Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
c. Form of and Promulgation of
Judgment
INDIAS v PHILIPPINE IRON MINES,
INC.
107 PHIL 297
BAUTISTA ANGELO; Apr 29, 1957
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations
FACTS
- A complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that
respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice
- Hearings were conducted by the hearing
examiner, Atty. Emiliano Tabigne, at which both
parties, represented by counsel, appeared.
- After the presentation of the evidence, the
hearing examiner rendered his report stating that
the charge of unfair labor practice has not been
substantiated by the evidence and recommending
its dismissal. He also found that the dismissal of
petitioner was for sufficient cause.
- The court approved the hearing examiner's
recommendation and rendered the following order:
Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends
the dismissal of this case on the ground that
the evidence by the complainant did not
support the charges of unfair labor practice.
The facts are stated in the Hearing Examiner's
dated May 16, 1955.
After a perusal of the record of the case, the
Court finds no sufficient justification for
modifying said recommendation, findings and
conclusions, and consequently, this case is
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the court en banc.
- Hence this petition for review.
- It is contended that the aforequoted order runs
counter to the Constitution which provides that
"No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based" (Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule 35,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides
that a court decision shall state "clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based." And the claim is made in view of the fact
that the order does not contain either a discussion
of the evidence or any finding of fact based on said
evidence, which counsel claims does not meet the
requirements of the law and the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Industrial Relations can issue an
order dismissing a case without stating the facts
and the law support thereof.
HELD
YES
- The order, it is true, does not make its own
discussion of the evidence or its own findings of
fact, but such is not necessary if the court is
satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee
which already contains a full discussion of the
evidence and the findings of fact based thereon.
The situation differs if the court disagrees with the
report in which case it should state the reasons for
its disagreement. If it is in full accord with the
report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee
or examiner has already found in it.
- Such is the present situation. The court approved
the report of the hearing examiner "after a perusal
of the record of the case." This presupposes that it
has examined the evidence and found no
justification for modifying his findings and
conclusions. This is a substantial compliance with
the law.
- When the Court of Industrial Relations refers a
case to a commissioner for investigation, report,
and recommendation, and at such investigation
the parties were duly represented by counsel,
heard or at least given an opportunity to be heard,
the requirement of due process has been satisfied,
even if the court failed to set the report for
hearing, and a decision on the basis of such report,
with the other evidence of the case, is a decision
which meets the requirement of a fair and open
hearing.
Disposition The order appealed from was
affirmed.
SERRANO v PSC
24 SCRA 867
FERNANDO; Aug 30, 1968
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the Public
Service Commission.
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FACTS
- Serrano filed an application with the Public
Service Commission requesting authority to
operate a taxicab automobile service within
the City of Manila and from said city to any
place in Luzon open to motor vehicle traffic
and vice versa. Fifty units of taxicabs were
to be used.
- Serrano was a public service bus operator in
the City of Manila and was the holder of
several certificates of public convenience.
- His application was heard by Associate
Commissioner Panganiban. Serrano
completed the presentation of his evidence,
but the oppositors and no evidence was
presented to rebut his claims as to his
qualification and financial capacity. The
Public Service Commission denied application
- A motion for reconsideration was filed and
denied by the PSC.
- Serrano alleged that the Public Service
Commission erred in failing to make a
statement of facts as to each case regarding
the qualification and financial ability of the
applicant and the other factors constituting
the criterion used as basis in granting the
application, in whole or in part, on the one
hand, and dismissing or denying the
application on the other. He relies on the
constitutional provision that no decision shall
be rendered by any court of record without
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
ISSUE
WON the denial of the PSC of Serrano’s petition
was correct
HELD
NO
Ratio Quasi-judicial tribunals, including the Public
Service Commission, should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered.
Reasoning
- The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which the decision is based is
incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service
Commission is not a court of record within the
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meaning of the above constitutional provision.
- The PSC is not a judicial tribunal and its functions
are limited and administrative in nature. The PSC
is not a court (citing Dagdag vs. PSC and Filipino
Bus Co. vs Philippine Railway).
- It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion
of the administrative tribunal within the scope of
the above constitutional provision justifies the
summary disposition of petitioner's application in
the manner followed by respondent Public Service
Commission.
- In Ang Tibay v. Court, speaking of the Court of
Industrial Relations, which is likewise an
administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial
powers like the PSC, the Court made clear that
while it (the CIR) is "free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements," it does not mean "that
it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirement of due process.”
- The failure to respect such cardinal primary right
of petitioner to have his application decided in
such a manner as to inform him not only of the
issues involved but the reasons for the decision,
which necessarily would likewise require a finding
of facts, cannot receive judicial approval.
- The denial of Serrano’s petition was plain and
palpable error. There is a need then to remand the
matter to the Public Service Commission so that it
could consider the evidence and discharge the
function committed to it by law. Only after it has
rendered its decision setting forth the facts on
which it is based does the power of review on the
part of this Court come into play.
Disposition Decision set aside, case remanded to
PSC.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v
CAMPOSANO, et al.
G.R. No. 157684
PANGANIBAN; Apr 27, 2005
NATURE
Petition for Review
FACTS
-Camposano was the Finance and Mgt Officer,
Agustin was an Accountant , and Perez was the
Acting Supply Officer of Dept of Health NCR (DOH-
NCR)
- a complaint was filed before the DOH Resident
Ombudsman against Dir. Majarais, Acting Admin
Officer Cabrera, and respondents, for an alleged
anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles
of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vit B Complex and
Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00
-the Resident Ombudsman submitted an
investigation report to the Sec of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative
charge. Sec of Health filed a formal charge against
the respondents and their co-respondents for
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA
3019.
-Exec Sec Ruben Torres issued AO 298 creating an
ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC)
-the PCAGC took over the investigation from the
DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution
finding Majarais, Camposano, Cabrera, Agustin,
and Perez guilty as charged and recommended to
Pres Ramos that they be dismissed from
government service.
-Pres Ramos issued AO 390 finding Majarais guilty
and dismissed from service and remanded records
of case to Sec of Health for appropriate action.
-Sec of Health issued an Order disposing of the
case against respondents and Cabrera. The
dispositive portion said: pursuant to the
Resolution rendered by the PCAGC, respondents
Camposano, Cabrera, Agustin, Perez are hereby
dismissed from the service.
-Respondents filed MFR of the said Order. Sec of
Health denied. They filed appeal w/ the CSC. CSC
denied. Respondents went to the CA.
-CA held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over
administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission
had no power to investigate the charges against
respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely
relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of
health failed to comply with administrative due
process.
ISSUE
WON the decision of Sec of Health was valid
HELD
NO
- Administrative due process requires that, prior to
imposing disciplinary sanctions,the disciplining
authority must make an independent assessment
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of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision
imposing administrative sanctions must show the
bases for its conclusions. While the investigation
of a case may be delegated to and conducted by
another body or group of officials, the disciplining
authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence
gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this
manner, the respondents would be informed of the
bases for the sanctions and thus be able to
prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure
is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a
democracy.
-Due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit supporting evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis
to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration
of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would
know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved.
-The CA correctly ruled that administrative due
process had not been observed in the present
factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth
requisite is equally evident from the health
secretary’s Order dismissing the respondents. The
decision of Secretary Reodica should have
contained a factual finding and a legal assessment
of the controversy to enable respondents to know
the bases for their dismissal and thereafter
prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so
desired.
-To support its position, petitioner cites American
Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents. However, this
case merely authorized the delegation of the
power to investigate, but not the authority to
impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring the
disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment
and discretion in deciding a case, American
Tobacco supports the present respondents’ cause.
In that case, the petitioners objected to the
appointment of hearing officers and sought the
personal hearing of their case by the disciplining
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authority. The Court, however, sustained the right
to delegate the power to investigate, as long as
the adjudication would be made by the deciding
authority.
- (Solicitor General insists that respondents are
guilty of the charges and deserve dismissal from
the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in
this case is not the guilt of respondents, but solely
due process. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor
penalty imposed, unless due process is first
observed. )
Disposition Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO v THE
DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
67 SCRA 287
ANTONIO; Oct. 14, 1975
FACTS:
- petitioners are challenging the validity of Rule
168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as
amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to
designate any ranking official of said office to hear
"inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise
provides that "all judgments determining the
merits of the case shall be personally and directly
prepared by the Director and signed by him."
These proceedings refer to the hearing of
opposition to the registration of a mark or trade
name, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of determining the question of priority of
adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a
trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent
Office.
- Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No.
166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with
jurisdiction over opposition, interference and
cancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise,
the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains
a similar provision, thus:
168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceeding. - The Director of Patents shall
have original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings. In the event that the Patent
Office should be provided with an Examiner of
Interferences, this Examiner shall have the
original jurisdiction over these cases, instead
of the Director. In the case that the Examiner
of Interferences takes over the original
jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his
final decision subject to appeal to the Director
of Patents within three months of the receipt
of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be
governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court insofar as said sections are applicable
and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be
P25.00.
- The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were
drafted and promulgated by the Director of
Patents and approved by the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce.
- Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule 168 to
read as follows:
168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings. - The Director of Patents shall
have original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings, [In the event that the Patent
Office is provided with an Examiner of
Interferences, this Examiner shall then have
the original jurisdiction over these cases,
instead of the Director. In the case that the
Examiner of Interferences takes over the
original jurisdiction over inter partes
proceedings, his final decisions shall be
subject to appeal to the Director of Patents
within three months of the receipt of notice
decision. Such appeals shall be governed by
Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar
as said sections are applicable and
appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be
[P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the
Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall
be heard before the Director of Patents, any
hearing officer, or any ranking official
designated by the Director, but all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him. (Emphasis
supplied.)
- In accordance with the amended Rule, the
Director of Patents delegated the hearing of
petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically,
Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico
Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents
herein.
- Petitioners filed their objections to the authority
of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging
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that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void
because under the law the Director must
personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said
objections were overruled by the Director of
Patents, hence, the present petition for
mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to
personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of
the hearing officers.
ISSUE:
WON the amendment of the rule is illegal and void
as it should be the Director who must personally
hear and decide inter partes cases.
HELD:
NO.
- The power conferred upon an administrative
agency to which the administration of a statute is
entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as
may be deemed necessary or proper in order to
carry out its purposes and provisions may be an
adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provisions of
the Act or by implication it has been withheld.
- The nature of the power and authority entrusted
to The Director of Patents suggests that the
aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation
to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as
to give the aforesaid official the administrative
flexibility necessary for the prompt and
expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. As such officer, he is
required, among others, to determine the question
of priority in patent interference proceedings,
decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed
patent, cancellations of patents under Republic Act
No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as
oppositions, claims of interference, cancellation
cases under the Trade-mark Law and other
matters in connection with the enforcement of the
aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view
of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require
him to hear personally each and every case
pending in his Office. This would leave him little
time to attend to his other duties. The remedy is a
far wider range of delegations to subordinate
officers.
- Thus, while the power to decide resides solely in
the administrative agency vested by law, this does
not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the
administrative agency will be made.
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- The rule that requires an administrative officer to
exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, the aid of
subordinates to investigate and report to him the
facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his
decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law. Neither does due process of law
nor the requirements of fair hearing require that
the actual taking of testimony be before the same
officer who will make the decision in the case. As
long as a party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof, and the decision is supported by
the evidence in the record, there is no question
that the requirements of due process and fair trial
are fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of
responsibility on the part of the officer concerned
as the actual decision remains with and is made by
said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give
the substance of a hearing, which is for the
purpose of making determinations upon evidence
the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies
them."
- In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may
make preliminary rulings on the myriad of
questions raised at the hearings of these cases,
the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues
and questions involved is left to the Director of
Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the
point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional,
petitioners have not shown in what manner they
have been prejudiced by the proceedings.
Disposition Petition is dismissed
ALBERT v GANGAN
353 SCRA 673
BUENA; March 06, 2001
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Ramon Albert, president of the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corp (NHMFC) approved
loans taken out to finance several projects in
pursuance of its Community Mortgage Program
(CMP), a low-cost home financing scheme. One of
the projects under this program was the AMAKO
project for which P36,796,711.55 was released and
approved by petitioner.
- Upon petitioner’s instruction, an inspection of the
said project was conducted and it was found that
the project was 3 months in arrears in their
amortization. Because of this finding, petitioner
ordered other investigations be conducted. After
investigation, the CoA Resident Auditor of NHMFC
disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO proj. for
the following reasons: (a) non-submission of
documentary requirements/non-complying or
defective documents as required under NHMFC
Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b)
irregular/excessive expenditures per COA Circular
No. 85-55A
- Months later, petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman a letter-complaint against his
subordinate employees who appeared to be
responsible for the fraud with respect to the
AMAKO loan transaction. Petitioner also filed a civil
case for sum of money, annulment, damages and
attorney’s fees with preliminary attachment,
against SHGCCI, AMAKO, Sapang Palay &
Development Foundation, Inc., and other persons
responsible for the misrepresentation, tortious and
fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted
to AMAKO project.
- The Commission on Audit (COA), after
investigation, later found petitioner as among the
persons liable for the amount representing
payment of loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO.
The COA disallowed the plan payment because it
found the payment irregular and an excessive
expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable
pursuant to sec. 103 of PD 1445, which states,
“expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the
official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefor.”
- In his MFR, which was later denied, Albert’s
defense was that he cannot and should not be held
personally liable for the amount of the loan as he
acted only in the performance of his official duties
and that there was no clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence on his part.
- The COA in dismissing said MFR stated thus:
Albert himself was the final approving authority of
the transaction in question and that the
officers/employees who processed the same were
directly under his supervision. He could have
conclusively determined the validity of a
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transaction involving such a large amount. Albert’s
claim of good faith and exercise of due diligence
are disputable presumptions, and these
presumptions are overcome by evidence of
specific acts constituting an offense, as where
there exists the fact that loss of government funds
resulted from official action. Lastly, it stated that
Sec3. (9) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) declares to
be unlawful the act of “entering, in behalf of the
government, into a contract or transaction
manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
- Aggrieved, petitioner filed this case contending
that he can’t be held personally liable for the
amount of P36, 796,711.55 representing the loan
proceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COA
decisions don’t have any findings that he has
knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent
transaction. He claims that there is no clear
showing that he acted in bad faith, with malice, or
gross negligence when he approved the loan
transaction.
ISSUE
WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion
when it held petitioner personally liable for the
subject disallowance.
HELD
YES.
Ratio The decision of a government agency must
state the facts and the law on which the decision is
based.
Reasoning The assailed decision failed to mention
petitioner’s direct participation in the fraudulent
scheme. It merely held that petitioner be
immediately and primarily held responsible for the
disallowance, for the simple reason that, as the
approving officer, any transaction presented to
him for approval is subject to his discretion. The
COA decision merely stated conclusions of law.
Facts and circumstances (the why’s, what’s and
how’s of the disallowance), were patently missing,
inaccurate or incomplete. The COA cannot just
perform its constitutional function of disallowing
expenditures of govt funds at sheer discretion.
There has to be factual basis why the expenditure
is alleged to be fraudulent or why there was a
misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the
wrong committed and not solely by reason of
being the head of govt agency. The COA even
mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes
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liability for a grossly disadvantageous contract
entered into by a govt functionary but as to why
and how the disbursement of funds in this case
was considered disadvantageous must be duly
supported by findings of facts.
Disposition Decision of COA REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
AROCHA VS VIVO
GR No.24844
REYES, J.B.L; Oct 26, 1967
FACTS
- Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the Manila
International Airport together with four other
persons supposedly his father (Jose Gatchalian), an
aunt and two brothers, and sought entry as Filipino
citizen. Not satisfied with his papers, the
immigration officer referred the case of Pedro to
the Special Board of Inquiry. This body, after due
hearing, rendered decision admitting Pedro and
seven others, as Filipino citizens.
- Pedro Gatchalian was issued an identification
certificate by the immigration authorities, attesting
to his admission as citizen of the Philippines
- the Secretary of Justice, as department head,
issued a memorandum order directing the
Immigration Commissioners to review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the
entrant was a citizen of the Philippines.
- the Board of Commissioners reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and
ordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian for
being improperly documented. Pedro was
accordingly. But, although the warrant for his
exclusion was issued in July, 1962, Pedro
Gatchalian was taken into custody by the
immigration authorities only June 6, 1965.
- Macario Arocha, on behalf of Pedro, petitioned
the CFI for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that
the detention of Pedro, a Filipino by the
Immigration Commissioner is violative of said
petitioner's constitutional rights. Respondents
immigration officials countered that the exclusion
order was issued pursuant to the decision of the
Board of Commissioner, finding Pedro to have
failed in proving the allegation that he is a Filipino
citizen.
- In its decision, the court sustained petitioner's
theory that the decision of reversal of the Board of
Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond
the prescribed one-year period. Holding that the
decision of the Special Board of Inquiry, adjmitting
the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian had
already become final, the Court ordered his
immediate release from detention and enjoined
respondents, permanently, from arresting,
deporting and otherwise depriving of his liberty.
On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued
by the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was released from
custody of the immigration authorities at 9 o'clock
in the evening of August 3, 1965.
- The cause of petitioner and appellant
Commissioner of Immigration in this Court hinges
on the issue of the correct date of promulgation of
the decision of the Board of Commissioners
reversing that of the Special Board of Inquiry. For
if, indeed, the reversal was made on July 20, 1962,
as asserted by Pedro, instead of July 6, 1962, as
maintained by Vivo (the Commissioner of
Immigration), then the admission on July 6, 1961
by the Special Board of Inquiry of the fact of
Pedro's Philippine citizenship would have become
final and, therefore his detention by the
immigration authorities would be unlawful.
- pursuant to Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act
613, as amended by RA 503, the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry shall become final unless
reversed on appeal by the Board of
Commissioners, or in the absence of an appeal,
unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners
after a review by it, motu proprio, of the entire
proceedings within one year from the
promulgation of the said decision.
ISSUES
1.WON the decision of the Board of Commissioners
reversing that of the Special Board of Inquiry was
made within the one-year prescriptive period.
2. WON the decision of the Inquiry Board had
become non-reviewable since 1961 because of its
confirmation by the majority of the preceding
Board of Commissioners.
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The mere fact of a retyping of dates on the
face of the documents, without further evidence of
record, does not suffice to convict the three
members of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners of maliciously antedating their
decision, considering the presumption of regularity
in official actuations, and the serious implications
of the charge, which amounts to no less than a
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falsification of official documents. Such an offense
cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The operative
date of the Commissioners' action is that when the
resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by
them as a Board, regardless of the date when the
decision in extenso was prepared, written and
signed.
Reasoning
- the decision of the Board of Commissioners, the
notification to appellee's counsel that such
decision was rendered, and the warrant of
exclusion, bear the date July 6, 1962, or within one
year from the reviewed decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry. It is contended, however, that in all
of these documents, the date of promulgation of
the decision appeared to have been originally
written as July 20, 1962, but the number "20" was
erased and superimposed by "6".
- Vivo insists that these erasures and substitutions
were corrections made only to rectify clerical
mistakes.
