Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Examens :
Cours, lectures, application du cours, powerpt (http://dev.ulb.ac.be/sciencespo/fr/avisdetails 46138.ht)
Livres à lire :
Lipset, Stein, Seymoon, Rokkan, Structures et clivages de partis et alignement des électeurs, éd.ULB, 08
Sartori Giovanni, Bien comparer, mal comparer, Revue internationale de pol comparée, vol 1, n°1, 1994
Politique comparée
Why comparer ?
Place de la comparaison
Méthode comparative
Selon la théorie
Selon l ambition explicative
Selon le nbre de cas
Selon la dimension tporelle
Selon le nbre de variables
Selon le type de cas étudiés
Pièges de la comparaison
Ds l élaboration du design de recherche
Ds l analyse et l interprétation des résultats
Approches de la comparaison
Applications
Examen : article de Sartori
Mémoire : transition démocratique
Conférence UN
Conférence DEUX
Why comparer ?
Place de la comparaison
1 - Why comparer ?
Cela permet de relativiser, conceptualiser et d utiliser
a) Permet de relativiser.
Tt étant relatif, tte perception et analyse se fait par comparaison. De plus, la comparaison systématique
permet de sortir des lieux communs et l ethnocentrisme. 7 why la tâche du politologue est de construire
une grille de comparaison la plus rigoureuse et scientifique possible pr appréhender l univers politique.
Almond avait négligé les nbreuses exceptions, d où une new catégorie : la démocratie consociative.
b) Permet de conceptualiser.
Comparer oblige à définir précisément les concepts.
Ex. : extrême droite en Belgique et France s appelle droite radicale populiste en Autriche
c) 4 usages de la comparaison.
Contextualiser. Permet d élargir sa propre conception du monde et de faire ressortir pt communs et
divergences < > les cas.
Chps à part
Approche dominante née aux USA qui se divise en deux sous chps : ceux qui ne wk pas sur les
Relations Internationales, les théories politiques et les USA ne ft que du comparatif.
Daniel Caramani nuance : l analyse comparative est une analyse empirique des intérêts à l intérieur des
états < > au moins deux cas. Les USA ne st qu un seul pays et les wk sur les RI qui comparent les
relations entre états ne pvent devenir théorie politique car les chps st trop vastes et nbreux.
Méthode comparative
Une analyse comparative 1. a pr objectif d établir une relation < > 2 ou +ieurs variables en gardant
constantes les variables non analysées et 2. peut s appliquer aux objets de ts les chps d étude.
Méthode expérimentale : mettre en place des données sous contrôle et évaluer les chgts.
Selon Lijparht, la + scientifique. Mais pas utilisable car on ne peut établir des états juste pr les tester.
Méthode statistique : recherche de corrélation en le plus de variables possibles recueillies sur un sujet.
Pas utilisable car need de trop nbreuses infos pr des pays.
II Méthode comparative
Globalisantes ou ttles
Explication valable pr ts les cas, même ceux non étudiés.
Ex : Lipset et Rokkan et la théorie des clivages.
Un gd nbre de cas
Closed universe : réformes électorales ds les démocraties établies (Italie en 1993, Italie en 2005, Japon
en 1994, NZ en 1993, France en 1985 et 1986)
a) Localisme
1. Oubli du caractère nationalement (terme « libéral ») et historiquement (terme « gauche ») marqué
d un concept. Les chercheurs vt prendre pr acquis la valeur du concept utilisé ds son système culturel ou
politique. On retrouve cela ds les termes communément utilisés en sc po. En Belgique, le mot "libéral"
nomme la droite représentée par certains partis. Aux USA il nomme la gauche voire l'extrême gauche, ce
qui est fort différent. On voit bien ici le piège du localisme. Il n'apparaît pas que lorsqu'on déplace un
concept ds l'espace mais aussi ds le tps. De même, le mot "Gauche" signifiait le parti qui défendait la
séparation de l'église et de l'état fin XIXe début XXe alors qu'il signifie actuellement le rattachement à
des valeurs sociales et démocratiques.
b) Mauvaise classification
Construction de catégories inappropriées. Ex : étude des familles de parti sur base du nom des partis.
Famille libérale : oubli du Parti démocratique luxembourgeois, de la Venstre danoise, du Partido Social
Democrata portugais
Famille nationaliste : Scottish National Party, Partido Nacionalist Vasco, Front national, Alleanza
Nazionale.
c) Gradualisme
La réalité est trop complexe pr la réduire à des catégorisations binaires. C est why on estime que les
traitements continus (blanc, gris clair, gris foncé ou noir) st plus pertinents que les traitements
dichotomiques (blanc ou noir). Pourtant, Sartori démontre qu aucune des deux options n est par
définition supérieure à l autre. Les traitements continus pvent faire perdre leur sens aux concepts utilisés
(ex : démocratie). La plupart des échelles finissent pas être transformées en catégories tt aussi arbitraires
que le classement dichotomique. Le chercheur doit constamment garder à l esprit que tte catégorisation
affecte la réalité observée
ENPP
USA 2.41
Canada 2.35
Allemagne 2.84
Belgique 5.49
Autriche 2.72
Suisse 5.57
Australie 2.19
d) Elasticité conceptuelle
Elargir la définition d un concept pr le rendre applicable en dehors de son contexte originel.
Le risque est de l élargir au pt de lui faire perdre son pv explicatif. Ex : « clivage », ligne de division
identitaire, née d'un conflit historique, qui va se diviser ds une logique partisane en politique.
Modèles alternatifs d explication des voix de préférence des candidats flamands aux élections de 2007
De multiples angles de vue st possibles pr tte réalité et tt objet et chaque approche fait ressortir certains
traits plus que d autres. Ex. : l'approche visuelle fera ressortir les couleurs et les dimensions et pas
l'odeur ou le matériau utilisé.
Paradigme (Lakatos)
L'ensemble des règles admises et intériorisées comme « normes », à un moment donné de son histoire
par la communauté scientifique pr délimiter et problématiser les « faits » qu'elle juge dignes d'étude.
On choisit dc d'abord un paradigme dominant. Les anomalies révèlent que d'autres paradigmes rentrent
en cpte. On essaye alors d'y trouver des solutions et si cela échoue on voit la fragmentation de l'autorité.
On réfute dc et on prend en cpte les modifications et les nveaux paradigmes. On revient alors à une
période normale. Ex : on a lgtps pensé la réponse à la stagfaltion suite à la crise économique des 70
par le keynesianisme. On se rend cpte que ds les années 80 cela ne marche pas. On remet alors en
question le paradigme et on voit émerger les théories de Friedman etc. et ensuite le neo-libéralisme de
Thatcher et Reagan.
Aujourd'hui également on est peut être en train de chger de paradigme suite à la crise financière actuelle
et les réponses inadéquates à celle ci. On a dc tjrs une succession de paradigmes qui ft avancer les
choses. Même en période normale on a des paradigmes qui critiquent le paradigme dominant.
