,
Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of these words and simply
states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or
prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
 authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
"made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as
well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as
in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of
general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific
public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the
language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in
the past or in the present.17
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless
they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely
complying with the duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing
this petition. Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues
raised. As to whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more
especially the enormous amount that had been incurred by the past administration,
which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political
decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom
and sound discretion.

Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Corazon C. Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing for the Fiscal Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering
SO ORDERED.
the estimated obligation that will be incurred by the national government during the
fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the proposed budget, P86.8 is set aside for
debt servicing as follows:

1âwphi1
National Government Debt
Service Expenditures,
1990
(in million pesos)

Domestic Foreign Total

RA 245, as RA 4860
amended as amended,
PD 1967

Interest
Payments P36,861 P18,570 P55,431

Principal
Amortization 16,310 15,077 31,387

18
Total P53,171 P33,647 P86,818
======== ======== ========

as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de
Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of
Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the street as she was going, when a
delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose of
transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of
horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said
plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's
carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at
great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street
and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass
by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely
wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also
injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing
it.
xxx xxx xxx
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect
that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident
occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero;
that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable
on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the cochero
driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for
the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the
forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the
driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened
the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver
was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which
street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff,
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is
before us on an appeal from that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in
the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damages should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to avoid the damage.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above
provisions, liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are of the
opinion that the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not
disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what
different from that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the
rules under which the fact of negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the
same. That is to say, while the law designating the person responsible for a negligent
act may not be the same here as in many jurisdictions, the law determining
what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as elsewhere. (Supreme
court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April, 1896; 14
March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April,
1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were
gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven
one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the
habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on
the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been,
therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in
unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the
custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was
being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom
was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in
the manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American
jurisprudence. (Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590;
Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N.
J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if
every person who suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods
out of it was obliged to employ another to look after the horses, it would be
impossible for the business of the metropolis to go on.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at
the time of the injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary
care and prudence under like circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of
leaving the horse unhitched is in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to
leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the disposition of the horse;
whether he was under the observation and control of some person all the time,
and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury
from the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the
part of the trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a
quite, gentle horse to leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a
public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon."
The said court closed its opinion with these words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the
horse was quite and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading
goods on the wagon, at time of the alleged injury, and that the horse had been
used for years in that way without accident. The refusal of the trial court to
charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the defendant,
although the jury was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon
stopping with his horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a
hundred rods from a railroad crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five
minutes while he was in the house, knowing that it was not afraid of cars, and
having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it or knowing it to
start, is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is
to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing
an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no
liability, although damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489;
Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524; Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson
Architectural Iron Works vs.Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34 Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An.,
63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive
or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time
that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they
beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result
from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results.
To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is
necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against
the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates aprima facie case, and that
only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of
was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case
showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative
reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case
of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs. Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p.
554):

. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case

before the jury, was that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water,
was thrown with such force against a wharf properly built, as to tear up some
of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie evidence of negligence
on the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless upon the
whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such
damage to a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her
officers and carefully managed by them, evidence that such damage was done
in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained, sufficient evidence of
negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so instructed.

There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of
the runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the
runaway occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero
was not negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs'
favor, if any, was destroyed as soon as made.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of

merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the
injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the
accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or
injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for
years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior
objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make
culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was
acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We
think not.

The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989
RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch
V, respondents.
David W. Natividad for petitioner.
Calamba, Garcia, Geralde & Calamba Law Offices for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the decisio * of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition filed and docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-07192-R, entitled: "Rudy Gleo
Armigos, petitioner, versus Judge L.D. Carpio, respondent," and the resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration of said decision.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner
with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 971, for
the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in
favor of the private respondent and against the herein petitioner. A copy of the decision
was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he
filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he
completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of
an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the
case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V) for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed
beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Whereupon, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary
injunction with the Court of Appeals, claiming that from 8 June 1977, when he received
a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his
appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the
computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of
the decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00
o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the novel interpretation suggested as it would
result in many confusing situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a
copy of a decision, order or pleading is received, and cited the case of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Encarnacion, 1 where this Court held that when a law was to be effective
upon approval by the President and the President signed the same on 16 June 1950, the
law should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President
signed the same on 16 June 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said day of
16 June 1950.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, but
his motion was denied in a resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Hence, the present recourse.
We find no merit in the petition. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the
effect that "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is
required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including
the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the
old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other
applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period
of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to
be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run
until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying
this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find no
cogent reason to adopt a different view.
Besides, human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary
one for a person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for
the exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party?
Petitioner's suggestion, however, may find application in appeals in habeas
corpus cases where the law requires that such appeals should be made within 48 hours
from notice of judgment. 2
While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real
matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court
is vested with discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is
not unconditional. There must be justifiable reason to warrant such action, since the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the
court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. 3 In the instant
case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M.
Brillantes for plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law
being involved therein.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in
Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D.
Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co.,
Inc. to pay jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus
7% interest from May 25, 1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for
attorney's fees, and plus costs;
(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be
made to pay in this decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. pay the amount adjudged to plaintiff in this decision. From the date of
such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has
fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said
case. On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all
the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation,
as plaintiff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the same defendants, for
the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D.
Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and
plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the
amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a
revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter of jurisdiction must
be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court
became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December
21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days
(Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that
when this present case was filed it was filed two days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed
as having prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals,
which, on March 20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the
only question therein raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for
the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of
Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be
revived has become final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by the defendants herein
on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus
confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson
maintains otherwise, because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil
Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29
days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from
December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view
in its appealed order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar
year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since
what is being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as
the basis of computation. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December
21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is
not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong?
Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days
constitute one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the
explicit provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the
connotation of each "year" — as the term is used in our laws — to 365 days.
Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had
held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural"
month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such
provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated.
Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code,
"whenever months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months
are of 30 days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are
"designated by name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of
days they have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to
a calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the
approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to
the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the
particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or
nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days."

Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not
realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of
plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of
our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby
engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative
Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without

costs. It is so ordered.
 G.R. No. L-37048 March 7, 1933
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AUGUSTO C.
GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.
Quintin Paredes and Barrera and Reyes for appellant.
DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for plaintiff-appellee.
Camus and Delgado for intervenors-appellees.
HULL, J.:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of
the City of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and
lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They
voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived together as man and wife. Of
this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age.
Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued for
several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support
and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be
increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in
her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook himself to
Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of
desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant
moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928, where he has since
remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the
forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a
result of that marriage. Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the
amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor
children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710,
which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree
becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year
thereafter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse
who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the guardian
appointed by the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what would
have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate
immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the
equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from the
respective estates had their parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also prayed
that the community existing between plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and
the defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her share
of the community property, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony at
the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that the defendant be ordered to pay
the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that the
defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the three minor
sons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as
intervenors and join their mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after
hearing, found against the defendant and granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff
and intervenors, with the exception of reducing attorneys fees to three thousand, and
also granted costs of the action against the defendant. From this judgment defendant
appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine
Divorce Law, is unconstitutional, null and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law)
applies to the Nevada decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C.
Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to confirmation and
recognition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of
cause of action against appellant and appellee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors
to be null and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for
the support not only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela
Barretto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is
not entitled to support from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the
alimony fixed by the divorce decree in Exhibit A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-
appellee P3,000 attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in
trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno
divorce. On the record here presented this can not be done. The public policy in this
jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710, and the
decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252); Garcia Valdez vs.
Sotera�a Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855); Chereau vs.
Fuentebella (43 Phil., 216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb vs.
Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42); Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy
Pian Ng Shun and Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late case of Cousins Hix vs.
Fluemer, decided March 21, 1931, and reported in 55 Phil.,
851.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The
lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the
divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent
children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The hardships of
the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the writer on
the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that
such laws are too strict or too liberal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own
actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by
decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to
public order and good morals. Holding the above views it becomes unnecessary to
discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in his first assignment
of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be
submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and reversed and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action.
confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands This, however, without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the
regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under intervenors may have against defendant. No special pronouncement as to costs. So
conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial domicile of this ordered.
couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of
Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide
residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the
bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court
heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been
expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or
fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in
force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign
country.

And article 11, the last part of which reads:

. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those
intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect
by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a
foreign country.

It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the
Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-
appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages
against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and
Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos,
Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares,
in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a
previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple
were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-
between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the
governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get
married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her
clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting
place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not,
however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage,
her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the
college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married
Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine
marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church,
due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26
February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does
not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage.
Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare,
was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew
it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less
frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged
(Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from
the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a
petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not
sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her
non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating
in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was
domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application
was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a
verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta
sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada.
She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F.
Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally
valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and
plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño
liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña
Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-
appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our
civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above
the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which
was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under
civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the
Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of
the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and,
therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by
section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be
declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them
believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45
Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the
case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the
marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu.
Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under
the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention,
and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such
vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and
admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21
October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo
ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree
of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared
public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the
Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees
would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not
permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have
appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally,
because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where
the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence
that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to
be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her
claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal
separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid
divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the
absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710
became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding
absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act
above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could
not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed
for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates
born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's
marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the
innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not
so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person
(whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises.
Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given
in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts
have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño
and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written
before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274).
In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for
the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride,"
"effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and
court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their
shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the
marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon
advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the
marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife,
but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections.
Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even
if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her
and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes
between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his
child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs.
However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers
is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for
alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy
motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with
respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it,
the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself
in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses
or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences
resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home
and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously
enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to
stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied
in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in
the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are
not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez
from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated
in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on
appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence
that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a
promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While
appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion
that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño
and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the
filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused
them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present
society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000
only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by
the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity
in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than
the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to
Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles
the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not
lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal

separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez

the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to
set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No.
1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and
her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong
in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that
they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively;
that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon
Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding
that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
 3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
court. dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

xxx xxx xxx 4 Without costs.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of SO ORDERED.
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be
an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born
on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation
of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23,
1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of
the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that
the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and
to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent
judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April
6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while
the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on
the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the
purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court
over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to
try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-
called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the
State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no
other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action,
it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or
petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may
not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party
being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private
crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for
adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within
his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates
the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or
status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist
at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity
to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse
must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can
be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in
pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus
was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense
is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining
the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion
that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American
husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business
concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the
particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the
same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the
marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers
intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows,
even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that
the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being
no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration
of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently
contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where
the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by
a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore
cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for
adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in
favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at
bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12
years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object
left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an
information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a
woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a
foreign object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her
death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial
on the merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4)
Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8)
Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz,
(12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16)
Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte,
(20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta,
(22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the
testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita
Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused
Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive,
Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from among a bunch of
street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath.
Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out
Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot
was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting
dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table. Other things which
were taken out and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which
he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused
played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish
blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside
the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established to be
anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok
when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused
told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started
masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be
masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked,
and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in
bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and
accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his
attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina
of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit.
After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was
sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an
"American, paid Ramirez alias"Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then
left them in the hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and
Rosario told Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But
they could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left,
and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following
day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already
removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez
claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was
complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the
foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein
Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and
when he tried to talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks.
Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already went home to
his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the
primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage
scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at
Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by
people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious and foul
smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and
brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious
condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one
who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her
residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as
"guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room.
Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of Rosario
Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of
the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on duty. Limos testified that
it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The
Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar
Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that through his own
testimony, Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had
already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he has
seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who
is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora"
who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also
living with their mother, brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in
his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even stays for one week or a few
days at his brother's house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely
assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario
at his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of
Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he
even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely be
concluded that he knows her very well. It is against normal behavior especially
to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the
real name of the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital,
nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away
from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to
religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel
and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon
Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after
finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short
interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped
up about her residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing
her the medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for an
operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get the name and age of Rosario
Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For
Fe Israel, the age of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their
program assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel
movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but
which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in
the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined
by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign
object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with
blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors
who attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to
extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several attempts proved
futile because said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was
covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended,
symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was
scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an
operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino
Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on
her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even
in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was
corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation.
It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened
her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He found out that
the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and
the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and
kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis
and septicemia were traced to have been caused through infection by the
foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The
foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a
portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while
under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr.
Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave
instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the
nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation successful and the
patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said
patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following
day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at
2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz
which was indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory
arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra
uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a
transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the
nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under proper receipt.
Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped financially Rosario's
case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in
custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar
Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to
trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that
her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral
Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial
expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence
at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the
person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed.
Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi
with his messenger came to her house and told her that the accused was willing
to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman
did not accept it because she knows that the accused is liable to pay damages
anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a
lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case
settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer bear the
situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew
obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty. Legaspi. On a
date not clear in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and
Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they
were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi
talked at the office near the bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left,
Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for
P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money
with the understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was
made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of her
granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she and the lawyer's
messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed
before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was not paid,
because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could
no longer attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the
Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A",
was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police
Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other
hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object inside Rosario's vagina
was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its
investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga.
Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario
was a street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street
children and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was with
Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object
was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about
Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot
sometime before Christmas of 1986 with an American, who brought them to
the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo
City and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee
Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez, a
composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the
local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some
American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing were
photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result was
negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance
of the suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-
sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita,
Manila, and thinking that the so-called American may be European or
Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl.
Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez and Michael
Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila
NISRA Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on September 23,
1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals
were said to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September
25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A. Mabini
and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual
stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson.
Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity
with the American suspect, so the two minors were instructed to follow the
foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie
Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him
and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this
foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a
beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said
caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie
Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said
foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western
Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they
were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The
foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with
Homicide. After the arrest, they first went to the pension house of the suspect
in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his personal
belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police
Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive
search by the foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and
 confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and
travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00, all duly
receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's name was
Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter,
Salonga and his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel,
because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he
identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at
the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him
at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was
assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla
because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita
Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left
them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts
was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the
Court was already in progress. And upon his (Policarpio Baluyot) own
admission, he only learned about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot
from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime
of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was described as an American
while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of
mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at the time of the commission of
the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on
December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that
Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on
December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish
Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and possession
of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he had no personal
knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's
stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is
not a weapon of death but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual
pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of
Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital,
who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that
the prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art.
335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences HEINRICH
STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of
attorney's fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly
committed by the court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS
COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS
THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE
DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only
if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to
exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of
both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed
the criminal act (See People v. Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a
young girl who died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual
vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—
whether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the
alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining
whether or not there was statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines
the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age, in
which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state do not have
to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually
abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of
force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's
grandmother and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These
oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court where, in the absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree
may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a member of the family.
Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the admission of
hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision,
p. 54).
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth
date because her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother)
was the only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth
allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on
December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was
more than one (1) year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and
the death certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the
Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's
alleged guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos.
Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was
told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as adequate
evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case
declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than Rosario
Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than
12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father
supported by other independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate
and the testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate
presented by the defense without any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the
application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989
Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to
testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the
declarant by birth or marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante
litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree
is in question must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration.
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the
declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were
admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they
both did testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not
before the controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not
members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed
according to their own personal knowledge of what happened and not as hearsay
evidence on matters of family history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the
ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted
the testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The
mother stated that she knew the age because the child was born about the time of the
cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from one who had direct
knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the
day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance
of its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral
was never established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be
remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in
court does not at all show that he had direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was
certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she was baptized.
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there
any basis shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were
based on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim
to the hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a year before her death. He had
absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death
certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based on the clinical records. It is
even less reliable as a record of birth.
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less
than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the
exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different date.
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court
rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by
interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence
on record is more convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to
the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic
priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him
Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book
or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there appears the name of
Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on December 26,
1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales.
Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
xxx xxx xxx
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements
on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and
marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331
[1968]), this Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of
the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church
by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order
that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof
recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries
made in the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to
the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in
the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the church during the
course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the certificate
(Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December
25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the
victim's father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different
from the one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented
to prove a date different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal
certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly
improbable that Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not
have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but
it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion
that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more
inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly
not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's
testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years
old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable
document as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born
on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the
alleged incident on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of
proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time
of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this
respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the
alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were
present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the
evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant.
In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next
morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January
6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence
presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child,
was a prostitute inspite of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to
submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come under the purview
of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was
committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a
consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the
appellant.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's
vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately,
the circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify
conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's
vagina. Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the
same object which the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he
answered that:
xxx xxx xxx
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na
inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin
ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang
inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa
lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang
pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada.
Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan
ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang
ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa
larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa
kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad
noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay
bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p.
2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant
does not deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white.
(T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with
color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6,
1988) The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the
statements made especially when he answered on additional cross-examination that the
reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same object being held by Ritter
was because it was the only one shown to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110,
January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because
he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the
foreigner inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement
as part of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res
gestae, the trial court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse of time between the
event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the insertion of a mechanical
device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is undoubtedly
startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence to show that the
statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively because the
event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's
vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the
appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her
vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even
categorically admitted to you that she was already able to remove the object
allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario
Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and when she told you
that she was already able to remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already
removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she
again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for
me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering defamatory words against
me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children
were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was
said to be groaning in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at
this point in time. If the device inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is highly
inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort until May, 1987,
seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a
witness for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a
graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of
the Bar 1949, and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology University. He was
awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a graduate of United
Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan
1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
in 1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the
Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on
Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal
Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical
Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended
no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled "Legal
Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical
background, his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions
of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2"
which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated.
Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the
probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human
being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the
tendency of the body may be: No. 1—expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The
tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One of the reactions that
maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to
cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury
to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest
symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but
may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering
the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is already not complete, this
shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react. If there is
mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of
power from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The]
composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and
any substance that will cause current flow. All of these substances are irritants
including areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the body
is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes develop and
in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would be a
supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman
will suffer from diseased process causing her the systemic reaction like fever,
swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15,
October 19,1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction
such as an infection would set in, how many days after the insertion of this
object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a
way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this
 irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time,
there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the
insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in
the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was
inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May
19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before this was
extracted, would you say that it will take that long before any adverse infection
could set in inside the vagina?
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN.,
Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this
lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the
patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you
mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame
wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr.
Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said
time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an
accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be
based on probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged
inside the body. An examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per
certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric,
Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic
(see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator
depicted in the catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or
mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the
open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1
shows the following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based
on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier.
Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the
generative organ of a woman, an organ which is lined with a very thin layer of
membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible to
infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case.
We see no reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be
controlling and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario
Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give
an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28,
1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that
day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if
any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The
patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel
chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to
the examining table. On examination, the patient is conscious, she was fairly
nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time
and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended
abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum
tenderness over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings,
if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I
placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and
was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum examination
wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of the vaginal canal, there I
saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a
foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to
remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also
but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in
the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you
able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG
NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and
placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the
time I examined her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next
with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that
time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation
with the doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara
stated that when he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and
writhing in pain.
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that
time because there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was
still able to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic
Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits
indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to
Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room
to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who
worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her
hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She
actually saw a child who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement floor
and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was too hot in the
bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13,
September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified
that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took
pity on her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still
answer questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains.
Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her
condition. The operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and
peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign
object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the
infection from the uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and the
abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case
of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the
defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant
faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the
Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with
all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important,
therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the
presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of
witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no
direct and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside
the victim's vagina which caused her death seven (7) months after its insertion. What
the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which were not
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While
circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative, though, that
the following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
[1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively point to the
liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her
death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they
sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should
preponderate in their lives, they experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form.
Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying their young minds, they
daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of
Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the
nation to care for its street children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and
prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so that his example
would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and implementation of
meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system
are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for
normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or
conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about
her being less than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the
evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date
she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory,
the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in
order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a
willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of
Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator.
The morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two
days later, he allegedly met Rosario who informed him that she was able to
remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second
encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was
even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also
contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign
object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection
only after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would
have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that the incident happened in
December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however
shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per
the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter
arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He
never returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The
incident could have happened only in October, but then it would have been
highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven (7)
months with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement
testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito."
The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the
hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a
"Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate
profession, there is always the possibility that she could have allowed herself to be
violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were
inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged
crime renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty
connection with the requisite moral certainty. (SeePeople v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156
[1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could
have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her
death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court
cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and
possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused.
(People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be
duly taken into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose
bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the
accused must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to
sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the
case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that
reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused.
The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of
guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof "to the satisfaction of the
court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the
fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces
and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.
(Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v.
Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally
certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children,
Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his
flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical
sights, enrich his intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy the
urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the
appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the
hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two
masturbated each other, such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a pedophile.
When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined
pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive
desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various
ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex
organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually committed by a homosexual
between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a
crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative
of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual
and social well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey
v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking
aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts
injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people. The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of
children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3
[2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing
them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The
well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly
liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
(Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides
that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil
liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for the
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public
action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying
the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is
also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It
will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's
house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate
profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental
anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected in
the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape
with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It
is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to
build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful
conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the
vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may
have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil
liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the
payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order
or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has
abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the
responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant
towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should not
and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we are
awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.

