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Timothy Morton
SubStance, Issue 117 (Volume 37, Number 3), 2008, pp. 73-96 (Article)
Ecologocentrism:
Unworking Animals
Timothy Morton
A cursory reading of Darwin shows that life forms are no less intricately,
intimately, and infinitely interrelated.4
In this essay, we shall slide from human being to nonhuman
“animals,” discovering how these neighbors confront us with the trauma
of infinite responsibility prior to any specific code of ethics such as
“animal rights.” We shall then slide from the animal to the vegetative, as
we recognize in the “idiotic” livingness of life forms an a-rational, “a-
cephalic” core. And insofar as animals raise the specter of consciousness,
we shall be sliding to the mineral realm—to the possibility that sentience
can be embodied in silicon, for example (the question of artificial
relationship with his ex-lover Rheya, who committed suicide and now
returns to haunt him in the flesh, as a metastasized version of the planet
Solaris’s drive to communicate, a superbly realized image of the Lacanian
sinthome, the inconsistent-impossible-real sprout of enjoyment.
In Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1972 film adaptation, Snaut calls this
simulacrum “the materialization of [Kris’s] conception of her.” Sartorius
calls her “A mechanical reproduction. A copy. A matrix.” Yet the people
whom Solaris materializes are no hallucinations, as Kris finds out quickly
in a Cartesian experiment to prove his sanity. They begin as all too real
sprouts of liquid imagery on the surface of the sentient ocean. Because
she is unaware of her status as an embodiment of this liquid being, Rheya
herself has to come to terms with her alien identity, giving the story a
Frankensteinian, Blade Runner-like theme of discovering the alien within
oneself. This discovery is surely the profound lesson of Darwinism, a
theory of mutagenic replicants whom we can only tentatively call species.
Lurking at the back of Kris’s encounter with his ex-lover Rheya (or
Hari in Tarkovsky’s film) is the existential life-substance, meaningless
spurts of ideation material. When Kris locks Hari in his room, she emits
terrible sounds and claws open the metal door. He tries to kill her by
sending her out into space, but she returns, a Xerox of his memory.
Disturbingly indestructible, when she drinks liquid oxygen, she
spontaneously revives. She is literally a text, information written in
material flesh, and like a text, she is utterly reproducible. We see the
living inkwell from which she springs. The sprouts of the ocean mind’s
enjoyment are called mimoids: the planet is a mimic—a parrot, or an ape
(OED, “ape,” n.1, 3). Mimoids are thus simple reflections, “apings” or
“parrotings.” When a parrot or a computer copies our language, is he, or
she, or it, behaving like us? Is it behaving consciously? Are we? The trouble
with animals is that their apparent mimicry of us reflects back on us,
making us wonder whether our own behavior is unique or deep.
Watching the mimoids and the simulacra is like reading text while
simultaneously watching it being written on a special page that writes
itself, automatically, without a separate author. This is a radical image of
the “book of Nature.” We see the “genotext” (the spurting matter) and
the “phenotext” (simulacra) at the same time (Kristeva 89–136). Or—to
translate Kristeva’s language back into the language of biology—we see
the genotype (genetic material) and the phenotype (what this material
“expresses”—from enzymes to organisms) at once. It is as if we were
watching replication, onto which were superimposed layers of
information. Of course, this is what actually does occur at the genomic
disclose the phantasmatic truths within the truism that all sentient
beings both constitute and are made up of their environments. The
problem with life forms is always in part a problem of semblance, a
problem of not knowing with whom we are dealing. The theory of
evolution makes this utterly explicit: every life form is made up of other
life forms. The simulacra are both too unreal, and too real.
There is something like this encounter with the environmental real
in Freud’s essay on the uncanny, in which environmental tropes
sometimes stand in for the encounter with the traumatic kernel of other
people and the otherness of people. Forests are iterations of trees, and so
uncanny: “when one is lost in a forest in high altitudes, caught, we will
suppose, by the mountain mist, and when every endeavor to find the
marked or familiar path ends again and again in a return to one and the
same spot, recognizable by some particular landmark” (Freud 17.237).11
The forest is a quintessential image of the text, which is why we say, “he
can’t see the forest for the trees.” We are always trying to make forests
into wholes. The scandal of Wordsworth’s so-called environmentalism
is that at crucial moments he expresses it as a perverse, singular love for
a unique thing: “There is a tree of many, one” (“Intimations of
Immortality,” 52). If there is no Nature, this does not mean that there is
nothing. We are not dealing with sheer nominalism here, but with an
ethics of singularity. Yet the forest-as-text is also an image of collectivity.