Modèle athéorique : le but n'est pas de produire une théorie explicative de la vie politique mais
seulement de mettre en évidence des recettes permettant de les comprendre.
Méthode peu scientifique : On n'essaye pas de construire de lois des théories, des hypothèses que l'on
puisse infirmer ou non. On ne cherche pas à confronter les théories à la falsifiabilité et la confrontation
empirique de Popper. Il y a à ce moment là des paradigmes qui proposent des théories explicatives plus
robustes en terme d'explication scientifique (behaviorisme par exemple). On va dc ranger au placard ce
paradigme dominant et d'autres vt s'imposer ds les 50.
Theda Skocpol : Etats et révolutions sociales : la révolution en France, en Russie et en Chine (1979)
Charles Tilly : Contrainte et capital ds la formation de l Europe : 990-1990 (1990)
Pour l'auteur, l'agriculture est à la base de tt cela. Sa modernisation se fait en même tps que la révolution
industrielle et entraîne dc une alliance entre la bourgeoisie urbaine et les propriétaires fonciers. Les élites
pvent alors s'appuyer sur une masse populaire forte pr moderniser l'économie. Par contre, sans cette
commercialisation de l'agriculture, on a pas cette alliance, la bourgeoisie des villes ne trouve pas de
relais, il y a dc un affrontement et pas de révolution bourgeoise réelle qui pourrait mener au capitalisme
et à la démocratie participative. Par contrer, si les propriétaires fonciers acceptent graduellement le
processus de modernisation de l'économie, ce st les anciennes élites qui veulent modifier l'économie
mais de leurs mains. On arrive à des systèmes autoritaires comme en Espagne ou Italie. Ds un troisième
cas on aura un état qui n'arrive pas à contrôler la révolution populaire, qui se retrouve débordé et cela
mène au communisme.
Accumulation de la contrainte
moyenne Etats
Trois visions : l Etat détermine l économie ; l économie détermine l Etat ; Etat et économie s opposent.
Effets sur l org. de l éco et place de l Etat ds l éco (Hall et Soskice (2001) - Varieties of capitalism) :
Economies de marché libérales vs économies de marché coordonnées
Convergence néo-libérale, divergence et convergence relative
4) Approche culturelle
La variable explicative majeure y est la culture politique. Cette approche est plus particulariste (comme
l historique) que globalisante (comme les institutionnelles et économiques).
La culture est un « système de signification et de valeurs communes que les mbres d un gpe connaissent
et utilisent ds leurs interactions ». Cette notion est subjective et interpersonnelle.
Pères fondateurs :
Alexis de Tocqueville (De la démocratie en Amérique)
Max Weber (L éthique protestante et l esprit du capitalisme)
Deux reproches :
1. traitement homogénéisant
2. manque de base empirique rigoureuse.
Deux solutions :
1. Etudes des micro-fondations de la culture
Laurence Wyllie - Un village du Vaucluse (1968)
Edward Banfield - The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1967)
Le dilemme du prisonnier
Prisonnier B
Prisonnier A Avoue Se tait
Si les prisonniers se taisent ts les deux, ils st seront libres, mais aucun ne sait si l autre va bien se taire ou
va essayer de minimiser sa peur en avouant pr écoper de deux ans au lieu de dix ans. Glement, ils
avouent ts les deux et écopent de la peine maximale.
6) L approche néo-institutionnaliste
Triple critique :
1. les approches holistes nient la liberté de l acteur
2. l approche stratégique surdimensionne la liberté de l acteur
3. les institutions ont été trop radicalement mises de côté
Réponse du néo-institutionnalisme :
1. rationalité limitée des acteurs
2. définition élargie des institutions
3. retour des institutions comme variable dépendante et indépendante.
(Bringing the State Back In, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985)
Approche institutionnelle :
Le poids des règles légales sur la capacité à réformer (constitutionnalisation et référendum)
Approche historique :
Le poids du mvt ouvrier sur la représentation proportionnelle (Blais, Dobrzynska et Indridason 2005)
Le poids de l héritage colonial (Blais, Massicotte et Yoshinaka 2004)
Approche culturelle :
Tradition et statu quo (Bogdanor et Butler 1983)
Culture consensuelle et culture adversérielle (Norris 1995)
Approche économique :
Lien entre commerce international et RP (Rogowski 1987)
Approche stratégique :
Réformer pr maximiser son pv (Benoit 2004)
Approche néo-institutionnelle :
Préférences limitées par le souvenir du passé (Bawn 1995)
Structure sociale (Rokkan 1965)
Culture et horizon cognitif (Pilet 2007)
V Applications
Examen
Mémoire
1) Article de Sartori
Question 2 : Morlino (1993) a étudié les cas du Japon, de l'Allemagne, de l'Italie, et de l'Espagne pr
comprendre l'émergence de mvts terroristes internes. Ds son design de recherche, il a mis de côté les
questions de dvpt économique du pays, de force de la classe ouvrière et de pluralisme politique pour
Question 3 : Un étudiant canadien souhaite comparer les cabinets libéraux de Verhofstadt et de Paul
Martin. Le prof lui parle des conseillers de Verhofstadt tandis qu il évoque qt à lui les ministres de Paul
Martin. Quel défaut de bcp d'études comparatives est à la base de ce dialogue de sourd ?
Le localisme.
Chacun fait référence à un cadre local du terme « cabinet » :
- En Belgique, cabinet renvoie aux conseillers du ministre.
- au Canada, renvoie aux ministres.
Question 4 : Un étudiant étudie l'idéologie des partis de gauche en matière de lutte vs le terrorisme. Il
propose de comparer le PS frçais, le Parti démocrate US et les radicaux en Italie. Quel danger le guette ?
La mauvaise classification.
Il réunit sous le label « parti de gauche » des formations à gauche ds leur propre système politique mais
qui, ds une perspective comparée, forment une classe partageant plus de différences que de similarités.
Question 6 : Formuler des hypothèses plausibles et inspirées des approches culturelles, historiques,
économique, stratégique et institutionnelle pr expliquer que les résistances à l intégration européenne
soit forte ds le Royaume Uni, La Bulgarie, les pays scandinaves, la Pologne, la Tchéquie et la France et
faible ds la Belgique, l Espagne, la Grèce, le Portugal et le Luxembourg.
Culturelle : culture consensuelle belge. Culture de centralisation française. Culture religieuse polonaise.
Historique : autorité politique extra nationale peu supportable depuis l URSS.
Economique : faciliter immigration clandestine et dc MO facile à exploiter.
Six indicateurs
- Proportion d'universitaires
- Proportion de fermes familiales
- Degré de ctralisation de l'économie non-rurale
- Degré de la population urbaine
Solution
- étude des fdements de la sté civile ds une seule petite localité du sud de l'Espagne (El Marco de Jerez),
représentative de l'Espagne sous Franco.
