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Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3.2 (1996) 75-90

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Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry

Sean A. Spence

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Self awareness is . . . one of the fundamental, possibly the most fundamental,

characteristic[s] of the human species . . . an evolutionary novelty; the
biological species from which mankind has descended had only rudiments of
self-awareness, or perhaps lacked it altogether. Self-awareness has, however,
brought in its train somber companions--fear, anxiety and death. Man is
burdened by death. A being who knows that he will die arose from ancestors who
did not know."

Dobzhansky (1967)

"What complicates life is having to make choices. The person who has his
choices made for him lives simply."

Peter Hoeg (1993)

Abstract: If the notion of free will is to be retained by philosophers,

psychiatrists and psychologists, then it will be a free will which is
essentially non-conscious. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a
conscious free will (in the sense of consciousness initiating action) is
incompatible with the evidence of neuroscience, and the phenomenology
described in the literature of normal creativity, psychotic passivity, and the
neurological syndrome of the alien limb or hand. In particular the work of
Libet and others who have directly stimulated the brain and measured activity
from its surface leads to the conclusion that subjective states (be they
sensory or intentional) are preceded by predictive neural activity. Subjective
phenomenology is temporally distinct from the initiation of "voluntary"
action. In addition it will be argued that free will is more than a belief and
that it comprises a perceptual sensorimotor component. Free will is
conceptualized as a three component phenomenon consisting of a perceptual,
non-linguistic experience of freedom, an experiential belief which is
linguistic, and related to a specified action in time, and an abstract belief
which is linguistic but remote from any particular action and akin to
philosophical discourse (the abstract belief or otherwise, in free will). A
theoretical explanation of some of the pathological phenomenology of
possession of action is offered in terms of temporal considerations. The
direction of action within mental/virtual space is hypothesized to be a
function of the temporal sequence of its initiation and awareness of the
latter "reaching" consciousness. It is suggested that perturbation of this
temporal sequence may lead to the misattribution of host-as-alien-initiated
action. Work of this kind, which is beyond subjective introspection, is
necessary if we are to develop adequate models to use in conjunction with
modern investigation techniques.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of free will in the light of evidence
accrued from neuroscience. In particular it will question whether traditional notions of
free will (relying as they seem to upon conscious awareness) are compatible with the
temporal properties of consciousness.

Given the breadth of this undertaking the literature may appear partisan, deriving
mainly from the fields of neurology, psychiatry and phenomenology. This is true. The
emphasis will be upon examining free will in real case scenarios. It is [End Page 75]
hoped that this will lead to some original insights into this area, and that this may
provoke debate of what must be one of the central features of human phenomenology--the
experience of free will.

Free Will

The following is an example of an attempt to address the problem of free will taken from
a philosophical encyclopedia:

The cluster of problems about the freedom of the will arises from an
incompatibility. . . .

On the one hand we believe that we can sometimes choose whether to act in a
certain way or not; . . . that we are responsible for so acting or refraining
from action; . . . that for those parts of our history which do not lie within
our choice we cannot be held responsible.

On the other hand we believe that nature is uniform, that whatever happens
results from and can be explained by a set of causes and conditions, and in
particular that our actions result from our inherited character as modified by
environment.

[I]f our actions arise from an inherited character as modified by our

environment, then it would seem that we are no more responsible for our
actions than we are for our inherited character and environment. (Urmson 113.
Paragraphs and italics added by author.)

In this summary the problem of free will is couched in terms of a set of beliefs which
may be accepted or rejected according to the evidence offered. In its emphasis upon
belief such a definition ignores phenomenological awareness related to specific acts in
the immediate present. By focusing exclusively upon belief it places "freedom of the
will" at one remove from those actions that it would appear to address. Is free will
merely a belief?

I would like to offer another conceptualization of free will which comprises three
parts:

1. The experience that we are free to choose our actions (on at least some occasions).
This experience of free will occurs at the time of an act and for its duration. It may
be conceived of as a perceptual phenomenon.

2. Experiential belief , a belief "attached" to, or addressing, an ongoing experience

(and temporally related to the latter).

3. The abstract belief that we are free or not free (which may occur at times remote
from specific acts).

These aspects of free will are potentially separate. I may, for instance, experience
myself as a free agent, free in my volition, choosing to move or act in a certain way,
but I might also believe that I am not free, that my thoughts and acts result from
genetic and environmental influences, and that at some ultimate level of analysis I am
not as free as I feel (or experience myself).

Such a distinction would separate experience (1) and experiential belief (2) from
abstract belief (3). The separation of experience (1) from experiential belief (2) is
more problematic but will become apparent when we address pathological states (below).

