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The Top 10 Myths Of Reliability Management

BY RICK HOFFMAN

INTRODUCTION 1. If it worked once, it will work in Vertical slice audits are an effective
According to the dictionary a myth is a any service. way to determine if the management
“notion based more on tradition or systems are functioning. In this
convenience than on fact.” There are a MYTH NUMBER 10: method an operation such as a weld is
number of myths surrounding Relia- YOU CAN ALWAYS TRUST selected at random. The operation is
bility management. These myths can FABRICATION SHOPS THAT “vertically sliced” to look at all aspects
often lead to poor decisions that HAVE INDUSTRY CERTIFI- of this step in the fabrication process.
increase cost, reduce reliability and in CATION For example, the weld procedure spec-
some cases compromise safety. This REALITY ification (WPS), procedure qualifica-
paper will challenge the top 10 myths, Trusting a fabrication shop is like pick- tion record (PQR), welder certificate,
offer a dose of reality and present an ing up a firearm. You may think the weld maps, rod control procedure,
alternate way of approaching the issue. shop will do a good job or the gun is fitup record, heat treatment record,
Case histories will be presented to unloaded, but it is important to check hydrotest record and test equipment
illustrate the myth, and in some cases for sure. Even though a shop has vari- calibration data would be reviewed.
tools will be included to improve the ous code stamps or quality system cer- Normally if a few welds are sampled
work process. tificates, the client must monitor the using the “vertical slice” technique,
work to assure a satisfactory product. problems with the shop quality system
Shops should be qualified through will be found. Appendix 2 contains a
THE TOP 10 MYTHS OF typical audit checklist for welding.
RELIABILITY MANAGE- a comprehensive vendor assessment
MENT program including evaluation of the When the order is placed for a
technical, quality, financial and man- piece of equipment, a vendor surveil-
10. You can always trust fabrication
agement systems. The assessment lance plan must also be implemented
shops that have industry certifica-
must be thorough enough to verify the to provide hold and witness points for
tion.
systems are actually functioning and inspection during fabrication. Appen -
9. Myth 10 is not important since
not just written in a QA manual. This dix 3 contains an example of our Sup-
you can sue the vendor.
process should begin with a question- plier Surveillance Requirements (SSR)
8. Mechanical engineers know forms. The SSR program defines the
naire and desktop review prior to visit-
everything . inspection requirements for each piece
ing the shop. Appendix 1 (visit our web
7. Reliability is a project. site at www.reliability-magazine.com of equipment. The SSR’s are included
6. The craftsman is only involved in and click on “Myths Su r ro u n d i n g as a part of our engineering standards
repairs, not reliability. Reliability Ma n a g e m e n t” for the and can be customized for special situ-
5. Management will always support Appendices listed in this article) con- ations.
the program. tains a typical questionnaire used for
4. You can trust everything on an this activity. In the event the vendor CASE HISTORY
electronic screen. passes this step, a shop audit must be The vendor assessment program has
3. The key to high reliability is conducted. Audits should be updated been in place for about eight years.
speedy repair. if the vendor experiences a significant During this period we have discovered
2. Reliability performance is up to change, such as a buyout or turnover serious deficiencies in a number of fab-
the reliability superintendent. of the management team. rication shops. For example, we have
been to pressure vessel shops that hold

