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REVIEW
I
N THE PAST 10 YEARS, SOME LATIN Objective To assess the effectiveness of conditional monetary transfers in improv-
American countries have intro- ing access to and use of health services, as well as improving health outcomes, in low-
duced programs that provide and middle-income countries.
monetary transfers to households Data Sources Relevant publications were identified via electronic medical and so-
on the condition that they comply cial science databases from inception to April 2006 (PubMED, EMBASE, POPLINE, CAB
with a set of behavioral require- Direct, Healthcare Management Information Consortium, WHOLIS (World Health
ments. These requirements are typi- Organization Library Database), African Healthline, International Bibliography of the
cally linked to attendance for preven- Social Sciences (IBSS), Eldis, British Library for Development Studies (BLDS), ID21,
tive interventions at primary health Journal Storage ( Jstor), Inter-Science, ScienceDirect, Internet Documents in Econom-
care facilities and educational enroll- ics Access Service (Research Papers in Economics) (IDEAS[Repec]), Latin American and
ment for children. Caribbean Health Sciences Literature (LILACS), MEDCARIB, Virtual Library in Health
(ADOLEC), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), FRANCIS, The Cochrane Central
These programs are justified by
Register of Controlled Trials, the Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness,
social equity concerns, especially and the Effective Practice and Organization of Care Group (EPOC) Register. Refer-
when they target disadvantaged ence lists of relevant papers and “gray” literature resources were also searched.
groups. As low-income individuals
Study Selection To be included, a paper had to meet study design criteria (ran-
usually face the greatest barriers to domized controlled trial, interrupted time series analysis, and controlled before and
access, such conditional cash transfer after study) and include a measure of at least 1 of the following outcomes: health care
mechanisms can also help redistrib- utilization, health expenditure, or health outcomes. Twenty-eight papers were re-
ute resources to reduce health ineq- trieved for assessment and 10 were included in this review.
uities. They can potentially increase Data Extraction Methodological details and outcomes were extracted by 2 review-
the use of health services by low- ers who independently assessed the quality of the papers.
income individuals by providing
Results Overall, the evidence suggests that conditional cash transfer programs are
funds to help overcome some finan- effective in increasing the use of preventive services and sometimes improving health
cial barriers to access, including costs status.
related to seeking health care or
Conclusions Further research is needed to clarify the cost effectiveness of condi-
sending children to school. tional cash transfer programs and better understand which components play a critical
Interest in conditional cash trans- role. The potential success and desirability of such programs in low-income settings,
fer programs has increased, and these with more limited health system capacity, also deserves more investigation.
programs are spreading beyond Latin JAMA. 2007;298(16):1900-1910 www.jama.com
America. There is discussion of simi-
lar programs in sub-Saharan Africa,
Author Affiliations: London School of Hygiene & Tropi-
and there are pilot programs aimed ber of overviews have been carried cal Medicine, London, England.
at improving uptake of maternal out,3,4 there has been no systematic Corresponding Author: Mylene Lagarde, MSc, Re-
search Fellow, London School of Hygiene & Tropical
health services in Bangladesh and review critically assessing existing Medicine, Health Policy Unit, Keppel Street, London,
Nepal.1,2 Until now, although a num- evidence on this subject. WCE1 7HT, England (mylene.lagarde@lshtm.ac.uk).