- the accusation of Pedro is negatived by the
official minutes of the Board's proceedings, which
clearly show that the resolution to exclude was
adopted on July 6, 1962. No alteration in dates
appears in these. In fact, the alterations observed
are susceptible of the explanation that the date
July 20 was originally placed by the stenographer
or typist because it was then that the reasoned
and extended decision was typewritten in final
form, but that it was corrected to July 6, the date it
was voted, because the decision in extenso must
relate back to the day the resolution to exclude
was actually adopted.
- the Court below erred in finding and declaring
that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry in
the case of petitioner-appellee had become final
and unreviewable, and that its review and
revocation by the Commissioners of Immigration
was null and void.
2. NO.
Ratio Individual action by members of a board
plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its
constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized
the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that
they should deliberate collectively and in order
that their views and ideas should be exchanged
and examined before reaching a conclusion. The
powers and duties of boards and commissions may
not be exercised by the individual members
separately. Their acts are official only when done
by the members convened in session, upon a
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concurrence of at least a majority and with at least
a quorum present. Where the action needed is not
of the individuals composing a board but of the
official body, the members must be together and
act in their official capacity, and the action should
appear on the records of the board.
Reasoning It is pointed out by Pedro that two
members of the board in reference to said decision
had marked "Noted" over their own signatures,
while only the third Commissioner made of record
his adverse opinion. The former Immigration
Commissioners appeared to have acted
individually in this particular instance and not as a
Board. It is shown by the different dates affixed to
their signatures that they did not actually meet to
discuss and vote on the case. This was officially
made to record by the Secretary of Justice in his
Memorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962,
wherein he stated that for the past several years,
the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has
not met collectively to discuss and deliberate in
the cases coming before it.
- Secondly, the aforementioned Memorandum
Order, issued in the exercise of his powers of
control and supervision as Department Head,
expressly declares that the public interest so
requiring, it is ordered that all decisions purporting
to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu
proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry,
are set aside and this nullification included the
alleged 1961 decision.
Dispostion decision and order of CFI reversed,
nullified and set aside.
NERIA v THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION
G.R. NO. 24800
CASTRO; May 27 1968
FACTS
- On July 9, 1961 the petitioner, with three other
persons, supposedly his widowed mother (Dolores
Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix and Manuel
Neria), arrived at the Manila International Airport
from Hongkong on board a Cathay Pacific Airways
plane. The immigration inspector at the airport,
not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents
and those of his companions upon primary
inspection thereof, referred the matter of their
admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for
investigation "to determine filiation and paternity
to a Filipino citizen". Accordingly, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing on July
14, 1961, at which time the petitioner offered oral
and documentary evidence to support his claim for
admission as a Filipino citizen After the conclusion
of the investigation, the said board on August 2,
1961 deliberated on the case and unanimously
voted for petitioner's admission. The board on the
same date rendered its decision, declaring Dolores
Neria a Filipino citizen, and the petitioner a Filipino
citizen as he is an illegitimate son of Dolores, and
allowing his admission into the Philippines. This
written decision was subsequently submitted to
the members of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners. The Immigration authorities issued
Identification Certificate 16306 to the petitioner,
attesting that he "was admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines" per decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 dated August 2, 1961.
- On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum Order 9 (exh. 7), directing
that
[i]t appearing that for the past several years, the
Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not
met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the
cases coming before it,… it is hereby ordered that
all decisions purporting to have been rendered by
the Board of Commissioners on Appeal from, or on
review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of
Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of
Commissioners is directed to review, in
accordance with Section 27 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting
entry of aliens into the country and give
preference to all cases where entry has been
permitted on the ground that the entrant is a
citizen of the Philippines, following the principle
laid down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act
613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall
be upon such alien to establish that he is not
subject to exclusion' and the ruling of this
Department that "Citizenship is a status of
privilege, power and honor of inestimable value.
When doubts exist concerning a grant of it, they
should be resolved in favor of the Government
against the claimant"
- In compliance with the above directive, the Board
of Immigration Commissioners, proceeded to
review motu proprio the entire proceedings had
before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative
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to the petitioner's case and that of his supposed
relatives. A hearing officer of the Bureau of
Immigration was directed to conduct an
investigation of the entire proceedings of and the
evidence presented before the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1. On the basis of a memorandum of
the hearing officer, the new Board of Immigration
Commissioners found that the petitioner had not
satisfactorily established his claim for admission as
a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and
ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the
Philippines as an alien not properly documented
for admission and be returned to the port from
whence he came or to the country of which he is a
national. The petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of said decision. This motion was
denied by the new Board.
- The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying the Court of First Instance of
Manila to restrain the Commissioner of
Immigration and the Board of Immigration
Commissioners from arresting and expelling him,
and prohibit them from taking any further steps or
actions contrary to the decision rendered by the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1. This petition was
given due course, and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued as prayed for. But this
petition was dismissed.
- On April 30, 1965 the present petition for habeas
corpus was filed, the petitioner claiming that the
respondent's agents picked him up at Rosario St.,
Manila, in the evening of the previous April 23 on
the supposed claim that he was not properly
documented for admission as a Filipino citizen
when he entered the Philippines; and that since
then he "has been unlawfully and illegally
confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in
the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station in the
Engineering Island, Manila." On the same date, the
lower court required the respondent to bring the
petitioner before the court on May 3, 1965 at 8:30
O'clock in the morning. The clerk of court issued
the corresponding writ of habeas corpus directing
the respondent to submit his return. The latter's
written return of May 6, 1965 states, among other
things, that the petitioner was under lawful
custody on a valid process commanding his
exclusion from the Philippines and ordering his
return to the port where he came from or to the
country of which he is a national.
- On June 18, 1965 the lower court dismissed the
petition stating that the petitioner is legally
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detained on a warrant issued by the respondent
Commissioner of Immigration." On July 20, 1965
the lower court set aside its decision of June 17,
1965, and, on the same date, rendered an
amended decision completely reversing its
decision of June 17, granted the writ of habeas
corpus and ordered the immediate release of the
petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision
rendered by the new Board of Commissioners is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no
administrative action being possible because the
question involved in this case is purely a legal
question, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has no application in this
case." On July 22 the clerk of court issued the
corresponding writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE
WON the decision of the new Board of Immigration
Commissioner is null and void for having been
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, in violation of
section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613
HELD
YES
RATIO Comm. Act 613, as amended, provides in
part that :“[t]he decision of any two members of
the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and
shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the
Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in
the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the
Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu
propio of the entire proceedings within one year
from the promulgation of said decision....”
- The resolution of this issue, in turn, depends
upon the determination of the date when the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 was
promulgated, August 2, 1961 when it was actually
rendered, or September 4, 1961 when the
petitioner was actually notified thereof and a copy
received by his counsel. The date of promulgation
is important. It is from that date that the one-year
period commenced within which the Board of
Immigration Commissioners could review motu
proprio the entire proceedings of Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1.
- According to the Solicitor General, the correct
date of promulgation is September 4, 1961,
because under the Immigration Rules and
Regulations, the decision of a Board of Special
Inquiry "shall be rendered in writing",5 and under
section 27 (b), supra, the written decision "shall be
promulgated"; that the words "rendition" (from
"rendered") and "promulgation" (from
"promulgated") connote two separate and distinct
acts required to be accomplished by the Board of
Special Inquiry, for rendition is the date when a
judge signs his decision and files it with the clerk
of court, whereas promulgation is the date when
such decision is published, officially announced, is
made known to the public, or delivered to the clerk
of court for filing, coupled with notice to the
parties or to their counsel; and that in this case,
rendition was accomplished on August 2, 1961
when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded
its hearing on the petitioner's case, deliberated
thereon, voted for his admission into the
Philippines and rendered its written decision, and
promulgation was accomplished on September 4,
1961 when the petitioner was actually notified of
the decision, copy of which was received by his
counsel.
- No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words
"rendition" and "promulgation" would convey
different meanings. This Court defined
promulgation as "the delivery of the decision to
the Clerk of Court for filing and publication". The
word "promulgate" was viewed by the majority in
People vs. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry
made by the clerk of a judgment or order in the
book of entries of judgments made by said clerk.
- The petitioner's argument, at all events, is
without merit. Section 27 (b), supra, provides that
proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry its
appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its
deliberation, its decision and notice thereof to an
alien, and the time when an appeal may be
brought therefrom "shall be conducted under
rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration."
- In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date when
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its
hearing of petitioner's case (I.C. 61-2312-C),
deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as a
citizen of the Philippines. August 2, 1961 was also
the date when the decision in extenso was
rendered. That date and not September 4, 1961,
therefore, is the date of promulgation of the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1,
which decision should "prevail and shall be final ...
unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners
after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire
proceedings within one year from the
promulgation of said decision."10 Computing the
one-year period from August 2, 1961, the Board of
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Immigration Commissioners had until August 2,
1962 within which to review the proceedings motu
proprio.
- The case of the petitioner was included in the
agenda of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners for review motu propio for July 24,
1962. The case was referred to the Immigration
hearing officer, who, on July 30, 1962, submitted
his memorandum to the said board. The case was
again included in the agenda of the said board for
August 2, 1962, the date it was considered
submitted for decision. The minutes of the meeting
of the Board of Immigration Commissioners
presented by its Secretary Pio Noche and read into
the records of this case, however, reveal that the
petitioner's case was actually acted upon and
decided, not on August 2, 1962, as the decision
and the warrant of exclusion would tend to show,
but on August 8, 1962
- The minutes of the meeting of the new Board of
Commissioners and, the testimony of its Secretary
show that as late on August 8, 1962, the new
Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on
the case of the petitioner. The admission of the
Secretary of the new Board of Commissioners that
the case of the petitioner was not acted upon on
August 2, 1962, shows that the alteration of the
date of the decision of the new Board of
Commissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2,
1962 was deliberate. The fact that the case of the
petitioner was submitted to the new Board of
Commissioners for its resolution on August 2,
1962, is no excuse for ante-dating its decision
which was actually rendered after that date. On
August 2, 1962, it did not reverse the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having
actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner
on August 8, 1962, it could not have on August 2
resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry.
- The alteration of the true date of the decision of
the new Board of Commissioners, made upon
instruction of the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration, is revealing: it shows that the
respondent Commissioner knew that the one-year
period was to be computed from August 2, 1961; it
shows also that he knew that if the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 had to be reversed,
the new Board of Commissioners had to act not
later than August 2, 1962.
As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of
Immigration Commissioners as a body deliberated
on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the
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Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu
proprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-year
period fixed by section 27 (b), supra. The said
decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion
issued on the strength of such decision, are
therefore, as correctly found by the lower court,
null and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by
that time had already become "final."
- The respondent also contends that the
petitioner's petition for habeas corpus was
prematurely filed, because he did not first appeal
the decision of the Board of Immigration
Commissioners to the Secretary of Justice, who, by
law, is vested with power of control and
supervision over the said Board. We have already
held that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one", or where
the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction and "nothing of an administrative
nature is to be or can be done" thereon.
DISPOSITION Decision affirmed from affirmed
GO YU TAK WAI v VIVO
G.R. No. L-22257
AQUINO; May 25, 1977
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CFI/RTC.
FACTS
- The controversy arose when Go Yu Tak Wai (Mrs.
GO) applied with the Bureau of Immigration for
admission as a returning resident. It appears that
Mrs. GO arrived in the Philippines after 20 years of
absence from the country. The Bureau’s Board of
Special Inquiry (BSI) concluded that Mrs. GO
satisfactorily proved her right to admission as a
returning resident. The decision of BSI was
promulgated on March 27, 1962. It was reviewed
motu proprio on March 11, 1963 by the Board of
Commissioners (BOC). On said March 11th, BOC
resolved to reverse the BSI’s decision (and, thus,
to exclude Mrs. GO).
- However, BOC's decision in extenso (extended
opinion) was not immediately rendered and
promulgated. It appears that the draft of the BOC
decision was signed by the Commissioners during
the period August 13-26. The decision was
mailed on August 27th to Mrs. GO, who received
the same the following day. Upon Mrs. GO’s
complaint, CFI held that BOC’s decision was void
because it was promulgated after the statutory
one-year period.
ISSUE
Whether or not a resolution of BOC which reversed
the decision of BSI and adopted within one year
from the promulgation of BSI’s decision is
sufficient
HELD
YES.
REASONING BOC is empowered to reverse motu
proprio the decision of BSI within one year from
promulgation of said decision. The Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, Commonwealth Act No.
613, as amended provides:
SEC. 27.
xxx
(b) A board of special inquiry shall have
authority (1) to determine whether an alien
seeking to enter or land in the Philippines
shall be allowed to enter or land or shall be
excluded… The decision of… the [BSI]…
shall be final unless reversed on appeal by
the Board of Commissioners… or, in the
absence of an appeal, unless reversed by
the Board of Commissioners after a
review by it, motu proprio of the entire
proceedings within one year from the
promulgation of said decision… The
decision [of the BSI] shall be promulgated…
not later than two days from the date of the
deliberation… [T]he Commissioner of
Immigration… may grant an extension of
time if he considers it necessary.
(c) An alien excluded by [BSI] or a
dissenting member thereof may appeal to
the [BOC], whose decision in the case shall
be final. The decision on appeal shall be put
in writing and promulgated not less than
seven days from the time the case is
submitted for decision. xxx
- This Court had already held that “the operative
date of the Commissioners' action is that
when the resolution of exclusion was voted
and adopted by them as a Board, regardless
of the date when the decision in extenso was
prepared, written and signed" because "the
decision in extenso must relate back to the
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day when the resolution to exclude was
adopted” (citing, inter alia, Arocha vs. Vivo and
Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration).
Consequently, the Commissioners were justified in
using March 11, 1963 as the date of their written
decision although it was actually drafted on August
13th and mailed to Mrs. GO on August 27th. The
decision related back to the date when the
Commissioners deliberated on the decision of BSI
and resolved to reverse it.
- Section 27(b) specifies that the decision of BSI
"shall be promulgated… not later than two days
from the date of the deliberation". The absence of
such a requirement with respect to the decision of
BOC supports the view that such decision need not
be promulgated within the one-year period. It
suffices that BOC should review the decision
of BSI and deliberate upon it within one year
from promulgation of BSI's decision and that
the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the
action which they took within the said statutory
period.
- Moreover, section 27(c) expressly requires that
the decision of BOC in case of an appeal from the
decision of BSI should "be put in writing and
promulgated not less than seven days from the
time the case is submitted for decision". In
contrast, no such requirement is provided for in
section 27(b) with respect to the Commissioners'
decision in case they motu proprio review the
decision of BSI.
Disposition for lack of necessary votes to reverse
the trial court's decision, the same is considered
affirmed. [only 6 Justices (Fernando, Makasiar,
Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., Martin, JJ. and the
writer) voted for reversal. J. Teehankee filed a
dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice
(Castro) and J. Antonio concurred. J. Barredo also
dissented.]
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
The operative date of the decision of BOC is the
date of promulgation, if not the date of notice to
the party aggrieved.
TEEHANKEE, J, dissenting:
- The Act's provisions as well as public policy
support a construction that requires that a
resolution or decision of BOC on a review motu
proprio must be in writing and promulgated with
due notice on the party affected within the one-
year period.
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Dean Carlota
- Section 27 (b) provides that "the decision [of BSI]
shall be promulgated… not later than two days
from the date of deliberation." Section 27 (c)
likewise provides for a summary period of seven
days from submittal for decision within which BOC
shall put in writing and promulgate its decision on
appeal. Read in context, it seems obvious that the
decision on a review motu proprio by BOC
must be no less than a decision on appeal by
either party; it must be duly put in writing and
promulgated within the more than adequate one-
year period fixed by the Act.
- Where the alien has appealed from an adverse
decision or a dissenting BSI member has appealed
a favorable decision, the applicant for admission
knows as mandated by the law that a final decision
must be handed down within seven days from
submittal of the appeal for decision. Where there
has been no appeal and BOC conducts a
review motu proprio of which the applicant is
likely unaware, both public policy and due
process demand that where no adverse
decision is promulgated within the one-year
period, the decision of BSI shall have become
final. (Otherwise, such one-year period
would be an elastic period and would have
no meaning, as in this case where the
appellee would have been ordered excluded
by a decision of reversal promulgated 5
months after the lapse of the one-year
period.)
- Such a view is in consonance with law's policy of
a definite date of fixed finality of the BSI's decision
and to reduce occasion for anomalies and
irregularities in the admission or exclusion of
aliens and applicants for admission, under the
procedures for appeal or review motu proprio
established by the Act.
SICHANGCO v BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-23545
MAKASIAR; Nov 7, 1979
FACTS
- Sy Te, whose name was changed to Benito
Sichangco was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a Filipino citizen by birth in an
order dated February 19, 1960 .Sychangco is
married to Cheng Yok Ha. Three sons were born in
China allegedly out of their marriage, namely, Si
Beng, Si Son and Si Luna.
- On August 28, 1961 arrived in the Philippines and
sought admission claiming to be the children of
Benito Sichangco. An investigation was conducted
by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the Bureau
of Immigration. After hearing, the said Board
rendered a decision on September 11, 1961 (Exh.
C) admitting these minors into the Philippines as
citizens thereof, being the children of the
petitioner . said decision was submitted to the
then members of the Board of Commissioners who
"noted" the decision on different dates.
- On January 24, 1962, then Secretary of Justice
Jose W. Diokno issued Memorandum Order No. 9,
wherein he found "that for the past several years,
the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has
not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on
the cases coming before it," for which reason he
set aside "all decisions purporting to have been
rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
appeal from, or on review motu propio of,
decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry," and
directed the Board of Commissioners "to review in
accordance with Section 27(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the
Boards of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens
into this country and give preference to all cases
where entry has been permitted on the ground
that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines,
following the principle laid down in Section 30 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'the
burden of proof shall be upon such alien to
establish that he is not subject to exclusion ..."
- Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, a
committee examined the pretended right of the
said minors as alleged children of petitioner to
admission, and thereafter forwarded its findings to
the Commissioner of Immigration recommending
the exclusion of said minors, the revocation of the
order declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco a
Filipino citizen, and the filing of deportation
proceedings against him.A copy of this decision
was received by the minors on October 26,1962.
- Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng,
Si Son and Si Luna, filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction on November 20, 1962
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, to
annul the decision of the Board of Commissioners
of Immigration excluding the abovenamed minors
from the Philippines.
- CFI declared that the decision of the Board of
Commissioners dated September 4, 1962,
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reversing the decision of the previous Board of
Commissioners dated September 11, 1961, to
have been rendered on October 26, 1962, more
than a year from the first decision, and therefore
illegal and null and void, and the injunction earlier
issued was made permanent, with costs against
respondent Board.
ISSUE:
WON the notice of the BOC decision must be
received within the 1 year period
HELD
NO
- The Board of Commissioners rendered on
September 4, 1962 its decision reversing that of
the Board of Special Inquiry No, 1 dated
September 11, 1961, well within the one-year
period required by law.
