Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
Viardo vs. Belmonte
G.R. No. L-14127 August 21, 1962
ISIDORO M. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEON C. VIARDO and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA
ECIJA, defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-14128 August 21, 1962
LEON C. VIARDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PILAR BELMONTE, PATRICIA DRIZ, JOAQUINA DRIZ,
ISIDORO MERCADO,
TRINIDAD ISIDRO, ZACARIAS BELMONTE, TERESITA
FLORES,
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC. and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendants-appellees.
No. L-14127:
Agustin C. Bagasao for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel A. Concordia for defendants-appellants.
No. L-14128:
Manuel A. Concordia for plaintiff-appellant.
E. A. Bello, M. Y. Macias and A. A. Reyes for defendant-appellee
Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc.
Cecilio F. Wycoco for defendants-appellees Pilar Belmonte and
Teresita Flores.
Carlos M. Ferrer for defendants-appellees Patricia Driz, et al.
PADILLA, J.:
In civil case No. 7611 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, entitled Leon C. Viardo vs. Bartolome Driz and Pilar
Belmonte, a writ of execution was issued and levy was made
"upon all the rights, interest and participation which the spouses
Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte have or might have" in a
parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 of
the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of Nueva Ecija
(Exhibit A, p.3). This certificate of title covers a parcel of land
(Lot No. 1, Psu-14371) in the barrios of Nieves and Santo
Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, province of Nueva Ecija,
containing an area of 1,192,775 square meters, more or less.
The land is registered in the names of "Leonor Belmonte, Felisa
Belmonte, Pilar Belmonte and Ines de Guzman, subject . . . to
the condition that ¼ share [that] belongs to Ines de Guzman is
usufructuary "correspondiendo la nuda propiedad a sus tres hijas
arriba citadas en participaciones iguales quienes se consolidara
el dominio despues del fallecimiento de su madre' " (Exhibit A, p.
2).
On 25 February 1941, by virtue of the writ of execution above
mentioned, the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija sold at public
auction one-half (½) of the following property:
TAX DECLARATION NO. 11313 OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ZARAGOZA, PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA AND COVERED
BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 OF THE
LAND RECORDS OF NUEVA ECIJA.
A parcel of land, situated in the sitio of Valdez, barrio Sto.
Rosario, municipality of Zaragoza, Province of Nueva Ecija.
Bounded on the North by property of Felisa Belmonte; on the
East by Sapang Dalagot; on the Southeast by Ines de Guzman;
on the South by the property of Felisa Belmonte; and on then
West by the property of Cirilo Acosta; containing an area of
THIRTY (30) HECTARES, more or less. Declared under tax No.
11313 in the name of Pilar Belmonte with an assessed value of
P8,400.00.
Page 1 of 11
The highest bidder at the auction sale was the judgment creditor,
Leon C. Viardo, who paid P2,125.64 for the interest sold and
P83.15 for the land tax corresponding to such interest (Exhibit
B). When the judgment debtors failed to redeem the property
within the statutory period of one year from the date of sale (21
February 1941), the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija executed on
12 May 1943 a Final Bill of Sale of the property described in
Exhibit B in favor of Leon C. Viardo (Exhibit C). On 3 May 1943 a
co-owner's copy of the certificate of title was issued to Leon C.
Viardo (Exhibit A, p. 3).
On 28 December 1945 the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, in Land Registration Case No. 918, G.L.R.O. Record No.
17910, acting upon a verified petition of Leon C. Viardo, ordered
the Registrar of Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija —
to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 3484 and to issue
another in lieu thereof in the name of and in the proportion as
follows: LEONOR BELMONTE ¼ share; FELISA BELMONTE, ¼
share; PILAR BELMONTE, ¹/8 share; LEON C. VIARDO, ¹/8
share; and INES DE GUZMAN, ¼ share, upon the payment of
the corresponding fees (Exhibit D).
However, it appears from Original Certificate of Title No. 3484
(Exhibit A) that the above-mentioned order was not carried out
and that said original certificate of title was not cancelled.
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint against Leon
C. Viardo (civil case No. 161) praying that judgment be rendered
against the defendant:
(a) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the property in question
in favor of plaintiffs herein upon payment by the latter of the
lawful redemption price in accordance with law, or the sum of
P2,125.64 with interest at the rate of one per centum (1%) per
month for twelve (12) months from February 27, 1941 to
February 27, 1942. (Exhibit E.)
On 4 June 1946 Patricia Blando, attorney for the plaintiffs
Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte, requested the Registrar of
Deeds in and for Nueva Ecija for —
the annotation of a Notice of LIS PENDENS on the back of
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 3484 of the Office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija, affecting
the undivided one-half (½) portion of the property of the plaintiffs
in the above-entitled cause, situated in the Sitio of Valdez, Barrio
of Sto. Rosario, Municipality of Zaragoza, which is involved in the
said controversy against the defendant LEON C. VIARDO, and
which is more particularly described under paragraph (4) of the
plaintiffs' complaint a copy of which is hereby presented,
hereunto attached. (Exhibit F.)
On 6 June 1946 the Registrar of Deeds made the following
annotation on the back of original certificate of title No. 3484:
Entry No. 3347/0-3484: Kind — Lis Pendens — Executed in
favor of Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte; Conditions — Al the
rights, interests, and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this title is
the subject of a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16 of the C.F.I.
of N.E. now pending for action. Date of the instrument — June 4,
1946; Date of the inscription — June 6, 1946 at 3:18 (?) p.m.
(Sgd.) F.C. Cuizon, Acting Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 3.)
While the above-mentioned case was pending in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Pilar Belmonte, one of the
plaintiffs, entered into the following contracts involving her
interest or rights over the parcel of land covered by original
certificate of title No. 3484:
(1) Entry No. 10984: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of — Isidro
M. Mercado & Trinidad Isidro; Conditions--Pilar Belmonte sold a
portion of Seven and One-Half (7-½) hectares of the property

