Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55102 June 19, 1985

GORGONIO TEJERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EULALIO D. ROSETE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, Branch IV and FRANCISCO ARES, respondents.

Cecilio A. Pepito, Jr. for petitioner.

Virgilio Cabanlet for private respondent.

CUEVAS, J.:

Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to annul and set
aside the, Order   dated July 28, 1980, issued by the Hon. respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 6728
1

entitled "Gorgonio Tejero versus Francisco Ares", for Cancellation of Contract with Damages; and
the Order   dated August 8, 1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
2

On September 4, 1979, herein petitioner Gorgonio Tejero filed with the then Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, a complaint   for cancellation of contract with damages, against herein private
3

respondent Francisco Ares. The case was docketed in the said court as Civil Case No. 6728 and
assigned to Branch IV thereof, presided by the Hon. respondent Judge.

The complaint, among others, alleged that —

2. Plaintiff is the owner and proprietor of the Tejero Subdivision, a private residential
subdivision located at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;

3. On May 23, 1963, plaintiff and defendant entered into a Purchase Agreement
whereby plaintiff agreed to sell and defendant agreed to buy for the sum of Four
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos (P4,368.00) two (2) parcels of
residential land situated at the plaintiff's aforementioned subdivision;

4. Under the terms of said agreement, defendant bound to pay the aforesaid
consideration in thirty-nine (39) monthly installments ...;

5. Defendant failed to pay and comply with his obligation under the aforecited
agreement ...

Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment cancelling the Land Purchase Agreement and ordering
defendant to vacate the premises and return possession thereof to the plaintiff; to pay attorney's
fees, damages and costs.
Private respondent, then defendant, filed his Answer with Counterclaim   on November 3, 1979,
4

alleging, as special defenses that the court has no jurisdiction over the action, the matter relating
thereto being now governed by the National Housing Authority; tat defendant has a justifiable reason
to suspend the payment of his remaining obligation with the plaintiff; that defendant has fully paid his
obligation with plaintiff thru valid tender of payment and consignation; and that consequently plaintiff
has no cause of action against the defendant.

By way of counterclaim, private respondent prays for the recovery of moral damages in the sum of
P10,000.00, P3,000.00 attorney's fees, exemplary damages as the Court may in its discretion award
and costs of suit.

The issues having been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference on July 28, 1980.

At this scheduled pre-trial conference, which is admittedly the first pre-trial schedule, petitioner (then
plaintiff failed to appear "due to sickness leading to his paralysis". Nevertheless, counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Cecilio A. Pepito, Jr. appeared, with a notarized Special Power of Attorney   dated
5

July 15, 1980 signed by petitioner Gorgonio Tejero, the pertinent portion of which reads —

I Gorgonio Tejero ... do hereby name, constitute and appoint Atty. Cecilio A. Pepito,
Jr. as my attorney-in-fact for the purpose of representing my interest in Civil Case
No. 6728 before Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.

Further, I hereby grant authority unto my said attorney-in-fact to settle or compromise

the above-stated case for and in my behalf.

xxx xxx xxx

On the same day, July 28, 1980, respondent Judge issued his now assailed Order,   reading as
6

follows:

For failure of plaintiff to appear in Court this morning for pre-trial, despite due notice,
the complaint is hereby dismissed for non-suit. Counsel for plaintiff although
equipped with a special power of attorney is not in a position to say whether the
signatures appearing in the receipts of payments are those of the plaintiff or not and
said counsel is not in a position to know whether the person who signed the receipts
of payments were authorized by the plaintiff or not, the special power of attorney then
of counsel is deficient and so plaintiff himself should have come to Court. The special
power of attorney which is executed in favor of his counsel defeats the purpose of a
pretrial therefore.

The reception of the evidence for the counterclaim of defendant is hereby set for
August 8, 1980 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, subject, however, to the result of the
motion for reconsideration that may be filed by plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration   of the said order was denied by respondent Judge in the
7

following Order,   to wit:

8

The reason for declaring plaintiff non-suited and for dismissing the complaint was the
insufficiency of the Special Power of Attorney because counsel as attorney-in-fact
 could not tell whether the signatures appearing in the receipts of payments presented
by the defendant were signed by the plaintiff or whether the plaintiff authorized the
persons who signed the receipts for the plaintiff. The only person who could Identify
the signatures and who could say whether the persons who signed the receipts of
payments were authorized by the plaintiff is the plaintiff himself, as his presence was
necessary but despite which he did not come to court. Besides, the motion for
reconsideration did not furnish any copy to the adverse counsel. This is an incident
which could not be considered ex-parte.

In view thereof, said motion for reconsideration is, therefore, denied. In the
meantime, the reception of the evidence in support of the counterclaim is hereby
reset August 19, 1980 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration   having been denied,   he now comes before this
9 10

Court, through the instant Petitioner,   claiming that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
11

discretion in dismissing his complaint as well as in denying his motion for reconsideration.

We find the petitioner to be meritorious.

While it is true that under Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory for the parties and
their counsel to appear at the pre-trial to consider inter alia "the possibility of an amicable settlement,
the simplication of the issues, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts, totally or
partially, and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action"; and that a party
who fails to appear at the pre-trial may be non-suited or considered as in default,   this rule was by
12

no means intended as an implacable bludgeon but as a tool to assist the trial courts in the orderly
and expeditious conduct of trials.   Time and again We have emphasized that the rules should be
13

liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only
speedy, but more importantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.  14

It cannot be overstressed that the application of the procedural rules on dismissal of

actions (as well as on defaults) rests upon the sound judicial discretion of the trial
courts and such discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never
capriciously, with a view to substantial justice in the light of the Rules' express
mandate that they be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding."  15

It will be noted that in the cases   where this Court sustained the trial court's non-suit orders for non-
16

appearances, the pattern and scheme to delay disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules appeared evident.

In the case at bar, however, no such pattern to delay or wanton attitude on the part of the petitioner
appeared disclosed by the records.

The complaint was filed on September 4, 1979; the answer of private respondent, on November 3,
1979; and the case was set for the pre-trial for the first time on July 28, 1980. It is not seriously
disputed that the failure of petitioner to appear at the first scheduled pre-trial was due to illness
which later led to his paralysis. It is not disputed that counsel for petitioner appeared properly clothed
with a special power of attorney executed by the petitioner. The lower court's order of dismissal
solely because of the inability of counsel for petitioner "to state whether the signatures appearing in
the alleged receipts of payments are those of the plaintiff or not" is hasty and drastic, considering
that it is the first time the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference. While the intention of
respondent Judge to terminate the subject case promptly is laudable, the better procedure should
have been and the ends of justice would have been better served had his HONOR reset the case for
another pre-trial to enable counsel for petitioner to verify from his client the authenticity of the
signatures appearing on the questioned receipts; or it could have declared the pre-trial terminated
and set the case for trial on the merits so that the parties, particularly the private respondent, could
present their evidence. At any rate, no substantial right of the private respondent has been affected
when counsel for petitioner failed or refused to admit the genuineness of the signatures appearing
on the disputed receipts, since private respondent has all the right to present evidence thereon at
the trial on the merits.

Inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a

solution to the congestion of court dockets; while they lend a deceptive cure of
efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate
reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to
delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final
disposition of the cases before the court.  17

WHEREFORE, the Orders complained of, the first dated July 28, 1980 dismissing petitioner's
complaint and that dated August 8, 1980 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 6728 is hereby REMANDED to the proper Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "D", Petition, page 16, Rollo.

2 Annex "F", Petition, page 20, Rollo.

3 Annex "A", Petition, pages 10-12, Rollo.

4 Annex "B", Petition, page 13-14, Rollo.

5 Annex "C", Petition, page 13, Rollo.

6 Annex "D", Petition, page 16, Rollo.

7 Annex "E", Petition, pages 17-18, Rollo.

8 Annex "F", Petition, page 20, Rollo.

9 Annex "G", Petition, pages 21-23, Rollo.

 10 Order dated August 25, 1980, Annex "H", Petition, page 24, Rollo.

11 Given due course in the Resolution dated March 4, 1981, page 54 Rollo.

12 Section 2, Rule 20, Rules of Court; Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. Flores, 101 SCRA
641.

13 Rice & Corn Administration vs. Ong Ante, 41 SCRA 636.

14 Heirs of Jose Fuentes vs. Macandong, 83 SCRA 648.

15 Tandoc vs. Tensuan, 93 SCRA 881.

16 Home Ins. Co. vs. U.S. Lines Co., 21 SCRA 863; Saulog vs. Custombuilt Mfg.,
Corp. 26 SCRA 1; et al. vs. Baysa, 4 SCRA 167.

17 Macasa vs. Herrera, 101 Phil: 44 Perez, et al, 73 SCRA 517.

G.R. No. 77154

JESUS DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JAIME HAMOY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch XV, Region IX, Zamboanga City, and
WILEADO DE LEON, DOMINGO DE LEON, CRISTINO DE LEON, HENCIANO DE LEON,
MARCIANO AIZON, and EPIFANIA DE LEON, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes, in
lieu of the personal appearance of the plaintiff, the petitioner in this case, the respondent Judge
declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint "for failure of the plaintiff to appear for pre-trial
conference.   We do not agree. The respondent Judge manifestly erred. He acted with indecent
1

haste. He could have easily required the counsel for the plaintiff to buy the required one-peso
documentary stamp outside the court room and affix the same to the special power of attorney and
that respite would not have taken ten minutes. Had he been less technical and more sensible, the
present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court and of his own would have been
avoided.

The respondent trial Judge had three chances to rectify his grave error but he missed all of them. He
was adamant. By such rigidity he denied the petitioner substantial justice.

(1) He procrastinated when the plaintiff and his counsel immediately after the hearing on the same
morning of July 25, 1986, made oral representations with him inside his chamber for the
reconsideration of his order declaring the plaintiff non-suited and dismissing the complaint. The
plaintiff, through his counsel, explained that he was actually inside the court room while his lawyer
and the defendants' counsel, were arguing, but he (plaintiff) was too timorous to interrupt the
proceedings and make known his presence to his counsel or to the court. Despite the immediacy of
the representations and the plausibility of this explanation considering the plaintiff's nescience, being
merely an agricultural tenant and can hardly write his name, the respondent Judge still required him
to file a written motion and set it for hearing "in accordance with the Rules of Court."

(2) Complying, the plaintiff's counsel forthwith filed the written motion,   duly supported by an Affidavit
2

of Merit of the plaintiff, on the same day, July 25, 1986, and set it for hearing as ordered by the
respondent Judge. This motion for reconsideration was denied "for lack of merit" on August 29,
1986.   The order of denial states in part:
3

x x x           x x x          x x x

A judicious appraisal of the facts alleged in the motion for reconsideration and in the
accompanying affidavit of merit fail to convince the Court to reconsider the Order. As
admitted by the plaintiff, he was inside the Court room when the case was caned for pre-trial
conference and when his counsel, Atty. Alejandro Saavedra and defendants' counsel Atty.
Navarro Belar Navarro were arguing about the insufficiency of the special power of attorney,
but he never made known his presence to the Court or to his counsel or to the defendants.
He approached his counsel and presented himself to him when they were already outside
the Courtroom and after the case was already dismissed. To the mind of the Court, the
foregoing circumstances detailed by the plaintiff do not constitute excusable negligence or
mistake.  4

x x x           x x x          x x x

(3) Undaunted, seven days later, on September 5, 1986, the petitioner filed a second motion for
reconsideration   verified by his counsel, setting it for hearing on September 19, 1986, which was
5

promptly denied on the same day of the hearing.

And, on October 7, 1986, as a coup de grace, an over-kill to be sure, the respondent Judge issued a
court order which reads:

x x x           x x x          x x x

The Court having denied the second motion for reconsideration for not being allowed by
Section 4 of the Interim Rules as per Order entered on September 19, 1986, the case at bar
is therefore considered closed and terminated.

SO ORDERED.  6

x x x           x x x          x x x

The respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves, fortified by
jurisprudence, mandate a liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings in order to effect
substantial justice.   After an, "[O]verriding all the foregoing technical considerations is the trend of
7

the rulings of this Court to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.  8

In a recent case   where the trial court, as in this instance, declared the petitioner non-suited for
9

failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, and consequently dismissed the complaint, this Court
reiterated the doctrine of liberality in the construction of the rules of procedure to be followed by all
courts.
 While it is true under Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory for the parties
and their counsel to appear at the pretrial to consider inter-alia "the possibility of an amicable
settlement, the simplification of the issues, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or
admission of facts, totally or partially, and such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action," and that a party who fails to appear at the pre-trial may be non-
suited or considered as in default, this rule was by no means intended as an implacable
bludgeon but as a tool to assist the trial courts in the orderly and expeditious conduct of
trials. Time and again WE have emphasized that the rule should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy, but more
importantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. 10

Practically on all fours with this case is Gabucan vs. Hon. Judge Luis D. Manta, et al.,   in which the
11

petition for the probate of a notarial will was dismissed on the sole ground that the will did not bear a
thirty-centavo documentary stamp, and, hence, according to the respondent Judge, it was not
admissible in evidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 Tax Code,
which reads:

x x x           x x x          x x x

SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An instrument, document, or paper

which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy
thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court
until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled.

No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall add his jurat or
acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax unless the proper
documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled. 12

In reversing the interpretation of the provisions of sections 238 and 250 of the old Tax Codes above
copied which are Identical to those of section 214 of the National Internal Code of 1986, as
amended, the law now obtaining, this Court held:

x x x           x x x          x x x

What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix
the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will
which is the taxable portion of that document.

That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of
the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the
requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."

Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable
document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena, 49 Phil. 749). If the
promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp, the court should have allowed
plaintiff's tender of a stamp of supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. 67, 71.
Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the documentary
stamp on a document does not invalidate such document. See Cia. General de Tabacos vs.
Jeanjaquet, 12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar, 16 Phil. 403, 405-
6.)
13
This is as it should be because the quality of justice is not strained.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the trial court complained of the first dated July 25, 1986 declaring the
petitioner non-suited and dismissing his complaint, and those dated August 29, 1986 and October 7,
1986, denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 3331 is hereby remanded to the respondent trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of the respondent judge.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, 17-18.

2
 Id., 15.

3
 Id, 13.

4
 Id., 19.

5
 Id., 10-11.

6
 Id, 20.

7
 Maturan vs. Araula, No. L-57392, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 615 (1982).

8
 De Mesa Abad vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-42225. July 9, 1985, 137 SCRA 416 (1985);
citing Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-37522, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262
(1975); See also, Sigueriza vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-44050, July 16, 1985, 137 SCRA 570
(1985).

9
 Tejero vs. Rosete, No. L-55102, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 69 (1985).

10
 Tejero vs. Rosete, supra, 74.

11
 No. L-51546, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 751(1980).

12
 Supra, 753.

13
 Supra, 754.
G.R. No. 170728               August 31, 2011

D. M. WENCESLAO AND ASSOCIATES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, PARAÑAQUE CITY ASSESSOR, PARAÑAQUE CITY TREASURER and
PARAÑAQUE CITY COUNCIL, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari are the October 15, 2004 and November 24, 2005
Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV UDK No. 9532-D. The CA dismissed the
appeal of D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. from the Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 03-048 for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the
construction business. It is the registered owner of more than 200,000 square meters of reclaimed
land in Barangay Tambo, Parañaque City, now known as the Aseana Business Park.

In 1996, the City of Parañaque passed Ordinance No. 96-16, providing for the market values of the
properties within its jurisdiction as basis for assessment and real property taxation. The ordinance
also provided for a discount of 70% of the base value of the developed lots in the area, for low,
sunken and undeveloped parcels of land, such as the lots reclaimed and owned by petitioner.

The City Assessor of Parañaque, however, assessed petitioner's lots based on the rates applicable
to Barangay Baclaran, which rates were higher than those applicable to properties in Barangay
Tambo. Petitioner informed the City Assessor of the wrongful assessment in 1998; hence, starting
on the 3rd quarter of 1998, the Tambo rates were used, although petitioner claimed that the discount
provision in the ordinance was still not applied.

Subsequently, the City Treasurer declared petitioner’s properties delinquent and included them in
the auction sale scheduled on February 7, 2003. On February 4, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC
of Parañaque City a Complaint 3 for collection of excess real property taxes and damages with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to restrain
respondents from enforcing the foreclosure sale. The RTC denied petitioner’s prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, to prevent its properties from being auctioned,
petitioner paid under protest the amount of ₱101,422,581.75 on February 7, 2003. 4 Said payment
brought the total amount of real property taxes paid by petitioner to ₱111,424,157.10 for the taxable
years 1995 to 2002.

On March 20, 20035 petitioner amended its complaint. Essentially, petitioner argued that had the
correct assessment been made, it should have paid only ₱6,172,979.51 6 instead of
₱111,424,157.107 to the City of Parañaque. Petitioner argued that pursuant to Ordinance No. 96-16,
the properties located in Barangay Tambo should have been assessed based on the market value of
₱3,000.00 for the years 1995 to 1996 and ₱4,000.00 for the years 1997 to 1999. However, the City
Assessor used the market value applicable to properties located in Barangay Baclaran, which were
subject to a higher rate. Petitioner also pointed out that the ordinance provided that undeveloped
parcels of land shall have 70% of the base value of the nearest developed or improved lots located
in that area. Thus, petitioner claimed that the City of Parañaque is liable to return the excess realty
taxes under the principle of solutio indebiti.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) the cause of action is
barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim; and (3) the complaint is filed in violation of the rule on forum shopping.
Respondents contended that petitioner’s cause of action based on solutio indebiti is in reality a
smoke screen to its real intention which is to claim for tax refund. As such, petitioner’s action has
already prescribed pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Code.

On November 20, 2003, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss. It found that
petitioner’s cause of action was really based on Section 253 8 of the Local Government Code. As
such, petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed inasmuch as the allegations in the
complaint show that the alleged overpayment of real property tax occurred in 1995-1999 and 2001-
2002 while the complaint was only filed in February 4, 2003. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the action
to undo the alleged wrong tax assessments and collections in order to ask for refund would make
the court do a technical job reserved for special administrative bodies like the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied by the RTC on May 4,
2004.9

On May 17, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, 10 which was approved by the RTC on May 24,
2004.11 Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court was directed to transmit the entire records of the case
to the CA.

As earlier mentioned, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal in a Resolution dated October 15, 2004,
to wit:

For failure of plaintiff-appellant to pay the required docketing fees, the appeal interposed in this case
is deemed abandoned and is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 13 alleging that it never intended to abandon its appeal. It
explained that because of extremely heavy workload and by excusable inadvertence, petitioner’s
counsel overlooked the fact that the required appeal fee was not paid at the time of the filing of the
notice of appeal. Petitioner also informed the CA that its counsel had already paid the appeal fee of
₱3,000 on October 20, 2004.

In a Resolution dated November 24, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
thus:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff-appellant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of sufficient merit.

SO ORDERED.14

The CA held that it could no longer reconsider the October 15, 2004 Resolution considering that the
appealed dismissal order of the trial court has become final and executory due to petitioner’s failure
to perfect the appeal by paying the docket fees on time. It explained that although there are
recognized circumstances that warrant the relaxation of the rules on payment of docket fees, such
as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, the heavy
workload and inadvertence of counsel are not among them. The CA also noted that in this case,
petitioner was delayed in the payment of the docket fees for five months counted from the filing of
the notice of appeal. Finding no justifiable reason for such delay, the CA ruled that it can no longer
accept such payment.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition before this Court.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for late
payment of docket fees.

Petitioner contends that it immediately paid the appeal fee of ₱3,000 on October 20, 2004 after
having been advised of its nonpayment, and such action negates the theory that it intended to
abandon its appeal. Petitioner adds that it would not abandon its case to recover the amount of
₱105,251,177.59 especially after it had paid ₱2,111,914.30 in docket and other legal fees. Petitioner
argues that the court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and liberally applying the rules of
procedure, may give due course to the appeal despite its failure to pay the docket fees within the
reglementary period.

On the other hand, respondents counter that petitioner failed to perfect its appeal. They stress that
under Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner should have
paid the appellate docket fees within the period to appeal or within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment appealed from. Moreover, the payment of appellate docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Since the payment of the docket fees was
made more than one-hundred fifty (150) days after the expiration of the period for the perfection of
an appeal, the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the case except to order its dismissal.

We agree with respondents’ contention.

The rule that appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the period for taking an
appeal is stated in Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said
fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on
appeal.

Likewise, Section 3, Rule 41, of the same Rules state:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, x x x. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order. x x x

xxxx

In this case, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's Order on May 14, 2004. Thus, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 41, in relation to Section 1,15 Rule 22, it had until May 31, 2004 within which to
perfect its appeal by filing within that period the notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket and
other legal fees. On May 17, 2004, petitioner filed its notice of appeal within the reglementary period.
We note, however, that it paid the required docket fees only on October 20, 2004, or late by almost
five months.

It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for the
perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of
docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate
docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without
which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was
filed.16

We held in one case that the CA correctly dismissed the appeal where the docket fees were not paid
in full within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days but were paid forty-one (41) days late due to
inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work.17 In another case, we ruled that no appeal was
perfected where half of the appellate docket fee was paid within the prescribed period, while the
other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made. 18

Evidently, where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the
decision of the trial court becomes final and no longer susceptible to an appeal. For once a decision
becomes final, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 19 1awphi1

Moreover, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the CA,
on its own motion or that of the appellee, may dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed
to pay the docket and other lawful fees.20 Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules provides that:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.–An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule
41;

xxxx

Pertinently, this Court’s ruling in Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals21 is instructive:

With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the appellate docket fees was belatedly made
four (4) months after the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that the CA did not
acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal except to order its dismissal, as it rightfully did. Thus, the
September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the realm of finality and became executory by
operation of law. (Underscoring ours.)