- It is true that the copy of the decision of the
Board of Commissioners dated September 4, 1962
was sent by mail to the petitioner's minor children
herein only on October 26, 1962, and received by
the said minors on the same date. This fact,
however, does not work to vitiate said decision. All
that the Immigration Law requires is that the
decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners
be promulgated within one year from the rendition
of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
Notice of said decision of reversal may be sent
even after the one-year period has elapsed. In the
case of Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration (L-
24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 807, citing Arocha
vs. Vivo, supra), the Supreme Court ruled that "the
operative date of the Commissioners' action is that
when the resolution (of exclusion) was noted and
adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the
date when the decision in extenso was prepared,
written and signed," and with more reason, as in
this case, regardless of the date when such
decision is mailed, "because the decision in
extenso must relate back to the day the resolution
to exclude was actually adopted. Necessarily the
extended opinion had to be posterior to the day
when the Commissioners voted and resolved to
reverse the findings of the Board of Special
Inquiry. The Secretary's certificate shows that the
Board of Immigration Commissioners acted upon
not less than eight Immigration cases (including
that of the Gatchalians) on July 6, 1962; and it was
of course impracticable to prepare and sign fully
reasoned decisions in all these cases."
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REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP
v SENDINO
233 SCRA 665
KAPUNAN, J.: July 5, 1994
FACTS:
- Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered
into a reservation agreement with Realty
Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square
meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat,
Paranaque for P307,800.00 as its purchase price.
She paid P1,000.00 as partial reservation fee on
January 15, 1989 and completed payment of this
fee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00.
- On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI
P16,600.00 as full downpayment on the purchase
price. However, she was advised by REVI to
change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for
an extension of one month to do so.
- For alleged non-compliance with the requirement
of submission of the appropriate documents under
the terms of the original agreement, REVI,
through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed
respondent of the cancellation of the contract on
the 31st of July 1989.
- On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a
complaint for Specific Performance against REVI
with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) asking that respondent
be ordered: To comply and continue with the sale
of the house and lot, Block 4, Lot 17 at the
Raymondville Subdivision, Sucat Road, Paranaque,
Metro Manila;
- This petition was amended on August 17, 1990
by impleading petitioners Magdiwang Realty
Corporation (MRC) which appeared to be the
registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No.
76023.
- On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to
hear and decide the complaint was challenged by
REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment in favor
of private respondent and ordered petitioners to
continue with the sale of the house and lot and to
pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages,
P5,000 as exemplary damages and P6,000 as
attorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appeal
from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA
Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The
decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the
Office of the President, herein public respondent.
A2010
- On January 7, 1993, the public respondent
rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners'
appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the decision 3. Jurisdiction
was denied by the public respondent on January
26, 1993. Consequently petitioners come before
this Court, in this petition. FELICIANO, et al. v DIRECTOR OF
PATENTS
ISSUE 93 Phil 113
WON the HLURB can act validly as a division
PADILLA; May 22, 1953
composed of only 3 commissioners
NATURE
HELD
Petition for review order of director of patents
Yes.
- Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the
FACTS
powers and duties of the commission, the board is
- An application for patent was filed with the
specifically mandated to “adopt rules of procedure
Patent Office. Pending examination of the
for the conduct of its business” and to perform
application, Albaña filed a motion to intervene
such functions necessary for the accomplishment
claiming that the Feliciano and Tapinio had “sold
of its above mentioned functions. Since nothing in
and/or bartered and assigned to him their right to
the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies
contract or deal the sale of their invention called
or withholds the power or authority to delegate
Fel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or through
adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see
the Corp that they were then organizing under his
how the Board, for the purpose of effectively
direction and to fix and decide on the purchase
carrying out its administrative responsibilities and
price of it to at least P200,000 in installments cash
quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should
and P300,000 in shares of stock of said
be denied the power, as a matter of practical
Corporation * * *” and praying that applicant-
administrative procedure, to constitute its
inventor Tapinio be compelled to sign a contract
adjudicatory boards into various divisions.
and, together with the other applicant-inventor
- After all, the power conferred upon an
Feliciano who had already signed it, to
administrative agency to issue rules and
acknowledge it in another contract before a
regulations necessary to carry out its functions has
notary public, to have both contracts recorded in
been held "to be an adequate source of authority
the Patent Office and in the office of the Register
to delegate a particular function, unless by express
of Deeds, and that the patent for the invention be
provision of the Act or by implication it has been
issued in his name and in the name of the
withheld." The practical necessity of establishing a
inventors.
procedure whereby cases are decided by three (3)
- motion: denied on ground that under the Patent
Commissioners furthermore assumes greater
Law (RA165) the Director of Patents has no
significance when one notes that the HLURB, as
jurisdiction or power to decide the question
constituted, only has four (4) full time
submitted to him. He then filed an amended
commissioners and five (5) part time
motion, denied (it contended that Albaña is the
commissioners to deal with all the functions,
assignee of inventors Feliciano and Tapinio of the
administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise,
undivided part interests in the invention for whose
entrusted to it.
patent is applied for.)
- As the Office of the President noted in its
- Dir. Of Patents denied the amended motion, on
February 26, 1993 Resolution denying petitioners'
the ground that assignment made to Albaña is not
Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible and
one of exclusive right to make, use and sell the
very impractical to gather the four (4) full time and
electrical contrivance for which patent is applied
five (5) part time commissioners (together) just to
for; that it is just an authority to act as the selling
decide a case." Considering that its part time
agent for the inventors of the patent, if granted,
commissioners act merely in an ex-officio capacity,
and the invention covered thereby and to receive
requiring a majority of the Board to sit en banc on
compensation therefor; and that not being entitled
each and every case brought before it would result
to have his name included as one of the patentees,
in an administrative nightmare.
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Dean Carlota
if patent for the invention be granted, the movant
has no right to intervene in the proceedings for the
grant of the patent.
ISSUE
WON the Director of Patents erred in denying the
motion
HELD
NO
Ratio Under the provisions of the Patent Law
(RA165), the Director of Patents has no power and
authority to compel the applicant-inventors to do
what the appellant is asking them to perform.
What the appellant asked the Director of Patents
to do for him is essentially a judicial function which
would require the determination or finding by a
court of competent jurisdiction as to whether there
was a meeting of the minds of the contracting
parties before it could compel the applicant-
inventors to perform what the appellant prays the
court to order them to do. Aside from want of
authority and power, the Director of Patents lacks
the means to make such determination and finding
which would be necessary before he could act on
the appellant's motion.
Reasoning - Despite the amendment to the 1st
motion to intervene by which he claims
assignment of the invention, still it remains that
the alleged assignment is not of the invention but
it is an agreement whereby he is to act as selling
agent for the inventors of the patent (if granted)
and of the invention covered thereby and to
receive compensation therefor.
- the contract clearly shows that it wasn’t an
assignment of the invention and the patent applied
for.: “We (the inventors) *** hereby declare and
ratify that both of us are the co-inventors and joint
50-50 owners of the 'Fel-Tap Electric Meter Guard
& Detector' ***. We are now organizing a
Corporation under the direction of Mr. Albaña to
exploit and industrialize the invention *** which we
promise hereby to sell to said Corporation with its
letter-patent *** except the Royalty Right of the
same, ***. For and in consideration of the
monetary and other help that said Mr. Albaña ***
has rendered and is rendering us *** we hereby
promise and actually pay to Mr. Albaña in
installments P50,000 of P200,000 purchase price
***.”
- Assignments of patents and inventions covered
thereby may be recorded in books and records
kept for the purpose in the Patent Office if
presented in due form; but the appellant does not
ask for the registration of the alleged agreement
between him and the inventors, but prays that the
Director of Patents compel Tapinio to sign the
contract executed and signed by Feliciano and
both applicant-inventors to acknowledge it, and
then to have both documents recorded in the
Patent Office and in the office of the Registrar of
Deeds.
Disposition Petition is dismissed. Order is
affirmed
SYQUIA V BOARD OF POWER AND
WATER WORKS (RUIZ, ENRIQUEZ,
MOSES)
74 SCRA 212
TEEHANKEE; Nov 29, 1976
NATURE
Petition for special civil action for certiorari
FACTS
- December 1974 > Ruiz, Enriquez, Moses
(respondents) filed 3 complaints with Board of
Power and Waterworks charging Syquia
(petitioner) as administrator of the South Syquia
Apartments at Malate, Manila, for selling electricity
without permit or franchise issued by the board, in
that Syquia billed Ruiz et al various specified
amounts for their electricity consumption at their
respective apartments for the months of May to
September 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates
authorized by the board.
- Syquia’s motion to dismiss the complaints
asserting that they involved contractual
obligations of Ruiz et al as apartment tenants and
were beyond the board's jurisdiction was denied
by the latter.
- Syquia filed her answer, wherein she questioned
the complaints as beyond the jurisdiction of the
board as a regulatory body, since she is not
engaged in the sale of electric power but merely
passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users
their legitimate electric current bills in accordance
with their lease contracts, and their relationship is
contractual in nature. She added that the tenants
including Ruiz et al had no complaint under the
contractual set-up of billings for water and electric
service consumption, whereby while individual
electric meters are installed in each apartment,
Meralco billings include all consumption in the
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entire compound, including the common areas,
servants' quarters and elevators, the payment for
which was advanced by Syquia and later collected
by way of reimbursement from the tenants pro
rata; but that Ruiz et al alone complained later
when on account of the energy crisis, additional
fuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco to
their billings which were likewise passed on by
Syquia to all the tenants pro rata.
- August 28, 1975 > Syquia further manifested her
willingness to abide by such computations as the
board may determine to be the correct electric
billing that should be charged against Ruiz et al for
their respective electric consumption and
submitted pertinent records of the electrical
consumption and Meralco billings. The board in
said order however came up with its computation
which would allow Syquia to charge Ruiz et al only
the cost of electricity registered in their individual
apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of
additional electricity charged them pro rata by
Syquia for the cost of electricity consumed by all
tenants in the common areas.
- Syquia pointed out in her MFR that the board's
computation would not reimburse her for the cost
of the electric consumption in the common areas
and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the
least of P1,250.00 a month or P15,000.00 a year
and reiterated that this was a contractual
obligation of the tenants over which the regulatory
board had no jurisdiction, the board, acting
through its Acting Chairman de Guzman denied
reconsideration and ruled that since the tenants
are already paying rentals for the use of their
rooms and for the cost of their electricity within
their rooms, they should no longer be required to
pay for the extra cost of electricity in common
areas such as the elevator and the servants'
quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that the
cost of electricity for common areas such as the
elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered
alone by the owner of the building as part of the
cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants
ISSUE
WON the Board of Power and Waterworks has
jurisdiction over the said case
HELD
NO
Ratio The board as a regulatory board manifestly
exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and adjudicating the complaints filed by Ruiz et al
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
against Syquia. The board acquired no jurisdiction
over Syquia’s contractual relations with Ruiz et al
as her tenants, since Syquia is not engaged in a
public service nor in the sale of electricity without
permit or franchise. Ruiz et al’s complaints
against being charged the additional cost of
electricity for common facilities used by the
tenants give rise to a question that is purely civil in
character that is to be adjudged under the
applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the
Public Service Act) and not by the regulatory board
which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts
of general jurisdiction.
Reasoning
- Comment of Acting Solicitor: the regulatory
board acted without jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the complaints, since Syquia does not
operate, manage or control the power plant and
furthermore, since electricity is directly and
uninterruptedly supplied to the end-user, it cannot
be correctly claimed that Syquia is selling
electricity nor can she be considered a middleman
in the electric power business.
- The dispute between Syquia the landlord and her
tenants as to how much each tenant should be
correspondingly billed, for the actual electricity
consumed and as to the proportionate amount
each tenant should bear for the common facilities
used in the apartments, if such amounts should be
borne by the tenants at all, is an issue affecting
mathematical computations and conditions of
lease between landlord and tenant.
- Under the reorganization plan effected by PD No.
1 as amended by PD No. 458 issued on May 16,
1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control over
public service related to electric light, power and
waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public
Service Act were transferred to the Board of Power
and Waterworks.
Disposition The orders of the board are annulled
and the complaints of Ruiz et al are ordered
dismissed
GO TEK v DEPORTATION BOARD
79 SCRA 17
AQUINO; Sept 9, 1977
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of First
Instance
FACTS
Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of
Investigation after a search of an office in Sta Cruz,
Manila. He was alleged to have with him at the
time of the arrest fake dollar checks in violation of
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Court which
rendered him an undesirable alien.
- The Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation filed a
complaint against Go Tek with a prayer that after
the trial the Deportation Board recommend to the
President of the Philippines Go Tek’s immediate
deportation as his presence in this country having
been, and will always be a menace to the peace.
welfare, and security of the community.
- Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint was premature because there
was a pending case against him and that the
Board had no jurisdiction to try the case in view of
the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board,
118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deported only on
the grounds specified in the law.
- The Board denied the motion. They reasoned that
it was not necessary for an alien to be convicted
before the State can exercise its right to deport
said alien. Besides the Board is only a fact finding
body whose function is to report and recommend
to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive
power to deport an alien.
- The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tek and issued a writ
of prohibition against the Board.
- Hence this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE/S
WON the Deportation Board can entertain a
deportation proceeding based on a ground not
specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law and
although the alien has not yet been convicted of
the offense imputed to him.
HELD
Yes.
- A thorough comprehension of the President's
power to deport aliens may show the baselessness
of the instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The
President's power to deport aliens and the
investigation of aliens subject to deportation are
provided for in the following provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code:
- SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power.
A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled,
or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his
own country by the Governor-General except upon
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prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or
his authorized agent, of the ground upon which
such action is contemplated. In such case the
person concerned shall he informed of the charge
or charges against him and he shall be allowed not
less than three days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing
witnesses.
- On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration
Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the
Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination
by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien."
- So, under existing law; the deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of
the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and
(2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua
Chee Gan vs- Deportation Board, supra).
- The State has the inherent power to deport
undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228
U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
power may be exercise by the Chief Executive
"when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation.
Disposition CFI decision is reversed and set aside
VERA v. CUEVAS
90 SCRA 379
DE CASTRO; May 31, 1979
NATURE
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
FACTS
- Private respondents are engaged in the
manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk
products throughout the Philippines.
- Commissioner of Internal Revenue required
plaintiffs-private respondents to withdraw from the
market all of their filled milk products which do not
bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the
Tax Code within fifteen days from receipt of the
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
order with the explicit warning that failure of
plaintiffs-private respondents to comply with said
order will result in the institution of the necessary
action against any violation of the aforesaid order.
"Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed
milk. All condensed skimmed milk and all milk in
whatever form, from which the fatty part has been
removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in
the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked
on its immediate containers, and in all the
language in which such containers are marked,
with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age,"
or with other equivalent words."
- The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
from requiring plaintiffs-private respondents to
print on the labels of their filled milk products the
words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment
for infants less than one year of age or words of
similar import," as directed by the abovequoted
provision of law, and from taking any action to
enforce the above legal provision against the
plaintiffs-private respondents in connection with
their filled milk products, pending the final
determination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276,
on the merits.
- OSG brought an appeal from the said order by
way of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Respondent court in the meantime suspended
disposition of these cases but in view of the
absence of any injunction or restraining order from
the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them
until their final disposition therein.
- Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand,
is an action for prohibition and injunction with a
petition for preliminary injunction. Petitioners
therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade Board
desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. 1,
entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs. Institute of
Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines,
etc." pending final determination of Civil Case No.
52276.
- Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both in
their individual capacities and in their capacities as
Public Relations Counsel and President of the
Philippine Association of Nutrition, respectively,
filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board for
misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or
misbranding.
- Among other things, the complaint filed include
the charge of omitting to state in their labels any
statement sufficient to identify their filled milk
products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of
genuine cows milk, and omitting to mark the
immediate containers of their filled milk products
with the words: "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age
or with other equivalent words," as required under
Section 169 of the Tax Code.
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in ruling that Sec.
169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by
implication.
2. WON the lower court erred in ruling that Sec.
169 of the Tax Code has lost its purpose.
3. WON the lower court erred in ruling that the fair
trade board is without jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling,
and/or misleading advertisement of filled milk
products.
HELD
1. NO.
- Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with
Section 141 (which imposed a specific tax on
skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized
the sale of skimmed milk without payment of the
specific tax and without the legend required by
Section 169). However, Section 141 was expressly
repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and
Section 177, by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463.
By the express repeal of Sections 141 and 177,
Section 169 became a merely declaratory
provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal
sanction.
- Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of
the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use
of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed
milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed
milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict
the scope of the general clause "all milk, in
whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been
removed totally or in part." In other words, the
general clause is restricted by the specific term
"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem
generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they
follow in the statute.
- There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute
that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of all
ages. Being so, the declaration required by Section
169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not suitable
for nourishment for infants less than one year of
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age would, in effect, constitute a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
2. YES.
- With the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the
Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose.
Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose,
petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his
authority to enforce the same. This was so held by
his predecessor immediately after Sections 141
and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-
85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial
Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to
wit:
". . . As the act of selling skimmed milk without
first paying the specific tax thereon is no longer
unlawful and the enforcement of the requirement
in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its
immediate containers is a subject which does not
come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section
177 of the said Code having been repealed by
Republic Act No. 463."
- The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police
power only when necessary in the enforcement of
its principal powers and duties consisting of the
"collection of all national internal revenue taxes,
fees and charges, and the enforcement of all
forfeitures, penalties and fines connected
therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails
the promotion of the health of the nation and is
thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the
exclusive function of the Food and Drug
Administration of the Department of Health as
provided for in Republic Act No. 3720.
3. NO.
- The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to
investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding,
mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of
filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is
vested upon the Board of Food and Drug
Inspection and the Food and Drug Administrator,
with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of
Justice, also intervening in case criminal
prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the
petitioners have also jurisdiction as would be the
result were their instant petition granted, would
only cause overlapping of powers and functions
likely to produce confusion and conflict of official
action which is neither practical nor desirable.
Disposition decision appealed from is affirmed en
toto.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
DE LA FUENTE v DE VEYRA
G.R. No. L-35385
GUTIERREZ; January 31, 1983
FACTS
- At 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the crew of
a Q-boat of the Philippine Coast Guard
spotted a vessel, the M/V Lucky Star I,
owned by the private respondent Lucky
Star Shipping Co., unloading cargo to
several small watercrafts alongside the
vessel off the coast of Zambales. As the
Q-boat was approaching the M/V Lucky
Star I, it was met by gunfire from the
smaller watercrafts which immediately
fled from the scene. Only the M/V Lucky
Star I was apprehended.
- The Philippine Coast Guard officers
discovered 3,400 cases of foreign made
Champion cigarettes allegedly owned by
Teng Bee Enterprises Co. (HK) Ltd. The
coast guard officers, also saw on board a
certain Deogracias Labrador, Filipino
Captain of the domestic watercraft, M/L
Sangbay, one of the boats seen alongside
the M/V Lucky Star I.
- The captain of the Lucky Star I, Li Tak Sin,
was not able to present documents or
papers for the cigarettes. He and the crew
were arrested for smuggling. The
boarding officers also seized the Lucky
Star I and ordered its complement,
including Labrador, to proceed to Manila
on board said vessel.
- A warrant of seizure and detention was
issued by the Collector of Customs of the
Port of Sual-Dagupan against the vessel
and the articles.