Schéma gl
1. Oppression du régime en place
2. Mécontentement citoyen (ds le cas de El Marco, celui des wkeurs industriels et ruraux)
3. Première mobilisation en petits réseaux et premières actions de contestations secrètes
4. Intégration des petits réseaux contestataires ds de + gdes org. clandestines (PC, Comm. ouvrières, etc)
5. La contestation clandestine conscientise même les inactifs à l'idée de mobilisation politique collective
6. Embryon de sté civile servira de fdement à la démocratie au moment de la transition
Plan et objectif
Synthèse
Résumé
(1) : plus la distance par rapport au c ur éco de l'Europe est gde, plus l'unification territoriale est aisée.
- La richesse économique et l'intensité des échanges commerciaux ont permis à de nbreux ctres urbains
d'émerger, morcelant le territoire et rendant l'unification difficile.
Situations intermédiaires
- France : unification possible pr la partie ouest hors de la ceinture urbaine (Bourgogne) et distance à
Rome suffisante.
- Espagne : unification théoriquement précoce car à la périphérie mais retardée par la force du
catholicisme (c ur de la contre réforme).
1) Ce clivage n'est pas né d'une rupture brutale comme une révolution ou un conflit violent. Certains ont
voulut considérer Mai 68 comme élément de rupture mais Pilet pense que non.
2) Un clivage est sensé durer ds le tps. Ce clivage aurait alors du perdurer mais aussi monter en
puissance. Or l'agent de socialisation sur le long terme concernant ce "clivage" est faible. Il y a dc un
conflit et une création de parti mais entre les deux il y a une notion de socialisation et de transformation
de l'identité. Pouvons nous dès lors parler ds ce cas d'un clivage ? Est ce qu'on peut définir son identité
politique et sociale sur le matérialisme ou le post-matérialisme ? Il y a débat. pr Pilet, Mai 68 n'est pas
un conflit assez important, les partis ne se st pas inscrits ds la durée et de plus il n'y a pas d'agent de
En ce qui concerne les écologistes, cette école explique ce phénomène sur le fait que cela n'est pas du au
dégel des clivages mais au nveau positionnement des gens. Non plus sur des questions identitaires mais
sur des enjeux.
2. Le clivage gagnants/perdants
Modernisation des stés : les gagnants s'y adaptent et en tirent une amélioration de leur niveau de vie.
Les perdants en st victimes (ouvriers, agriculteurs mais aussi professions libérales en perte de prestige).
Ils seraient sensibles aux discours populistes, ce qui expliquerait la montée de l'extrême droite.
Mais est-ce bien un clivage au sens de L&R ? Elasticité conceptuelle.
Ceux qui pensent que ce n'est pas vrai disent que la révolution post-industrielle est une révolution douce
et qu'en plus le critère identitaire gagnant/perdant marche bien en Europe occidentale mais pas vraiment
ailleurs. De plus l'individualisation détruit les clivages et ne les construit pas. Troisièmement, ils
maintiennent que l'émergence de l'extrême droite est due à des personnages charismatiques et non pas à
la naissance d'un nveau clivage.
3. Le clivage européen
Retour du clivage ctre-périphérie avec l'intégration européenne as nveau mvt d'intégration nationale ?
Nveau clivage ouverture/fermeture à l'autre ? Simple enjeu ? Il n y a pratiquement aucun parti et dc
aucune alliance dt la raison d'être serait cette question. Dc, en fait, des déterminants du vote assez limités.
2. La méthode
Quel est le rapport à la théorie chez L&R ?
Par rapport aux 5 modèles, ils mêlent le modèle de vérification de hypothèses et le modèle de tests et
vérification de la théorie. On est dc ds un rapport existant avec la théorie. Ils se basent sur la théorie de
Parson. En fait, avant Rokkan, on explique pas les différences entres les systèmes partisans de manière
comparée. Il propose dc une nouvelle théorie (génère des hypothèses) sur les clivages. C'est pr autant
une création d'hypothèses qui ne fait pas table rase du passé puisqu'il se réfère à Parson. Mais il fait cela
avec beaucoup de liberté. Ce qu'il dit, c'est qu'il applique sa théorie aux 20 et que du au phénomène de
"gel des clivages", elle est tjrs applicable ds les 60.
Comment opèrent-ils leur sélection des cas pr les chapitres de leur livre ?
(Pg 10 : 2ème paragraphe) : Ils essayent en fait de comprendre pourquoi es pays ont un système partisan
différent. Sur la variable dépendante "quel est leur système partisan", ils st différents. Par rapport à cela
que fait il ? Cherche t-il à étudier ceux qui on le même système partisan ? Non, il l'élargit puisqu'ils
étudient 12 pays qui se ressemblent plutôt (pluralistes aujourd'hui et pluralistes ds le passé). La variable
indépendante : la compétition politique. Sur celle-ci, ils st semblables. C'est la première matrice qui
permet d'arriver au modèle explicatif. Au départ on a dc bien une approche par "cas semblables". Mais
restent-ils ds cette approche ? Non puisqu'ils vt prendre d'autres cas qui st "dissemblables". Par exemple,
l'Espagne où il n'y avait pas de compétition autrefois mais il y en a bien une aujourd'hui. Il prend
également un Etat d'Afrique, le Japon et le Brésil. Il dit que la variable dépendante est identique pr ces
trois Etats aux variables indépendantes différentes très importantes mais ils ont tous une variable
indépendante concernant les clivages identique. Et c'est cette variable indépendante qui expliquerait la
variable dépendante.
La pple critique qu'on a fait à ces auteurs est leur considération des révolutions comme pilier ppl de la
construction des clivages.
2) Synthèse
Si chaque science, chaque domaine d étude, cptent nbres de spécialistes ; Stein Rokkan et Seymour
Martin Lispet en ft indubitablement partie et st considérés comme tels ds la discipline des sciences
sociales et plus encore, ds le chp de la science po.
Stein Rokkan, professeur de politique comparée à l Université de Bergen (Norvège) s est intéressé à la
formation des partis politiques européens ainsi qu au concept d Etat-nation. Trois ans durant, il a présidé
l International Political Science Association (IPSA). Il est par la suite psdt du Conseil international des
sciences sociales au sein de l UNESCO, psdt de l International Sociological Association et co-fdateur de
l European Consortium for Political Research. Honoré à titre posthume, il décède en 1979.
Seymour Martin Lipset a été professeur de sociologie politique à Stanford avant de partir pr l Université
d Harvard. Il présidera qt à lui l American Sociological Association et l American Political Science
Association. Il décède en 2004.
L ouvrage sur lequel porte cette synthèse s articule autours de trois blématiques qui st par ailleurs
induites ds le titre. Chacune se caractérise par une série de questions distinctes.
La première blèmatique porte sur la construction de l Etat 1 édition originale parue en anglais (1967)
sous le titre « Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments : Cross-National Perspectives
modern in Europe », relate la structure et la formation de clivages fdamentx et pose des questions sur la
genèse du système de contrastes et de clivages à l intérieur de la communauté nationale.
La seconde porte sur l établissement des partis. Elle pose une série de questions concernant les
conditions de dvpt d un système stable de clivages et d oppositions ds la vie politique nationale.