The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.

With regard to petitioner’s plea for a liberal treatment of the rules in order to promote substantial
justice, the Court finds the same to be without merit. It is true that the rules may be relaxed for
persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedures.22 However, it must be stressed that procedural rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive
of reasons when they may be relaxed.23

In this case, petitioner has not shown any reason such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, or a similar supervening casualty which should justify the relaxation of the rules. 24 The
explanation advanced by petitioner’s counsel that the failure to pay the appellate docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period was due to his extremely heavy workload and by excusable
inadvertence does not convince us.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated October 15, 2004 and November 24,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV UDK 9532-D are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated August 24, 2011 vice Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo who recused himself from the case due to close relation to one of the
parties.
1
 Rollo, pp. 22, 24-26. Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada with Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Mario L. Guariña III concurring.

2
 Id. at 80-82. Penned by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.

3
 Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-048.

4
 Rollo, pp. 78-79.

5
 Id. at 30-75.

6
 Id. at 52, 55.

TCT No. Amount Amount  

(1995 to 1999) (2001-2002)
134310 ₱ 223,898.44    
104641 256,255.11    
134311 145,913.96    
99880 530,124.33    
95325 199,614.24    
100815 194,040.00    
100816 194,040.00    
100817 194,040.00    
100818 149,798.88    
104639 198,151.29    
104640 198,659.33    
104642 318,252.85    
104643 198,941.57    
101006 1,191,491.84    
146915   988,149.77  
146916   991,607.90  
Total ₱ 4,193,221.84 ₱ 1,979,757.67 P 6,172,979.51

7
 Id. at 48, 53.

TCT No. Amount Amount  

(1995 to 1999) (2001-2002)
134310 ₱ 5,140,525.50    
104641 5,883,408.00    
 134311 3,350,065.50    
99880 12,171,222.00    
95325 4,582,980.00    
100815 4,455,000.00    
100816 4,455,000.00    
100817 4,455,000.00    
100818 3,439,260.00    
104639 4,549,392.00    
104640 4,561,056.00    
104642 7,306,825.50    
104643 4,567,536.00    
101006 27,355,680.00    
146915   ₱ 7,562,370.60  
146916   7,588,836.00  
Total ₱ 96,272,950.50 ₱ 15,151,206.60 ₱ 111,424,157.10

8
 SEC. 253. Repayment of Excessive Collections.–When an assessment of basic real
property tax or any other tax levied under this Title, is found to be illegal or erroneous and
the tax is accordingly reduced or adjusted, the taxpayer may file a written claim for refund or
credit for taxes and interests with the provincial or city treasurer within two (2) years from the
date the taxpayer is entitled to such reduction or adjustment.

xxxx

9
 Rollo, p. 83.

10
 Id. at 84-85.

11
 Id. at 86.

12
 Id. at 22.

13
 Id. at 90-97.

14
 Id. at 26.

 SECTION 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or

15

allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the
act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the
date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run
until the next working day.
 16
 Caspe v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142535, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 588, 591.

17
 Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, No. L-43714, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 32.

18
 Lee v. Republic, No. L-15027, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65, 67.

 Province of Camarines Sur v. Heirs of Agustin Pato, G.R. No. 151084, July 2, 2010, 622
19

SCRA 644, 652, citing M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, 484 Phil. 500, 505
(2004).

20
 See Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137761, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 208, 210.

21
 G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 594, 603-604.

 Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 138031, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA
22

439, 446.

 Meatmasters International Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development Corporation, G.R.

23

No. 163022, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 626, 633, citing Lazaro v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 20 at 214.

 See Yambao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141,
24

147.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30576 February 10, 1976

ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE
HERMINIO C. MARIANO, respondent.

Susano A. Velasquez for petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Trial
Attorney Herminio Z. Florendo for respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June 27, 1968, dismissing
petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. It seeks to have the findings
and conclusions of law contained in -the decision annulled and revoked and to declare the petition
for adoption meritorious and the child sought to be adopted, the minor Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan, declared the child by adoption and heir of herein petitioners-Appellants. Robin Francis
Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.  1

Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife, the
former a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an American
citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines. Having no children of their own but having
previously adopted another child, said spouses filed a petition with respondent court (Sp. Proc. No.
5457) for the adoption of a child previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan. The petition is filed and denominated as Sp. Proc. No. 5457.

In the decision rendered by respondent Court dated June 27, 1968, the petition for adoption was
dismissed. 2

The principal reason given for the dismissed al of the petition was that ... the consent given in this
petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law. 
3

Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:

Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:

2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in mandatory terms by the
word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the persons who will give the consent to the adoption
in the order as follows: parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.

It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the mother who
gave her the child. This being the case, the proper person who is supposed to give
the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in the order of preference, the
parent or the mother herself. 4

On the allegation of petitioners that their principal witness, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, under
whose care the newly-born child was entrusted by the unwedded mother, could not reveal the
identity of the mother because it would violate the privileged communications between the attorney
and client, respondent Judge explained: "The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez, the witness for the petitioners who gave the written consent to the adoption of the child in
her capacity as loco parentis to said child) to reveal the identity of the mother would be violative of
the client-attorney relationship existing between her and the mother cannot hold water, because in
the first place, there was no such relationship existing between them in so far as this case is
concerned and secondly, it is not only a question of revealing the identity of the mother but rather, of
giving consent to adoption by that alleged unwed mother." 5

Taking exception to respondent Judge's decision and the ratio decidendi thereof, appellants-

petitioners alleged the following as errors committed by the trial court: 
6

1) The inviolability of privileged communication between attorney and client is only

binding upon the attorney in the same case where such relationship of attorney and
client arose when the client imparted the privileged communication and that
elsewhere or in another case the attorney is not bound to the secrecy;
 2) The infant that was given away by the natural mother, even without the latter
providing for the child's maintenance and support, could not be considered as
abandoned;

3) The stranger who received the baby or child, in this case, Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez, could not be considered as the guardian de facto and in loco parentis of
the child, and therefore, is not empowered by law to give written consent to the
adoption;

4) That whenever and as long as the natural mother is known to anybody, only said
natural mother can give the written consent to the adoption;

5) That the term "person in charge of the person to be adopted", one of those who
can give consent to the adoption under Article 340 of the Civil Code, means or refers
to institutions or orphanages established for the purpose of rearing orphans,
foundlings and destitute children.

The facts of this case are few and simple.

a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days old)   was given
7

to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for
them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized
as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned espouses appearing in
the records of said baptism as the parents of said child; 8

b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant from the
child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity
because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The
mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who
will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of
her child; 9

c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty. Corazon
de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of
the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law; 10

d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez that the
natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the court then
pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused
to divulge the same on the ground that there existed an attorney and client
relationship between them. She had been instructed by her client not to reveal the
latter's identity. She could not now violate such privilege communication. 11

After examining the facts and the arguments presented, it appears to this Court that there is only one
principal issue involved, i.e., whether or not the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in
this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such
consent.

The law applicable is. Art. 340 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 340. The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary:
 (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

On the other hand, the Rules of Court (Rule 99) has this to say on those who are required to give
consent in adoption:

Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition a written consent
to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not
incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by each of its known living
parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such
child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian ad litem of
the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home,
or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been
recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.

Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by law may be
considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent. They are:

Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court,
describing it as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned such child." The father's
consent here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty: Corazon de Leon Velasquez) is
assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had consequently caused the rejection of the
petition, this Tribunal will now look into her alleged authority or lack thereof to give the controverted
consent.

Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly declared as only
three days old then, was turned over by its mother to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The
natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court
which started in mid- year of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the
condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In
short, this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not
insane Or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact
said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously declared
that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental claims to the child.   Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the
12

child in this case can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with all
legal consequences attached thereto.

Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there appears to be
no more legal need to require the written consent of such parent of the child to the adoption. As had
been said by this Court in the aforecited case of Santos vs. Aranzanso, the parental consent
required by the law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their
child.   The question now is whether or not Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed
13

custodian of the abandoned waif may be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person
standing in loco parentis of said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.
It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could give it protection and
sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child
and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the
identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had
said mother seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the
proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as
the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad
litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's
home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. It was she who had
actual. physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended
the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a
tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted
illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan
deed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian
exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.

The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed
lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally
finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be
softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding,
for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock,
than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes,
love, care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street
urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social problems, should be given the
widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be
made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally
and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances
for human life to exist — with a modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.

The herein petitioners, the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen,
appear to be qualified to adopt the child. There is no showing that they suffer from any of the
disqualifications under the law. Above all, they have the means to provide the child with the proper
support, care, education and love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously adopted
another child as theirs. The fact that even before they have applied for legal custody and adoption of
the infant they have already showered it with love and care and had it baptized, with them appearing
in the records of the baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of
petitioners to have the child as their very own. The child was born in May, 1967, and he will be at
this time, 1976, about 9 years of age. In all the years, from the time he was turned over to the herein
petitioners when he was only about a week old (there is no showing that the said child was ever
placed at any' time in the care and custody of some other persons) he had been cared for and loved
by the spouses Robin Francis RadLey Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. He must have known
no other parents than these persons. If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this
Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it
will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be
similarly situated. We consider it to be justifiable and more humane to formalize a factual relation,
that of parents and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses and the minor child
baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and cruel
interpretation of the law that was done by the respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in
consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold,
encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family relations.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision of the respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in Sp. Proc. No. 5457, dated June 27, 1968, is hereby annulled,
and We declare that the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is the adopted child and the heir of
petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Brief for Petitioners, p. 23; Rollo, p. 69.

2 Decision, Annex "A", Petition for Certiorari; Rollo, p. 24.

3 Ibid, p. 8; Rollo, p. 31.

4 Ibid, pp. 6-7.

5 Ibid, p. 7.

6 Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, p. 66.

7 Petition for certiorari, p. 3; Rollo, p. 12.

8 Ibid, p. 6.

9 Ibid, p. 7.

10 Ibid, p. 7.

11 Ibid p. 7; Petition for Certiorari, p. 3; Rollo, p. 12.

12 Santos vs. Aranzanso, L-2328, Feb. 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 344.

13 Ibid.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 92299             April 19, 1991

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA
ALMAJOSE, respondents.

Legal Services Division for petitioner.

Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the
petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated
February 9, 1990.

The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it

hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the
approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is
upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)

The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the private respondent's
appointment by denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left
vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.

In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting
PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further
requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the
contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay,
Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.

In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of
Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of
a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three
nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since
she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.

On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of
the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his
request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier
appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.

On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay
Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget
Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through
oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are
qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.

On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's
appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that
Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private
respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No.
31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director
or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.

On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative
Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is
not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up
the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.

On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.

On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment
of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter.

Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which prompted the
petitioner to submit before us the following assignment of errors:

A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT

SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.

B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE
REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.

C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT

QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.

D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT
ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE
REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)

All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled
to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent
DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his
nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:

Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed
henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall
be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of
Budget and Management.

The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position
was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment.

There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to
recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the
required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM
is expected to reject the same.

In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us.

Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil
service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337).
The Code further enumerated the qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216,
subparagraph (2) of the same code states that:

(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce,
public administration or any related course from a recognized college or university, a first
grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at least five years experience
in budgeting or in any related field.

The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the Provincial Budget
Officer of Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in
empowering him to recommend nominees to the position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his
recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in
consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under
Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself
the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February
9, 1988.

The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:

As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the
recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for
appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the
 local chief executive is merely directory and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise by
the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give the
law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into
consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and
supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be
gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit, only on
another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to
preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local government unit, he
must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must
not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the
requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list
submitted or recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee
for the position. He may consider other nominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of
the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)

The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget
Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the
premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most
important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.

The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of
the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating
greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers.
They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal
corporations.

President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission ordered
the new Government "to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal
governments in which natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be
afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are
capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their
capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty.

In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and
legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between
presidential control and supervision as follows:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)

the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He
has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both
general and circumscribed by statute.
In Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:

. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion as the ponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, the presidential
competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided
by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and
fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in an opinion penned
by Justice Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the present
Chief Justice in his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand,
"means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter." It would follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to
the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power
of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which
such disciplinary action would be taken.

Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was
enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments
by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in
1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further
autonomous powers to local governments governments."

The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal
provisions are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle
of government:

Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local
government code defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. Any
creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance
with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of
revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.

Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in
greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of
Article X provide:

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
 Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor
as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local
autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the
right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own
funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:

Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the
nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.

is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees
to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper
administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the
local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared
by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated
in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether
or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there should be a
genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local
and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a
sharing of power between the two levels of government.

It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of
Justices and Judges.  Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are
1âwphi1

made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The President makes the appointments from the list of
nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the
Council nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no
reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's personal choice.

The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez
required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified
than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private
respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that
his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and
the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest.

In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local
governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they
enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free
nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp.
705-706).

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The
Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal
from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.

Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of

Appeals   in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
1

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the

trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94,   in Sp. Proc. No.
2

Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero,
private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand,
Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind,
not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose
of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were
not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure
and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that
said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It
found, inter alia:

Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question
of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix,
this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to
comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of
the testatrix.

For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from
the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the
oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix
which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of
identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other
than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the
identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in
Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.

xxx xxx xxx

While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in
Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly
shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have
explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in
question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix.
Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic
will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
complied with.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent)

Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her
sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around
 which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of
sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew
the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even
had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot
number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her
bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a
nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession,
there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the
testamentary act.

In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary
capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the
will submitted herein.

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance
of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some
other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper
pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente
Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the
will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also
established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her
independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has
been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or
improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue
influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will
and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject
of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find
convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.

Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in

case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and
the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance
of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein
must be admitted to probate.   (Citations omitted.)
3

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for
its validity."   It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
4

Code, which read, as follows:

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date
validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will,

the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but
not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the
time of its execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of

making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence

of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,

on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.   Thus, in a petition to admit
5

a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument
submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will
and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.  6

In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is
erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription,
attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself,   as provided under Article 810 of
7

the New Civil Code, thus:

A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic
will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court
held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the

testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said
"la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985."   (Citations omitted.)
8

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of
the holographic will or on testator's signature,   their presence does not invalidate the will itself.   The
9 10

lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be
traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
 Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form
and with the requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to
the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and
must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must
identify them over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article
810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are
essential to the probate of a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house
and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do
what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will.   In the case at
11

bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in
the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her
conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to
the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated
November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Sixteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices Luis L. Victor (ponente),

Ricardo J. Francisco (chairman), and Pacita Cañizares-Nye.

2 Presided by Judge Filemon H. Mendoza.

3 Rollo, pp. 37-39.

 4 Impugned Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 46.

5 Pecson vs. Coronel, 45 Phil. 216 (1923); See 3 EDGARDO L. PARAS, Civil Code
of the Philippines Annotated (1989), pp. 145-146.

6 See Montanaño vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909).

7 See Fernando vs. Villalon, 3 Phil. 386 (1904).

8 See Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720, 725 (1903), citing a Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, dated April 4, 1895; See also, 3 MANRESA, Commentarios al
Codigo Español (Quinta ed.), p. 483; See further, 3 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code (1973), p. 107, citing Castan 341,
5 Valverde 82; 3 AMBROSIO PADILLA, Civil Code Annotated (1987),
pp. 157-158; 2 RAMON C. AQUINO and CAROLINA C. GRIÑO-AQUINO (1990), p.
42.

9 3 PARAS, op. cit.

10 It must be noted, however, that in Kalaw, this Court laid down an exception to the
general rule, when it invalidated the entire will because of an unauthenticated
erasure made by the testator. In that case, the will had only one substantial
provision. This was altered by substituting the original heir with another , with such
alteration being unauthenticated. This was altered by substituting the original heir
with another, with such alteration being unauthenticated. This Court held that the
whole will was void "for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after (the
provision is invalidated) which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written
should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix.
But, that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature."

11 Nepomuceno vs. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 (1985); See Nuguid vs.

Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966); See also Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522
(1984).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13431            November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.

GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

Filemon Sotto for appellants.

M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the
name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains
only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of
these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of
the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.

In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one
applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the
substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely
purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration,
undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which
the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would
assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We
cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator
and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of
the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary;
and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add
nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator
and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the
bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient
security.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any
sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one
sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering
whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the
will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the
numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring
specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation
clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator
since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.

Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all
the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and
the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and
the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded. lawphil.net

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the
dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was
executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which
this will is written.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13139             May 24, 1961

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHU KENG TO BE ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF

THE PHILIPPINES. TAN CHU KENG petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Jesus P. Narvios and Cesar A. Kintanar for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

This is an appeal by the Republic of the Philippines from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, granting Tan Chu Keng Philippine citizenship.

On September 15, 1955, Tan Chu Keng filed a petition for naturalization, with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, alleging that he emigrated to the Philippines from Amoy, China, in or about July
1912, arriving in the islands on board the boat Susana; that he is married to Lu Lay Tee, also a
Chinese, born in Amoy, China, who came to the Philippines in 1932; that he has three (3) children
with his wife Lu Lay Tee, namely, Domingo Tan, Esperanza Tan and Bienvenido Tan, all born in
Cebu, on January 28, 1940, September 30, 1942 and April 22, 1945, respectively; that his children
are now studying in the Cebu Institute, a school duly recognized by the government where Philippine
history, civics and Philippine government are taught and which school is open to children of all
races; that he is a merchant, having a sari-sari store and deals in lumber, copra and corn meal
business; that he has no tax liabilities; knows the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution
can speak and write English, Spanish and the Cebu-Visayan dialect. Petitioner claimed that he is
entitled to the benefits of Commonwealth Act No. 535, which exempts any person who has resided
in the Philippines for a period of thirty (30) years from filing a declaration of intention — to become a
citizen. The affidavits of two character eyewitnesses, Dr. Hospicio B. Iballe City School Dentist of
Cebu City, who claimed to have known petitioner since childhood, and Atty. Antonio T. Paulin who
lived a stone throw from petitioner's house, vouching for his good moral character and
irreproachable conduct, were also presented. Both witnesses are compadres of petitioner.

In the course of the proceedings, the provincial fiscal, on cross examination was able to elicit facts
which were not contained in the petition, such as: that petitioner before he married his present wife,
was married in China sometime in 1923; that his first wife died in 1925, leaving a son Espiritu Tan,
who was living at C. Padilla street, Cebu City, at the time; that Espiritu studied at the Silliman
University and reached the 2nd year high school; that he (Espiritu) was already 35 years old at the
time of the hearing; that he did not include Espiritu in the enumeration of his children in the petition
because he was already of age. On redirect, petitioner explained that Espiritu did not finish his
studies because of the outbreak of the last war and of his marriage after.

After the hearing, the provincial fiscal requested for fifteen (15) days within which to file a
memorandum. Before the expiration of the period, however, counsel for the petitioner filed a motion
for the re-opening of the case to present additional evidence, since he (petitioner) failed to introduce
"important material and relevant facts, through excusable negligence and mistake." At the
reopening, petitioner testified that aside from the three (3) children he mentioned in his petition, he
had two (2) others, namely, Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan, who were born in Amoy, China, on
February 17, 1924 and January 8, 1933, respectively; that when Espiritu was under the custody of
petitioner, he attended the Cebu Little Flower School, the Silliman University and the Balamban
Institute that in 1937 to 1938, Espiritu was classified as a third grader and a fifth grader in 1939 to
1940; that Alfonso studied in the Balamban Public School from Grade I to IV. Atty. Narvios, counsel
for the petitioner, testified that at the preparation of the petition, he discovered that Espiritu and
Alfonso were already 31 and 21 years old and both married in 1953 and 1955, respectively; that he
believed there was no necessity to include their names in the petition, considering that under section
15 of Act 473, only minor children are affected by the naturalization of the father.

It was also brought out at the said hearing that on February 25, 1942, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization in the CFI of Cebu, in which petition he included the names of the two children
(Espiritu and Alfonso), who were then minors; but that said petition was dismissed for his failure to
appear during the hearing, due to illness.

The lower court on June 8, 1957, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the petition to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines of petitioner TAN

CHU KENG is granted and the Court hereby decrees the naturalization of the said petitioner
as a citizen of the Philippines.

The Solicitor General alleged in his appeal brief that the lower court erred in holding that: (1) the
omission in the petition of the names of two of petitioner's children who were 31 and 22 years old,
respectively, at the time of the filing of the petition, is not sufficient ground for dismissing the petition;
(2) the omission of the names of Espiritu Tan and Alfonso Tan in the petition was not made in bad
faith or due to some ulterior motive; (3) petitioner is exempt from filing his declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen; and (4) petitioner has all the qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
1. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law (Comm. Act No. 473) specifically provides that the petitioner
will set forth, among others, whether he is single or married and the father of children, "the name,
age, birthplace and residence of the wife and each of the children." Petitioner gave the flimsy
explanation and his counsel tried to corroborate it that the failure to state the names of the two (2)
children (Espiritu and Alfonso) was due to the belief that there was an necessity for it. It will be
recalled that it was only during the cross-examination that the existence of these children was
elicited; that petitioner did not voluntarily tell the court, during the hearings, that he had another son
besides Espiritu and that it was only when the Fiscal asked for time to file a memorandum that
petitioner moved for a re-opening of the case, alleging that he had to introduce material and relevant
facts, which turned out to be the existence of another son.

