Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/07/2021 05:14 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Mariano,Deputy Clerk

1 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP

ROBERT E. MANGELS (Bar No. 48291)
2 rmangels@jmbm.com
MATTHEW D. HINKS (Bar No. 200750)
3 mhinks@jmbm.com
1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
4 Los Angeles, California 90067-4308
Telephone: (310) 203-8080
5 Facsimile: (310) 203-0567
Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS
6 TECHNOLOGY CENTER

7 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP

WILLIAM H. FORMAN (Bar No. 150477)
8 wforman@scheperkim.com
DAVID C. SCHEPER (Bar No. 120174)
9 dscheper@scheperkim.com
MARGARET E. DAYTON (Bar No. 274353)
10 pdayton@scheperkim.com
800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
11 Los Angeles, California 90017-2701
Telephone: (213) 613-4655
12 Facsimile: (213) 613-4656
Attorneys for Defendant CHURCH OF
13 SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

14
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
15
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
16

17
VALERIE HANEY, Case No. 19STCV21210
18
Plaintiff, [Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Richard J.
19 Burdge, Jr., Department 37]
v.
20 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY DEFENDANTS RELIGIOUS
21 INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER AND CHURCH
TECHNOLOGY CENTER; and DAVID OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
22 MISCAVIGE; and DOES 1-25, FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.7
23 Defendants.
Date: January 14, 2021
24 Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 37
25
Action filed: June 18, 2019
26 Trial date: N/A
27

28

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 1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 On March 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion asking this Court to reconsider its ruling granting

3 Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration. That motion was premised upon the contention made by

4 Plaintiff’s counsel in a declaration submitted with the motion that Plaintiff had recently uncovered

5 “new” evidence that was purportedly unavailable to her or her counsel prior to the hearing on the

6 arbitration motions. In their opposition to that motion and in this motion, Defendants exposed that

7 lie for what it was. In particular, Defendants established that the central, purportedly “new”

8 document filed with the motion for reconsideration was a document Plaintiff’s counsel held in his

9 hand as he argued about it during the hearing on the motions to compel arbitration. Defendants also

10 established that the central “new” witness that had allegedly come forward is the former co-host of

11 an anti-Scientology television show on which Plaintiff and her counsel made repeated appearances

12 and on which Plaintiff herself was credited, and is a member of a Board of Directors of a lobbying

13 organization the majority of which is comprised of lawyers representing Plaintiff in this very

14 lawsuit. Defendants further established that the nine purportedly “new” documents filed with

15 Plaintiff’s motion had either previously been filed by Defendants in this case, had previously been

16 cited by Plaintiff in her complaint, contained facts alleged in the complaint, or were available in the

17 public record (and also included one that Plaintiff made no argument from). Not surprisingly, the

18 Court rejected Plaintiff’s motion out of hand ruling that, “Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
19 new facts, circumstances or law within the meaning of [Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §] 1008.”1

20 Plaintiff’s opposition to this motion utterly fails to justify the filing of her motion for

21 reconsideration in light of the showing made by Defendants here. It is black letter law that a motion

22 for reconsideration may not be filed unless it is based on new facts or new law unavailable to the

23 moving party prior to the hearing on the previous motion. Plaintiff and her counsel here had neither

24 new facts nor new law, and instead simply manufactured “new” evidence based upon witnesses and

25 documents that were obviously available to them all along. Plaintiff’s motion was built upon a

26
27 Over two hundred days after Defendants gave notice of the Court’s ruling on the arbitration motion,
1

Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal seeking to overturn the Court’s
28 ruling. Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeal rejected that petition as untimely. Plaintiff then sought
review in the Supreme Court. That petition was denied as well.
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 1 foundation of falsehoods and it merits sanctions.

2 Enough is enough. Plaintiff and her counsel have long played fast and loose with the Court’s

3 rules. An award of monetary sanctions of sufficient magnitude is necessary here to deter Plaintiff,

4 her counsel and future litigants from abusing the Court’s processes through groundless motions for

5 reconsideration seeking multiple bites at the same apple. The motion should be granted.