And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect
street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents
or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape
and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of
pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our
society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and
other studies deal at length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the
appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications catering to them
will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the
Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of
Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the
problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something must be
done about it.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant

HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The
appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings against the
appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the
country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001
Decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while
the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are
owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot
area of one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B",
pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in
consideration of ₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the
Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan
secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp.
468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until
on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off.
Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a
certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months
corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma.
Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N.,
October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p.
12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to
explain who authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar
Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a]
complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez]
(Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected
when the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December
14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act
with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before
disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not
even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar,
in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant COWD. There was one though,
but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date
for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither did
they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should
have investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act
because Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have
requested before the cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she
attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them. She knew
that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers. She
should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants
[Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following
sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby
dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs
was because they were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent
too for which they should be liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the awarded damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the
possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection,
she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of
disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the
unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but
these were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the
finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the
petition was denied via a Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD
and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality
through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following
Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS
REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND
SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH
CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR
D. GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE
UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE
ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING
TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS
ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS'
WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE
(3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST
PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO
PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR
THE TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH
WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART.
2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS
AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH
JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND
GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-
defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as
respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the
RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make
COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's
counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so,
considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim
against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-
claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim
against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing
so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on
certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004,
making the presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and
Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already precluded from
participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing
pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their
previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues
raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the
function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of
which is present in this instant petition.13 This is especially true when the findings of the
RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition
lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent
spouses' water supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection.
However, she admitted in the present petition that it was she who requested COWD to
disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and
Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually
discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it was through
the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in
the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide
to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to
their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to
cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.15 Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.16 In the present case, intention to
harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such
request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of
COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to
comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have
advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with
their obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made
matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior
notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite
payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner,
COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides
that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing
Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s
rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated
that while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some
basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39].
The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely
stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law
may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.)
Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent spouses
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such deprivation
rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides,
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded,
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest, and where the defendant acted in
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. demandable claim.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks
SO ORDERED.
of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to
the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on
the circumstances of each case. x x x18

To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is

her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention.
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the
impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses'
water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling
of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.

The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article
2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.

As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the
instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question
for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending
before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case
for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge
ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City
Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information
for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance
of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said
court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B.
Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration
of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which
action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the
ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was
already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner
Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to
obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent
or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported
themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least
five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978,
for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article
76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-
02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case
can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for
denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further
directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of
his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case
of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent
judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated
April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution
of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted
that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the
nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required
to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated
upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case
states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered
into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial
questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of
marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to
such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage
must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly
different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that
petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on
the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the
outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused
much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the
hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the
second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We
cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited
case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela
Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as
contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B.
Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not
aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a
judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz
was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot
apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is
proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage
was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The
preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second
marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B.
Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent
through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent
marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an
affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally
ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed
the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only
when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse
of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with
the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private
respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that
Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent
Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-
emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action
for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued
by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22579 February 23, 1968
ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the
question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the
annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the
latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of
the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against
him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963,
petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,
presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the
information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which
marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an
action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided
plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to
petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous
character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse,
praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void,
on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to
appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the
criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages
involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the
motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above
order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March
13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to
answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him
from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile,
before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the
amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another
respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the
statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the
bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It
alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are
actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not
mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to
warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even
on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It
continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article.
. . ." 2
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions
of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second
marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal
action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation
where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be
determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted.
The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question
because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil
action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this
Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage
which he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned
in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for
bigamy can proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As
explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial
question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . .
The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before
the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These
requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second
marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis
of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the
second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. . . ."

The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had
been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second
spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse
alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent
Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the

probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five
months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the
thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial
question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a
finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing
to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët
ROE v. WADE(1973)
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179,
present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas
statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for
approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast and are a
legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent
attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new
thinking about an old issue.
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of
the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy,
one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious
training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's
thinking and conclusions about abortion.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to
complicate and not to simplify the problem.
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of
emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we [410
U.S. 113, 117] have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon,
medical and medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man's attitudes
toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice
Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 76 (1905):
"[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and
the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."
I Fourteenth Amendments.
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's
Penal Code. 1 These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein [410 U.S. 113,
118] defined, or to attempt one, except with respect to "an abortion procured or
attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." Similar
statutes are in existence in a majority of the States. 2 [410 U.S. 113, 119]
Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, 1, set
forth in 3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898). This was soon modified into
language that has remained substantially unchanged to the present time. See Texas
Penal Code of 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-536; G. Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197
(1866); Texas Rev. Stat., c. 8, Arts. 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev. Crim. Stat., Arts. 1071-
1076 (1911). The final article in each of these compilations provided the same
exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by "medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother." 3 [410 U.S. 113, 120]
II
Jane Roe, 4 a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this
federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a
declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on
their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her
pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe,
clinical conditions"; that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her
life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she
could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under
safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and
that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint Roe purported
to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene
in Roe's action. In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for
violations of the Texas abortion statutes and[410 U.S. 113, 121] that two such
prosecutions were pending against him. He described conditions of patients who came
to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was
unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by
Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his
patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice
medicine, rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
John and Mary Doe, 5 a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe.
They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional
deprivations, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they
were a childless couple; that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder;
that her physician had "advised her to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition
has materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the present time would not present
"a serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice, she had discontinued use
of birth control pills; and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to
terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported
to sue "on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated."
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge
district court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the
childless couple, with the wife not pregnant,[410 U.S. 113, 122] and the licensed
practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the Texas criminal abortion statutes.
Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary
judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class, and Dr. Hallford, had
standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing. It
concluded that, with respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was
not warranted. On the merits, the District Court held that the "fundamental right of
single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by
the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas
criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both
unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs'
Ninth Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with
respect to the requests for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does' complaint,
declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief.
314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (ND Tex. 1970).
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253,
have appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the
injunction. The defendant District Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to
the same statute, from the court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both
sides also have taken protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision here.
We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U.S. 941
(1971). [410 U.S. 113, 123]
III
It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to
us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the
granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v.
Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970), and Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U.S. 383
(1970), are to the effect that 1253 does not authorize an appeal to this Court from the
grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude, nevertheless, that those
decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and the declaratory aspects
of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal under 1253 from
specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily
identical. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Growers v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80 -81 (1960). It would be destructive of time and energy for all
concerned were we to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179.
IV
We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and abstention. Have Roe
and the Does established that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), that insures that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972)? And what effect did the pendency of criminal
abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in state court have upon the propriety of the
federal court's granting relief to him as a plaintiff-intervenor? [410 U.S. 113, 124]
A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that Roe is a
fictitious person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and as established, her
existence; her pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as
May 21 of that year when she filed an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her
inability to obtain a legal abortion in Texas.
Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as late as May, there
can be little dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and that, wholly apart
from the class aspects, she, as a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal
abortion laws, had standing to challenge those statutes. Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121,
1125 (CA2 1971); Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 838-839 (CA6 1971); Poe v.
Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991 (Kan. 1972). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915). Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really asserting anything to the
contrary. The "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., at 102 , and the necessary degree of
contentiousness, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), are both present.
The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at
the time of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, 6or on the following June 17
when the court's opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must
now be moot because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to
any 1970 pregnancy. [410 U.S. 113, 125]
The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of
appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v.
Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day
human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual
appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy
litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be
effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than
once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will
always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of
nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178 -179 (1968); United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 -633 (1953).
We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this
litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her
1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot.
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's litigation as a
plaintiff-intervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:
"[I]n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at
the present time stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the
Criminal District Court of Dallas County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas
vs. [410 U.S. 113, 126] James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2) The
State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-2524-H. In both cases the
defendant is charged with abortion . . . ."
In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like representations as to the
abortion charges pending in the state court. These representations were also repeated in
the affidavit he executed and filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court, declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to the same statutes under which he stands charged in
criminal prosecutions simultaneously pending in state court. Although he stated that he
has been arrested in the past for violating the State's abortion laws, he makes no
allegation of any substantial and immediate threat to any federally protected right that
cannot be asserted in his defense against the state prosecutions. Neither is there any
allegation of harassment or bad-faith prosecution. In order to escape the rule articulated
in the cases cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that, absent harassment and bad
faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively challenge in
federal court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks to
distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a "potential future
defendant" and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here.
We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971), compels the conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted declaratory
relief to Dr. Hallford instead of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was
correct in refusing to grant injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that
action, however, are those expressed in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger
v. [410 U.S. 113, 127] Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77
(1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216
(1971). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). We note, in passing, that
Younger and its companion cases were decided after the three-judge District Court
decision in this case.
Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed. 7 He is remitted
to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment
of the District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his
complaint in intervention.
C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue of the
Does' standing in their case has little significance. The claims they assert are essentially
the same as those of Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly
note the Does' posture.
Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being
pregnant, who have no desire to have children at this time because of their having
received medical advice that Mrs. Doe should avoid pregnancy, and for "other highly
personal reasons." But they "fear . . . they may face the prospect of becoming [410 U.S.
113, 128] parents." And if pregnancy ensues, they "would want to terminate" it by an
abortion. They assert an inability to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and,
consequently, the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of going outside
Texas to some place where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.
We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted immediate and
present injury, only an alleged "detrimental effect upon [their] marital happiness"
because they are forced to "the choice of refraining from normal sexual relations or of
endangering Mary Doe's health through a possible pregnancy." Their claim is that
sometime in the future Mrs. Doe might become pregnant because of possible failure of
contraceptive measures, and at that time in the future she might want an abortion that
might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.
This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its speculative character. Their alleged
injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible
future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any
one or more of these several possibilities may not take place and all may not combine.
In the Does' estimation, these possibilities might have some real or imagined impact
upon their marital happiness. But we are not prepared to say that the bare allegation of
so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual case or controversy. Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S., at 41 -42; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S., at 109 -110; Abele v. Markle,
452 F.2d, at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d, at 839. The Does' claim
falls far short of those resolved otherwise in the cases that the Does urge upon us,
namely, Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Data Processing
Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); [410 U.S. 113, 129] and Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968). See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was
properly dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal.
V produce abortion," 14 or "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it,
The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly
invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her
pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal "liberty"
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital,
familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras,
see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); id., at 460 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); or among those rights reserved to
the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 486
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it desirable briefly to
survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that history may
afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal
abortion laws.
VI
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in
effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws,
generally proscribing abortion or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when
necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life, are not of ancient or even of common-
law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the
latter half of the 19th century. [410 U.S. 113, 130]
1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that at
the time of the Persian Empire abortifacients were known and that criminal abortions
were severely punished. 8 We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in
Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, 9 and that "it was resorted to without
scruple." 10 The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient
gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-
abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he
resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. 11 Greek
and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in
some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father's right
to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. 12
2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the
ethical guide of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek
(460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who has been described[410 U.S. 113, 131] as the Father of
Medicine, the "wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art," and the "most important
and most complete medical personality of antiquity," who dominated the medical
schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the
past?13 The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any
translation the content is clear: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor
suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to
nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an
abortive remedy." 15
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case or in Doe
v. Bolton, post, p. 179, it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical
concepts in medicine, and its influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of
Hippocrates dissuade abortion practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Dr.
Edelstein provides us with a theory: 16 The Oath was not uncontested even in
Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers frowned upon the related
act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at least
prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, VII, 1335b 25. For the
Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them the embryo was animate
from the moment of conception, and abortion meant destruction of a living being. The
abortion clause of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines," [410 U.S. 113,
132] and "[i]n no other stratum of Greek opinion were such views held or proposed in
the same spirit of uncompromising austerity." 17
Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing only a
small segment of Greek opinion and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient
physicians. He points out that medical writings down to Galen (A. D. 130-200) "give
evidence of the violation of almost every one of its injunctions." 18 But with the end of
antiquity a decided change took place. Resistance against suicide and against abortion
became common. The Oath came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity
were in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the nucleus of all
medical ethics" and "was applauded as the embodiment of truth." Thus, suggests Dr.
Edelstein, it is "a Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an absolute standard
of medical conduct." 19
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic
Oath's apparent rigidity. It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long-
accepted and revered statement of medical ethics.
3. The common law. It is undisputed that at common law, abortion performed before
"quickening" - the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually
from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy 20 - was not an indictable offense. 21 The
absence [410 U.S. 113, 133] of a common-law crime for pre-quickening abortion
appears to have developed from a confluence of earlier philosophical, theological, and
civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. These disciplines variously
approached the question in terms of the point at which the embryo or fetus became
"formed" or recognizably human, or in terms of when a "person" came into being, that
is, infused with a "soul" or "animated." A loose consensus evolved in early English law
that these events occurred at some point between conception and live birth. 22 This was
"mediate animation." Although [410 U.S. 113, 134] Christian theology and the canon
law came to fix the point of animation at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a
view that persisted until the 19th century, there was otherwise little agreement about the
precise time of formation or animation. There was agreement, however, that prior to this
point the fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother, and its destruction, therefore,
was not homicide. Due to continued uncertainty about the precise time when animation
occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and perhaps to
Aquinas' definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton
focused upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening was
echoed by later common-law scholars and found its way into the received common law
in this country.
Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime,
is still disputed. Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought it homicide. 23 But
the later and predominant view, following the great common-law scholars, has been that
it was, at most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited [410 U.S. 113, 135] passage,
Coke took the position that abortion of a woman "quick with childe" is "a great
misprision, and no murder." 24 Blackstone followed, saying that while abortion after
quickening had once been considered manslaughter (though not murder), "modern law"
took a less severe view. 25 A recent review of the common-law precedents argues,
however, that those precedents contradict Coke and that even post-quickening abortion
was never established as a common-law crime. 26 This is of some importance because
while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion of an
unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, 27 others
followed Coke in stating that abortion [410 U.S. 113, 136] of a quick fetus was a
"misprision," a term they translated to mean "misdemeanor." 28 That their reliance on
Coke on this aspect of the law was uncritical and, apparently in all the reported cases,
dictum (due probably to the paucity of common-law prosecutions for post-quickening
abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a
common-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.
4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord
Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, 1,
a capital crime, but in 2 it provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before
quickening, and thus preserved the "quickening" distinction. This contrast was
continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, 13. It disappeared, however,
together with the death penalty, in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85. 6, and did not
reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, 59, that
formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967. In
1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its
emphasis was upon the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being born alive." It
made a willful act performed with the necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso
that one was not to be[410 U.S. 113, 137] found guilty of the offense "unless it is
proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for
the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."
A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex v. Bourne,
1939. 1 K. B. 687. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the question
whether an abortion necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted
from the criminal penalties of the 1861 Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge
Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that that Act related to "the case
where a child is killed by a wilful act at the time when it is being delivered in the
ordinary course of nature." Id., at 691. He concluded that the 1861 Act's use of the word
"unlawfully," imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the 1929
Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother's life in the 1861 Act.
He then construed the phrase "preserving the life of the mother" broadly, that is, "in a
reasonable sense," to include a serious and permanent threat to the mother's health, and
instructed the jury to acquit Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted in a good-faith belief
that the abortion was necessary for this purpose. Id., at 693-694. The jury did acquit.
Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15
& 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion where
two other licensed physicians agree (a) "that the continuance of the pregnancy would
involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental
health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated," or (b) "that there is a substantial risk that if the child were
born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as [410 U.S. 113,
138] to be seriously handicapped." The Act also provides that, in making this
determination, "account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably
foreseeable environment." It also permits a physician, without the concurrence of
others, to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good-faith opinion that the abortion
"is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman."
5. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-
19th century was the pre-existing English common law. Connecticut, the first State to
enact abortion legislation, adopted in 1821 that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that
related to a woman "quick with child." 29 The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion
before quickening was made a crime in that State only in 1860. 30 In 1828, New York
enacted legislation 31 that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early anti-
abortion statutes. First, while barring destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as a
quick fetus, it made the former only a misdemeanor, but the latter second-degree
manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of therapeutic abortion by providing
that an abortion was excused if it "shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such
mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose."
By 1840, when Texas had received the common law, 32 only eight American
States [410 U.S. 113, 139] had statutes dealing with abortion. 33 It was not until after
the War Between the States that legislation began generally to replace the common law.
Most of these initial statutes dealt severely with abortion after quickening but were
lenient with it before quickening. Most punished attempts equally with completed
abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an abortion thought by one or
more physicians to be necessary to save the mother's life, that provision soon
disappeared and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary for
that purpose.
Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century the quickening distinction disappeared
from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties
were increased. By the end of the 1950's, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned
abortion, however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of
the mother. 34 The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted
abortion to preserve the mother's health. 35 Three States permitted abortions that were
not "unlawfully" performed or that were not "without lawful justification," leaving
interpretation of those standards to the courts. 36 In[410 U.S. 113, 140] the past
several years, however, a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in
adoption, by about one-third of the States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned
after the ALI Model Penal Code, 230.3, 37 set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in
Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 205.
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution,
and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less
disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way,
a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in
most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very
possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity [410 U.S. 113, 141] to make this
choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law
continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.
6. The position of the American Medical Association. The anti-abortion mood prevalent
in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed,
the attitude of the profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of
stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period.
An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed in May 1857. It presented its
report, 12 Trans. of the Am. Med. Assn. 73-78 (1859), to the Twelfth Annual Meeting.
That report observed that the Committee had been appointed to investigate criminal
abortion "with a view to its general suppression." It deplored abortion and its frequency
and it listed three causes of "this general demoralization":
"The first of these causes is a wide-spread popular ignorance of the true
character of the crime - a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the
foetus is not alive till after the period of quickening.
"The second of the agents alluded to is the fact that the profession themselves
are frequently supposed careless of foetal life . . . .
"The third reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found in the grave
defects of our laws, both common and statute, as regards the independent and
actual existence of the child before birth, as a living being. These errors, which
are sufficient in most instances to prevent conviction, are based, and only
based, upon mistaken and exploded medical dogmas. With strange
inconsistency, the law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent
rights, for civil purposes; while personally and as criminally affected, it fails to
recognize it, [410 U.S. 113, 142] and to its life as yet denies all protection."
Id., at 75-76.
The Committee then offered, and the Association adopted, resolutions protesting
"against such unwarrantable destruction of human life," calling upon state legislatures
to revise their abortion laws, and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies
"in pressing the subject." Id., at 28, 78.
In 1871 a long and vivid report was submitted by the Committee on Criminal Abortion.
It ended with the observation, "We had to deal with human life. In a matter of less
importance we could entertain no compromise. An honest judge on the bench would
call things by their proper names. We could do no less." 22 Trans. of the Am. Med.
Assn. 258 (1871). It proffered resolutions, adopted by the Association, id., at 38-39,
recommending, among other things, that it "be unlawful and unprofessional for any
physician to induce abortion or premature labor, without the concurrent opinion of at
least one respectable consulting physician, and then always with a view to the safety of
the child - if that be possible," and calling "the attention of the clergy of all
denominations to the perverted views of morality entertained by a large class of females
- aye, and men also, on this important question."
Except for periodic condemnation of the criminal abortionist, no further formal AMA
action took place until 1967. In that year, the Committee on Human Reproduction urged
the adoption of a stated policy of opposition to induced abortion, except when there is
"documented medical evidence" of a threat to the health or life of the mother, or that the
child "may be born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency," or that
a pregnancy "resulting from legally established statutory or forcible rape or incest may
constitute a threat to the mental or physical health of the [410 U.S. 113, 143] patient,"
two other physicians "chosen because of their recognized professional competence have
examined the patient and have concurred in writing," and the procedure "is performed
in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals." The
providing of medical information by physicians to state legislatures in their
consideration of legislation regarding therapeutic abortion was "to be considered
consistent with the principles of ethics of the American Medical Association." This
recommendation was adopted by the House of Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA
House of Delegates 40-51 (June 1967).
In 1970, after the introduction of a variety of proposed resolutions, and of a report from
its Board of Trustees, a reference committee noted "polarization of the medical
profession on this controversial issue"; division among those who had testified; a
difference of opinion among AMA councils and committees; "the remarkable shift in
testimony" in six months, felt to be influenced "by the rapid changes in state laws and
by the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more freely available;" and a
feeling "that this trend will continue." On June 25, 1970, the House of Delegates
adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed by the reference committee.
The preambles emphasized "the best interests of the patient," "sound clinical judgment,"
and "informed patient consent," in contrast to "mere acquiescence to the patient's
demand." The resolutions asserted that abortion is a medical procedure that should be
performed by a licensed physician in an accredited hospital only after consultation with
two other physicians and in conformity with state law, and that no party to the
procedure should be required to violate personally held moral
principles. 38 Proceedings [410 U.S. 113, 144] of the AMA House of Delegates 220
(June 1970). The AMA Judicial Council rendered a complementary opinion. 39
7. The position of the American Public Health Association. In October 1970, the
Executive Board of the APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These were
five in number:
"a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be readily available through state
and local public [410 U.S. 113, 145] health departments, medical societies, or
other nonprofit organizations.
"b. An important function of counselling should be to simplify and expedite
the provision of abortion services; it should not delay the obtaining of these
services.
"c. Psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory. As in the case of other
specialized medical services, psychiatric consultation should be sought for
definite indications and not on a routine basis.
"d. A wide range of individuals from appropriately trained, sympathetic
volunteers to highly skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors.
"e. Contraception and/or sterilization should be discussed with each abortion
patient." Recommended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am. J. Pub.
Health 396 (1971).
Among factors pertinent to life and health risks associated with abortion were three that
"are recognized as important":
"a. the skill of the physician,
"b. the environment in which the abortion is performed, and above all
"c. the duration of pregnancy, as determined by uterine size and confirmed by
menstrual history." Id., at 397.
It was said that "a well-equipped hospital" offers more protection "to cope with
unforeseen difficulties than an office or clinic without such resources. . . . The factor of
gestational age is of overriding importance." Thus, it was recommended that abortions
in the second trimester and early abortions in the presence of existing medical
complications be performed in hospitals as inpatient procedures. For pregnancies in the
first trimester,[410 U.S. 113, 146] abortion in the hospital with or without overnight
stay "is probably the safest practice." An abortion in an extramural facility, however, is
an acceptable alternative "provided arrangements exist in advance to admit patients
promptly if unforeseen complications develop." Standards for an abortion facility were
listed. It was said that at present abortions should be performed by physicians or
osteopaths who are licensed to practice and who have "adequate training." Id., at 398.
8. The position of the American Bar Association. At its meeting in February 1972 the
ABA House of Delegates approved, with 17 opposing votes, the Uniform Abortion Act
that had been drafted and approved the preceding August by the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 58 A. B. A. J. 380 (1972). We set forth the Act
in full in the margin.40 The [410 U.S. 113, 147] Conference has appended an
enlightening Prefatory Note. 41
VII
Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal
abortion laws in the 19th century and to justify their continued existence. [410 U.S. 113,
148]
It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social
concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance this
justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or commentator has taken
the argument seriously.42 The appellants and amici contend, moreover, that this is not a
proper state purpose at all and suggest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad
in protecting it since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most
criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the
woman. 43 This was particularly true prior to the[410 U.S. 113, 149] development of
antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of course, were based on discoveries by Lister,
Pasteur, and others first announced in 1867, but were not generally accepted and
employed until about the turn of the century. Abortion mortality was high. Even after
1900, and perhaps until as late as the development of antibiotics in the 1940's, standard
modern techniques such as dilation and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are
today. Thus, it has been argued that a State's real concern in enacting a criminal
abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting
to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.
Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appellants and various amici
refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end
of the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates
for women undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low
as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. 44 Consequently, any interest of the
State in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it
would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared. Of course,
important state interests in the areas of health and medical standards do remain. [410
U.S. 113, 150] The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any
other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety
for the patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician and
his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability of after-care, and to adequate
provision for any complication or emergency that might arise. The prevalence of high
mortality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather than weakens, the State's
interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are performed. Moreover,
the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a
definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is
proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.
The third reason is the State's interest - some phrase it in terms of duty - in protecting
prenatal life. Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new
human life is present from the moment of conception. 45 The State's interest and
general obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when
the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries
within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a
legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that
life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth. In assessing the
State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least
potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the
pregnant woman alone. [410 U.S. 113, 151]
Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply disputed in some courts the
contention that a purpose of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal
life. 46 Pointing to the absence of legislative history to support the contention, they
claim that most state laws were designed solely to protect the woman. Because medical
advances have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early
pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be
justified by any state interest. There is some scholarly support for this view of original
purpose. 47 The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting the woman's health
rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus. 48 Proponents of this view point out that
in many States, including Texas, 49 by statute or judicial interpretation, the pregnant
woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for cooperating in an
abortion performed upon her by another. 50 They claim that adoption of the
"quickening" distinction through received common[410 U.S. 113, 152] law and state
statutes tacitly recognizes the greater health hazards inherent in late abortion and
impliedly repudiates the theory that life begins at conception.
It is with these interests, and the weight to be attached to them, that this case is
concerned.
VIII
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions,
however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts,
the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the
First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 -9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill
of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484 -485; in the Ninth Amendment, id.,
at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also
make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 -542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 453 -454; id., at 460,
463-465 [410 U.S. 113, 153] (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and child rearing and education,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically
diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the
woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever
time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not
agree. Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating
the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the
woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive. The [410 U.S. 113, 154] Court's
decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in
areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert
important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become
sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion
decision. The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it
is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to
do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy
previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an
unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization).
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation.
We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered abortion law
challenges have reached the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the District
Court in the present case, have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part, because
of vagueness or because of overbreadth and abridgment of rights. Abele v. Markle, 342
F. Supp. 800 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-56; Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp.
224 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730; Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (ND
Ga. 1970), appeal decided today, post, p. 179; Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill.
1971), appeal docketed, No. 70-105; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (Kan. 1972);
YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 1972); Babbitz v. McCann, [410 U.S. 113,
155] 310 F. Supp. 293 (ED Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); People v.
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v.
Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED
Ky. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-256; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-42; Corkey v.
Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (WDNC 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-92; Steinberg v.
Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Rampton (Utah 1971), appeal
docketed, No. 71-5666; Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. ___, 285 N. E. 2d 265 (1972);
Spears v. State, 257 So.2d 876 (Miss. 1972); State v. Munson, 86 S. D. 663, 201 N. W.
2d 123 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-631.
Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of
privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right,
nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the
state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become
dominant. We agree with this approach.
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," Kramer v.
Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 485 ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 -308 (1940); see[410
U.S. 113, 156] Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S., at 460 , 463-464 (WHITE, J., concurring
in result).
In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have recognized these principles. Those
striking down state laws have generally scrutinized the State's interests in protecting
health and potential life, and have concluded that neither interest justified broad
limitations on the reasons for which a physician and his pregnant patient might decide
that she should have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining
state laws have held that the State's determinations to protect health or prenatal life are
dominant and constitutionally justifiable.
IX
The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that
the Texas statute's infringement upon Roe's rights was necessary to support a
compelling state interest, and that, although the appellee presented "several compelling
justifications for state presence in the area of abortions," the statutes outstripped these
justifications and swept "far beyond any areas of compelling state interest." 314 F.
Supp., at 1222-1223. Appellant and appellee both contest that holding. Appellant, as has
been indicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state imposition of criminal
penalties in the area. Appellee argues that the State's determination to recognize and
protect prenatal life from and after conception constitutes a compelling state interest. As
noted above, we do not agree fully with either formulation.
A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language
and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length
and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of
personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, [410 U.S. 113,
157] for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. 51 On the other hand, the
appellee conceded on reargument 52 that no case could be cited that holds that a fetus is
a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in defining
"citizens," speaks of "persons born or naturalized in the United States." The word also
appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is
used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for
Representatives and Senators, Art. I, 2, cl. 2, and 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause,
Art. I, 2, cl. 3; 53 in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, 9, cl. 1; in the
Emolument Clause, Art. I, 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II, 1, cl. 2, and the
superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art.
II, 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive
Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as
in 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the
word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance,
that it has any possible pre-natal application. 54 [410 U.S. 113, 158]
All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the
19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today,
persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn. 55 This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases
where the issue has been squarely presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital,
340 F. Supp. 751 (WD Pa. 1972); Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31
N. Y. 2d 194, 286 N. E. 2d 887 (1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-434; Abele v. Markle,
351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730. Cf. Cheaney v. State, ___
Ind., at ___, 285 N. E. 2d, at 270; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (CA7 1960),
aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2
Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, 28 [410 U.S. 113, 159] Ohio St.
2d 65, 275 N. E. 2d 599 (1971). Indeed, our decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402
U.S. 62 (1971), inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged
in statutory interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the
necessary consequence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
protection.
This conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by
Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.
B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and,
later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the
human uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 478-479, 547 (24th ed.
1965). The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom
possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which
Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were
respectively concerned. As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate
for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the
mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's
privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
accordingly.
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and
is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest
in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as
to the answer. [410 U.S. 113, 160]
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most
sensitive and difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that
life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. 56 It appears to be
the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. 57 It may be
taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community,
insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on
the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the
individual and her family. 58 As we have noted, the common law found greater
significance in quickening. Physicians and their scientific colleagues have regarded that
event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth,
or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable," that is, potentially able to
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid.59 Viability is usually placed at
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. 60 The
Aristotelian theory of "mediate animation," that held sway throughout the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until the
19th century, despite opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the Church
who would recognize the existence of life from [410 U.S. 113, 161] the moment of
conception. 61 The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church.
As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics as
well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view
are posed, however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception
is a "process" over time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as
menstrual extraction, the "morning-after" pill, implantation of embryos, artificial
insemination, and even artificial wombs. 62
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory
that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the
unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent
upon live birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal
injuries even though the child was born alive. 63 That rule has been changed in almost
every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was
viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few [410 U.S. 113,
162] courts have squarely so held. 64 In a recent development, generally opposed by
the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an
action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. 65 Such an action, however,
would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the
view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn
children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or
other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad
litem. 66 Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon
live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense.
X
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the
State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident
who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another
important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These
interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman
approaches [410 U.S. 113, 163] term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes
"compelling."
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother,
the "compelling" point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately
the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact,
referred to above at 149, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion
may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point,
a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible
state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is
to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the
procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or
some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the
like.
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this
"compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be
effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
"compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of
fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is
interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion [410 U.S. 113, 164] during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting
legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction
between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits
to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the procedure.
The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional challenge to the
Texas statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S.,
at 67 -72.
XI
To summarize and to repeat:
1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life [410 U.S. 113, 165] may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
2. The State may define the term "physician," as it has been employed in the preceding
paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician currently licensed
by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so
defined.
In Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, procedural requirements contained in one of the modern
abortion statutes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read
together. 67
This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests
involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of
the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day.
The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the
period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the
recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points
where important [410 U.S. 113, 166] state interests provide compelling justifications
for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical
judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are available.
XII
Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas
abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be struck down
separately, for then the State would be left with a statute proscribing all abortion
procedures no matter how medically urgent the case.

Although the District Court granted appellant Roe declaratory relief, it stopped short of
issuing an injunction against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The Court has
recognized that different considerations enter into a federal court's decision as to
declaratory relief, on the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 -255 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free expression, an
area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S., at 50 .

We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding

injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full
credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are
unconstitutional.

The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and Dr.
Hallford's complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the
judgment [410 U.S. 113, 167] of the District Court is affirmed. Costs are allowed to
the appellee.

It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician
who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent
Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering the
latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On
appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority
vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by
her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had
herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three
met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to
the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and
award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum
award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn
foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la
criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser
no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado",
Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer
to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following
article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated
from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that
recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit
Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases
collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because
the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority
opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an
"indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels

outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of
a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit,
and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal
cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil
action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the
beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife,
without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act,
that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her
husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without
costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of
Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the
appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a
complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same
pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court
below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City,
and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite
efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she
claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the
trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child,
although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be
accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they
were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring
that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become
entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the
corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni
aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura
juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las
condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de
un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page
271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to
force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in
this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the
order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-39110 November 28, 1933
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de
Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and
representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff,
for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty
thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a
marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural
children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the
amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause,
after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to
recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate
of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this
judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied
part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision
which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the
age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila,
being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente
Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed
to go for tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried
girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was
not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence
of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The
defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her
pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his
departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote
several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed
with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning
the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon.
The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatory preparations were
made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to
attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint
Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement.
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the
baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for
about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric
light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor
abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant
decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point that should here be noted
is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of
the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him,
instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted
above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during
pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1
of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that
the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that
a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being
dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the
acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is
really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of
identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to
connect the particular individual intended with the name used.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the
writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael
Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition
contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a
baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter
be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the
name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the
defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is
removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the
repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters were defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with
good appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of
only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection
of herself and ofjunior also. we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have
jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of require.
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of
article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father.
Upon this point we are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting
together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made
in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the
admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice
to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus.
There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any
particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.

