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Audience participation: Media power in the emergent public spheres in China

Keywords: public sphere, media power, participation, Chinese media,

qualitative discourse analysis

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The concept “public sphere” was in a large degree derived from German sociologist

Jurgen Habermas’ work The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), which

analyzed the origins and transformation of bourgeois public spheres in European countries.

The public sphere in the strict Habermasian’s sense refers to an intermediary between the

state and civil society where autonomous people can gather and discuss freely issues

concerning the public, and affect the political decision makings of the state. It is the site

where public opinion is debated and formed deliberatively, and where the state learns the

needs of its people.

Source: Habermas (2006): The role of the public sphere and media independence in deliberative politics.

In the public sphere, the state, mass media and the civil society represent the public with

three levels of power. The state (in the west), normally constituting of the parliament,

governmental institutions and the courts, represents the strong publics whose discourse

comprise both opinion formation and formal decision-making; the media system which

carries mediated political communication and the discursive opinion formation constitutes the

weak publics whose discourse only involves public opinion formation but not decision

making; and the civil society, composed of civic and social associations autonomously
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formed by the private citizens who are independent of the state, represents the episodic

publics who influence and give inputs to the public opinion (Fraser, 1991; Habermas, 1991;

Habermas, 2006). The three levels of publics constitute the major sources of the input and

output of the formal communication flow in the public sphere. However, it needs attention

that though this categorization of strong, weak and episodic publics reflects Habermas’

response to some critics of his “one unified public sphere” and once again reinforces the view

that hierarchical power relations exist in the public sphere or among the public spheres, the

more important task is to pursue an institutional arrangement that best serves the democratic

will formation of the public and decision making of the government bodies (Habermas,

1992).

When discussing how discursive opinions are formed in an autonomous public sphere,

Habermas (1991) stated in Further Reflections on the Public Sphere that:

“A public sphere that functions politically requires more than the institutional

guarantees of the constitutional state; it also needs the supportive spirit of

cultural traditions and patterns of socialization, of the political culture, of a

populace accustomed to freedom.” (p.453)

This thinking is rooted in his theory of communicative action from which perspective he

perceives the historical and continuing structural changes of the public sphere as a

rationalization of the lifeworld (p.453). Free communication in the public sphere is not only

generated from the institutional and legal protection from the state, but more importantly, it is

a habitual practice of the liberal political culture. Liberalism embraces free markets and

protection of individual rights. Ideally people in a mature democratic society with liberal

political culture enjoy freedom of thoughts and speech and participate equally in the

elections. For the world transitioning economies, where free markets and liberal political

culture were not the norm, Habermas (2001) commented that changes in the culture and
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traditions are unavoidable if these nations have adopted the liberal market approach to

economic reforms and participate in capitalistic modernization. The basis of the argument is

the legal system and liberal culture should be compatible with the free market to ensure the

healthy functioning of the economy. However, can we expect that the transformations in the

economic sphere will automatically bring about the adaption of the traditional culture to the

economic modernization and generate “a populace accustomed to freedom”?

Debates on the public sphere and civil society in China

Whether the public sphere has ever existed in China, and to what extent the term can be

applied to the Chinese society became debatable shortly after the concept was introduced to

the context of China. The controversy focused on whether China has a civil society that

confronts the state, considered by many as the premise for the existence of public spheres

(Bergere 1997; Rankin 1993). Scholars opposing to this idea focused on the genuineness of

the opposition between the state authority and the civil society. To them, the concept of civil

society and public sphere can be applied to China unless such confrontation exists between

the state and society. Frederic Wakeman and Philip Huang (1993) contended that since public

sphere is a “value-laden and historically specific” concept, lacking autonomy from the state

power makes “public sphere” inapplicable to China. Instead, Huang proposed a value-neutral

term “third sphere” in an effort to render “public sphere” useful in explaining the state-

society relationship in China (Huang, 1993; Yang, 2003).

Scholars supporting the idea argued otherwise that either civil society or public sphere is

applicable to the Chinese case. In the early 1990s, a few historians made the first attempt to

look for public sphere and civil society in the late imperial and modern history of China.