For the present we will claim the existence of an (immediate) experience of free will.
When behaving normally, e.g., lifting my arm, picking up a pen, writing, I have the
subjective experience (sensation) of freedom. This is clearly distinct from the
sensation of passive movement, e.g., when another lifts my arm. What is less clear is
the point at which motor and sensory data, my perceptual experience, acquire a related
subjective belief (my immediate experiential belief that I am free).

Part of the problem is that the "experience" of freedom is by its very nature
non-linguistic. In the example of moving my arm the sense of volition involved is
primarily related to motor activity and proprioception of the latter. This may provide
the distinction that we seek. The experience of freedom is perceptual and (essentially)
sensory and as such will access varying levels of conscious awareness, or processing. At
what point does an experience become a belief? If any propositional statement (e.g., "I
am lifting my arm"), is regarded as a belief, then clearly the acquisition of a
linguistic label is the point at which experiential belief (2) accrues to experience
(1).

Thus, for the purpose of the current paper the "problem of the freedom of the will"
breaks down into 3 aspects which are phenomenologically distinct:

1. The experience (sensorimotor) of freedom coexistent with an act (pre-linguistic).

[End Page 76]

2. The experiential belief which accompanies such an act (and which is linguistic).

3. The abstract belief occurring remotely from specific acts (which is linguistic and
akin to philosophical discourse).

So far we have assumed that each aspect of "freedom" may access consciousness, but there
is clearly a necessity to examine what is meant by this term.

Consciousness

For free will to be meaningful must we be aware of our actions? Clearly we do not invoke
free will for all actions, especially those that we do not influence or of which we are
only minimally aware, e.g., reflexes. A central issue in this paper is the requirement
of conscious awareness for the experience of free will. To make a choice it seems
appropriate (although this may be questioned) that one should be aware of that choice.
(There is a difference between awareness of a choice already made, and awareness which
precedes decision and indeed initiates the latter.) Are consciousness and awareness the
same? For the purpose of this paper consciousness will be used in its original sense,
meaning "inwardly sensible or aware", i.e., awareness of one's own thinking (Wilkes
1988). Thus, it is not being used merely to denote being awake, or non-comatose, but to
connote a certain form of mental activity (metarepresentation: thinking about thinking).

Certain assumptions regarding consciousness should be acknowledged from the outset. When
we discuss consciousness, as inner awareness, we assume that this will be understood by
others, that they will experience a similar inner awareness. Such an assumption is
essentially unverifiable: we cannot know another's consciousness. (This question is
closely allied to that of theory of mind, the belief that others have minds and will
behave as if they do, a faculty which is hypothesized to be deficient in autism [Frith,
Morton and Leslie, 1991].)

Similarly we assume that such inner awareness is robust between different cultural
groups and across historical epochs. Again, this assumption is unverifiable, and indeed
may be undermined by certain linguistic evidence. Wilkes (1988) has emphasized the
absence of words for "mind" and "consciousness" from some contemporary languages, and
the absence of "consciousness" from English prior to the seventeenth century: "in other
words . . . what strikes some of us so forcefully seems to have left little impression
on others" (Wilkes 1988). We will return to this question below.

Next, the existence of consciousness as a single entity has been questioned by a number
of writers, particularly Dennett (1991). He offers a multiple draft theory of
consciousness, with no single current experience or phenomenological "quale" [plural
"qualia"], but multiple systems functioning (and experiencing) in parallel. According to
this theory an inner state reported verbally gains only apparent precedence above
others, but does not truly represent the singular experience of the individual. A
unitary experience is illusory (Dennett 1991). Others have questioned Dennett's approach
suggesting an error in his equation of the contents of consciousness with consciousness
itself; the latter being a single awareness which is independent of many competing items
of content (Clark 1992).

Finally, there is the issue of the relationship of "consciousness" to "mind." Are they
equivalent or is the former part of the latter. Wilkes (1988) has suggested that we
place undue emphasis upon consciousness (to the detriment of "non-conscious") and that
this is a product of relatively recent ways of thinking about ourselves. In particular
she blames a "Cartesian catastrophe," accusing Descartes of forcing a schism between
"conscious" and "non-conscious," creating a dichotomy which is unnecessary.

For Descartes conscious awareness, "I think therefore I am," became evidence for the
existence of a soul (Wilkes 1988). Wilkes suggests that this was a new conceptualization
and that "consciousness" enters European language (and also phenomenology) at this time.

However, for the same reasons that we cannot verify conscious experience in others or in
times preceding our own, neither can it be excluded. For the present author the written
report of Descartes suggests that he experienced phenomenology [End Page 77] consistent
with what we would regard as "inner awareness." Similarly, records which precede
Descartes may not use words such as "mind" or "conscious" but appear to describe
experiences which we may recognize or translate in these terms:

The properties of a rational soul are these. She can contemplate herself,
analyse herself, make of herself what she will, herself enjoy the fruit she
bears . . . and always have her work perfectly complete at whatever moment our
life reaches its appointed limit. (Marcus Aurelius AD 121-180)

Not withstanding the assumptions acknowledged above consciousness will be regarded as an

"inner awareness" which is experienced by normal individuals and which provides the
medium for the experience of free will, and beliefs pertaining to the latter.