The dialectic of strange strangeness compels us to see “animals” both as
unique and as part of a non-holistic collective.
Solaris’s simulacra are called Phi-Creatures, which for a Lacanian is
almost too perfect. Phi (F) is Lacan’s symbol for the “imaginary Real.”
The “negress” Phi-Creature (30) is the imaginary Real of racist enjoyment
(Kris’s reaction is horror). What emerges from the sentient ocean are
pathetic embodiments of enjoyment whose excess parodies the
ideological frames in which they normally appear. The gigantic stature
of the negress is overwhelming, like Frankenstein’s creature, parodically
threatening the onlooker with her or his own racist desire, through the
trope of hyperbole: the textual overdoing of something, the sprouting
forth of something extra. The sprout of enjoyment persists, zombie-like,
even after the ideology that framed it is useless—like a “primitive negress”
walking around on a spaceship. The sprout is the a-rational,
nonconceptual and inconsistent core of ideological fantasy, and as such
it provides a way of dissolving the fantasy. When found walking around
the space station, outside their ideological frames, the Phi-Creatures put
the scientists to shame: “Shame, the feeling that will save humanity”
(Kris, in Tarkovsky’s Solaris). Shame, the awareness that I am caught in
the gaze of the other, is always the “animal presence” in which one finds
oneself. (I part company here with Levertov, who suggests that we can
“Come into” this “presence.”)
Should we then suggest that when I see an animal, I am always
seeing something disturbing from my inner space, scuttling around
outside of me? I am ashamed precisely because “it is me” more directly
than I myself am. Surely this is the basis for the social practice of
scapegoating: literally loading the shame of the community onto an
animal and sending her or him out into the wilderness. Every attempt to
get rid of this disturbing “abject” thus directly wounds me and disturbs
even more profoundly the social space, thus readying the closed
community for another round of scapegoating. This is precisely why
animals cannot just be accepted as humans with fur and feathers into
the human “community,” because accepting animals implies dissolving
the holistic notion of community as such that always serves as a screen
to prevent me from witnessing my inextricable intimacy with other
beings.
Against this disturbing of human beingness—this maximal
externalized eccentricity—Kris attempts to formulate Cartesian sanity
in a closed loop (I know I am sane because I can prove that something
exists, 50). Unfortunately this must be done with the help of a giant
computer. The thinking machine is a prosthetic externalization of the res
intellectus. Because the “something that exists” is the computer whose
“brain” sticks out like a sore thumb, the experiment itself deconstructs
existence into ex-sistence (literally, “placement outside of oneself”). The
very form of Kris’s experiment makes clear that personal identity always
depends upon some external, supplementary substance that undermines
its identitarian claims. That Descartes was half conscious of this is
confirmed by his parapraxis of “res”—what we find beyond and above
matter is a thing that thinks. Likewise, the Phi-Creatures are emanations
of the ultimate wetware, the brain-ocean.
Human being collapses into “animal presence,” and “animal
presence” collapses into writhing, vegetative life. Tarkovsky decided to
begin with Kris amidst the fecund, wet, birdsung ambience of a rural
Russian upper middle class. Looking into a stream, Kris Kelvin sees what
could be reflections of a mass of undulating fronds—a figure both for the
Imaginary (we are seeing a water image, possibly a reflection, perhaps
distorted by the flow of water) and for the Real (we are beholding, in the
rippling anamorphosis of the flow of water itself, the sprouts of
enjoyment). The fronds wonderfully encapsulate the mimoids of Solaris—
animal? In Tarkovsky’s film, the zero gravity scene prefigures the image
of Kris’s home island floating on the psychedelically swirling, mimetic
ocean. Here the camera floats around the bounded horizon of a Brueghel
painting of a feudal village in a snowy forest clearing, an invocation of a
Lebenswelt made strange by the floating point of view. The planet’s
gravitational field is such that the space station temporarily loses its
artificial gravity, so the floating camera angle literally floats Brueghel’s
world in a wider, displacing ocean. We are drawn into a cinematic world
in which form enacts content. The images of and metaphors for the planet
ocean have an analogue in the imagery of fronds in flowing water that
recurs once at the beginning of the film and once before the concluding
shot. The fluid motion of the water, with floating detritus—living and
dead—is an analogue for the filmic surface itself.