6 II. ARGUMENT
7 A. Plaintiff Concedes That Defendants Properly and Timely Served This Motion
8 Defendants prepared and served this motion on Plaintiff’s counsel on June 25, 2020. (Hinks

9 Decl., ¶ 5.) Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7(c)(1), Plaintiff’s deadline to withdraw or correct the

10 motion pursuant to the 21-day “safe harbor” provision was July 17, 2020. (Id., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff did not

11 do so; Defendants therefore filed this motion on July 20, 2020. Plaintiff does not dispute that this

12 motion was properly served and filed in accordance with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 128.7, that she was

13 given proper notice or that she was provided the statutory safe harbor period to withdraw her motion,

14 and therefore concedes all of these points. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723,

15 728, fn. 4 (1964) (where nonmoving party fails to oppose a ground for a motion “it is assumed that

16 [nonmoving party] concedes” that ground); DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court,

17 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566 (2000) (“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue.”).

18 B. Plaintiff Fails to Address the Fact That the Central, Allegedly “New” Document
19 Filed with the Motion for Reconsideration Was Clearly Not New Evidence
20 As Defendants showed in their motion for sanctions, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration

21 was initially based upon Plaintiff’s contentions that she had been declared a suppressive person

22 (Factual Contention 1) and was terminated from Defendants’ staff (Factual Contention 2) prior to

23 her executing her Staff Departure Agreement. (Mtn. for Reconsideration, pp. 1-4.) Plaintiff falsely

24 claimed that these purported facts were unknown to her prior to the Court’s ruling on the motions

25 to compel arbitration. (See, e.g., Thompson Decl. iso Mtn. for Reconsideration, ¶ 8 (“Allowing

26 discovery would have revealed … [that] Plaintiff was forced under duress to sign the ‘Staff
27 Departure Agreement’ after she was already fired from the Sea Org” [and] “Plaintiff was already

28 declared a ‘suppressive person’ before she was forced, under duress, to sign the ‘Staff Departure

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 1 Agreement’”) (emphases in original).) Plaintiff further contended she learned of these new facts

2 through a Church document called a Fitness Board Turndown (“FBT”). (Mtn. for Reconsideration,

3 p. 2.) Based upon the supposedly “new” facts from the FBT, Plaintiff argued that she had new

4 evidence that she executed the Staff Departure Agreement under duress (id., pp. 7-8) and the

5 Agreement was unconscionable (id., pp. 8-9), and that such “new” facts warranted reconsideration.

6 Defendants readily exposed that lie. Among other things, Defendants showed that Plaintiff

7 was aware of the FBT all the way back in 2017, a fact that Plaintiff has never disputed. (Assam

8 Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Sutter Decl., ¶¶ 5-6 (Plaintiff given and reviewed FBT prior to executing Staff

9 Departure Agreement).) Defendants also showed (and the evidence filed by Plaintiff herself proved)

10 that Plaintiff’s counsel made arguments concerning the FBT at the hearing on the motion to compel

11 arbitration. (Thompson Decl. iso Mtn. for Reconsideration, Exh. 1 at pp. 3-5.) In fact, Plaintiff’s

12 counsel argued that the FBT meant that Plaintiff executed the Staff Departure Agreement under

13 duress, which was the same argument Plaintiff made in her motion for reconsideration. Obviously,

14 neither the FBT nor the purported facts derived from the FBT, were new facts, despite Plaintiff’s

15 misrepresentation to the Court that they were. See Schiffer v. CBS Corp., 240 Cal. App. 4th 246,

16 254-55 (2015) (evidence known to a party prior to the hearing on the motion and issuance of the

17 challenged order is not new evidence under Section 1008).

18 What is more, and as Defendants also showed in this motion, Plaintiff’s contentions
19 regarding the FBT never even made logical sense. If it were the case that the statements made in the

20 FBT proved that she signed the Staff Departure Agreement under duress, then the FBT must have

21 been known to Plaintiff when she signed the Agreement. In other words, it could not simultaneously

22 be true that Plaintiff was coerced into signing the Staff Departure Agreement by reason of the FBT

23 and that Plaintiff was unaware of the existence of the FBT until after the motion to compel

24 arbitration was heard. Yet, that is exactly what Plaintiff urged in her motion for reconsideration.