1900 JAMA, October 24/31, 2007—Vol 298, No. 16 (Reprinted) ©2007 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
METHODS authors using criteria adapted from (where they received antiparasitic
A number of relevant databases those of the Cochrane collaboration5 drugs, vitamins, iron supplements,
(available from author on request) and tailored to the features of the and vaccinations) and attended
were searched using the following studies. Given the potentially spurious health education workshops. An
key terms, their combinations, or results that could arise from ignoring additional cash transfer was contin-
both: cash transfer, conditional cash clustering effects,6 attention was paid gent on enrollment and regular
transfer, monetary incentive, social to assessing whether clustering effects attendance at primary school. The
protection, safety nets, health services, were accounted for in the analyses. program Familias en Acción 1 6 in
health, and demand. No limitation Discrepancies in quality ratings were Colombia was also similar. Targeting
regarding publishing date was used. resolved by discussion between the the poorest households in disadvan-
To identify “gray” literature studies, authors. taged municipalities, it provided
we systematically reviewed the bibli- Given the heterogeneity of interven- monetary transfers to mothers on the
ographies of all relevant publications, tions, outcome measurements, and set- condition that their children who
searched the System for Information tings, statistical pooling of results was were younger than aged 7 years
on Gray Literature in Europe data- not attempted and a narrative synthe- attended preventive health examina-
base (SIGLE), and explored online sis was undertaken. tions, and another transfer if their
resources extensively (available from children aged 7 to 17 years attended
author on request). RESULTS school regularly. Mothers were also
The scope of the review was re- The review of titles and abstracts of encouraged to attend health educa-
stricted to interventions in low- and more than 24 000 references from the tion courses. In Honduras, any
middle-income countries as defined by main search led to the retrieval of 28 household in municipalities with
the World Bank. We identified all stud- articles for full-text assessment. Ten ar- high prevalence of malnutrition and
ies that evaluated the effect of directly ticles that describe data and results from benefiting from the Programa de
transferring money to households con- 6 studies (TABLE 1) were included in Asignación Familial14 had access to 2
ditional on some requirements, at least the final review. Of these 6 studies, 4 types of monetary incentives: one
1 of which had to be related to health- were randomized trials,7,12-14 1 was a conditional on school attendance of
seeking behavior. Studies on in-kind or quasi-randomized evaluation,15 and 1 children aged 6 to 12 years, and the
unconditional cash transfers were ex- was a controlled before and after other conditional on undergoing
cluded. study.16 monthly preventive health examina-
We included studies with the fol- tions for children and prenatal care
lowing study designs: randomized con- Description of Interventions attendance for pregnant women.
trolled trials, controlled before and af- With the exception of 1 study in Finally, in Brazil the program Bolsa
ter studies, interrupted time-series Africa, most included studies A l i m e n t a ç ã o 1 5 w a s t a r g e t e d t o
analyses, and multi cross-sectional stud- described large-scale conditional improve child and maternal health
ies using matching techniques. To be cash transfer programs in Latin among low income populations.
included, a study had to include a mea- America. In Mexico, the seminal Pro- Mothers received capped transfers
sure of at least 1 of the following out- gresa program (later called based on the number of beneficiaries
comes: health care utilization or ac- Opportunidades)7-11 aimed to improve (either children younger than aged 7
cess to health care, household health health and education outcomes of years or pregnant or lactating wom-
expenditure, or health or anthropo- low-income children. Households, an) in the household. Transfers were
metric outcomes. selected on socioeconomic criteria, conditional on attendance at preven-
Two of the authors (M.L. and A.H.) were given cash provided that chil- tive health check ups and nutrition
independently sifted the titles and ab- dren regularly attended both school workshops for the women and
stracts of retrieved publications and se- and appointments for preventive adherence to vaccination schedules
lected potentially relevant articles. In health care. Participating children for children. The 1 study from Africa
case of disagreement, full-text articles aged 4 to 23 months were also given described a pilot program in
were retrieved and examined. All ar- food supplements. In Nicaragua, the Malawi13 that tested whether finan-
ticles that were judged to meet criteria Red de Protección Social12 pilot pro- cial incentives would increase the
for this study were then indepen- gram was designed in a similar man- collection of human immunodefi-
dently reviewed (M.L. and A.H.). A data ner to the program in Mexico. Disad- ciency virus test results.