The law requires the petitioner, if he is the father of children, to state the name, age, birthplace and
residence of each of the children, without making a distinction whether the petitioner's children are
minors or of age. Where the law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. If it were the
intention of the law to require only minor children of the petitioner to be mentioned in the petition, it
would have so stated. An applicant for naturalization must comply with all the requirements and
conditions petitions specified by law (Lau Lang Sin vs. Republic, 48 O.G. p. 1780). To dispense with
some requirements of the law on the shallow excuse that petitioner's counsel was responsible for the
omission, would blaze the trail for dangerous precedents.

2 and 3. It would seem that the omission was tinged with the color of bad faith and done for ulterior
motives, considering the facts that petitioner claims exemption to file his declaration of intention.
Commonwealth Act No. 535, amending section 6 of the Naturalization Law, provides that, "Persons
born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or
those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and those who have
resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their
application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying
with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes
that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools
or in private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. . . . ."
While petitioner might have satisfied the condition of the thirty years continuous residence, he has,
however, failed to comply with the further requisite of having given all his children of school age,
primary and secondary education. Awareness of this requisite has undoubtedly motivated the
petitioner to exclude the names of Espiritu and Alfonso in the petition, contrariwise, he would have
been compelled to show that he had given said children primary and secondary education in the
proper schools, which he had admittedly failed to do. Under these facts, petitioner is not entitled to
the exemption of making a declaration of intention. The failure to file a declaration of intention within
the prescribed time, in accordance with the requirements of Section 5 of the Naturalization Law, is
fatal to his application (Yu Hiang vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8378, March 23, 1956).

The requirements of the law regarding the qualifications of a petitioner for citizenship are stringent.
In view of the above findings, it is seriously doubted whether the petitioner herein possesses the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Doubts concerning grant of citizenship should be resolved
in favor of the government and against the claimant (U.S. vs. Macintosh, N.Y., 1931, 51 S. Ct. 570,
283 U.S. 605, 75 L. Ed. 1302, cited in Velayo's Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 1153).

The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another entered denying the petition for
citizenship of petitioner-appellee Tan Chu Keng. Costs against the petitioner-appellee.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, De
Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127240             March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
1 

Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato 2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony
of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish
to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
§2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner
5 

stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as
"Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The state also annexed income tax
6 

returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
7 

support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show
8  9 

that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,  petitioner
10 

resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.  The appellate court held:
11 

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give
the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of
the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and
said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
 Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of
clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It
is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN

NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER

STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"  so it was argued, because under
12 

Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143  of the Rules of Court which provides
13 

that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election

cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
 for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata.  Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
14 

from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.  We are
15 

not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility.  Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
16 

the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.  17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted
for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation
Sheet  of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
18 

031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published,  with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
19 

substantial compliance with §7.  This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
20 

objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the

government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another.  It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
21 

enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.  As noted by
22 

the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the
petition his present and former places of residence.  This provision and the rule of strict application
23 

of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought
to be denied. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras and Alicia
1 

Austria Martinez.

Presided by the Rodolfo C. Soledad.

2 

TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Emphasis added).

3 

Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.

4 

Annex B; Id., pp. 129-138.

5 

Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.

6 

Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4; Id., pp. 144-157.

7 

Annex D; Id., p. 139.

8 

Annex E; Id, p. 140.

9 

10 
Annex A; Records, p. 16.

11 
CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted.

12 
Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.

13 
Now found under Rule 1, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

14 
Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).
 15 
Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.

16 
See Peninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma, 194 SCRA 667 (1991).

17 
Appellee's Brief, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 184.

Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that the petition be
18 

dismissed as petitioner failed to meet the requirements under LOI 491 because his income is
insufficient for his support and that of his family and also because he failed to show that he
believes in the principles underlying the Constitution.

19 
In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.

20 
Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.

21 
Watt v. Republic, supra.

Chan Chen v. Republic, 109 Phil. 940 (1960), citing Co Quing v. Republic, 104 Phil. 889
22 

(1958) and Co. v. Republic, 108 Phil. 265 (1960).

23 
Comment, p. 23; Rollo, p. 110.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173017               March 17, 2009

FELIMON BIGORNIA, SPO3 BORROMEO GORRES, ADELIANO RICO, SPO3 JOVENTINO

BIGORNIA, SPO3 ALMANZOR JANGAO, SPO2 MESTERIOSO ARANCO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (23rd Division), and MELCHOR AROMA, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Resolutions dated July 22, 2004 1 and April 3, 20062 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73091. The appellate court dismissed petitioners’ appeal and denied
their motion for reconsideration.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Melchor Aroma filed an action for replevin with damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte. Petitioners allegedly detained Aroma’s
fishing vessel for 14 days after it was seized in a seaborne patrol.
On August 28, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision3 in favor of respondent. It ordered petitioners to
pay jointly and severally the sums of ₱350,000 by way of actual and compensatory damages;
₱100,000 as moral and exemplary damages; attorney’s fees of ₱20,000; and the costs of suit.

Petitioners appealed. On January 19, 2004, the office of Atty. Arthur L. Abundiente, counsel for
petitioners, received notice requiring petitioners to file an appellants’ brief within 45 days or until
March 4, 2004. Petitioners however, filed their brief only on March 18, 2004, 14 days beyond the
deadline. On July 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals issued the challenged Resolution. Its fallo states:

Having been unjustifiably filed out of time, the Appellant[s’] Brief is ORDERED EXPUNGED
FROM/STRICKEN OFF THE RECORDS. This instant appeal is accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure for appellants’ failure to file their Brief
within the time provided for under the Rules.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated April 3, 2006,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, the instant petition which presents the single issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE 23rd DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
ADMITTING THE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF, AND IN ORDERING THAT THE SAME BE EXPUNGED
FROM THE RECORD.6

Stated simply, the lone issue for our consideration is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing the appeal.

Petitioners explain that their counsel was unable to file the brief on time because he was busy
campaigning as candidate for Vice Governor of Lanao del Norte. 7 Petitioners fault the Court of
Appeals for giving notice to file brief only two years after they appealed. 8 They claim that they could
have immediately submitted a brief had notice been sent earlier. 1avvphi1

Petitioners contend that dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(e), 9 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court is
directory, not mandatory. They cite the case of United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Munsingwear
Creation Manufacturing Company,10 where a lapsed appeal was allowed by the Court in the interest
of substantial justice. According to them, a lesser offense of delay in filing of brief should merit the
same consideration. Petitioners argue that rules of procedure should be liberally construed so that
cases may be resolved on the merits, and not on technicalities.

Private respondent counters that technical rules of procedure were designed to effect expediency.
Thus, a party seeking liberal application of the rules must adequately explain his failure to abide by
them. Respondent believes that petitioners failed in this respect.

Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of the appellant to file the
appellants’ brief on time. But, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory. Hence, the court has
discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.
The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. 11 1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioners had 45 days or until March 4, 2004 to file an appellants’ brief. Unfortunately, petitioners
could not be located as some of them retired while the rest were assigned to other places. It was
their counsel who took the liberty of filing a brief in their behalf, but 14 days late and without a motion
for leave of court for its admission. Nonetheless, the more pressing consideration of substantial
justice compels this Court to heed the plea of petitioners. The amount of damages involved in this
case is relatively substantial. Petitioners are police officers, and government employees who receive
meager salaries for risking life and limb. It is but fair that they be heard on the merits of their case
before being made to pay damages, for what could be, a faithful performance of duty.

The circulars of this Court prescribing technical and other procedural requirements are meant to
promptly dispose of unmeritorious petitions that clog the docket and waste the time of the courts.
These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial
justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain their prime objective
for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. 12 Thus, in a
considerable number of cases,13 the Court has deemed it fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a
particular case from its strict operation where the appellant failed to perfect his appeal within the
reglementary period, resulting in the appellate court’s failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. With
more reason, there should be wider latitude in exempting a case from the strictures of procedural
rules when the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case and, as in
this case, petitioners failed to file the appellants’ brief 14 on time.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of substantial justice, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated July 22, 2004 and April 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No 73091
are SET ASIDE; petitioners’ appeal is reinstated; and the instant case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated member of Second Division pursuant to Special Order No. 571 in place of
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga who is on sabbatical leave.

 Rollo, pp. 57-58. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices
1

Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Edgardo A. Camello concurring.

 Id. at 46-47. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices
2

Normandie B. Pizarro and Ricardo R. Rosario concurring.

3
 Id. at 41-45. Penned by Judge Mamindiara P. Mancotara.

4
 Id. at 58.

5
 Id. at 47.

6
 Id. at 11.

7
 Id. at 9-10.

8
 Id. at 9.

9
 SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court
of Appeals, on its own motion, or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief
or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;

xxxx

10
 G.R. No. 76193, November 9, 1989, 179 SCRA 260.
 11
 Aguam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 784, 789.

 Acme Shoe, Rubber & Plastic Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103576, August 22,
12

1996, 260 SCRA 714, 719.

 Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147070, February 17, 2004, 423 SCRA 175; Sapad
13

v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132153, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 304.

14
 Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, id. at 179-180.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43706 November 14, 1986

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO.,
INC., respondents.

Conrado Q. Crucillo for petitioner.

Gregorio D. David for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside: (a) the judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals dated March 25, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 50112-R, entitled National Power Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee vs. The Philippine American Insurance Company, Inc. Defendant-Appellant, which
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 70811
entitled "National Power Corporation v. Far Eastern Electric, Inc., et al." and (b) respondent's Court's
resolution dated April 19, 1976 denying petitioner National Power Corporation's Motion for
Reconsideration (Petition, p. 13, Rollo).

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

The National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a contract with the Far Eastern Electric, Inc.
(FFEI) on December 26, 1962 for the erection of the Angat Balintawak 115-KW-3-Phase
transmission lines for the Angat Hydroelectric Project. FEEI agreed to complete the work within 120
days from the signing of the contract, otherwise it would pay NPC P200.00 per calendar day as
liquidated damages, while NPC agreed to pay the sum of P97,829.00 as consideration. On the other
hand, Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) issued a surety bond in the
amount of P30,672.00 for the faithful performance of the undertaking by FEEI, as required.

The condition of the bond reads:

 The liability of the PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC. under this bond will expire One (1) year from final Completion and Acceptance
and said bond will be cancelled 30 days after its expiration, unless surety is notified
of any existing obligation thereunder. (Exhibit 1-a)

in correlation with the provisions of the construction contract between Petitioner and Far Eastern
Electric, Inc. particularly the following provisions of the Specifications. to wit:

1. Par. 1B-2l Release of Bond

1B-21 Release of Bond

The Contractor's performance bond will be released by the National Power

Corporation at the expiration of one (1) year from the completion and final
acceptance of the work, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3959, and subject to
the General Conditions of this contract. (Page 49, Printed Record on Appeal); and

2. GP-19 of Specifications, which reads:

(a) Should the Contractor fail to complete the construction of the work as herein
specified and agreed upon, or if the work is abandoned, ... the Corporation shall have
the power to take over the work by giving notice in writing to that effect to the
Contractor and his sureties of its intention to take over the construction work.

(b) ... It is expressly agreed that in the event the corporation takes over the work from
the Contractor, the latter and his bondsmen shall continue to be liable under this
contract for any expense in the completion of the work in excess of the contract price
and the bond filed by the Contractor shall be answerable for the same and for any
and all damages that the Corporation may suffer as a result thereof. (pp. 76-78,
Printed Record on Appeal)

FEEI started construction on December 26, 1962 but on May 30, 1963, both FEEI and Philamgen
wrote NPC requesting the assistance of the latter to complete the project due to unavailability of the
equipment of FEEI. The work was abandoned on June 26, 1963, leaving the construction unfinished.
On July 19, 1963, in a joint letter, Philamgen and FEEI informed NPC that FEEI was giving up the
construction due to financial difficulties. On the same date, NPC wrote Philamgen informing it of the
withdrawal of FEEI from the work and formally holding both FEEI and Philamgen liable for the cost of
the work to be completed as of July 20, 1962 plus damages.

The work was completed by NPC on September 30, 1963. On January 30, 1967 NPC notified
Philamgen that FEEI had an outstanding obligation in the amount of P75,019.85, exclusive of
interest and damages, and demanded the remittance of the amount of the surety bond the answer
for the cost of completion of the work. In reply, Philamgen requested for a detailed statement of
account, but after receipt of the same, Philamgen did not pay as demanded but contended instead
that its liability under the bond has expired on September 20, 1964 and claimed that no notice of any
obligation of the surety was made within 30 days after its expiration. (Record on Appeal, pp. 191-
194; Rollo, pp. 62-64).

NPC filed Civil Case No. 70811 for collection of the amount of P75,019.89 spent to complete the
work abandoned; P144,000.00 as liquidated damages and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Only
Philamgen answered while FEEI was declared in default.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of NPC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the defendant Far Eastern Electric, Inc., is ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P75,019.86 plus interest at the legal rate from September 21, 1967 until
fully paid. Out of said amount, both defendants, Far Eastern Electric, Inc., and the
Philippine American Insurance Company, Inc., are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P30,672.00 covered by Surety Bond No. 26268, dated
December 26, 1962, plus interest at the legal rate from September 21, 1967 until fully
paid,

Both defendants are also ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees and costs.

On appeal by Philamgen, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and dismissed
the complaint.

Hence this petition.

Respondent Philamgen filed its comment on the petition on August 6, 1978 (Rollo, p. 62) in
compliance with the resolution dated June 16, 1976 of the First Division of this Court (Rollo, p. 52)
while petitioner NPC filed its Reply to the comment of respondent (Rollo, p. 76) as required in the
resolution of this Court of August 16, 1976, (Rollo, p. 70). In the resolution of September 20, 1976,
the petition for certiorari was given due course (Rollo, p. 85). Petitioner's brief was filed on
November 27, 1976 (Rollo, p. 97) while Philamgen failed to file brief within the required period and
this case was submitted for decision without respondent's brief in the resolution of this Court of
February 25. 1977) Rollo, p. 103).

In its brief, petitioner raised the following assignment of errors:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER

SHOULD HAVE GIVEN NOTICE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT PHILAMGEN OF
ANY EXISTING OBLIGATION WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM EXPIRATION OF THE
BOND TO HOLD SAID SURETY LIABLE THEREUNDER, DESPITE PETITIONER'S
TAKING OVER OF THE WORK ABANDONED BY THE CONTRACTOR BEFORE
ITS COMPLETION.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER SHOULD STILL NOTIFY PRIVATE

RESPONDENT PHILAMGEN OF ANY EXISTING OBLIGATION UNDER THE
BOND DESPITE THE TAKE-OVER OF WORK BY PETITIONER, RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS NONETHELESS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S
LETTER DATED JULY 19, 1963 (EXH. E) TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITION OF THE BOND.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ABSOLVING PRIVATE

RESPONDENT PHILAMGEN FROM ITS LIABILITY UNDER THE BOND.
The decisive issue in this case is the correct interpretation and/or application of the condition of the
bond relative to its expiration, in correlation with the provisions of the construction contract, the
faithful performance of which, said bond was issued to secure.

The bone of contention in this case is the compliance with the notice requirement as a condition in
order to hold the surety liable under the bond.

Petitioner claims that it has already complied with such requirement by virtue of its notice dated July
19, 1963 of abandonment of work by FEEI and of its takeover to finish the construction, at the same
time formally holding both FEEI and Philamgen liable for the uncompleted work and damages. It
further argued that the notice required in the bond within 30 days after its expiration of any existing
obligation, is applicable only in case the contractor itself had completed the contract and not when
the contractor failed to complete the work, from which arises the continued liability of the surety
under its bond as expressly provided for in the contract. Petitioner's contention was sustained by the
trial court.

On the other hand, private respondent insists that petitioner's notice dated July 19, 1983 is not
sufficient despite previous events that it had knowledge of FEEI's failure to comply with the contract
and claims that it cannot be held liable under the bond without notice within thirty days from the
expiration of the bond, that there is a subsisting obligation. Private respondent's contention is
sustained by the Court of Appeals.

The petition is impressed with merit.

As correctly assessed by the trial court, the evidence on record shows that as early as May 30,
1963, Philamgen was duly informed of the failure of its principal to comply with its undertaking. In
fact, said notice of failure was also signed by its Assistant Vice President. On July 19, 1963, when
FEEI informed NPC that it was abandoning the construction job, the latter forthwith informed
Philamgen of the fact on the same date. Moreover, on August 1, 1963, the fact that Philamgen was
seasonably notified, was even bolstered by its request from NPC for information of the percentage
completed by the bond principal prior to the relinquishment of the job to the latter and the reason for
said relinquishment. (Record on Appeal, pp. 193-195). The 30-day notice adverted to in the surety
bond applies to the completion of the work by the contractor. This completion by the contractor never
materialized.

The surety bond must be read in its entirety and together with the contract between NPC and the
contractors. The provisions must be construed together to arrive at their true meaning. Certain
stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to control.

Furthermore, it is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should
be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 327, July 16,
1984).

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the breach of contract in this case, that is, the
abandonment of the unfinished work of the transmission line of the petitioner by the contractor Far
Eastern Electric, Inc. was within the effective date of the contract and the surety bond. Such
abandonment gave rise to the continuing liability of the bond as provided for in the contract which is
deemed incorporated in the surety bond executed for its completion. To rule therefore that private
respondent was not properly notified would be gross error.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision dated March 25, 1976 and the resolution dated April 19,
1976 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered reinstating
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 70811 entitled "National Power
Corporation v. Far Eastern Electric, Inc., et al."

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25290             March 18, 1966

SOTERA VIRAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO LEGASPI and HEIRS OF CEZARIA
MERENDO, respondents.

Andres Amante, Jr. for the petitioner.

Regino M. Monta for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

On October 25, 1965, petitioner received notice that her motion for reconsideration of the adverse
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31922R was denied. Admittedly, the 15-
day period allotted her by the Rules to appeal the decision to this Supreme Court expired on
November 9, 1965, since October had 31 days. However, upon petition by her counsel, petitioner-
appellant was granted —

an extension of only 15 days from the expiration of the reglementary period. (Res. of Nov.
15, 1965, G.R. No. L-25290).

The petition for certiorari having been actually filed only on November 26, 1965, when the period for
so doing expired on November 24, this Court, by Resolution of February 8, 1966, dismissed the
petition for having been filed out of time.

Petitioner-appellant now moves for reconsideration, claiming that her first fifteen days that should be
counted from and after October 25, 1965, and which ended on November 9, should be considered
as expiring on November 10, 1965, because November 9 was a holiday (Election day); that the 15-
day extension granted her should, therefore, be counted from November 10; that the 15 days from
November 10 terminated on November 25; and as the latter was also a holiday (Thanksgiving Day),
the petitioner had until the next day, Friday, November 26, to file her petition for review, which she
did.
We rule that the motion for reconsideration is based on an erroneous premise. The extension of 15
days granted to the petitioner, tacked to the original 15 days granted her by the Rules of Court, in
effect gave her a thirty (30)-day period, from October 25, 1965, within which to file her petition in this
Court. Since October had 31 days, her last day was November 24, and not November 26.

The rule that excludes the last day of a period, should the same be a holiday, refers to
the performance of the act prescribed or required. But it does not apply where at the end of the
period no such act is to be done. The rule is stated thus in American Jurisprudence:

Rules of Court in respect to the time for the doing of an act in a judicial proceeding relating to
a matter of practice are usually construed, where the last day for the doing of an act falls on
Sunday, to allow the whole of the next day for the purpose; and in many states this
construction has been adopted by statute or rule of court. The principle announced,
however, is subject to an exception where there is nothing to be done on the last day, in
which case Sunday is not to be excluded in the computation of time. (52 Am. Jur. p. 345,
sec. 19) (Emphasis supplied).

Nor do we see any merit in the substance of the petition itself. The refusal by the trial court to admit
an amended answer that would withdraw previous admissions and change the theory of the case,
adopted in the answer originally filed, can not constitute a grave abuse of discretion considering that
(1) no adequate excuse was offered for the delay in tendering the allegedly correct facts and theory,
and that (2) the unauthorized abandonment of her certificate of public convenience, averred by
petitioner Viray in the proposed amended answer, was in violation of law, and can not be used by
her to avoid her statutory obligations, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. 1äwphï1.ñët

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar
and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29131             August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for
plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved
therein.

On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No.
20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:

(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay
jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25,
1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;

(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this
decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to
plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would
pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson
has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.

Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and
judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701
thereof, against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No.
20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and
plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:

Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than
P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court,
the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the
decision of this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on
December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days
(Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present
case was filed it was filed two days too late.

The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed. 1äwphï1.ñët

The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on
March 20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein
raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred
by the statute of limitations.

Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same
Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This, in turn,
took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was
received by the defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken
therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December 21, 1955
expired.

Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise,
because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964 being leap
years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an
aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court
accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar
year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being
computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation.
There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following
year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day,
then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and, therefore,
that the 366 days constitute one year." 2

The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit
provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as
the term is used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain,
the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it
meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such
provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the
same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are
referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or
"solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the
Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be
understood to refer to a calendar month."  4 In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del
Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we
have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the particularity
that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto
the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days."

Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for
failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot
be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section 13 of the
Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act
of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so
ordered.

Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Zaldivar, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes
 1
Sec. 1, Rule 39, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 31, Rules of Court.