Le but est de mettre en évidence l incidence de chaque problématique sur les deux autres pr établir une
théorie des clivages. Pr ce faire, les auteurs établissent une analyse comparative historique des
conditions économiques et sociales ds les pays occidentaux jusque ds les 20, la situation n ayant pas
évolué significativement depuis lors. L&R considèrent ce paradigme parsonien 1 comme un modèle de
départ possible pr une analyse comparative car il a la prétention de présenter l inventaire des bases de
clivages potentiels. Il n est en aucun cas limitatif et ils passeront outre très rapidement.
Il établit quatre « sous systèmes fctnels » 2, ce modèle AGIL s applique à n importe quel système
d action : la sté (ds laquelle naît les clivages) étant un système d action spécifique. La critique émise par
L&R à l intention de ce modèle réside ds le fait qu il s agisse ici d une procédure analytique portant sur
des éléments uniques : ce modèle permet de traiter les clivages mais de manière individuelle.
1er blèmatique : il faut dc introduire un nveau modèle ayant pr but de traiter les clivages ds leurs
multiplicités, un modèle jouant le rôle d une grille de lecture pr l analyse comparée de parti. Tel qu ils le
conçoivent, il se présente sous la forme d un espace bidimensionnel (formé autours d une dimension
territoriale et d une dimension fctnelle) comprenant une double dichotomie : oppositions sur des intérêts
spécifiques [a] et idéologiques [i] pr la dimension fctnelle ; oppositions parmi les élites nationales
établies [g] et locales-régionales [l] pr la dimension territoriale 3.
Ainsi, ns retrouvons des conflits politiques du type producteurs vs consommateurs ou encore wkeurs vs
employeurs à l extrémité [a] ; d autres gravitant autours de conceptions religieuses-morales distinctes à
l extrémité [i], de type Etat vs Eglise mais également des conflits culturels opposant culture dominante
et culture dominée ou encore des conflits économiques < > l économie primaire (l agriculture en est un
ex) et l éco 2daire (l industrialisation accompagné du dvpt urbain). Ces quatre clivages, présentés
comme fdtx par L&R, st liés à la dimension fctnelle st prédominants sur les clivages résultant de la
dimension territoriale et inversement suivant les pays.
Cette remarque qt à la prédominance des uns sur les autres s applique également ds un cadre tporel :
historiquement, ces clivages s articulent autour de deux gdes révolutions : deux d < > eux 4 résultent de
la révolution nationale, deux autres st issus de la révolution industrielle 5.
2de blèmatique : Ds le dvpt qui précède, ns touchons très clairement à la première blèmatique de
l ouvrage. Le lien causal unissant cette même blèmatique à la 2de est la concrétisation des quatre
clivages fdtx ont prit la forme de mvts de protestations, soit à l égard des partis dominants ds les
systèmes pluralistes, soit à l égard des partis ttlitaires ds les 6tm de type monolithique. Concrètement,
ces mvts de protestations prennent la forme de partis (partis agraires, partis idéologiquement
orientés, ). La question à se poser n est pas si ce lien causal existe ou non puisque L&R en ft leur
postulat mais de savoir comment ces clivages se traduisent ds les oppositions < > partis ?
Pr répondre à cette 2de blèmatique, les auteurs soulèvent l ensemble des conditions 6 rendant possible la
protestation et la représentation (en termes de partis) des divers intérêts en présences ds tte sté, en ce
compris les intérêts qui ne st pas tjrs « en phase » avec ceux du parti au pv.
Les réponses apportées à ces questions ns donnent plus de précisions qt à la facilité ou non pr un nveau
parti de se faire une place ds l échiquier politique.
Ds une perspective de théorisation, L&R établissent une série de quatre seuils jalonnant le chemin de tt
nveau mvt ds un 6tm pol et classifient les systèmes politiques (les différents régimes) en fct de leurs
positionnements qt à ceux-ci : LIR PM
1. Le seuil de légitimation (le système politique en place accorde-t-il le droit à la critique, accepte-t-il
une forme d opposition ?) ; 2. Le seuil d incorporation (les adhérents de mvts naissants ont-ils les
mêmes droits, le même statut que les autres lors du choix des représentants ?) ; 3. Le seuil de
représentation (le mvt naissant est-il en mesure d accéder seul aux organes représentatifs ou est-il
contraint d établir des alliances ?) ; 4. Le seuil du pv majoritaire (quelle est la marge de manoeuvre d un
parti au pv pr apporter des chgts d ordre structurels au système en vigueur ds un pays ?).
En fct des réponses à ces questions, ns retrouverons différents types de régimes politiques tels que les
régimes autocratiques, oligarchiques, parlementaires. La variation d un (ou +ieurs) de ces seuils a pr
conséquence de redéfinir le type de régime en place mais aussi de favoriser ou défavoriser l émergence
de parti d opposition. Ainsi, L&R constatent que l abaissement des seuils de légitimation et
d incorporation favoriserait l émergence de partis d opposition, ouvrirait le droit du suffrage à une strate
de la population plus répandue, avec les conséquences multiples et diverses telles que l apparition des
partis de défense territoriale ou de défense agraire.
Ds le même ordre d idée que précédemment 7, L&R ont tjrs ce souci d établir un lien < > les
blèmatiques présentées ds cet ouvrage. Ils voient ds la diversité de régimes existants la résultante directe
de l influence de moments historiquement cruciaux pr chaque nation : la Réforme et bien plus tard, la
révolution nationale, la révolution industrielle ainsi que l émergence et la structuration des mvts ouvriers
autours desquels s expriment les quatre clivages fdtx vus précédemment.
3e blèmatique : Quelles étaient les caractéristiques pples des gpes d électeurs mobilisés par chaque parti
? L&R n apportent pas de véritable réponse ds cet ouvrage. Ils le justifient par la nécessité de collecter
un maximum d infos (notamment sur les tx de participation ou encore la répartition des voix entre
partis) pr comprendre les processus de mobilisation des masses.
Or, ce type d étude n en est qu à ses débuts ds la plupart des pays étudiés et ne comprend aucune étude
comparée digne de ce nom sur laquelle établir une théorie valide. Le sujet étudié et la méthode utilisée st
à la fois rigoureux, complets et instructifs, mais L&R ns donnent un aperçu de l objet d étude de la pol
comparé sous un aspect fort théorique.
3) Résumé
a) Remarques liminaires
Réflexions critiques ?
E-mail : e.h.allern@stv.uio.no
Work in progress please do not quote. Paper (i.e. project presentation) prepared for the conference Party
membership in Europe : Explorations Into the Anthills of Party Politics , Ctre d étude de la vie politique,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium, 30-31 October 2008.