- The Acting Provincial Fiscal before the CFI
of Zambales an information against Li Tak
Sin, the crew of Lucky Star I, Deogracias
Labrador, and other persons for violation
of Section 101 of the Tariff and Customs
Code and penalized under Section 3601
of Republic Act 1937, as amended by
Republic Act 4712
- Meanwhile, the private respondents Lucky
Star Shipping Company and Teng Bee
Enterprises Company (HK) Ltd. filed
before the CF of Manila presided over by
respondent judge de Veyra a complaint
for injunction and recovery of personal
property against the petitioners praying
for the return of the goods seized and the
release of the M/V Lucky Star I. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 87435.
- Judge de Veyra issued an order declaring
that it has no jurisdiction as jurisdiction is
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. With regard to the
vessel, admittedly it is more than 30 tons
dead weight thus ma not be forfeited.
The remedy of the Bureau would only be
the imposition of a fine. the Bureau of
Customs is given until June 29, 1972
within which to inform this Court the
maximum fine that may be imposed on
the vessel, and this shall be the basis for
a bond that would entitle Plaintiff to
repossess the vessel. In the meantime,
until the vessel is released the members
of the crew of the vessel are in need of
provisions and medicines and the
Philippine Navy is ordered to permit
Plaintiff, under proper escort of Philippine
Navy Guards, to furnish provisions and
medicines to the members of the crew.
ISSUE:
WON the CFI has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the complaint filed by the private respondents
Lucky Star Shipping Company and Teng Bee
Enterprises Company (HK) Ltd. for the release of
the vessel M/V Lucky Star I, which is the subject of
a seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the
Collector of Customs of the port of Sual-Dagupan.
HELD:
NO
- It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the
Collector of Customs precludes a Court of First
Instance from assuming cognizance over such
cases. We, therefore, set aside the assailed orders
of the respondent judge.
- It has been held that the law affords the Collector
of Customs sufficient latitude in determining
whether or not a certain article is subject to
seizure or forfeiture and his decision on the matter
is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs and
then to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the Court
of First Instance. The fundamental reason is that
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the Collector of Customs constitutes a tribunal
when sitting in forfeiture proceedings beyond the
interference of the Court of First Instance. As
expressed in Pacis v. Averia, the Court of First
Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs. Moreover, on grounds of
public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude
that the legislators intended to divest the Court of
First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a
property which is a subject of a seizure and
forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code, Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of
property for violation of Customs laws could easily
be undermined by the simple device of replevin.'
The judicial recourse of the owner of a personal
property which has been the subject of a seizure
and forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of
Customs is not in the Court of First Instance but in
the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after
exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau
of Customs. If the property owned believes that
the Collector's conclusion was erroneous, the
remedy is by appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs, and then to the Court of Tax Appeals
should the Commissioner uphold the Collector's
decision. The Court of Tax Appeals exercises
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review the ruling
of the Commissioner in seizure and confiscation
cases. and that power is to the exclusion of the
Court of First Instance, which may not interfere
with the Commissioner's decisions even in the
form of proceedings for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, which are in reality, attempts to
review the Commissioner's actuations.
CARINO v COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
(Giulia)
SIMON, JR., v COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
229 SCRA 117
VITUG; January 5, 1994
FACTS
- A "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo
(one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
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Dean Carlota
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA.
- The group, led by their President Fermo, filed a
letter-complaint with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman for a
letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of
the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA.
- The CHR issued an Order, directing the
petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls
and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of
the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
-
Despite the Order, the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia.
- Thus, the CHR ordered the disbursement of
financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00
in favor of the private respondents to purchase
light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with
the warning that violation of said order would lead
to a citation for contempt and arrest."
- A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners
questioning the CHR's jurisdiction.
- The CHR cited the petitioners in contempt of
court.
ISSUES
WON the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the
"business rights" of the private respondents whose
stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the
instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City;
b) to cite the petitioners in contempt and impose
the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as
financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition.
HELD
a. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, the Commission
does not have.
b. On its contempt powers, the CHR is
constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly,
the CHR acted within its authority in providing in
its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any
person in direct or indirect contempt, and to
impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in
the Rules of Court." That power to cite for
contempt, however, should be understood to apply
only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to
carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised
against persons who refuse to cooperate with the
said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons,
and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The
"order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us,
however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does
not possess.
c. The CHR's disbursement of the amount of
P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate
issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack
of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly,
the matter lies with the appropriate administrative
agencies concerned to initially consider.
DISPOSITION Petition is GRANTED.
Dissenting Opinion (Padilla)
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The CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of
a case involving an alleged human rights violation;
that such cease and desist order maybe necessary
in situations involving a threatened violation of
human rights, which the CHR intents to
investigate.
The CHR should be given a wide latitude to look
into and investigate situations which may (or may
not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY VS CA (CALOOCAN)
320 SCRA 478
ROMERO; March 16, 1994
FACTS
-Task Force Camarin Dumpsite in Caloocan filed a
complaint with petitioner seeking to stop the
operation of the Tala Estate open garbage
dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the health
of the residents and possible pollution of the water
in the surrounding area. After an on-site
investigation affirming such contamination, and
after a public hearing, petitioner issued a cease
and desist order (under its enabling law, RA 4850)
on the city government of Caloocan to desist from
dumping waste matter in said dumpsite.
-the city government filed with the RTC an action
for the declaration of nullity of the cease and
desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of
injunction and further sought to be declared as the
sole authority on the health and safety of the
people in Caloocan city, the TRO later granted by
the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that under RA 3931 (Pollution Control Law),
the order is reviewable both on the law and facts
by the CA and not the RTC. Respondent presiding
RTC judge Serapio dismissed a motion to dismiss
the case, as consolidated with a similar earlier
case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the SC. The SC referred the
case to the CA for proper disposition and issued a
TRO ordering Serapio to desist from exercising
jurisdiction over the case and for the mayor/city
government of Caloocan from its operations in the
dumpsite.
-respondents filed an MFR; the Court directed the
CA to set a hearing to determine WON the TRO
should be lifted, but the parties failed to settle the
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dispute at the conference. CA promulgated a
decision that the RTC had no jurisdiction on the
appealed case since such appeal is w/in the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA under
Sec. 9 of BP129 and that petitioner had no
authority to issue the cease and desist order. Said
order was lifted, with the condition that any future
dumping be in conformity with the procedure
contained in the proposal attached to the record of
the case. Hence the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE
WON petitioner can lawfully exercise jurisdiction
over the case
HELD
YES. Petitioner’s jurisdiction was validly invoked on
the basis that the open dumpsite project was
undertaken without its clearance, as required
under RA 4850, which was also recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR.
-RA 4850 authorizes petitioner to “make, alter, or
modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution”. Petitioner may not have been expressly
conferred with the power to issue an ex parte
cease and desist order, but there is enough
jurisprudence to the effect that such authority
need not be express (pollution adjudication board
vs ca). Administrative agencies are conferred not
only with such powers granted by law, but also
those which are necessarily implied in the exercise
of its express powers. The immediate response to
the demands of the necessities of protecting vital
public interests gives life to the statement on a
healthful ecology in Art. 2 Sec. 16 of the
Constitution.
-Petitioner’s charter, RA 4850, provides it with the
power to institute necessary legal proceedings
against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any
project w/in Laguna de Bay without previous
clearance from it. Such a provision was designed
to give petitioner sufficiently broad powers in
regulation of such projects initiated in the Laguna
Lake region.
Disposition The petition is granted
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD
210 SCRA 558
GRIÑO-AQUINO; June 29, 1992
FACTS
- In 1973, Martha David purchased from Fereit
Realty Development Corporation (FRDC) a
condominium unit which was in the process of
completion, with a parking space, in the
condominium project known as "Europa
Condominium Villas" in Baguio City.
- The agreed purchase price was P217,000. David
made a 20% down payment of P43,400 on the
price, leaving a balance of P173,600 which was
payable in 60 equal monthly installments of
P3,861.64 per installment. She took possession, as
owner, of the condominium unit, with notice to the
management. As of October, 1976, she had paid at
least twenty-two (22) monthly installments of the
price of the condominium unit.
- In January 1978, FRDC, without the knowledge of
David, and without the prior approval of the
National Housing Authority, mortgaged the
condominium project to Bancom Development
Corporation , predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP), as
security for a loan of P40,000,000.
- As FRDC failed to pay its obligation which,
Bancom foreclosed the mortgage on 45
condominium units, including the unit of David.
The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale to
Bancom and the Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC). After the expiration of the redemption
period, UBP held out the units for sale.
- David and the purchaser of her unit, Quazon,
filed a complaint in the HLURB, against FRDC, UBP
and FEBTC to annul the title of UBP and FEBTC
over David's condominium unit and to order the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
Quazon. The complaint sought the following
reliefs:
- UBP filed a motion to dismiss. UBP's main
argument is that the HLURB has no jurisdiction
over the complaint for consignation which should
have been filed in the regular trial courts.
Furthermore, as the HLURB was created in 1981
(E.O. No. 641), it has no jurisdiction over contracts
that took effect prior to 1981.
- HLURB Arbiter Manuel denied the motion of
UBP, on the ground that the motion will render
nugatory the summary nature of proceedings
before this Office.
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In due time, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction was filed by UBP.
ISSUE
WON the HLURB for brevity has jurisdiction to hear
and decide a condominium buyer's complaint for:
(a) annulment of a real estate mortgage
constituted by the project owner without his
consent and without the prior written consent of
the National Housing Authority; (b) for annulment
of the foreclosure sale; and (c) for annulment of
the condominium certificate of title that was
issued to the highest bidder at the foreclosure
sale.
HELD
YES
The applicable provisions of P.D. No. 957,
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree" provide
that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of the decree.
Sec. 18. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be
made by the owner or developer without prior
written approval of the Authority. Such approval
shall not be granted unless it is shown that the
proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for
the development of the condominium or
subdivision project and effective measures have
been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan
value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage
shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any,
shall be notified before the release of the loan. The
buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for
the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall
apply the payments to the corresponding
mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular
lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling
said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit
promptly after full payment thereof.
- P.D. No. 1344 of April 2, 1978 expanded the
jurisdiction of the NHA to include the following:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in PD No. 957,
the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature: A.
Unsound real estate business practices; B. Claims
involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
salesman; and C. Cases involving specific
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performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker, or salesman.
- On February 7, 1981, EO No. 648 transferred the
regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA
to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
Sec. 8. The regulatory functions of the NHA
pursuant to PD No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other
related laws are hereby transferred to the
Commission, together with such applicable
personnel appropriation, records, equipment and
property necessary for the enforcement and
implementation of such functions. Among these
regulatory functions are: 1. Regulation of the real
estate trade and business; 2. Registration of
subdivision lots and condominium projects; 3.
Issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and
condominium units in the registered units; 4.
Approval of performance bond and the suspension
of license to sell; 5. Registration of dealers,
brokers, and salesmen engaged in the business of
selling subdivision lots or condominium units; 6.
Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and
salesmen;
7. Approval of mortgage on any subdivision lot or
condominium unit made by the owner or
developer;
8. Granting of permits for the alteration of plans
and the extension of period for completion of
subdivision or condominium projects; 9. Approval
of the conversion to other purposes of roads and
open spaces found within the project which have
been donated to the city or municipality
concerned;
10. Regulation of the relationship between lessors
and lessees; and 11. Hear and decide cases on
unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners,
developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and
cases of specific performance.
- EO No. 90 dated December 17, 1986 changed the
name of the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission to HLURB.
- Clearly, FRDC's act of mortgaging the
condominium project to Bancom and FEBTC,
without the knowledge and consent of David as
buyer of a unit therein, and without the approval of
the NHA (now HLURB) as required by P.D. No. 957,
was not only an unsound real estate business
practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer,
David, who has a cause of action for annulment of
the mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure sale, and
the condominium certificate of title that was
issued to UBP and FEBTC as highest bidders at the
sale. The case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NHA (now HLURB) as provided in P.D. No.
957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 of 1978.
- The allegations of UBP that the contract between
FRDC and David had been rescinded, that the
installment payments made by David had been
forefeited, that it is FRDC who should refund the
said installment payments to David, are mere
matters of defense which are not proper in a
petition for certiorari (Planters Products Inc. vs. CA,
193 SCRA 563: Commercial Corp. vs. PNB, 175
SCRA 1).
AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE V.
FACTORA
00 SCRA 00
SANDOVAL-GUITIERREZ, February
27, 2002
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
-Sevenis Enterprises, Inc. (Sevenis-land owner =
LO) owns a parcel of land at Paranaque. It engaged
the services of Jesus Factora (Factora -
construction) to construct a four-storey condo
bldg. on said lot. Sevenis obtained a P3.9 M loan
from Fund Centrum Finance, Inc. (Fund Centrum –
Creditor), secured by a mortgage on the realty
project. Sevenis also had a P1.3+ debt with
Factora as contractor’s fees. Sevenis entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Fund
Centrum and Factora wherein through a Dacion in
Payment, Sevenis assigned and conveyed to Fund
Centrum the land and improvements on the lot.
Sevenis debt with Factora was also recognized as
contractor’s lien with all the rights provided for by
law. He was assigned 3 units. By virtue of the
Dacion, Sevenis is relieved from any liabilities to
Fund Centrum and Factora, without prejudice to
receiving its share in the net residue.
-Fund Centrum sold the condo bldg to Supreme
Capital (Supreme - buyer1), Supreme Capital
resold the property to MCI Real Estate and Dev’t
Corp. (MCI – second buyer/lessor). MCI leased
property with AMA Computer College (AMA –
lessee) which converted the condo into a computer
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school. The conversion included 3 units assigned
to Factora based on MOA.
-so Factora filed 2 complaints against Fund
Cenrum, Supreme Capital, and AMA with Office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) for recovery of condominium certificates
and title and damages. OAALA dismissed the
complaints for lack of jurisdiction. Factora
appealed to HLURB Board of Commissioners,
Board affirmed OAALA decision. Factora elevated
decision to the Office of the President. Exec. Sec
Torres issued a resolution setting aside the Board’s
decision and remanding the records of the case to
HLURB. So AMA filed petition for review with CA.
CA dismissed AMA’s petition. AMA filed MFR,
denied.
ISSUES
WON HLURB had NO jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the complaints because Factora did
not acquire ownership of the subject condominium
units pursuant to the MOA (Not being the owner,
he is not a condominium buyer within the purview
of P.D. 957)
HELD
YES
Ratio. Sec. 1 of P.D. 1344 expanded the
jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. 957,
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree," to
include: (1) any claims filed by condominium buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman, and (2) cases involving
specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. Corollarily, a transaction to "buy" and
"purchase" under P.D. 957 has been defined as
"any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise
acquire for a valuable consideration x x x a
condominium unit in a condominium project." The
term "buyer" is not limited to those who enter into
contracts of sale. Its concept is broad enough as
to include those who "acquire for a valuable
consideration" a condominium unit. Thus, a buyer
of said unit seeking to enforce the performance of
an obligation arising from such transaction, or
claiming damages therefrom, may bring an action
with the HLURB.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Reasoning. Factora is a buyer within the
contemplation of P.D. 957. He acquired the three
condominium units as they were assigned to him
by Sevenis in payment for its indebtedness in the
amount of P1,333,523.00 as contractor's fee.
Clearly, his acquisition of the units was for a
valuable consideration.
-on contention that the MOA merely intends to
recognize the indebtedness of Sevenis to
respondent as a contractor's lien, hence no
assignment has been made: While the MOA
recognizes Sevenis' indebtedness as a lien,
however, it expressly provides for the settlement
of such indebtedness by the assignment of the
three 2-BR units to respondent. Thus, by virtue of
the assignment, respondent relieved Sevenis from
its indebtedness to him. The extinguishment of
the indebtedness vested upon respondent the
right to own said units.
-on theory that respondent is not the owner of the
said condominium, therefore HLURB had no
jurisdiction over the case: cases for specific
performance of contractual obligations against
condominium owners filed by buyers fall within its
competence and expertise. Arranza vs. B.F.
Homes, Inc: “P.D. 957 was promulgated to
encompass all questions regarding subdivisions
and condominiums. It is aimed at providing for an
appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to
which all parties aggrieved in the implementation
of its provisions and the enforcement of
contractual rights with respect to said category of
real estate may take recourse.”
SPOUSES OSEA V AMRBOSIO AND
PEREZ
486 SCRA 599
CARPIO-MORALES; April 7, 2006
FACTS
- Petitioner Osea and respondent Ambrosio
(owner/developer of the Villa San Agustin
Subdivision located at Novaliches, QC) entered
into a Contract to Sell a “House and Lot Unit”. A
month after occupying the house, its front and
back walls cracked.
- Osea lodged a complaint against respondents
with the Office of the Building Official of Quezon
City for violation of the National Building Code. The
spouses Osea subsequently filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of QC.
- Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC, contending that it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
- In the meantime, the Office of the Building
Official of QC found that the building and
occupancy permits were validly issued and that
“‘minor and insignificant deviation pertaining to
installed girt and rafters at the roof framing of
subject unit-house’ would not in any way affect the
structural strength of the one-storey residence.
- RTC QC promulgated its decision, finding for
petitioners and granting their prayer for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages.
- CA declared null and void the RTC decision for
lack of jurisdiction as it is the HLURB which has
jurisdiction over the complaint.
- Petitioners’ MFR was also denied.
Petitioners’ Claims
- The complaint before the RTC is clearly for a
breach of contract in view of respondents’ failure
to comply with the building plans and technical
specifications of the residential dwelling.
- Their rights to the lot, which they admit to be
under the jurisdiction of HLURB, is separate from
their rights to the house built thereon which they
allege to be enforceable only in the regular courts.
ISSUE
WON HLURB has jurisdiction (and not the RTC)
HELD
YES
Ratio Generally, the extent to which an
administrative agency may exercise its powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency.
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Reasoning Sec. 11 of P.D. 1344 clarifies and spells
out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of
jurisdiction to the HLURB.
- The extent to which the HLURB has been vested
with quasi-judicial authority must also be
determined by referring to the terms of P.D. 957,
“THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS'
PROTECTIVE DECREE” which provides that “The
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with this Decree.”
- The intention was aimed at providing for an
appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to
which all parties aggrieved in the implementation
of provisions and the enforcement of contractual
rights with respect to said category of real estate
may take recourse. In the exercise of its powers,
the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply
contracts and determine the rights of private
parties under such contracts.
- This Court has consistently held that complaints
for breach of contract or specific performance with
damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the owner or developer fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
- Under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy where issues for resolution demand
the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, &
services of the admin. tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
Dispositive Petition is DENIED. The assailed CA
Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
MATEO V CA (STA. MARIA)
1
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the
real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
Administrative Law A2010
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247 SCRA 284 corporation created pursuant to a special law, P.D. Philippines and her cabinet on January 21, 1987,
No. 198, and as such its officers and employees the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
PUNO; August 14, 1995
are covered by the Civil Service Law. “2. Continue direct connections for industries
NATURE
-Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and authorized under the BOI-NPC Memorandum of
Petiton for certiorari
firing of employees of goverment-own and Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such time
controlled corporations are governed by the as the appropriate regulatory board determines
FACTS
provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and that direct connection of industry to NPC is no
-Upon complaint of some Morong Water District
Regulations. longer necessary in the franchise area of the
(MOWAD) employees, petitioners, Aniceto Mateo,
-Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No. specific utility or cooperative meeting standards of
Maximo San Diego, Quirino Mateo, Daniel
292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular financial and technical capability, with satisfactory
Francisco and Leonila Kuizon, all Board Members
No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service guarantees of non-prejudice to industry, to be set
of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private
Commission spell out the initial remedy of private in consultation with NPC and relevant government
respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General
respondent against illegal dismissal. They agencies; and reviewed periodically by the
Manager.
categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a regulatory board.' . . .