The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in
holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence,
the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco,
under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in
our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add
here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with
the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of
this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived
together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia
became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of
abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough
to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he
abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant.
The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean
that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.

What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With
respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right
in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of
promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
 [ G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948 ]
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO PETITIONER, VS. INTESTATE STATE OF PEDRO O.
FRAGANTE, DECEASED, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy
Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O.
Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, RizaJ, whereby said commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper
and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant
of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original
applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death; and that his
intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The
commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that
under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, a
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one half tons (2-1/2) in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said
Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in
Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp.
33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
"1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
"2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by
evidence.
"3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold
Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable
opportunity to meet the increased demand.
"4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant." (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to
allow the substitution of the legaLrepresentative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for
the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in
subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the
right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one
would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had
invested in the ice plant in question P35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially
able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business
alone was netting him about P1,440 monthly. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to
be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence
before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The
aforesaid right of Pedro O.Fragante to prosecute said application to its final conclusion
was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part
of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied the application, although under the facts of the
case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate
to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947,
admits (page 3) that a certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should
descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the
right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged
to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after
his death.
If Pedro O. Fragante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and
during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary
course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no
doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and
legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to
acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with
the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro 0. Fragante's undoubted right to
apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence
established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon
the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of
course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was
subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions,
but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in
the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased
which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of
the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or
administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the
possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367), the
present Chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions
cited by him:
"Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the
property or rights (underscoring supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought
by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or
against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the
right * * *".
It is true that a proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience
before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions
and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which,
being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can
not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the
creditors, devisees, or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right
involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
application fcr a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public
Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and
entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the
Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are
not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that
article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently
expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property
includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad
commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same
volume we read:
"However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to
include every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in
contract, whether executory or executed." (Italics supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p. 5325), states the following doctrine in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
"As the estate of a decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after
the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be
prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6
N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77."
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery
committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The
objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed
with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this
objection as follows:
"* * * The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard
the estate of a decedent as a person.
This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of a decedent is a person in legal
contemplation. 'The word "person", says Mr. Abbot, 'in its legal signification, is a
generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons,' 2 Abb. Dict. 271;
Douglas vs. Pacific, etc., Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port.
(Ala.) 404. It is said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and
artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection
or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of
artificial parsons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Examples are the
estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.' 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases
inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom
we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person,
naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct,
there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after
the death of the person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can
be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result;
for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as
an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of
the assets to be properly made, and, although natural persons as heirs, devisees, or
creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity.
The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due
administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the
estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since he
cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of
their respective interests. The fraudulent ntent is against the artificial person, the estate,
and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interests in it." (107 Ind. 54,
55, 6 N. E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of Justice unless the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante is considered a "person", for the quashing of the proceedings for no other
reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to
P35.000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements
which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let
alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample
precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having
legal personality independent of the heirs. Among the most recent cases may be
mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Conception, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the
principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave
judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
"* * * the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants
Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to the plaintiffs in the amount of P245.804.69 *
* *."
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as
the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first
Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere
fact of his death. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46.
However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil
Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13 22. In that
case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by
the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has the been
the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by
the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his
rights and obligations which survive after his demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality
simply by legal fiction, for they might not be even of his flesh and blood the reason was
one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded
to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights
and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the
estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be
no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise
those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for
indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to
the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L.
Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of
property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for
instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragante
can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the
Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and
categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public
convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the
Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or
joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and
the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities
must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal
fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of a deceased person is considered a
"person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is
assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as
announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
"* * * It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an
artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the
assets to be properly made * * *"
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example,
under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the
majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and
(2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter
would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property
without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.
We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no
less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar
nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.
Hence, we hold that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the
judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of
his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above,
an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered
extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him ,may be paid, and
any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs,
respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the
purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission.
The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of
the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any
prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragante had lived
longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his
citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as
the fiction of the extension of his personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the
injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he had already made in the ice
plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the
Public Service Commission to this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the Constitution
(Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of
extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of
extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for
refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of
this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death.
His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received
from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist
here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is
the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case
No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality
and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so
adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of
the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO
DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago
Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958.
The lower court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before
its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the
judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for
the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the
sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had
become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the
"foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
which he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares,
was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The
sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the
action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were
the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court
Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the
principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the
original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and
all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator
of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria
(Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the
summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time
the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, was filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the
suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the
court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the
other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It
reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that
Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of
Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs
appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as
to the validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being
already in the other world, was never served with summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago,
86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No.
T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have
been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical
capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
(Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for
Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction
over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has
no application to this case.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in
order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to
claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their
stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's death.
Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining
Oria as a co-defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in
Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The
execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy
Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-
CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R.
No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas
Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and
orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required
comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a
temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity),
her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity)
filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a
corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to
petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine
Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he
(petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy
in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed
legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed
before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then
issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor
in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to
dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of
the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a
dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live
person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were
granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of
Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition),
private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any
way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury
her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the
next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their
sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally
submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the
respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills
Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent
court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an
order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended
petition, up to the second amended petition that the ultimate facts
show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then
this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons
entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said
deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana
Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the
Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case because it
may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition
on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment
thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage
and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the issue of custody
and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this
Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the
allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec.
19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a
decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court
acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body,
without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without
the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308
in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the
allegations in the original petition as well as in the two amended
petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty
and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial
of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this
court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain
and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead
body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and
since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other
courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this
case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of
rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of
preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since
there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being
himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No.
86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in
the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7
February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to
maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23
February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a
clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a
decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old
female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood
brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
 2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority
to treat the action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the
deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil
Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and
two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be
made in the following order:
(1) From the
spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption
of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the
action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain
whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not
issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to
appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima
facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if
the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition
complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for
relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very
critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this
jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or
detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case
should not have been dismissed. The court below should not have
overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning
the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the
minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against
all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has
expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law
repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court
below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not
originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full
protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power
to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned.
What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be
not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was
proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored
and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so
far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases
or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances
such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like,
which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents,
the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of
the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the
court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the
term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence
of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's
brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of
co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice
Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that
with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law
spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold
that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was
not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers
and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate

duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the
ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or

woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of
burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the
deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to
defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.
Leonardo Abola for respondent.
TUASON, J.:
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de
Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been
heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed
to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in
turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the
deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in
the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court
found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls,
named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin
de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.,
the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the
petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died
before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the
rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased
spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the
spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's
wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the
German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During
their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the
Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside
the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were hit
and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided
to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela
Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor,
Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay
flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the
German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to
reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10,
1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open.
They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately
met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his
daughter-in-law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela
Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two
or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad
Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez,
who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined
that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the
evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption
must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof
of the death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one
was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of
the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died
shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness,
and that the burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but
there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the
condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the
instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can
glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to
escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a
variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed
by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by
splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available
on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside,
and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot
support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall
back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the
presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like
these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his
mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69,
subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the
question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There
being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is
identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that
the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing
in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and
usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some may die
from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards
episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the
presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-
Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion,
and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No.
129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the
civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the
petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence,
as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should,
under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration
when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that
neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or
conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2)
particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is
presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the
sexes, according to the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more
persons who would inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the
prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of
rights from one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks
and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section
69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only
unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of
death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are
unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the
different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied
with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken
from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the
Supreme Court of California said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be
inferred" that one died before the other it means that there are circumstances
from which the fact of death by one before the other may be inferred as a
relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does not mean
circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to show, probably
that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App.
28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove
a survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the circumstances by
which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and
sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or
conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left
to probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be
indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule
of preponderance of evidence controls.
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez'
testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this
issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the
trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to
credence."
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15
meters away from the building but I could see what was going on.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two
events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the
German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you
know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes?
— A. Possible, but not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A.
Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club, which was
burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive
evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that
Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her
actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive
and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died there.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Because
the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting people outside, so
we thought of running away rather than be roasted.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the
Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? — A.
to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the
entrance, because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese were
those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they were
among those killed.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes
before you left the place? — A. That is what I think, because those Japanese
soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — .
There were many people shot because they were trying to escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building,
can you explain that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the
problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the
statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be
noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational
deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it
will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German
Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds
or less, and so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building.
Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the
clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and
son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or
fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True,
people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly
refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not
very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made
frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing
themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an
idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment
her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the
situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it
lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred
about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead,
and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said
the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was
"minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the
inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by
which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the
probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese
sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living
members of her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides,
the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for
the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the
premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because
the building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden.
As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space
of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section
69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which
it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of
evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is
never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's
Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44;
Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts have said, it
is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must
be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in
civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author,
"according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed
from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence.
The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary
facts. How likely, according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain
secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case
where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught
firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about
an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight,
but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another
possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is
based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in
the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from
established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a
very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which
civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an
instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an
action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired
was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the
fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns,
and which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The
point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from which
the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed,
and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a
question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As
was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857,
"Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible
witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But
when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned
and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted
upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the
issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is
to be invoked is a question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to
decisions supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real
evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception
to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution
of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial
court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva
troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's
death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
G.R. No. 15574 September 17, 1919
SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.
Ross and Lawrence for petitioner.
Attorney-General Paredes for respondent.
MALCOLM, J.:
A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin
Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him
to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato.
The Attorney-General, acting as counsel for respondent, demurs to the petition on the
general ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent provisions of law
are clear and understandable, and interpretative American jurisprudence is found in
abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be resolved. The question, flatly
presented, is, whether Act. No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid — or, more
directly stated, whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its
Legislature, can deny the registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations having
alien stockholders.
FACTS.
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of
a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more
than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose
of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was
made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate
of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason
that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.
LAW.
The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of April 30, 1906
but reenacting a portion of section 3 of this Law, and still in force, provides in its
section 1:
That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels of the United
States of vessels owned in the Philippine Islands, the Government of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized to adopt, from time to time, and enforce
regulations governing the transportation of merchandise and passengers
between ports or places in the Philippine Archipelago. (35 Stat. at L., 70;
Section 3912, U. S. Comp Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.)
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in
force, provides in section 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as
follows.
SEC. 3. That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws. . . .
SEC. 6. That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force
and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered,
amended, or repealed by the legislative authority herein provided or by Act of
Congress of the United States.
SEC. 7. That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when
not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter modify, or
repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from
time to time see fit
This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein provided as to
the tariff to all laws relating to revenue provided as to the tariff to all laws
relating to revenue and taxation in effect in the Philippines.
SEC. 8. That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is
hereby granted to the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act.
SEC. 10. That while this Act provides that the Philippine government shall
have the authority to enact a tariff law the trade relations between the islands
and the United States shall continue to be governed exclusively by laws of the
Congress of the United States: Provided, That tariff acts or acts amendatory to
the tariff of the Philippine Islands shall not become law until they shall receive
the approval of the President of the United States, nor shall any act of the
Philippine Legislature affecting immigration or the currency or coinage laws of
the Philippines become a law until it has been approved by the President of the
United States: Provided further, That the President shall approve or disapprove
any act mentioned in the foregoing proviso within six months from and after
its enactment and submission for his approval, and if not disapproved within
such time it shall become a law the same as if it had been specifically
approved.
 SEC. 31. That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in
conflict with any of the provisions of this Act are hereby continued in force
and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.)
On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first
section of this law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel
of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of
Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership
and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine
register shall be optional with the owner.
"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in
some one or more of the following classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the United States residing
in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed wholly of
citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of both, created
under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof, or the
managing agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands
Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen
hundred and eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under existing
law, shall likewise be deemed a vessel of domestic ownership so long as there
shall not be any change in the ownership thereof nor any transfer of stock of
the companies or corporations owning such vessel to person not included
under the last preceding paragraph.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the
Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a
certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of
customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or
destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership
as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this
Code.
The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its
owner, master, crew, or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel is
engaged in legitimate trade and is entitled to have or retain the certificate of
Philippine register.
SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board
vessels. — No Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the high
seas shall be permitted to have on board more than one master or one mate and
one engineer who are not citizens of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one thousand one hundred and
ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the United States or
of the Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such
vessel. Any such vessel which fails to comply with the terms of this section
shall be required to pay an additional tonnage tax of fifty centavos per net ton
per month during the continuance of said failure.
ISSUES.
Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above stated recur,
namely, whether Act No 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part
— whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny
the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders .
OPINION.
1. Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of doubt as to the
power of the Philippine Legislature to enact Act No. 2761. The Act of Congress of
April 29, 1908, with its specific delegation of authority to the Government of the
Philippine Islands to regulate the transportation of merchandise and passengers between
ports or places therein, the liberal construction given to the provisions of the Philippine
Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by the courts, and the grant by the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature,
are certainly superabundant authority for such a law. While the Act of the local
legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of Congress regulating the
coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet the general rule that only such laws
of the United States have force in the Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and
the abnegation of power by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands would leave no
starting point for convincing argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for petitioner does
not assail legislative action from this direction (See U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7;
Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22 How., 227.)
2. It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues against the
constitutionality of Act No. 2761. The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of
the Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights
as set forth in the Jones Law, provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." Counsel says that Act
No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it,
in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of
corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious,
and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of
law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every
beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it
could not use .
The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine Islands
have been used in the same sense as like provisions found in the United States
Constitution. While the "due process of law and equal protection of the laws" clause of
the Philippine Bill of Rights is couched in slightly different words than the
corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
the first should be interpreted and given the same force and effect as the latter.
(Kepner vs. U.S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Sierra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S.,.470; U.
S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
announced in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at the expense
of restating what is so well known, these basic principles must again be set down in
order to serve as the basis of this decision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality.
The word "person" includes aliens. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356;
Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33.) Private corporations, likewise, are "persons"
within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. (Santa Clara
County vs. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118.U. S., 394; Pembina Mining
Co. vs. Pennsylvania [1888],.125 U. S., 181 Covington & L. Turnpike Road
Co. vs. Sandford [1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of
providing diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based
upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection (Gulf, Colorado &
Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis [1897],.165 U. S., 150.) Examples of laws held
unconstitutional because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be cited.
Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid
aliens to engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living.
(State vs. Montgomery [1900], 94 Maine, 192, peddling — but see.
Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass., 262; Templar vs. Board of Examiners of
Barbers [1902], 131 Mich., 254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S.,.356,
discrimination against Chinese; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; In re Parrott
[1880], 1 Fed , 481; Fraser vs. McConway & Torley Co. [1897], 82 Fed , 257; Juniata
Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating to the employment of
aliens by private corporations.)
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause
the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to
a corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the
laws. Like all beneficient propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples of
a denial of rights to aliens notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
could be cited. (Tragesser vs.Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to sell spirituous
liquors denied to persons not citizens of the United States; Commonwealth vs. Hana
[1907], 195 Mass , 262, excluding aliens from the right to peddle;
Patsone vs.Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S. , 138, prohibiting the
killing of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex
parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442, discriminating in favor of citizens with reference to
the taking for private use of the common property in fish and oysters found in the public
waters of the State; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U. S.,.175, and Crane vs. New York
[1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting employment on public works by, or for, the State or a
municipality to citizens of the United States.)
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence
is, that neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and
comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and
legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its
wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special
character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts."
(Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27; New Orleans Gas Co. vs. Lousiana Light
Co. [1885], 115 U.S., 650.) This is the same police power which the United States
Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as
to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." (Bacon vs.Walker [1907], 204
U.S., 311.) For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic
Law could could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine
Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest. (U. S. vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39
Phil., 660.) Another notable exception permits of the regulation or distribution of the
public domain or the common property or resources of the people of the State, so that
use may be limited to its citizens. (Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442;
McCready vs. Virginia [1876], 94 U. S., 391; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania [1914], 232U. S., 138.) Still another exception permits of the limitation of
employment in the construction of public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to
citizens of the United States or of the State. (Atkin vs. Kansas [1903],191 U. S., 207;
Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U.S., 175; Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195.)
Even as to classification, it is admitted that a State may classify with reference to the
evil to be prevented; the question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.
(Patsone vs.Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.)
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to
obtain a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed
wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not
infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the exceptions
here mentioned This must be done, moreover, having particularly in mind what is so
often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction — our local experience and our peculiar
local conditions.
To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine jurisdictional limits
are found more than three thousand islands. Literally, and absolutely, steamship lines
are, for an Insular territory thus situated, the arteries of commerce. If one be severed,
the life-blood of the nation is lost. If on the other hand these arteries are protected, then
the security of the country and the promotion of the general welfare is sustained. Time
and again, with such conditions confronting it, has the executive branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the sanction of the judicial
branch, taken a firm stand with reference to the presence of undesirable foreigners. The
Government has thus assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason of the
benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its
dominion. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs.Chuoco, Tiaco and Crossfield
[1910], 16 Phil., 534;.228 U.S., 549; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41.) Boats
owned by foreigners, particularly by such solid and reputable firms as the instant
claimant, might indeed traverse the waters of the Philippines for ages without doing any
particular harm. Again, some evilminded foreigner might very easily take advantage of
such lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters, to obtain valuable information for
unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino or American
commerce. Moreover, under the Spanish portion of Philippine law, the waters within
the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the national domain, open to public use.
(Book II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, arts 1, 2,
3.) Common carriers which in the Philippines as in the United States and other countries
are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with a public interest," can only be permitted to use
these public waters as a privilege and under such conditions as to the representatives of
the people may seem wise. (See De Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.)
In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U.S., 138), a case herein
before mentioned, Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court said:
This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to
kill any wild bird or animal except in defense of person or property, and `to
that end' makes it unlawful for such foreign-born person to own or be
possessed of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of $25 and a forfeiture of the
gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found guilty and was sentenced to pay
the abovementioned fine. The judgment was affirmed on successive appeals.
(231 Pa., 46; 79 Atl., 928.) He brings the case to this court on the ground that
the statute is contrary to the 14th Amendment and also is in contravention of
the treaty between the United States and Italy, to which latter country the
plaintiff in error belongs .
Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold; unjustifiably depriving
the alien of property, and discrimination against such aliens as a class. But the
former really depends upon the latter, since it hardly can be disputed that if the
lawful object, the protection of wild life (Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U.S., 519;
40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 600), warrants the discrimination, the, means
adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. . . .
The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we
start with reference to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class
discriminated against is or reasonably might be considered to define those
from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked out. A
lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one,
dependent upon experience. . . .
The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the
legislature of Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for
the law that resident unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil
that it desired to prevent. (Barrett vs. Indiana,. 229 U.S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed.,
1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 692.)
Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this
court ought to be very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in its
facts (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228 U.S., 572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971,.977; 33 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 610.) If we might trust popular speech in some states it was right; but
it is enough that this court has no such knowledge of local conditions as to be
able to say that it was manifestly wrong. . . .
Judgment affirmed.
We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having
alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and
equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell
&. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not
belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but
does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power,
and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to us, however, that
the legislative history of the United States and the Philippine Islands, and, probably, the
legislative history of other countries, if we were to take the time to search it out, might
disclose similar attempts at restriction on the right to enter the coastwise trade, and
might thus furnish valuable aid by which to ascertain and, if possible, effectuate
legislative intention.
3. The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the
Constitution, includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in the
United States by registries and enrollments, and the recording of the
muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress "may encourage or it
may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in any way it may
see fit between these two extremes." (U.S. vs.Craig [1886], 28 Fed., 795;
 Gibbons vs. Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases [1849], 7 How.,
283.)
Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the United States had not
been long convened before it enacted on September 1, 1789, "An Act for Registering
and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes." Section 1
of this law provided that for any ship or vessel to obtain the benefits of American
registry, it must belong wholly to a citizen or citizens of the United States "and no
other." (1 Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly after repealed, but the same idea was
carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792 and February 18, 1793. (1 Stat.
at L., 287, 305.).Section 4 of the Act of 1792 provided that in order to obtain the
registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and subscribed by the owner, or by one of
the owners thereof, before the officer authorized to make such registry, declaring, "that
there is no subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way
of trust, confidence, or otherwise, interested in such vessel, or in the profits or issues
thereof." Section 32 of the Act of 1793 even went so far as to say "that if any licensed
ship or vessel shall be transferred to any person who is not at the time of such transfer a
citizen of and resident within the United States, ... every such vessel with her tackle,
apparel, and furniture, and the cargo found on board her, shall be forefeited." In case of
alienation to a foreigner, Chief Justice Marshall said that all the privileges of an
American bottom were ipso facto forfeited. (U.S. vs. Willings and Francis [1807], 4
Cranch, 48.) Even as late as 1873, the Attorney-General of the United States was of the
opinion that under the provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792, no vessel in which a
foreigner is directly or indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a vessel of the
United. States. (14 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.], 340.)
These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the Act of March 3,
1825, may have affected them, until amended by the Act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at
L., 188) which extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a
citizen or citizens of the United States to corporations created under the laws of any of
the states thereof. The law, as amended, made possible the deduction that a vessel
belonging to a domestic corporation was entitled to registry or enrollment even though
some stock of the company be owned by aliens. The right of ownership of stock in a
corporation was thereafter distinct from the right to hold the property by the corporation
(Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U.S., 304; Queen vs. Arnaud [1846], 9 Q. B.,
806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.],188.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found a substantive
law in operation in the Islands with a civil law history which it wisely continued in
force Article fifteen of the Spanish Code of Commerce permitted any foreigner to
engage in Philippine trade if he had legal capacity to do so under the laws of his nation.
When the Philippine Commission came to enact the Customs Administrative Act (No.
355) in 1902, it returned to the old American policy of limiting the protection and flag
of the United States to vessels owned by citizens of the United States or by native
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Sec. 117.) Two years later, the same body reverted
to the existing Congressional law by permitting certification to be issued to a citizen of
the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws of the United
States or of any state thereof or of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 1235, sec. 3.) The
two administration codes repeated the same provisions with the necessary amplification
of inclusion of citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Adm. Code of
1916, sec. 1345; Adm. Code of 1917, sec. 1172). And now Act No. 2761 has returned
to the restrictive idea of the original Customs Administrative Act which in turn was
merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first American Congress.
Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a
certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading
would make them appear.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be
to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to
encourage Philippine ship-building. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the
intention of the United States Congress in passing navigation or tariff laws on different
occasions. The object of such a law, the United States Supreme Court once said, was to
encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by giving American ship-
owners exclusive privileges. (Old Dominion Steamship Co. vs.Virginia [1905], 198
U.S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 139.)
In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1)
is found the following:
Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for
example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The
act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and
place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost
every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is
contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is
not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that
effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to
confer on her American privileges, as contradistinguished from foreign; and to
preserve the. Government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding
themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the
revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected.
The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of legislating wisely for
a new country did so imbued with a spirit of Americanism. Domestic navigation and
trade, it decreed, could only be carried on by citizens of the United States. If the
representatives of the American people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the
national policy, and if their action was accepted without protest in the courts, who can
say that they did not enact such beneficial laws under the all-pervading police power,
with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of promoting its prosperity?
Quite similarly, the Philippine Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos, representing
the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights, acting under
practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has
desired for these Islands safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common
property exclusively by its citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection
for the common good of the people. Who can say, therefore, especially can a court, that
with all the facts and circumstances affecting the Filipino people before it, the
Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of Act No. 2761?

Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart from active life, in
monastic seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient records, but, as keen spectators of
passing events and alive to the dictates of the general — the national — welfare, can
incline the scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively
promote the public policy. All the presumption is in favor of the constitutionally of the
law and without good and strong reasons, courts should not attempt to nullify the action
of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission
(Legislature), we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be
repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of
another construction not in conflict with the higher law." (In re Guariña [1913], 24.
Phil., 36; U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true construction which will
best carry legislative intention into effect.

With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly
of the opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a
certificate of Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, and to citizens of the United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph
1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 No treaty right relied upon Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held valid and constitutional .

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
 [ GR No. 2832, Nov 24, 1906 ]
REV. JORGE BARLIN v. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ +
DECISION
7 Phil. 41
WILLARD, J.:
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the
Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church
and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There Avas
evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary
for this reconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo under the direction of
the cabezas de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was
required to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days every year.
The time spent in the reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the forty
days. The material necessary was bought and paid for in part by the parish priest from
the funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo.
After the completion of the church it was always administered, until November 14,
1902, by a priest of the Roman Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo
professed that faith and belonged to that church.
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took
possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. He administered it as such under the
orders of his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been
then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of
the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money,
and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document of that date,
refused to make such delivery. That document is as follows:
"At 7 o'clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino your respected order
of the 12th instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting
parish priest of this town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to
you at the vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you that the town of
Lagonoy, in conjuntion with the parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection
with the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino
Church, the head of which is at Manila. This resolution of the people was reduced to
writing and triplicate copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy herewith.
"For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey your said order by
delivering to Father Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which, as I
understand it, is now outside of the control of the Pope and his representatives in these
Islands. May God guard you many years.
"Lagonoy, November 14, 1902.
(Signed) "VICENTE RAMIREZ.
"RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT."
The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as follows:
"Lagonoy, November 9, 1902.
"The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent citizens having; learned
through the papers from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino
National Church, separate from the control of the Pope at Kome by reason of the fact
that the latter has refused to either recognize or grant the rights to the Filipino clergy
which have many times been urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced
why such offices should be given to the Filipino clergy are evidently well-founded, we
have deemed it advisable to consult with the parish priest of this town as to whether it
would be advantageous to join the1 said Filipino Church and to separate from the
control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore the rights of the said Filipino
clergy, under the conditions that there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that
the sacraments and other dogmas will be recognized and particularly that of the
immaculate conception of the mother of our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Kome
recognizes and grants the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we will return
to his control. In view of this, and subject to this condition, the reverend parish priest,
together with the people of the town, unanimously join in declaring that from this date
they separate themselves from the obedience and control of the Pope and join the
Filipino National Church. This assembly and the reverend parish priest have
accordingly adopted this resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send a copy
thereof to the civil government of this province for its information, and do sign the same
below. Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Tsrael, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso,
Macario P. Ledesma, Ceeilio Obias, ISalbino Imperial, Juan Preseñada, Fernando
Pemlor, Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater."
At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted, there
were present about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the
population of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants
were satisfied with the action there taken. Although it is of no importance in the case,
we are inclined to think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about 100 of
the principal men of the town were in favor of the resolution and about HO of such
principal men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Kaniirez,
continued in the possession of the church and other property and administered the same
under the directions of his superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino
Church. The rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the same after the
14th day of November as they were before, but the relations between the Roman
Catholic Church and the defendant had been entirely severed.
In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez,
alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of
the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property
belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the
defendant render an account of the property which lie had received and which was
retained by him, and for other relief.
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the allegations
of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the
property described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the
inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. After this
answer had been presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of
Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and join with
the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition having been granted, the
municipality on the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that the
defendant, Kamirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint under
tire authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such
municipality was the owner thereof.
Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and
final judgment entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The
defendants then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.
That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property described in
the complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the evidence. It does
not appear that the municipality, as a corporate body, ever took any action in reference
to this matter until they presented their petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the
witnesses for the defense, when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, say they
are owned by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, the president, said that the
municipality as a corporation had nothing whatever to do with the matter. That the
resolution adopted on the 14th of November, and which has been quoted above, was not
the action of the municipality, as such, is apparent from an inspection thereof.
The witnesses for the defense speak of a delivery of the church by the people of the
pueblo to the defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the case of any such
delivery. Their testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on
the 14th of November, a record of which appears in the document above quoted. It is
apparent that the action then taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the
Roman Catholic Church, and nothing is said therein in reference to the material
property then in the possession of the defendant, Ramirez. There are several grounds
upon which this judgment must be affirmed:
(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the property as
the servant or agent of the plaintiff. The only right, which he had to the possession at
the time he took it, was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took
possession under the agreement to return that possession whenever it should be
demanded of him. Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when the return of
such possession is demanded of him by the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff is not the
owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. The principle
of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord's title, which is found in section 333,
paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable
to a case of this kind. An answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he
himself Avas the owner of the property at the time he received it from the plaintiff, or in
which he alleged that the pueblo was the owner of the property at that time, would
constitute no defense. There is no claim made by him that since the delivery of the
possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the title thereto by
other means, nor does he in his own behalf make any claim whatever either to the
property or to the possession thereof.
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such, to be the owner of the
property. As we have said before, the evidence shows that it never was in the physical
possession of the property. But waiving this point and assuming that the possession of
Ramirez, which he alleges in his answer is the possession of the municipality, gives the
municipality the rights of a possessor, the question still arises, Who has the better right
to the present possession of the property? The plaintiff, in 1902, had been in the lawful
possession thereof for more than thirty years and during all that time its possession had
never been questioned or disturbed. That possession has been taken away from it and it
has the right now to recover the possession from the persons who have so deprived it of
such possession, unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto. This
was the proposition which was discussed and settled in the case of the Bishop of
Cebu vs. Mangaron,[1] No. 1748, decided June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as
against one who has been in possession for the length of time the plaintiff has been in
possession, and who has been deprived of his possession, and who can not produce any
written evidence of title, the mere fact that the defendant is in possession does not
entitle the defendant to retain that possession. In order that he may continue in
possession, lie must show a better right thereto.
The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality lias, as sucli, any right
whatever in the property in question. It has produced no evidence of ownership. Its
claim of ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following propositions:
That the property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish
Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the Government
of the United States; that by section 1.2 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such
property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that by the
circular of that Government, dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and the right to
the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the
purposes of the argument, we should admit that the other propositions are true, there is
no evidence whatever to support the last proposition, namely that the Government of the
Philippine Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the municipality of
Lagonoy. We have found no circular of the date above referred to. The one of February
10, 1903, which is probably the one intended, contains nothing that indicates any such
transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy, therefore, it is very clear that it has neither
title, ownership, nor right to possession.
(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership even admitting that the
Spanish Government was the owner of the property and that it passed by the treaty of
Paris to the American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a matter of law,
the Spanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed, was not the owner
of this property, nor of any other property like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the
Philippine Islands were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title1 2, book 1, of the
Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows:
"Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses of the Spaniards and
natives of our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and expense of our
royal treasury, and applied for their service and maintenance the part of the tithes
belonging' to us by apostolic concession according to the division we have made."
Law 3 of the same title relates to the construction of parochial churches such as the one
in question. That law is as follows:
"The parish churches which may be erected in Spanish towns shall be of durable and
decent construction. Their cost shall be divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal
treasury, another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the place where such
churches are constructed, and the other part by the Indians who abide there; and if
within the limits of a city, village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated to
our royal crown, we command that for our part there be contributed the same amount as
the residents and encomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents who have no
Indians shall also contribute for this purpose in accordance with their stations and
wealth, and that which is so given shall be deducted from the share the Indians should
pay."
Law 11 of the same title is as follows:
"We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the erection of
churches shall be given to their superintendents to be extended for those things
necessary for these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials, and by their
warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and charge the archbishops and bishops
not to interfere in the collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard these
structures."
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:
"In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall be erected a church
where mass can be decently held, and it shall have a door with a key, notwithstanding
the fact that it be subject to or separate from a parish."
Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and under
his direction, but it was made unlawful to erect a church without the license of the King.
This provision is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:
"Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and maintain all cathedrals, parish
churches, monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious and pious
establishments where they are necessary for the teaching, propagation, and preaching of
the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to aid to this effect with our royal
treasury whenever possible, and to receive information of such places where they
should be founded and are necessary, and the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies
belonging to us:
"We command that there shall not be erected, instituted, founded, or maintained any
cathedral, parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious or
religious establishment without our express permission as is provided in Law 1, title 2,
and Law 1, title 3, of this book, notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by
our.viceroy or other ministers, which in this respect we revoke and make null, void, and
of no effect."
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain, all tithes in the
Indies were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made by the King of the
fund thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as follows:
"Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by apostolic concessions
of the supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our royal treasury of those
provinces to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become due from the
crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in which it has been the custom to pay
the same, and from these tithes the churches shall be provided with competent persons
of good character to serve them and with all ornaments and things which may be
necessary for divine worship, to the end that these churches may be well served and
equipped, and we shall be informed of the provisions made, it pertaining to the worship
of God, our Lord; this order shall be observed where the contrary has not already been
directed by us in connection with the erection of churches."
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was continued
to the present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by
the roya.1 order of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the construction and repair
of churches, there being authority for saying that the latter order was in force in the
Philippines.
This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines, having been
erected by the Spanish Government, and under its direction, the next question to be
considered is, To whom did these churches belong? Title 28 of the third partida is
devoted to the ownership of things and, after discussing what can be called public
property and what can be called private property, speaks, in Law 12, of those things
which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as follows:
"LAW XII-HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY
ANY PERSON.
"No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of
ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his property holdings.
Although the priests may have such things in their possession, yet they are not the
owners thereof. They hold them thus as guardians or servants, or because they have the
care of the same and serve God in or with them. Hence they were allowed to take from
the revenues of the church and lands what was reasonably necessary for their support;
the balance, belonging to God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding
and clothing of the poor, (he support of orphans, the marrying of poor virgins to prevent
their becoming evil women because of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives
and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, hooks, and
others tilings which they might be in need of, and other similar charitable purposes."
And then taking up for consideration the tirst of the classes into which this law has
divided these things, it defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida, consecrated things.
Thai law is as follows:
"Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by I he bishops, such as
churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other
things which are intended for the service of the church, and the title to these tilings can
not be alienated except in certain specific cases as we have .already shown in the
first partida of this book by the laws dealing with this subject We say further that even
when1 a consecrated church is razed, the ground upon which it formerly stood shall
always be consecrated ground. Jiut if any consecrated church should fall into the hands
of the enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease to be sacred as long as the
enemy has it under control, although once recovered by the Christians, it will again
become sacred, reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall have all
the rights and privileges formerly belonging to it."
That the principles of the partidas in reference to churches still exist is indicated by
Sanchez Roman, whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement:
"First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. A. Spiritual.From early times
distinction has been made by authors and by law between things governed by divine
law, called divine, and those governed by human law, called human, and although the
former can not be the subject of civil juridical relations, their nature and species should
be ascertained either to identify them and exclude them from such relations or because
they furnish a complete explanation of the foregoing tabulated statement, or finally
because1 the laws of the partidas deal with them.
"Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by God for
his service and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or canonical
laws. This makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual tilings, which are those
which have a direct influence on the religious redemption of man such as the
sacrament, prayers, fasts, indulgences, etc., and corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are
those means more or less direct for the proper religions salvation of man.
"7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things(sacred, religious,
holy, and temporal belonging to the church). Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so
divided.
"(a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and worship in general, such as
temples, altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be alienated except for some1
pious purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws, according to which their
control pertains to the ecclesiastical authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned,
to the believers and the clergy. (2 Dereeho Civil Español, Sanchez Koman, p. 480; 8
Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, p. 030; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionario de
la Adininistracion Española, p. 480.)"
The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what
belonged to private persons. In the first group churches are not named. The present
Civil Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. Article
339, which defines public property, is as follows:
"Property of public ownership is
"1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and
bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character.
"2. That belonging exclusively to the State without being for public use and which is
destined to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as
walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their
concession lias been granted."
The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos, and in defining what
property is of public use, article 344 declares as follows:
"Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town
roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public
works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.
"All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall lie governed by the
provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribed in special laws."
It will be noticed that in neither one of these articles is any mention made of churches.
When the Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which were for the
common use of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it
mentioned a great many other things, it did not mention churches.
It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage
Law indicates that churches belong to the State and are public property. That article is
as follows:
"There shall he exeepted from the record required by article 2 of the law:
"First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and
which is for the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders,
wagon roads, and roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks,
public promenades and commons of towns, provided they are not lands of common
profit to the inhabitants; walls of cities and parks,. ports, and roadsteads, and any other
analogous property during the time they are in common and general use, always
reserving the servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of
navigable rivers.
"Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith."
A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State
and to the eminent domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had belonged to
the State, they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed
in a paragraph by themselves.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the
United States, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the
commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of private
property in the sense that any private person could be the owner thereof. They
constituted a kind of property the distinctive characteristic of which was that it was
devoted to the worship of God.
But, being material things it was necessary that some one should have the care and
custody of them and the administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom,
under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and administration? For the
purposes of the Spanish law there was only one religion. That was the religion
professed by the Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion and
for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the Philippines
were erected. The possession of the churches, their care and custody, and the
maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that
body. It was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which could under any
circumstances have possession of, or any control over, any church dedicated to the
worship of God. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of control were
necessarily exclusive. It is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of
possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings
of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical
person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the
exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in
the Philippines, did not give him any right to interfere with the material possession of
these buildings.
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the Laws of the of Indies treats Del Patronazgo
Real de las Indias. There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this
lille which in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in
the Indies because he had constructed them. These laws relate to the right of
presentation to ecclesiastical charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title
commences as follows:
"Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries,
prebends, curates, and doctrines and all other beneficies and ecclesiastical offices
whatsoever belong to us, no other person can obtain or possess the same without, our
presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title."
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private jwrsons,
but there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the
private patron is the owner of the church.
When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended
to say that the Government had no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power
of eminent domain which necessarily resides in every government, it might have
appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of individuals, lint
nothing of this kind was ever, attempted in the Philippines.
It, therefore, follows that in 1908, and prior to the frealy of Paris, (he Woman Catholic
Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the
legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was
consecrated. It was then in lhe full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights
aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That
treaty, in article S, provides, among other things, as follows:
"And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to
which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or
rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic
bodies, or any other associations having1 legal capacity to acquire and possess property
in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever
nationality such individuals may be."
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the
Government of the United States, nor the Government of these Island.s, lias ever
attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had
in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference
that has resulted has been caused by private individuals, acting without any authority
from the Government. Against such interference by private persons with the rights of
others, redress is given in the courts of justice without reference to the provisions of the
treaty of Paris.
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made
between the church and the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the
church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the
Laws of the Indies would apply. That law is as follows:
"We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as
mav be deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios may live
comfortably adjoining the parish church of the place where they may be built for the
benefit of the priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and
conversion of their Indian parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any
other purpose."
The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is always
mentioned in connection with the church and convent and no point is made by the
appellant that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of the church and
convent, lie is not also entitled to recover possession of the cemetery. So, without
discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are in all respects
applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the
same right to the cemetery that he has to the church.
(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Koman So ordered.
G.R. No. L-5921 July 25, 1911
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, defendants;
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
Chicote and Miranda for appellant.
W.A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals,
and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties,
assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard
Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with
interest at P1 per month.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors
for payment of the P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent
per month from the 15th of December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on
Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default
and were so notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76,
together with the interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until
complete payment should have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife
of Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter
was declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that
she was appointed his guardian by the same court; (3) that, on October 11, following,
she was authorized by the court, as guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings
for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity,
among them that concerned in the present cause, issued in behalf of The Standard Oil
Company of New York; (4) that she, the guardian, was not aware of the proceedings
had against her husband and was only by chance informed thereof; (5) that when
Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he was already
permanently insane, was in that state when summoned and still continued so, for which
reason he neither appeared nor defended himself in the said litigation; and, in
conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve the said defendant Villanueva from
compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against him in the suit before
mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the said
defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond in
question, which evidence could not be presented in due season on account of the then
existing incapacity of the defendant.
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of
evidence, after due consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that when
Vicente Villanueva, on the 15th of December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he
understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act performed by him and
that the consent that was given by him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and,
consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such findings the court ruled that the
petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the case be
denied and that the said execution be carried out.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with
reference to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of
exceptions was presented in support of the appeal submitted to this court and which is
based on a single assignment of error as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by
the defendant Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as
the one herein concerned.
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine
which supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily
imply the result that the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a
contract of bond like the one here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower
court. It would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and
constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the
defendant Villanueva was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other
cause, that is, that there was not, nor could there have been any other cause for the
contract than an ostentation of wealth and this purely an effect of monomania of wealth;
and that the monomania existed on the date when the bond in question was executed.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this
branch of medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility,
some of them, as Casper, going so far into a wealth of classification and details as to
admit the existence of 60 to 80 distinct states, an enumeration of which is unnecessary.
Hence, the confusion and the doubt in the minds of the majority of the authors of
treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment and the point of
beginning of this incapacity, there being some who consider as a sufficient cause for
such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even those other chronic diseases
or complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania,
somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers passional
states which more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty."
(Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge
of the state of mental alienation such certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant
the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who suffers the monomania of wealth,
believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is really insane and it is to be
presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under the influence of a
perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous contract .The
bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and
his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until
July 24, 1909.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years
suffered from such monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine
above cited, that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere
illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind
himself in a contract. Specifically, in reference to this case, the following facts were
brought out in the testimony given by the physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don
Gervasio de Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the first of whom had visited him
some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903, and the latter, only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q. But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns
his houses and if you should direct him to read it, do you believe that he would
understand the contents of the document?
A. As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing
particularly remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the question involved,
it might be that he could not do that; it depends upon what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q. Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those
concerning greatness?
A. Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of
greatness and wealth.
Q. He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?
A. Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I
have made no trial.
Q. Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of
this monomania of greatness and wealth?
A. Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q. He knows how to read and write, does he not?
A. Yes, sir I believe that he does.
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had prepared
the instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers; that he explained to
Mr. Villanueva its contents and when the witness asked the latter whether he wished to
sign it he replied that he was willing and did in fact do so; that the defendant's mental
condition appeared to the witness to be normal and regular and that he observed nothing
to indicate the contrary; and that the defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in an
ordinary way without giving cause fir any suspicion that there was anything abnormal.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the
Court of First Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the
Chinaman Go-Cho-Co, and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein,
the witness asked him some questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether
he was solvent and would be adequate surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as
many, others had done, and witness did not notice any particular disorder or
perturbation of his mental faculties; that he answered the questions concerning the
property that he held, stated its value, specified the place where it was situated, his
answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated; that he therefore approved the
bond; and that all this took place between July and September, 1908. This witness
having been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the
date mentioned, had again been surety in any other case, and whether it appeared
strange to witness that Mr. Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for
that reason he rejected this new bond, replied that it was in that same case relative to the
estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he endeavored to investigate, as he customarily
did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given any other previous bond, and the
discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal case, but that, as it
had already been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one offered by Mr.
Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be
not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or
out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a
consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not
be expressed in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the
debtor proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of bond the