described in this title for the sum of P5,500.00 (D-126: P-90: B-
11: S-1948, Herminio E. Algas, N. E.) Date of the Inst. — June
28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 10985/0-3484: Kind — Sale with right of
repurchase: Executed in favor of — Federico Aquino; Conditions
— Pilar Belmonte sold with a right of repurchase seven and one-
half (7-½) hectares of her share, interest and participation in this
title for the sum of P3,600.00 (D-127: P-90: B-11: S-48. H. Algas,
N. E.) Date of the Inst. — June 28, 1948; Date of the Inscription
— June 28, 1948 at 1:30 p.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 15110/0-3484: Kind — Resale: Executed in favor of
— Pilar Belmonte; Conditions — Federico Aquino resold his
share in this title consisting of 7-½ Has. for the sum of P3,600.00
(D-63: P-15: B-6: S-1949, Jose E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of
the Inst. — March 8, 1958: Date of the Inscription — April 8,
1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(4) Entry No. 15111/0-3484: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of
— Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil: Pilar Belmonte
sold a portion of seven (7) Has. of her share and participation in
this title for the sum of P7,000.00. (D-64: P-15: B-6: S-1949, J. E.
Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 9, 1949; Date of
the Inscription — April 8, 1949 at 11:30 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds. (Exhibit A, p. 4)
On 11 April 1950 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
rendered judgment in civil case No. 161, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court absolves the
defendant from the complaint of the plaintiffs, in the same
manner that plaintiffs are absolved from the counter complaint of
the defendant. Defendant is the legal owner of the land in
question and the right of redemption of the plaintiff of said land
had already elapsed. With costs to the plaintiff. (Exhibit G.)
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the
defendant Leon C. Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals.
While the appeal was pending, the following transactions
involving the interest or rights of Pilar Belmonte over the parcel
of land covered by original certificate of title No. 3484 took place:
(1) Entry No. 7967/NT-15162: Kind — Partition: Executed in
favor of — Felisa Belmonte, et al.; Conditions — By virtue of a
deed of partition, the share of the deceased Ines de Guzman
and Isidro Belmonte has been adjudicated in favor of the heirs of
said deceased. (D-891: P-77: B-V: S-1948, Manuel E.
Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. — March 31, 1948: Date of
the Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(2) Entry No. 7968/NT-15162: Kind — Agreement: Executed in
favor of — Felisa Belmonte, et al; Conditions — By virtue of an
agreement of the parties concerned in the partition, Lots Nos. 1-
D and 1-J, with an area of 300,000 sq. m. and 80,000 sq.m.,
more or less, respectively in the subdivision plan Psd-36340, a
portion of lot 1 described on plan Psu-14371, of this title, have
been adjudicated in favor of Felisa Belmonte and Lot 1-G with an
area of 75,000 sq.m., more or less, of the same subdivision, has
been adjudicated in favor of Isidoro Mercado, See TCT No.
15162 and 15163, Vol. No. 76. (D-211: P-44: B-IV: S-1952, P.
Bautista, Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Jan. 22, 1952: Date of
the Inscription — Feb. 18, 1954 at 10:18 a.m.(Sgd.) F.C.
CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(3) Entry No. 9715/NT-15746: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor of
— Sp. Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita Flores; Conditions —
Dominador Asuncion and Tomasita Dansil sold all their rights
and interest in this title consisting of seven hectares for the sum
of P6,000.00. (D-177: P-37: B-IV: S-1952; R. S. Pengson, N.E.)
Date of the Inst. — Feb. 4, 1952; Date of Inscription — May 13,
1954 at 10:08 a.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
Page 2 of 11
Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
(4) Entry No. 12168/NT-15162: Kind — Project of Partition —
Executed in favor of Pilar Belmonte; Conditions — By virtue of a
project of partition re-estate of the late Ines de Guzman, a
portion of 13.2775 hectares of the land described in this title has
been adjudicated in favor of Pilar Belmonte. (D-891: P-77: B-V:
S-1948, Manuel E. Castañeda, Manila) Date of the Inst. —
March 31, 1948: Date of the Inscription — Aug. 23, 1954 at 2:00
p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.1äwphï1.ñët
(5) Entry No. 12169/NT-16440: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor
of — Joaquin Driz: Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-B of
the subdivision plan of this title Psd-36340 a portion taken from
her undivided 13.2775 hectares with an area of 52,775 sq.m.,
more or less, for the sum of P800.00. See TCT NT-16440, Vol.
No. 83. (D-160: P-33: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab. City)
Date of the Inst. — Aug. 23, 1954; Date of the Inscription — Aug.
23, 1954 at 2:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of Deeds.
(6) Entry No. 12370/NT-16488: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor
of — Patricia Driz: Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot 1-A of
the subdivision plan Psd-36340 being a portion of Lot 1
described in plan Psu-14371, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 17910,
of this title for the sum of P1,000.00 with an area of 80,000
sq.m., with respect to her share of 13.2775 hectares. See TCT
No. NT-16488, Vol. 83. (D-440: P-90: B-V: S-1954, H. V. Garcia,
Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Aug. 31, 1954: Date of the
Inscription — Sept. 2, 1954 at 8:00 p.m. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(7) Entry No. 12512/NT-16546: Kind — Sale; Executed in favor
of — Patricia Driz: Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lots Nos.
1-H and 1-I of the subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property
described in this title for the sum of P850.00. See TCT No. NT-
16524, Vol. 83. (D-167: P-35: B-I: S-1954, Adolfo San Juan,
Cab. City) Date of the Inst. — Sept. 9, 1954; Date of the
Inscription — Sept. 9, 1954 at 11:50 a.m. (Sgd.) F. C. CUIZON,
Register of Deeds.
(8) Entry No. 12569/NT-16546: Kind — Sale; Executed favor of
— Patricia Driz; Conditions — Pilar Belmonte sold Lot I-E of the
subdivision plan Psd-30340 of the property described in this title,
with an area of 79,848 sq.m., more or less the subdivision plan
of this title, was sold for the sum of P2,000.00. See TCT No. NT-
16546, Vol. 83. (D-172: P-36: BS-1954, Adolfo San Juan, Cab.
City) Date of the Inst. — Sept. 11, 1954; Date of the Inscription
— Sept. 13, 1954 at 8:20 am. (Sgd.) F.C. CUIZON, Register of
Deeds. (Exhibit A, pp. 4-5.)
On 22 September 1954, a few days after the last transactions
mentioned above, the Court of Appeals passed a resolution
granting the prayer of defendant-appellant Leon C. Viardo that
the children and only heirs, namely, Artemio, Patricia, Mario,
Domingo, Joaquina and Catalina, surnamed Driz, who were all of
age, be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz
(the husband of Pilar Belmonte). (Exhibit H-1).
On 25 September 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
awarding damages prayed for in the counterclaim of Leon V.
Viardo. The judgment made the following findings and
conclusions:
. . . The area of the contested property is 15 hectares. By
computation, this is capable of producing 750 cavans of palay a
year. On the basis of 70-30, defendant is entitled to 225 cavans
of palay a year. Therefore, plaintiffs are under obligation to
deliver to defendant this quantity of palay every agricultural year
from the filing of defendant's answer on August 5, 1946, up to
the time he vacates said land, or pay the equivalent value
thereof at P12.00 a cavan.
Having been declared owner of the land in dispute, defendant is
entitled to its possession. Inasmuch as the court below did not
order plaintiffs to restore the possession of the land in question,