10 — RELIABILITY®Magazine June 2001


a code stamp where there is no engineer on staff or the pres- interest via a comprehensive vendor monitoring and inspec-
ident of the company is the QA manager. In some cases the tion program.
owners indicated the QA manual is window dressing to get a
c e rtificate but is not implemented. We have been to MYTH NUMBER 8:
exchanger shops where customer requirements are ignored MECHANICAL ENGINEERS KNOW EVERY-
and equipment is assembled without completing required THING
inspections. One of the most serious incidents was a relief REALITY
valve shop that had non-English speaking workers pulling Mechanical engineering is a vast, complex field covering
parts for three different relief valves and putting the parts in everything from jet engines to pressure vessels. There are
one basket. Incorrect RV springs were found. These inci- numerous codes, fabrication methods and design issues asso-
dents demonstrate that the owner must closely monitor the ciated with each type of equipment used in plants. It is unre-
work to assure a quality product. alistic to expect a plant engineer to understand these items in
Would you contract to have a house built and just show enough detail to be successful without expert help from
up for closing? Most people visit the construction site fre- company specialists, engineering standards and consultants.
quently to assure the job is being done correctly. Why should However, we often assume plant maintenance engineers are
we do less for equipment being installed in our process superhuman and are experts in everything from compressor
plants? performance testing to heat exchanger design and construc-
tion. The results of these expectations are often disastrous.
MYTH NUMBER 9:
CASE HISTORY
MYTH NUMBER 10 IS NOT IMPORTANT
SINCE YOU CAN SUE THE VENDOR A junior maintenance engineer was assigned to a compressor
REALITY retrofit project since the plant machinery engineer was mov-
The world is full of hungry lawyers who would be glad to ing to a new position. Corporate resources were unavailable
represent you. However, the reality is that unless injury to support the project. Although the individual was a top
occurred due to negligence, the vendor would likely only performer, the expectation that he could perform his daily
have to replace the defective equipment. The owner is stuck duties plus a job that should have been assigned to an expert
with the problem, delay and production loss. Your insurance machinery engineer was unrealistic. Due to the excessive
policy to prevent these incidents is to establish engineering workload the engineer did not recognize a certain part was
standards, a good audit program, and inspect equipment exposed to the process and the incorrect material was select-
during fabrication. ed. After the error was discovered two critical compressors
had to be shut down for a temporary repair and the
machines had to be opened again at the next turnaround to
CASE HISTORY
make permanent repairs. Substantial maintenance costs and
A vendor supplied a turbine trip throttle valve for a critical production losses occurred.
ethylene refrigeration service for a large olefins facility. This
valve failed due to poor assembly practices, incorrect clear-
ances and poor testing. A spare valve provided by the same
MYTH NUMBER 7:
vendor also had problems and required emergency repairs
RELIABILITY IS A PROJECT
REALITY
prior to installation. As a result, several days of production
Many of us have often heard “The business is good, we need
were lost. A review of the vendor’s contract liability was com-
to improve reliability...by next Tuesday. We have to lower
pleted and it was determined liability was limited to repair or
maintenance costs...by next month. Let’s have a reliability
replacement of the poorly constructed parts. The owner was
project. We can assign Joe, he isn’t doing anything.” The
stuck with the production loss which was thousands of times
reality is that reliability is a very long-term commitment to
the value of the parts. The point is that the owner is holding
systems, records, procedures and personnel. It can not be
the bag on production losses and must protect the company
created overnight, or turned on and off like a switch.

RELIABILITY®Magazine June 2001 — 11


There are, however, times when a project approach is perform shop QA functions and develop standard repair
useful. After programs and projects have been identified, plans. We have been successful with this concept. In addi-
good project management skills can make it happen. The tion to improving our reliability program, it has provided
Project Manager can identify costs, schedule, manpower and financial and career growth opportunities for talented
other items necessary for successful implementation of the hourly personnel.
program or project.
CASE HISTORY
CASE HISTORY Severe wear problems occurred on a rail/wheel system in a
One European plant has had excellent reliability perfor- synthetic fuels plant. Although the design calculations pre-
mance for more than ten years and averaged over 99 percent dicted infinite life of the system, the rails were destroyed in
availability for the past 6 years. A number of factors have about 18 days of operation. Decommissioning of the sys-
made this possible. These include continuity of personnel, tem, repair and realignment of the rails was taking nearly 40
methodic elimination of problems, a long-term view of days on an around the clock basis. Specialists from MIT,
plant profitability and a reserve of maintenance funds for British Rail and the American Rail Association were brought
refurbishment of insulation and painting. A classic example in to work the problem. Cross sectional area of the rails was
of the plant philosophy is shown in Appendix 4. In the early increased and metallurgy was upgraded. However, the real
80’s the plant experienced over 80 leaks per year from exter- breakthrough came from the hourly mechanics that worked
nal corrosion. There were unscheduled shutdowns, environ- on the machine each time it came down. The mechanics dis-
mental problems and high maintenance costs. A covered the loads were not evenly distributed between the 24
comprehensive program to address external stress corrosion wheels on the machine. They also came up with a clever way
cracking and general corrosion under insulation was imple- to measure the loads, determine the amount of imbalance
mented. Additional maintenance funds were dedicated to between wheels, and shim the device to balance the load.
this effort for several years. The problem was brought under Equipment life increased from 18 days to 2 years through
control, leaks were reduced from over 80/year to 2/year, and these modifications.
costs were reduced.
MYTH NUMBER 5:
MYTH NUMBER 6: MANAGEMENT WILL ALWAYS SUPPORT
THE CRAFTSMAN IS ONLY INVOLVED IN THE PROGRAM
REPAIR, NOT IN RELIABILITY REALITY
REALITY During a recent 14-month period I had four bosses, went
The reality is that no reliability program can be successful through three restructuring programs and one takeover.
without full cooperation of the craft personnel and their Each boss, structure and company had a different view on
supervision. These people are the critical man-machine the costs and benefits associated with reliability manage-
interface for predictive, preventive and breakdown mainte- ment. These different views could have had a significant
nance. Since these people are working on assembly and impact on the program including manpower, priorities and
repair of the equipment, they form a critical link in the root allocation of resources. It was important to have the facts
cause analysis effort. In addition, many craft people will available on the financial benefits of the program and take
work on the same equipment for a number of years and can leadership with each of the new organizations to demon-
provide “corporate memory” that is often lost when turnover strate the effectiveness of the program.
of maintenance engineers occurs. The critical issue is that the reliability manager must
It is important for the organization to recognize and maintain documentation on the cost benefit ratio of the pro-
reward craft personnel with special aptitude in the reliability gram for a number of reasons. First, it is an important tool
area. These people can be pulled into staff positions in the for determining allocation of resources and which programs
reliability group to help set up programs, train personnel, are leveraging. It may indicate programs need modification,

