ESTAFA JURISPRUDENCE

♦ As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who
is simply a middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:

A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating
contracts relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator
between other parties, never acting in his own name, but in the name of those who employed
him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purposes the agent of both parties. 1

♦ Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the
questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. 2

An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.
Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.

♦ It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others that there be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except
when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The
overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. 3

♦ EUGENIO v PEOPLE
(G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008)

True, conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the
concerted acts of the accused. However, this does not dispense with the requirement that
conspiracy, like the felony itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a
reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense as principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the
accused as accessory or accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused. 4

Here, petitioner's acts which the lower courts considered as constitutive of her complicity in the supposed
plot to swindle Mangali consisted of the following: (1) petitioner was the one who brought Saquitan, Ty,
and Ablaza to Mangali; (2) petitioner was present in all the occasions Mangali met Saquitan, Ty, and Ablaza;
(3) petitioner confirmed that TCT No. 171602 was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila when in
fact it was already cancelled; and (4) the real "Epifania Saquitan" denied mortgaging the Sta. Ana property
to Mangali. By themselves, these circumstances can plausibly pass muster to prove petitioner's
involvement in a plan among the accused to swindle Mangali.

However, when petitioner's side is considered, taking into account admitted facts and unrebutted claims,
her participation in the events leading to her arrest is cast in an entirely new light raising reasonable doubt
as to her culpability. These facts and unrefuted claims are: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission
basis, in the latter's check re-discounting and lending businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila
certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 that Saquitan gave petitioner.

As Mangali's agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not
earn commissions. This also explains why she was present in all the ocassions Mangali met Saquitan and Ty
- she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable
her to receive commission from Mangali.

At any rate, for the presumption of authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to
profit or had profited from the use of the falsified document. 5
1
De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017.
2
Consing v. People, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013.
3
Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996.
4
Eugenio v. People, G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008.
5
Eugenio v. People, G.R. No. 168163, March 26, 2008.
 Here, the extent of petitioner's participation on Ty's loan was to bring Ty (and Ablaza) to Mangali. The
prosecution failed to show any proof that petitioner received a portion of the loan Mangali extended to Ty,
just as there is no proof on record that she received any share from the loan Mangali extended to Saquitan.
Petitioner is not a party to any of the documents Mangali, Ty, and Saquitan signed.

♦ QUEZON v. PEOPLE
(G.R. No. 169109, September 7, 2006)

In the case at bench, the record shows that the acts of accused-appellent Reynaldo Quezon were evidently
aimed at achieving a common design and purpose, that is, to defraud the private complainant Clarita
Ramos. Thus, he told her that he was engaged in the "bote at bakal" business (Accused-Appellant's Brief, p.
5); however, in his testimony, he introduced himself to private complainant as seller of forty (40) gold bars
and a Buddha. In another time, Reynaldo said he was only a mere agent of gold bars. Thereafter, every time
he would meet the private complainant, Reynaldo would persuade private complainant to buy the gold
bars, notwithstanding the latter's repeated refusal to do so as she was not interested. He also assured the
private complainant that the gold bars he was offering for sale were 100% genuine, for they came from Mt.
Pinatubo, and that the Aetas were in a hurry looking for buyers because they badly needed money for their
food. When private complainant was finally persuaded to buy the gold bars, Reynaldo, together with his
daughter and Arcadio Dumdum, accompanied private complainant twice in going to Bamban, Tarlac where
the gold bars were allegedly kept.

On January 15, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner and his daughter Teresita of the
crime of estafa, holding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
that they were in conspiracy with Dumdum in defrauding Clarita.

In assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision, petitioner contends that the evidence for the prosecution failed
to establish conspiracy. He maintains that his participation in the transaction is not sufficient to conclude
that he and Dumdum have a common design. At most, he merely acted as an agent of Dumdum not knowing
that the gold bars he was selling as agent were fake.

The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may not be reviewed by this Court, except (a) when its factual
findings and those of the trial court are contradictory; (b) when its inference is manifestly mistaken or
absurd; (c) when its judgment is premised on its misapprehension of the facts; and, (d) when it failed to
resolve relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a modification or reversal of the decision
of the appellate court.

Petitioner failed to show that his petition falls under any of these exceptions.

♦ The fact that no proof was introduced to prove or show as to who committed the falsification
abovementioned, does not exempt or exculpate the herein accused-appellant from liability. The accused-
appellant is the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the documents in question as such, 'it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsifications.' (Sarep vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440;
449).6

♦ The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used
a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification.

If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of
it and profiting thereby, - the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. 7

♦ Unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2(a) of that
provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated or converted
the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by the
complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. 8

♦ In estafa, damage to the offended party, not the gain of the offender, is the important consideration. 9

6
Maliwat v. CA, G.R. Nos. 107041-42, May 15, 1996.
7
Maliwat v. CA, G.R. Nos. 107041-42, May 15, 1996.
8
Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 199294, July 31, 2013.
9
Reyes, L. B. (2012), Revised Penal Code Book Two (Eighteenth ed.)
♦ In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they actually took no part in
the negotiations, never saw the customer." For the Court, the primary occupation of a broker is simply
bringing "the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made.” 10

♦ In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan11, this Court said:

Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the
assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually must
be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate
that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them to concert means is proved. Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which is essentially hatched under
cover and out of view of others than those directly concerned, is perhaps most frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances only. (Emphasis supplied.)

♦ In the crime of estafa, the gravity of the offense is not determined by the value which accused has delivered
or has returned to the offended party after the criminal action is instituted, but by the value which is not
delivered of returned upon the obligation to do so and before the institution of the criminal action. 12

♦ The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (or
imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to eight years), if the amount of the fraud is over
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period (6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years), adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be." 13

♦ Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person 14

♦ Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of a criminal case.15

10
De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017.
11
G.R. Nos. 98494-98692, etc., July 17, 2003.
12
People v. Pagayon, 71 Phil. 337.
13
De la Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 105213, December 4, 1996.
14
Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996.
15
Consing v. People, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013.