we hereby order them to vacate the same and restore
possession thereof to defendant. (Exhibit H.)
This judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and
executory and the records were remanded to the lower court. On
16 December 1954 the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
issued a writ of execution (Exhibit W). The return made by Chief
of Police of the Municipality of Zaragoza on 14 February 1955
states that Leon C. Viardo had been placed in possession of the
parcel of land referred to in the writ and that levy was made on a
total of 86 cavans and 74 kilos of palay, and that the same were
deposited in a warehouse (Exhibit X).
On or about 4 January 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed a third
party claim with the Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit Y).
The affidavit attached to the claim states that Isidoro M. Mercado
and his wife purchased from Pilar Belmonte on 28 June 1948
seven and one-half hectares of her undivided share in the land
described in original certificate of title No. 3484, that on the same
day the deed of sale was registered, that a transfer certificate of
title was issued in their names, and that since 1948 up to the
time of the levy on execution he had been in actual possession
of the parcel of land, paying the corresponding taxes thereon
and had exclusively benefited from the harvests therein, (Exhibit
Y-1). The sheriff was requested not to continue with the levy on
the harvest in the parcel of land they were claiming.
On 2 February 1955 Isidoro M. Mercado filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint docketed as civil case No.
1718, against Leon C. Viardo and the Provincial Sheriff. The
complaint alleged that improper levy had been made on the
harvest in plaintiff's parcel of land and prayed that judgment be
rendered ordering the defendants to return the palay levied
upon, together with damages. On 26 February 1955 the
defendants answered that plaintiffs' purchase of the parcel of
land in question from Pilar Belmonte was subject to whatever
judgment the courts might render in civil case No. 161 between
Pilar Belmonte and Leon C. Viardo. On 17 October 1955 the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entered an order
suspending the trial of the case, in view of the information by
counsel for the defendant that his client Leon C. Viardo would file
a complaint against all persons claiming ownership of or interest
in the parcel of land covered by original certificate of title No.
3484 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
On 5 December 1955 civil case No. 2004 was filed by Leon V.
Viardo against Pilar Belmonte, Patricia Driz, Joaquina Driz,
Isidoro Mercado, Trinidad Isidro, Zacarias Belmonte, Teresita
Flores, Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. and the
Philippine National Bank, as parties claiming some right,
participation, share or interest in the parcel of land covered by
original certificate of title No. 3484 or by trader certificates of title
derived therefrom. The defendants filed their answers. After
trial,1 on 24 August 1956 the trial court rendered judgment in
civil cases Nos. 1718 and 2004, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, in Civil
Case 2004, Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias
Belmonte and Patricia Driz are hereby declared CO-OWNERS
PRO-INDIVISO of lots 1-A PSD-16864, which is the ¼ share of
Pilar Belmonte in Lot 1, PSU 14371, OCT No. 3484 in the
following proportions: ONE-HALF for LEON C. VIARDO; 7½
hectares for Isidoro M. Mercado; 7 hectares for Zacarias
Belmonte, and the remainder for Patricia Driz, it being
understood that whatever is adjudicated to Patricia Driz in the
partition shall be subject to the mortgage in favor of the
Philippine National Bank; the deeds of sale executed by Pilar
Belmonte in favor of Patricia Driz, Exhibits R and S are declared
NULL AND VOID; the deeds of partition Exhibits L and N, are set
aside, and the certificates of title issued in favor of Zacarias
Belmonte, Isidoro M. Mercado and Patricia Driz, Exhibits P, Q,
R-1 and S-1 are ordered cancelled. And in civil case 1718
Isidoro M. Mercado is hereby declared to be entitled to the
Page 3 of 11
Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
products which had been levied upon by the Provincial Sheriff.
No damages are awarded. The parties in civil case 2004 shall
come to an amicable settlement with respect to the partition.
Upon their failure to arrive at an amicable settlement,
commissioner shall be appointed by this Court in accordance
with a law to make the partition.
With costs against the defendants in both cases.
Only Leon C. Viardo, plaintiff in civil case No. 2004 and
defendant in civil case No. 1718, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On 21 May 1958 the latter certified and forwarded the
appeals to this Court because the facts are not in dispute and
"the questions raised by appellant in his brief are purely legal in
nature."
In his first assignment of error the appellant contends that the
trial court "erred in not annulling the sale executed by Pilar
Belmonte to Isidoro M. Mercado, marked as Exhibit I, and to
Dominador Asuncion and Teresita Bansil (Exhibit J) and the sale
by Dominador Asuncion to Zacarias Belmonte and Teresita
Flores in a Deed of Sale marked Exhibit M." In support thereof
he argues that the three sales took place and were registered
after he had become the absolute owner of an undivided one-
half interest in the parcel of land owned by Pilar Belmonte and
after notice of lis pendens had been recorded on the title of Pilar
Belmonte.
The argument is without merit. It is true that the appellant
became the absolute owner of an undivided one-half interest in
the undivided one-fourth interest owned by Pilar Belmonte in the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 3484;
that before Pilar Belmonte sold parts of her undivided share in
the parcel of land to Isidoro M. Mercado and Dominador
Asuncion and the last in turn sold his part to Zacarias Belmonte,
there was notice of lis pendens recorded on the certificate of title;
and that this notice is binding upon all who should acquire an
interest in the property subsequent to the record of the lis
pendens. The notice of lis pendens (Exhibit A), however, was
limited to one-half interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo from Pilar
Belmonte. The other one-half undivided interest of the latter was
not in litigation and therefore the trial court correctly held that
Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this undivided one-half interest,
had a right to sell it and could convey absolute title thereto or to
parts thereof. Of course, the deeds of sale executed by Pilar
Belmonte appears to convey definite or segregated parts of her
remaining interest in the parcel of land described in original
certificate of title No. 3484, which she could not do, because this
one-fourth in interest had not yet been subdivided to show the
interest acquired by Leon C. Viardo, amounting to one-half of the
said one-fourth interest. This defect, however, does not result in
the nullity of the deeds of sale she had executed relating to her
remaining interest of one-eighth. The sales were valid, subject
only to the condition that the interests acquired by the vendees
were limited to the parts which might be assigned to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Article 493,
Civil Code).
In the second assignment of error the appellant contends that
the trial court "erred in not annulling the sales executed by Pilar
Belmonte in favor of her daughters Joaquina and Patricia Driz of
lots 1-B and 1-A, Exhibits U and V of Plan PSD 36340."
Lots 1-B and 1-A of Plan PSD-36340 are taken, not from the
original one-fourth interest of Pilar Belmonte in the parcel of land
covered by original certificate of title No. 3484, which interest
was levied upon and thereafter acquired by Leon C. Viardo to
the extent of one-half, but from another one-fourth interest in the
same parcel of land, which belonged originally to Ines de
Guzman, the mother of Pilar Belmonte. This one-fourth interest
subsequently devolved upon Pilar Belmonte and her two sisters.
The three sisters partitioned this one-fourth interest among
themselves and lots 1-A and 1-B were assigned to Pilar
Belmonte who, in turn, sold them to her daughters. These sales,