From some historicans’ perspectives, the Habermasian concept of civil society and public

sphere needs re-conceptualization. Some even advocated searching for a Chinese variant (e.g.

Rowe, 1993; Rankin 1993). They reasoned that China developed public sphere and civil
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society in a different style compared to the western European society. Rankin thought that the

“public sphere” has emerged in the late imperial China and grew continuously but slowly into

“local public spheres” in some parts of China. And the civil society never developed to full

fledge due to the state-society relation in the 1930s and 1940s. Bergere (1997) investigated

the state and societal changes in the Republican China through the lens of urban cities. She

claimed that the state-societal relationship in China is more complex than the one delineated

in the Habermasian model. Chamberlain (1993) used examples in the industrial workplace

and civil law to demonstrate the emergence of civil society in present China. He considered

civil society as not a counter-structure of the state but rather “a creature of the state” and

proposed that in China the state might even be “a powerful ally and instrument in the

process” of separating civil society from the society (p.209). Perry and Selden (2000) also

used cases in the civil law, and protests and resistance of the citizens in recent years to depict

the rise of civil society in China.

Other scholars adopted a less stringent Habermasian approach to study public sphere and

civil society in China. Davis et al. (1995) researched about the emergence of public spheres

in the urban settings. A particularly interesting case is the emergence of autonomous

associational life outside the state realm due to the “physical practice” such as qigong, or

private leisure, among the Chinese people (Yang, 2002). In a book later, Davis (2000) again

delved into the consumption behaviors of Chinese people and observed the increased

individual freedom in private life cultivated by the commercialization and marketization of

contemporary China. After reviewing seven books on public sphere, civil society and China,

Yang Guobin (2003) observed that the term “public sphere” was avoided direct use by those

researchers. Instead, they tended to include value-neutral concepts such as public space or

social space. Even the term “public sphere” appeared, it was not strictly Habermasian

definition. Meanwhile Yang (2003) pointed out that “Whether the authors admit it or not,
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they are implicitly guided by the normative meanings of Habermas’ concept” and “for the

development of a Chinese civil society, it is better to have these space than not” (p.7). In

another study Media, Civil Society, and the Rise of a Green Public Sphere in China, Yang

used an environmental case to illustrate how the public debates through the mass media

altered the local government’s decision to construct a hydropower project in the Southwest

China. According to him, this occurrence indicated the formation of a green public sphere of

environmental discourse, or the “possibility of multiple public spheres” (2007, p.213). This

“public sphere” is a relaxed concept, composed of public discourse, publics involved in the

communication and the media (Yang, 2007).

Furthermore, touching on the issue of autonomy of the civil society, Richard Madsen

(1993) argued that the economic reform in China has nurtured numerous social groups that

“are at least partially autonomous from the state” (p.189). In more recent studies on the

NGOs, especially the environmental NGOs, scholars revealed that though the civil society

organizations are constrained by the state and institutional regulations, this does not prevent

the people from responding to the problems concerning their interest. Many newly

established associations have obtained a relative high autonomy. Even promising, these

NGOs fostered certain degree of democratic decision-making within their organizations, and

influenced the policy-making of the central government, practices that are essential for the

development of a functional political public sphere (Dasgupta and Wheeler 1996; Knup 1997;

Ho 2001).

Paralleling the idea of subaltern and multiple public spheres, Jude Howell (2007)

proposed the emergence of a multiple civil societies in China and thought that “The diverse

civil societies do not constitute an overarching, self-conscious civil society that speaks in the

liberal democratic image of civil society with a collective voice to check the state and protect

individual rights. Yet, the growth of networks suggests that this is a direction that civil
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society may be moving towards, a direction that is nevertheless risky.” (p.22). Meanwhile,

she pointed out the tension between the burgeoning “depoliticized public sphere” focusing on

public goods and services and the episodic “politicized public sphere” checking the state

power.