2
Emphasis ours.

3
Decision of April 6, 1895.

4
Guzman v. Lichauco, 42 Phil. 292; Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336.

5
97 Phil. 70-71.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 157801               June 8, 2005

PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. LYNDON D. JUNTILLA, in his capacity as HOUSING AND LAND USE ARBITER of
HLURB, Region VII, Cebu City, and TERESA C. AGUILAR, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 69812 which held that the Housing and Land Use Arbiter of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion of herein private respondent for a writ of possession.

The controversy arose from the following antecedents:

In 1996, Teresa C. Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI)
covering a condominium unit which was under construction at Mary Cielo Leisure Resort Compound,
Opon, Lapu-Lapu City. PPGI obligated itself to deliver the unit by June 1998, as indicated in its
promotional material. Thereafter, Aguilar paid by installment the purchase price of the condominium
unit in the total amount of ₱727,921.82. 2

After the lapse of almost two years after the signing of the contract to sell, Aguilar saw that the
construction of the building, where her supposed condominium unit was to be located, had barely
even started. Believing that PPGI would not be able to deliver the unit to her by June 1998, she
demanded in writing the rescission of her contract to sell with PPGI and the refund of what she had
paid. When PPGI refused, she filed a complaint 3 against PPGI for the rescission of the contract to
sell and damages with the HLURB. The case was docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-0207-
0326198.

On August 26, 1999, the HLURB rendered its Decision 4 in favor of Aguilar. The fallo of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant

declaring the Contract to Sell executed by the parties as having been Rescinded and ordering the
Respondent to:

a. Pay the complainant the amount of ₱727,921.82 as refund of the payments made;

b. Pay the complainant 12% legal interest computed from the date of filing of this instant
case until its final determination;

c. Pay the complainant the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

d. Pay the complainant the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. Pay the complainant the amount of ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;

f. Pay the Board administrative fine of ₱10,000.00 for violating Section 20. Of (sic)
Presidential Decree No. 957.

SO ORDERED.5

The respondent appealed the decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners which, on December
21, 1999, affirmed the same and declared it as final and executory. On motion of the complainant,
the HLURB issued a writ of execution ordering the ex-officio sheriff to execute its decision against
PPGI with address at the Penthouse, Century Citadel, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati
City.

Sheriff Cesar D. Raagas of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 138, levied several
properties of PPGI, one of which was a condominium unit identified as Condominium Unit No. 3301
in the Makati Prime Citadel located at P. Burgos Street, Makati City, and covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 25156. The sale at public auction was set on March 30, 2000. He
issued a Sheriff’s Notice of Sale dated February 17, 2000, 6 posted a copy7 thereof to satisfy the writ
of execution, and sent a copy of the said notice to PPGI at Room 2807, Makati Prime Citadel
Condominium, P. Burgos Street, Makati City.8 The same notice was also published in the
newspaper.9

Before the scheduled auction sale, or on March 21, 2000, Michael J. O’Pallick served a copy of his
affidavit of third-party claim10 to Sheriff Raagas. O’Pallick claimed that the condominium unit was the
subject of a contract to sell executed by PPGI in favor of Reynaldo Poblete and Tomas Villanueva
who, in turn, had executed a deed for assignment in his favor. The latter appended copies of the
said deeds to his affidavit.11

The Sheriff proceeded with the sale at public auction on March 30, 2000. Aguilar was declared the
highest bidder for the condominium unit for ₱1,200,000.00. The Sheriff executed a certificate of sale
over the property in her favor.12
Following the failure of PPGI to redeem the property, the Sheriff executed, on April 20, 2001, a final
deed of sale13 in favor of Aguilar, and in whose favor CCT No. 74777 was issued. 14 She declared the
condominium unit for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 10134. 15

In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the counsel of PPGI withdrew his appearance as its
counsel.16 On November 28, 2001, Aguilar filed a motion with the HLURB for the issuance of a writ of
possession.17 A copy of the motion was served on PPGI at its principal office as alleged in the
complaint at No. 21/F Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City. It
appears that Ramon Reyes, Jr. received the said copy for PPGI on November 23, 2001. 18

During the hearing of the said motion, no representative of the PPGI appeared. On December 21,
2001, the HLURB issued its Order19 granting Aguilar’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, and directing the PPGI, its officers, incorporators, stockholders and/or
assignees/transferees to peacefully vacate the subject condominium. 20 It appears that the president
of PPGI was to be served with a copy of the order at Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6809
Ayala Avenue, Makati City.21

On January 18, 2002, PPGI filed its motion for reconsideration 22 of the December 21, 2001 Order of
the HLURB, contending that it was not served with a copy of Aguilar’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession. PPGI averred that it had transferred its office from 21/F Multinational
BanCorporation Centre, 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City to the Prime Citadel Condominium, No.
5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City. PPGI further averred that despite its earnest efforts to secure
copies of the aforementioned motion of Aguilar, the HLURB Arbiter refused to furnish it with such
copies. PPGI prayed that the HLURB Order dated December 21, 2001 be recalled and set aside
and, in the meantime, an order suspending the implementation thereof be issued. PPGI set the
hearing of its motion on January 21, 2002. Meanwhile, on January 22, 2002, the Sheriff placed
Aguilar in physical possession of the subject condominium. 23

On February 27, 2002, the HLURB issued its Resolution 24 denying the said motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, and for the added reason that the same had already been enforced
and, as a consequence, the said motion was considered moot and academic. 25

Aggrieved, PPGI filed, on April 11, 2002, its petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and sought the reversal of the HLURB Order dated December 21, 2001 on the
following issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE QUESTIONED ORDER DATED
DECEMBER 21, 2000 (SIC) AND THE RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 27, 2002, WHICH
DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.26

PPGI asserted that in issuing the writ of execution, the HLURB Arbiter took judicial notice of its new
address at the Prime Citadel Condominium at No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City.
Despite this, the respondent caused the service of a copy of her motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession at its old office; hence, it behooved the HLURB to defer consideration of the said motion
until service had been made upon it at the said address. The petitioner asserted that the HLURB
acted arbitrarily when it allowed time to elapse before resolving the motion of the respondent herein,
and enabled the Sheriff to place her in possession of the property. 1awphi1

In her comment on the petition, respondent Aguilar averred that (1) in view of the petitioner’s failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies (including a petition for certiorari before the Board of
Commissioners of the HLURB), the petition was premature; (2) in view of the claim of O’Pallick that
he had acquired ownership over the property, the latter was the real party-in-interest to file the
petition; and (3) the HLURB acted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB when it
resolved the respondent’s motion for a writ of possession.

On November 12, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision27 denying the petition of PPGI for lack of merit.
The appellate court declared that the records of the case reflected the address of PPGI as "No. 21/F
Multinational BanCorporation Centre, 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City," and that it was never
changed by PPGI; it remained as PPGI’s address on record. Thus, when Aguilar sent a copy of her
motion at the said address, PPGI was deemed to have been notified. On its claim that its new
address was known to the HLURB as shown in the writ of execution it issued, the CA declared that
the address "Rm. 2807, Makati Prime Citadel Condominium, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati
City," merely cropped-up because it was where the levied condominium unit was located. The CA
further ruled that the assailed order and resolution were legally issued. After all, the respondent had
already been issued CCT No. 74777 over the condominium unit; hence, she was entitled to the
possession thereof.

The appellate court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the decision for lack of
merit.28

The PPGI, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD’S ACTION IN ORDERING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WHEN
PETITIONER PRIMETOWN WAS NOT INFORMED NOR DULY NOTIFIED OF THE HEARING ON
THE MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER
PRIMETOWN OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.29

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFERRING POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF

RESPONDENT AGUILAR OVER THE SUBJECT CONDOMINIUM UNIT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT TITLE OR OWNERSHIP THERETO HAD BEEN WRONGLY TRANSFERRED IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT AGUILAR AS IT HAD BEEN SOLD ALREADY TO ANOTHER BUYER PRIOR TO
THE PUBLIC AUCTION HELD.30

On the first issue, the petitioner avers that under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
respondent Aguilar was mandated to serve on it a copy of her motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession at least three days before the date of its scheduled hearing. However, the respondent
failed to do so because she served a copy of the said motion at its old principal office at No. 21/F
Multinational BanCorporation Centre, No. 6805 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, and not at its new
principal office address. The petitioner avers that the HLURB and respondent Aguilar were aware of
its new principal office address because the writ of execution issued by the HLURB specifically
stated that its principal office was located at the "Penthouse, Century Citadel Inn, No. 5007 P.
Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City."

The petitioner posits that the HLURB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and granting the respondent’s motion for a writ of possession. As
such, the petitioner posits, the motion of respondent Aguilar was a mere scrap of paper. Worse, the
HLURB dilly-dallied in resolving its motion for reconsideration, thus allowing the Sheriff to place
respondent Aguilar in possession of the unit and thereafter denying the said motion solely on the
ground that it had become moot and academic.  Patently, the petitioner argues, it was deprived of its
1avvphi1

property without due process of law.

On the second issue, the petitioner avers that respondent Aguilar bought the property at public
auction in bad faith because, before she secured CCT No. 74777, on October 30, 2001, she was
already aware that the condominium unit had been sold by the petitioner on March 20, 1995 in favor
of Poblete and Villanueva, and that they assigned their right to O’Pallick, who, in turn, executed his
affidavit of third-party claim on March 17, 2000 and filed the same with the office of the ex-
officio Sheriff. Hence, respondent Aguilar was not entitled to the possession of the condominium
unit.

In her comment on the petition, respondent Aguilar avers that the petitioner failed to notify her and
the HLURB of any change or transfer of its principal office. Hence, she cannot be blamed for serving
a copy of her motion on the petitioner at its original principal office, and the HLURB for serving a
copy of its order at the said address. On the second issue, the respondent avers that she was
entitled to the possession of the unit following the issuance of CCT No. 74777 in her favor. The
respondent pointed out that O’Pallick had filed a complaint for quieting of title against her with the
RTC of Makati City on April 2, 2001 with a plea for injunctive relief, but that the RTC denied his plea
for injunctive relief and his motion for reconsideration thereof. Besides, the respondent argues, her
title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

The petition is bereft of merit.

First. The petitioner was mandated to notify the HLURB and the respondent herein of the transfer of
its principal office from the Multinational BanCorporation Centre to the Prime Citadel Condominium
at No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City. However, the petitioner failed to do so. Based on the
records of the HLURB and those of the respondent’s, the principal office of the petitioner remained
at the Multinational BanCorporation Centre. While it may be true that in the writ of execution issued
by the HLURB and the Sheriff’s notice of sale the address of the petitioner appears to be at the
Prime Citadel Condominium at No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Makati City, the said address had
reference to the location of the condominium unit levied upon and sought to be sold at public
auction, not to the petitioner’s principal office. That the petitioner retained its principal office at the
Multinational BanCorporation Centre is shown by the fact that its employee, Ramon Reyes, Jr.,
received a copy of the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent on
November 23, 2001. The petitioner has not disputed the authority of Reyes, Jr. to receive such copy
of the respondent’s motion.

Second. The petitioner’s reliance on Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
quoted, infra, is misplaced:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the
filing of the motion.
 …

Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof.

This is so because the aforecited provisions apply only to a litigated motion and not to an ex
parte motion.

The said rules do not apply to a motion which is merely a mode by which the respondent herein
informed the Court that the writ of execution had not been implemented, and that she had not been
placed in possession of the property. There is no need for a hearing of such motion because it is not
a litigated motion, and the court may act thereon without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner as
the adverse party. The prejudice caused to the petitioner as the adverse party from the HLURB
order directing it and its officers and employees to vacate the condominium unit would not have
been greater than that caused by the issuance of the writ of execution itself. The writ of possession
was but an implementation of the writ of execution. 31

Third. The procedure in a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without an opportunity for
the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. 32 The issuance of a writ of possession is
not a judgment on the merits.33 Thus, the HLURB may grant the motion even in the absence of the
judgment obligor, herein petitioner.

Fourth. The buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is
not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. 34 The issuance of the
writ of possession had become ministerial duty on the part of HLURB since the respondent had
sufficiently shown her proof of title over the subject condominium. Being the registered owner of the
condominium unit, she is entitled to its possession. The case at bar is akin to foreclosure
proceedings where the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial act of the court after
title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgage. 35

It must be stressed that the Register of Deeds had already cancelled CCT No. 25156 and issued
CCT No. 74777 in the name of the respondent. Thus, the argument of the petitioner that the title or
ownership had been wrongfully vested with the respondent is a collateral attack on the latter’s title
which is more appropriate in a direct proceeding.36

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

On official leave
REYNATO S. PUNO*
Associate Justice
Chairman
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ**

Associate Justice
Acting Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

** Acting Chairman.

 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos, with Associate Justices Oswaldo D.
1

Agcaoili (retired) and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.

2
 CA Rollo, p. 40.

3
 Id. at 24.

4
 Penned by Housing and Land Use Arbiter Lyndon D. Juntilla.

5
 CA Rollo, pp. 46-47.

6
 Rollo, pp. 126-127.

7
 Id. at 53.

8
 Rollo, p. 53.
9
 Id. at 55.

10
 Id. at 57.

11
 Id. at 116-125.

12
 Id. at 58.

13
 Id.

14
 Id. at 66.

15
 Id. at 61.

16
 Id. at 59.

17
 Rollo, p. 60.

18
 Id. at 63.

19
 CA Rollo, p. 80.

20
 Id. at 80-83.

21
 Id. at 83.

22
 Id. at 84.

23
 Rollo, p. 65.

24
 Id. at 67.

25
 Id.

26
 CA Rollo, p. 15.

27
 Rollo, p. 32.

28
 Rollo, p. 38.

29
 Id. at 17.

30
 Id. at 21.

31
 Bajet v. Baclig, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-00-1598, 30 July 2002, 385 SCRA 343.

32
 Spouses Ruben Santiago and Inocencia Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera,
Inc., G.R. No. 147820, 18 March 2005.
  A.G. Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111662, 23 October 1997,
33

281 SCRA 155.

34
 Joven v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80739, 2 August 1992, 212 SCRA 700.

35
 See Vaca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109672, 14 July 1994, 234 SCRA 146.

36
 Section 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:

SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34382 July 20, 1983

THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and/or ANGEL JOSE TRANSPORTATION, INC. and HON. A.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, Presiding Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance, Branch
XVII, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34383 July 20, 1983

THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
N. V. NEDLLOYD LIJNEN; COLUMBIAN PHILIPPINES, INC., and/or GUACODS, INC., and HON.
A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, Presiding Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance, Branch
XVII, respondents.

No. L-34382.

Zapa Law Office for petitioner.

Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for respondents.

No. L-34383.

Zapa Law Office for petitioner.

Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa Law office for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Questioned in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are the decisions of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing the complaints in Civil Case No. 71923 and in Civil
Case No. 71694, on the ground that plaintiff therein, now appellant, had failed to prove its capacity to
sue.

There is no dispute over the facts of these cases for recovery of maritime damages. In L-34382, the
facts are found in the decision of the respondent court which stated:

On or about January 13, 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated
Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS "Eastern Jupiter' from
Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of "Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods." The said
VESSEL is owned and operated by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines (CARRIER).
The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. O-MA-9, with arrival notice to Phelps
Dodge Copper Products Corporation of the Philippines (CONSIGNEE) at Manila. The
shipment was insured with plaintiff against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06
under its Insurance Policy No. AS-73633.

xxx xxx xxx

The coils discharged from the VESSEL numbered 2,361, of which 53 were in bad
order. What the CONSIGNEE ultimately received at its warehouse was the same
number of 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils entangled,
partly cut, and which had to be considered as scrap. Upon weighing at
CONSIGNEE's warehouse, the 2,361 coils were found to weight 263,940.85 kilos as
against its invoiced weight of 264,534.00 kilos or a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kilos,
according to Exhibit "A", or 1,209,56 lbs., according to the claims presented by the
consignee against the plaintiff (Exhibit "D-1"), the CARRIER (Exhibit "J-1"), and the
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Exhibit "K- l").

For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, plaintiff paid the consignee under its
insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which plaintiff became
subrogated to the rights and actions of the CONSIGNEE. Plaintiff made demands for
payment against the CARRIER and the TRANSPORTATION COMPANY for
reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. ...

The facts of L-34383 are found in the decision of the lower court as follows:

On or about December 22, 1966, the Hansa Transport Kontor shipped from Bremen,
Germany, 30 packages of Service Parts of Farm Equipment and Implements on
board the VESSEL, SS "NEDER RIJN" owned by the defendant, N. V. Nedlloyd
Lijnen, and represented in the Philippines by its local agent, the defendant
Columbian Philippines, Inc. (CARRIER). The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading
No. 22 for transportation to, and delivery at, Manila, in favor of the consignee,
international Harvester Macleod, Inc. (CONSIGNEE). The shipment was insured with
plaintiff company under its Cargo Policy No. AS-73735 "with average terms" for
P98,567.79.

xxx xxx xxx

The packages discharged from the VESSEL numbered 29, of which seven packages
were found to be in bad order. What the CONSIGNEE ultimately received at its
warehouse was the same number of 29 packages with 9 packages in bad order. Out
 of these 9 packages, 1 package was accepted by the CONSIGNEE in good order
due to the negligible damages sustained. Upon inspection at the consignee's
warehouse, the contents of 3 out of the 8 cases were also found to be complete and
intact, leaving 5 cases in bad order. The contents of these 5 packages showed
several items missing in the total amount of $131.14; while the contents of the
undelivered 1 package were valued at $394.66, or a total of $525.80 or P2,426.98.

For the short-delivery of 1 package and the missing items in 5 other packages,
plaintiff paid the CONSIGNEE under its Insurance Cargo Policy the amount of
P2,426.98, by virtue of which plaintiff became subrogated to the rights and actions of
the CONSIGNEE. Demands were made on defendants CARRIER and CONSIGNEE
for reimbursement thereof but they failed and refused to pay the same.

In both cases, the petitioner-appellant made the following averment regarding its capacity to sue:

The plaintiff is a foreign insurance company duly authorized to do business in the Philippines
through its agent, Mr. VICTOR H. BELLO, of legal age and with office address at Oledan Building,
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.

In L-34382, the respondent-appellee Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., filed its answer and alleged that it:

Denies the allegations of Paragraph I which refer to plaintiff's capacity to sue for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

Respondent-appellee, Angel Jose Transportation, Inc., in turn filed its answer admitting the
allegations of the complaint, regarding the capacity of plaintiff-appellant. The pertinent paragraph of
this answer reads as follows:

Angel Jose Admits the jurisdictional averments in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the heading Parties.

In L-34383, the respondents-appellees N. V. Nedlloyd Lijhen, Columbian Philippines, Inc. and

Guacods, Inc., filed their answers. They denied the petitioner-appellant's capacity to sue for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

As earlier stated, the respondent court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the same
ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue. The court reasoned as follows:

In the opinion of the Court, if plaintiff had the capacity to sue, the Court should hold
that a) defendant Eastern Shipping Lines should pay plaintiff the sum of P1,630.22
with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968, the date of the institution of the
Complaint, until fully paid; b) defendant Angel Jose Transportation, Inc. should pay
plaintiff the sum of P1,630.22 also with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968
until fully paid; c) the counterclaim of defendant Angel Jose transportation, Inc.
should be ordered dismissed; and d) each defendant to pay one-half of the costs.

The Court is of the opinion that Section 68 of the Corporation Law reflects a policy
designed to protect the public interest. Hence, although defendants have not raised
the question of plaintiff's compliance with that provision of law, the Court has
resolved to take the matter into account.
A suing foreign corporation, like plaintiff, has to plead affirmatively and prove either
that the transaction upon which it bases its complaint is an isolated one, or that it is
licensed to transact business in this country, failing which, it will be deemed that it
has no valid cause of action (Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
17 SCRA 1037). In view of the number of cases filed by plaintiff before this Court, of
which judicial cognizance can be taken, and under the ruling in Far East
International Import and Export Corporation vs. Hankai Koayo Co., 6 SCRA 725, it
has to be held that plaintiff is doing business in the Philippines. Consequently, it must
have a license under Section 68 of the Corporation Law before it can be allowed to
sue.

The situation of plaintiff under said Section 68 has been described as follows in Civil
Case No. 71923 of this Court, entitled 'Home Insurance Co. vs. N. V. Nedlloyd
Lijnen, of which judicial cognizance can also be taken:

Exhibit "R",presented by plaintiff is a certified copy of a license, dated

July 1, 1967, issued by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner
authorizing plaintiff to transact insurance business in this country. By
virtue of Section 176 of the Insurance Law, it has to be presumed that
a license to transact business under Section 68 of the Corporation
Law had previously been issued to plaintiff. No copy thereof,
however, was submitted for a reason unknown. The date of that
license must not have been much anterior to July 1, 1967. The
preponderance of the evidence would therefore call for the finding
that the insurance contract involved in this case, which was executed
at Makati, Rizal, on February 8, 1967, was contracted before plaintiff
was licensed to transact business in the Philippines.

This Court views Section 68 of the Corporation Law as reflective of a

basic public policy. Hence, it is of the opinion that, in the eyes of
Philippine law, the insurance contract involved in this case must be
held void under the provisions of Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code,
and could not be validated by subsequent procurement of the license.
That view of the Court finds support in the following citation:

According to many authorities, a constitutional or

statutory prohibition against a foreign corporation
doing business in the state, unless such corporation
has complied with conditions prescribed, is effective
to make the contracts of such corporation void, or at
least unenforceable, and prevents the maintenance
by the corporation of any action on such contracts.
Although the usual construction is to the contrary, and
to the effect that only the remedy for enforcement is
affected thereby, a statute prohibiting a non-
complying corporation from suing in the state courts
on any contract has been held by some courts to
render the contract void and unenforceable by the
corporation, even after its has complied with the
statute." (36 Am. Jur. 2d 299-300).

xxx xxx xxx

 The said Civil Case No. 71923 was dismissed by this Court. As the insurance
contract involved herein was executed on January 20, 1967, the instant case should
also be dismissed.