Introduction
Theory and Status of Knowledge
Specification of Research Questions
The Party Member and Delegate Study in Detail
1. Introduction
This working paper presents an on-going research project dealing with the development of party membership
and membership parties since the mid-1980s in Norway. The paper briefly sketches our analytical starting
point, major research questions, proposed methodology and draft of questionnaire(s). First and foremost, we
will conduct « a survey among the parties » members and congress delegates during the spring of 2009. The
questionnaires will be designed to make comparisons with two previous Norwegian surveys possible, but we
also aim to coordinate our efforts with surveys (planned or conducted) in other European countries. Hence,
all kinds of comments on the research design methodology are more than welcome. The study forms part
a larger national project which also includes two other sub studies designed as contributions to international
comparative research. The research group consists of Hanne Marthe Narud (leader), Knut Heidar, Elin H.
Allern and Anders R. Jupskås (PhD Candidate). Before elaborating on the study of party members and
membership parties in particular, we shall briefly present the project at large.
Thus, what first and foremost seems to have happened is that « the golden age » of the mass membership
party and party-controlled electoral politics is over in Europe and elsewhere (Katz and Mair 1995 ; Farrell
and Schmitt-Beck 2008), and it is argued that parties consequently have declined as channels for popular
demands, or as facilitators of citizen control over the people s agents in public office (Kirchheimer 1966 ;
Strøm et al. 2003 : 665). At least, a shift seems to have taken place from the combined representative (« input
») and procedural roles of parties (« output ») to a more exclusively procedural function, in terms of
recruitment, organization of government and delivery of public policies (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 336).
Some even claim that the parties have lost their legitimacy as representative organisations in the entire
parliamentary chain of delegation and accountability (see e.g. Mair 2005), by turning into so-called cartel
parties, that is, parties which have retreated from civil society and turned into professional, semi-stage
agencies (Katz and Mair 1995). Whatever the case may be, several empirical pieces of the puzzle are still
missing. In this project, we draw attention to three understudied aspects of party developments and
democracy, all dealing with the individual level of party politics. Our focus is on the behaviour of and the
relationship between party members, activists, leaders and candidates and public office-holders, both with
regard to policy-making, election campaigns and political recruitment.
Second, parties are still in charge of candidate recruitment, but an understudied topic is exactly how and
how predominantly parties do perform this function following the decrease of party members and increased
leadership dominance, the rise of broadcast media, and concomitant decline of a partisan press. These
developments all make new demands on parties political communication with the electorate.
More specifically, systematic research on the extent to which parties employ « party patronage »
appointments to positions in public and semi-public life as a governing instrument has been limited so far
(Strøm et al. 2003 : 664 ; Kopécky and Mair 2006). Meanwhile, recent developments within the state like
delegation of power from the core executive to non-governmental or semi-public agencies (Peters 2003)
are widely seen as institutional changes disempowering political parties. Stronger emphasis on partisanship
in key appointments to positions in these agencies could be a way to counterbalance such a development
(Kopécky and Mair 2006).
In sum, this leads to three major research questions as regards contemporary party politics : 1
1. What characterizes the parties membership organizations today, compared to the traditional European mass
party model in terms of size of party membership, motivations for individual participation, level of grass root
involvement and the nature of decision-making processes ?
2. What characterizes the candidate selection and electoral campaigning of contemporary political parties,
compared to the golden era of party-controlled activity, in terms of for example how the nomination process is
structured, which demands that are put forward to the candidates, and the nature of their own campaigning
efforts?
3. To what extent is the allocation of important public and semi-public positions in the gift of, or controlled by,
political parties in the Norwegian political system, and to what extent is emphasis put on partisanship in
appointments to positions in the state ?
The research questions are further specified with regard to Norwegian parties as our primary empirical aim is
to study the political parties of Norway, and to the extent possible, development over time. The latter aspect
includes, among other things, the issue of what explain changes in party membership. By additionally
conducting a voter survey, we aim to compare voters, members, party leaders, candidates, and MPs in terms
of social characteristics, views on party membership, policy views, degree/type of political participation,
levels of political trust, and perceptions of parties role in democracy. Hence, the project includes both
synchronous and diachronic elements.
To fully explore some of the issues concerning party membership development, a long-run panel is needed.
Unfortunately, such a study is not available. However, by establishing time-series and cross-national co-
ordination we hope to throw new light on questions like : What characterizes the contemporary level of
political participation within and outside the party sphere ? What explain party membership ; why do citizens
enter and leave parties ? Are the political elites of parties candidates and MPs getting increasingly
homogenous and professionalized ? Is Putnams « law of increasing disproportion » more relevant than ever ?
Are the political elites of a different brand, giving the public representatives a more centrist or extremist
profile than the voters along major conflict dimensions and/or in key issues (cf. « Mays law », the « cartel
thesis ») ? So far existing research on Norwegian voters and political elites suggest that the parties MP s tend
to be ideologically more extreme than their respective voter groups in general (Narud and Valen 2007, ch. 8),
and studies of voters, party leaders and party activists do not find general support for May s law of
curvilinear disparity (Narud and Skare 1999).
1 Study 2 and 3 form parts of international effors to collect data, see http://www.statsvitenskap.uio.no/forskning/ppd/index.html for
details.
And how do voters consider political parties to work more specifically, compared to members, activists,
candidates and public office-holders ? By focusing on the individual level of party politics from civil
society, towards public office, and in government the project at large supplement earlier studies of political
parties in civil society, which have largely focused on the formal structures of parties as organizations.
Previous research has concluded that parties´ membership figures and organizational strength have declined,
and that the party in public office is empowered. But less is known about how members, activist and leaders
behave within the organizational frameworks. Hence, the three parts of the project will address one core
problem from different perspectives, namely the representative role of political parties and their function in
modern democracy. To sum up, in addition to map key developments of parties as membership organizations
over time, we will in a synchronous perspective produce more relevant knowledge on :
who is affiliated to and active within parties, and why (party member survey, voter survey)
who runs 4 a party (candidate survey) and how are these people selected (expert survey on rules n regulations) ;
how and to what extent can parties control personnel selection within the state (patronage study)
Hereby, we will bridge the gap between studies of party organizations, election and campaign studies and
studies of parties in government, combining survey data with elite interviews. In all three cases, what factors
explain variation across parties are also key issues. To the extent that cross-national comparisons are
possible to conduct, we furthermore aim to explore possible variation across countries in Europe, in
collaboration with colleagues abroad. The candidate survey and the study of patronage both form part of
international co-ordinated efforts to gather comparable data, and when designing the party member and
delegate study, we aim to make comparative analyses possible.
On the other hand, seen from a competitive point of view, viable intra-party democracy risks preventing fair
preference aggregation at the system-level, depending on, for example the opinion profile of party activists.
If party members make up an arena with a different agenda and policy views compared to the attitudes of
voters (and party candidates), this could create a democracy of double standards which in extreme cases
could relegate electoral democracy to a mere facade (Allern and Pedersen 2007). More specifically, this sub
study departs, as indicated above, from the long-lasting debate on party organizational development after the
Second World War in established democracies. Have former mass membership parties by the early 2000s
turned into top-heavy cartel or cadre parties, as suggested by Katz and Mair (1995) and others ? No doubt
that the mass membership model has declined in Europe (Katz and Mair 1994), but the extent to which
parties have by and large become close to empty vessels in civil society is still a somewhat moot point (cf.