consideration, general, is no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the
liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.) Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for
some other consideration, according to the agreement and the free stipulation of the
parties and may be, as in onerous and remuneratory contracts, something remunerative
stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two
members of the firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified
that he had never had dealings with Villanueva; from which it is inferred that the latter
could hardly have been moved to favor the former by the benefit of an assumed
obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos, with monthly interest .But he added
that Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for them, to whom Arenas paid
a certain sum of money. The witness did not know, however, whether Arenas gave the
money for the signature of the bond or simply in order that the agent might find
sureties. The fact is that the sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his
dealings with Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the
13th of May, 1909, that is, two days before Villanueva was declared to be in default,
inviting him to a conference "for the purpose of treating of a matter of great importance
of much interest to Villanueva, between 5 and 6 of that same day, in the garden and on
the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel, on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle
Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not be affirmed with certainty
(the trial court considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the business of giving
bonds for a certain consideration or remuneration; but neither can it be sustained that
there was no other cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental disorder
that dominated the intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his believing
himself so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person
whatever. There is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate
ostentation of wealth, nor that, if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds,
among them that herein concerned, he was influenced only by the monomania of
boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting
that he was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the
bond now under discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of
incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is not
enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at
a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the performance of the act
which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor, the
latter was insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the performance of
that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent. The
witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's
conduct, referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another of them to the year
1908, but none to December 15, 1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be
invalidated. the testimony of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife
endeavored, in 1908, to have her husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and
cared for therein, objection was made by the director of the institution who advised her
that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men, as soon as he shouted
and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up in the insane ward; to
which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly insane enough to be
placed among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in this case, stated:
that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go wherever he
wished and do what he liked; that her husband had property of his own and was not
deprived of its management; that he went out every morning without her knowing
where he went; that she did not know whether he had engaged in the business of signing
bonds, and that, with reference to the one now concerned, she had learned of it only by
finding to note, before mentioned, wherein Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on the
benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel; that she had not endeavored legally to deprive
him of the management of his own real estate which had been inherited by him,
although he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the payment of the land tax,
all this being done by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the
family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point under
discussion, she was asked:
Q. It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go
out of the house and was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A. He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the
markets, and buys provisions and other things. In fact I don't know where he
goes go.
Q. From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being
sane when he was on the street, according to your opinion?
A. Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very
strange that this should have occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there
are many people who can testify in regard to this particular.
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to the
market, would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions, and
when she was asked by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied
that, as far as she knew, he had never squandered any large sum of money; that he had
never been engaged in business; that he supported himself on what she gave him; and
that if he had something to count on for his living, it was the product of his lands.
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it
is very evident that it can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when
Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary
capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-11872 December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis
Espiritu, defendant-appellee.
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.
Vicente Foz for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the
judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District
dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual
silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought
suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter
died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu
in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The
plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado,
were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis
Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a
tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of
Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint,
which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters,
through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the
year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently
succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale
of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was divided among
the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that
said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in
question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of
said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and
Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes
of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis
Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel
therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and
void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that
the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land
that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita
Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent,
to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint,
denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged
that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed
rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the
plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y
Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit,
an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on
May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity
as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same
Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered
by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's)
children, and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from said
Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May
17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their
sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally
in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto
de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu, effected by
their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they
sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the
property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they acknowledged
having received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-complaint the
defendant alleged that the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and
malicious, and that thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to
the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be
rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the land in
litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages, and
that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set
forth, and in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale
inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they
reached their majority the four years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had
not yet elapsed. They therefore asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-
complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the
judgment aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a
reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken
by the petitioners, and the proper bill of exceptions having been presented, the same
was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on
May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions
submitted to the decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the
plaintiffs were then minors and therefore incapable of selling their property on the date
borne by the instrument Exhibit 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person
who is really and truly a minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can,
after the execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the
instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates the contract, in
accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that he may obtain the
restitution of the land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title
by composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio
of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75
hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon
Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands passed by inheritance to his four children named
Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's estate,
the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-seven and odd hectares
was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares. Margarita
Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five
children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed
Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of
law, one-half of the land described in the complaint.
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them
of two-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land
described in the complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and
37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question
comprised only an area such as is customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs'
mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis
Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by
about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account of the loss of the original of said
instrument, which was on the possession of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore
because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of public documents of the
Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of
the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party
Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his own
name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa,
and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had
been made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the
widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or
mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six
cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said
Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in question — a transaction which
Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to cover his
children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year
1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo
and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal
status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on
May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their
deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and
authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of
P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price, the land described in said
instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to
that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of
Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu
and Ines Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of
Hermogenes Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the
ground that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to
contract, and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed
himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit
(plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish
pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo
Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she testified had been
kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado, pages 396 and 397
of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on August 4,
1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the
averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of said
Domingo Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was
only 23 years old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of
age in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale,
Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of
age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her
brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used
to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the
property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her
brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, pertaining to the year 1910, where in it
appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age; that she did not know why her
uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17,
1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to
her uncle Luis Espiritu.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was
Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was
corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff
Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just how long, under the control of
Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his
wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less
than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his
wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in
spite of its being high land and of inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute,
and that its yield was still larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764
cavanes.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a
witness for the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request
of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they
were all of legal age; that said document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other
contracting parties, after it had been read to them and had been translated into the
Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand Spanish. On cross-
examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age and began to court,
he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she
had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the
year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34
years of age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned
by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its
owner's death, was under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons;
that the products yielded by a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by
about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of
his having acquired the land; and that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband
Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of the land, containing an area
of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held same
until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified
that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased
father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's
house and those of his other relatives. He denied that his father had at any time
administered the property belonging to the Mercado brother and sisters.
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified
that he mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to
Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that
he was not acquainted with its contents. This same witness also testified that he
mediated in a transaction had between Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did
not remember the year), in which the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in
Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this
instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever
was presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have concerned
either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit 1,
or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by
Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2.
In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary
Tanjutco for the purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She
stated that she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle
Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said document was
being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto whose names
appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, because he had sent for her,
as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu
denied ever having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the
plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of
her brother.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the
purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to
effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this
document the vendors, the brother and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz
and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the certainty of the previous sale
which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said purchaser Luis
Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of the
vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit,
Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as
an increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare
having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and
thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just
price of the property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale
of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the
vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an
acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an
area of six cavanes, made with the same purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price
of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows: P2,000,
collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400,
collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu
conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her
death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or
portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit
2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs,
recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting
of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in perpetuity, the
vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the
record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of
any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the
vendors who executed it.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of
previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between
the contracting parties, and also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of
these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of
the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned, without proof to the contrary, it would
be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts hereinabove set forth, that the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or simulate the document
Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by virtue
of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May,
1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the
remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or
intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that
contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the
land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage
in security for the sum of P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the
land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as
its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase
and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it
before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the return of the sum which their deceased
father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime, received as a loan under security of
the pledged property; but, after the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor
Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is
therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract
of final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is
of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its
execution and of the date of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors
in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his
wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of
an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an
instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 — an instrument that disappeared or was
burned — and likewise recognizing that the protocols and register books belonging to
the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request
of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in
said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing
he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority,
inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who
authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's
interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by
said real property.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic
by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence
whatever that this document is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as
such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there is no legal ground or well-
founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore properly admitted as
evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in
that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were
minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891,
though no evidence appears in the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo
Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified copies were presented of their baptismal
certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove
that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the
document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A,
notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date
referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they
were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale
mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered
as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased
father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by him as a loan from his brother-
in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold
by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is
valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions
of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid
and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the
laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in
consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July
11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it
was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on
April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate
the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition
that he did, would also allow it to be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the
claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out on February 14, 1914, where in it is
recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of age, for both these facts
are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement made by the
plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date
when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation
contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was
introduced.

Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it
cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed
the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages
in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as
the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother, Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the
greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice
to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was
obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to secure the
loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to
P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his
children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father
himself, they received through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed,
which passed into the possession of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must
have accrued to them from the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the
execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided
between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by
Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower
of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3,000, the
amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed,
and is the just price of the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be
considered as equivalent to, and compensatory for, the true value of said land.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from
have been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the
evidence of record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-27710 January 30, 1928
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint
wherein it is alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title,
of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said
deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the
fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the
land in question to the defendants.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit
1, dated July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said
document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the
defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While
the evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's
allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the
said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which
is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell
the land in question.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado
vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting
the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case
now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to
the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula
used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff
and her son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that
no amount was given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the
sum of P663.40, which appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately,
by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto
interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years
up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the
witness Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was
contradicted by that of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that
she possesses about half of the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data
in the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second
husband Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from
Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to
the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later
that the land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens
title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir and
caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of
the requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the
provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to
make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to the
transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not
acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration, the
vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.
G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners,
vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
Antonio Barredo for petitioners.
Zosimo D. Tanalega for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons
Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land.
Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931,
Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of
Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and
accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however,
Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw
Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon
Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold
one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share
in the two parcels of land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna.
Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores,
Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the brother
and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the
decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against
Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly
sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest
from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who
was absolved from the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided
one-fourth interest in the lot originally covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna
plus the cost of the suit. From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us
on appeal by certiorari.
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On
August 3, 1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of
legal age. It is not pretend and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not
believe and rely on such recital of fact. This conclusion is decisive and very obvious in
the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that in the resolution on the for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that when informed of
appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest
beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor,
strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was
executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative by the following positive
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.
As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say
that the appellees were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the
transaction was completed. (Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect
their interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in
writing of appellant's minority. (Resolution.)
. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that
appellant was a minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit
1) informing appellees of his client's desire to disaffirm the contract . . .
(Decision.)
The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after
the contract was made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not
serve to bar it unless the period fixed by the statute of limitations expired
before the filing of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the
appellants invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215),
wherein this court held:
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the
sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact
they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled
in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the
judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of
minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith.
(Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1840, July 11, 1868,
and March 1, 1875.)
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the
appellants did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not
suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the
consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino
Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in
the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing
obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents
himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as
long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance
to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness
(unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the
absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed
that the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the appellee's minority.
Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a contract executed by parties with
full legal capacity.

The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated
information merely leads to the inference that the appellants in fact did not know that
the appellee was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes
appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said
information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the sum
of P500.

Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the
real age of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The
suggestion, while perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the
point, because the findings of the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants
knew or could suspected appellee's minority.

The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee
informing the appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the
sale, and that although the choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until
the courts adjudge the agreement to be invalid, said notice shielded the appellee from
laches and consequent estoppel. This position is untenable since the effect of estoppel in
proper cases is unaffected by the promptness with which a notice to disaffirm is made.

The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants
absolved from the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
Oscar M. Herrera for petitioners.
R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the
Court of Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de
Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30,
1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing
(Exhibit A) to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the
cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been
established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have
received P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that
Guillermo and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A.
After hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the
appellate court affirmed, in the terms above described.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because
the minority of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal
defense of the minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares
for which such minors may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that
at the time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and
18 respectively. However, the Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the
following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that
they were not yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should
have appraised him on their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the
information relative to their age, parted with his money, then he should be
contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps
defendants in their desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and
willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment
with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant
case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on
be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation
contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37
Phil., 215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their
minority in the same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal
proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical
duty to disclose their inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a
contract as part of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis
of an action in tort. Other authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be
the basis of such an action, on the theory that such misrepresentation is not a
part of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the enforcement of
liability for such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of
enforcing liability on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the
fraud must be actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere
silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud which can
be made the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis Ours.)
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him
in the belief that he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere
failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient. (27 American
Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document
signed therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained
no such statement. In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active
misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt
it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment
in favor of limiting the scope of the application of the Mercado ruling, what with the
consideration that the very minority which incapacitated from contracting should
likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not
be legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed
only in 1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too
late to invoke it because more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become
emancipated upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the
Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action to annul a contract by reason of
majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. The
parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however, that in
October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in
October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that
when this defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely
elapsed from October 1947.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by
Article 1301 of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action,
without the minors asking for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they
have not filed in this case an action for annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse
from liability.

Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary
responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written
contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent
that they have profited by the money they received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that
the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the
Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that they had profited to
the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively established
in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were
equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.

Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should
now return P1,166.67.3Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A)
can not be enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding
themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said
Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario
Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944;
and Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total
amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint
was filed. No costs in this instance.
G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472 March 13, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
William J. Rohde for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with
parricide, in one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his
daughter. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the
accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case. From this judgment he
appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court together.
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the
manner charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of
these crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were
introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at
and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. they also testified that he had been
complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for
the prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that
he refused into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was
cut by the appellant; that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who
were cut by him;" that he did not know of any disagreement between the appellant and
the two deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt
pains in his head and stomach." The witness further stated that the appellant's "eyes
were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and
daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because
if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife and child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin
capture the appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt
pains in the head and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he
looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without
paying any attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and
stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked
very sad at the time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that
"he must have been crazy because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant,
testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his
head is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for
something he goes back he does without saying anything, even if he comes back he
does not say anything at all;" that when the appellant returns from work he does not say
a word; and that about every other night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What
kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found
that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other
wounds on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from
one side to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the
defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant in the jail and that he
did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.
There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up
into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does.
Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An
extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person
acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy"
is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound
mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness testified that
"according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy
he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy"
evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person
would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman;
crazy, because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who
it was." It is not at all unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and
child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture
him. The appellant's sister said "he must have been crazy because he cut me." This is
another illustration of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being thus used to
describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow
prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse
which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant
might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me;
what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient
to show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for
an assault with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition
which would involved no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision
distinguished between passion and insanity as follows:
 But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the
law may extend to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed
from criminal responsibility. Those who have not lost control of their reason
by mental unsoundness are bound to control their tempers and restrain their
persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow their
anger to lead them so far as to make them reckless, the fact that they have
become at last too infuriated to keep them from mischief is merely the result of
not applying restraint in season. There would be no safety for society if people
could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and then to desperate acts of
violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and unbridled
passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure and punishment.
(People vs. Finley, 38 Mich., 482; Welch vs. Ware, 32 Mich., 77.)
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued
with an explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives
of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under
such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of homicides
committed are occasioned by just such motives as these.' "
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the
subject of anger and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following
concise statement:
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that
mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from
any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system,
where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility
for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish
between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse
resulting from disease of the mind.
In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was
convicted of the crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any
question as to the actual commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the
accused committed them, confined himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that
on the night of the crime the defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind and that
in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts, wounding his wife and the other
members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the decision in that case this
court stated:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became
demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude
that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the
ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will
are proven.
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal
actions, we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262,
265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that
the accused is sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the
fact. (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C., 454.) If the killing and nothing more
appears, this presumption, without other proof upon the point of sanity, is
sufficiently to support a conviction and as the State must prove every element
of the crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this
presumption affords such proof. This presumption however may be overthrow.
It may be shown on the part of the accused that the criminal intent did not exist
at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional is a defense, and like
other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of it. "The
positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a
dispensation to the prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be
proved as it s affirmed by him." (State vs. Stark, 1 Strob., 506.)
What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient
merely to allege insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading,
a denial, and ineffectual without proof. In order to make not such defense, as it
seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome in the first place the
presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be offered.
In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the
impulse of passion or revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for
the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the
consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the
commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the
person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct
consequences of his insanity.
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an
enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound
mind at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each information
having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the
judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. 54135
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of
P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
"The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita
Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother
of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias 'Baket Ines' with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house
at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two
children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the
mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house
about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00
o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of
the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the
complainant inside the store and said, 'Come, let us have sexual intercourse,' to which
Estelita replied, 'I do not like,' and struggled to free herself and cried. Theaccused held a
bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie
down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own
pants, went on top of the complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her
inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused
cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the
house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not
leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the
accused that evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily
routine work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what
happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel
ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's
mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant
could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18,
1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon
knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately
accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police
Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a
cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal
building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police
headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit 'E', which the accused allegedly used in threatening
the complainant."[1]
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial
and in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following
"Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the
testimony of the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution,
'Exhibits B and C'.
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the
mental condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was
suffering from insanity."[2]
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose
testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony
of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape
incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she
had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that
she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother
who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and
brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on
cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential
details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and
therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant.[3]
The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of
complainant in this respect is clear and convincing:
"Fiscal Guillermo:
Q: Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from
the door and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now,
after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what
happened then?
A: 'You come and we will have sexual intercourse,' he said.
Q: And what did you say?
A: 'I do not like,' I said.
Q: And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual
intercourse with him?
A: I struggled and cried.
Q: What did the accused do after that?
A: He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what
he wanted to do. He was able to do what he wanted to do.
Q: This 'kutsilyo' you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please A: He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
demonstrate, if any? Fiscal Guillermo:
A: This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet Q: Now, when he inserted his private parts inside your vagina what did you feel,
long.) if any?
xxx xxx xxx A: I felt something that came out from his inside.
Fiscal Guillermo: Q: Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your
Q: Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after vagina?
he placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what A: Around five (5) minutes maybe, sir.
did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo at your throat and before having Q: After that what happened then?
sexual intercourse with you? A: He removed it.
A: He had sexual intercourse with me. Q: After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
Q: What was your wearing apparel that evening? A: No more, sir, he sat down.
A: I was wearing pants, sir. Q: What, if any, did he tell you?
Q: Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear? A: There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my mother and to anybody in
A Yes, sir, I have a panty. their house.
Q: Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do Q: What else did he tell you?
with respect to your pants and your panty? A: He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
A: He removed them, sir. Q: After that where did you go?
Q: Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do? A: I went home already, sir."[4]
A: I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a mental aberration
that's why he succeeded. characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At
Q: Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant
happened? confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and
A: He went on top of me, sir. treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the
Q: At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel? hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
A: He was wearing pants.
Q: When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and
panty, was he still wearing his pants? physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip
A: He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants. and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service,
Q: And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he respectively.
opened? In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning
A: I saw his penis. appellant's mental condition were set forth:
Q: Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his
penis which you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what "On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look
did you do, if any? up whenever questioned but refused to answer.
A: I struggled. On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with
Q: Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around
the accused when he was on top of you? him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He
A: Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get. refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally
xxx xxx xxx inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep
COURT: thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are 'Aywan ko, hindi ko alam.'
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in getting what he wanted to get? His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices 'parang ibon, tinig ng ibon,' but
Fiscal Guillermo: cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be here."
allowed to ask a leading question which is a follow-up question? The report then concluded:
Witness:
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by
carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce],
smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility,
seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing
strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs
further hospitalization and treatment."[5]
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of
appellant's mental condition:
"At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his responses. There is
dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by
himself and would show periods of being irritable saying - 'oki naman' with nobody in
particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not
know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong
act"
and the following conclusions:
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of
irritability - cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative,
retarded in his responses, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied
and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment."[6]
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become
"better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone,
in touch with his surroundings and x x x free from hallucinatory experiences." During
the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he
stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups.
During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores,
conversed and associated freely with other members of the household and slept well,
although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at
times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could not understand.
The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental
condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment,
medication and check-ups.[7]
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in
household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed"
and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was
in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."[8]
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who
suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the
hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia
when he raped complainant.[9] The defense next presented Dr. Raquel Jovellano, a
psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that he had examined and treated
the appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
"Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -- The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court.
xxx xxx x x x."
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only
in People vs. Formigones[10] that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal
insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on
the Revised Penal Code, thus:
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may
be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For
this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of
the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because
mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with]
imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he
was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary,
and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him
from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of
will are proved." (Underscoring supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases.[11] A
linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests
that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition --
"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test
of volition -- "or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will." But our
caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition rather than on a test relating to
"freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where
this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of
"freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches
out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show
complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a
mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-
power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts."[12]
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is
said to be the most common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages
15 and 30.[13] A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
"Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a
disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler
also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic -- that is, his detachment from
reality and his consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his
uncertain effectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often
referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he
considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a
diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken
aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic
hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of
one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions
controlled or influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of
second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-
rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and
euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia x x x.
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external
stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory
hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more
voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices
address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or
are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic
patients experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently,
for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly
spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic
patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic or affective psychoses
experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day,
but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the
night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual
hallucinations occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in
color, life size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never
occur by themselves but always in combination with hallucinations in one of the other
sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by
reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient -- that is, not part of his cultural
environment. They are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid
type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious
power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for
schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and
for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept
up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or
spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for many
schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world."[14]
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting
circumstance,[15] it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the
evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties,
such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the
consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as
follows:
"(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q: Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say
doctor that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in
connection with the incident in this case?
A: He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q: Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape?
A: Yes, he was conscious.
Q: And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A: Yes.
Q: And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A: Yes.
Q: And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he
will place his penis?
A: Yeah.
Q: And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A: Yes. accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
Q: Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic committed.[18] Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians
which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental
that is committed? condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to
A: Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
the act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted
an insane and a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense
devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary chose to present Dr. Nerit.
environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q: Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
accused here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape? In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not
A: Yes, they are also capable. exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of
Q: He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault? his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the
A: Yes. Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's
Q: And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to will-power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant
perform all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have
person? affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code:
A: Yes, it could be done. "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty
Q: Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not? (reclusionperpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
A: Yes, sir. mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
Q: Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is deed."
wrong?
A: Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the
wrong but yet there is no inhibition on the individual. amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Q: Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are
going to commit is wrong?
A: Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the
inhibition. The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there,
the drive is [not] there."[16] (Underscoring supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the
time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is
critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan
threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually
assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr.
Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that a person suffering from schizophrenia
sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of the power of
self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently
demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it
is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of
insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.[17] Here, appellant failed to present clear
and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the
sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the
G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991
180 SCRA 509 [1989]), to wit:
BENJAMIN P. ABELLA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 100739 September 3, 1991
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMSSION ON ELECTIONS and SILVESTRE DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. for petitioner in 100739.
Cesar A. Sevilla for petitioner in 100710.
Panganiban, Benitez, Baninaga & Bautista for private respondent S. de la Cruz.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on who is the rightful governor of
the province of Leyte 1) petitioner Adelina Larrazabal (G.R. No. 100739) who obtained
the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and was
proclaimed as the duly elected governor but who was later declared by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) "... to lack both residence and registration qualifications for
the position of Governor of Leyte as provided by Art. X, Section 12, Philippine
Constitution in relation to Title II, Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 137 and Sec. 89, R.A.
No. 179 and is hereby disqualified as such Governor"; 2) petitioner Benjamin Abella
(G.R. No. 100710), who obtained the second highest number of votes for the position of
governor but was not allowed by the COMELEC to be proclaimed as governor after the
disqualification of Larrazabal; or 3) Leopoldo E. Petilla, the vice-governor of the
province of. Leyte.
This is the fourth time that the controversy relating to the local elections in February 1,
1988 for governor of the province of Leyte is elevated to this Court. The antecedent
facts of these cases are stated in the earlier consolidated cases of BENJAMIN P.
ABELLA and SILVESTRE T. DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, v. ADELINA INDAY
LARRAZABAL, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LEYTE and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents (G.R. Nos. 87721-30) and BENJAMN
P. ABELLA and SILVESTRE T. DE LA CRUZ, petitioners v. ADELINA
LARRAZABAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents (G. R. No. 88004)
The Court has ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos 87721-30 and G.R. No.
88004 involving the same parties and the same election in 1988 for the office
of provincial governor of Leyte. Challenged in the petitions for certiorari are
the resolutions of the respondent Commission on Elections dismissing the pre-
proclamation and disqualification cases filed by the herein petitioners against
private respondent Adelina Larrazabal.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party
for provincial governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1, 1988.
The private respondent is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original
candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the
Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack of residence. (G.R. No.
88004, Rollo, pp. 102-104) (He filed a petition for certiorari to challenge this
resolution. He, however, filed an urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw petition
which was granted in a resolution dated January 21, 1988 and the case was
dismissed. [G.R. No. 81313]) On January 31, 1988, the day before the election,
she filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband. (Ibid.,
p. 48) The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock in the morning, Silvestre de la
Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her
certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. (Id., pp. 113-118) This was
immediately transmitted to the main office of the Commission on Elections,
which could not function, however, because all but one of its members had not
yet been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. De la Cruz then
came to this Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on February 4,
1988, enjoining the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte 'from proclaiming
Adelina Larrazabal as the winning candidate for the Office of the Governor in
the province of Leyte, in the event that she obtains the winning margin of votes
in the canvass of election returns of said province.' (Id., p. 179) On March 1,
1988, the Commission on Elections having been fully constituted, we
remanded the petition thereto for appropriate action, including maintenance or
lifting of the Court's temporary restraining order of February 4, 1988. (Id. pp.
182-184)
In the meantime, petitioner Abella, after raising various verbal objections (later
duly reduced to writing) during the canvass of the election returns, seasonably
elevated them to the Commission on Elections in ten separate appeals docketed
as SPC Nos. 88-627 to 88627-I. Pending resolution of these cases, Abella
intervened on March 7, 1988 in the disqualification case, docketed as SPC No.
88-546, and the following day filed a complaint, with the Law Department of
the COMELEC charging the private respondent with falsification and
misrepresentation of her residence in her certificate of candidacy. On March
 22, 1988, the public respondent consolidated the pre-proclamation and
disqualification cases with the Second Division.
On February 3, 1989, this Division unanimously upheld virtually all the
challenged rulings of the provincial board of canvassers, mostly on the ground
that the objection raised were merely formal and did not affect the validity of
the returns or the ballots, and ordered the proclamation of the winner after
completion of the canvass. (G.R. Nos. 87721-30, Rollo, pp. 18-50) On that
same date, the disqualification case was also dismissed by a 2-1 decision, and
the matter was referred to the Law Department for 'preliminary investigation
for possible violation of Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. ' (G.R. Nos.
88004, Rollo, pp. 26-40)
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution on the pre-proclamation cases
was denied by the COMELEC en banc on April 13, 1989, with no dissenting
vote. (G.R. Nos. 87721-30, Rollo, pp. 51-56) These cases are the subject of
G.R. Nos. 87721-30, where we issued on April 18, 1989, another temporary
restraining order to the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte to CEASE and
DESIST from resuming the canvass of the contested returns and/or from
proclaiming private respondent Adelina Larrazabal Governor of Leyte.
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution on the qualification case was
also denied by the COMELEC en banc on May 4, 1989, but with three
commissioners dissenting. (G.R. No. 88004, Rollo, pp 47-61; penned by
Commissioner Abueg, Jr., with Commissioners Africa Rama, and Yorac,
dissenting) The dismissal of this case is the subject of G.R. No. 88004. (at pp.
511-513)
Disposing of the consolidated petitions, this Court rendered judgment as follows:
1. In G.R.Nos. 87721-30, the decision dated February 3, 1989, the resolution
dated April 13, 1989, are affirmed and the petition is DISMISSED.
2. In G.R. No. 88004, the decision dated February 3,1989, and the resolution