We resolved to consolidate the two cases when we gave due course to the petition.

The petitioner raised the following assignments of errors:

First Assignment of Error

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS AN ISSUE THE

LEGAL EXISTENCE OR CAPACITY OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

Second Assignment of Error

THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON

THE FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE.

On the basis of factual and equitable considerations, there is no question that the private
respondents should pay the obligations found by the trial court as owing to the petitioner. Only the
question of validity of the contracts in relation to lack of capacity to sue stands in the way of the
petitioner being given the affirmative relief it seeks. Whether or not the petitioner was engaged in
single acts or solitary transactions and not engaged in business is likewise not in issue. The
petitioner was engaged in business without a license. The private respondents' obligation to pay
under the terms of the contracts has been proved.

When the complaints in these two cases were filed, the petitioner had already secured the
necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines. It could already filed suits.

Petitioner was, therefore, telling the truth when it averred in its complaints that it was a foreign
insurance company duly authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent Mr. Victor H.
Bello. However, when the insurance contracts which formed the basis of these cases were
executed, the petitioner had not yet secured the necessary licenses and authority. The lower court,
therefore, declared that pursuant to the basic public policy reflected in the Corporation Law, the
insurance contracts executed before a license was secured must be held null and void. The court
ruled that the contracts could not be validated by the subsequent procurement of the license.

The applicable provisions of the old Corporation Law, Act 1459, as amended are:

Sec. 68. No foreign corporation or corporations formed, organized, or existing under

any laws other than those of the Philippine Islands shall be permitted to transact
business in the Philippine Islands until after it shall have obtained a license for that
purpose from the chief of the Mercantile Register of the Bureau of Commerce and
Industry, (Now Securities and Exchange Commission. See RA 5455) upon order of
the Secretary of Finance (Now Monetary Board) in case of banks, savings, and loan
banks, trust corporations, and banking institutions of all kinds, and upon order of the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications (Now Secretary of Trade. See 5455,
section 4 for other requirements) in case of all other foreign corporations. ...

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 69. No foreign corporation or corporation formed, organized, or existing under
any laws other than those of the Philippine Islands shall be permitted to transact
business in the Philippine Islands or maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the
recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the license
prescribed in the section immediately preceding. Any officer, director, or agent of the
corporation or any person transacting business for any foreign corporation not having
the license prescribed shag be punished by imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than two years or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor
more than one thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and fine, in the
discretion of the court.

As early as 1924, this Court ruled in the leading case of Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser &
Co. (46 Phil. 70) that the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was to subject the
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Marshall
Wells Co. decision referred to a litigation over an isolated act for the unpaid balance on a bill of
goods but the philosophy behind the law applies to the factual circumstances of these cases. The
Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant isolates a portion of one sentence of section 69 of the Corporation Law

and asks the court to give it a literal meaning Counsel would have the law read thus:
"No foreign corporation shall be permitted to maintain by itself or assignee any suit
for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the
license prescribed in section 68 of the law." Plaintiff, on the contrary, desires for the
court to consider the particular point under discussion with reference to all the law,
and thereafter to give the law a common sense interpretation.

The object of the statute was to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts. The object of the statute was not to
prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from
acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary
to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. The implication of the law is that it
was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which
happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing
redress in the Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to permit persons to avoid their
contracts made with such foreign corporations. The effect of the statute preventing
foreign corporations from doing business and from bringing actions in the local
courts, except on compliance with elaborate requirements, must not be unduly
extended or improperly applied. It should not be construed to extend beyond the
plain meaning of its terms, considered in connection with its object, and in connection
with the spirit of the entire law. (State vs. American Book Co. [1904], 69 Kan, 1;
American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co. vs. Superior Court of City & Country of
San Francisco and Hebbard [1908], 153 Cal., 533; 5 Thompson on Corporations, 2d
ed., chap. 184.)

Confronted with the option of giving to the Corporation Law a harsh interpretation,
which would disastrously embarrass trade, or of giving to the law a reasonable
interpretation, which would markedly help in the development of trade; confronted
with the option of barring from the courts foreign litigants with good causes of action
or of assuming jurisdiction of their cases; confronted with the option of construing the
law to mean that any corporation in the United States, which might want to sell to a
 person in the Philippines must send some representative to the Islands before the
sale, and go through the complicated formulae provided by the Corporation Law with
regard to the obtaining of the license, before the sale was made, in order to avoid
being swindled by Philippine citizens, or of construing the law to mean that no foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines can maintain any suit until it shall
possess the necessary license;-confronted with these options, can anyone doubt
what our decision will be? The law simply means that no foreign corporation shall be
permitted "to transact business in the Philippine Islands," as this phrase is known in
corporation law, unless it shall have the license required by law, and, until it complies
with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary
holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should
be and can be easily avoided. (Sioux Remedy Co. vs. Cope and
Cope, supra; Perkins, Philippine Business Law, p. 264.)

To repeat, the objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our
courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which
does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial
intercourse among countries.

The objectives enunciated in the 1924 decision are even more relevant today when we view
commercial relations in terms of a world economy, when the tendency is to re-examine the political
boundaries separating one nation from another insofar as they define business requirements or
restrict marketing conditions.

We distinguish between the denial of a right to take remedial action and the penal sanction for non-
registration.

Insofar as transacting business without a license is concerned, Section 69 of the Corporation Law
imposed a penal sanction-imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years or
payment of a fine not less than P200.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or both in the discretion of the
court. There is a penalty for transacting business without registration.

And insofar as litigation is concerned, the foreign corporation or its assignee may not maintain any
suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever. The Corporation Law is silent on
whether or not the contract executed by a foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void
ab initio.

We are not unaware of the conflicting schools of thought both here and abroad which are divided on
whether such contracts are void or merely voidable. Professor Sulpicio Guevarra in his
book Corporation Law (Philippine Jurisprudence Series, U.P. Law Center, pp. 233-234) cites an
Illinois decision which holds the contracts void and a Michigan statute and decision declaring them
merely voidable:

xxx xxx xxx

Where a contract which is entered into by a foreign corporation without complying

with the local requirements of doing business is rendered void either by the express
terms of a statute or by statutory construction, a subsequent compliance with the
statute by the corporation will not enable it to maintain an action on the contract.
(Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Const. Co., 295 P. 1 [1930]. See also Diamond Glue Co.
v. U.S. Glue Co., supra see note 18.) But where the statute merely prohibits the
maintenance of a suit on such contract (without expressly declaring the contract
"void"), it was held that a failure to comply with the statute rendered the
contract voidable and not void, and compliance at any time before suit was sufficient.
(Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Const. Co., supra.) Notwithstanding the above decision,
the Illinois statute provides, among other things that a foreign corporation that fails to
comply with the conditions of doing business in that state cannot maintain a suit or
action, etc. The court said: 'The contract upon which this suit was brought, having
been entered into in this state when appellant was not permitted to transact business
in this state, is in violation of the plain provisions of the statute, and is therefore null
and void, and no action can be maintained thereon at any time, even if the
corporation shall, at some time after the making of the contract, qualify itself to
transact business in this state by a compliance with our laws in reference to foreign
corporations that desire to engage in business here. (United Lead Co. v. J.M. Ready
Elevator Mfg. Co., 222 Ill. 199, 73 N.N. 567 [1906].)

A Michigan statute provides: "No foreign corporation subject to the provisions of this
Act, shall maintain any action in this state upon any contract made by it in this state
after the taking effect of this Act, until it shall have fully complied with the requirement
of this Act, and procured a certificate to that effect from the Secretary of State," It
was held that the above statute does not render contracts of a foreign corporation
that fails to comply with the statute void, but they may be enforced only after
compliance therewith. (Hastings Industrial Co. v. Moral, 143 Mich. 679,107 N.E. 706
[1906]; Kuennan v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., Mich. 122; 123 N.W. 799 [1909]; Despres,
Bridges & Noel v. Zierleyn, 163 Mich. 399, 128 N.W. 769 [1910]).

It has also been held that where the law provided that a corporation which has not
complied with the statutory requirements "shall not maintain an action until such
compliance". "At the commencement of this action the plaintiff had not filed the
certified copy with the country clerk of Madera County, but it did file with the officer
several months before the defendant filed his amended answer, setting up this
defense, as that at the time this defense was pleaded by the defendant the plaintiff
had complied with the statute. The defense pleaded by the defendant was therefore
unavailable to him to prevent the plaintiff from thereafter maintaining the action.
Section 299 does not declare that the plaintiff shall not commence an action in any
county unless it has filed a certified copy in the office of the county clerk, but merely
declares that it shall not maintain an action until it has filled it. To maintain an action
is not the same as to commence an action, but implies that the action has already
been commenced." (See also Kendrick & Roberts Inc. v. Warren Bros. Co., 110 Md.
47, 72 A. 461 [1909]).

In another case, the court said: "The very fact that the prohibition against maintaining
an action in the courts of the state was inserted in the statute ought to be conclusive
proof that the legislature did not intend or understand that contracts made without
compliance with the law were void. The statute does not fix any time within which
foreign corporations shall comply with the Act. If such contracts were void, no suits
could be prosecuted on them in any court. ... The primary purpose of our statute is to
compel a foreign corporation desiring to do business within the state to submit itself
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. The statute was not intended to exclude
foreign corporations from the state. It does not, in terms, render invalid contracts
made in this state by non-complying corporations. The better reason, the wiser and
fairer policy, and the greater weight lie with those decisions which hold that where, as
here, there is a prohibition with a penalty, with no express or implied declarations
respecting the validity of enforceability of contracts made by qualified foreign
 corporations, the contracts ... are enforceable ... upon compliance with the law."
(Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper, 172 N.E. 319 [1930].)

Our jurisprudence leans towards the later view. Apart from the objectives earlier cited from Marshall
Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co (supra), it has long been the rule that a foreign corporation
actually doing business in the Philippines without license to do so may be sued in our courts. The
defendant American corporation in General Corporation of the Philippines v. Union Insurance
Society of Canton Ltd et al. (87 Phil. 313) entered into insurance contracts without the necessary
license or authority. When summons was served on the agent, the defendant had not yet been
registered and authorized to do business. The registration and authority came a little less than two
months later. This Court ruled:

Counsel for appellant contends that at the time of the service of summons, the
appellant had not yet been authorized to do business. But, as already stated, section
14, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction as to corporations with or
without authority to do business in the Philippines. The test is whether a foreign
corporation was actually doing business here. Otherwise, a foreign corporation
illegally doing business here because of its refusal or neglect to obtain the
corresponding license and authority to do business may successfully though unfairly
plead such neglect or illegal act so as to avoid service and thereby impugn the
jurisdiction of the local courts. It would indeed be anomalous and quite prejudicial,
even disastrous, to the citizens in this jurisdiction who in all good faith and in the
regular course of business accept and pay for shipments of goods from America,
relying for their protection on duly executed foreign marine insurance policies made
payable in Manila and duly endorsed and delivered to them, that when they go to
court to enforce said policies, the insurer who all along has been engaging in this
business of issuing similar marine policies, serenely pleads immunity to local
jurisdiction because of its refusal or neglect to obtain the corresponding license to do
business here thereby compelling the consignees or purchasers of the goods insured
to go to America and sue in its courts for redress.

There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of registration affects only
the remedy.

Significantly, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, the Corporation Code of the Philippines has corrected the
ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69 of the old Corporation Law.

Section 133 of the present Corporation Code provides:

SEC. 133. Doing business without a license.-No foreign corporation transacting

business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shag be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
administrative agency in the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

The old Section 69 has been reworded in terms of non-access to courts and administrative agencies
in order to maintain or intervene in any action or proceeding.

The prohibition against doing business without first securing a license is now given penal sanction
which is also applicable to other violations of the Corporation Code under the general provisions of
Section 144 of the Code.
It is, therefore, not necessary to declare the contract nun and void even as against the erring foreign
corporation. The penal sanction for the violation and the denial of access to our courts and
administrative bodies are sufficient from the viewpoint of legislative policy.

Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the
subsequent registration is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases.

The petitioner averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to
do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the
Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati. These are all the averments required by Section 4, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court. The petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue. The private respondents
countered either with an admission of the plaintiff's jurisdictional averments or with a general denial
based on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments.

We find the general denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in
the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so. Section 4, Rule 8 requires that "a party
desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or
be sued in a representative capacity shall do so by specific denial, which shag include such
supporting particulars as are particularly within the pleader's knowledge. At the very least, the private
respondents should have stated particulars in their answers upon which a specific denial of the
petitioner's capacity to sue could have been based or which could have supported its denial for lack
of knowledge. And yet, even if the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an
issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to
engage in the insurance business at the time it filed the complaints.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby granted. The decisions of the respondent court are reversed
and set aside.

In L-34382, respondent Eastern Shipping Lines is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,630.22
with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid and respondent Angel Jose
Transportation Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,630.22 also with interest at the
legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid. Each respondent shall pay one-half of the costs. The
counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is dismissed.

In L-34383, respondent N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, or its agent Columbian Phil. Inc. is ordered to pay the
petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from February 1, 1968 until fully paid,
the sum of P500.00 attorney's fees, and costs, The complaint against Guacods, Inc. is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

 
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos,  is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
1

Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony
covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to
the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.  In a close bidding held on 18
2

September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the

GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel. . . .

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC

PARTNER —
 The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than

October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on

Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel)
are obtained. 3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution
of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.  In a subsequent letter
4

dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .  which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
5

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On
18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to
it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.  Petitioner also argues that
6

since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its
business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share.
8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be
existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and
second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner
speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which
make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation.
What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it
right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by
petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the
block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid
had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative
duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority
from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation.   It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
10

departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.   Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if
11

a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is
null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.   A provision which
12

lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not
self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms,
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 
13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it
is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.  This can be
14

cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than

non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 
15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the

Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
"PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be
understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos
who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is

it to remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" as against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use

the word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws
will always lay down conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes,  16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature
without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise
of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in
the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be
self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.   Subsequent
17

legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are
not self-executing.   The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
18

because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.  19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation   speaks of constitutional
20

provisions on personal dignity,   the sanctity of family life,   the vital role of the youth in nation-
21 22

building   the promotion of social justice,   and the values of education.   Tolentino v. Secretary of
23 24 25

Finance   refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights   and on
26 27

education.   Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato   cites provisions on the promotion of general

28 29

welfare,   the sanctity of family life,   the vital role of the youth in nation-building   and the promotion
30 31 32

of total human liberation and development.   A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that
33

they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very
terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission   explains —

34

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only
to out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers
to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not
only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability
or faculty of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.   When the
35

Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was
the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors
who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.  36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of
a City.   During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
37

military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was
selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand.
Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host
to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped
numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986
the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed"
President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila
Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim
that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
 THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo

amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the
words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is

agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a
corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual

Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we

say that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.  39

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment

be read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF

RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word
"Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only
individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-
controlled by Filipinos.  40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner

Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a
question.
 MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is

qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you,  41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL —

THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be
given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the
national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject
provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo   —
43

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions . . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of
credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering
and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be
chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS
and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance
with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be
possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel.  44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt
to violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To
adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For,
even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have
juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the
government a defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt
—

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the
sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress,
or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a
constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government operates.  45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again
is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with
the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons
distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with
the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state
action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact
a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.  46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this
case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will
be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor
are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws
and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per
share.   Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of
47

shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go
to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to
match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was
already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner
had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality
then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of
the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the
latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award
has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any
other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of
the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided
in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution
not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any
reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much
less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes
more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such
preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not
been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility
of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism
for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against
the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements
were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that
the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not
violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that
duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.  48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing
further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the
expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material
values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free
society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved.  49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican
state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-
state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to
such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot
override the demands of nationalism.  50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the
most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel
where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak
the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel
has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a
place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a
country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for
some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from
a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold
to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted
to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is
the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And
this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit
more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions
such as the Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point
states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos. 1
Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I)
consisting of land, sea, and air.  study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
2

patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not
only their natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino
people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and
possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They
knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through
development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but
also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony). 3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation.
This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting
foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do
so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the
trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos
was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating
the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put
more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a
subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment"  To quote further: "Let not our children
6

be mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is
rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and encumbrances". 7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must

refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very
"heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to
the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or
equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the
qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be
made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an
opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our
country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While
government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and
make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not
preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture
and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established
themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels.
This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the
hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our
national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos"  is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be
1

amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act
of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to
take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before
us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match
the foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars
to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it
becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown
that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the
peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at
time is seen, to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it
even takes on non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"  is to allow petitioner Philippine
1

corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of
Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession
given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and
the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"  so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be
2

preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation.
Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest
bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner
but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the
shares of stocks.  That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this
3

case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno  to a 1947 statute giving "preference to
4

Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls."  This Court upheld the cancellation of existing
5

leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter
of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly,
in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,  this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance
6

passed pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and
granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the
stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,  the preference granted under the statute was held to apply to
7

cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public
markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law,
apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and
aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to preference immediately
arises."8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s
in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as
employment, contracting and licensing.  Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are
9

situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated
in the Constitution   is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal
10

footing with aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive
the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common
trades of common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst,   but with the sale of
11

government property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions
covering the national economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential
treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is
a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the
relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not
in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be
trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are
qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process.   It is only the result of the public bidding that
12

is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest
bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be
not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted
the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules
on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share
for a range of 9 to 15 million shares).   Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other
13

hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will
not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to
those who have "validly submitted bids."   The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no
14

basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the
case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of
history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of logic."

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and
cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the
nation".

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the
1987 Constitution Commission proceedings thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN THE

GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS".
And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos
but also Filipino-Controlled entities fully controlled by
Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 608).

MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as

Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this
body already approved what is known as the Filipino
 First policy which was suggested by Commissioner de
Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV,
Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:

MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and

concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a

foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise
still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some

aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred:?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p. 616,

Records of the Constitutional Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged on
this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —

The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . .

It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or
unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the
product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance
by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness
to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discussed
in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be
placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished
historical values of our people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the
words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps
flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look
towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push
the river or people towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.

I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding
the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.

I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale
violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the
Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was
included in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested
buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel
Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale
was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance
of the Manila Hotel"  The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.
1

In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified. 2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:

I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;
Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995;

xxx xxx xxx

IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide

management expertise and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting
to the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the
following qualifications:

a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel

industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board

representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide

access to the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

xxx xxx xxx

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration

Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the
period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the
following:

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila

Hotel Corporation
 c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and
Bidding Conference

xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila

Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification
documents will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this
conference is strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be
penalized if it does not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents

(1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00
AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in
Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with

the assistance of the TEC based on the Information
Package and other information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the

evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of
the group, taking into account the contribution of each
member to the venture.

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the

results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the

criteria set forth below:

a. Business management expertise,

track record, and experience

b. Financial capability.

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the

proposed strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem

appropriate.
 6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT
Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International
Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in
the Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification
process again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of

Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date
specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by

member whose qualification was a material consideration for being
included in the shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to

participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred

Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Percent
to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares
of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The
Qualified Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of
shares within the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract
bidders with different preferences and objectives for the operation
and management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum

bid required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is
Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the

minimum required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x           x x x          x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

 1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy
of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be
properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may
be a sufficient basis for disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the
Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a
sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be

submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the

Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately
authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf of the
corporation with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of

the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution
authorizing one of its members and such member's representative to
make the bid on behalf of the group with full authority to perform such
acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:

i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft

payable to the "Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable banking institution
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable

banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:

i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less

than the required amount.
c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or
unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security
will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the
Qualified Bidder's offered purchase price.

e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned

immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not
declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest
Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in
its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of

GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract specified by the Highest Bidder or other types of contract in
its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement

with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price

not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for

any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the

following location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding

to accept any and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be
invited to witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid
Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a
sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents
in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security

5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and

"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM,
Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid
shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered bids
shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of
the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the
corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes will
be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding,
the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those who
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which
is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be
disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be
immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at

3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will
be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will

formally announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis. In
the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalent
price per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger
ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed

period; or
 b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and
acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below
by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of
Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute

with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing Reservation System Contract
or other type of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If the
Highest Bidder is intending to provide only financial
support to The Manila Hotel, a separate institution
may enter into the aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock

Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of
which will be distributed to each of the Qualified
Bidder after the prequalification process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management

Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in
the Management Contract are as follows:

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross

revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating

profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead
expenses and the basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0%
of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should
indicate in its Information Package if it is wishes to
charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for

the hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the
Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.
 A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The
Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee
structure above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification
documents to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be

in accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective
bids in their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given
to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest
bids on the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC

PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and

COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than
October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares
after deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check or

unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution licensed
to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such application
as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS
similarly reserves the right to require the submission of any additional
information from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.
 2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding
prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under
amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the
Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submission
of the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or
other pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the
respective deadlines/target dates.