collection form was used to collect in- vantaged households in low-income
formation on study design, interven- areas received a cash transfer pro- Methodological Limitations
tion, setting, and outcome measures. vided they brought their children of Included Studies
The quality of the selected studies who were younger than aged 5 years Lack of reliability of data was a prob-
was assessed independently by the 2 to preventive health examinations lem for some studies. For instance,
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
results entirely based on self-reported designs (clustering effects) or to con- visits for children by 16 percentage
outcomes may have been unreliable, trol for potential biases stemming from points. However, they found no effect
in particular when respondents be- flawed implementation or design.8,9,12,20 on the percentage of women who re-
lieved that their answers could jeopar- All studies but 1 used intention-to- ceived a 10-day follow-up visit after
dize enrollment in a program. The treat estimators.10 The analysis per- delivery.
authors of the Honduras study ac- formed by Behrman10 may have over- Findings from the Nicaraguan pro-
knowledged this as a possible limita- estimated the effects of the program in gram show a mean increase of 19 per-
tion.14 They found discrepancies be- controlling for leakage and implemen- centage points after 1 year and 11 per-
tween health cards and reports by tation problems in the delivery of the centage points after 2 years on the
mothers on their use of child growth- nutrition complements (Papilla). proportion of infants (aged 0-3 years)
monitoring services, explained by self- Due to the variety of methods used taken to health centers in the past 6
report. Barham8 also noted that some to analyze the effects of the interven- months.12 This effect was only signifi-
lack of specificity of survey instru- tions and the different ways each pa- cant for disadvantaged children, who
ments may have led the researchers to per reported results, synthesis and benefited from most of the increase (24
overestimate the effects of the pro- sometimes even comparisons be- percentage points). Children from fami-
gram in Mexico on immunization. tween publications on the same pro- lies with greater income levels did not
Some studies had problems with the gram were difficult. improve their use significantly. Fi-
quality of their randomization. Behr- nally, according to household survey
man and Todd18 show that the pro- Care-Seeking Behavior data, the Colombian program16,17 led to
gram in Mexico experienced a break- Five studies reported that conditional an increase in children’s preventive
down of randomization within the cash transfers increased use of health health care visits by 23 percentage
clusters, although randomization of the services (TABLE 2). points for children younger than aged
clusters was successful. In addition, The Malawi 8 pilot project to in- 2 years and 33 percentage points for
leakage (within and between clusters) crease uptake of human immunodefi- children aged 2 to 4 years. There was
and selective distribution of the lim- ciency virus results found that partici- no significant increase for older chil-
ited nutritional supplements to older pants were very responsive to any dren.
children deemed by health workers to monetary incentive. The introduction
have poor nutritional status further of an incentive increased the percent- Immunization Coverage
weakened the study design.10 age of individuals collecting human im- Four studies detail the impact of con-
In the experiment on learning hu- munodeficiency virus test results by a ditional cash transfer programs on im-
man immunodeficiency virus status in mean of 27% (after controlling for dis- munization coverage, with the results
Malawi,13 the randomization of the tance). There was also a positive lin- showing unclear effects (TABLE 3).
value of vouchers (valued between 0 ear effect with the level of incentive Barham8 shows that immunization
and US $3) was not successful and the (each extra dollar increased the collec- against measles increased by a mean of
final distribution of cash vouchers was tion of human immunodeficiency vi- 3 percentage points 6 months after the
skewed toward higher values. rus results by a mean of 9%). beginning of the program in Mexico and
Several biases were detected in the Based on facility-level data, Gertler7 that tuberculosis vaccination was 5 per-
nutritional subsample of the study in found that the Mexico project scheme centage points greater for children aged
Mexico.10,19 In addition to an impor- increased the mean number of visits to 12 to 23 months at baseline. However,
tant attrition bias of the follow-up sur- the health facilities by 2.09 visits per day the latter increase was due to a sudden
vey, there were significant differences in the areas where it was offered— decline in coverage in the control zones,
in the characteristics of control and beneficiary families visited the health and this increase disappeared 6 months
treatment children, causing bias to- facilities twice as frequently as nonben- later, once the control areas returned
ward overrepresentation of children eficiary families. Based on similar fa- to their initial levels. In Mexico, im-
with poor nutrition in treatment groups. cility data, the Honduras program is said munization rates were already very high
Finally, the absence of a baseline sur- to have significantly increased use of before the program began, even in areas
vey for this substudy10,11 limited the pos- health services by 23% for infants covered by the program, where 88% of
sibilities to control for some of the bi- younger than aged 1 year and 42% for children younger than 12 months and
ases mentioned. preschool children aged 1 to 5 years.15 97% of children aged 12 to 23 months
In the nonrandomized study, the lack Morris et al15 report that the program were immunized against tuberculosis.