In line with the view that public sphere is a useful perspective to look at the social and

political changes in China, the author agree that though China does not have an overarching,

Habermasian normative “public sphere”, the revised concept of “sub-public spheres” or

“subaltern public spheres” allow the observation of Chinese society through the lens of “the

public sphere”. Reviewing existing literature relevant to both public sphere/civil society and

media in China, the author found that although Yang Guobin’s (2003) work studied how the

mass media and internet facilitate the development and activities of civil society

organizations, systematical observation is lacking in how the public have participated in the

media for political purposes after media reform, thus transformed the media into social and

political power in the rising public sphere(s). Through scrutinizing the changing media

landscape of the Chinese media, and discourse analysis of one prominent case in 2007, this

article attempts to look at this question from a historical perspective, throwing light on the

transformative power of the media on the emergent public spheres in China. The author

intends to explain 1) how the participation of Chinese citizens in the media is made possible

by the economic and institutional reforms; 2) how the public discussion in the media

influenced the political decision-making; 3) how the media nurtured a culture oriented toward

freer expression and democratic participation.

Citizen participation and media power in the public sphere (s)

The press is historically perceived as the fourth estate. In a recent ICA speech, Habermas

(2006) expressed very similar views. He argued that four categories of powers exist in the

public sphere: 1) political power which “requires legitimation” through democratic

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procedures of public deliberation; 2) social power that demonstrates through individual social

status in a class society; 3) economic power that transforms into social power and puts

pressures on the political system; and 4) media power that resides both within the mass

communication technology and the media professionals (Habermas, 2006, p.8). For this

study, an important question is how media system is transformed into media power for the

public to influence political decision-making through citizen participation in the

communication process?

In the Structural Transformation, Habermas noted that historically, discussion in the

public sphere takes place in face-to-face conversations, in coffee shop, market place, theatre

and salon. Later on, in the mercantilist stage of capitalist society, the press transformed from

the private correspondence among the tradesmen, politicians, etc., to the public journals and

periodicals oriented at a larger literate public. This transition, Habermas said, “in turn

developed a unique power” (p.21). It merits attention that by then the public authority and the

civil society was still closely related and the differentiation of the public sphere and the

private sphere was still underway. The press immediately became the official instrument of

the state administration system rather than the outlet of the public opinions (p.22). The

governments circulated various information through these journal publications, addressed all

subjects to the educated classes, etc. Meanwhile, professors and scholars as well as bourgeois

writers (in Prussia, to be more specific) made use of the press for critical reasoning. They

attempted “to inform the public of useful truths” through reviews and even criticism of the

authority (p.25). These activities were subjected to regulation and censorship by the Prussian

authority until the French Revolution when these public opinions expressed by private people

converted into legitimating power on the authority.

In modern society, political communication in the public sphere is facilitated through the

mass media, which on the one hand provide citizens what to think about and on the other
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hand reflect the results of the deliberation of the public (Habermas, 2006, p.7). Obtaining

information through the media, citizens deliberate, discuss and analyze issues of public

relevance and then formulate public opinion and ideally influence political action. The

readers, viewers and listeners are thus connected by the media and make it a virtual and

discursive public realm where the government learns public responses to the laws, regulations

and other political decisions.

The former interpreted graph (on page 1) also illustrates the point that the power of the

media is embedded within the public sphere. It is through the media that the public opinions

are circulated and deliberated. The strong publics need to be informed by the episodic publics

and outlet their own point of views; the episodic publics mediate over the public issues, share

their opinions with others, reach the decision making bodies, and learn the possible decisions

from the strong publics again through the media. As a double-edged sword, the media system

is either a manipulative force for the system to control the public, or a resistance for the

public to legitimate the political and economic power. The quality of the input and output in

the public sphere, be it factual information or audience participation, is indispensable with the

quality of the media that selects, processes and shapes information before it reaches the civil

society and the state authorities.