4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it

has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders,

except the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public

Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public
Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these
results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit or
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders
who have participated in the Public Bidding. 3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The
GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the
bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three
million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions
of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain
petitioner's request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18,
1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution  on
4

the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

 The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;

(3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government.  As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further
5

legislative action.  Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate
6

laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe.

The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its
language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present
enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.  The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in
7

question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,  rather than as
9

requiring future legislation for their enforcement.   The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they
10

are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign
people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress.   Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
11

unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in
action should not suffocate them.  12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures,   the rights of a person under custodial investigation,   the rights of an accused,   and the
13 14 15

privilege against self-incrimination,   It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts
16

to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the
protection of property.   The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the
17

taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by
which the policy shall be carried into effect.   Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article
19

II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be
construed as mere statements of principles of the State.   We have also ruled that some provisions
20
of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights,"   and Article XIV on "Education Science and
21

Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports"   cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their
22

enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for
legislation   to effectuate their policy content. 
23 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country   to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
25

cent   of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact
26

laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain
areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-
owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse.
Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this
paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.   The provision
27

in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong
v. Hernandez,   where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain
28

areas of investments.   By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10
29

affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of

Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not
to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is
also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within
[the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot
be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national
economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever.
Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of
Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino
First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half- pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According
to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race.   By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of
30

the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights
involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture
cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Beth Day Romulo,   the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by
31

the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while traveling
to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For
sometime, it was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official
guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began
coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied
Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It
was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of
Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and
kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were
housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local
scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel
has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act
No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a
particular cultural property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural
property.   Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its
32

reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as
synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A
look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government.   The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
33

indifferently.   They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of
34

the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS,   Excess funds,
35

however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the
employees.  It is thus contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a
36

simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is
subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission   and the Commission on Audit.   As
37 38

state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the
general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people
elevated as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for
a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest
needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as
a living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to define the
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that
present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:

x x x           x x x          x x x

THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or the prospective laws will always
lay down conditions under which business map be
done, for example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera.

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as
giving preference to qualified Filipinos as against
Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the

intention of the proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.

x x x           x x x          x x x

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is
addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and
 regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their
rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the
standards to measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not
seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad.  39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it
a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the
second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is
pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited
from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of
the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of
our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to
develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need
to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define
the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to
serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-
makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified
Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the
need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos
and vice verse.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at
any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right
primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of
government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state
policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining
the degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national
economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate
the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently,
we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to
determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject
sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of
preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot
be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2,
section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to
legal hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I
submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that
instance, all things stand equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the
rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to
match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of
shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the
highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter
of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the
higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties
may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of
preference as defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of
facts and factors whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and
agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the
wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long
as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right
that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an
inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the
first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot
be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners'
stance will wreak havoc on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest
bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize its capacity to deliver
essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners
participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among
others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids
are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant
petitioner that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second
chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M.
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own
land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First
policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy
makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be
unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be
obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution
protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno,
may I just add

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process
is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and
thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of
rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal
that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the
Philippines!.

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed
properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the
guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own
jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino
enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the
global marketplace with absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even
authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation
are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all
the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without
being unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied.
But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bellosillo. At the same time, I would like to expound a bit
more on the concept of national patrimony as including within its scope and meaning institutions
such as the Manila Hotel.

It is argued by petitioner that the Manila Hotel comes under "national patrimony" over which qualified
Filipinos have the preference, in ownership and operation. The Constitutional provision on point
states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall Give preference to qualified Filipinos. 1

Petitioner's argument, I believe, is well taken. Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony"
consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article I)
consisting of land, sea, and air.  study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of "national
2

patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the even more comprehensive
expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that the phrase encircles a concept embracing not
only their natural resources of the country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino
people, the tangible and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and
possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with conservation. They
knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and that this may be achieved only through
development as a correlative factor to assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but
also the exclusive benefits of their national patrimony). 3

Moreover, the concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural
resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race.4

There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony
and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation.
This institution has played an important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a
historical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting
foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. 5

It is therefore our duty to protect and preserve it for future generations of Filipinos. As President
Manuel L. Quezon once said, we must exploit the natural resources of our country, but we should do
so with. an eye to the welfare of the future generations. In other words, the leaders of today are the
trustees of the patrimony of our race. To preserve our national patrimony and reserve it for Filipinos
was the intent of the distinguished gentlemen who first framed our Constitution. Thus, in debating
the need for nationalization of our lands and natural resources, one expounded that we should "put
more teeth into our laws, and; not make the nationalization of our lands and natural resources a
subject of ordinary legislation but of constitutional enactment"  To quote further: "Let not our children
6

be mere tenants and trespassers in their own country. Let us preserve and bequeath to them what is
rightfully theirs, free from all foreign liens and encumbrances". 7

Now, a word on preference. In my view "preference to qualified Filipinos", to be meaningful, must

refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very
"heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to
the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or
equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the
qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be
made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an
opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.

It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our
country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While
government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to such a trend, and
make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not
preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture
and heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established
themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels.
This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation in the
hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our
national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.

VITUG, J., concurring:
I agree with Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo on his clear-cut statements, shared by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in a well written separate (dissenting) opinion, that:

First, the provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(I)n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos"  is self-executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be
1

amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.

Second, the term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its
cultural heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, Jr., Manila
Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.

Third, the act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a government entity which
derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act
of the State subject to the Constitutional mandate.

On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," I find it somewhat difficult to
take the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before
us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match
the foreign bid for, as a particular matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars
to be at par (to the last cent) with another. The magnitude of the magnitude of the bids is such that it
becomes hardly possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.

It is most unfortunate that Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown
that it did not deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the
peculiar constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that the Court at
time is seen, to instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequate which create the perception that it
even takes on non-justiciable controversies.

All told, I am constrained to vote for granting the petition.

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

I take the view that in the context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the
constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos"  is to allow petitioner Philippine
1

corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling
shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino of
Philippine corporation can be given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession
given by the State, by favoring it over a foreign national corporation.

Under the rules on public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and
the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be given] to the bidder
seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC,"  so that petitioner bid for more shares, it would be
2

preferred to the Malaysian corporation for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation.
Consequently, it is only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest
bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not by declaring it winner
but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price per share" before it is awarded the
shares of stocks.  That, to me, is what "preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this
3

case — by favoring Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.

This was the meaning given in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno  to a 1947 statute giving "preference to
4

Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls."  This Court upheld the cancellation of existing
5

leases covering market stalls occupied by persons who were not Filipinos and the award thereafter
of the stalls to qualified Filipino vendors as ordered by the Department of Finance. Similarly,
in Vda. de Salgado v. De la Fuente,  this Court sustained the validity of a municipal ordinance
6

passed pursuant to the statute (R.A. No. 37), terminating existing leases of public market stalls and
granting preference to Filipino citizens in the issuance of new licenses for the occupancy of the
stalls. In Chua Lao v. Raymundo,  the preference granted under the statute was held to apply to
7

cases in which Filipino vendors sought the same stalls occupied by alien vendors in the public
markets even if there were available other stalls as good as those occupied by aliens. "The law,
apparently, is applicable whenever there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and
aliens for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to preference immediately
arises."8

Our legislation on the matter thus antedated by a quarter of a century efforts began only in the 1970s
in America to realize the promise of equality, through affirmative action and reverse discrimination
programs designed to remedy past discrimination against colored people in such areas as
employment, contracting and licensing.  Indeed, in vital areas of our national economy, there are
9

situations in which the only way to place Filipinos in control of the national economy as contemplated
in the Constitution   is to give them preferential treatment where they can at least stand on equal
10

footing with aliens.

There need be no fear that thus preferring Filipinos would either invite foreign retaliation or deprive
the country of the benefit of foreign capital or know-how. We are dealing here not with common
trades of common means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst,   but with the sale of
11

government property, which is like the grant of government largess of benefits and concessions
covering the national economy" and therefore no one should begrudge us if we give preferential
treatment to our citizens. That at any rate is the command of the Constitution. For the Manila Hotel is
a business owned by the Government. It is being privatized. Privatization should result in the
relinquishment of the business in favor of private individuals and groups who are Filipino citizens, not
in favor of aliens.

Nor should there be any doubt that by awarding the shares of stocks to petitioner we would be
trading competence and capability for nationalism. Both petitioner and the Malaysian firm are
qualified, having hurdled the prequalification process.   It is only the result of the public bidding that
12

is sought to be modified by enabling petitioner to up its bid to equal the highest bid.

Nor, finally, is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest
bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all that a Filipino entity would then do would be
not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted
the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the rules
on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimum bid required (P36.87 per share
for a range of 9 to 15 million shares).   Bids below the minimum will not be considered. On the other
13

hand, if the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will
not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to
those who have "validly submitted bids."   The suggestion is, to say the least, fanciful and has no
14

basis in fact.

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the petition.

TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:

Constancy in law is not an attribute of a judicious mind. I say this as we are not confronted in the
case at bar with legal and constitutional issues — and yet I am driven so to speak on the side of
history. The reason perhaps is due to the belief that in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., a "page of history is worth a volume of logic."

I will, however, attempt to share my thoughts on whether the Manila Hotel has a historical and
cultural aspect within the meaning of the constitution and thus, forming part of the "patrimony of the
nation".

Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national goals and priorities.

The foregoing provisions should be read in conjunction with Article II of the same Constitution
pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" which ordain —

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
by Filipinos. (Sec. 19).

Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of the highlights in the
1987 Constitution Commission proceedings thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. NOLLEDO. The Amendment will read: "IN THE

GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS".
And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos
but also Filipino-Controlled entities fully controlled by
Filipinos (Vol. III, Records of the Constitutional
Commission, p. 608).

MR. MONSOD. We also wanted to add, as

Commissioner Villegas said, this committee and this
body already approved what is known as the Filipino
First policy which was suggested by Commissioner de
Castro. So that it is now in our Constitution (Vol. IV,
Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 225).

Commissioner Jose Nolledo explaining the provision adverted to above, said:

 MR. NOLLEDO. In the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a

foreign enterprise is qualified and the Filipinos
enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise
still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some

aspects than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino
still be preferred:?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes". (Vol. III, p. 616,

Records of the Constitutional Commission).

The nationalistic provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutions. That we have no reneged on
this nationalist policy is articulated in one of the earliest case, this Court said —

The nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. . . .

It cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit
underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or
unconstitutional (Ichong, et al. vs. Hernandez, et al., 101 Phil. 1155).

I subscribe to the view that history, culture, heritage, and traditions are not legislated and is the
product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance
by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people.

The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness
to historic events (too numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years.

As I intimated earlier, it is not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal
largese which have given rise to this controversy. As I believe that has been exhaustively discussed
in the ponencia. Suffice it to say at this point that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be
placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profits subverts the cherished
historical values of our people.

As a historical landmark in this "Pearl of the Orient Seas", it has its enviable tradition which, in the
words of the philosopher Salvador de Madarriaga tradition is "more of a river than a stone, it keeps
flowing, and one must view the flowing , and one must view the flow of both directions. If you look
towards the hill from which the river flows, you see tradition in the form of forceful currents that push
the river or people towards the future, and if you look the other way, you progress."

Indeed, tradition and progress are the same, for progress depends on the kind of tradition. Let us not
jettison the tradition of the Manila Hotel and thereby repeat our colonial history.

I grant, of course the men of the law can see the same subject in different lights.
I remember, however, a Spanish proverb which says — "He is always right who suspects that he
makes mistakes". On this note, I say that if I have to make a mistake, I would rather err upholding
the belief that the Filipino be first under his Constitution and in his own land.

I vote GRANT the petition.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

This is a. petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
domestic corporation, to stop the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from selling the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to a foreign corporation. Allegedly, the sale
violates the second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation. It is the sole owner of the
Manila Hotel which it operates through its subsidiary, the Manila Hotel Corporation. Manila Hotel was
included in the privatization program of the government. In 1995, GSIS proposed to sell to interested
buyers 30% to 51% of its shares, ranging from 9,000,000 to 15,300,000 shares, in the Manila Hotel
Corporation. After the absence of bids at the first public bidding, the block of shares offered for sale
was increased from a maximum of 30% to 51%. Also, the winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic
partner" of the GSIS was required to "provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance
of the Manila Hotel"  The proposal was approved by respondent Committee on Privatization.
1

In July 1995, a conference was held where prequalification documents and the bidding rules were
furnished interested parties. Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a domestic corporation, and Renong
Berhad, Malaysian firm with ITT Sheraton as operator, prequalified. 2

The bidding rules and procedures entitled "Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification and
Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization" provide:

I INTRODUCTION AND HIGHLIGHTS

DETERMINING THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER

The party that accomplishes the steps set forth below will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner and will be awarded the Block of Shares:

First — Pass the prequalification process;

Second — Submit the highest bid on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares;

Third — Negotiate and execute the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995;

xxx xxx xxx

IV GUIDELINES FOR PREQUALIFICATION

A. PARTIES WHO MAP APPLY FOR PREQUALIFICATION

 The Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner will be expected to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of The Manila Hotel. In this context, the GSIS is inviting
to the prequalification process any local and/or foreign corporation,
consortium/joint venture or juridical entity with at least one of the
following qualifications:

a. Proven management .expertise in the hotel

industry; or

b. Significant equity ownership (i.e. board

representation) in another hotel company; or

c. Overall management and marketing expertise to

successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

Parties interested in bidding for MHC should be able to provide

access to the requisite management expertise and/or international
marketing/reservation system for The Manila Hotel.

xxx xxx xxx

D. PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

xxx xxx xxx

E. APPLICATION PROCEDURE

1. DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE AT THE REGISTRATION OFFICE

The prequalification documents can be secured at the Registration

Office between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the
period specified in Section III. Each set of documents consists of the
following:

a. Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequalification and Public Bidding of the MHC
Privatization

b. Confidential Information Memorandum: The Manila

Hotel Corporation

c. Letter of Invitation. to the Prequalification and

Bidding Conference

xxx xxx xxx

4. PREQUALIFICATION AND BIDDING CONFERENCE

 A prequalification and bidding conference will be held at The Manila
Hotel on the date specified in Section III to allow the Applicant to seek
clarifications and further information regarding the guidelines and
procedures. Only those who purchased the prequalification
documents will be allowed in this conference. Attendance to this
conference is strongly advised, although the Applicant will not be
penalized if it does not attend.

5. SUBMISSION OF PREQUALIFICATION DOCUMENTS

The applicant should submit 5 sets of the prequalification documents

(1 original set plus 4 copies) at the Registration Office between 9:00
AM to 4:00 PM during working days within the period specified in
Section III.

F. PREQUALIFICATION PROCESS

1. The Applicant will be evaluated by the PBAC with

the assistance of the TEC based on the Information
Package and other information available to the PBAC.

2. If the Applicant is a Consortium/Joint Venture, the

evaluation will consider the overall qualifications of
the group, taking into account the contribution of each
member to the venture.

3. The decision of the PBAC with respect to the

results of the PBAC evaluation will be final.

4. The Applicant shall be evaluated according to the

criteria set forth below:

a. Business management expertise,

track record, and experience

b. Financial capability.

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the

proposed strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel

5. The PBAC will shortlist such number of Applicants as it may deem

appropriate.

6. The parties that prequalified in the first MHC public bidding — ITT
Sheraton, Marriot International Inc., Renaissance Hotels International
Inc., consortium of RCBC Capital/Ritz Carlton — may participate in
the Public Bidding without having to undergo the prequalification
process again.

G. SHORTLIST OF QUALIFIED BIDDERS

 1. A notice of prequalification results containing the shortlist of
Qualified Bidders will be posted at the Registration Office at the date
specified in Section III.

2. In the case of a Consortium/Joint Venture, the withdrawal by

member whose qualification was a material consideration for being
included in the shortlist is ground for disqualification of the Applicant.

V. GUIDELINES FOR THE PUBLIC BIDDING

A. PARTIES WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PUBLIC BIDDING

All parties in the shortlist of Qualified Bidders will be eligible to

participate in the Public Bidding.

B. BLOCK OF SHARES

A range of Nine Million (9,000,000) to Fifteen Million Three Hundred

Thousand (15,300,000) shares of stock representing Thirty Percent
to Fifty-One Percent (30%-51%) of the issued and outstanding shares
of MHC, will be offered in the Public Bidding by the GSIS. The
Qualified Bidders will have the Option of determining the number of
shares within the range to bid for. The range is intended to attract
bidders with different preferences and objectives for the operation
and management of The Manila Hotel.

C. MINIMUM BID REQUIRED ON A PRICE PER SHARE BASIS

1. Bids will be evaluated on a price per share basis. The minimum

bid required on a price per share basis for the Block of Shares is
Thirty-Six Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P36.67).

2. Bids should be in the Philippine currency payable to the GSIS.

3. Bids submitted with an equivalent price per share below the

minimum required will not considered.

D. TRANSFER COSTS

x x x           x x x          x x x

E. OFFICIAL BID FORM

1. Bids must be contained in the prescribed Official Bid Form, a copy

of which is attached as Annex IV. The Official Bid Form must be
properly accomplished in all details; improper accomplishment may
be a sufficient basis for disqualification.

2. During the Public Bidding, the Qualified Bidder will submit the
Official Bid Form, which will indicate the offered purchase price, in a
sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."
 F. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

During the Public Bidding, the following documents should be

submitted along with the bid in a separate envelop marked
"SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS":

1. WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO BID (UNDER OATH).

If the Qualified Bidder is a corporation, the representative of the

Qualified Bidder should submit a Board resolution which adequately
authorizes such representative to bid for and in behalf of the
corporation with full authority to perform such acts necessary or
requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

If the Qualified Bidder is a Consortium/Joint Venture, each member of

the Consortium/Joint venture should submit a Board resolution
authorizing one of its members and such member's representative to
make the bid on behalf of the group with full authority to perform such
acts necessary or requisite to bind the Qualified Bidder.

2. BID SECURITY

a. The Qualified Bidder should deposit Thirty-Three Million Pesos

(P33,000,00), in Philippine currency as Bid Security in the form of:

i. Manager's check or unconditional demand draft

payable to the "Government Service Insurance
System" and issued by a reputable banking institution
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and
acceptable to GSIS; or

ii. Standby-by letter of credit issued by a reputable

banking institution acceptable to the GSIS.

b. The GSIS will reject a bid if:

i. The bid does not have Bid Security; or

ii. The Bid Security accompanying the bid is for less

than the required amount.

c. If the Bid Security is in the form of a manager's check or

unconditional demand draft, the interest earned on the Bid Security
will be for the account of GSIS.

d. If the Qualified Bidder becomes the winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner, the Bid Security will be applied as the downpayment on the
Qualified Bidder's offered purchase price.
e. The Bid Security of the Qualified Bidder will be returned
immediately after the Public Bidding if the Qualified Bidder is not
declared the Highest Bidder.

f. The Bid Security will be returned by October 23, 1995 if the Highest
Bidder is unable to negotiate and execute with GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other types of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in
its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel.

g. The Bid Security of the Highest Bidder will be forfeited in favor of

GSIS if the Highest Bidder, after negotiating and executing the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract specified by the Highest Bidder or other types of contract in
its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel, fails or refuses to:

i. Execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement

with GSIS not later than October 23, 1995; or

ii. Pay the full amount of the offered purchase price

not later than October 23, 1995; or

iii. Consummate the sale of the Block of Shares for

any other reason.

G. SUBMISSION OF BIDS

1. The Public Bidding will be held on September 7, 1995 at the

following location:

New GSIS Headquarters Building

Financial Center, Reclamation Area
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

2. The Secretariat of the PBAC will be stationed at the Public Bidding

to accept any and all bids and supporting requirements.
Representatives from the Commission on Audit and COP will be
invited to witness the proceedings.

3. The Qualified Bidder should submit its bid using the Official Bid
Form. The accomplished Official Bid Form should be submitted in a
sealed envelope marked "OFFICIAL BID."

4. The Qualified Bidder should submit the following documents

in another sealed envelope marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS"

a. Written Authority Bid

b. Bid Security
5. The two sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" and
"SUPPORTING BID DOCUMENTS" must be submitted
simultaneously to the Secretariat between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM,
Philippine Standard Time, on the date of the Public Bidding. No bid
shall be accepted after the closing time. Opened or tampered bids
shall not be accepted.

6. The Secretariat will log and record the actual time of submission of
the two sealed envelopes. The actual time of submission will also be
indicated by the Secretariat on the face of the two envelopes.

7. After Step No. 6, the two sealed envelopes will be dropped in the
corresponding bid boxes provided for the purpose. These boxes will
be in full view of the invited public.

H. OPENING AND READING OF BIDS

1. After the closing time of 2:00 PM on the date of the Public Bidding,
the PBAC will open all sealed envelopes marked "SUPPORTING BID
DOCUMENTS" for screening, evaluation and acceptance. Those who
submitted incomplete/insufficient documents or document/s which
is/are not substantially in the form required by PBAC will be
disqualified. The envelope containing their Official Bid Form will be
immediately returned to the disqualified bidders.

2. The sealed envelopes marked "OFFICIAL BID" will be opened at

3:00 PM. The name of the bidder and the amount of its bid price will
be read publicly as the envelopes are opened.

3. Immediately following the reading of the bids, the PBAC will

formally announce the highest bid and the Highest Bidder.

4. The highest bid will be, determined on a price per share basis. In
the event of a tie wherein two or more bids have the same equivalent
price per share, priority will be given to the bidder seeking the larger
ownership interest in MHC.