of comparability between control and in Honduras also increased the mean The evaluation of the Honduras pro-
intervention sites may have led to spu- percentage of individuals receiving pre- gram15 showed a mean increase of 6.9
rious conclusions.20 However, all stud- natal care by 19 percentage points, rou- percentage points in the coverage of the
ies used rigorous statistical methods to tine pediatric examinations by 20 per- first dose of diphtheria, tetanus tox-
address the specificities of some study centage points, and growth-monitoring oids, pertussis (antigens unspecified)
©2007 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. (Reprinted) JAMA, October 24/31, 2007—Vol 298, No. 16 1903
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
maximal for poorest children aged mean annual growth experienced in points after 2 years). On the other
younger than 6 months. They found the absence of the program—after 1 hand it did not have an impact on the
that an exposure of 2 years to the pro- year of exposure to the program. The proportion of wasted children aged 0
gram, compared with a 1-year expo- authors further showed that this effect to 5 years, probably due to the very
sure at a later age (when aged 12-18 was principally captured by the oldest low level of wasting at baseline, which
months), resulted in a mean incre- group—children aged 24 to 36 limits the statistical power to detect
mental growth of 1.1 cm. Using 1999 months at baseline—who experienced small changes.
data matched with 1997 socioeco- a height increase of 1.22 cm. This However, the evaluation of the Bra-
nomic data to control for covariates, could be explained by the fact that zilian program15 shows no effect on
Gertler9 estimated that children aged nutritional supplements were given to height-for-age measures and even a nega-
12 to 36 months after 1 year of expo- children older than 2 years only when tive impact on weight-for-age for chil-
sure to the Mexico program (in Sep- they were underweight, 11 thereby dren younger than 7 years. These unex-
tember 1999) were 0.96 cm taller than maximizing the potential effect of pected findings may have come from a
children from control areas. However, these supplements. misunderstanding of the eligibility cri-
it did not affect their probability of The analysis of the Nicaraguan pro- teria for the program by participating
being stunted. Finally, trying to com- gram12 showed that it had reduced the mothers (see “Comment” section).
pensate for several biases, Behrman magnitude of stunting (net mean
and Hoddinot10 found similar results improvement of the height-for-age z Health Status
and showed that children aged score by 0.17) and the proportion of Other health outcomes were reported
between 12 and 36 months gained underweight children aged 0 to 5 from 3 of the 7 programs (Mexico,
approximately 1 cm—one-sixth of the years (a net impact of 6 percentage Nicaragua, Colombia) included in the
©2007 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. (Reprinted) JAMA, October 24/31, 2007—Vol 298, No. 16 1905
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
review. They showed mixed effects on The impact on anemia was assessed year of benefits from the program in
objectively measured health out- by 2 of the programs. The program in Mexico, children in the intervention
comes and positive effects on moth- Nicaragua showed no impact on ane- group had a significant higher level of
ers’ reports of health outcomes of their mia prevalence among infants.12 Con- hemoglobin, and therefore a lower
children (TABLE 5). versely, Rivera at al11 show that after 1 rate of anemia than the control group.