25 Plaintiff’s response to all of this in her opposition brief is to ignore it. The words “Fitness

26 Board Turndown,” “FBT,” duress,” “coercion,” or any other similar words, appear nowhere in her
27 brief. She does not mention the concept of being declared a suppressive person. She does not dispute

28 that she was fully aware of the FBT at all times. Plaintiff’s opposition to this motion does not even

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 1 include a declaration from the Plaintiff, and Mr. Thompson’s declaration says nothing about the

2 issue. Their silence is deafening. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel can justify the unjustifiable. They

3 attempted to deceive the Court. Their conduct deserves sanctions.

4 C. Plaintiff Fails to Rebut Defendants’ Showing That the Purportedly New Facts
5 Concerning the Scientology Arbitration Procedures Were Not New
6 Likewise, Plaintiff’s opposition brief also fails to justify the motion for reconsideration

7 based upon the supposedly “new” evidence concerning Scientology’s arbitration procedures

8 introduced through the declarations of Mike Rinder and Hana Whitfield (Factual Contention 3).

9 As Defendants pointed out in the motion for sanctions, the “facts” laid out in the Rinder

10 Declaration were not new within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure § 1008 because they were

11 always available to Plaintiff and her counsel. See Garcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal. App. 4th 674, 690

12 (1997) (party moving for reconsideration based on new facts must meet a “strict requirement of

13 diligence” and establish “a satisfactory explanation for failing to provide the evidence earlier”).

14 According to Mr. Thompson, after the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, he “and/or other

15 members of Plaintiff’s legal team” were contacted by Mr. Rinder who, Mr. Thompson claims,

16 provided Plaintiff’s lawyers with documents and information previously unavailable to them.

17 (Thompson Decl. iso Mtn. for Reconsideration, ¶ 5.)

18 Both Mr. Thompson’s declaration and the motion for reconsideration generally were
19 purposely vague and deceptive, intentionally hiding from the Court the obvious truth that both

20 Plaintiff and her lawyers have long been affiliated with Rinder. For example, Mr. Thompson did not

21 address whether he or other members of the legal team knew of, or had communicated or consulted

22 with Mr. Rinder prior to Rinder allegedly contacting him “and/or other members of Plaintiff’s legal

23 team” after the arbitration motion hearing.2 Likewise, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration did not

24 include a declaration from Plaintiff disclosing her relationship with Mr. Rinder. Nor did Plaintiff’s

25 motion papers disclose Plaintiff’s and her lawyers’ extensive affiliation with Mr. Rinder:

26  Plaintiff and Rinder served in the Sea Org together from 1995 to 2007. (Farny Decl.,
27
2
28 At the same time, neither the Rinder Declaration nor the Whitfield Declaration described their
alleged initial contacts with Plaintiff’s legal team.
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 1 ¶ 2; Rinder Decl., ¶ 2);

2  Following Plaintiff’s departure from the Sea Org in 2017, she and Rinder
reconnected and worked together on the anti-Scientology television series, Leah
3 Remini: Scientology and the Aftermath (the “Aftermath”). Mr. Rinder was a co-host
of the show along with Leah Remini, and Plaintiff was Ms. Remini’s personal
4 assistant. (Farny Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; FAC ¶ 69.);
5  Plaintiff also appeared over the past two years on three episodes of the Aftermath
appearing and conversing with Mr. Rinder. (Farny Decl., ¶ 6);
6
 Plaintiff’s counsel, Marci Hamilton, appeared on another episode with Mr. Rinder in
7 August 2019 also appearing and conversing with Mr. Rinder. (Id.);
8  Mr. Rinder sits on the Board of Directors of a lobbying organization, the majority of
which is composed of Rinder and three of Plaintiff’s lawyers representing her here:
9 Marci Hamilton, Jeffrey Fritz and Brian Kent. (Forman Decl. Ex. R);
10  Plaintiff’s lawyer, Marci Hamilton, is the CEO of that lobbying organization. (Id.)