the appellant contends, are fictitious and in fraud of his rights as
creditor.
The only evidence adduced by the appellant in support of this
contention is that the sales were made by the mother to her
daughters. This is not enough evidence to hold the sale fictitious
and fraudulent. There is no evidence whatsoever that Pilar
Belmonte, at the time she sold the lots, had outstanding debts or
was in an otherwise embarrasing financial position. Even the
credit of Leon C. Viardo, the appellant, was established only
after the sales were executed, when the Court of Appeals
modified the judgment of the trial court in civil case No. 161 by
awarding damages to him. There is no merit, therefore, in the
second assignment of error.
In the third assignment of error the appellant contends that the
trial court "erred in declaring that the "product raised in the
portion under the occupancy of Isidoro Mercado, therefore,
pertains to him and was not subject to the levy or execution in
favor of Leon C. Viardo in Civil Case No. 161." In support of this
assignment the appellant again harps on the fact that the time
Isidoro Mercado acquired an interest in the property, there was
notice of lis pendens, and therefore Isidoro Mercado "is not a
purchaser in good faith."
This contention has been overruled in the first assignment of
error when the notice of lis pendens (Exhibits A and F) was held
to refer not to the remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte
in the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No.
3484, but to the one-eighth interest which Leon C. Viardo had
acquired from Pilar Belmonte, and which the latter was trying to
recover from him in civil case No. 161. It was Pilar Belmonte who
caused the notice of lis pendens to be recorded to subject "all
the rights, interests and participation of Leon C. Viardo in this
Title" to the result of the litigation in the aforesaid civil case No.
161. Pilar Belmonte did not thereby subject her remaining one-
eighth interest to the result of civil case No. 161 which she had
filed against Leon C. Viardo. If the latter wanted to subject the
remaining one-eighth interest of Pilar Belmonte to the outcome
of his counterclaim in civil case No. 161, he should have asked
for it.
The view held by this Court in passing upon the third assignment
of error renders it unnecessary for the Court to discuss the
respective rights and liabilities of co-owners when one co-owner,
without the knowledge and/or consent of the other co-owners,
plants or builds on the property owned in common.
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred "in
concluding that the heirs of Bartolome Driz could not be held
personally liable for the judgment rendered against the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 161 and therefore Lots 1-A and 1-B cannot be
subject to the payment of the judgment in favor of Leon C.
Viardo."
The only ground of appellant for this contention is that the
present owners of these lots are the children of the spouses Pilar
Belmonte and Bartolome Driz, the plaintiffs in civil case No. 161,
and that, upon the death of Bartolome Driz during the pendency
of the appeal in civil case No. 161, these children were
substituted as parties. This assignment of error is without merit.
The substitution of parties was made obviously because the
children of Bartolome Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could
properly represent and protect whatever interest he had in the
case on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have
the effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for
whatever judgment might be rendered on the appeal against
their deceased father. Article 774 of the Civil Code provides:
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon
C. Viardo, the creditor, was to proceed against the estate of
Bartolome Driz.
Moreover, it appears from the evidence that Bartolome Driz was
only a formal party to civil case No. 161, the real party in interest
being his wife Pilar Belmonte. The subject matter in litigation was
Pilar Belmonte's interest in the parcel of land described in
original certificate of title No. 3484, which appears to be
paraphernal property.
The appellant's fifth and last assignment of error is that "the trial
court erred in not awarding damages to the plaintiff Leon C.
Viardo in Civil Case No. 2004." Obviously the appellant refers to
the prayer in his complaint that P5,000 be awarded to him
against Pilar Belmonte for attorney's fees. He maintains that
appellee Pilar Belmonte had disposed of all her property with the
intent of avoiding payment of her liability or debt to him.
A review of the record lends credence to the appellant's claim.
Appellee Pilar Belmonte had one-fourth interest in a parcel of
land containing an area of 119.2775 hectares. On 12 May 1943
Leon C. Viardo acquired one-half interest of Pilar Belmonte's
one-fourth interest. In a partition, where the appellant did not
participate but which he does not impugn, Pilar Belmonte's
original one-fourth interest was segregated and delimited. She
was assigned in that partition and subdivision, Lot 1-A of Plan
PSD-16864, containing an area of 30 hectares (Exhibit K). Upon
the death of her mother, she acquired another 13.2775 hectares.
These 13.2775 hectares she sold to her two daughters and the
validity of the sales has been upheld by this Court. With the
original 30 hectares, however, Pilar Belmonte did not act in good
faith when she sold more than 15 hectares to her daughter
Patricia Driz. Knowing that one-half of said 30 hectares or a total
of 15 hectares belonged to the appellant Leon C. Viardo, she
nevertheless proceeded to enter into the following transactions:
(1) sale of seven and one-half hectares to Isidoro Mercado,
dated 28 June 1948, Exhibit A; (2) sale of seven hectares to
Dominador Asuncion, who later sold the same parcel or interest
to Zacarias Belmonte, dated 9 March 1949, Exhibit A; (3)
subdivision and partition of her lot 1-A, PSD-16864, into lots 1-E,
1-F, 1-G, 1-H and 1-I, without the knowledge of her co-owner
Leon C. Viardo, Plan PSD-36340, Exhibit O; (4) sale in favor of
her daughter Patricia Driz of lots 1-H and 1-I, Plan PSD-36340,
containing an area of 20,000 and 55,152 sq. meters,
respectively, dated 9 September 1954, Exhibits R and A; and (5)
sale in favor of her daughter Patricia Driz of lot 1-E; Plan PSD-
36340, containing an area of 79,848 sq. meters, dated 11
September 1954, Exhibits S and A.
It will thus be seen that on 9 March 1949, after Pilar Belmonte
had sold seven hectares to Dominador Asuncion, she had only
one-half hectare left to dispose of, since out of her original thirty
hectares (Lot 1-A, PSD-16864) the appellant Leon C. Viardo had
acquired one-half or fifteen hectares, Isidoro Mercado, seven
and one-half hectares, and Dominador Asuncion, seven
hectares.
Fully aware that one-half hectare remained her only property,
Pilar Belmonte nevertheless proceeded to sell to her daughter
Patricia Driz three lots containing a combined area of more than
fifteen hectares. It is obvious, therefore, that the sales to Patricia
Driz cannot be sustained, regardless of whether Pilar Belmonte
was aware or suspected that she would be held liable for
damages to Leon C. Viardo in civil case No. 161, as in fact she
was held liable by the Court of Appeals about two weeks after
she had executed the sales in favor of her daughter. The sales
above referred to stand on a different footing from the sales
made in favor of Isidoro Mercado and Dominador Asuncion,
because in the latter sales Pilar Belmonte still had something to
sell, namely, her remaining fifteen hectares. But after she had
disposed of fourteen and one-half hectares to Mercado and