A corollary to the above is that there will be mental processes which occur outside
conscious awareness and which will be termed non-conscious (a relatively neutral term).
For the purposes of this paper the assumption is that this non-conscious is a
heterogeneous entity comprising sensory information processing, storage of (semantic and
episodic) memory, procedural memory, and the possibility of dynamic or learned complex
behavioral patterns which, in psychiatric terms, may be regarded as "defenses." The
veracity of elements of this non-conscious will not be debated here. However it is clear
that there are components that are described elsewhere as preconscious, subconscious and
unconscious by other authors.

The Experience of Free Will: The Normal Case

Under normal conditions many acts may be performed without undue attention or conscious
processing being devoted to them. A common example is driving a car while talking or
listening to music. Under these conditions behavior is clearly "automatic" to some
extent and may be accompanied by very little subjective volition. Indeed it is not
uncommon to reach the end of such a process without any conscious awareness of the
preceding interval (e.g., the details of a familiar journey).

When activity is complex or novel it receives greater attention, and is more likely to
be remembered (Frith 1992). Under these circumstances the sensory aspects of the
activity are more likely to be attended to, and awareness of one's own volition
increasingly apparent (e.g., the first faltering steps of learning to drive or to play a
musical instrument). In this normal situation it can be difficult to distinguish the
sensory experience of freedom from the associated experiential belief in the same, but
as stated before, there exists a distinction between motor and sensory perceptual
phenomena e.g., the sequence of finger movements on a keyboard, and the thoughts
(beliefs) which address these phenomena.

When anxious an individual may become acutely aware of his own actions, interrupting the
flow of normally fluent activities e.g., walking and speech. In such a condition the
experience (perception) of voluntary activity is heightened, but there is not
necessarily any change in the experiential belief in the freedom of a specific act.

In normal individuals engaged in creative activities there is frequently a

phenomenological account which describes altered volition. Such cases have been
documented elsewhere by Boden (1992) as evidence for non-conscious processing producing
novel computations in response to creative problems. These solutions subsequently access
consciousness . The following descriptions taken from different sources speak of an
alteration in the phenomenology of volition.

A1. "Sometimes when I'm singing there's no sensation in my throat. It feels as

if some outside influence has taken over. The air is coming through me--as if
I'm being sung like a flute." Sheila Chandra (quoted in "The Wire", May 1994)
 A2. "I just play what comes into my mind." Thelonious Monk (quoted in Jazz at
Ronnie Scott's,1979)

A3. "So . . . I did one of those things you do and never find out why, even
though something in you knows you could never have done anything else."
William Gibson (1993)

A4. "When you blurt something out and haven't censored yourself, your first
instinct is to cover up because it doesn't make sense, rather than just
letting it be there. It's a mistake to censor those kind of irrational [End
Page 78] utterances. They are often the deepest things you say." David Byrne
(The Wire, 1994)

A 5. "How can I tell what I think until I see what I say?" E. M. Forster
(1960)

A 6. "It was late before the two guests left and Russell was alone with Lady
Ottoline. They sat talking over the fire until four in the morning. Russell,
recording the event a few days later, wrote, "I did not know I loved you till
I heard myself telling you so--for one instant I thought 'Good God, what have
I said?' and then I knew it was the truth.'" Clark (1975) quoted by Dennett,
1991, 246

A 7. "I was sitting in a chair in the Patent Office at Berne when all of a
sudden a thought occured to me: 'If a person falls freely he will not feel his
own weight.' I was startled. This simple thought made a deep impression on me.
It impelled me toward a theory of gravitation." Albert Einstein, quoted in
Highfield and Carter (1993)

In these accounts from normal individuals there are circumstances described in which the
subjective experience of voluntary action is diminished or lost, and experiential belief
is altered. They comprise altered motor performance e.g., singing, playing the piano,
speaking, and also, in the case of Einstein, insightful thought (or "inner speech").
None of the individuals attribute the phenomenon to an outside force, although, in the
case of A1 there is clearly a metaphorical allusion to such passivity ("as if I'm being
sung like a flute"). However, despite the obvious fact that they are all physically
responsible for their respective acts they do not experience as freely willed action the
impulses which produced these acts.

Thus, in "normals" it appears possible for the experience of free will to be heightened,
diminished or lost, and for the experiential belief in free will (pertaining to a
specific act) to be altered (but nevertheless retained). Any allusion to outside forces
remains metaphorical and does not reach delusional intensity.