Audience participation in the Chinese media

Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s book Four Theories of the Press has been dominant in

how the west perceived press in communist or authoritarian countries. The character of soviet

media was summarized as anti-professional and anti-commercial since they were political

propaganda tools used instrumentally by the communist party. As a former communist

country, China’s press system is investigated within the framework of Soviet Communist

Theory of Press and is regarded as the party’s propaganda tool. But recently, scholars of this

area have called for an alternative model to understand the structural change of Chinese
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media system since China has transformed from communism to “post-communist neo-

authoritarianism” due to domestic economic reform (Huang, 2003). As a result, several new

models are attempted, aiming at interpreting the new landscapes within the models of

political-economy, or party vs. market (Winfield & Peng, 2005; Huang, 2003). Explaining

the current situation of Chinese media through the lens of the political and commercial power

relationship is valuable given that China is placing economic development as priority within

a party-state political system. However, the media users merit attention as important role

player in the changing scene. With the redistribution of power from the center of the state to

the market, the Chinese audiences are now more active and essential to the existence of

media institutions.

The practice of news press for propaganda purposes started when the Chinese

Community Party operated newspaper and radio station during the civil war at the first half of

20th century. After the founding of PRC in 1949 and till the mid-1980s, the media continued

as an organ of the party. Brendebach (2005) commented that “traditionally…statements and

reports found in the Chinese media to be the genuine views of the leadership”.

However, evidence shows that, in rural China, citizen participated in media

related activities at a limited level. This phenomenon is in line with the grand

modernization discourse in the 1950s when Daniel Lerner, Wilbur Schramm and

others advocated that economic growth, democratization and the development of

media had a positive correlation. It is rather a result of a nation’s modernization

effort than promoting citizen’s democratic participation. When PRC was newly

founded, the Chinese central government fully adopted the modernization

viewpoint that media should play significant role in modernization of the society.

Both the national five-year plan and state’s effort to develop and use media

system embodied this idea.

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Terrell (1984) discussed how the CCP integrated the mass communication system as a

component of government agency to promote the national goal of modernizing agriculture,

education, science and technology, industry and defense throughout the country after 1949.

Back to the 1950s, when literacy level was low and radio and TV were not available to the

people in rural areas, the government created a wired speaker system as the major

communication technology and rural people relied heavily on it as a source of information.

Some part-time journalists from the rural villages were trained to “use the system to report on

various subjects of interest to area residents, including crop conditions, work assignments and

events taking place in nearby villages and communes” (Terrell, p.148). This may be regarded

as the earliest form of audience participation in the media despite of the fact that strict

guidelines were offered on what to broadcast from the central department. Thus the scope of

what topics were to be discussed publicly was limited as well. Overall speaking, at this time

the tightly controlled media was not independent from the state and could not serve as a

sphere where genuine public debate happened. And the communication was unidirectional,

from the party and central government to the people.

Nationwide, television broadcasting started in 1958 and thrived in the 1980s since the

government encouraged its development as part of the economic reform scheme. The arriving

of television was viewed by the Chinese as both “metonym and metaphor for the state’s

socialist modernity” (Sun, 2007, p.187). TV programs served as invaluable instruments in

regard to improving the skills and educational levels of the nation. Courses broadcast

throughout the national TV stations include subjects of education, medicine, electronics and

English language. After two decades, the country has the largest TV market in the world and

one third of the Chinese audience relied on television to obtain information on current events

(de Burgh, 2001; Zhang, 2006). The large population plus the encouragement of the

government to develop media fostered a huge readership and viewer-ship. This has laid the
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foundation for the participation of a wider audience and elevated the inclusiveness for the

public debate later.

When the central government decided to reform the media sector in the early 1980s, the

system undertook significant restructure. Although the party still holds to the propaganda

function of the media, but the leaders perceived the roles of media differently as China has

been undergoing social and economic transformation over the long term. Along with the

change of the media is the changing role of the audience and citizens. A large majority of the

audience was used to be passive receivers of information and propaganda for a long time, but

gradually they have become active participants after the reform. Most recently, the wide

spread internet and mobile technology transformed some though a fraction of media users to

“netizens” (Yu, June 2006).

Beginning in the 1978, the large scale media reform was enforced by the central

government under the advocacy of both party leaders and Chinese intellectuals. In this wave,

fundamental to the booming of audience participation is the commercialization of the media,

which has transformed the structure and function of Chinese media. The logic of capitalistic

market rejected party monopolistic control and forced decentralization of the press institution.

The role of media now is not only to inform, but also to sell and entertain the people.