dated May 4, 1989, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Commission on Elections is ORDERED to directly hear and decide SPC Case
No. 88-546 under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, with authority to
maintain or lift our temporary restraining order of April 18, 1989, according to
its own assessment of the evidence against the private respondent.
The parties are enjoined to resolve this case with all possible speed, to the end
that the Governor of Leyte may be ascertained and installed without further
delay. (p. 520)
In view of these rulings, the COMELEC, upon motion of Larrazabal, lifted its
temporary restraining order against her proclamation paving Larrazabal's proclamation
and her assumption to the Office of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the
disqualification case (SPC No. 88-546) continued.
On February 14, 1991, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision
disqualifying Larrazabal as governor.
On July 18, 1991, the Commission en banc issued a resolution which denied
Larrazabal's motion to declare decision void and/or motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the second division's decision. In the same resolution, the Commission
disallowed Abella's proclamation as governor of Leyte.
Hence, these petitions.
We treat the various Comments as Answers and decide the petitions on their merits.
Acting on a most urgent petition (motion) for the issuance of a restraining order filed by
petitioner Larrazabal, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on August 1,
1991.
xxx xxx xxx
... [E]ffective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering the respondent on on Elections to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing, implementing and executing the decision and resolution,
respectively dated February 14, 1991 and July 18, 1991.
It appearing that despite the filing of this petition before this Court and during
its pendency, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Leyte Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla,
took his oath as Provincial Governor of Leyte and assumed the governorship as
contained in his telegraphic message, pursuant to COMELEC resolution SPC
No. 88-546, promulgated on July 18, 1991, the Court further Resolved to
ORDER Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla to MAINTAIN the status quo ante then
prevailing and/or existing before the filing of this petition and to DESIST from
assuming the office of the Governor and from discharging the duties and
functions thereof. (Rollo-100739, p. 204)
In G.R. No. 100739, petitioner Larrazabal professes that the COMELEC completely
disregarded our pronouncement in G.R. No. 88004 in that instead of acting on SPC
Case No. 88-546 under section 78 of the Election Code, the COMELEC proceeded with
a disqualification case not contemplated in G.R. No. 88004.
The argument is not meritorious.
The questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC conform with this Court's
decision in G.R. No. 88004.
Initially, herein respondent Silvestre T. de la Cruz (Benjamin P. Abella, petitioner in
G.R. No. 100710 was allowed to intervene in the case) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on
the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as
Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The COMELEC
dismissed the petition and referred the case to its Law Department for proper action on
the ground that the petition was a violation of Section 74 of the Election Code and,
pursuant to it rules, should be prosecuted as an election offense under Section 262 of the
Code.
This Court reversed and set aside the COMELEC's ruling, to wit:
The Court holds that the dismissal was improper. The issue of residence
having been squarely raised before it, it should not have been shunted aside to
the Law Department for a roundabout investigation of the private respondent's
qualification through the filing of a criminal prosecution, if found to be
warranted, with resultant disqualification of the accused in case of conviction.
The COMELEC should have opted for a more direct and speedy process
available under the law, considering the vital public interest involved and the
necessity of resolving the question of the earliest possible time for the benefit
of the inhabitants of Leyte.
In the view of the Court, the pertinent provision is Section 78 in relation to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. —
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Section 6 of R.A. 6646 states as follows:
Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The above-stressed circumstances should explain the necessity for continuing
the investigation of the private respondent's challenged disqualification even
after the election notwithstanding that such matter is usually resolved before
the election. Independently of these circumstances, such proceedings are
allowed by Section 6 of RA. 6646 if for any reason a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified ...
In fine, the Court directed the COMELEC to determine the residence qualification of
petitioner Larrazabal in SPC Case No. 88-546. Concomitant with this directive would
be the disqualification of petitioner Larrazabal in the event that substantial evidence is
adduced that she really lacks the residence provided by law to qualify her to run for the
position of governor in Leyte.
In line with the Court's directive, the COMELEC conducted hearings in SPC Case No.
88-546 to resolve the qualification of Larrazabal on the basis of two (2) legal issues
raised by Silvestre T. de la Cruz namely, Larrazabal's lack of legal residence in the
province of Leyte and her not being a registered voter in the province, as required by
Title II, Chapter I, Section 42, B.P. Blg. 337, in relation to Article X, Section 12 of the
Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 42. Qualification. — (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English,
Pilipino, or any other local language or dialect.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abena was that respondent Larrazabal is
neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident
and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but
independent of the province pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the Constitution
thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of Leyte. They presented
testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove their stance.
On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was a resident and a
registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. She, too presented testimonial as well as
documentary evidence to prove her stand.
The COMELEC ruled against the respondent, now petitioner Larrazabal.
In its questioned decision and resolution, the COMELEC found that petitioner
Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter thereat. With
these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor of the province of
Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied
on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required
residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that
under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on
the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc
City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for
as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDIevidenced by her continuous and regular
acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at
Ormoc City." (Petition, Rollo, p. 40)
As can be gleaned from the questioned decision, the COMELEC based its finding that
the petitioner lacks the required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that
despite protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her
residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her
attempt to purportedly change her residence one year before the election by registering
at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the province of
Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident of Ormoc City. In the
absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on the provisions of the Family
Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not
present evidence to show that she and her husband maintain separate residences, she at
Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The second division of the COMELEC
in its decision dated February 14, 1991 states:
xxx xxx xxx
But there is the more fundamental issue of residence. The only indications of a
change of residence so far as respondent is concerned are: the address
indicated in the application for cancellation filed by respondent indicating her
postal address as Kananga, Leyte, the annotation in her Voter's affidavit for
Precinct No. 15 that her registration was cancelled due to lack of residence; the
testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag that she entered into a contract of
lease with option to buy with the spouses Emeterio and Inday Larrazabal over
two parcels of land the witness owned in Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte; that she
sees the spouses in the leased house in Kananga, that she was informed by
Inday Larrazabal that the spouses had decided to buy their property because
she wanted to beautify the house for their residence. She attached as annex the
written contract signed by her and the spouses; and the testimony of Adolfo
Larrazabal Exh. "10" cousin of the spouses that 'at a family meeting ... the
political plan of the Larrazabal clan was discussed, among which were (sic) the
problem of Terry's residence in Ormoc City' and that it was decided in said
meeting ... that Inday Larrazabal, wife of Terry, will transfer her Ormoc
Registration as a voter to Kananga, Leyte (so) she will be able to vote for Terry
and also help me in my candidacy; that they have been staying in Kananga,
very often as they have properties in Lonoy and a house in Mahawan.
The references to residence in the documents of cancellation and registration
are already assessed for their evidentiary value in relation to the documents
themselves above. The question must therefore be addressed in relation to the
testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag and Adolfo V. Larrazabal. The
gist of the testimonies is that they leased properties in Mahawan, Leyte and
that they are seen in the house on the land leased. But the contract of lease with
option to purchase itself indicates as to where the legal residence of the
Jarrazabal is. The pertinent portion states:
SPS EMETERIO V. LARRAZABAL AND ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL,
both of legal age, Filipino, and residents of Ormoc City, Philippines,
hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
The acknowledgment also indicates that Emeterio V. Larrazabal presented his
Residence Certificate No. 155774914 issued in Ormoc City.
The testimony of Adolfo Larrazabal reenforces this conclusion. It admits, as of
the second or third week of November, that the residence of Emeterio
Larrazabal was Ormoc City and that Inday Larrazabal was going to transfer her
registration so she may be able to vote for him.
For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should
be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have
properties and may visit from time to time.
The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of
their habitual residence.
 Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also provide as follows:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one
spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence
which is their usual place of abode. (COMELEC decision, pp. 21-23; Rollo –
100710, pp. 67-69; Emphsis supplied)
As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI we ruled in the case of Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]):
xxx xxx xxx
... [M]ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies,
engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The determination of a persons legal
residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred
from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has
abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly
such abandonment or loss.
xxx xxx xxx
... A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for 'greener pastures' as the
saying goes, to improve his life, and that, of course, includes study in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to
return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of
his professional or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has
the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity
to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin, has not forsaken him. ... (at pp. 297-300)
In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her
residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What
is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and
considers herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon
her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she occasionally
visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an intention to continue her
residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we
formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein although
for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.
Anent the issue of whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte,
the petitioner insists that she is such a registered voter based on the following
antecedents: 1) She cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987,
and 2) she then transferred her registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by
registering thereat and 3) she later voted on election day (February 1, 1988) in Kananga,
Leyte.
Despite the insistence of the petitioner, the evidence shows that her supposed
cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of registration in Kananga,
Leyte, is not supported by the records. As the COMELEC stated:
The train of events, which led to respondent's g of her certificate of candidacy
on the basis of her registration started on November 25, 1987, when she
allegedly filed all application for cancellation of registration Exh. "2-B".
Subsequent to this request, her voter's affidavit in Precinct 15, Ormoc City
with Serial No. 0918394 J was annotated with the words 'cancelled upon
application of the voter due to transfer of residence.' Thereafter, she registered
in Precinct No. 17, Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte on November 28,1987 which
registration was contained in Voter's Affidavit with Serial No. 0190840-J The
cancellation of registration was submitted to the Board of Election Inspectors
on January 9, 1988 (Revision Day) on the submission of the sworn application
at 4:30 p.m. allegedly by a clerk from the Election Registrar's Office with only
the poll clerk and the third member because the Chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors allegedly left earlier and did not come back. Exh. "3-B".
We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. The story is
marked by so many bizarre cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course
of events or the natural behavior of persons. Among these are:
(1) The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y.
Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's
Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in
a sealed envelope;
(2) The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January
9,1988;
(3) The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or
covering letter from the Election Registrar or anybody else;
(4) The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards
the last hour of the revision day, allegedly at 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;
(5) All the members of the Board of Election Inspectors had already signed the
Minutes indicating that no revision of the voter's list was made as of 5:00 PM
(6) The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that
the election clerk had delivered the application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M.
without any reference to the minutes they had previously signed;
(7) Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17,
Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed to have filled up an application for
cancellation of his registration in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct 17
concurrent with his registration. His application for cancellation was never
submitted in evidence.
(8) The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in
Precinct No. 17 are far removed from the serial numbers of the other new
registrants in November 28, 1987 in the same precinct.
The most telling evidence is the list of voters (Form 2-A), Exh. "G", that the
Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the same, closed by the
signatures of both officials showing that there were only nine (9) additional
registered voters in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte, namely, Bantasan,
Merly; Conie; Limosnero Anita; Limosnero W; Pame Virginia; Savenario,
Analiza; Verallo, Ofelia; Basan, Juanita; and Acgang Bonifacio. This is
consistent with the list of new voters after the November 28, 1987 for Precinct
No. 17, Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte submitted by the Election of Kananga to
the National Central File of the Commission per certification of the Chief,
National Central File Division on January 25, 1988 dated January 25, 1988,
Exh. 'C'. The affidavits submitted by the Election Registrar to the Commission
could only have come from the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No.
17, after the November 28, 1987 registration, for the Election Registrar could
not have had the affidavits of these new registrants apart from those supplied
by the Precinct itself. Why were not the affidavits of the Larrazabals included?
Was this part of the incredibly bizarre series of inadvertence and neglect that
spanned Ormoc City and Kananga? This also explains the certification dated
January 29, 1988, of the Election Registrar of Kananga that as of that date Mrs.
Adelina Larrazabal was not a registered voter in any of the' precincts in
Kananga. Exh. "L". It was only on February 15, 1988, or two weeks after the
election day that the same Registrar certified for the first time that there were
two voters lists, the first without the names of the Larrazabals and the second,
which appeared only after February 1, submitted by the Chairman of the Board
for Precinct 17 which contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.
It might also be stressed that one set of voter's list Exh. "G" had the signature
of both the Chairman, poll clerk and third member of the board, while the one
which appeared later which included the names of the Larrazabal had the
signature only of the Chairman. Exh. "I".
From the certification of the National Central Files, it appears that the Serial
Nos. of the newly registered voters were as follows: 0189821-J 018922-J
0189823-J 0189824-J 0189825-J 0189826-J 0189827-J 0189828-J 0189839-J
The alleged registration of Emeterio V. Larrazabal and Adelina Y. Larrazabal
are inexplicably effected through voter's affidavits with Serial Nos. 0190893J
and 01 90840-J. These serial numbers are traced per record of the Commission
to Precinct No. 6, municipality of Kananga, Leyte. Per official Project of
precincts on file with the Commission, Precinct No. 6 is a poblacion precinct
located in Kananga, Municipal High School Building. How these documents
came to be used in Precinct No. 17 in Barangay Mahawan and only by the
Larrazabals has never been explained.
It also takes a lot of straining to believe the story about the effort to cancel
registration on November 25, 1987, which application surfaced before the
Board of Election inspectors for Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City only on January
9, 1988, Revision Day. As pointed out by Petitioner, it is absurd that it would
only be on Revision Day, normally set aside for the purpose of receiving
inclusion and exclusion orders from the courts, that the application for
cancellation would be coincidentally found and delivered to the Board of
Election Inspectors for Precinct 15. Furthermore, the entire membership of the
Board of Inspectors for said precinct, signed a Minutes, Exh. "3-A" which
indicates that no order of inclusion or exclusion was received from any court
and that the board proceeded with the numbering of a total 229 voters for the
precinct. The Minutes also indicates that the Board adjourned at 5:00 p.m. Exh.
"3-B" which was supposedly prepared after Exh. "3-A" signed only by the poll
clerk and third member indicates that at 4:30 P.M. an unidentified clerk from
the Election Registrar's Office arrived with the application for cancellation of
Vilma Manzano and Adelina Larrazabal.
It also appears that on November 28, 1987, the Board of Election Inspectors
for Precinct 15, Ormoc City prepared the list of voters for said precinct, Exh.
'N' where the name of Adelina Y. Larrazabal appears as voter No. 96 and
Emeterio V. Larrazabal is listed as Voter No. 98. At the back of the list there is
a certification that there was no voter which was included by court order and
that to voters, one Montero and one Salvame were excluded by virtue of such
order. As of January 29, 1988, when the certified true copy of the Voter's List
for Precinct 15 was furnished the petitioner, no additional entry was reflected
on the list which would show what transpired on January 9, 1988, as alleged by
 the Election Registrar for Ormoc City and the poll clerk and third member of
the board of inspectors that a cancellation was effected. It taxes credulity
therefore, to lend belief to Exh. "2-C", when was issued by the City Registrar
for Ormoc only on February 1, 1990, which for the first time showed
handwritten annotations of cancellation of the registration of Adelina
Larrazabal and Vilma Manzano by witnesses Gratol and Patonog. If this
evidence did not exist at the time of the entry which purports to have been on
January 9, 1988, this evidence could have been used to confront within
Carolina Quezon when she testified and identified Exh. "N" on April 14, 1988.
In fact if these entries indicating (sic) were made, they would have been
evident in Exh. 'W. The failure to confront Quezon with the entries and the late
submission of Exh. "2-C" can only lead to two conclusions: these entries did
not exist as of January 29, 1988 when the certification of the list of voters was
made and that they were annotated in the voter's list after that date. This is
consistent with Exh. "P" which was issued on February 11, 1988.
The relative weight of the parties' evidence supports petitioner's thesis that
respondent was not a registered voter in Precinct No. 17, Brgy. Mahawan,
Kananga, Leyte, and, that she and her husband Emeterio Larrazabal continued
to be registered voters in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City. (Rollo, pp. 62-67;
COMELEC decision, pp. 22-27)
The Court is bound by these factual findings as they are supported by substantial
evidence:
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), speaking of the need to
preserve the 'independence and all the needed concomitant powers' of the
Commission on Elections, Justice Antonio P. Barredo declared that it is but
proper that the Court should accord the greatest measures of presumption of
regularity to its course of action ... to the end it may achieve its designed place
in the democratic fabric of our government ... (Abella v. Larrazabal, supra)
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte,
the petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc
City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of
Leyte.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be
deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the
members of the Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte — The qualified
voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election
of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution
one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not
yet a highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the province
of Leyte to which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters
from voting for the provincial elective officials. The question now is whether or not the
prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials
necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to be elected as provincial
officials.
The petitioner citing section 4, Article X of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
submits that "while a Component City whose charter prohibits its voters from
participating in the elections for provincial office, is indeed independent of the
province, such independence cannot be equated with a highly urbanized city; rather it is
limited to the administrative supervision aspect, and nowhere should it lead to the
conclusion that said voters are likewise prohibited from running for the provincial
offices." (Petition, p. 29)
The argument is untenable.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized
cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for
other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar
prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized
cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are
geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the
prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for
the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The
Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the
cited case involves Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the
same principle is applicable.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision,
prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective
offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase
'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and
the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions
— one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective
official." (Resolution En Banc, p. 6)
The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation
is "wrong English" since nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a prohibition
against running for provincial elective office. She states that if the prohibition to run
was indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified TO
RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have been used after
the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the
election of the provincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words
"not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote." (Petition, p. 19)
The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.
In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo (175 SCRA 76 [1989]) this Court interpreted Section 20
of Presidential Decree No. 957 in relation to the conjunction and, to wit:
Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide
the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development,
including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated
in the approved subdivision or condominium plans. ...
The Court ruled:
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the called
doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively,
of Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of 'facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development' interpreted to
mean that the demonstrative Phrase 'which are offered and indicated in the
approved subdivision plans, etc,' refer only to 'other forms of development' and
not to 'facilities, improvements and infrastructures.' While this subserves his
purpose, such bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectives phrase is set apart
from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and
applicable rule is ad proximum antedecens flat relationisi
impediatursentencia (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 57 citing Brown v.
Brown, Delta 3 Terry 157, 29 A. 2d 149, 153) Relative words refer to the
nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case,
the employment of the word 'and' between 'facilities, improvements,
infrastructures' and 'other forms of development,' far from supporting
petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics
that and is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a
joinder or union. (at pp. 81-83)
Applying these principles to the instant case, the conjunction and between the
phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the
COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte."
Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's
second division is null and void on the ground that on that date, the term of
Commissioner Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion (vote was
2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991. (Commissioner Flores was nominated by
the President on January 30, 1988 and was confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments on February 15, 1988. His term of office was fixed by the President for
three years from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991.)
The petitioner postulates that the President has no power to fix the terms of office of the
Commissioners of the COMELEC because the Constitution impliedly fixes such terms
of office. With regards to Commissioner Flores, the petitioner professes that Flores'
term of three (3) years expired on February 2, 1991 based in section 1(2), Article IX, C,
of the Constitution, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Any appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. In relation to the
Transitory Provision of the 1987 Constitution (Article XVIII) particularly
Section 15 thereof, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year
after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
cause or become incapacitated to discharge The duties of their office or
appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer
than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution.
There is no need to pass upon this constitutional issue raised by the petitioner. The
Court ruled in the case of Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37
[1985]):
xxx xxx xxx
... This Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case. If there exists some other ground
based on statute or general law or other grounds of construction, we decide the
case on a non-constitutional determination. (See Burton v. United States, 196
U.S. 283; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 213 U.S. 175; Berea College
v. Kentucky 211 U.S. 45.) (at p. 45)
Even if we concede that Commissioner Flores' term expired on February 2, 1991, we
fail to see how this could validate the holding of an elective office by one who is clearly
disqualified from running for that position and the continued exercise of government
powers by one without legal authority to do so. The powers of this Court are broad
enough to enjoin the violation of constitutional and statutory provisions by public
officers especially where, as in this case, we merely affirm the decision of the
COMELEC en banc promulgated at a time when Commissioner Flores was no longer a
member.
Moreover, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the decision of the second
division of COMELEC would still be valid under the de facto doctrine.
Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to
February 15, 1991. In these three years he exercised his duties and functions as
Commissioner. Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating when the terms of
the COMELEC Chairman and members commence and expire, that his term expired on
February 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional provision that
the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis commencing and ending
at fixed intervals, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a color of
validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to February 15, 1991, are
considered valid. The Court ruled in the case of Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Aurelio D.
Menzon v. Leyte Acting Governor Leopoldo E. Perilla, et al. G.R. No. 90762, May 20,
1991:
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of
Local Government, possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very
least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-
Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the
petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the
Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before
Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government
Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color
of validity.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella in G.R. No. 100710 obtained the second highest number
of votes, next to Larrazabal in the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte. The COMELEC en banc, after affirming the February 14, 1991 decision of its
second division disqualifying arrazabal as governor disallowed Abella from assuming
position of governor in accordance with section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 and the
rulings in the cases of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989])
and Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC.
According to him these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that
the Frivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quowarranto filed under section 253 of
the Omnibus Code, contesting the eligibility of the respondents after they had been
proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be unseated while
SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of candidacy for
material misrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore,
avers that since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes case for him shall not be counted.
the votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not
considered counted making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest
number of votes should be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004.
The petitioner's arguments are not persuasive.
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province
of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of
the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the
candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to
assume the positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the
position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that
compelling. What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is
voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing
the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position can not assume
the vacated position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside
the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to conduct hearings to
determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a candidate for the position of
governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No. 88004.
Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who
filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot.
The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who
placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and
Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana
and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435)
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with
Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although
one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two
others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court
held:
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified,
or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office
or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the
votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the
questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. The questioned decision
of the second division of the Commission on Elections dated February 14,
1991 and the questioned Resolution en banc of the Commission dated July 18,
1991 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on
August 1, 1991 is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the

constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for