Thus the closest the spectator comes to the encounter with the really
other other is in our encounter with the mute, metamorphic surface of
the film stock, as in Stan Brakhage’s experiments such as Dog Star Man, in
which he worked directly on the film stock itself. In 2001, the monolith
stands in for the dark letterbox shape of the blank screen, a space into
which ape creatures and humans project desire, and from which shoot
beams of technical knowledge, immersing them in a horrifying high
pitched scream of white noise—does this noise not strangely prefigure
the sound of a dialup modem connecting to a server? In the final sequence
of 2001 the monolith becomes a screen within a screen, out of which
emerge not undulating wet fronds but spectacular beams of light:
frightening, fast, “wowing” Dave and us with a lightshow, yet leading
him to cosmic rebirth. By contrast, Kris washes his hands in the water in
which the fronds slowly undulate, returning him and us to a world that
he and we know is an illusion. As in Brakhage’s experiments, the filmic
surface is already populated with an other, with being as otherness.
In answer to Kubrick’s presentation of the cinema screen as void,
Tarkovsky gives us the screen as fullness—but not as full presence. In his
later film Stalker, the screen is filled with garbage, the detritus of human
desire, as the camera tracks across the surface of the water in The Zone.
In Solaris the film stock becomes the (other) planet, the environment itself.
Zizek expresses it eloquently in a passage on Stalker:
counts as a person. If we accept Gaia, why resist the opposite idea: that
rather than the weather being sentient, sentient beings are like the
weather? If the two terms are indeed related by identity, or even simply
resemblance—which is what the Gaia metaphor implies—then surely
the concept is reversible? And if so, where do we draw the line between
this and that weather, or even between weather and non-weather? We
can tell that Gaia is ideological because the copula is not reversible: Gaia
is a whole greater than the sum of its parts. A careful reading of Solaris
shows that to enter into relationship with a strange stranger is precisely
not to forge a communion with a Gaia-like, holistic entity.
Again, neither a theistic nor a nihilistic outcome appears possible or
desirable. The philosopher John McDowell claims, “it is doubtful that we
can conceive of thinking as a subjectless occurrence, like a state of the
weather” (McDowell 256). Derek Parfit, whose Reasons and Persons strongly
argues for the idea that there is no independent, single or lasting self,
refutes McDowell’s claim that a reductionist or “no-self” view would
entail a process without a subject (“Experiences, Subjects, and Conceptual
Schemes”). Such a view might simply require that we expand or limit
our view of what a subject is—in the language of this essay, this is the
encounter with the strange stranger. Something like this is required of
Kris in his relationship with replica-Rheya, who is at once a person in
her own right, and an interface for Solaris itself. Kris has to perform two
difficult operations: to recognize that replica-Rheya is not Rheya; and to
acknowledge at the same time that she is not an independent person, but
something like an avatar (to use the internet term) of the planet-mind.
is, the hard way. This idea has now lost its charming, naïve 1960s aura.
Such is the effect of risk society (Beck).15
Since the late eighteenth century (the period we call Romantic), the
arts and humanities have held an idea that “nature” is something (some
thing) “over yonder.” Science, and current events, have outstripped this
idea. How can the arts and humanities catch up? Unfortunately for some,
this will mean de-Bambifying nature: it cannot be just cute any more.
The logic of the movie Happy Feet is that you can only be nice to one
species at a time: seals look nasty from a penguin’s eye view. A somewhat
cynical reading might be “Dance for us, or we’ll keep on killing you.”
Children flushed their goldfish down toilets when Finding Nemo came
out. Sentimentality is not working. Nor is the wild energy of the sublime.
For nature to be sublime, we have to be at least a little distant from it. A
toxic leak is not sublime by the time it has entered the lungs. Global
warming is not sublime: it is far more disorienting, and painful, than
that.
This essay has not advocated “postmodern” relativism, nor has it
claimed that trees and rabbits and coral do not exist. It is simply that
human beings cannot afford (in all senses) to pursue old-school thinking
about our coexistence with all the other beings on this Earth. Thinking
must take a step back and rearticulate “the environment” at the very
moment at which it is flooding into our homes on the airwaves and as
the all too real waves of events such as Hurricane Katrina. Crises make
us panic, and panic wants us to act, and act fast. We are going to need to
act and think at the same time, and this praxis is not as easy as walking
and chewing gum. Ecology without Nature is itself a form of the
ontological hesitation with which the political animal confronts us.