5. The Public Bidding will be declared a failed bidding in case:

a. No single bid is submitted within the prescribed

period; or

b. There is only one (1) bid that is submitted and

acceptable to the PBAC.

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH

GSIS/MHC

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below
by October 23, 1995 or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
 purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of
Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute

with GSIS/MHC the Management Contract,
International Marketing Reservation System Contract
or other type of contract specified by the Highest
Bidder in its strategic plan for The Manila Hotel. If the
Highest Bidder is intending to provide only financial
support to The Manila Hotel, a separate institution
may enter into the aforementioned contract/s with
GSIS/MHC.

b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock

Purchase and Sale Agreement with GSIS, a copy of
which will be distributed to each of the Qualified
Bidder after the prequalification process is completed.

2. In the event that the Highest Bidder chooses a Management

Contract for The Manila Hotel, the maximum levels for the
management fee structure that GSIS/MHC are prepared to accept in
the Management Contract are as follows:

a. Basic management fee: Maximum of 2.5% of gross

revenues.(1)

b. Incentive fee: Maximum of 8.0% of gross operating

profit(1) after deducting undistributed overhead
expenses and the basic management fee.

c. Fixed component of the international

marketing/reservation system fee: Maximum of 2.0%
of gross room revenues.(1) The Applicant should
indicate in its Information Package if it is wishes to
charge this fee.

Note (1): As defined in the uniform system of account for hotels.

The GSIS/MHC have indicated above the acceptable parameters for

the hotel management fees to facilitate the negotiations with the
Highest Bidder for the Management Contract after the Public Bidding.

A Qualified Bidder envisioning a Management Contract for The

Manila Hotel should determine whether or not the management fee
structure above is acceptable before submitting their prequalification
documents to GSIS.

J. BLOCK SALE TO THE OTHER QUALIFIED BIDDERS

1. If for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.

2. The order of priority among the interested Qualified Bidders will be

in accordance wit the equivalent price per share of their respective
bids in their public Bidding, i.e., first and second priority will be given
to the Qualified Bidders that submitted the second and third highest
bids on the price per share basis, respectively, and so on.

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC

PARTNER

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic

Partner after the following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contract with

GSIS/MHC not later than October 23, 1995; and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and

COP/OGCC are obtained.

I. FULL PAYMENT FOR THE BLOCK OF SHARES

1. Upon execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC, the

Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner must fully pay, not later than
October 23, 1995, the offered purchase price for the Block of Shares
after deducting the Bid Security applied as downpayment.

2. All payments should be made in the form of a Manager's Check or

unconditional Demand Draft, payable to the "Government Service
Insurance System," issued by a reputable banking institution licensed
to do business in the Philippines and acceptable to GSIS.

M. GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. The GSIS unconditionally reserves the right to reject any or all

applications, waive any formality therein, or accept such application
as maybe considered most advantageous to the GSIS. The GSIS
similarly reserves the right to require the submission of any additional
information from the Applicant as the PBAC may deem necessary.

2. The GSIS further reserves the right to call off the Public Bidding
prior to acceptance of the bids and call for a new public bidding under
amended rules, and without any liability whatsoever to any or all the
Qualified Bidders, except the obligation to return the Bid Security.

3. The GSIS reserves the right to reset the date of the

prequalification/bidding conference, the deadline for the submission
of the prequalification documents, the date of the Public Bidding or
other pertinent activities at least three (3) calendar days prior to the
respective deadlines/target dates.
 4. The GSIS sells only whatever rights, interest and participation it
has on the Block of Shares.

5. All documents and materials submitted by the Qualified Bidders,

except the Bid Security, may be returned upon request.

6. The decision of the PBAC/GSIS on the results of the Public

Bidding is final. The Qualified Bidders, by participating in the Public
Bidding, are deemed to have agreed to accept and abide by these
results.

7. The GSIS will be held free and harmless form any liability, suit or
allegation arising out of the Public Bidding by the Qualified Bidders
who have participated in the Public Bidding. 3

The second public bidding was held on September 18, 1995. Petitioner bidded P41.00 per share for
15,300,000 shares and Renong Berhad bidded P44.00 per share also for 15,300,000 shares. The
GSIS declared Renong Berhad the highest bidder and immediately returned petitioner's bid security.

On September 28, 1995, ten days after the bidding, petitioner wrote to GSIS offering to match the
bid price of Renong Berhad. It requested that the award be made to itself citing the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution. It sent a manager's check for thirty-three
million pesos (P33,000,000.00) as bid security.

Respondent GSIS, then in the process of negotiating with Renong Berhad the terms and conditions
of the contract and technical agreements in the operation of the hotel, refused to entertain
petitioner's request.

Hence, petitioner filed the present petition. We issued a temporary restraining order on October 18,
1995.

Petitioner anchors its plea on the second paragraph of Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution  on
4

the "National Economy and Patrimony" which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

The vital issues can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

(2) Assuming section 10 paragraph 2 of Article XII is self-executing whether the

controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation;
 (3) Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement
section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution;

(4) Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give preference to
petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;

(5) Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation.

Anent the first issue, it is now familiar learning that a Constitution provides the guiding policies and
principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general framework of the law and
government.  As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-executing and can be enforced without further
5

legislative action.  Some of its provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate
6

laws enacted by the Legislature, hence not self-executing.

To determine whether a particular provision of a Constitution is self-executing is a hard row to hoe.

The key lies on the intent of the framers of the fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its
language. A searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is intended as a present
enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law, or if it needs future legislation for completion and
enforcement.  The inquiry demands a micro-analysis of the text and the context of the provision in
7

question.8

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,  rather than as 9

requiring future legislation for their enforcement.   The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they
10

are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign
people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress.   Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the
11

unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional in
action should not suffocate them.  12

Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and
seizures,   the rights of a person under custodial investigation,   the rights of an accused,   and the
13 14 15

privilege against self-incrimination,   It is recognize a that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts
16

to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the
protection of property.   The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the
17

taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation. 18

Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by
which the policy shall be carried into effect.   Accordingly, we have held that the provisions in Article
19

II of our Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies" should generally be
construed as mere statements of principles of the State.   We have also ruled that some provisions
20

of Article XIII on "Social Justice and Human Rights,"   and Article XIV on "Education Science and
21

Technology, Arts, Culture end Sports"   cannot be the basis of judicially enforceable rights. Their
22

enforcement is addressed to the discretion of Congress though they provide the framework for
legislation   to effectuate their policy content. 
23 24

Guided by this map of settled jurisprudence, we now consider whether Section 10, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is self-executing or not. It reads:

Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
 corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain areas of investments in the
country   to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
25

cent   of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress to enact
26

laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred percent Filipino-owned
enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph orders the entire State to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights and privileges covering the national
economy and patrimony. The third paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign
investments in line with our national goals and well-set priorities.

The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express text, there is a
categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain
areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-
owned Filipino enterprises. The right granted by the provision is clearly still in esse.
Congress has to breathe life to the right by means of legislation. Parenthetically, this
paragraph was plucked from section 3, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.   The provision
27

in the 1973 Constitution affirmed our ruling in the landmark case of Lao Ichong
v. Hernandez,   where we upheld the discretionary authority of Congress to Filipinize certain
28

areas of investments.   By reenacting the 1973 provision, the first paragraph of section 10
29

affirmed the power of Congress to nationalize certain areas of investments in favor of

Filipinos.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and not
to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is
also broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within
[the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Beyond debate, they cannot
be read as granting Congress the exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving
preference to qualified Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national
economy and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever.
Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The second and the third paragraphs of
Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.

This submission is strengthened by Article II of the Constitution entitled "Declaration of Principles

and State Policies." Its Section 19 provides that "[T]he State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." It engrafts the all-important Filipino
First policy in our fundamental law and by the use of the mandatory word "shall," directs its
enforcement by the whole State without any pause or a half- pause in time.

The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation
involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According
to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race.   By this yardstick, the sale of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of
30

the constitutional provision giving preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights
involving our national patrimony. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture
cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes beyond pesos and centavos. As
chronicled by Beth Day Romulo,   the hotel first opened on July 4, 1912 as a first-class hotel built by
31

the American Insular Government for Americans living in, or passing through, Manila while traveling
to the Orient. Indigenous materials and Filipino craftsmanship were utilized in its construction, For
sometime, it was exclusively used by American and Caucasian travelers and served as the "official
guesthouse" of the American Insular Government for visiting foreign dignitaries. Filipinos began
coming to the Hotel as guests during the Commonwealth period. When the Japanese occupied
Manila, it served as military headquarters and lodging for the highest-ranking officers from Tokyo. It
was at the Hotel and the Intramuros that the Japanese made their last stand during the Liberation of
Manila. After the war, the Hotel again served foreign guests and Filipinos alike. Presidents and
kings, premiers and potentates, as well as glamorous international film and sports celebrities were
housed in the Hotel. It was also the situs of international conventions and conferences. In the local
scene, it was the venue of historic meetings, parties and conventions of political parties. The Hotel
has reaped and continues reaping numerous recognitions and awards from international hotel and
travel award-giving bodies, a fitting acknowledgment of Filipino talent and ingenuity. These are
judicially cognizable facts which cannot be bent by a biased mind.

The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act
No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our national patrimony. Republic Act No. 4846, "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," merely provides a procedure whereby a
particular cultural property may be classified a "national cultural treasure" or an "important cultural
property.   Approved on June 18, 1966 and amended by P.D. 374 in 1974, the law is limited in its
32

reach and cannot be read as the exclusive law implementing section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. To be sure, the law does not equate cultural treasure and cultural property as
synonymous to the phrase "patrimony of the nation."

The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the respondent GSIS. A
look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-owned and controlled corporation that
administers funds that come from the monthly contributions of government employees and the
government.   The funds are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of
33

indifferently.   They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of
34

the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the GSIS,   Excess funds,
35

however, are allowed to be invested in business and other ventures for the benefit of the
employees.  It is thus contended that the GSIS investment in the Manila Hotel Corporation is a
36

simple business venture, hence, an act beyond the contemplation of section 10, paragraph 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution.

The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public
corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is
subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission   and the Commission on Audit.   As
37 38

state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the
general welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people
elevated as a constitutional command.

The fourth issue demands that we look at the content of phrase "qualified Filipinos" and their
"preferential right." The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to be for
a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can bent to meet today's manifest
needs and tomorrow's unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as
a living constitution.

Thus, during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Nolledo to define the
phrase brushed aside a suggestion to define the phrase "qualified Filipinos." He explained that
present and prospective "laws" will take care of the problem of its interpretation, viz:

x x x           x x x          x x x

THE PRESIDENT. What is the suggestion of

Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom? As
against aliens over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word "QUALIFIED" because
the existing laws or the prospective laws will always
lay down conditions under which business map be
done, for example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera.

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. If we say, "PREFERENCE TO

QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," it can be understood as
giving preference to qualified Filipinos as against
Filipinos who are not qualified.

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, that was the

intention of the proponents. The committee has
accepted the amendment.

x x x           x x x          x x x

As previously discussed, the constitutional command to enforce the Filipino First policy is
addressed to the State and not to Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be
understood as limited to legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and
regulations adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their
rule-making power. In the case at bar, the bidding rules and regulations set forth the
standards to measure the qualifications of bidders Filipinos and foreigners alike. It is not
seriously disputed that petitioner qualified to bid as did Renong Berhad.  39

Thus, we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of preference gives it
a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad.

With due respect, I cannot sustain petitioner's submission. I prescind from the premise that the
second paragraph of section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Pilipino but not anti-alien. It is
pro-Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited
from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of
the nation.

In implementing the policy articulated in section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task of
our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desiderata — first, the need to
develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need
to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the Constitution did not define
the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified Filipinos. They knew that for the right to
serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable content that can be adjusted by our policy-
makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In fine, the right of preference of qualified
Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates and circumstances warrant. The lesser the
need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of the right of preference can be given to Filipinos
and vice verse.

Again, it should be stressed that the right and the duty to determine the degree of this privilege at
any given time is addressed to the entire State. While under our constitutional scheme, the right
primarily belongs to Congress as the lawmaking department of our government, other branches of
government, and all their agencies and instrumentalities, share the power to enforce this state
policy. Within the limits of their authority, they can act or promulgate rules and regulations defining
the degree of this right of preference in cases where they have to make grants involving the national
economy and judicial duty. On the other hand, our duty is to strike down acts of the state that violate
the policy.

To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently,
we must turn to the rules and regulations of on respondents Committee Privatization and GSIS to
determine the degree of preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject
sale. A tearless look at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of
preferential right to be accorded qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot
be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2,
section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to
legal hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I
submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Benong Berhad. In that
instance, all things stand equal, and bidder, as a qualified Pilipino bidder, should be preferred.

It is with deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the rules but even if we examine the
rules inside-out .thousand times, they can not justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to
match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded block of
shares . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It tendered the highest bid. It was declared as the
highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter
of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino privilege to match the
higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our symphaties
may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the latitude and longtitude of the right of
preference as defined by the rules. The parameters of the right of preference depend on galaxy of
facts and factors whose determination belongs to the province of the policy-making branches and
agencies of the State. We are duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the
wisdom of their judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as long
as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action amounts to a denial of the right
that the Court can come in and strike down the denial as unconstitutional.

Finally, I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad.
Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the bidding. It knew that the rules and
regulations do not provide that a qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid submitting an
inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the
first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed to respect. It cannot
be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners'
stance will wreak havoc on he essence of bidding. Our laws, rules and regulations require highest
bidding to raise as much funds as possible for the government to maximize its capacity to deliver
essential services to our people. This is a duty that must be discharged by Filipinos and foreigners
participating in a bidding contest and the rules are carefully written to attain this objective. Among
others, bidders are prequalified to insure their financial capability. The bidding is secret and the bids
are sealed to prevent collusion among the parties. This objective will be undermined if we grant
petitioner that privilege to know the winning bid and a chance to match it. For plainly, a second
chance to bid will encourage a bidder not to strive to give the highest bid in the first bidding.

We support the Filipino First policy without any reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M.
Recto has warned us that the greatest tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own
land. The Constitution has embodied Recto's counsel as a state policy. But while the Filipino First
policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an alien. Our policy
makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we are not free to be
unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are written, they must be
obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection clause of the Constitution
protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without unfairness to foreigner.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Narvasa, C.J., and Melo, J., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

I regret I cannot join the majority. To the incisive Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno,
may I just add

1. The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process
is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and
thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art. XII] simply states that "in the grant of
rights . . . covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos." The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal
that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majority's strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the
Philippines!.

2. Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial is short-sighted and, viewed
properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interest. It encourages other countries — in the
guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed retaliation — to discriminate against us in their own
jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of Filipino
enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals. The majority's thesis will thus marginalize Filipinos as pariahs in the
global marketplace with absolute no chance of winning any bidding outside our country. Even
authoritarian regimes and hermit kingdoms have long ago found out unfairness, greed and isolation
are self-defeating and in the long-term, self-destructing.

The moral lesson here is simple: Do not do unto other what you dont want other to do unto you.

3. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all
the bids are equal. In this manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without
being unfair to the foreigner.

In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied.
But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

Footnotes

1 See Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

2 Par I. Introduction and Highlights; Guidelines and Procedures: Second

Prequailifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization; Annex "A,"
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; Rollo, p. 142.

3 Par. V. Guidelines for the Public Bidding, id., pp. 153-154.

4 Annex "A," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining

Order; Rollo, pp. 13-14.

5 Annex "B," Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining

Order; id., p. 15.

6 Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Temporary Restraining Order, pp. 5-
6; id., pp. 6-7.

7 Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, p. 17; id., p. 133.

8 Par. V.J. 1, Guidelines for Public Bidding, Guidelines and Procedures: second
Prequalifications and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization, Annex "A,"
Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents; id., p. 154.

9 Respondents' Joint Comment with Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining

Order, p. 9; Rollo, p. 44.
10 Marbury v. Madison, 5, U.S. 138 (1803).

11 Am Jur. 606.

12 16 Am Jur. 2d 281.

13 Id., p. 282.

14 See Note 12.

15 Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10.

16 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 3, 22 August 1986, p. 608.

17 16 Am Jur 2d 283-284.

18 Sec. 10, first par., reads: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as
Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

Sec. 10, third par., reads: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals
and priorities.

19 State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 SW2d 319.

20 G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

21 Sec. 11, Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.

22 Sec. 12, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
government.

23 Sec. 13, Art. II, provides that [t]he State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

24 Sec. 1, Art. XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), provides that [t]he Congress
shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.

Sec. 2, Art. XIII, provides that [t]he promotion of social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-
reliance.

25 Sec. 2, Art. XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports),
provides that [t]he State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society;

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and
high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;

(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,
subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both
public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged.

(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indegenous learning, independent, and out-
of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and

(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.

26 G.R. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.

27 See Note 25.

28 Sec. 1 Art. XIV, provides that [t]he State shall protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education at all levels of education and shall take appropriate steps
to make such education accessible to all.

29 G.R. No. 118910, 17 July 1995.

30 Sec. 5 Art. II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), provides that [t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.

31 See Note 23.

32 See Note 24.
33 Sec. 17, Art II, provides that [t]he State shall give priority to education, science
and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

34 Nolledo, Jose N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p.
72.

35 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1986 ed., p. 1656.

36 The guest list of the Manila Hotel includes Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Duke of
Windsor, President Richard Nixon of U.S.A., Emperor Akihito of Japan, President
Dwight Eisenhower of U.S.A, President Nguyen Van Thieu of Vietnam, President
Park Chung Hee of Korea, Prime Minister Richard Holt of Australia, Prime Minister
Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, President Lyndon Johnson of U.S.A., President
Jose Lopez Portillo of Mexico, Princess Margaret of England, Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser of Australia, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Prime Minister
Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina, President
Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of Japan, Prime Minister
Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia,
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, Premier Li Peng of China, Sultan
Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei, President Ramaswani Venkataraman of India, Prime
Minister Go Chok Tong of Singapore, Prime Minister Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile,
Princess Chulaborn and Mahacharri Sirindhorn of Thailand, Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama of Japan, Sultan Azlan Shah and Raja Permaisuri Agong of Malaysia,
President Kim President Young Sam of Korea, Princess Infanta Elena of Spain,
President William Clinton of U.S.A., Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia,
King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of Spain, President Carlos Saul Menem of
Argentina, Prime Ministers Chatichai Choonvan and Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand,
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, President Vaclav Havel of Czech
Republic, Gen. Norman Schwarzcopf of U.S.A, President Ernesto Perez Balladares
of Panama, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius of Lithuania, President Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran, President Frei Ruiz Tagle of Chile, President Le Duc
Anh of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Julius Chan of Papua New Guinea, see
Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 16-19.

37 Authored by Beth Day Romulo.

38 See Note 9, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 50-51.

39 Record of the Constitutional Commission. Vol. 3, 22 August 1986. p. 607.

40 Id., p. 612.

41 Id., p. 616.

42 Id., p. 606.

43 Nolledo, J.N., The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., pp.
930-931.
44 Bidders were required to have at least one of the these qualifications to be able to
participate in the bidding process; see Note 2.

45 Memorandum of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 6.

46 Id., pp. 3-4.

47 See Note 8.

48 Keynote Address at the ASEAN Regional Symposium of Enforcement of Industrial

Property Rights held 23 October 1995 at New World Hotel, Makati City.

49 Speech of Senior Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla at the Induction of Officers

and Directors of the PHILCONSA for 1996 held 16 January 1996 at the Sky-Top,
Hotel Intercontinental, Makati City.

50 Memorandum of Authorities submitted by former Chief Justice Enrique M.

Fernando, p. 5.

51 8 March 1996 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, p. B13.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

1 Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, 1987 Constitution.

2 Padilla, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Volume III, p. 89.

3 Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed, p. 112.

4 Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines, Announced, 1990 ed., p. 72.

5 Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 1.

6 Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-1935), p.

507.

7 Id., p. 562.

VITUG, J., concurring:

1 Second par. Section 10, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.

MENDOZA, J., concurring:

1 Art. XII, §10, second paragraph.

2 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES: SECOND PREQUALIFICATION AND

PUBLIC BIDDING OF THE MHC PRIVATIZATION (hereafter referred to as
GUIDELINES), Part. V, par. H(4)..
3 Id.

4 83 Phil. 242 (1949).

5 R.A. No. 37, §1.

6 87 Phil. 343 (1950).

7 104 Phil. 302 (1958).

8 Id, at 309.

9 For an excellent analysis of American cases on reverse discrimination in these

areas, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 780-819 (1991).

10 Art. II, §19: "The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." (Emphasis added)

11 See Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) (invalidating an
ordinance imposing a flat fee of P500 on aliens for the privilege of earning a
livelihood).

12 Petitioner passed the criteria set forth in the GUIDELINES, Part IV, par. F(4), of
the GSIS, relating to the following:

a. Business management expertise, tract record, and experience

b. Financial capability

c. Feasibility and acceptability of the proposed strategic plan for the

Manila Hotel.

13 GUIDELINES, Part V, par. (1)(3), in relation to Part. I.

14 Id., Part V, par. V (1).

PUNO, J., dissenting:

1 Introduction and Highlights, Guidelines and Procedures: Second Prequalification

and Public Bidding of the MHC Privatization, Annex "A" to Petitioner's Consolidated
Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, p. 142.