Structural changes in direction of empowered parliamentary groups or use of armchair participation like
membership ballots do not necessarily lead to the end of substantial intra-party democracy.
Some empirical work has previously been done on European party members, but basically this has been one-
party or one country studies (e.g. Heidar 1988 ; Heidar and Saglie 2002 ; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004 ;
van Haute and Pilet 2007). There is very little research-based knowledge of a comparative nature (but see
Pedersen and Saglie 2005 ; Heidar and Pedersen 2006 ; Weldon 2006 ; Rüdig 2007). So no doubt more
comparative research is needed to find out what is going on behind formal structures and beyond leadership-
oriented media coverage of party politics (Heidar 2007). Moreover, we aim to further explore what factors
explain individual party membership and participation or lack thereof for example by contrasting
structural and rational choice (cost-benefit) perspectives: Is party involvement mainly a reflection of social
characteristics and location or is it primarily a product of individual calculations of relative usefulness ?
That said, previous research on, for example, the Norwegian case our primary focus has produced some
interesting insights already. Studies of parties formal organizational structures has shown that despite of
recent debates on membership ballots and increased openness towards various external interest groups few
radical changes had been made to Norwegian party organizations by the turn of the early 2000s (Heidar and
Saglie 2002 ; Allern 2007). As far as the individual level is concerned, a major conclusion of previous party
member surveys (from 1985 and 2000-01) are that the ttl number of active members in Norwegian parties
have declined (Heidar and Saglie 2002).
SV Ap Sp KrF V H FrP
1990 13 072 128 106 47 117 56 176 11 300 146 308
1991 13 073 130 092 44 882 55 014 11 398 119 640 14 926
1992 13 983 114 863 47 880 54 302 7800 106 077
1993 11 473 95 865 47 079 48 001 7 300 98 597 13 197
1994 11 487 90 281 47 365 52 076 6 950 83 987 3 671
1995 9 318 72 557 46 627 56 612 7 180 78 145 4 976
1996 8 609 68 833 43 508 54 071 10 500 70 447 5 654
1997 7 696 64 415 39 667 51 412 7 491 68 457 6 816
1998 7 792 62 984 35 932 50 301 6 857 64 368 7 905
1999 8 255 61 327 33 432 48 315 7 270 66 654 11 224
2000 7 428 58 769 31 557 47 864 6 552 63 993 11 824
2001 7 274 52 929 27 500 48 219 5 992 62 135 12 567
Sources: Party annual accounts, from Knut Heidar and Jo Saglie, Hva skjer med partiene (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2002).
1 Figures refer the turn of the year (i.e 1998 = 31/12/98). Membership in youth organizations is included in the figures of the
Ctre Party, the Christian People s Party and the Conservatives, but not in the other cases. Corporate members are included
in the case of Labor until 1995. The Progress Party does not consider its figures reliable until 1994. For these and other
reasons, one should only be careful when comparing figures, especially over time.
Abbreviations: SV = Socialist Left Party, DnA = Labour Party, Sp = Ctre Party, KrF = Christian People s Party, V =
Liberals, H = Conservatives, FrP = the Progress Party.
As Table 1 shows, there has been a dramatic reduction of membership figures in recent decades, particularly
for the larger parties. During the 1990s, the seven major parties lost half of their members in sum. In the
early 2000s, the curve seems to have leveled off (table to be updated). Only the Progress Party has
experienced rise in membership number over the last decade. On average, the membership/electorate ratio
So in addition to mapping of possible organizational reforms and recruitment strategies (or lack thereof), we
plan to extend the time series of members and congress delegates behaviour. Relevant more specific
research questions for survey analysis in light of the discussion above are legion, but key issues to
explore are: What is the evidence for decline or for change in terms of participatory or deliberative grass root
democracy ? By surveying both members and delegates we would be able to report on the character of the
decision-making process within the parties, or in other words on the nature of internal party democracy.
Next: Who are the members ? Why do they join, what explains their activities, and what opinions do they
hold? In a long-term perspective we will explore degrees of cges, for ex by asking : Are party members today
more instrumentally motivated, and less driven by norms and expressive motives, than they used to be ?
We generally aim to explore whether party members have different backgrounds, different motivations and
involvements, different political views and issue engagements across time, parties and according to
organizational levels. We hypothesize members and delegates to conform to the general research findings on
political participation that activists are more educated, more resourceful and more socially integrated than the
average citizen. But by comparing in detail Norwegian members/delegates and voters who are not party
members, we aim to identify more pieces to the puzzle of why some citizens join political parties and why
some also become active while others prefer to be independent and inactive or engage in alternative forms
of political involvement. We also hope to explore why some members leave political parties (by studying ex-
members). Moreover, as indicated above, we will hopefully be able to look for (sources of) variation in a
comparative setting between countries and (European) party families.
To throw light on the various research questions, the questionnaires will focus on the following topics :
1. Party enrolment, activities and motivations
2. Views on (evaluation of) intra-party democracy, decision-making procedures
3. Political issues (policy views)
4. Membership in other organizations, alternative political participation
5. Social background (a range of variables)
Attached in the appendix is the questionnaire distributed to party members in 2000. The delegate version
looks very similar, but is for example more detailed as regards topic 1) and 2) and it also includes a section
on the party congress itself.
Abbreviations: SV = Socialist Left Party, DnA = Labor Party, Sp = Ctre Party, KrF = Christian People s Party, V = Liberals,
H = Conservatives, FrP = the Progress Party.
We are currently working on updating both schemes. Most questions will be replicated to allow for time
series to be created (1985-2009). However, we will update the questions on current political issues and also
add a few questions on how the respondents perceive parties in general to work within the democracy at
large (and perhaps also include more questions on motivations for membership and on more specific policy
issues). In any case, all kinds of critical comments on the survey design are very welcome. For the record,
the response rates from previous (Norwegian) surveys are presented in Table 2. Finally, we will supplement
the survey material with content analysis of party documents, interviews with key informants in the party
headquarters and with observation of all the relevant party congresses during the spring of 2009.
6. Conclusion
By combining studies of members, middle-level elites, candidate selection, and patronage we hope to throw
new light on the performance of political parties as linkage in democratic governance and their ctral role for
Abstract
In the literature, we find a straightforward picture of declining party membership and party identification
from the beginning of the 80s onwards. In most of the countries, there is a clear decline in the number of
people that are enrolled in political parties (Scarrow, 2000 : 86-91). For instance, the number of people that
are member of a political party in Belgium has declined by 32% between 1987 and 2001, from 633,946 to
433,553 members (Noppe, 2003 ; Mair & van Biezen, 2001). Although this view is generally accepted, it is
not clear whether this decline in party membership has led to a more equal division in terms of gender, age
and socio-economic status. Furthermore, some reasons for this decline have been suggested, e.g.
modernization, declining group-based memberships, increasing political dissatisfaction and an increasing
number of scandals, have been suggested, but not yet empirically tested. We will explore, using the European
Values Study (1981 2004), how large the decline of party membership is in recent years and who has left the
party over a period of ten years. For the analyses, we will use logistic multilevel analysis.