Ecology without Nature does not mean that it is okay to keep on
drilling for oil rather than exploring solar and wind energy. Entities
such as coral reefs do exist. It is not scholarship but modern life that is
doing its best to make sure that they really do not exist. While tackling
global warming with all deliberate speed and trusting the near total
scientific consensus, we should be using culture not only to create a
framework in which global warming science becomes recognizable and
legible. And in general, we should be slowing down, reflecting, and using
this moment as an opportunity to change and develop.
In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels state that under the
current economic conditions, “National one-sidedness and narrow-
mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous
national and local literatures, there arises a world literature” (224–5). If
this idea is to mean more than people from several different countries
writing the same thing in the same ways, it must include the idea that
writing in general can, under certain circumstances, meditate upon the
idea of world as such. This capability is not unconnected to the
globalization of specific kinds of misery. It eventually becomes possible
to sing a song called “We Are The World,” and wince about it, or to see
the many levels of painful irony within the phrase “United Nations.”
Ecology has reminded us that in fact we are the world, if only in the
negative. In material historical terms, environmental phenomena
participate in dialectical interplay insofar as they bring an awareness of
environmental negatives such as global warming, the Asian “brown
cloud” and toxic events such as Chernobyl. Far from needing filling out
with some positive “thing” such as “nature” or the ecofeminist and
Lovelockian image of Gaia, this negative awareness is just what we need.
Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris and its film versions thematize the drastic, queer
quality of what has been normatively and neuteringly called the love of
nature. Solaris is about getting over our projections, and yet staying with
the planet. I return to the idea of subjective difference not grounded in
identity: the Buddhist metaphor of Indra’s net is never experienced as an
integrated whole, only as traumatic and singular encounters with a
stranger qua irreducible-real Thing, an animal whose vegetative being
is not far from the surface. Are we intimate with ghosts or with plants?
In the ecological society to come, we are going to need more and less than
nature lovers and tree huggers.
If leftist ecology is to have an ethics, then it cannot be the fascist one
in which we are components of a greater whole. It must instead reside in
the singularity of, and conscious commitment to, the other. Such a
responsibility cannot be reciprocal, otherwise we return to the holistic
web of life. This asymmetry is elegantly demonstrated in the Solaris
thought experiment. The planet is not a biosphere on which the
astronauts depend. Indeed, no life forms do. This dependency comes after
the ethical commitment, when Kris decides to let the space station fall
into Solaris’s gravitational field. Biospheric holism, then, is at odds with
the infinite responsibility towards the political animal opened up by a
decision to coexist—that is, to coexist ultimately with coexistence itself,
which happens whether we like it or not. Solaris is a radical text of
animality, since it deprives us of the phantasmatic support of a
background world, a wonderful Gaian web of life in which, like couch
potatoes spectating the Iraq War, we are “embedded.”
In our age of ecological panic, what we are losing is precisely this
sense of “nature” or “the environment” as an enveloping, nonhuman
and/or non-sentient “world.” This world provided a background to our
Notes
1. Thanks to Scott Shershow, David Simpson and Dimitris Vardoulakis for their helpful
comments on this essay, and to Derek Parfit for corresponding with me about per-
sonal identity.
2. I develop this further in Morton, Ecology without Nature, 160–9. Other scholars have
noted the ways in which figures of the weather can stand in for history, in more and
less problematic ways. See for example Cadava.
3. The recent publication of Derrida’s complete seminar on animals is a case in point. See
Works Cited.
4. I discuss this fully in The Ecological Thought.
5. See Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 57–8. Scott Shershow has powerfully demonstrated
this linkage (165–82, 193–205).
6. Denise Levertov, “Come into Animal Presence,” from Poems 1960–1967, copyright ©
by Denise Levertov, reprinted by permission of New Directions, Pollinger Limited
and the proprietor.
7. This has been strongly asserted by Dimitris Vardoulakis in “The Politics of Impassiv-
ity in Agamben and Spinoza.” See also Wall.
8. I am thinking of the argument in A Thousand Plateaus, reprinted in Atterton and
Calarco’s Animal Philosophy.
9. I take my cue from Ferry 53–4.
10. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6425927.stm.
11. For a comprehensive study see Harrison, especially 2, 5, 84, 186.
12. This is surely the environmental significance of Agamben’s and Zizek’s discussion
of the Muselmann (Homo Sacer 184–5; Zizek 160–2).
13. I am grateful to Dimitris Vardoulakis for discussing this with me. See Hamacher for
further discussion.
14. For further discussion, see Morton, Ecology without Nature, 29–78.
15. For further discussion see Morton, Ecology without Nature, 84–5, and Heise 53–4,
119–23.
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