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National Transportation Safety Board NTSB ID: WPR09LA151 Aircraft Registration Number: C-GCIL
Location/Time
Nearest City/Place State Zip Code Local Time Time Zone
Casper WY 82604 1526 MDT
The captain reported that the flight was initially performing a takeoff from runway 3 (a
10,165-foot long asphalt runway). About one-third of the way down the runway, between 60 to 100
knots, he heard the tower controller notify them that he thought he saw smoke originating from the
left engine. The captain stated that he immediately called for an aborted takeoff and the first
officer initiated the aborted takeoff sequence, "using normal breaking and thrust reverser
deployment for a few seconds and continued using thrust reversers only." The flight crew exited
the runway onto taxiway Alpha 6, and subsequently performed an engine power check with no anomalies
noted. The flight crew then taxied back to Alpha 1 via taxiway Alpha. The captain further stated
that he "had no reason at this time to suspect hot breaks due to the minimal use" and "elected to
taxi for another takeoff." The captain reported that following a 4 to 5 minute taxi time, the
first officer conducted a second takeoff.
The captain further reported that during the second takeoff roll on runway 3, between 80 knots and
"prior to the V1 call," the flight crew heard and felt a bang as the airplane yawed to the right.
The captain called for a second aborted takeoff. As the first officer initiated the second aborted
takeoff, a second bang and additional yaw was noted. The captain took control of the airplane, and
maintained directional control with reverse thrust and nose wheel steering. The captain further
stated that they were able to slow the airplane down and exit the runway onto taxiway Alpha 7.
Upon opening the cabin door, they observed a fire near the left main landing gear and immediately
evacuated the airplane. The Airport Fire and Rescue team arrived shortly after and extinguished
the fire.
The first officer reported that during the initial takeoff, about one-third of the way down the
runway and shortly after the "80 kt call, the tower controller made a call over the tower frequency
that he thought he saw smoke coming from our engine." The first officer stated, "The captain
called for an aborted takeoff, and I immediately commenced a rejected takeoff, using normal braking
and maximum thrust reversers. Within a few seconds, I let off the brakes and used thrust reversers
to approximately 60 knots, where I returned to using brakes at taxi speed."
The first officer further stated that during the second takeoff, between 80 knots and V1, she heard
and felt a bang, followed by a yaw to the right. Following the captain's call to abort the
Narrative (Continued)
takeoff, "I commenced the rejected takeoff and maintained directional control, only to hear a
second bang and harder yaw to the right."
Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector revealed that the
left main landing gear exhibited fire damage. A punctured hole within the right side of the
fuselage was observed just aft of the cockpit.
A post-accident check of the runway by the Casper Airport Public Safety Department revealed that
numerous amounts of tire debris extended from the area of taxiway Alpha 4 to Alpha 7.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was retrieved from the airplane and sent to the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Division for inspection.
The CVR recorded 31 minutes and 56 seconds of usable audio information. The recording revealed
that about 16 minutes and 2 seconds after power was applied to the airplane, the flight crew began
preparing for flight. At 19 minutes, 27 seconds, the captain requested clearance to taxi from the
ground controller. About 2 minutes, 43 seconds later, the captain requested clearance for takeoff
from the tower controller. The flight was cleared for takeoff 8 seconds later. During the takeoff
sequence, about 8 seconds after the first officer responded to the captain's call of "eighty
knots," the tower controller transmitted "appears you have a lot of smoke coming out your engine."
At 23 minutes, 28 seconds, the captain called for a rejected takeoff. About 37 seconds later, the
first officer stated "the right brake felt funny."
Following the aborted takeoff, the captain decided to run up both engines as the first officer was
heard briefing the passengers. At 24 minutes, 45 seconds, the tower controller transmitted "it
appears the smoke was from the left engine." At 26 minutes, 1 second, the captain requested
clearance to taxi to runway 3. At 27 minutes, 18 seconds, the captain stated "both engines are
pulling full power" immediately followed by a comment that it was not a high-speed abort since the
"aircraft was only through ninety knots."