1906 JAMA, October 24/31, 2007—Vol 298, No. 16 (Reprinted) ©2007 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
©2007 American Medical Association. All rights reserved. (Reprinted) JAMA, October 24/31, 2007—Vol 298, No. 16 1907
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CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS FOR IMPROVING UPTAKE OF HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
First, the cost-effectiveness of con- These issues will be a particular pri- ever, the success of these strategies de-
ditional cash transfer programs com- ority if conditional cash transfer pro- pends on the existence of effective
pared with classic supply-side inter- grams are expanded into areas where primary health services and local in-
ventions (eg, improving quantity and the eligibility criteria are relaxed or dis- frastructures. In the case of the more
quality of infrastructure and services) continued as means testing may be complex Latin American programs, it
has not been examined, as most con- more difficult and costly in low- is also dependent on effective systems
ditional cash transfer programs have so income settings because of the ab- for identifying and making payments
far been implemented in settings with sence of reliable information systems to low-income families. It is impor-
relatively adequate (health) infrastruc- such as the ones used in Latin Ameri- tant to consider the availability of these
tures. Therefore, monetary transfers can programs. If the entire population requirements in many of the other low-
(and compulsory education work- becomes eligible for payment, evaluat- income settings in which conditional
shops) were probably the most rel- ing the cost-effectiveness of theses pro- cash transfer might be considered. Fur-
evant strategies to address demand- grams will become critical. ther rigorous evaluations of future pro-
side barriers (eg, financial or cultural Expanding conditional cash trans- grams in low-income settings are
ones). But in more resource-poor set- fer programs also raises issues of eth- needed, taking into account the les-
tings where public spending on health ics and broader effectiveness, once un- sons learned from the studies identi-
is low and access to effective interven- intentional effects are taken into fied so far, and avoiding as far as pos-
tions very limited, supply-side ob- account. Conditional monetary trans- sible the methodological pitfalls
stacles such as geographical inaccessi- fer programs create strong incentives to outlined.
bility or poor quality of services are change behavior, but unanticipated per- Author Contributions: Ms Lagarde had full access to
critical as well.25 In such settings, it is verse effects can also occur. In the stud- all of the data in the study and takes responsibility for
likely that expanding health system ca- ies included in this review, Stecklov et the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data
analysis.
pacity may be a preliminary step be- al27 found that the Honduran program Study concept and design: Lagarde, Haines, Palmer.
fore the introduction of conditional cash may have resulted in an increase in fer- Acquisition of data: Lagarde.
Analysis and interpretation of data: Lagarde, Haines.
transfer programs. tility of 2 to 4 percentage points, be- Drafting of the manuscript: Lagarde.
Second, the size of the transfers cause pregnant women only were eli- Critical revision of the manuscript for important in-
tellectual content: Lagarde, Haines, Palmer.
needed in different settings requires gible for a subsidy. Morris et al15 suggest Obtained funding: Haines, Palmer.
more attention, due to 2 sources of that the unexpected small negative im- Administrative, technical, or material support: Lagarde,
inefficiency of conditional cash trans- pact of the Brazil program on chil- Haines.
Study supervision: Palmer.
fer programs as identified by de Janvry dren’s weight gain may be explained by Financial Disclosures: None reported.
and Sadoulet.26 On the one hand, such a misinterpretation of eligibility rules. Funding/Support: We gratefully acknowledge the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation for funding this work.
programs can yield very high costs per Beneficiaries may have mistakenly Role of the Sponsor: The funder had no role in the
marginal visit/change induced, thought that having at least 1 malnour- design and conduct of the study; collection, manage-
ment, analysis, and interpretation of the data; or the
because money is given to all targeted ished child was necessary for contin- preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript.
individuals, regardless of their possible ued membership of the program. It is Additional Contribution: We also thank Andy Ox-
previous compliance with the condi- clear that programs with such poten- man, MD from the Cochrane EPOC Group for his use-
ful comments on the protocol of this review. Dr Ox-
tionality of the programs. Conse- tially strong effects must be designed man did not receive compensation for his contribution
quently, the positive outcomes of con- with care, and it is important to de- to this article.
ditional cash transfer programs should velop measures of welfare that are broad
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1910 JAMA, October 24/31, 2007—Vol 298, No. 16 (Reprinted) ©2007 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.
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