Accordingly, the media users are no long the information receivers but consumers who now

enjoy the redistribution of power and have more say in the media market. Winfield et al

(2005) presented three typologies of Chinese media: In the center is the official mainstream

media which the central government has the ownership. They remain dominant; at the second

layer is those outer circles which used to be part of central or local government organs but

now unofficial, trade or regional media; the outmost layer includes those fringe media, those

semi-independent (financial and managerial independent) mass appeal newspapers and

magazines and internet portals. They are now the “alternative voice” and are least controlled
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by the government. The loosening of the press institutions from the unified control of the

central government gave space to the representation of more varied views and public opinion

in the media. This also promises the rising of a public sphere which is independent from the

state and mediating between the government and the people.

Consequently, to attract and satisfy the demand side has become the priority of the

media. Competition among the newspapers, magazines and television stations inspired them

to meet the interest of the audience and even draw news clues from the audience so as to

make profits from advertising. Previously, CCTV is the only legal TV station broadcasting

throughout the nation and representing the party view, but now it has the dual identity as both

the state’s throat and mouth and a business enterprise. It once operated only one channel but

has expanded to 12 channels today. Except for the channel-1 that broadcasts news and current

events in line with the party propaganda and government policies, most programs in other

channels are “propaganda-free and very much market oriented” (Huang, 2000, p.652). Thus

the number of entertainment programs boosted. As a way to win audiences and high ratings,

their participation in all kinds of forms are encouraged or rewarded. However, this form of

participation is less political oriented but more entertaining and commercial. Though it is not

the serious dialogue between the citizens and government and whether citizen voice exists

could hardly be evaluated, the participation in the TV programs may nurture a sense of

democratic procedure and a habit of public discussion among the audience. There are other

benefits as well. In her cultural readings of significant events on CCTV, Sun Wanning (2007)

numerated six brand-name programs, ranging from soap opera to political feature and

entertaining shows. All of them do have decentralization participatory elements embedded.

Commenting on the melodrama among the six, Lisa Rofel (1994) marked it as Chinese state’s

“partial withdrawal” and “the state has…enabled a discursive space for the individuals”

(p.709). Sun also said that viewing TV series fostered the “conversation, exchanges and
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debates, at home and in social settings”, which “have become integral to a new way of

socialization” (p.195). Another program, Eastern Time-Space, offered a platform to

represent audience perspectives and make their voices heard through discussing mundane

issues. The column Everyday Life Space of Eastern Time-Space is motivated by the belief to

“let people speak, and encourage them to speak truthfully and honestly” (translated by Sun

Wanning from the column’s producers’ own words, p.198).

The onboard of investigative journalism in newspapers and TV programs in 1990s is one

milestone of Chinese media, which enhanced audience’s autonomous participation. This is

the result of the government’s urgency to battle against the corruption among local officials

(Brendebach, 2005). China’s Central Television is the first to introduce this kind of program,

with the support of the then premiere Zhu Rongji. Such program soon became extremely

popular among the audience and broadcasters because it is highly critical about public events

and corruptions, for example, in the mid-1990s, Focus (jiao dian fang tan), an investigative

feature hosted by CCTV, claimed to have 30% of the audience (300 million) around the

country (Zhang, 2006). For some reasons, the audience regarded such programs as an open

forum for public discussion of the social problems and a vehicle to solve the social injustice

they met in real life (Sun, 2007). It is said that each day, outside the studio of CCTV,

hundreds of thousands of citizens waited in long line only to make their complaints and

stories public on TV. In line with the Hu-Wen government’s call for more news about

citizens’ life and concerns instead of reporting high officials’ meetings and visits abroad,

CCTV News Channel launched a Local News Report (di fang she hui xin wen) broadcasting

common people and community stories. However, as some critiques observed, since the

programs were under the guidance and supervision of the party, the extent to which the

authority of the government could be questioned or the voice of the people in the reports is

limited. Zhang Xiaoling and others analyzed Focus, and concluded that, though this
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investigative reporting “set(s) an example for the media world in China in adopting the

democratic approach of interaction and discussion, with experts and ordinary people talking

on the programme”, the topic selection, timing, and degree of criticism revealed that

government agenda was not absent (Zhang, p.725). Therefore, its function as a public forum

is restricted.