At 28 minutes, 34 seconds, the tower controller cleared the flight for takeoff a second time on
runway 3. The sound of increasing engine noise was identified at 29 minutes, 11 seconds, followed
by an "eighty knots" call at 29 minutes, 25 seconds. Two loud noises, about one second apart were
heard beginning at 29 minutes, 34 seconds. At 29 minutes, 36 seconds, the captain called for a
rejected takeoff, followed by the first officer stating "blew a tire."
The flight crew reported that at the time of the accident, the airplane weighed 20,772 pounds.
The Learjet 55 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM), Section 3, "Emergency Procedures," page 36, states "if
rejected takeoff was made at weight above the landing maximum brake energy weight as determined
from the applicable LANDING WEIGHT LIMITS chart in Section V, the High Energy Stop Inspection
(Chapter 5, Learjet Maintenance Manual) must be performed."
The Learjet 55 AFM, Section 5, "Performance Data," page 65, Maximum Landing Weight, states in part
"the maximum landing weight (design structural limit for landing) is 17,000 pounds.
The Learjet 55 AFM, Section 1, "Limitations," page 13, part "TURN-AROUND LIMITS - Aircraft 55-003
thru 55-076 when not incorporating AAK 55-82-6" states in part "if the turn-around weight limit for
brake energy, as determined from the applicable LANDING WEIGHT LIMIT chart (Figures 5-54 and 5-55)
in Section V, is exceeded during a landing or rejected takeoff, the following limitations must be
observed: The aircraft must be parked for a minimum waiting period of 30 minutes before the next
Narrative (Continued)
takeoff attempt can be made. After the waiting period is observed, a visual inspection of the main
gear tires, wheels, and brakes for condition must be made." The operator of the aircraft reported
that the accident airplane was equipped with the AAK 55-82-6 modification, therefore, the 30 minute
waiting period did not apply.
Updated on Mar 23 2010 5:08PM
Aircraft Information
Aircraft Manufacturer Model/Series Serial Number
Gates Learjet Corporation Learjet 55 089
ELT Installed?/Type Yes / Unknown ELT Operated? No ELT Aided in Locating Accident Site? No
Owner/Operator Information
Registered Aircraft Owner Street Address
230 Aviation Place NE
Sunwest Aviation Ltd. City State Zip Code
Calgary T2E7G1
Street Address
Operator of Aircraft 230 Aviation Place NE
City State Zip Code
Sunwest Aviation Ltd.
Calgary T2E7G1
Operator Does Business As: Operator Designator Code:
- Type of U.S. Certificate(s) Held: None
Air Carrier Operating Certificate(s):
Sex: M Seat Occupied: Left Occupational Pilot? Yes Certificate Number: On File
Medical Cert.: Class 1 Medical Cert. Status: Without Waivers/Limitations Date of Last Medical Exam: 09/2008
Instruction Received
Last 90 Days 42 42 27
Last 30 Days 15 15 9
Last 24 Hours 2 2 1
Seatbelt Used? Yes Shoulder Harness Used? Yes Toxicology Performed? No Second Pilot? Yes
Flight Plan/Itinerary
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Departure Point State Airport Identifier Departure Time Time Zone
Type of Airspace:
Weather Information
Source of Wx Information:
Weather Information
WOF ID Observation Time Time Zone WOF Elevation WOF Distance From Accident Site Direction From Accident Site
Accident Information
Aircraft Damage: Substantial Aircraft Fire: Ground Aircraft Explosion None
First Pilot 1 1
Second Pilot 1 1
Student Pilot
Flight Instructor
Check Pilot
Flight Engineer
Cabin Attendants
Other Crew
Passengers 2 2
- TOTAL ABOARD - 4 4
Other Ground
- GRAND TOTAL - 4 4
Administrative Information
Investigator-In-Charge (IIC)
Joshua Cawthra
Bruce Hansen
Federal Aviation Administration
Casper, WY