11 Mr. Thompson also did not disclose in his declaration that, while Mr. Rinder, Plaintiff and

12 her legal team were appearing on television together and serving on the same board, Mr. Rinder was

13 also employed as a so-called expert on Scientology arbitration procedures in the Garcia v. Church

14 of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc., M.D. Fla., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM lawsuit. (Forman

15 Decl., ¶¶ 13, 17.) The Garcia case, as the Court is aware, like this one, involved a motion to compel

16 arbitration based upon the same arbitration provision that was at issue here. Rinder provided two

17 publicly-available declarations in 2013 and 2014 in the Garcia case concerning the procedures of

18 Scientology arbitration that by and large mimic the Rinder Declaration filed in this case. (Forman
19 Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17, Exs. L, P). The opinions generated in the Garcia case were featured heavily and

20 discussed at length in Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration.

21 Defendants also showed in this motion that even the documents cited by Mr. Rinder in his

22 declaration were available to Plaintiff and her counsel had they bothered to conduct any kind of

23 reasonable investigation required by Section 128.7 because those documents were either: (1) already

24 in the possession of Plaintiff’s counsel as reflected in the quotations from the documents in the

25 complaint filed in the Bixler case; (2) were filed by Defendants in this case; (3) were previously

26 filed in the Garcia case and available publicly; (4) or were taken from the same Internet websites
27 quoted by Plaintiff’s counsel in the Bixler complaint. (Motion for Sanctions, pp. 15:3-16:21.)

28 As to Hana Whitfield, Defendants showed that Plaintiff’s counsel also knew of Ms.

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 1 Whitfield prior to the arbitration motion hearing. (Forman Decl. Ex. S.) According to her declaration

2 filed with Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, Ms. Whitfield left the Church in 1984. (Whitfield

3 Decl. (Thompson Decl. iso Mtn. for Reconsideration, Exh. 6), ¶ 3.) The Whitfield Declaration

4 offered no information not already addressed in the Rinder declaration. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion for

5 reconsideration did not rely on the Whitfield Declaration for any particular fact. The motion cited

6 to the Whitfield Declaration only four times3 (pp. 3, 4, 5.), and each time the motion cited to the

7 same paragraphs of the Whitfield Declaration together with the same paragraphs from the Rinder

8 Declaration, no surprise given that the declarations are duplicative. In the opposition to this motion,

9 Plaintiff fails to identify a single fact from the Whitfield Declaration that was necessary to their

10 motion for reconsideration or a single purported fact that was not already in the Rinder Declaration.

11 Given the evidence submitted by Defendants with their motion for sanctions and opposition

12 to the motion for reconsideration, one would have expected Plaintiff to offer some evidence—any

13 evidence—that would at least attempt to show that, despite their extensive contacts with Mr. Rinder

14 going back several years, Plaintiff could not have filed the Rinder Declaration and attached exhibits

15 with her original opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. That was precisely her burden when

16 filing the motion for reconsideration. See New York Times Co., 135 Cal. App. 4th at 214 (where

17 movant “undoubtedly possessed the means to” contact potential witnesses and obtain testimony

18 from them previously and chose not to, the testimony is not “new” evidence on a motion for
19 reconsideration). But Plaintiff offered no such evidence with her motion for reconsideration, and

20 offers none here. Her counsel does not deny knowing Mr. Rinder or being fully acquainted with his

21 anti-Scientology views long before this lawsuit was even filed. And, as noted above, Plaintiff’s

22 opposition papers do not include a declaration from Plaintiff addressing her relationship with Mr.

23 Rinder or her knowledge of the matters discussed in the Rinder declaration concerning Scientology

24 arbitration, which is particularly striking given Plaintiff’s long affiliation with Mr. Rinder, and

25 before that, her service with the Church, including her training in Scientology Ethics and Justice

26
3
27 In one of those instances, the motion cited to the Whitfield declaration for the proposition that
Plaintiff had been declared a Suppressive Person (p. 5), which is: (1) not true; (2) not a fact even
28 claimed in the Whitfield declaration; and (3) not something that Whitfield has a proper foundation
to testify about even if she did allege it.
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 1 procedures. (See Order Granting Mtns. to Compel Arbitration, pp. 9-10 (documenting Plaintiff’s

2 service in Church including as an “Ethics Officer” and training in “Scientology justice materials”).