In the newspaper sections, semi-independent or quasi-independent media unit appeared.

The semi-independent media refers to those institutions that enjoy financial, managerial and

editorial autonomy but without legal status. These newspapers are often non-party and semi-

official. They are operated by organizations or government at all levels, for instance, Beijing

Youth News was published by the Beijing Communist Youth League, a party affiliated

organization; World Economic Herald obtained its license from Shanghai Academy of Social

Science, a research institution and the World Economists Association, a non-governmental

organization; and the license holder of the most famous city newspaper Chengdu Business

News is two departments of Chengdu government (Huang, 2000). While they benefit from

independence in editorial, personnel and financial matters, they are fully responsible for the

loss and profit. Ensuring more readers and acquiring a larger market share is their priority.

For example, the local daily newspaper Chengdu Business News of Chengdu, capital city of

Sichuan province, southwest of China, rewards those citizens who provide any news clue

adopted by the news editor. This method stimulates the enthusiasm of the citizens. It turns out

that the first line of many news reporting begins with acknowledging that the clue was

provided by some local resident. The semi-independent media constitute features that favor

the formation of a freer outlet for citizen input into the media. The scope of the topic is less

restricted and the editorial is more independent than before. Besides, the independence in

financial and managerial matters democratizes the decision-making process regarding media

management, which is beneficial to the growth of a healthier media.

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In the late 1990s to now, with the popularity of internet and other mobile technology, the

change has become even significant in terms of audience participation and the dialogue

between government and citizens. Though the internet is monitored by the state, the space for

public discussion is enlarged than ever. Yu Haiqing (2003) studied the transitions of urban

Chinese media users and discussed the rising citizen’s participation in online forum. She

thought that new media, particularly the internet, have transcended the temporal and spatial

limitation to decentralize citizenship and foster political participation of Chinese audience.

She cited examples to illustrate how the “netizens”, though only a very small fraction of

Chinese population, not only involved actively in online discussion but also extended such

democratic activity to real world social-political events. Their influences, according to Yu,

have already urged the government to act toward social injustices and make adjustment to

policies and regulations.

Since audiences or citizens that are accustomed to freedom of expression either in person

or through media is the prerequisite for the formation of the public sphere in liberal

democracy. Though the current Chinese political system is not a western democratic society

and will hardly become so within the next few years, the commercialization of the media has

enhanced the participation and opinion expression of the audience. This trend has changed

the Chinese social and political culture and will not so easily subject to intervention from the

above.

Media into power: A case illustration

In the past two decades, instances emerged increasingly where the citizens used the

media, particularly the internet, to make their voices heard by the governments. Even the

Chinese president showed up in a recent webcast interview and said that the CCP leaders

browsed websites and discussion forums to learn what the netizens say online about the

policies and government. Many resorted to the media and internet to expose cases injustice
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or violating the laws and regulations if they cannot reach the government through formal

procedures. Through survey data and in-depth case analysis, Yang Guobin (2003)

demonstrated the internet has facilitated public debates and problem articulation, and

nurtured associational life and civil society in China. In the following, a successful example

where the citizens used new media to guard against the government for their own rights is

analyzed to show how the media system is transformed into media power via citizen

participation in the political communication process. The media messages in an

environmental case in Xiamen, south China will be studied in terms of the political

communication in the public spheres among strong, weak and episodic publics: the formal

communication in the political institution, the mediated public opinions, and the daily talks

among citizens.

Xiamen PX Incident happened in Fujian province, south of China in 2007. In Nandu,

Haicang District of Xiamen, a massive PX (paraxylene) chemical plant was being

constructed. The PX incident is an environmental protection advocacy initiated by Xiamen

residents. The whole event embodied the current state of affairs of media institutions in China

and the autonomous participation of the media users as “citizens” in public affairs as well

(Martinsen, 2007).