Asuncion she had only one-half hectare left and therefore could
not sell another fifteen hectares.
The trial court, however, did not completely annul the sales
made by Pilar Belmonte in favor of her daughter. It merely
reduced the sale of fifteen hectares to a sale of one-half hectare,
obviously in the belief that the sales should be sustained to the
extent of Pilar Belmonte's remaining interest. The record shows
that both Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz knew that
one-half hectare only remained as the former's property, but they
nevertheless proceeded to sell and purchase more than fifteen
hectares. When it is considered further that the final judgment in
civil case No. 161 awarded damages to Leon C. Viardo
amounting to 225 cavans of palay from 1946 (Exhibit H) and that
when this judgment was executed in 1954 no property of Pilar
Belmonte could be found to satisfy the damages (p. 11, t.s.n.), it
is evident that Pilar Belmonte and her daughter Patricia Driz had
conspired to dispose of all the property of Pilar Belmonte in order
to frustrate any award of damages the Court of Appeals might
make in favor of Leon C. Viardo and that this conspiracy must
have taken place at the latest on 9 September 1954 when Pilar
Belmonte proceeded to sell to her daughter Patricia Driz parcels
of land which no longer belonged to her.
The judgment appealed from is modified by holding and
declaring that (1) Leon C. Viardo, Isidoro M. Mercado, Zacarias
Belmonte and Pilar Belmonte (not Patricia Driz) are the co-
owners pro-indiviso of lot 1-A, Plan PSD-16864, which is the
one-fourth share of Pilar Belmonte in lot 1, PSD-14371, original
certificate of title No. 3484, in the following proportion: one-half
or fifteen hectares owned by Leon C. Viardo, seven and one-half
hectares by Isidoro M. Mercado, seven hectares by Zacarias
Belmonte, and one-half hectares by Pilar Belmonte, subject to
the rights of Leon C. Viardo to the balance of his judgment credit
against Pilar Belmonte; and (2) Leon C. Viardo is awarded
damages of P1,000 against Pilar Belmonte. In all other respects,
the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellees Pilar Belmonte and Patricia Driz.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
FOOTNOTES
On 30 June 1956 the complaint against the Philippine American
General Insurance Company. Inc. was dismissed because the
company no longer had any interest in the parcel of and in
dispute. It was made a defendant because it was the mortgagee
of a part of the land. When the mortgage debt was paid, it
released the mortgage.
Pamplona vs. Moreto
[G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and
APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO,
MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO
MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO
MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA
MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA,
respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
Page 5 of 11
Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision
of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled
"Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs. Cornelio
Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife.
During their marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495,
4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in
Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the
name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during
their marriage six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz,
Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his
heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina,
Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her
heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the
following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro,
and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir
herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue
and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the
other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba,
Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of
his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent
of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano
could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona,
married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale
(Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale
(Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an
area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of
title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to
Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their
marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was
cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was
issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia
Onte (Exh. "A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh.
"1"), the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte
constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as
Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land
which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one
meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor
Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought
all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot
No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale
(Exh. "1") although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of
by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Apolonio Onte enlarged their house and they even constructed a

piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-
half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the
plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises
where they had their house and piggery on the ground that
Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of
the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the
premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted by
the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the
nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as
regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to
declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of
said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion
thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment of the other half of
the purchase price"; to order the defendants to vacate the
portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay actual
and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order
the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958
until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the
use and occupancy of the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in
their favor is valid as the lot sold is registered in the name of
Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith
that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by
agreement of the parties, it was found out that there was mutual
error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the
execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed
recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the
parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of
lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale
transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part
thereof being as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs
declaring the deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952
pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of
781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners
and entitled to its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half
(1/2) of 1781 square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square
meters of which defendants are declared lawful owners and
entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with
an area of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall
be entitled to a certificate of title covering said portion and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the Register
of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles
issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their
respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register
of Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the
name of Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by
virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are
ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
5671 within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become
final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for
the province of Laguna for his information and guidance.
Page 6 of 11
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Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said
judgment, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether
under the facts and circumstances duly established by the
evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the
property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the
property on July 30, 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of
P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already been dead six
years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil
Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the
conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and
divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The
necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act
3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an
extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for
partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became
the property of a community between the surviving husband,
Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica
Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this
bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the
legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by
operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of
the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower
or the widow, it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse.
Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the
fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question.
(Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said
that "(t)here is no reason in law why the heirs of the deceased
wife may not form a partnership with the surviving husband for
the management and control of the community property of the
marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather
community of property, between the heirs and the surviving
husband might be formed without a written agreement." In
Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that
"(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as
administrator of the community property, has authority to sell the
property withut the concurrence of the children of the marriage,
nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children,
with the result of bringing about a conventional ownership in
common between the father and children as to such property;
and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of
the property will acquire only the undivided interest of those
members of the family who join in the act of conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the
sale in 1952, the vendees constructed their house on the eastern
part of Lot 1496 which the vendor pointed out to them as the
area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of the
vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a
cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the
back of their house about one and one-half meters from the
eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees
believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of
the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No.
14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the deed of
sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold

as Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon
agreement of the parties during the proceedings of the case
below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses
Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as well as that of their
son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral
adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of
the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a
period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private
respondents who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of
Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger
to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the
land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded
and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by
laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void.
Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and
negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil.
92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal
partnership was already dissolved six years before and
therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano
Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased
wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is
applicable and it provides a follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of
the co-ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto
pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by
him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their
house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners
likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and
Monica Maniega owned three parcels of land denominated as
Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an
area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq.
meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters.
These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as
each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is
bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by
Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot
1496 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear
that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate
properties located in different places but they abut each other.
This is not disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of
the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these three
lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was
entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173
sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to
dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses.
Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to
one-half and invalid as to the other half for the very simple
reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to
more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which
he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners.
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-
owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the
Page 7 of 11
Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the
contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his
heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against
the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the
deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors
of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica
Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano
Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same.
Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano
Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the
provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the
obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and
transfering the ownership of the whole property sold, which is
transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private
respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other part to pay therefore a price
certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and
deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the
sale.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private
respondents received from their deceased parents and/or
predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and
obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death.
And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract
of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private
respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is
transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole
area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original
obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only
one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and
occupied by petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the
filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private
land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a
segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name
based on the relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the
sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano Moreto in
favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and
valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the
781 sq. meters at the eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied
by said petitioners and whereon their houses and piggery coral
stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate
the area of 781 sq. meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and
to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners
covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Rabadilla vs. CA
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2
COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals,3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555,
which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees
(including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix
Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said
Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special
Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me
to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in
my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the
aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that
should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the
ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942),
and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the
said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty
Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Page 8 of 11
Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation
to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph
of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the
month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in
the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and
his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and
deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25)
piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the
buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir
and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to
give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria
Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil)
that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey
and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they
cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to
the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife
Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and
Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza
Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod
City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint
alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank
and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver
one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25
piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated
demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the
Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or
mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per
crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498
in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in
default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted,
with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his
Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a
certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was
lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of
defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver
one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No.
49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January
of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing
in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan
Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar
Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity
as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the
annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87,
and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number
of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed
upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar
during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of
December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80
piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a
decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court
finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action
against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff.
While there maybe the non-performance of the command as
mandated exaction from them simply because they are the
children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.
The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category
as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate
the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her
claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being
prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering
thus:
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Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-
appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under
Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said
obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined
by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392
and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such
non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the
reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge
Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-
appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to
enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her
legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot
No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and
another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together
with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering
the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja
Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling
that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving
the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code
on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised
which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action.
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere
simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants"
should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died
single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and
such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid
substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not
definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who
are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438
and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be
deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his
supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue
posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there
was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the
private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to
stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right
against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue
the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional
rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower,