3 Instead, Plaintiff offers nothing but argument and doubles down on her obviously false

4 contention that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was based upon new facts not previously

5 available. The Court has already rejected this contention. (Order denying Mtn. for Reconsideration,

6 p. 3 (“Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that new facts, circumstances or law within the meaning of

7 section 1008.”)). Plaintiff’s failure to address Defendant’s evidence, the Court’s ruling or to justify

8 her motion for reconsideration in light of the evidence in the record is telling.

9 Plaintiff also contends that sanctions should not be awarded because, purportedly, Plaintiff

10 conducted a “reasonable investigation.” (Opp. Br., p. 2.) But nowhere does Plaintiff ever identify

11 what this supposedly reasonable investigation consisted of and submits no evidence substantiating

12 her claim that she conducted a reasonable investigation in connection with the motion to compel

13 arbitration or her motion for reconsideration. Instead, Plaintiff argues that she satisfied her

14 obligation of a reasonable inquiry by seeking permission from the Court to engage in discovery as

15 part of her opposition to the motion to compel arbitration. (Opp. Br., p. 2.) Nonsense. As Plaintiff

16 herself acknowledges, a “reasonable inquiry” means an inquiry reasonable under “all the

17 circumstances of a case.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir.

18 1990). Plaintiff argued in her opposition to Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration that she
19 executed the Staff Departure Agreement under duress. As to the FBT, a reasonable investigation

20 under the circumstances at an irreducible minimum would have led Plaintiff’s counsel to question

21 their own client regarding the circumstances of the execution of that Departure Agreement and the

22 reasons that led her to claim it was executed under duress and present that evidence with her original

23 opposition papers. A reasonable investigation would also have uncovered the purported “facts” set

24 forth in the Rinder declaration given Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff’s counsel’s close association with

25 Rinder over many years, the fact that Rinder served as a purported expert on Scientology arbitration

26 procedures in the Garcia case, and the Garcia case, the only reported case addressing Scientology
27 arbitration, was discussed at length in Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration.

28 Plaintiff accuses Defendants of making an absurd argument that a reasonable investigation

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 1 requires a party to search the dockets of every case cited in any motion for potentially relevant filings

2 and exhibits. (Opp. Br., pp. 4-5.)4 Defendants nowhere made such a bizarre contention. Rather,

3 Defendants’ point—unrebutted by Plaintiff’s opposition papers—is that, had Plaintiff’s counsel

4 conducted a reasonable investigation prior to filing the opposition to the motions to compel

5 arbitration, that investigation would have led Plaintiff to uncover the publicly-available facts and

6 documents, including the documents filed in the Garcia case, which Plaintiff falsely claimed were

7 “new” in connection with her motion for reconsideration. No reasonable lawyer would have

8 presented the Rinder Declaration as “new” under these circumstances. Sanctions are warranted.

9 D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration Was Based upon Frivolous Legal

10 Arguments, Which Plaintiff Fails to Justify
11 Defendants also established that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was littered with

12 frivolous legal contentions that independently warrant sanctions. Eichenbaum v. Alon, 106 Cal. App.

13 4th 967, 976 (2003) (violation of legal certification under Section 128.7(b) warrants the imposition

14 of sanctions). Specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s request that the Court reconsider its

15 arbitration ruling under LeFrancois v. Goel, 35 Cal. 4th 1094 (2005), was procedurally improper

16 under the very authority Plaintiff cited, that Plaintiff’s legal contentions regarding the import of the

17 FBT were untenable and frivolous, and that the newly-minted legal arguments in Plaintiff’s motion

18 for reconsideration were based on known facts and existing law, including cases dating from 2012
19 and before, were therefore not “new” and could not possibly justify reconsideration.