12 — RELIABILITY ®Magazine June 2001


additional resources or to be eliminat- the tools, instruments and data that
ed. In addition when organizational are used in making critical decisions.
changes take place, the manager must Inaccuracy in measurement methods
be able to demonstrate the benefits of can cause poor decisions to be made
the program to technical and business on the condition of equipment and
personnel. extent of repair.

CASE HISTORY CASE HISTORY


During the early-80’s a well-known In 1997 we recognized heat exchang-
chemical and refining company had ers were a major issue for plant reliabil-
extensive standards, vendor assessment ity. Thirty one percent of the outage at
practices, non-process engineering three gulf coast facilities was caused by
expertise and manpower. This compa- heat exchanger failures. These failures
ny staffed up as a result of delays of up cost the company about $12MM in
to one year on plant startups due to production losses. An extensive study
machinery problems. This compre- was conducted of over 500 heat
hensive non-process engineering pro- exchanger repairs. Tools were devel-
gram had become a standard way of oped to help assess the required turn-
doing business and was considered a a round repairs. In addition we
“given” in the organization. When developed a tool called the Mock Heat
crude oil prices dropped and pressure Exchanger. This was a small, portable
increased on quarterly profits, the pro- exchanger used to test non-destructive
gram was devastated since the techni- examination (NDE) operators and
READER SERVICE NO. 52
cal personnel we re unable to methods. The exchanger was fabricat-
adequately articulate the benefits of ed using typical tube sizes and materi-
the program. Numerous personnel als. Known defects were placed in the repair, not speedy return to service. A
were laid off and much of the technol- tubes. When we began testing and thorough repair includes appropriate
ogy was lost. qualifying operators we were shocked dimensional checks, replacement of
at the results. Even though the testing parts that are near the end of life and
MYTH NUMBER 4: was conducted in a clean room under appropriate procedures for returning
YOU CAN TRUST EVERY- pristine conditions, certain methods the equipment to service.
THING ON AN ELECTRONIC showed extensive data scatter and inac- Many plants want the quickest
SCREEN curacy. This program has driven us to repair instead of allowing maintenance
REALITY qualify all NDE operators, eliminate the proper amount of time to com-
We tend to believe everything that certain test methods, remove more plete the job. This often leads to repeat
comes to us in a fancy electronic pre- tubes to verify results and be more failures and short equipment life. This
sentation. This includes TV, the Inter- conservative in retubing exchangers. is because the symptom is addressed
net, distributed control system (DCS) The results of NDE testing are shown instead of the root cause. For example,
screens and electronic tools used in the in Appendix 5. plants often just replace failed pump
field. We used to have a saying, “If you seals when the root cause may be bear-
want management to believe you, use MYTH NUMBER 3: ing problems, alignment or incorrect
color slides.” THE KEY TO HIGH RELIA- tolerances. In addition, operations
The fact is engineers must under-
BILITY IS SPEEDY REPAIR may demand the work be done after
REALITY normal working hours when resources
stand the accuracy and limitations of
The key to high reliability is thorough are limited.