-On December 13, 1992, private respondent was
decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of -In its Petition, ILPI alleged, inter alia, that it can
placed under preventive suspension. He was later
the government involving termination of services meet, even surpass, the set of financial standards
dismissed on January 7, 1993.
may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) adopted by the ERB pursuant to the policy
-On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a
days. Thereafter, under the present rule, as guidelines set by the Cabinet . . ."AMI filed its
Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and
provided by Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended 'Answer with Affirmative Defenses and/or Motion
Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the
by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which to Dismiss,' 'without accepting jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, challenging his
took effect on June 1, 1995, the party may appeal Honorable Board over the subject matter of the
dismissal by petitioners.
the final resolution of the Commission to the Court petition,' on the following grounds, to wit: 1) lack
-Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on
of Appeals (under former rule, private respondent of jurisdiction to hear the petition for
two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction
could only go on certiorari to the SC under Rule 65 implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the
over disciplinary actions of government employees
of the Rules of Court). Power Sector following the transfer of its non-price
which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service
Disposition Petition is GRANTED regulatory jurisdiction and functions to the
Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the
Department of Energy under Rep. Act No. 7638;
proper remedy.
-On January 4, 1994, the ERB denied in open court
-Respondent Judge Arturo Marave denied the
Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V. CA AMI's motion to dismiss the petition. Likewise,
AMI's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Reconsideration (AMI)
ERB in its order dated April 7, 1994 . . . Hence, the
-Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court G.R. No. 127373 instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
PANGANIBAN; March 25, 1999 annul the aforesaid order dated April 7, 1994 and
which was referred to respondent Court of Appeals
to prohibit respondent
-CA dismissed the petition and denied the Motion
FACTS ERB from proceeding with the hearing of ILPI's
for Reconsideration.
-The members of the Association of Mindanao petition."
Industries are enterprises based in Mindanao and
ISSUE
registered with the Board of Investments which ISSUE
WON the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has
were among those granted direct connection WON ERB is the agency of the government which
jurisdiction over cases involving the dismissal of
facility by the National Power Corporation although has jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute
an employee of quasi-public corporation
operating within the franchise area of private
HELD
respondent Iligan Light and Power, Inc. (Iligan for HELD
No.
short). NO. DOE and ERB
-MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created
-On October 12, 1993, Iligan filed with the Reasoning The foregoing sufficiently indicates
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198,
respondent Energy Regulatory Board (ERB for that it is now the Department of Energy that has
known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973,
short) a petition for the implementation of the jurisdiction over the regulation of the marketing
as amended.
1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, and the distribution of energy resources. It may be
-In Davao City Water District v. Civil Service
praying specifically that the direct supply of power true that this function formerly belonged to the
Commission, the Court en banc ruled that
to industries within its franchise area be ERB, by virtue of the "Cabinet Policy Reforms in
employees of government-owned or controlled
discontinued by the National Power Corporation the Energy Sector" embodied in the Cabinet
corporations with original charter fall under the
(NPC, for short). Memorandum of January 23, 1987, and EO 172
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
-The Cabinet Policy Reforms referred to were issued May 8, 1987. However, pursuant to Section
-As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al.,
among those approved by the President of the 18 of RA 7638, which was subsequently enacted
We already ruled that a water district is a
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Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
by Congress on December 9, 1992, the non-rate-
fixing jurisdiction, powers and functions of the ERB
have been transferred to the Department of
Energy. The applications for the NPC's direct
supply or disconnection of power involve
essentially the distribution of energy resources,
not by any incident the determination of power
rates. Consequently, these applications must be
resolved by the DOE.
It is of no moment that the petition instituted by
ILPI before the ERB was captioned "for the
Implementation of the 1987 Cabinet Policy
Reforms in the Power Sector." The relief it
specifically sought was the discontinuation of
NPC's direct supply of power to private
respondent's member-companies. Definitely then,
the distribution of an energy resource was its main
purpose.
Neither does the Court agree with the petitioners'
claim that the regulatory functions of the ERB that
were transferred to the DOE concerned those
relating to the petroleum industry only and not to
electric power. Section 3 of EO 172 broadly defines
energy resource as "any substance or
phenomenon which by itself or in combination with
others emanates, [or] generates energy," Electric
power or electricity has been in turn defined as "an
imponderable and invisible agent producing light,
heat, chemical decomposition, and other physical
phenomena." Undoubtedly, electricity produces or
generates energy. By simple logic, it is an energy
resource. The regulation of its distribution is,
therefore, among those functions formerly
belonging to the ERB, which have been transferred
to the DOE as expressly directed in Section 18 of
RA 7638. Nowhere in this provision is there any
restriction of its scope to petroleum and its
products only. The reference to petroleum is
merely by way of example of what an energy
resource is. In fact, the set of examples of energy
resources enumerated in the law is prefaced with
"such as but not limited to." This can only mean
that the enumeration is nonrestrictive.
-Moreover, Section 5 of RA 7638 defines the
powers and functions of the DOE as follows:
"SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. — The
Department shall have the following powers and
functions:
(d) Exercise supervision and control over all
government activities relative to energy projects in
order to attain the goods embodied in Section 2 of
this Act. & (e) Regulate private sector activities
relative to energy projects as provided for under
existing laws; Provided, That the Department shall
endeavor to provide for an environment conducive
to free and active private sector participation and
involvement in all energy activities."
-As to what energy projects encompass, Section 3
of the same law gives this definition:
"SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — (a)
'Energy projects' shall mean activities or projects
relative to the exploration, extraction, production,
importation-exportation, processing,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization,
conservation, stockpiling or storage of all forms of
energy products and resources."
Disposition Petition DENIED
UNILONGO V. CA (MENDIOLA)
G.R. No. 123910.
KAPUNAN; April 5, 1999
FACTS
-On 4 July 1989, the Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SNSNAI), was
incorporated and registered by petitioners
(hereafter referred to as the Unilongo group) as a
non-stock corporation with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). petitioners
comprised SNSNAI’s original Board of Trustees.
-However, since no elections for a new Board of
Trustees and for a new set of corporate officers
were held from the time of its incorporation,
private respondents (hereafter referred to as the
Diño group) aired their complaints and sought the
intervention of the Office of the Mayor of
Parañaque and the SEC.
-On 29 April 1991, the Unilongo group amended
the SNSNAI’s By-Laws by changing the term of
office of the Board of Trustees from 1 year to 2
years.
-Despite the above amendment, elections were
held on 5 May 1991 and the Diño group emerged
as the new Board of Trustees of the SNSNAI.
-On 21 May 1991, in order to perpetuate
themselves in office, the Unilongo group
established the Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac
Homeowners Association, Inc. (CDSHA) and
registered it with the Home Insurance Guarantee
Corporation (HIGC).
-On 27 June 1991, the CDSHA filed a complaint for
injunction and damages with the HIGC against the
Diño group.
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-On 25 October 1992, elections were conducted for
the 1992-1993 SNSNAI Board of Trustees. The Diño
group was re-elected as members of the Board of
Trustees.
-Thereafter the CDSHA filed a "Motion to Cite for
Contempt (private respondents) and To Annul
Elections of 25 October 1992" in HIGC Case.
-SNSNAI is saying that by forming a separate and
distinct corporation (CDSHA) the Unilongo group is
"unlawfully, maliciously, unwarrantedly and
capriciously, whimsically and oppressively, holding
and exercising in bad faith and under unlawful
pretenses, and ultimately performing the functions
of the offices and/or positions of private
respondents in their capacities as duly and legally
elected members of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES and
OFFICERS of the Sto. Niño de Cul de Sac
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (for short,
"SNSNAI")
-SNSNAI filed before the trial court.
-Unilongo Group filed motion to dismiss on the
ground that Disputes involving homeowners
associations fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC)
as expressly provided by E.O. Nos. 90 and 535
amending R.A. No. 580
-TC denied motion. CA dismissed petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by Unilongo Group
ISSUE
WON Disputes involving homeowners associations
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Home
Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC)
HELD
YES.
Reasoning jurisdiction of the SEC over
homeowners associations has been transferred to
the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation
(HIGC), the new name given by Executive Order
No. 90, Section 1(d) to what was formerly the
Home Financing Corporation (HFC) created under
R.A. No. 580.
-Implementing E.O. No. 535, the HIGC issued the
Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of
Homeowners’ Disputes, thus:
Rule II Disputes Triable by HIGC/ Nature of
Proceedings
SECTION 1. Types of Disputes. — The HIGC
or any person, officer, body, board, or committee
duly designated or created by it shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the
following:
Administrative Law
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a) Devices or schemes employed by or any facts of
the Board of Directors or officers of the association
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public or
of the members of the association or the
association registered with HIGC.
b)Controversies arising out if intra-corporate
relations between and among members of the
association, between any and/or all of them and
the association of which they are members, and
insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a
corporate entity, between the association and the
state/general public or other entity.
c) Controversies in the election, appointment, or
selection of directors, officers, or members of the
association, including the regularity thereof and
eligibilities of such directors, officers or members.
d)Suspension or revocation of the certificate of
registration of any homeowners association duly
registered by HIGC upon any of the grounds
provided by law, rules and regulation of HIGC,
including but not limited to the following:
1. Fraud or misrepresentation in procuring its
certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the
association can do or is doing;
3. Refusal to comply with or defiance of any lawful
order of HIGC or its hearing officers;
4. Misuse of a right, privilege, or franchise
conferred upon it by law, or exercise of a right,
privilege or franchise in contravention of law;
5. Commission or omission of an act which
amounts to a surrender of its corporate rights,
privileges, or franchise;
6. Violation of any provision of HIGC rules and
regulations and those of the Corporations Code
whenever the same is applicable;
7. Continuous inoperation or inactivity for a period
of at least five (5) years; and
8. Failure to file required reports in appropriate
forms as determined by HIGC within the prescribed
period.
-In sum, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-
corporate matters concerning homeowners
associations, including their dissolution has now
been transferred to the HIGC. In this case, the
entities involved are homeowners associations.
Although the SNSNAI is registered with the SEC as
a non-stock, non-profit corporation, the purposes
for which this neighborhood association was
established correspond to the requirements laid
down in the HIGC
Disposition Petition GRANTED.
DELTAVENTURES RESOURCES, INC.
v CABATO
327 SCRA 521
QUISUMBING; March 9, 2000
FACTS:
(*This action seeks to annual the Order dated
November 7, 1994, of Judge Cabato (RTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet) which dismissed DELTA’s
amended third-party complaint, and to annul as
well the Order denying the MR.)
- In 1992, a Decision was rendered by Exec. LA
Norma Olegario, (NLRC CAR) in the case of
"Alejandro Bernardino, et al, vs. Green Mountain
Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe", wherein
the respondents were found guilty of Illegal
Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice and ordered
the respondents to pay the Bernardino et al, in
solidum, a certain amount per person (see list in
the orig case nlng!) plus atty’s fees.
- Complainants in the abovementioned labor case
filed before the NLRC a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution as respondent's appeal to the
NLRC and SC were respectively denied.
- In 1994, Exec LA Gelacio C. Rivera, Jr. to whom
the case was reassigned in view of LA Olegario's
transfer, issued a writ of execution directing NLRC
Deputy Sheriff Adam Ventura to execute the
judgment against respondents, Green Mountain
Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe.
- Sheriff Ventura then proceeded to enforce the
writ by garnishing certain personal properties of
respondents.
- Findings that said judgment debtors do not have
sufficient personal properties to satisfy the
monetary award, Sheriff Ventura proceeded to
levy upon a real property covered by Tax
Declaration No. 9697, registered in the name of
Roberto Ongpin, one of the respondents in the
labor case.
- Thereafter, Sheriff Ventura caused the
publication on the Baguio Midland Courier the date
of the public auction of said real property.
- A month before the scheduled auction sale,
DELTA filed before the NLRC a third-party
claim asserting ownership over the property
levied upon and subject of the Sheriff notice
of sale. LA Rivera thus issued an order
directing the suspension of the auction sale
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until the merits of petitioner's claim has
been resolved.
- DELTA filed with the RTC a complaint for
injunction and damages, with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO against Sheriff Ventura,
reiterating the same allegations it raised in the
third party claim it field with the NLRC.
- Judge Cabato eventually issued a TRO, enjoining
respondents in the DELTA v. Ventura et al civil
case to hold in abeyance any action relative to the
enforcement of the decision in the labor case.
- DELTA also filed a complaint (in the NLRC)
questioning its authority to hear the case,
the matter being within the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. LA Rivera dismissed it.
- Bernardino et al moved for the dismissal of the
civil case on the ground of the court's lack of
jurisdiction.
- RTC ‘s decision: RTC is equal rank with the
NLRC, hence, has no jurisdiction to issue an
injunction against the execution of the NLRC
decision; NLRC retains authority over all
proceedings anent the execution of its decision.
This power carries with it the right to determine
every question which may be involved in the
execution of its decision; DELTA should rely on
and comply with the Rules of the NLRC because it
is the principal procedure to be followed, the Rules
of Court being merely suppletory in application;
ESTOPPEL is N/A. . . . . [B]efore the defendants
have filed their formal answer to the amended
complaint, they moved to dismiss it for lack of
jurisdiction; DELTA having in the first place
addressed to the jurisdiction of the NLRC by filing
with it a Third Party Claim may not at the same
time pursue the present amended Complaint
under the forum shopping rule. (Delta’s MR was
denied)
ISSUE
WON RTC may take cognizance of the complaint
filed by DELTA and consequently provide the
injunction relief sought. (or WON the acts
complained of are related to, connected or
interwoven with the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the LA or the NLRC)
HELD
NO.
The subject matter of Delta’s third party claim is
an incident of the labor case which is a matter
beyond the jurisdiction of the regular courts, as
the complaint was, in essence, a motion to quash
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the writ of execution of a decision rendered w/in
the jurisdiction of the LA/ NLRC (i.e. the illegal
dismissal and ULP case.)
Ratio: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complainant which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the petitioner's cause of
action. (r6 sec 3 ROC)
-Multinational Village Homeowners Ass., Inc. v. CA,
et al.~ Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
determined upon the allegations made in the
complainant, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim
asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and
as a result of the trial.
Reasoning:
- Delta asserts that the instant case does not
involve a labor dispute, as no ER-EE relationship
exists between the parties. Nor is the case related
in any way to either parties' case before the NLRC-
CAR hence, not within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
- However, by filing its third-party claim with the
deputy sheriff, Delta submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the NLRC acting through the LA.
- Precedents abound confirming the rule that said
courts have no labor jurisdiction to act on labor
cases or various incidents arising therefrom,
including the execution of decisions, awards or
orders as these pertain exclusively to the proper
labor official concerned under the DOLE. To hold
otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
- Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case
is terminated.
- Whatever irregularities attended the issuance
and execution of the alias writ of execution should
be referred to the same administrative tribunal
which rendered the decision.
- This is because any court which issued a writ of
execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own
processes.
- Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can
only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction
over incidents arising from, in connection with or
relating to labor disputes, as the controversy
under consideration, to the exclusion of the
regular courts.
- A254 LC explicitly prohibits issuance of a
temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order in any case involving or growing out of labor
disputes by any court or other entity (except as
otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264).
- In denying the petition for injunction, the court a
quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle
that a RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC has
no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision
of the latter.
CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND
LIGHT CO., INC. V. CONSTANCIO F.
COLLERA ET. AL.
GR No. 102184
PARDO; April 12, 2000
FACTS
- Cagayan Electric had been collecting payments
for electric consumption from respondents under
the Power Adjustment Clause.
- Respondents said they tendered payments for
their bills less charges for power cost adjustment,
currency exchange rate adjustment and
surcharge, w/c petitioner refused to accept.
Because of refusal, respondents consigned to
court.
- Respondents filed with RTC a complaint against
petitioner for unjust enrichment, recovery of sums
of money, recovery of customers’ deposits, breach
of contract, consignation, injunction and damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction.
- City of Cagayan de Oro filed complaint in
intervention.
- TC denied respondents’ application for
preliminary injunction,
- TC dismissed complaint and complaint in
intervention on ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over subject matter
- TC denied MFR. Respondents appealed to CA.
- CA set aside the orders of dismissal of complaint
and complaint in intervention. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON jurisdiction over subject matter is with
regular courts or Energy Regulatory Board
HELD
Subject is within jurisdiction of RTC.
- RTC is a court of general jurisdiction. On the
other hand, RA 6173, as amended by PD 1206
empowered the ERB to regulate & fix power rates
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to be charged by electric companies. Power to fix
rates doesn’t carry with it power to determine
whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging
customers. This falls within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.
- The question of determining the breakdown and
itemization of the power adjustment billed by an
electric power company to its customers is not a
matter that pertains to the ERB's supervision,
control or jurisdiction to regulated and fix power
rate but falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.
- Petitioner is a public utility company. If, indeed,
petitioner used the deposits, discounts,
surcharges, PCA and CERA rates as instruments to
obtain undue profits through various loan activities
and benefits provided to petitioner's employees,
then respondents may have causes of action
against petitioner to be litigated before the regular
courts and decided on the basis of evidence which
the parties may present during the trial.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
LIM ARRANZA V BF HOMES
G.R. No. 131683
DAVIDE; June 19, 2000
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Respondent filed with the SEC a petition for
rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a
state of suspension of payments. SEC placed
respondent under a management committee, and
appointed Orendain as a Receiver.
- Orendain instituted a central security system and
unified the 65 homeowners' associations into an
umbrella homeowners' association called United
BF Homeowners' Associations, Inc. (UBFHAI), which
was thereafter incorporated with the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC)
- Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control and
administration of security in the subdivision, the
Clubhouse and the open spaces. Through the
Philippine Waterworks and Construction
Corporation (PWCC), respondent's managing
company for waterworks in the various BF Homes
subdivisions, respondent entered into an
agreement with UBFHAI for the annual collection of
community assessment fund and for the purchase
Administrative Law
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of eight new pumps to replace the over-
capacitated pumps in the old wells
- Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his duties as
a Receiver. The new Board revoked the authority
given by Orendain to use the open spaces at
Concha Cruz Drive and to collect community
assessment funds; deferred the purchase of new
pumps; recognized BF Parañaque Homeowners'
Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the representative of
all homeowners in the subdivision; took over the
management of the Clubhouse; and deployed its
own security guards in the subdivision.
- Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for
and in behalf of the more than 7,000 homeowners
in the subdivision" against respondents. Petitioners
raised "issues" on the following basic needs of the
homeowners: rights-of-way; water; open spaces;
road and perimeter wall repairs; security; and the
interlocking corporations that allegedly made it
convenient for respondent "to compartmentalize
its obligations as general developer, even if all of
these are hooked into the water, roads, drainage
and sewer systems of the subdivision."