20 Plaintiff largely ignores these points. As to the one argument Plaintiff does address—

21 regarding LeFrancois—Plaintiff contends that her request that the Court “reconsider its ruling

22 under” LeFrancois was proper. No reasonable attorney could make such a contention in light of the

23 LeFrancois opinion and subsequent authorities. As Defendants explained, while LeFrancois permits

24 a court to reconsider a prior ruling on its own motion, the Court also unequivocally held that a party

25 may not file a motion for reconsideration to invoke the Court’s inherent authority. LeFrancois, 35

26 Cal. 4th at 1108 (“[A] party may not file a written motion to reconsider that has procedural
27
4
28 Strangely, the Thompson Declaration discusses and attaches the dockets from the cases cited in
the motion for sanctions, not their motions to compel arbitration.
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 1 significance if it does not satisfy the requirements of section … 1008.”). Moreover, reconsideration

2 under LeFrancois is permitted to allow a court to “correct its own errors” based upon the evidence

3 originally submitted. Id.at 1107; In re Marriage of Herr, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1470 (2009).

4 Plaintiff violated both of these limitations and filed a written motion under LeFrancois based

5 upon supposedly new evidence, claiming that the “new” evidence warranted reconsideration. In

6 opposition, Plaintiff inexplicably cites Herr for the correct proposition that a court may reconsider

7 a prior ruling under LeFrancois based upon the evidence originally submitted but ignores the fact

8 that that is not what Plaintiff did here. Plaintiff also cites New York Times v. Superior Court, 135

9 Cal. App. 4th 206, 211 (2005), for the point that a court may order reconsideration on its own motion

10 after an opportunity to respond, but again ignores the fact that that did not happen here either.

11 Instead, Plaintiff filed a motion asking for reconsideration under LeFrancois based upon supposedly

12 new facts and law, which is a prohibited practice under the very authority Plaintiff moved.

13 E. The Court Should Award Sanctions in the Full Amount Sought by Defendants
14 Defendants established in their motion that the factual and legal contentions underlying

15 Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration were frivolous. In compliance with Section 128.7(c),

16 Defendants provided Plaintiff with a 21-day safe harbor period to withdraw or correct her motion.

17 Plaintiff refused to do so. Sanctions are warranted.

18 True, courts are careful to balance the need to deter sanctionable conduct with the desire to
19 permit vigorous advocacy. For example, the Peake opinion, cited by Plaintiff, noted that, “[f]orceful

20 representation often requires that an attorney attempt to read a case or an agreement in an innovative

21 though sensible way” and “the law is constantly evolving, and effective representation sometimes

22 compels attorneys to take the lead in that evolution.” Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 441. But this is

23 not a case of innovative advocacy, or a lawyer pushing an aggressive reading of case or a contract.

24 This is a case of a litigant making provably-false claims, such as Plaintiff’s claim that the FBT

25 constituted new evidence when her lawyer held the document in his hand and argued from it at the

26 hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. (Thompson Decl. iso Mtn. for Reconsideration, Exh. 1
27 at pp. 3-5). This is a case of a litigant withholding obviously relevant information to mislead the

28 Court, such as Plaintiff’s contention that the Rinder declaration constituted “new” evidence even

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 1 though the declaration principally relied on documents already in the record (see Motion for

2 Sanctions, pp. 15:3-16:21 and accompanying citations) and Rinder, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s lawyers

3 have long been well acquainted (Farny Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; FAC ¶ 69; Forman Decl. Ex. R).

4 Plaintiff also argues that Section 128.7 is not a fee-shifting statute and that the sanction

5 awarded should be limited to what is necessary to deter future wrongful conduct. However, Section

6 128.7(d)(1) specifically authorizes, “an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the

7 reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation,” which in

8 this case is the amount Defendants incurred opposing the motion for reconsideration. See, e.g.,

9 Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 432 (affirming trial court’s decision to impose as sanctions under

10 Section 128.7 the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims and $60,000—the full amount defendant incurred

11 in attorney’s fees defending the action). In addition, Section 128.7(c)(1) also specifically authorizes

12 the Court to award the prevailing party its attorney’s fees incurred in presenting the motion. Thus,

13 the sanctions sought by way of this motion are specifically authorized by statute. And where, as

14 here, the violations have been committed by multiple attorneys of record, only a significant award

15 of sanctions would offer the deterrent against future violations envisioned by Section 128.7.