Initially the decision-making regarding the PX project was neither transparent nor

democratic since the citizens were neither informed about the project nor were involved in

the discussion. But the messages disseminated by the citizens later on via emails, online short

messenger systems, or mobile phones revealed that they were very anxious and discontent

about the decision. In one of the emails, the PX chemical plant project was described as this:

if the factory starts production, it "would be like dropping an atomic bomb on Xiamen Island;

it would mean that in the future, the people of Xiamen would live in the shadow of leukemia

and deformed children." On May 29th, it was reported that over ten thousand Xiamen citizens
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were exchanging the same SMS messages. But before long, the message was screened, hard

to send or receive again, which runs as follow:

“The Xianglu Group has invested in a (benzene) project in Haicang District.

Should this highly-toxic chemical product be manufactured, it would be like

dropping an atomic bomb on Xiamen Island; it would mean that in the future,

the people of Xiamen would live in the shadow of leukemia and deformed

children. We want to live. We want our health! International organizations

have rules that these projects must be developed at least 100 km from cities;

Xiamen is just 16 km away from this project! For our children and

grandchildren....when you see this SMS please sent it to all of your friends in

Xiamen!” (Beijing Review website, 2007)

For some others who did not get the news from any form of media, they learned it by

word of mouth. And most of them were also against the municipal’s “secret decision”. It is

said that during the time of battling against the project, "Have you received the SMS?" has

become a greeting among Xiamen residents who met on the road. And people from Haicang

District have all been talking about the issue. The Xiamen municipal government had not

revealed any further information regarding the PX project to the citizens at the first hand, so

the "Boycott PX, Protect Xiamen" feeling circulated by SMS gradually spread. On June 1,

nearly one thousand Xiamen residents decided to demonstrate peacefully to express opinions

as a citizen. On the same night, related news was broadcast on the scrolling tickers of all of

Xiamen's TV stations.

In the event, the Xiamen citizens employed the media and communication technologies

intensively and actively. They did not only listen to the report by journalists through main

stream media but also involved in producing and spreading the messages. In addition to outlet

their opinion regarding PX project on TV or newspapers, some residents also use graffiti,
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BBS and blogs. A series of graffiti of tears, egrets (Xiamen's city bird) were displayed on the

wall near Xiamen University; some also painted words like "I LOVE XIAMEN" "Everyone

is island" "Everyone is Xiamen" and "ANTIPX". Zhezi and Lianyue are the two active

bloggers reporting on the project very critically. Zhezi said that this is “the action of a

sensitive, cowardly individual searching for his own voice”. Lianyue started several blogs

and wrote passionately on the whole event, advocating the people to stand up and protect

their homeland and criticizing the government’s misbehavior (Lianyue, 2007).

However, the government’s reactions to citizens’ concerns at times were not dialogic and

transparent but manipulative and unfair. In fact before the demonstration on June 1, Xiamen

public had expressed their concerns about the PX project during the Two Congresses in

March 2007. About 105 CPPCC members, representing the Xianmen people, signed a joint

"Proposal recommending removing the Xiamen Haicang PX project”, which was placed as

the priority topic in this year's CPPCC. Zhao Yufen, a CAS (Chinese Academy of Science)

academician, a CPPCC member, and a Xiamen University professor of chemistry, who

resides on Xiamen Island, was among the first to oppose the project. In the proposal, Zhao

and her colleagues listed the harmful consequences and pollution threat that the PX project

might cause since the site of Haicang PX project locates only seven kilometers from the

major city district. While internationally, for similar projects, it is 70 kilometers and even for

their Chinese counterpart, it is at least 20 km. After this proposal was reported by many

influential newspapers such as China Business, Southern Metropolis Daily, and China Youth

Daily, a strong reaction was inspired in Xiamen. And more citizens wondered why such a

major project connected to the public interest was not announced to the public beforehand.

Even after the demonstration on June 1, the Xiamen PSB still criticized the demonstration as

an “illegal mass demonstration” that “seriously disrupted public order and disturbed the lives

and work of the general public” (Beijing Review, 2007).