are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and
sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need
of further proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all
the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished
by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392
to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct
thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent
every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent.
Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to
the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code
on modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix
intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar
to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or
persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted.
Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide
for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall
pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,
renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a
simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person
with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to
another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The
Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions
of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this
point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the
first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with
the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking;
the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second
heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the
testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."16
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Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776
Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is
not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the
usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is
not related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case
under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal
institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge
imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it
appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once
provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred
to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner
stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most
analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882
is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub
modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the
efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is
similar to a resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be
gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject
property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly
worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent,
Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of
such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of
liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be
considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will
itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt,
the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.22
 Succession
Inheritance: Obligations | Art. 776

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that
the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the
right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because
the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer,
lessee or mortgagee.
Art. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall
be void, unless by some event or circumstance his identity
becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a definite
class or group of persons shall be valid.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the

face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the
Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it
was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the
Will in all its parts must be adopted.24

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under

obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to
Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer,
lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or
otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further
provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar
is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The
non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction
of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed
by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his
successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in
case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to
the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of

the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the
Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever
obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee;
that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and
constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment
of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the
seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and

free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which
a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will
cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would
thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in
CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs

SO ORDERED.

Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice

Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

FOOTNOTES

Art. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and
surname, and when there are two persons having the same
names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which the
instituted heir may be known.

Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir,
should he designate him in such manner that there can be no
doubt as to who has been instituted, the institution shall be valid.

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