Substitution of Heirs

1. Palacio vs. Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704 (1982)

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants. G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez (a
French who lives in Paris); his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion
Wanda de Wrobleski (an Austrian who lives in Spain).

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his
widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI-Manila. Maria Luisa
Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. She submitted an inventory of the estate with
a net aggregate value of P507,976.97. The administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts.

Based on the will SC Decision (nilagay ko na dito

One Part Other part (1/2)-free portion para makita agad)
(1/2)
One part To Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
shall go to nuda propriedad”. This is subject to One-half (1/2) thereof to his
the widow usufruct: widow as her legitime;
'en pleno (a) one third (1/3) of the free portion
dominio" is charged with the widow's usufruct One-half (1/2) thereof which is
in (with fideicommissary substitution in the free portion to Roberto and
satisfaction favor of Wanda) and Jorge Ramirez in naked
of her ownership and the usufruct to
legitime (b) the remaining two-thirds (2/3) Wanda de Wrobleski with a
with a usufruct in favor of Wanda simple substitution in favor of
(with fideicommissary substitution in Juan Pablo Jankowski and
favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
Horace V. Ramirez.

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Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds, among others, that the vulgar
substitutions are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda survived the testator and that
the fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.

Issues:

1. WON the usufruct charged against the free portion in favor of the widow is valid?

No. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the
testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court  a quo erred for
Marcelle, who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is
more than what she is given under the will, is not entitled to have any additional share in the
estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention because
his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.

2. WON the substitutions are valid?

(a) Substitution over the usufruct (1/3) in favor of Wanda-moot since Marcelle is not entitled to
any usufruct;

(b) Substitution over the usufruct (2/3) in favor of Juan Pablo and Horace.

(i) VOID as fideicommissary substitution

 The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted."

“The word "degree" is construed as generation. By providing that the substitution

shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted", the Code clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first
heir. Thus, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent
of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from
the fiduciary.”

 There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes
as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the
testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he

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 permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and the naked owners."

(ii) VALID as a simple substitution.

3. WON the substitution, in its vulgar/simple aspect, in favor of Juan Pablo and Horace is void
since Wanda did not predecease the testator?

No. Dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal
or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.

2. Crisologo vs. Singson, 4 SCRA 491 (1962)

3. PCIB vs. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 (1974)

Conditional Testamentary Dispositions

4. Rabadilla vs. CA, 334 SCRA 522 (2000)

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA  COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents. G.R. No. 113725               June 29, 2000

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee to most of the properties of the decedent with the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar
to private respondent Maria Marlena Coscoluella Y Belleza Villacarlos every year during her
lifetime.

The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also to his
successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix’s “near descendants.”

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Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein petitioner.

Private respondent file a complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject
property to the surviving heirs of the testatrix. She alleged that the heirs failed to comply with the
provisions on the codicil because: (a) The lot was mortgaged to PNB and RPB in disregard of the
testatrix’s specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix; (b) Defendants-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to
private respondent from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint, despite repeated
demands; (c) the banks failed to comply with the Codicil which provide s that in case of the sale,
lease or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation
to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to private respondent.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action for being prematurely filed.

The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature of modal
institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose when petitioner failed to
comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate
of the testatrix.

ISSUE: WON private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as one of
the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla

-Yes.

The CA found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a
legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states
(1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or
(3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation upon the heir
or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his right to succession. On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir
to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

In the case at bar, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be
inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Likewise, the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted

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heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did
not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be
not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner
of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon
the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such
was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and
not conditional.

5. Morente vs. De La Santa, 9 Phil 387

ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant, vs.

GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry
anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the
property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and
remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located,
which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the
testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the
probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the CFI of Tayabas in which she alleged the
second marriage of Gumersindo and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled.

In its judgment the court denied the petition. It was said, however, that the husband having
married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-
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thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be
disposed of by the husband.

ISSUE: Whether the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
contained in the first clauses of the will.

NO. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made
conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain
cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. However, It is to be observed that by the
second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third
clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that
he shall not marry again.

To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall
lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he
does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the
will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said
that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event
does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the will shall be
changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to
Vicente, the brother of the testatrix.

There being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage,
it cannot be said that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. The subsequent
marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will.

Petition denied. Lower court Decision affirmed.

6. Villanueva vs. Juico, 4 SCRA 550 (1962)

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