Introduction
It is generally accepted that, in old democracies, there is a decline in the membership of political parties, as
well as in other traditional forms of political participation. Several authors have used different datasets,
mostly from party registers, to document this decline in the number of people belonging to political parties,
or in partisanship in general (Mair and van Biezen, 2001 ; Katz et al., 1992 ; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).
In the literature, different reasons for this decline have been cited, such as a change in values
(postmaterialism, individualism, etc.), the disengagement of young people, decline in group-based
memberships and declining political trust. Even if it is generally agreed that such a decline exists, the effect
of this decline on members profile (e.g. their background variables) needs to be studied further. While
some authors have documented trends in the determinants of political participation (young people refraining
from politics and political participation (Putnam, 2000), an increase in women s parties and political
participation among girls and women (Heidar, 2006 ; Hooghe and Stolle, 2004 ; Webb and Kolondy, 2006)),
there are almost no studies available on how the determinants of party membership have changed.
Not only the number of people, but which people participate (or do not participate) might be important.
Differences in levels of political participation among different groups of people are considered to be
problematic, because traditionally disadvantaged groups are less influential (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,
1995 ; Franklin, 2004). A low level of political participation has an impact on democratic representation as
some groups are underrepresented (such as women, lower educated people and immigrants) and these
patterns are relatively persistent over time (Anduiza, 2002 ; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995 ;
Martikainen, Martikainen, and Wass, 2005 ; Parry, Moyser, and Day, 1992). Equal representation leads to
political equality. Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) argue that in the United States, the smaller the number of
participants, the larger the inequality in political participation. Voting is, after all, one of the ways to
influence the division of scarce resources. And as those who are active and inactive may have different
opinions and interests, unequal representation could be problematic (Schlozman et al., 2004; Verba, 2003 ;
1
Dahl, 2006 : 1) . Equal political participation leads to a relatively fair division of available resources, to
equality in political influence and to integration in society (Parry, Moyser, and Day, 1992; Dahl, 2006 : 1 ;
The present article does not aim to replicate the analyses performed by Katz et al. (1992) and Mair and Van
Biezen (2001). Rather, it seeks to investigate the decline in party alignment in greater depth. The main aim of
this article is to explore who has abandoned from the parties and, consequently, whether the profile of
contemporary party members has changed over the past years. The importance of examining party members
profile has also been recognized by Mair and Van Biezen (2001 : 14), who argued that it is crucial that we
learn more precisely who is remaining within the parties . Therefore, this paper will investigate in greater
depth whether there is a decline in the ratio between men/women, older/younger people and people with a
higher/lower socio-economic status among the party members. In addition, the reasons suggested in the
literature for declining party membership are investigated.
First, the state of the art on the decline in political party membership will be described, with a focus on the
reasons for this decline and the effect on different groups of party members. A second section will describe
the data (European Value Surveys) and methodology used to analyze the changing determinants of political
party membership. Finally, the analyses are discussed in the light of the available literature on political party
membership.
Second, participation in formal and informal social networks has also been linked to political
participation and mobilization : people in associations are more visible, more influential and therefore
more frequently asked to participate (Galston, 2004 ; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Rosenstone &
Hansen, 2003). Further, voluntary engagement makes people more inclined to political participation
(Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003).
The third explanation is party members dissatisfaction with the functioning of their party, which is mostly
caused by scandals and corruption. In the Unites States, dealignment was, for instance, related to the
Vietnam War and Watergate; in Belgium, the Agusta-affair had a similar effect. These scandals cause party
members to become disillusioned with political parties and to disengage from them. Furthermore, scandals,
corruption and other mechanisms have led most governments to increase funding to political parties in order
to lessen their dependence on private funding. As a result, most political parties now receive the bulk of their
resources from the state and are therefore less dependent on membership fees. Equally, in the wake of these
scandals, government monitoring has increased, which means that politicians cannot easily provide their
members with personal benefits anymore (Mair and van Biezen, 2001 : 14 ; Scarrow, 1996 : 43-45 ; Katz,
1996 ; van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007).
The usual suspects for the decline in membership are young people. Young people are often targeted
for their low levels of political engagement. Such an assumption is not unfounded: in almost every
election, young people are the least likely to vote (Wattenberg, 2007), and these participation rates
continue to fall (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Gauthier, 2003; Kimberlee, 2002), as
does youth membership of political parties (Hooghe, Stolle, and Stouthuysen, 2004). For almost each
activity or attitude, young people have the lowest score. Nevertheless, it is important for political parties to
have young members since political participation is a habit: once people become a member of a particular
party, they are highly likely to also stay a member in the future (Galston, 2001; Jennings, 1987 ; Youniss,
McLellan, and Yates, 1997). However, Canadian research has shown that older people are more likely to
enroll in a political party than younger people, as the mean age of new members is 53 and 55 in Denmark
(Cross and Young, 2004 : 433 ; Pedersen et al., 2004 : 372). A possible explanation for the decline may be
that young people prefer ad hoc, cause-oriented participation over long-term engagement. They prefer
activities that are less time-consuming, allowing them to limit their level of commitment, to participate only
sporadically and to opt out easily (Norris, 2002). While traditional party membership does not fit in young
people s repertoire of political engagement, other forms of political participation such as signing petitions,
buy- and boycotting products, donating money etc. do (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti, 2005 ; Li and Marsh,
2008). Therefore, Dalton (2000 : 30) argues that the decrease in partisanship may be linked to the influx of
young voters unattached to political parties .
A second group to be investigated is women. Traditionally, women are under-represented in political parties
(Cross and Young, 2004). In the early 2000s, women made up 38 percent of party members in Canada and
33 percent in Denmark (Cross and Young, 2004 : 431; Pedersen et al., 2004 : 371). However, research has
shown that the percentage of women that has become engaged in political parties in Scandinavian countries
has risen in the last decades (Heidar, 2006 : 305). Several trends might explain this trend. Since the end of
the XXe century an increased number of women parties have been founded (Heidar, 2006 ; Cross and Young,
2004). Not only women s parties, but also other parties have targeted women as an interesting group from
which to recruit new members (Buelens and Deschouwer, 2003).
The third determinant of political party membership is socio-economic status. Higher educated people
and higher income people are in general more likely to be members of political parties (Verba and Nie,
1972 ; Cross and Young, 2004 : 434-435 ; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995 ; Parry, Moyser, and Day,
1992). However, research in Denmark has demonstrated that lower educated people are equally likely to
enrol in political parties as higher educated people (Pedersen et al., 2004 : 373). Furthermore, in some
political parties, group-based politics still plays a role, which often leads to a larger share of lower educated
people in the party (as lower educated are more likely to be a union s member, etc.). Canadian research, for
instance, indicates that political party members are still affiliated with interest groups that their members
were traditionally affiliated with (Cross and Young, 2004 : 438). Indirect membership might therefore
counterbalance the overrepresentation of higher educated people in political participation (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).