- HLURB Arbiter issued a 20-day TRO to avoid
rendering nugatory and ineffectual any judgment
that could be issued in the case; and subsequently,
an Order granting petitioners' prayer for
preliminary injunction was issued
ISSUE
WON it is the SEC and not the HLURB that has
jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision
homeowners against a subdivision developer that
is under receivership for specific performance
regarding basic homeowners' needs
HELD
NO
Ratio Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by
mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal.
It is determined by the averments of the complaint
and not by the defense contained in the answer.
Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shall
be determined upon an examination of the
applicable laws and the allegations of petitioners'
complaint before the HLURB
Reasoning
- LAW: Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree)
empowered the NHA with the "exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business." P.D. No. 1344 was issued to expand the
jurisdiction of the NHA to include unsound real
estate business practices; claims involving refund
and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and cases
involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The
regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA
were transferred to the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) by virtue of EO No.
648. Section 8 thereof specifies the functions of
the NHA that were transferred to the HSRC
including the authority to hear and decide "cases
on unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners,
developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and
cases of specific performance." EO No. 90
renamed the HSRC as the HLURB.
- The fact that respondent is under receivership
does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. A
receiver is a person appointed by the court, or in
this instance, by a quasi-judicial administrative
agency, in behalf of all the parties for the purpose
of preserving and conserving the property and
preventing its possible destruction or dissipation, if
it were left in the possession of any of the parties.
It is the duty of the receiver to administer the
assets of the receivership estate; and in the
management and disposition of the property
committed to his possession, he acts in a fiduciary
capacity and with impartiality towards all
interested persons. The appointment of a receiver
does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it
interfere with the exercise of its corporate rights.
- No violation of the SEC order suspending
payments to creditors would result as far as
petitioners' complaint before the HLURB is
concerned. To reiterate, what petitioners seek to
enforce are respondent's obligations as a
subdivision developer. Such claims are basically
not pecuniary in nature although it could
incidentally involve monetary considerations
Neither may petitioners be considered as having
"claims" against respondent within the context of
the following proviso of Section 6 (c) of P.D. No.
902-A, as amended by P.D. Nos. 1653, 1758 and
1799, to warrant suspension of the HLURB
proceedings.2 The word "claim" as used in Sec. 6
2
[U]pon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for
claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,
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(c) of P.D. 902-A, as amended, refers to debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature.
- LAW: For the SEC to acquire jurisdiction over any
controversy under P.D. No. 902-A, as amended,
two elements must be considered: (1) the status or
relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of
the question that is the subject of their
controversy. The first element requires that the
controversy must arise "out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members or associates; between any
or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively; and between
such corporation, partnership or association and
the State in so far as it concerns their individual
franchises." The second element requires that the
dispute among the parties be intrinsically
connected with the regulation or the internal
affairs of the corporation, partnership or
association
- Petitioners are not stockholders, members or
associates of respondent. They are lot buyers and
now homeowners in the subdivision developed by
the respondent. Also, the controversy here is
remotely related to the "regulation" of respondent
corporation or to respondent's "internal affairs."
- These two quasi-judicial agencies exercise
functions that are distinct from each other. The
SEC has authority over the operation of all kinds of
corporations, partnerships or associations with the
end in view of protecting the interests of the
investing public and creditors. On the other hand,
the HLURB has jurisdiction over matters relating to
observance of laws governing corporations
engaged in the specific business of development
of subdivisions and condominiums. The HLURB and
the SEC being bestowed with distinct powers and
functions, the exercise of those functions by one
shall not abate the performance by the other of its
own functions. There is no contradiction between
P.D. No. 902-A and P.D. No. 957.
- P.D. No. 957 was promulgated to encompass all
questions regarding subdivisions and
condominiums. It is aimed at providing for an
appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to
which all parties aggrieved in the implementation
of its provisions and the enforcement of
contractual rights with respect to said category of
real estate may take recourse. Nonetheless, the
powers of the HLURB may not in any way be
deemed as in derogation of the SEC's authority.
board or body shall be suspended accordingly
Administrative Law
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P.D. Nos. 902-A and 957, as far as both are
concerned with corporations, are laws in pari
materia. P.D. No. 902-A relates to all corporations,
while P.D. No. 957 pertains to corporations
engaged in the particular business of developing
subdivisions and condominiums. Although the
provisions of these decrees on the issue of
jurisdiction appear to collide when a corporation
engaged in developing subdivisions and
condominiums is under receivership, the same
decrees should be construed as far as reasonably
possible to be in harmony with each other to attain
the purpose of an expressed national policy.
COOP. DEVT. AUTHORITY V DOLEFIL
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
COOP.
GR No. 137489
DE LEON, JR.; May 29, 2002
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- The CDA received from certain members of the
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc. (DARBCI), a cooperative that owns 8,860
hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato,
several complaints alleging mismanagement
and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the
officers and members of the BOD (officers for
brevity). The CDA freezed DARBCI’s funds. The
officers filed a petition for certiorari in Polomolok
RTC assailing the CDA’s jurisdiction.
- The CDA placed the officers under preventive
suspension paving the way for the newly-created
management committee to assume office.
Polomolok RTC issued a TRO directing the parties
to restore status quo. The CDA questioned the
propriety of the TRO before the CA. The CA issued
a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing its TRO.
- Hence, the CDA continued with the proceedings
and issued a resolution directing the holding of a
special general assembly of the members of
DARBCI and the election of new officers and
members of the board of directors. The officers
filed a petition for prohibition with the CA which
issued a resolution restraining the CDA and the
administrator of DARBCI from proceeding with the
election. A joint venture partner of DARBCI, Investa
Land Corp., also filed a petition for annulment of
the CDA’s orders in the Polomolok RTC which also
granted a TRO.
- Due to the TROs, the planned election did not
take place. Nevertheless, the majority of the
members of DARBCI, on their own initiative,
convened a general assembly and held an
election. The original officers filed Twin Motions for
Contempt of Court and to Nullify Proceedings with
the CA. The CA granted the petition declaring the
election null & void.
ISSUES
1. WON the CDA is vested with quasi-judicial
authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in
view of its powers, functions and responsibilities
under Sec 3 of RA 6939
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio The authority of the CDA is to discharge
purely administrative functions which consist of
policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical
assistance to cooperatives and implementation of
cooperative laws.
Reasoning Sec 3 of RA 6939 enumerates the
powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA,
thus:
SEC. 3. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities. The
Authority shall have the following powers,
functions and responsibilities:
(a) Formulate, adopt and implement integrated
and comprehensive plans and programs on
cooperative development consistent with the
national policy on cooperatives and the overall
socio-economic development plan of the
Government;
(b) Develop and conduct management and training
programs upon request of cooperatives that will
provide members of cooperatives with the
entrepreneurial capabilities, managerial expertise,
and technical skills required for the efficient
operation of their cooperatives and inculcate in
them the true spirit of cooperativism and provide,
when necessary, technical and professional
assistance to ensure the viability and growth of
cooperatives with special concern for agrarian
reform, fishery and economically depressed
sectors;
(c) Support the voluntary organization and
consensual development of activities that promote
cooperative movements and provide assistance to
wards upgrading managerial and technical
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expertise upon request of the cooperatives
concerned;
(d) Coordinate the effects of the local government
units and the private sector in the promotion,
organization, and development of cooperatives;
(e) Register all cooperatives and their federations
and unions, including their division, merger,
consolidation, dissolution or liquidation. It shall
also register the transfer of all or substantially all
of their assets and liabilities and such other
matters as may be required by the Authority;
(f) Require all cooperatives, their federations and
unions to submit their annual financial statements,
duly audited by certified public accountants, and
general information sheets;
(g) Order the cancellation after due notice and
hearing of the cooperatives certificate of
registration for non-compliance with administrative
requirements and in cases of voluntary dissolution;
(h) Assist cooperatives in arranging for financial
and other forms of assistance under such terms
and conditions as are calculated to strengthen
their viability and autonomy;
(i) Establish extension offices as may be necessary
and financially viable to implement this Act.
Initially, there shall be extension offices in the
Cities of Dagupan, Manila, Naga, Iloilo, Cebu,
Cagayan de Oro and Davao;
(j) Impose and collect reasonable fees and charges
in connection with the registration of cooperatives;
(k) Administer all grants and donations coursed
through the Government for cooperative
development, without prejudice to the right of
cooperatives to directly receive and administer
such grants and donations upon agreement with
the grantors and donors thereof;
(l) Formulate and adopt continuing policy
initiatives consultation with the cooperative sector
through public hearing;
(m) Adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of
its internal operations;
(n) Submit an annual report to the President and
Congress on the state of the cooperative
movement;
(o) Exercise such other functions as may be
necessary to implement the provisions of the
cooperative laws and, in the performance thereof,
the Authority may summarily punish for direct
contempt any person guilty of misconduct in the
presence of the Authority which seriously
interrupts any hearing or inquiry with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos (P500) or
imprisonment of not more than ten (10) days, or
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Dean Carlota
both. Acts constituting indirect contempt as
defined under Rule 71 of the ROC shall be
punished in accordance with the said Rule.
- When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is only room for
application. Nowhere in RA 6939 can it be found
any express grant to the CDA of authority to
adjudicate cooperative disputes. At most, Sec 8 of
the same law provides that "upon request of either
or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and
conciliate disputes with a cooperative or between
cooperatives" however, with a restriction "that if
no mediation or conciliation succeeds within 3
months from request, a certificate of non-
resolution shall be issued by the commission prior
to the filing of appropriate action before the proper
courts". Being an administrative agency, the CDA
has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law and those which are necessarily implied
in the exercise thereof.
- The Court also quoted the deliberations in both
the Senate and the House to show that the
legislative intent was NOT to grant quasi-judicial
authority to the CDA in accordance with the policy
of the government granting autonomy to
cooperatives. The Court noted that in the past 75
years cooperativism failed to flourish in the
Philippines due to the stifling attitude of the
government toward cooperatives. While the
government wished to help, it invariably wanted to
control. Also, in its anxious efforts to push
cooperativism, it smothered cooperatives with so
much help that they failed to develop self-reliance.
As one cooperative expert put it, "The strong
embrace of government ends with a kiss of death
for cooperatives.”
Disposition Petition is DENIED. But the CA order
nullifying the election is SET ASIDE for lack of due
process. [Kasi, no notice & opportunity to be heard
was given to the new officers.]
DE JESUS v COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(Sarah)
4. Administrative and Judicial
Proceedings arising from the same
facts
GALANG V CA (TEE HOOK CHUN)
2 SCRA 234
CONCEPCION; May 30, 1961
NATURE
Original action for a writ of certiorari to set aside a
decision of, as well as a b ail bond granted by, the
CA.
FACTS
(sorry guys! a lot of the case is in Spanish)
- Upon some facts (in Spanish! All I know for sure is
Chun was a foreigner, and the CFI found him guilty
of evading some immigration law, and sentenced
him to 1 year of prison and a P1,000 fine, and I
think it ordered him to be deported to Hongkong
for the service of the prison sentence), the CA
found that a petition filed by Chun for a write of
habeas corpus was well taken, and allowed Chun
bail, and denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. This was based on the theory that
the warrant of exclusion and the judgment of
conviction of Chun are based upon the same facts;
that the administrative proceeding for his
exclusion is incompatible with his criminal
prosecution in our courts of justice; that the
institution of the criminal action implied a waiver
of the authority to exclude him by administrative
proceeding; and that the warrant of exclusion
issued by the petitioner became ineffective upon
the filing of the mentioned criminal case.
- both proceedings arose from the same facts but:
- the warrant of exclusion was based on section
29(a)(17) of Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
which said (a) The following classes of aliens shall
be ecluded from entry into the Philippines… (17)
Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this Act.
- On the other hand, the charge in the criminal
case was for an offense punishable under Section
45(e) of the same Act, which provided that “Any
individual who (e) being an alien, shall for any
fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a
Philippine citizen in order to evade any
requirement of the immigration laws… shall be
guilty of an offense, and upon conviction thereof,
shall be fined not more than P1000, and
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, and
deported if he is an alien.
ISSUES
1. WON the two proceedings are incompatible with
each other and that the institution of the court
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action amounted to a renunciation of the
administrative proceeding; and that, upon the
filing of the criminal case, the warrant of exclusion
became unenforceable.
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning This situation is analogous to that
where the same act constitutes 2 or more different
offenses not covered by Article 48 of the RPC,
except that, in this case, one offense is punishable
as a felony or crime, and the other is to be dealt
with administratively. The one is not legally
inconsistent with the other, and the prosecution of
the former does not entail a waiver of the action
due for the latter.
The alleged conflict is, at best, “purely
physical” in that the conflicts affect mainly the
time and place at which certain things will have to
be done (for example, if he’s tried in one case, it
may be impossible for him to appear at the
hearing of another case, which consequently might
have to be postpoed to another date; or, for
example, the service of several sentences might
not be served simultaneously, etc.) supported by
substantial evidence.
Disposition the aforementioned decision of
respondent Court is set aside, with costs against
Chun.
CO SAN V DIRECTOR OF PATENTS
GR 10563
BAUTISTA ANGELO; Feb. 23, 1961
FACTS
- Respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio filed with the
Philippine Patent Office two applications for the
issuance of letters patent on two designs for
luggages. Subsequently, the Director of Patents
issued Letters Patent Nos. 6 and 7 in his favor.
Petitioner Co San, however, filed with the Patent
Office a petition for cancellation of said letters
patent on the grounds provided for in sub-sections
(a) and (b) of section 28 of Republic Act No. 165,
to wit: .
(a) The design allegedly invented by Mr. Ong Lian
Bio is not now patentable in accordance with sec
7, 8, and 9 of Chapter II of RA 165.
(b) The specification submitted by said party does
not comply with the requirements of Section 14,
Chapter III of said Act.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- The petition for cancellation was dismissed by
the Director of Patents without hearing and
reception of evidence because of his lack of
statutory authority to consider the cancellation of
design patents. Upon review, however, by SC, the
Director of Patents was ordered to hear the
petition for cancellation.
- Petitioner adduced only documentary evidence
and relied heavily on the CA decision in People v.
Co San, in which he was acquitted of the crime of
unfair competition.
- The Director of Patents, after analyzing the CA
decision, dismissed the petition for cancellation for
insufficiency of evidence.
- Petitioner-appellant contends that the Director of
Patents erred in not accepting as final and
conclusive the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, namely, that the Petitioner was the prior
user of the design in question, and that the
designs in Letters Patent Nos. 6 and 7 are not new
and original. The Director of Patents held that
these findings are not "clear", "satisfactory" and
"free from doubt."
ISSUE/S
WON the Director of Patents is bound in the
cancellation proceedings by the findings arrived at
by CA in the Criminal case against petitioner.
HELD
NO.
Reasoning In the cancellation proceedings the
question refers to the validity of the design
patents issued to respondent Jose Ong Lian Bio,
while in the criminal case the inquiry is whether Co
San unfairly competed against the luggage of said
respondent protected by design patent No. 7. The
first is within the cognizance of the Patent Office
(Section 28, Republic Act No. 165, as amended) ;
the second under the jurisdiction of the court of
first instance (Article 189, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 172). The acquittal of
the petitioner by the Court of Appeals was not
based on the cancellation of a patent, but on the
opinion that the accused (petitioner) had not
deceived or defrauded the complainant12
(respondents).
Disposition Petition for review is dismissed
VILLANOS V SUBIDO
45 SCRA 142
BARREDO J; May 31,1971
FACTS:
-Villanos, a long-time and highly- regarded teacher
in Ilocos Sur. Due to a letter she wrote to two-co-
teachers containing libelous remarks, a criminal
case for libel was filed against her by the
recipients of such letter. A few days later, before
the Division Superintendent of Schools an
administrative charge against petitioner-appellee
for (1) gross discourtesy to them as her co-
teachers, and for (2) notoriously disgraceful and/or
immoral language and/or conduct. They supported
their charge with the same libelous letter, basis of
the criminal action.was also filed against her.
-pending the decision on the administrative case,
Villanos was found guilty of libel. The
administrative case was delayed due to motions
filed by Villanos for a different investigator for the
administrative case. Due to the long period of time
that the case was left hanging, the admin case
was indorsed to the Secretary of Education. Based
on the testimony of one witness and such
conviction for libel, the Secretary recommended “
that petitioner-appellee be transferred to another
station, reprimanded and warned that the
commission by her of the same or similar offense
will be severely dealt with”
-Subido, judge of the Civil Service Commission,
disregarded such recommendation and instead
dismissed Villanos from office.
-CA reversed on the ground that petitioner was not
afforded fair trial.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was afforded fair trial when she
was dismissed based solely on one testimony in an
unfinished investigation and her conviction in the
criminal case.
HELD:
NO
-The plea that the decision of the Court of Appeals
which found petitioner-appellee guilty of libel
against the complainants in the administrative
case, which arose from the same allegedly
slanderous remarks, is enough basis for
respondent-appellant's decision is equally without
merit.
-A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even
if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a
decision in an administrative case involving the
same facts, for the simple reason that matters that
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are material in the administrative case are not
necessarily relevant in the criminal case
-Even where criminal conviction is specified by law
as a ground for suspension or removal of an official
or employee, such conviction does not ex proprio
vigore justify automatic suspension without
investigation and hearing as to such conviction.
-Not even final conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, as distinguished from conviction
pending appeal, dispenses with the requisite
notice and hearing. Final conviction is in sec 2188
of Revised Administrative Code as ground for
proceeding administratively against the convicted
officer but does not operate as automatic removal
doing away with the formalities of an
administrative hearing.
PNR V DOMINGO
G.R. No. L-30772
Teehankee: October 29, 1971
FACTS:
- Private respondent Juan Mafe, a mechanic
in the employ of the Philippine National
Railways was charged in an information
for qualified theft for having stolen one
brass bearing valued at P45.00 from his
employer's shop.
- The evidence for the prosecution
consisted of the testimonies of the
Railways' policeman who apprehended
respondent in street clothes on his way
out at about 4 p.m. of July 4, 1967 with a
traveling bag which contained the brass
bearing; of the Manila Police Department
patrolman who took down the
respondent's extrajudicial confession; and
of the corroborative testimony of the
Railways' security guard who participated
in respondent's apprehension; as well as
of the said objects taken from respondent
- Respondent, on his part, disowned any
criminal intent claiming he was on his
way to return the brass bearing and
repudiated his extrajudicial confession,
asserting that he was coerced into signing
the same without being allowed to read
its contents, which were different from
what he stated at the police investigation.
- Respondent court, in its decision of
January 18, 1969, ruled that "the
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
prosecution has failed to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt" and rendered judgment
"acquitting the accused on reasonable
doubt."
- After promulgation on February 7, 1969 of
the verdict of acquittal, however,
respondent-accused filed on February 19,
1969 a motion for amendment of
respondent court's decision, alleging for
the first time that respondent had already
been dismissed from the service of the
Railways because of the very incident
subject matter of the criminal charge of
which respondent court had acquitted
him, and praying that respondent court
amend its decision so as to include
therein his reinstatement, with payment
of back salaries and restoration of all
accrued rights and privileges.