16 Finally, Plaintiff argues that sanctions should not be awarded because Defendants have not

17 alleged bad faith. That is both beside the point and wrong. In the first place, a party moving for

18 sanctions under Section 128.7 need not show subjective bad faith, but instead that the challenged
19 conduct was objectively unreasonable. SASCO v. Rosendin Elec., Inc., 207 Cal. App. 4th 837, 847

20 fn. 5 (2012); see also Peake, 227 Cal. App. 4th at 440 (issue under Section 128.7 is whether “the

21 party’s conduct in asserting the claim [i]s objectively unreasonable”). Not only was Plaintiff’s

22 motion for reconsideration objectively unreasonable here, but the conduct of Plaintiff and her

23 attorneys, including their outright falsehoods and their lack of candidness with the Court fully

24 documented in Defendants’ motion for sanctions and their opposition to the motion for

25 reconsideration, clearly shows their bad faith. Sanctions are appropriate.

26 III. CONCLUSION
27 For all of these reasons, the Court should grant this motion and award sanctions to

28 Defendants and against Plaintiff and her counsel in the amount of $160,220.

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 1 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
MITCHELL LLP
2

3 By: _________________________________ By:_________________________________

MATTHEW D. HINKS WILLIAM H. FORMAN
4
Attorneys for Defendant RELIGIOUS Attorneys for Defendant CHURCH OF
5 TECHNOLOGY CENTER SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

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 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1900 Avenue
4 of the Stars, 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308.

5 On January 7, 2021, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION BY DEFENDANTS RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY
6 CENTER AND CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL FOR SANCTIONS
PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §128.7 as follows:
7
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
8
BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the
9 persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and
mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with the practice of
10 Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell LLP for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the
11 ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with
postage fully prepaid. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The
12 envelope was placed in the mail at Los Angeles, California.

13 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package

provided by the overnight service carrier and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the
14 Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or
a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight service carrier or delivered such document(s) to a
15 courier or driver authorized by the overnight service carrier to receive documents.

16 BY E-MAIL: I caused the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address sj2@jmbm.com to

the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable
17 time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was
unsuccessful.
18
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
19 foregoing is true and correct.

20
Executed on January 7, 2021, at Los Angeles, California.
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 1 SERVICE LIST
2

3 SERVED VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney

AND E-MAIL
4 Robert W. Thompson
Kristen A. Vierhaus
5 THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C.
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
6 Burlingame, CA 94010

8 ATTORNEY NOT ADMITTED TO THE

CALIFORNIA BAR – SERVED VIA U.S.
9 MAIL AS A COURTESY

10 Brian D. Kent Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney

Guy D’Andrea
11 M. Stewart Ryan
Lauren E. Stram
12 LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
13 Philadelphia, PA 19102
bkent@lbk-law.com
14
Jeffrey P. Fritz Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
15 Lauren Goodfellow

16 SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P.C.

1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
17
jfritz@lawsz.com
18
Marci Hamilton Attorneys for Plaintiff Valerie Haney
19 University of Pennsylvania
Fox-Fels Building
20 3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
21 hamilton.marci@gmail.com

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 1 SERVED VIA EMAIL Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology
International
2 Peggy Dayton
William Forman
3 David Scheper
Jeffrey Steinfeld
4 SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
th
5 800 West Sixth Street, 18 Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
6 pdayton@scheperkim.com
wforman@scheperkim.com
7 dscheper@scheperkim.com
jsteinfeld@scheperkim.com
8
SERVED VIA EMAIL Attorneys for Specially-Appearing Defendant
9 David Miscavige
Jeffrey K. Riffer
10 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN
GARTSIDE LLP
11 10345 W. Olympic Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90064
12 jriffer@elkinskalt.com

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