Hypothesis
Although much has been written about the cross-sectional profile of political party members and the decline
in party membership, there is not much information on possible changes in this profile. Therefore, three
hypotheses can be formulated :
Hypothesis 1 : A smaller proportion of young people are enrolling in political parties, since young people are
increasingly disengaged ;
Hypothesis 2 : A larger proportion of women are currently enrolling in political parties, as political parties
increasingly try to attract more women ;
Hypothesis 3 : A larger proportion of people with a higher socio-economic status are currently enrolling in
political parties, since group-based membership is declining.
Furthermore, three reasons have been suggested to explain the decline in party membership: an increase in
postmaterialist values (H4), a decline in group-based membership (H5), and a decline in political trust due to
scandals amongst other things (H6). Finally, we will also investigate whether countries with a high level of
corruption have less party members (H7).
However, this method also has its disadvantages: people may not remember that they are member of a
political party, deny that they are a member or falsely state that they are a member (Heidar, 2006).
Moreover, in most large-scale social surveys, respondents are not asked about party membership (Mair
and van Biezen, 2001) or the question has changed over time (Widfeldt, 1999).
The dependent variable, party membership, was questioned at the same way in the three waves namely:
Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say which, if
any, do you belong to? Belong to political parties .
This variable was coded as a dummy with 1 indicating that the respondent was a party member.
As independent variables we include the background variables that are assumed to have a strong impact on
party membership namely gender, age and socio-economic status. Unfortunately, education level was not
questioned adequately in all waves. However, in all waves respondents were asked their socio-economic
status. Respondents could answer AB Upper/Upper middle class' (1), 'C1 Middle, no manual workers' (2),
'C2 Middle, manual workers' (3) or 'DE Manual workers/Unskilled,unemployed' (4). The variable Socio-
economic status ranges thus from 1 to 4. There are certainly better measurements of socio-economic status,
however this is the only relevant question available in the three waves.
Data on the reasons for declining party membership is also available in the three waves of the European
Value Surveys. Postmaterialist values are measured with a 4 item scale with high values indicating
postmaterialist values and low values indicating materialist values. Furthermore, respondents were asked
whether they belonged to various voluntary organizations. In all waves the membership of respondents in
seven organizations was questioned namely membership of labour unions, professional associations,
religious organizations, human rights, youth work and social welfare service for elderly and education, arts,
music or cultural activities. All memberships were add up and a new variable was created Group based
memberships which ranges from 0 to 7. In the analyses of the last wave, the variable group-based
membership is slightly different given that the membership in more organizations was questioned.
Respondents were for example also asked whether they belonged to an environmental group, women s group
or peace movement. One can expect that these organisations are especially relevant in mobilization members
to become a member of a political party or it can be expected that green political parties target for example
the members of environmental groups. Given the importance of these kinds of organizations, the variable
3
group-based membership is thus slightly adjusted and ranges now (in theory) from 0 to 13.
2
Party membership was not surveyed in the third wave (1995-1997).
3
Churchgoing is another good indicator of this group-based membership and of party membership in general.
Unfortunately, there were some problems with the operationalisation of the questions on this topic in the last wave of the
European Value Surveys (1999-2004).
On the country level, we include a corruption perceptions index . This index ranks 180 countries by their
perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. A high value on
this index indicates that the level of corruption is perceived to be low, whereas low values indicate that this
country is perceived as very corrupt. The variable ranges from 2.20 to 9.70
(www.transparency.org/policy_research/ surveys_indices/cpi).
Analyses
Firstly, we will investigate whether age, gender and socio-economic status are still determinants of party
membership using the most recent wave of the European Values Survey (1999-2004). In addition, we
analyze whether postmaterialist values, group-based membership, political trust and perceptions of
corruption influence the likelihood of becoming a party member.
Secondly, we will investigate whether the determinants of party membership have changed over time using
three waves of the European Values Surveys.
In Model 2, the reasons for declining party membership are introduced. Surprisingly, we see that people who
hold postmaterialist values are more likely to become a member of a political party. Group-based
membership also prove to be an important predictor of party membership. In addition, high political trust
increases the probability of becoming a party member. Finally, in Model 3 the country level characteristic
perceptions of corruption is introduced. Although the figures seem to suggest that there are more party
members in countries in which corruption is perceived to be at a low level, the differences are not significant.
Table 2 shows the trends in the profile of party members between 1981 and 2004. As expected a smaller
proportion of young people are enrolled in political parties. In line with the first hypothesis, this imbalance
becomes larger over time. Party members are still predominantly male but this inequality has slightly
decreased over time in line with the second hypotheses. With regard to socio-economic status we
hypothesized that given the decline in group-based membership, people with a higher socio-economic status
will outnumber people with a lower socio-economic status in political parties. Column 4 indeed shows the
increasing inequality with regard to socio-economic status.
If we turn to the reasons of declining party membership, the multilevel analyses already showed that
postmaterialists are more likely to become a party member. In column 5, we see that the ratio of
materialists/postmaterialists in a political party has changed over time and that postmaterialists as a
consequence are making up a larger part of the party members than materialists. In addition, group-
based memberships are indeed an important predictor of party membership and increase even in
importance over time. If we look at one specific organisation which is often assumed to be related to
political parties, we see that about 40 per cent of the party members are also a member of a labour union
and that this percentage is rather stable over time. Further, the multilevel model showed that political
trust is a determinant of party membership. Although the figures in the last column seem rather low,
political trust is even lower among other citizens (about 42 per cent). The level of political trust among
party members seems to be on the rise.
Conclusion
As party membership is decreasing, the inequalities in party membership are increasing. While there is a
fairly large body of research related to party membership relatively little has been written about the changing
inequalities in party membership. Previous research has indicated quite clearly that men and older people are
more likely to be enrolled in a political party than other groups within society. Regarding citizens with a
higher socio-economic status, there is no consensus. Due to the downward trend in party membership, these
inequalities are changing. The question arises which people have left the party and how this affects the
inequality in party membership. By providing a cross-national analysis, this article aimed to meet this need.
The analyses showed that there is indeed a declining trend in party membership, although the trend is less
pronounced as in former analyses on aggregated data from party registers. In line with our hypotheses age,
gender and socio-economic status proved to be important determinants of party membership. Also, in line
with our hypotheses, the importance of socio-economic status even increased between 1981 and 2004. In
addition, age became somewhat more important in predicting party membership. However, contrary to our
hypotheses, the effect of gender on party membership did not significantly change over time.
Changing values, declining group-based membership, declining political trust and an increasing number of
scandals have been brought forward in attempts to explain the trend in party membership. Except for
scandals, all reasons proved to be significant determinants of party membership. However, only the effect of
group-based memberships on party membership changed significantly over time. This determinant lost its
strength in recent years which can explain the increasing socio-economic inequality in party membership.
We can conclude therefore that gender, age and socio-economic status are still important determinants of
party membership. Moreover, the effect of socio-economic status and age on party membership has even
increased in recent decades.