- Respondent court in its order dated March
3, 1969 set hearing of the motion on
March 15, 1969 and ordered that the
parties and the general manager of the
Philippine National Railways be notified
thereof, and thereafter issued its
"amendatory decision" dated March 27,
1969, noting that there was no
appearance nor opposition from the
Railways at the hearing and granting
respondent's motion, by adding an order
to reinstate the accused immediately to
his position from which he was dismissed
on July 4, 1967 and to pay his salary in
full during the period beginning July 4,
1967 to the date of reinstatement, and to
restore the said accused to such benefits
and rights and privileges arising from the
position that he held which should have
accrued to him during the period
aforesaid.
- Respondent court had denied PNR’s
motion to set aside the amendatory
decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over it and over the subject matter of
reinstatement and back salaries and of
lack of due process. Upon petitioner's
motion and bond, the Court issued on
August 27, 1969 a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement and
execution of the amendatory decision.
ISSUE:
WON the TC may properly decree the payment of
salaries and order the reinstatement of the
accused
HELD:
NO
- The general rule that the court has no
such authority has long been uniformly
pronounced by the Court. In People vs.
Mañago: "In a criminal proceeding against
an accused, the judgment that the law
authorizes to be rendered, is either one of
acquittal or of conviction with indemnity
and the accessory penalties provided for
by law. The payment of salary of an
employee during the period of his
suspension cannot, as a general rule, be
properly decreed by the trial court in a
judgment of acquittal."
- In the analogous case of Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Baltazar, the Court further
elaborated that "In criminal cases courts
of first instance may dismiss an
information, try and acquit or convict and
impose upon the defendant the penalty
provided by law.
- The only civil responsibility that may be
imposed by the court is that which arises
from the criminal act. The acquittal of the
defendant does not mean necessarily that
he is not civilly liable unless the verdict
and judgment of acquittal is that he did
not commit the crime charged. But
whether a defendant acquitted of a
criminal charge is entitled to his salary
during suspension is not within the power
of the court to grant in the criminal case
where the defendant is acquitted. Neither
the Revised Penal code nor the Rules of
Court on criminal procedure vests in the
court authority to grant such relief.
THE POLICE COMMISSION V LOOD
G.R. No. L-34230D
TEEHANKEE; March 31, 1980
FACTS
- An administrative complaint was filed against
Captain Gabriel Paile, Corporal Reynaldo Alano and
five other members of the Makati Police
Department charging them with grave misconduct.
The succeeding year, twin criminal cases were
filed in the city court of Manila charging the same
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administrative respondents with grave coercion
based on the same acts for which they had already
been administratively charged. Soon thereafter,
acting Manila Mayor Jose C. Luciano issued a
Memorandum Order effecting the suspension from
office of the seven accused members of the Makati
Police Department.
- After due investigation, polcom rendered its
decision declaring Paile et al. guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the
service. In the meantime, the City Court of Manila
rendered judgment in the criminal cases against
Paile et al., acquitting them of the charges for
grave coercion on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
- In implementation of the decision of the Polcom,
acting Mayor Luciano issued Administrative Order
No. 39, Series of 1970, ordering the dismissal of
the said administrative respondents from the
service.
- Respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal presided by respondent judge Guardson R.
Lood against the Polcom, the Mayor and the Chief
of Police of Makati, and the Makati Board of
Investigators seeking, inter alia, the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
requiring the Mayor of Makati to immediately
reinstate them to their former positions in the
Makati Police Department on their theory that, by
reason of their acquittal of the criminal charges for
grave coercion by the City Court of Manila, the
Mayor of Makati had the duty specifically enjoined
to be performed by him by the second paragraph
of Section 16, R.A. No. 4864, to immediately
reinstate [them] and order the payment of the
entire salary they failed to receive during their
suspension.
- Respondent judge declared respondents'
dismissal from the service as "without authority of
law, null and void and without force and effect",
and directed the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to reinstate them to their
respective positions as Captain and Corporal in the
Makati Police Department, with all the rights and
privileges thereto appertaining, including the
payment of their salaries during the period of their
suspension from office.
- The Polcom thus filed with this Court the instant
petition for certiorari to assail the orders of the
presiding judge of the court a quo.
ISSUE
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and declaring respondents'
dismissal from the service as null and void
HELD
YES
- It is a fundamental principle of administrative
law, as reaffirmed by the Court in Philippines
National Railways v. Domingo that "the
administrative case may generally proceed against
a respondent independently of a criminal action for
the same act or omission and requires only a
preponderance of evidence to establish
administrative guilt as against proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the criminal charge, as in the
analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil
Code." Here, the administrative case against
respondents did proceed independently of the
criminal action and resulted in an earlier
administrative verdict of dismissal from the
service. The subsequent acquittal of said
respondents as accused in the criminal case was of
no consequence since such acquittal merely
relieved them from criminal liability but in no way
carried with it relief from the administrative
liability of dismissal from the service under the
final order of the Polcom in the administrative
case.
- Respondent judge’s reasoning in his challenged
order that "the administrative proceedings before
the respondent Polcom had not in fact been
terminated, and as a matter of fact there is no
showing that the motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial had in fact been resolved. The result
therefore is that the dismissal of the petitioners
thus partook of the nature of a punishment even
while their case is under consideration, a clear
violation of their constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.”,
is a patent error. The proceedings in the
administrative case before the Polcom had already
become final and had been executed.
TAN V COMELEC
237 SCRA 353
VITUG; October 4, 1994
FACTS
- Petitioner Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of
Davao City, was designated by COMELEC as Vice-
Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers (CBC) of
Davao City for 1992 national and local elections
conformably with the provisions of RA 6646 and of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).
- On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board
of Canvassers, Garcia was proclaimed the winning
candidate as representative of Second District of
Davao City in the House of Representatives.
- Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate
for the position, filed cases questioning the validity
of the proclamation of Garcia and accusing the
members of the CBC of "unlawful, erroneous,
incomplete and irregular canvass." -
- Meanwhile, the electoral protest of private
respondent Alterado was dismissed by the House
HRET. The criminal complaint for "Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act" before the the
Ombudsman was also dismissed for lack of
criminal intent. Still pending is an administrative
charge, the case now before SC, instituted in the
COMELEC against the CBC, including Tan, for
"Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence
and Acts Inimical to the Service."
- Tan moved to dismiss the administrative
complaint against him for alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the
Executive Dept of the government. COMELEC
denied petitioner's MTD. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC has committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted without jurisdiction in
continuing to take action on the administrative
case.
HELD
NO
- The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8),
Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-
encompassing when it comes to election matters,
and also under Section 52, Article VII, of the
Omnibus Election Code.
- The administrative case against Tan, taken
cognizance of by, and still pending with, the
COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his
duties as an election canvasser and not as a city
prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its
authority to exercise direct and immediate
supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and
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instrumentality of the government, required by law
to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections.
- To ensure that such officials and EEs of gov’t
carry out their respective assigned tasks, law
provides that upon the COMELEC's
recommendation, the corresponding proper
authority (DOJ Sec.) shall take appropriate action,
either to suspend or remove from office the officer
or employee who may, after due process, be found
guilty of violation of election laws or failure to
comply with instructions, orders, decision or
rulings of the COMELEC. But before making its
recommendation, COMELEC must first satisfy itself
that there indeed has been an infraction of the
law, by the person administratively charged.
- Note: COMELEC merely may issue a
recommendation for disciplinary action but that it
is the executive dept to which the charged official
or employee belongs which has the ultimate
authority to impose the disciplinary penalty.
- The investigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry
into the administrative charges by the COMELEC,
on the other hand, are entirely independent
proceedings. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other. Thus, an absolution from a
criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative
prosecution
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
OCAMPO v OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
322 SCRA 17
Buena ; Jan. 18, 2000
FACTS
-Ocampo (petitioner) is the Training Coordinator of.
NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National
Irrigation Administration.
-K.N. Paudel of the Agricultural Development Bank
of Nepal (ADBN) requested a training proposal on
small-scale community irrigation development.
-NIACONSULT conducted the training program for
six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6 to
March 7, 1989. ADBN, thru its representative,
Deutsche Gesselschaft ) Technische
Zusummenarbeit (GTZ) Gmbh Technical
Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in
two installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00.
-NIACONSULT, through its president, Wilfredo S.
Tiongco, wrote a letter to petitioner demanding the
turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN
which petitioner personally received. Despite
receipt of the letter, petitioner failed to remit the
said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its
president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an
administrative case before respondent
OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud
or willful breach of trust.
-Finding enough basis to proceed with the
administrative case, the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the respondent
OMBUDSMAN, on February 17, 1992, issued an
order requiring petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt with a
caveat that failure to file the same would be
deemed a waiver of his right to present evidence.
Despite notice, petitioner failed to comply with the
said order.
-A year later OMBUDSMAN issued another order
giving petitioner another chance to file his
counter-affidavit and controverting evidence.
Again, petitioner failed. Thus private respondent
was required to appear before the OMBUDSMAN to
present evidence to support its complaint.
-OMBUDSMAN issued Resolution that Ocampo be
discharged from the service.
-The dismissal of the criminal case will not
foreclose administrative action filed against
petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing
the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the
prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition
sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an
absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is
another class of evidence which, though
insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is
preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the
"substantial evidence" rule in administrative
proceedings which merely requires such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.18 [Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Ramon G. Enriquez, 218
SCRA 1 (1993)] Thus, considering the difference in
the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and
administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other.19 [Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 22-23
(1995)]
ISSUE
WON Ocampo was denied the opportunity to be
heard.
HELD
NO
Petitioner has been amply accorded the
opportunity to be heard. He was required to
answer the complaint against him. In fact,
petitioner was given considerable length of time to
submit his counter-affidavit. It took more than one
year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was
considered to have waived his right to file his
counter-affidavit and the formal presentation of
the complainant's evidence was set. The March 17,
1993 order was issued to give the petitioner a last
chance to present his defense, despite the private
respondent's objections. But petitioner failed to
comply with the second order.
Thus, petitioner's failure to present evidence is
solely of his own making and cannot escape his
own remissness by passing the blame on the graft
investigator. While the respondent OMBUDSMAN
has shown forebearance, petitioner has not
displayed corresponding vigilance. He therefore
cannot validly claim that his right to due process
was violated. We need only to reiterate that a
party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity
to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial
of due process.21 [Esber vs. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA
664.]
Petitioner's claim that he was not given any notice
of the order declaring him to have waived his right
to file his counter-affidavit and of allowing the
private respondent to present evidence ex-parte is
unmeritorious.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many
times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings, moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.20 [Concerned Officials of the MWSS vs.
Hon. Omubudsman Conrado Vasquez, 240 SCRA
502.]
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The orders of respondent OMBUDSMAN requiring
petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and which
was admittedly received by the latter explicitly
contain a warning that if no counter-affidavit was
filed within the given period, a waiver would be
considered and the administrative proceedings
shall continue according to the rules. Thus,
respondent OMBUDSMAN need not issue another
order notifying petitioner that he has waived his
right to file a counter-affidavit. In the same way,
petitioner need not be notified of the ex-parte
hearing for the reception of private respondent's
evidence. As such, he could not have been
expected to appear at the ex-parte hearing.
With regard to the petitioner's claim that he made
requests for the production of the documents
alleged to be material to his defense, the record is
bereft of any proof of such requests. If it were true
that the graft investigator did not act on such
requests, petitioner should have filed the proper
motion before the respondent OMBUDSMAN for the
production of the documents or to compel the
respondent complainant to produce whatever
record necessary for his defense. Petitioner did
not. It was only after the respondent OMBUDSMAN
issued the assailed resolution of November 18,
1993 that he bewailed the alleged failure of
respondent's graft investigator to require the
production of the records of the subject
transaction.
MIRALLES V GO
349 SCRA 596
PANGANIBAN; January 18, 2001
FACTS
- An administrative complaint was filed before the
Office of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM against
petitioner Manuel Miralles for Grave Misconduct. It
was alleged that he killed Patrolman Nilo
Resurrecion and Ernesto Merculio.
- After an investigation, the hearing officer
submitted to the Adjudication Board finding
Miralles guilty and recommending his dismissal
from service. The Adjudication Board also found
him guilty.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- petitioner appealed to the Special Appellate
Committee of the NAPOLCOM. The appeal was
dismissed since no appeal brief, memorandum or
any pleading was filed by the petitioner after a
period of more than one (1) year and seven (7)
months.
- Petitioner filed an MFR. The Special Appelate
Committee however affirmed the decision of the
Adjudication Board.
- Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA ruled that
the petitioner’s recourse was premature because
the SAC-Napolcom’s decision should have been
appealed first before the Civil Service Commission,
pursuant to RA 6975. Even if it would, as it did,
rule on the merits, the CA held that petitioner’s
appeal must still fail. The CA gave great weight to
the documents presented and to an eyewitness
account. It also ruled that the petitioner failed to
substantiate his claim of self-defense
ISSUE/S
1. WON the recourse to the CA was proper
2. WON the evidence was sufficient to support the
Board’s conclusion
3. WON the RTC’s dismissal of the criminal case
against him was conclusive of his innocence
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning
- Petitioner contends that his appeal is not
governed by RA 6975 since it was promulgated
only on January 2, 1991 and the assailed resolution
of SAC-Napolcom had been issued on October 20,
1989. However, petitioner filed its appeal to the CA
only on December 4, 1996. By then, the law in
force, RA 6975, had already prescribed that
appeals from the Decision of the Napolcom should
be lodged first with the DILG and then with the
Civil Service Commission. It did not matter that
the assailed Napolcom ruling had been
promulgated in 1989.
2. YES.
Ratio
As a rule, administrative agencies’ factual findings
that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by
the SC.
Reasoning
- On the documents presented: The bulk of these
documents, except Exhibits “B” and “C,” are public
documents consisting of reports made by
government officials in the performance of their
functions. Hence, they are prima facie evidence of
the facts they stated.
- On the eyewitness’ testimony: Petitioner claims,
however, that Lamsen was not credible because
he subsequently recanted his testimony “during
cross-examination. A cursory perusal of the
records indicates that it was not made on cross-
examination. On the contrary, the recantation was
done when Lamsen appeared as a witness for the
defense, after he had testified for the
complainants and been cross-examined as such.
His subsequent testimony for the defense was,
however, rightly brushed aside, because he had
failed to appear for cross-examination despite due
notice. Indeed, the Napolcom Adjudication Board
wrote: “However, he failed to appear for cross-
examination despite due notice at the later stages
of the formal investigation prompting the
prosecution to move for the striking out of this
portion of his testimony for the defense from the
records and which motion was granted by the
Hearing Officer.”
3. NO.
Ratio
An administrative proceeding is different from a
criminal case and may proceed independently
thereof. Indeed, the quantum of proof in the latter
is different, such that the verdict in one need not
necessarily be the same as in the other
Reasoning It should be emphasized that a finding
of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative
case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the
same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead to
a similar finding in the administrative action before
this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability
of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in
the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.
5. Rules of Evidence
PHILIPPINE MOVE PICTURES
WORKERS ASSOCIATION v PREMIER
PRODUCTION
109
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(Jonas)
ESTATE OF FLORENCIO BUAN V
PAMBUSCO
99 PHIL 373
REYES, A.; MAY 31, 1956
FACTS
- The estate of Florencio P. Buan (petitioner), is an
authorized bus operator along various lines in
central and northern Luzon, with authority to
operate 8 auto-trucks along the Manila-Bagac line
and 11 along the Moron Dinalupihan line. Allegedly
in response to various resolutions of municipal
councils and on petition of civic and labor groups
in the province of Bataan urging extension of its
services to their respective municipalities,
petitioner applied in four cases in the Commission
for certificates of public convenience to operate
additional trips between Manila and various
municipalities and barrios in Bataan.
- The Pampanga Bus Company (PAMBUSCO) and
La Mallorca (respondents) opposed these
applications, both alleging that they are authorized
to operate and are actually operating a fleet of
auto-trucks on the lines applied for and rendering
adequate and satisfactory service; that the
additional services applied for are superfluous, will
not promote public interest in a proper and
suitable manner, and will result in cut-throat and
ruinous competition.
- The Commission, after hearing the parties denied
the applications on the grounds that petitioner had
not made a case for the grant of the certificates
applied for, that the service of the oppositors was
adequate and sufficient for the actual needs of the
public and that grant of the applications would
only result in unnecessary or wasteful competition.
- To prove the inadequacy of the present service,
14 witnesses took the stand for petitioner and
testified to the insufficiency of transportation
facilities and the need for additional service on the
lines applied for. Documentary proof, consisting of
resolutions of municipal councils of Balanga,
Dinalupihan, Limay, and Orani, and a petition of
the Association of Citizens of Orion, was also
adduced to show the need for the solicited
additional service, and there was also mention of
the inability of the Pampanga Bus Company to
register its authorized number of units, as well as
Administrative Law
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the alleged noncompliance on the part of the two
respondents companies with the terms of their
certificates by suppressing trips on hours when
they do not expect a sufficient number of
passengers. On their part the two respondent
companies presented six witnesses, and
documentary proof too, to show that they were
rendering service in accordance with the
requirements of their certificates and that the
needs of the traveling public were being
adequately served.
- Unable at first to arrive at a decision from the
conflicting evidence presented for both parties, the
Commission ordered a survey of the passenger
traffic on the lines applied for. The agents found
that existing passenger traffic in all the lines do
not warrant the authorization of additional service.
ISSUE
WON the trips rendered by all the Bus lines are
adequate to serve the public need.
HELD
YES. There is no need for additional services.
Ratio The law, in investing the Public Service
Commission with the power of supervision and
control over public transportation, has also clothed
it with broad discretion in the exercise of that
power. With that discretion this Court is not
supposed to interfere except in case of clear
abuse.
Reasoning While it is true that the two oppositors
have authority to operate direct service only on
three of the nine lines applied for by petitioner, in
reality these direct lines pass through the other
routes applied for like Orani and Orion, and the
two oppositors have sufficient and convenient trips
going to the other destinations, whose hours of
departure and arrival are coordinated with those
on the direct trips to Manila.
- The discriminatory attitude imputed to the
Commission by reason of its having, to petitioner's
prejudice, allegedly deviated from its consistent
policy of approving applications for direct service
since such kind of service is more convenient to
the traveling public than the broken trips, is more
fancied than real, considering the finding that the
present authorized trips are more than adequate
to take care of the passenger traffic along the
routes in question.
- The fact that respondents have dispatched trips
without previous authority may call for some kind
of disciplinary action. But it would not be a good
ground for authorizing additional trips where the
Commission has found that there is already more
than adequate service along the main highway.
With regard to Rules of Evidence
- What appears is that the Commission, faced with
the conflict of evidence on the adequacy or
inadequacy of the present service, has sought to
discover the truth through an on-the-ground
inspection and observation by its own agents and
has, on the basis of information thus obtained,
arrived at the conclusion that the additional
service applied for is uncalled for because there is
already amplitude, if not superabundance, in the
number of authorized trips. That conclusion is
amply supported by the record and is far from
being the product of partiality or unfair
discrimination.
- The findings from the documents and the
Commission’s own investigation were supported
by more than substantial evidence and therefore
binding upon this Court, which is not required to
examine the proof de novo and determine for itself
whether or not the preponderance of evidence
really justifies the decision.
DISPOSITION Decision is affirmed, costs against
the petitioner.