RELIABILITY®Magazine June 2001 — 13


CASE HISTORY sonnel, engineers and even the clerical there is adequate experience are criti-
During two studies done in the 1980’s personnel must also understand how cal. You don’t want to be the Guinea
speedy return to service instead of their actions can affect plant perfor- Pig!
thorough repair was identified as a mance.
major factor in poor pump mean time CASE HISTORY CASE HISTORY
between failure. In order to correct this The company acquired a facility in the During startup of a synthetic fuels
problem, the plants changed their mid-90’s that had been poorly main- plant, severe operational problems
repair philosophy. When a machine tained and was operated on a “run to were encountered with a delumper.
came down, it became the property of failure” philosophy. Maintenance costs This device had normally been used to
maintenance and standard repair pro- we re a staggering 8-10 percent of shred materials such as sewage and
cedures were implemented. If opera- replacement value; reliability was poor performed very well. In the synthetic
tions needed the equipment back and safety awareness was low. Morale fuels plant the device was basically
q u i c k l y, maintenance would work of the engineering staff was poor since used as an in-line rock crusher ahead of
overtime, call in resources and expe- attempts to start reliability programs a slurry pump. The unit would only
dite parts. However the repair proce- or fix chronic problems were rejected. run for a few hours before it failed by
d u re was not compro m i s e d . After the acquisition, a program was fatigue or wear. A crew was continu-
Occasionally operations demanded initiated to upgrade the facility. Root ously repairing the device and parts
the equipment back immediately. In cause analysis, engineering standards were expensive and difficult to obtain.
this case operations had to sign a form and projects were implemented to Eventually the entire slurry system was
indicating the repair was compro- methodically eliminate the “bad actor” replaced at a cost of over $1MM. Large
mised and short life expected. These equipment. Reliability performance suction lines and pumps that could
forms were rarely executed and main- dramatically increased and morale handle the full particle size range were
tenance was generally given time to do improved despite a reduction in force. installed. In retrospect it was obvious
the repair. In addition, sound condi- the delumper was unsuitable for the
tion monitoring programs including MYTH NUMBER 1: task of crushing rock. Installation of
scheduled operation of spares gave IF IT WORKED ONCE, IT the proper slurry system during con-
operations confidence that the spare WILL WORK IN ANY SER- struction of the plant would have pre-
could carry the plant until a proper VICE vented extensive downtime and
repair could be executed. REALITY maintenance repair costs.
The vendor must demonstrate the
MYTH NUMBER 2: proposed equipment has been operat- SUMMARY
RELIABILITY PERFOR- ed in similar service for a reasonable Reliability performance can be severe-
MANCE IS UP TO THE period of time and that reliability has ly affected by preconceived notions or
RELIABILITY SUPERINTEN- been acceptable. This is critical for a assumptions by the plant staff. It is
DENT successful installation. Se e m i n g l y important that the plant be aware of
REALITY minor differences in fluid properties, the “myths” of reliability management
Reliability is just like safety; everyone inlet conditions, speed, and pressure that can hurt performance. Reliability
must be involved to make the program can significantly affect performance. is based on sound, long term pro-
successful. In most plants people walk Vendors will always tend to stretch the grams, continuity of personnel, spend-
through the gate focused on safety. In envelope on equipment to get a sale. ing to maintain the plant in good
plants with outstanding operating per- The downside for the vendor is very condition and most of all treating reli-
formance, people feel the same about small compared to the impact on the ability like safety. If this is done in your
reliability. Operations and mainte- plant if the prototype does not func- facility, you will control the plant
nance personnel have a key role in tion properly. Procedures to complete- instead of the plant controlling you.
plant reliability, but warehouse per- ly evaluate equipment to determine if

14 — RELIABILITY ®Magazine June 2001


Good luck in eliminating the myths in ment and Sustain Your Reliability Pro- oped reliability programs for refineries,
your plant. gram”, 8th International Process Plant chemical plants, and synthetic fuels oper -
Reliability Conference, Houston, Texas,
October, 1999.
ations. In the early 1980’s, Mr. Hoffman
REFERENCES 5. Hardy, Allison, Qualification Program headed up the technical support group
1. Gamio, Carlos and Pinto, Walter; “Shell for Heat Exchanger Tube Test Operators, responsible for startup and operation of
and Tube Exchanger Reliability Study,” NPRA Maintenance Confere n c e , the world’s first commercial oil shale ven -
NPRA Maintenance Conference, New Austin, Texas, May 2000. ture. Rick has a BSME (honors) degree
Orleans, Louisiana, May 1999.
from the University of Wyoming.
2. Bloch, Heinz P., “A Detailed Examina-
tion of “Best-Of-Class” Reliability Prac- Rick is currently Manager, Specialty
tices in the Hyd rocarbon Pro c e s s i n g Engineering, for Lyo n d e l l / Eq u i s t a r This article was presented at the 9th
Industry”, NPRA Maintenance Confer- Petrochemical Company. A 28-year vet - Process Plant Reliability Conference and
ence, New Orleans, Louisiana, Ma y eran in the reliability field, he is respon -
1999. Exhibition held October 25-26, 2000 in
sible for all corporate level maintenance Houston, Texas.
3. Loushin, L. Louis, “Assessment of Struc-
tural Integrity in Pressure Vessels, Predic-
and reliability programs for the Lyondell READER SERVICE NO. 63
tions and Verification”, ASME Pressure and Equistar sites. In addition, he has
Vessel Technology Conference, Ju n e world-wide responsibility for non-process
1996. corporate engineering and capital project
4. Hoffman, M. Rick, “Back to Basics, A technical support activities at over twen -
Down to Earth Approach to Sell, Imple-
ty plants. During his career he has devel -

READER SERVICE NO. 59 RELIABILITY®Magazine June 2001 — 15

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