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In addition, the city municipal exercised unequal power over communicating the issue

and also restricted citizens’ freedom to challenge the government through media. Many local

Xiamen residents learned about the issue from the most popular local BBS - Xiaoyu

Community. However, on May 30th, a message was showed on the Xiaoyu BBS "The

community is temporarily closed for a program upgrade”. The users of the Xiaoyu BBS had

received an email from the BBS whose general message instructed them not to post anything

having to do with PX. On June 5th, the BBS returned to normal (Beijing Review, 2007).

The insincerity of the government has led to citizens’ skepticism. In fact, the Xiamen

municipal government had decided to suspend constructing the highly polluting chemical

project on the Wednesday before the peaceful demonstration on June 1, 2007. The city

government said that it has listened to the opinions expressed and has decided, after careful

deliberation, that the project must be re-evaluated, By Wednesday, one government official

told reporters that they had asked a specialist agency to reassess its environmental impact.

During an interview at the similar time point, a Chinese journalist in New Delhi who was

born and brought up in Xiamen said that she was glad the government of her hometown has

listened to the people's worries. But still near one thousand citizens went to the demonstration

on Friday (Beijing Review, 2007).

By the time of the demonstration, it was obvious that the two sets of assumptions of

validity claims and the speech conditions were not met in the communication between the

Xiamen municipal government and the citizen. Though the government made response to

citizens’ concerns or in other words, citizens were listened to, the power to speak and

opportunity to challenge the authority was not distributed equally and its sincerity was in

question. However, the circumstances changed most recently. On December 5, the

government announced that after the reevaluation of the PX project, the citizens are invited to

attend a public hearing and discussion. They can register either online or through telephone.
 21

Xiamen citizens were very active in participating in the meeting. Statistics showed that 691

people called and 1,250 emails were sent by December 6. This action of the government

showed their willingness to communicate with the citizen and make decisions in a more

discursive way. The final result was published on the website of Xiamen city government.

The government and administration decided to cease the chemical project according to the

will of the citizen representatives (Lianyue’s blog, 2007; Xiameng Wang website, 2007).

The process showcased the media power in rising public spheres in a non-western culture

with different political system. If borrow Habermas’ graph above, similar patterns of

communication flow were found in the case under study. At the center, the governmental

bodies participated in the opinion formation and formal decision-making process; the media

and professionals circulated public opinions from both officials and citizens; at the periphery,

the citizens expressed their views mainly through new communication technologies,

deliberated over the proposed public policy, and participated in the formal decision-making

procedure.

In China such cases are become less episodic or marginal within the highly bureaucratic

political system. In addition to this single case, Yang and Calhoun (2003) depicted similar

cases happening both within the settings of environmental civil society groups and online

forums. All shed light on public spheres’ democratic potentials fulfilled through public’s

participation in the media and communication process.

Summary

Scholars such as Huang Chengju (2000) argued that even though tremendous changes

have occurred without western sense of press freedom and independent media in China,

under current circumstances, these changes are revolutionary in “China’s party journalism

history and significant for an understanding of the changing Chinese media philosophy and

practice in post-Mao China” (p.662). In the field of media studies, the ideological change
 22

leads to the emergence of audience research, for instance, audience rating and survey that

never happened before the media reforms. The redistribution of power to the audience

attributes to the rising of citizen participation in political events mediated by the

communication technologies. As a result, whether their voice is heard and is responded to by

the government becomes very important, at least to the stability and “harmony” of the

society. Like the Xiamen PX case, the insincerity and non-responsiveness of the government

inspired the large social movement of the citizens. The manipulation of the information and

communication leads to further uneasiness and doubt of the citizens to the government,

especially when the media provide many alternative channels for people to get informed.

A few questions remain and may be interesting for further exploration.

Brendebach cited the results of several surveys, which revealed that the Chinese

audience placed criticism and investigative report about public events as what

attracted them most in the media. In a 2001 survey, when asked about “which

social function consumers wished the media to fulfill”, most participants selected

“being the voice of the people”. Here the question of why Chinese media users,

living in an “unopened” media environment according to the western standard,

still retain the value and belief of media as an agent of people’s voice? This

question may be studied from a historical and cultural point of view and it is

useful at least to understand the argument that the character of the media in a

certain country is determined both by the political system and the disposition of

the audience (Winfield &Peng, 2005).

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References