RIZAL LIGHT & ICE CO., INC. V
MUNICIPALITY OF MORONG, RIZAL,
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
24 SCRA 285
ZALDIVAR; September 28, 1968
FACTS
-Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc. is a domestic
corporation with business address at Morong,
Rizal. In 1949, it was granted by the Commission a
certificate of public convenience and necessity for
the installation, operation and maintenance of an
electric light, heat and power service in the
municipality of Morong, Rizal.
-Dec19, 1956: the Commission required Rizal Light
to appear before to show cause why it should not
be penalized for violation of the conditions of its
certificate of public convenience and the
regulations of the Commission, and for failure to
comply with the directives to raise its service
voltage and maintain them within the limits
prescribed in the Revised Order No. 1 of the
Commission, and to acquire and install a kilowatt
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meter to indicate the load in kilowatts at any
particular time of the generating unit.
-Rizal Light failed to appear. The Commission
ordered the cancellation and revocation of Rizal
Light's certificate of public convenience and
necessity and the forfeiture of its franchise. Rizal
Light filed MFR on the ground that its manager,
Juan D. Francisco, was not aware of said hearing.
Respondent municipality opposed; motion was set
for hearing and it was found that the failure of
Rizal Light to appear at the hearing — the sole
basis of the revocation of Rizal Light's certificate —
was really due to the illness of its manager. The
Commission set aside its order of revocation.
Respondent municipality’s MFR was denied.
-June 25, 1958: the municipality formally asked the
Commission to revoke Rizal Light's certificate of
public convenience and to forfeit its franchise on
the ground, among other things, that it failed to
comply with the conditions of said certificate and
franchise. Said petition was set for hearing jointly
with the order to show cause. The hearings had
been postponed several times.
-Meanwhile, inspections had been made of Rizal
Light's electric plant and installations by the
engineers of the Commission. When the case was
called for hearing on July 5, 1961, Rizal Light failed
to appear. Respondent municipality was then
allowed to present its documentary evidence, and
thereafter the case was submitted for decision.
-July 7, 1961: Rizal Light filed a motion to reopen
the case upon the ground that it had not been
furnished with a copy of the report of the June 21-
24, 1961 inspection for it to reply as previously
agreed. Rizal Light was granted a period of 10days
within which to submit its written reply to said
inspection report, on condition that should it fail to
do so within the said period the case would be
considered submitted for decision. Rizal Light
failed to file the reply. And the Commission
proceeded to decide the case. On July 29, 1962
Rizal Light's electric plant was burned.
-August 20, 1962: the Commission, on the basis of
the inspection reports of its aforenamed engineers,
found that the Rizal Light had failed to comply with
the directives contained in its letters, and had
violated the conditions of its certificate of public
convenience as well as the rules and regulations of
the Commission. Accordingly, it ordered the
cancellation and revocation of Rizal Light's
certificate of public convenience and the forfeiture
of its franchise.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
-Sept 18, 1962: Rizal Light filed MFR, alleging that
before its electric plant was burned, its service was
greatly improved and that it had still existing
investment which the Commission should protect.
-Eight days before said MFR was filed, Morong
Electric, having been granted a municipal
franchise, filed with the Commission an application
for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity for said service. Rizal Light opposed in
writing said application.
-The company also filed MTD the application upon
the ground that applicant Morong Electric had no
legal personality when it filed its application,
because its certificate of incorporation was at that
time, not yet issued by the SEC. this MTD was
denied (Morong Electric was a de facto
corporation). Sir says we can omit this corpo law
part =)
-The case was heard on the merits and both
parties presented their respective evidence. On
the basis of the evidence adduced, the
Commission approved the application of Morong
Electric and ordered the issuance in its favor of the
corresponding certificate of public convenience
and necessity.
-Rizal Light filed with this SC these petitions for
review.
ISSUES
1. WON the Commission acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction when it delegated the hearing of
the case and the reception of evidence to Mr.
Pedro S. Talavera who is not allowed by law to
hear the same
2. WON the cancellation of Rizal Light's certificate
of public convenience was unwarranted because
no sufficient evidence was adduced against the
Rizal Light and that Rizal Light was not able to
present evidence in its defense
3. WON the Commission failed to give protection to
Rizal Light's investment
4. WON the Commission erred in imposing the
extreme penalty of revocation of the certificate.
NOTE: The other issues are under Corporation Law,
which are therefore omitted, as per instructions in
the outline.
HELD
A factual determination will not be disturbed
by SC unless patently unsupported by
evidence. The findings and conclusions of
fact made by the Public Service Commission,
after weighing the evidence adduced by the
parties in a public service case, will not be
disturbed by the Supreme Court unless those
findings and conclusions appear not to be
reasonably supported by evidence.
1. Rizal Light is estopped from raising this as an
issue.
Ratio Objection to the delegation of authority to
hear a case filed before the Commission and to
receive the evidence in connection therewith is a
procedural, not a jurisdictional point, and is waived
by failure to interpose timely the objection and the
case had been decided by the Commission.
Reasoning While Mr. Pedro S. Talavera, who
conducted the hearings of the case below, is a
division chief, he is not a lawyer. As such, under
Section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, the Commission should not have
delegated to him the authority to conduct the
hearings for the reception of evidence of the
parties.
-However, since Rizal Light has never raised any
objection to the authority of Mr. Talavera before
the Commission, it should be deemed to have
waived such procedural defect, and consonant
with the precedents on the matter, Rizal Light's
claim that the Commission acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in so authorizing Mr. Talavera
should be dismissed.
2. NO.
-In reviewing the decision of the Public Service
Commission this Court is not required to examine
the proof de novo and determine for itself whether
or not the preponderance of evidence really
justifies the decision. The only function of this
Court is to determine whether or not there is
evidence before the Commission upon which its
decision might reasonably be based. This Court
will not substitute its discretion for that of the
Commission on questions of fact and will not
interfere in the latter's decision unless it clearly
appears that there is no evidence to support it.
-The Commission based its decision on the
inspection reports submitted by its engineers who
conducted the inspection of Rizal Light's electric
service upon orders of the Commission. Said
inspection reports specify in detail the deficiencies
incurred, and violations committed, by the Rizal
Light resulting in the inadequacy of its service.
Said reports are sufficient to serve reasonably as
bases of the decision in question, for these are not
mere documentary proofs presented for the
consideration of the Commission, but are the
results of the Commission's own observations and
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investigations which it can rightfully take into
consideration
-Re: Rizal Light's failure to present evidence, as
well as its failure to cross-examine the authors of
the inspection reports… Rizal Light should not
complain because it had waived not only its right
to cross-examine but also its right to present
evidence in open court through its counsel Atty.
Luque.
-Re: Rizal Light's claim that the Commission should
have taken into consideration the testimony of Mr.
Bernardino… The Commission could not have
taken judicial cognizance of said testimony, for
various reasons: first, it is not a proper subject of
judicial notice, as it is not a "known" fact; second,
it was given in a subsequent and distinct case
after the Rizal Light's MFR was heard by the
Commission en banc and submitted for decision;
and third, it was not brought to the attention of the
Commission in this case through an appropriate
pleading.
-Re: the contention of Rizal Light that the
Commission had acted both as prosecutor and
judge… There are two matters that had to be
decided in this case, namely, the order to show
cause and the petition or complaint filed by
respondent municipality. Both matters were heard
jointly, and the record shows that respondent
municipality had been allowed to present its
evidence to substantiate its complaint. It can not
be said, therefore, that in this case the
Commission had acted as prosecutor and judge.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
there was a commingling of the prosecuting and
investigating functions, this exercise of dual
functions, is authorized by Sec17(a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended.
-Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Estate of F.P.
Buan (1958) the power of the Commission to
cancel and revoke a certificate of public
convenience and necessity may be exercised by it
even without a formal charge filed by any
interested party, with the only limitation that the
holder of the certificate should be given his day in
court.
-When prosecuting and investigating duties are
delegated by statute to an administrative body, as
in the case of the Public Service Commission, said
body may take steps it believes appropriate for the
proper exercise of said duties, particularly in the
manner of informing itself whether there is
probable violation of the law and/or its rules and
regulations. It may initiate an investigation, file a
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
complaint, and then try the charge as preferred.
So long as the respondent is given a day in court,
there can be no denial of due process, and
objections to said procedure cannot be sustained.
3. The rule is inapplicable.
-"protection-of-investment rule" - Batangas
Transpo Co. vs. Orlanes
-"The Government having taken over the control
and supervision of all public utilities, so long as an
operator under a prior license complies with the
terms and conditions of his license and reasonable
rules and regulations for its operation and meets
the reasonable demands of the public, it is the
duty of the commission to protect rather than to
destroy his investment by the granting of the
second license to another person for the same
thing over the same route of travel. The granting
of such a license does not serve its convenience or
promote the interests of the public."
-This rule is not absolute, for nobody has exclusive
right to secure a franchise or a certificate of public
convenience. Where, as in the present case, it has
been shown by ample evidence that the Rizal
Light, despite ample time and opportunity given to
it by the Commission, had failed to render
adequate, sufficient and satisfactory service and
had violated the important conditions of its
certificate as well as the directives and the rules
and regulations of the Commission, the rule cannot
apply.
-To apply that rule unqualifiedly is to encourage
violation or disregard of the terms and conditions
of the certificate and the Commission's directives
and regulations, and would close the door to other
applicants who could establish, operate and
provide adequate, efficient and satisfactory
service for the benefit and convenience of the
inhabitants. It should be emphasized that the
paramount consideration should always be the
public interest and public convenience. The duty of
the Commission to protect the investment of a
public utility operator refers only to operators of
good standing - those who comply with the laws,
rules and regulations — and not to operators who
are unconcerned with the public interest and
whose investments have failed or deteriorated
because of their own fault.
4. NO
-Sec16(n) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, confers upon the Commission ample
power and discretion to order the cancellation and
revocation of any certificate of public convenience
issued to an operator who has violated, or has
willfully and contumaciously refused to comply
with, any order, rule or regulation of the
Commission or any provision of law. What matters
is that there is evidence to support the action of
the Commission.
-In the instant case, as shown by the evidence, the
contumacious refusal of the Rizal Light since 1954
to comply with the directives, rules and regulations
of the Commission, its violation of the conditions of
its certificate and its incapability to comply with its
commitment as shown by its inadequate service,
were the circumstances that warranted the action
of the Commission in not merely imposing a fine
but in revoking altogether Rizal Light's certificate.
To allow Rizal Light to continue its operation would
be to sacrifice public interest and convenience in
favor of private interest.
-The imposition of a fine may only be one of the
remedies which the Commission may resort to, in
its discretion. But that remedy is not exclusive of,
or has preference over, the other remedies. And
this Court will not substitute its discretion for that
of the Commission, as long as there is evidence to
support the exercise of that discretion by the
Commission.
Disposition The two decisions of the Public
Service Commission affirmed, with costs in the two
cases against Rizal Light & Ice Co., Inc.
BORJA V MORENO, ET AL.
11 SCRA 568
MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1964
FACTS
- Borja is the owner of a parcel of land.
- An administrative complaint was filed against a
number of landowners, among them petitioner
Borja, for abatement of nuisance and demolition of
illegally constructed dams, dikes or any other
works in the public navigable rivers in Macabebe,
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
2056.
- In the particular case of Borja, he was alleged to
have closed the stream called Matlaue, supposedly
public, which runs through his land.
- Benjamin Yonzon, an attorney in the Department
of Public Works and Communications, was
designated by the Secretary to investigate the
charges in the complaint.
- A copy of the decision, purportedly signed by the
Undersecretary, M. B. Bautista, was served upon
counsel for Borja ordering the latter to remove the
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dams and/or dikes illegally constructed across the
channel of the southern portion of Batacan-
Matlaue
- The foregoing decision of respondent Secretary
was assailed by petitioner Borja.
- The trial the court rendered the judgment
granting the writs prayed for by petitioner;
declaring null and void and of no legal effect all
proceedings had by respondents in the
administrative investigation, including the
decision; restraining and prohibiting respondent
Secretary from enforcing said decision, and
declaring the injunction previously issued to be
permanent.
ISSUES
1. WON the lower Court erred in holding in effect
that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional
2. The lower Court erred in not finding the decision
of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications supported by evidence.
HELD
1. NO.
- It is not true that the trial court ruled the
foregoing provisions unconstitutional. On the
contrary, it declined to pass upon the
constitutional question on the ground that those
provisions do not apply to the facts of the instant
case.
- The particular fact which removes this case from
the purview of RA 2056 and which it considered
duly established by the evidence is that the
Matlaue stream which runs through the land of
petitioner-appellee is not a public navigable river
but his private property.
- The implication is that the authority of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to
proceed under the provisions of said statute
covers only cases where there is no dispute as to
the public navigable character of the river or
waterway alleged to be illegally obstructed, but
that when this is precisely a basic fact in
contention the matter should be left to the courts
for determination.
- There is a certain danger in leaving the
adjudication of a claim of private ownership of
property, vis-a-vis the Government, in the hands of
an executive official. This danger is demonstrated
by the very argument of appellants under their
third and fourth assignments of error. They point
to the evidence submitted at the administrative
investigation and, invoking the "substantial
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
evidence" rule, assail the lower court's conclusion
that the Matlaue stream is privately owned.
- The said rule, indeed, which has been applied in
a number of cases in this jurisdiction, is that if
there is substantial evidence to support the
findings of an administrative official in matters
within his competence, that is, "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion" the courts are
bound to look no further, not even to consider
contrary evidence of a preponderant nature.
- If the decision of the administrative official
carries with it, as the premise upon which it rests,
a finding that certain property claimed by a private
party to be his is in fact part of the public domain,
it does not seem fair to take that finding as
conclusive upon the courts just because it is
supported by substantial evidence, although there
may be evidence to the contrary which, if properly
considered and evaluated, would lead them to a
different conclusion.
2. YES.
- There is substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of respondent Secretary that the
Matlaue stream is a public navigable river. This
evidence consists of the testimony of two
witnesses, one a farmer and the other a fisherman,
and of the result of the ocular inspection
conducted by the investigator.
- Nevertheless, the Court di not feel justified in
affirming, for purposes of adjudication, the
aforesaid conclusion of respondent Secretary, and
reversing that of the trial court, for the
investigation wherein the evidence was received
was conducted with manifest disregard of the
requirements of due process. And it was solely on
that ground that the members of this Court agreed
that the decision should be predicated.
MACEDA V ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD
199 SCRA 454
EN BANC; July 18, 1991
FACTS
- Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy
Regulatory Board Orders dated December 5
and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings
conducted on the second provisional increase
in oil prices did not allow him substantial
cross-examination, in effect, allegedly, a
denial of due process.
- August 2, 1990 – Respondent oil companies
filed applications for an increase in oil prices
with the ERB.
- In an order dated September 21, 1990 - The
ERB issued an order granting a provisional
increase of P1.42 per liter. Maceda filed a
petition for Prohibition on September 26,
1990 seeking to nullify the provisional
increase. The petition was dismissed by the
SC, saying that “while under Executive Order
No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does
not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-
parte, a provisional increase, as it did here,
subject to its final disposition of whether or
not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce
or increase it further; or (3) to deny the
application.”
- In the same order of September 21, 1990,
authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set
the applications for hearing with due notice
to all interested parties on October 16, 1990.
Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said
hearing as well as on the second hearing an
October 17, 1990. The hearing was
postponed to October 20 to afford the
oppositors the chance to be heard. Another
postponement followed on November 5
because of a written request by Maceda.
- November 5, 1990 - The three oil
companies filed their respective motions for
leave to file or admit amended/supplemental
applications to further increase the prices of
petroleum products.
- Hearing for the presentation of the
evidence-in-chief commenced on November
21, 1990 with ERB ruling that testimonies of
witnesses were to be in the form of
Affidavits. ERB subsequently outlined the
procedure to be observed in the reception of
evidence as follows: to defer the cross-
examination of applicant Caltex's witness
and ask the other applicants to present their
evidence-in-chief so that the oppositors will
have a better idea of what all of these will
lead to. It was the intention of the Board to
act on these applications on an industry-wide
basis and the best way to give the oppositors
and a clear picture of what the applicants are
asking for is to have all the evidence-in-chief
to the presented first. Cross-examination
was to follow afterwards.
- Maceda maintains that this order of proof
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deprived him of his right to finish his cross-
examination of Petron's witnesses and
denied him his right to cross-examine each of
the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points
out that this relaxed procedure resulted in
the denial of due process.
ISSUE
WON the order of presentation of evidence has
resulted to denial of due process
HELD
NO
Ratio The order of testimony both with respect to
the examination of the particular witness and to
the general course of the trial is within the
discretion of the court and the exercise of this
discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the
order prescribed by the rules is not improper.
Reasoning
- Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in
administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in
matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as
exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial,
function. As such administrative agency, it is not
bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
governing court proceedings
- Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB
provides that: “These Rules shall govern
pleadings, practice and procedure before the
Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of inquiry,
study, hearing, investigation and/or any other
proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board.
However, in the broader interest of justice, the
Board may, in any particular matter, except itself
from these rules and apply such suitable
procedure as shall promote the objectives of the
Order.”
Disposition Petitions dismissed.
BANTOLINO V COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHIL
G.R. No. 153660
BELLOSILLO; JUNE 10 2003
FACTS
-Employees of Coca-Cola Bottlers filed complaint
against the company for unfair labor practice
through illegal dismissal, violation of their security
of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo
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Dean Carlota
System.
-Coca-cola denies that there was ER-EE
relationship (said independent contractors were
the ERs). Labor Arbiter that there was and ordered
reinstatement and payment of backwages.
-On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the
Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an ER-EE
relationship between the complainants and
respondent company.
-Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the CA which,
although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an
ER-EE rel existed bet. the contending parties,
nonetheless agreed with respondent that the
affidavits of some of the complainants, Bantolino
and 6 others, should not have been given
probative value for their failure to affirm the
contents thereof and to undergo cross-
examination. As a consequence, the CA dismissed
their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. (In
the same decision, other complainants were
declared regular employees since they were the
only ones subjected to cross-examination)
-Petitioners: CA should not have given weight to
respondent’s claim of failure to cross-examine
them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor
cases are decided based merely on the parties’
position papers and affidavits in support of their
allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be
filed thereto. The Rules of Court should not be
strictly applied in this case specifically by putting
them on the witness stand to be cross-examined
because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure
which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming
up with a decision in their favor.
-Respondent: since the other alleged affiants were
not presented in court to affirm their statements,
much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits
should be stricken off the records for being self-
serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE/S
WON giving evidentiary value to the affidavits
(despite the failure of the affiants to affirm their
contents and undergo the test of cross-
examination) is proper
HELD
YES
- Rabago v NLRC: "the argument that the affidavit
is hearsay because the affiants were not presented
for cross-examination is not persuasive because
the rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before
A2010
administrative bodies like the NLRC where
decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers only."
-Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v.
NLRC states: under Art. 221 of the Labor Code,
the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do
not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process.
-Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound
by the technical niceties of law and procedure and
the rules obtaining in courts of law. The Revised
Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may
be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy
or in a suppletory character and effect
-People v. Sorrel (cited by respondent) saying that
an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere
hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary
value, cannot find relevance in the present case
considering that a criminal prosecution requires a
quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the
discretion to determine the necessity of a formal
trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not
even required as the cases may be decided based
on verified position papers, with supporting
documents and their affidavits.
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