2 The four bidders who previously prequalified for the first bidding, namely, ITT
Sheraton, Marriot International, Inc., Renaissance Hotel International, Inc., and the
consortium of RCBC and the Ritz Carlton, were deemed prequalified for the second
bidding.

3 Annex "A" to the Consolidated Reply to Comments of Respondents, Rollo, pp. 140-

155.
4 Former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Commissioner Joaquin Bernas were
invited by the Court as amicus curiae to shed light on its meaning.

5 Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170, 190 [1930].

6 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 139 p. 510 [1979 ed. ]; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 52 p.
57 [1915]; see also Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co. 48 Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 31
A.J.R. 626, 16 L.R.A. 281 [1892]; State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P. 2d 844,
225 Kan [1978].

7 Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation, supra, at 1110-1111; see also Cooley, A Treatise on

Constitutional Limitations 167, vol. 1 [1927].

8 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 100.

9 Cooley, supra, at 171; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 53, pp. 57-58; Brice v. McDow, 116 S.C. 324,
108 S.E. 84, 87 [1921]; see also Gonzales, Philippine Constitutional Law p. 26
[1969].

10 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, p. 101.

11 Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W. 801, 804 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648, Ann.
Cas. 1913 A, 719 [1911]; Brice v. McDow, supra, at 87; Morgan v. Board of
Supervisors, 67 Ariz. 133, 192 P. 2d 236, 241 [1948]; Gonzales, supra..

12 Ninth Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), p. 1638.

13 Article III, Section 2; see Webb v. de Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995]; People v.
Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 (1994]; Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994]; Burgos v.
Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 [1940];
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]; and a host of other cases.

14 Article III, Section 12, pars. 1 to 3; People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995];
People v. Bandula 232 SCRA 566 [1994]; People v. Nito 228 SCRA 442 [1993];
People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 [1981]; People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]; and
a host of other cases.

15 Article III, Section 14; People v. Digno, 250 SCRA 237 [1995]; People v. Godoy,
250 SCRA 676 [1995]; People v. Colcol 219 SCRA [1993]; Borja v. Mendoza, 77
SCRA 422 [1977]; People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]; and a host of other
cases.

16 Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 [1985]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals 24

SCRA 663 [1968]; People v. Otadura, 86 Phil. 244 [1950]; Bermudez v. Castillo, 64
Phil, 485 [1937]; and a host of other cases.

17 Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F. Supp, 191, 195-196 [1979]; Erdman v.

Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 Atl. 327, 99 A.S.R. 783 63 L.R.A. 534 [1903]; see Ninth
Decennial Digest Part I, Constitutional Law, (Key No. 28), pp. 1638-1639.
18 City of Chicago v. George F. Harding Collection, 217 N.E. 2d 381, 383, 70 Ill.
App. 2d 254 [1966]; People v. Buellton Dev. Co., 136 P. 2d 793, 796, 58 Cal. App. 2d
178 [1943]; Bordy v. State, 7 N.W. 2d 632, 635, 142 Neb. 714 [1943]; Cohen v. City
of Chicago, 36 N.E. 2d 220, 224, 377 Ill 221 [1941].

19 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 143, p. 514; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law,
Sec. 48, p. 100; 6 R.C.L. Sec. 54, p. 59; see also State ex rel. Noe v. Knop La. App.
190 So. 135, 142 [1939]; State ex rel. Walker v. Board of Comm'rs. for Educational
Lands and Funds, 3 N.W. 2d 196, 200, 141 Neb. 172 [1942]; Maddox v. Hunt, 83 P.
2d 553, 556, 83 Okl. 465 [1938].

20 Article II, Sections 11, 12 and 13 (Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, 68 [1991]); Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 (Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 564 [1995]).

21 Article XIII, Section 13 (Basco, supra).

22 Article XIV, Section 2 (Basco, supra).

23 Kilosbayan v. Morato, supra, at 564.

24 Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra, at 68.

25 Congress had previously passed the Retail Trade Act (R.A. 1180); the Private
Security Agency Act (R.A. 5487; the law on engaging in the rice and corn industry
(R.A. 3018, P.D. 194), etc.

26 Or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe.

27 Article XIV, section 3 of the 1973 Constitution reads:

"Sec. 3. The Batasang Pambansa shall, upon recommendation of the National

Economic and Development Authority, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations wholly owned by such citizens, certain traditional areas
of investments when the national interest so dictates,"

28 101 Phil. 1155 [1957].

29 See Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 450, vol. II [1988].
The Lao Ichong case upheld the Filipinization of the retail trade and implied that
particular areas of business may be Filipinized without doing violence to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

30 Nolledo The New Constitution of the Philippines, Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 72. The
word "patrimony" first appeared in the preamble of the 1935 Constitution and was
understood to cover everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible and
the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and possessions of the
nation (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concepts [1962 ed.], p. 112;
Speech of Delegate of Conrado Benitez defending the draft preamble of the 1935
Constitution in Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, vol. III, p. 325
[1966]).
31 Commissioned by the Manila Hotel Corporation for the Diamond Jubilee
celebration of the Hotel in 1987; see The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City.any

32 Section 7 of R.A. 4846 provides:

Sec. 7. In the designation of a particular cultural property as a .national cultural

treasure," the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall
be notified at least fifteen days prior to the intended designation, and he shall be
invited to attend the deliberation and given a chance to be heard. Failure on the part
of the owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the panel to render its decision.
Decision shall be given by the panel within a week after its deliberation. In the event
that the owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the panel,
he may do so within thirty days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If
no request for reconsideration is filed after this period, the designation is then
considered final and executory. Any request for reconsideration filed within thirty
days and subsequently again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to
another panel chairmanned by the Secretary of Education with two experts as
members appointed by the Secretary of Education. Their decision shall final and
binding.

(b) Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects may be
designated as "National Cultural Treasures." The remainder, if any shall be treated
as cultural property.

xxx xxx xxx

33 P.D. 1146, Sec, 5; P.D, 1146, known as "The Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977" amended Commonwealth Act No. 186, the "Government
Service Insurance Act" of 1936.

34 Beronilla v. Government Service Insurance System, 36 SCRA 44, 53 [1970];

Social Security System Employees Association v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016, 1023
[1963].

35 Id., secs. 28 and 29.

36 Id., Sec. 30.

37 Constitution, Article IX (B), section 2 (1).

38 Constitution, Article IX (D), section 2 (1).

39 It is meet to note that our laws do not debar foreigners from engaging in the hotel
business. Republic Act No. 7042, entitled the "Foreign Investments Act of 1991" was
enacted by Congress to "attract, promote and welcome . . . foreign investments . . . in
activities which significantly contribute to national industrialization and socio-
economic development to the extent that foreign investment is allowed by the
Constitution and relevant laws." The law contains a list, called the Negative List
 specifying areas of economic activity where foreign participation is limited or
prohibited. Areas of economic activity not included in the Negative List are open to
foreign participation up to one hundred per cent (Sees. 6 and 7). Foreigners now own
and run a great number of our five-star hotels.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261             November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.,
ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-

ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-
intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO
LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY,
SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO
AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,
CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG,
ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI
LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM
MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA
LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO,
JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON

MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO,
EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO
TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE
TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME
BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA
LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.
SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V.
ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S.
RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.
CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN
BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO
SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF
THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.

DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M.

MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL
BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY.
MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS
G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO
FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS
HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent,
dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal
courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the
issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance,
that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by
what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all

cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once

within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
 the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not
vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment  to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the
House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. –
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.

In cases where a verified

complaint or a resolution of
 impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.
Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. – Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October
23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives
and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be
declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to
return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this
Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging
that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate;
and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President
Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens,
taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition
for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he
has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v.
PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal
profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles
of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in
ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be
protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in
their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the
House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating
therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President
from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and
taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine
Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be
declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the
Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo
N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for
Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional
the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in
his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or
giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for
Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second
impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as
professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of
their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate
from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but
alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the
Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in
his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing
of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings
arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be
prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings
thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution
of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and
void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the
same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the
eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28,
2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on
October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292
alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the
Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a
direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put
forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not
carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum, 19 and as reflected
above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court
directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003,
resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and
(d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on
petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for
and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation
asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment
cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
(Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide
impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate
them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later
than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon,
filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and
have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable
issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment
court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution
issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No.
160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,

Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of
petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003,
to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it;
on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this
time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of

Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant
petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and
novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to
determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section
1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel
in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision
in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the

Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict,
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility,
but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so
provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If
these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
 then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics
in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon
the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period
of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law
of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States
generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution,
the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of

the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
 The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of
the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any
branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in
the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during

martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it.
As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
 authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn
to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision

under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should
bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
 accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a

provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the

Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In
still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the

constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as
to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
 adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential

application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a

political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. 47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the
scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel
rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to
try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to
try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave
abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it
necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins
to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the
U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and
may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to
exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to
the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards
in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of

the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point.
These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held
that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was
based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of
the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 66 it ruled that
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost
all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court
had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases
involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance, 71 and that procedural matters
are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of
the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that,
when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in
the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing,
for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. 74 In
view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real
party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and
public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought
not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights –
as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar
and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 79 Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient
that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. 80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that
any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is
composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it
with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It,
therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by
it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to
deal properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before
this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege
standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive

determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied
that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A
party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case.
He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy
the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the
same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al.
has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join

petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise
the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is
valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making
of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that
submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence
of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at
hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts
an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as
set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative
power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners
will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture." 96 Only then may the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit,
as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no
urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this
Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second
impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules
provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can
raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their
signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity.
Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of
Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the
House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the
issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power
is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
 with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. 99 (Italics in the
original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this
Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise
its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take
jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when
he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the
judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds
the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions
or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will
of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's
indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it.
As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the
Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who
are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973
on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The
obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the
media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already
incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal
threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it
had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens
of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon.
So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some
provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a
free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held
sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner
Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the
questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections,
but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays
came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given
in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of
Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of
Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution
had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void.
The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and
that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx
 The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast
majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court
were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their
respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum.
None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of
the Court felt that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between

a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that
the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not
the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have
been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are
rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided
case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The
Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial
food for thought on the subject of the judiciary. 103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified
the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is
not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be
created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political
questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where
there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its
authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court
according to the new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting

to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with
the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

 When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power.
But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being
that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political
question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1)
"truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court
has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political
following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide. 106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court
declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-
justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may
be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts
to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens
the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is
radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4),
Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
 The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this
Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this
Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find
no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission
on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of
this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the
second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a
legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise
be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of
the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this
Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is
too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law
touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be
broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of
the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the
original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second
impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of
the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-
mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
 "We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned
Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x" 124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said
second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in
the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared
and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and
verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a
resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the
scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations
militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is
the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this
issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional
ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught
the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the
instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in
the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own.
Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the
very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting
as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again,
this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion
for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are
subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral
compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of
Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court.
Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction
be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred." 126 Otherwise,
this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is
a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has
acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has
laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon
the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit
to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a
moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the
case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them
to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting
in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution
could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
 Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme
or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply
place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members
of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is
nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is
the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is
equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of
judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of
judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of
limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort,
and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative
act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.
This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest
court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is
more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property
right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official
duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was
not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who
has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided
(citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from

different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial
review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement
 3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility
that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the
Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating
and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of
Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging
that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of
its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as
settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify
an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way
or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-
validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not
enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law
regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches
of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v.
Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers],
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond
boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then
law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers]
are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,"
resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our
present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is
clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can,
as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1)
by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar
prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices
had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act
on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz
Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of
"initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during
the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at
which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint,
dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to

commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice
Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the
instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts

consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to
the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of
the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco
and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee
votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but
by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the
law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive
provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think,
these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body.
This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the
First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers
several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of
record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on
the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee
resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears
that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of
the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the
Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to
the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably
the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very
technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3
(3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the
exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on
page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read:
"A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
 verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on
line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of
the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the
Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In
his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the
phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section
3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who
was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article
XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an
action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate,"
appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in
the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must
be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-
third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there
is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning
of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to
that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not
its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is
filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding
but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By
his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both
ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning
into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to
the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were
delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent
spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives
and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only
two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for
obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and
proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment.
Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its
rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
 (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to
interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later
Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United
States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for
this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations
that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case
of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was
even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if
we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that
day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted
by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the
members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to
do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to
the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to
for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their
own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts
the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject
to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of

congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the
Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship
with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers. 154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically

reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts
in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power
which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality
of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people. 156

xxx
 The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated
by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the
1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that
petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our
power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the
last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if
we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the
judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly
Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. 157 (Italics in the original emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third
parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that
this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of
Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus,
the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard
to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by
at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the
center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair
for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be
an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on
the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to
air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the
academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the
official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability
upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted,
this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with
respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against
the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the
Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned.
To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an
issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which
only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-
cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem
that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to
pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment
has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the
main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed
the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the
other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about
ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that
of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been
entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected
by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations
could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it
not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him
but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution?
Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case
in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the
Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which
recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its
agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government
branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than
the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice
is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of
every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no
other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in
our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and
aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.

Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."

2
 Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
(Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no
copy of the same was submitted before this Court.

3
 Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established "to help
ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution
and public policy and required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a special
fund to augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to
finance the acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and facilities."

4
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."

5
 The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was later amended to
include Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

6
 Supra note 4 at 123-124.

7
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A."

8
 http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9999

9
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.

10
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.

11
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B."

12
 Supra note 2.
13
 A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the following
signatories to the second impeachment complaint and the accompanying
Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix
Fuentebella, NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV,
NPC, Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-
Lokin, Party List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar,
(Chairman, House Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos, Independent, 1st
District, North Cotobato 8. Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin
Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District, Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone
District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas,
1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice, Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay
III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon City 15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of
Benguet 16. Alfredo Marañon, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-
Carreon, Reporma, 1st District, Zamboanga del Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd
District, Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd District, Masbate 20. Georgilu
Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21. Jose Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd
District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La Union 23. Uliran
Joaquin, NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of Tawi-Tawi
25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC, 2nd
District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28.
Zeneida Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio, Independent-LDP,
2nd District, Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Isabela 31.
Agusto Boboy Syjuco, Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone
District of Muntinlupa City 33. Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District, Agusan del
Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District,
Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis, Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo,
Party List-Partido ng Manggagawa 38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros
Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd District, Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC,
2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy, Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42.
Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga 43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th
District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone District of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M.
Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo Bondoc, NPC, 4th District,
Pampanga 47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan 48. Perpetuo Ylagan,
Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal 50. Joseph Ace
H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52. Carlos Q.
Cojuangco, NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th District,
Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M. Velarde,
Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio
Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng
Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60.
Joseph Santiago, NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio, NPC,
1st District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District,
Quezon 63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party
List-Sanlakas 65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla,
LDP, 2nd District, Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC,
Cagayan 69. Juan Miguel Zubiri, Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon
Jr,. NPC, 2nd District, Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of Nueva Ecija
72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC, 5th District, Pangasinan 73. Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone
District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan
75. Angelo O. Montilla, NPC, Lone District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga, NPC,
2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77. Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur
78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District, Davao City.
  Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two separate impeachment
14

complaints before the House of Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.

15
 299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued that as a taxpayer
and a citizen, he had the legal personality to file a petition demanding that the PCGG make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering
the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that the matter of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to
the public. The Supreme Court, citing Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987) and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264
(1989) ruled that petitioner had standing. The Court, however, went on to elaborate that in
any event, the question on the standing of petitioner Chavez was rendered moot by the
intervention of the Jopsons who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.

 384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
16

wherein the petition sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts
on its then on-going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez had the standing to
bring a taxpayer's suit because the petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties.

17
 224 SCRA 792 (1993).

 Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the
18

petitions, this Court also received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., and Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and
Senate President Franklin Drilon.

19
 Supra note 2 at 10.

 Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice Regalado E.

20

Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former
Minister of Justice and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and
Raul C. Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.

21
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.

22
 Id. at 292.

23
 63 Phil 139 (1936).

24
 Id. at 157-159.

 Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051 (1957);
25

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).

26
 Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.

27
 5 US 137 (1803).

28
 Id. at 180.
29
 In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute allowing for imprisonment
for non-payment of a debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court
invalidated a statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government grant
stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee would be in lieu of other taxes
was a contractual obligation which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation.
In Concepcion v. Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code, as
amended, which provided that judges of the first instance with the same salaries would, by
lot, exchange judicial districts every five years, was declared invalid for being a usurpation of
the power of appointment vested in the Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil
749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so far as it declares open to lease lands containing petroleum
which have been validly located and held, was declared invalid for being a depravation of
property without due process of law. In U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 2868,
in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of rice by proclamation and to
make the sale of rice in violation of such a proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid
delegation of legislative power.

30
 Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time 62-53 (2003).

31
 Supra note 23.

32
 Id. at 156-157.

 Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process
33

Of Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).

34
 Ibid.

35
 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).

36
 31 SCRA 413 (1970)

 Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz Farms v.
37

Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v.

Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).

38
 194 SCRA 317 (1991).

39
 Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.

40
 152 SCRA 284 (1987).

41
 Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc v. Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and I Tañada and Fernando, Constitution
of the Philippines 21 ( Fourth Ed. ).

42
 82 Phil 771 (1949).

43
 Id. at 775.

44
 Supra note 38.
45
 Id. at 330-331.

 Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220
46

and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.

47
 Supra note 2.

48
 Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

49
 Supra note 21.

50
 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

 Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment Process: A

51

Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.

52
 227 SCRA 100 (1993).

53
 Id. at 112.

 US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the sole Power of
54

Impeachment.

 1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the
55

exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

 Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy,

56

1984, pp. 112-113.

57
 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

58
 141 SCRA 263 (1986).

59
 Supra note 25.

60
 298 SCRA 756 (1998).

61
 272 SCRA 18 (1997).

62
 201 SCRA 792 (1991).

63
 187 SCRA 377 (1990).

64
 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
65
 Supra note 25.

66
 Supra note 23.

67
 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-331.

68
 Id. at 158-159.

69
 IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); House
International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA
703 (1987); Baker v. Carr, supra note 57.

70
 Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).

71
 Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).

 Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371, 378
72

(1988).

 Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to
73

be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.

74
 JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 (2000).

75
 246 SCRA 540 (1995).

76
 Id. at 562-564.

 Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449,
77

562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733
(2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).

78
 Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.

 Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v. Morato,
79

supra note 70; Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA

333 (1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, 110 Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay &
Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).

 BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252
80

(1989); Vide Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note

77; TELEBAP v. COMELEC, supra note 77; Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya
v. PCGG, supra note 69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC,
supra note 79; Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note
79; Philconsa v. Gimenez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v.
Feliciano, supra note 79; Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
  Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad
81

v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).

 Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 at

82

140-141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA

659 (1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41
SCRA 702 (1971).

83
 Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79.

 Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461
84

(1951) citing Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz,
4245.

 Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Gonzales v.

85

Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.

86
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).

 MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306,
87

January 28, 2003, citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles

County Winans, 109 P 640; Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.

 Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974), citing
88

Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages
454-455; Johnson, et al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348 (1925).

 MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, supra note 87,
89

dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio

Lines, 173 SCRA 514, 514-515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doña
Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627 (1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-
258; Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of
Court; Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran,
supra note 17.

90
 Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).

 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive

91

Secretary, supra note 38; Philconsa v. Giménez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn

Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949);
vide Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Santiago v.
COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v.
PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
(1992); Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
(1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Daza v. Singson, supra note
64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.

 Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 (1999) citing Gibson vs.
92

Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271

(1989).
93
 Supra note 79.

94
 Id. at 403.

95
 Supra note 81.

96
 Id. at 681.

97
 SECTION 3. x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.

98
 Supra note 25.

99
 Id. at 1067.

 Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882

100

(1952); De la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977).

 Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1

101

(1961); Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774

(1967); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.

102
 50 SCRA 30 (1973).

103
 Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 434-436.

104
 Id. at 439-443.

105
 177 SCRA 668 (1989).

106
 Id. at 695.

107
 203 SCRA 767 (1991).

108
 Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).

109
 Supra note 64.
110
 Id. at 501.

111
 Supra note 57.

112
 Id. at 217.

113
 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286.

114
 Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.

115
 76 Phil 516 (1946).

116
 Id. at 522.

117
 Supra note 37.

 Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

118

Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).

 Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452,
119

550 (2001); Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297

U.S. 288 (1936).

 As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of the hearings
120

conducted by the House Committee on Justice pursuant to said Resolution was submitted to
the Court by any of the parties.

121
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.

122
 Supra note 107.

123
 Id. at 777 (citations omitted).

124
 Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.

125
 Supra note 2 at 342.

126
 Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).

 Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v. Senate Electoral

127

Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316

(1948); Planas v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.

128
 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).

129
 Ibid.

130
 Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).

131
 Supra note 127.
132
 Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.

 Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 127; Vargas v.

133

Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.

134
 Supra note 119 at 210-211.

135
 Supra note 119.

 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69 at

136

575; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v.

Northwestern Airlines, 210 SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism
Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).

137
 Supra note 2 at 353.

138
 Supra note 33 at 32.

139
 Supra note 102.

140
 Supra note 33.

141
 249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).

142
 Id. at 251.

143
 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.

144
 Id. at 416.

145
 Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.

146
 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416

147
 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

148
 Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.

149
 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

150
 40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).

151
 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).

152
 277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).

153
 144 U.S. 1 (1862).

154
 Supra note 152 at 304-306.
155
 Id. at 311.

156
 Id. at 313.

157
 Supra note 152 at 314-315.

158
 Supra note 50.