Pathological Cases

A variety of pathologies underlying neuropsychiatric illnesses may disturb "willed"

action. From these "natural experiments" it may be possible to infer aspects of normal
functional organization. In some cases the pathology may be so devastating as to leave
little prospect of willed movement, e.g., the limbs affected by dense hemiparesis, or
the "off" state of Parkinson's disease. Similarly in severe psychiatric illness the
disturbance may be so profound as to offer little prospect of teasing apart aspects of
volition e.g., the depressed individual with both psychomotor retardation and nihilistic
delusions: "I am dead; I have no feelings and no will" (Sims 1988, 235).

In such a case we may clearly hypothesize that mechanisms of willed action and their
representation in the subject's consciousness are disturbed. But is this disturbance one
of higher processing, the abstract belief in freedom, or is it perhaps "lower," related
in some part to an experience of impeded action, a failure to initiate volition at some
level?

In an attempt to dissect volition some specific examples will now be addressed.

1. The Alien Hand Syndrome

The "alien hand" syndrome is a rare but potentially informative example of a

pathological process affecting willed movement. Initially the term was used to describe
the inability of the affected subject to identify their (affected) limb (Brion and
Jedynak 1972). However, in later descriptions the emphasis shifted to the subject's
inability to control the latter (Gasquoine 1993). The limb is experienced as being
autonomous. The syndrome is usually found in association with lesions of the medial
frontal lobe (contralateral to the affected limb) and anterior corpus callosum
(Gasquoine 1993). (However, it is common for the pathology e.g., cerebral infarction or
tumor to encroach on neighboring structures.)

The striking phenomenology encountered has been reported by a number of authors:

B1. "[A]t one point it was noted that the patient had picked up a pencil and
had begun scribbling with the [affected] right hand. When her attention was
directed to this activity, she reacted with dismay, immediately withdrew the
pencil, and pulled the right hand to her side using the [normal] left hand.
She then indicated that she had not herself initiated the original action of
[End Page 79] the right arm. She often reacted with dismay and frustration at
her inability to prevent these unintended movements of the right arm. She
experienced a feeling of dissociation from the actions of the right arm,
stating on several occasions that 'it will not do what I want it to do.'" (63
year old right handed female with left medial frontal infarction; Goldberg et
al 1981)

B2. "He viewed these (autonomous) actions as unwanted, unintentional, and

uncontrollable. He described the [affected] right hand as "the bad one, it has
a mind of its own," and that it was 'always trying to get into the act.' A
very specific complaint, which was chronic and persisted for a year after the
infarction, was that the patient felt the right hand anticipated future
actions and performed movements prior to the patient actually intending them.
The [normal] left hand did not show this tendency." (68 year old right handed
male with left medial frontal and callosal infarction; Feinberg et al 1992)

B3. "Astonishment and frustration were expressed regarding her inability to

voluntarily release her grasp of objects in the [affected] left hand. She
would attempt to restrain the unwanted movements of the left hand by keeping
her hands folded together or by gripping an object in the left hand. The left
hand would perform activities with objects around her in a compulsive way that
was not associated with a feeling of voluntary control. . . . Her left hand
was noted to wander around in the 'alien mode' when not restrained. . . .
Another incident occurred when the [normal] right hand picked up a bowl of hot
soup and the left hand threw it to the ground. On another occasion, her left
hand began to remove a cigarette from her mouth as she was about to light it
with the right hand. She stated that the left hand 'was trying to keep me from
smoking.'" (53 year old right handed female with right medial frontal lobe and
corpus callosum infarction; Goldberg and Bloom, 1990)

B4. "She often spoke to her own [affected] left hand, asking it to perform
some movement, but the hand 'did only what it wanted to.' In bimanual tasks
(e.g., lighting a match) she tried to use only her [normal] right hand but was
regularly impeded by her left hand's groping. At that time she experienced the
lack of ownership of her left hand and could not indicate her own among
others' hands.." (65 year old right handed female with right medial frontal
infarction extending to anterior cingulate gyrus, supplementary motor area and
anterior fibres of corpus callosum; Trojano et al 1993)

B5. "[S]he noticed that her [affected] left arm began to move 'on its own.'
The left hand would tenaciously grope for and grasp any nearby object, pick
and pull at her clothes, and even grasp her throat during sleep. These
autonomous left arm and hand movements tended to occur in bouts usually
signaled when her hand did 'silly things' such as scratching her knee. She
slept with the arm tied to prevent nocturnal misbehaviour. She never denied
that her left arm and hand belonged to her, although she did refer to her limb
as if it were an autonomous entity." (39 year old right handed female with
trauma to medial frontal white matter bilaterally, corpus callosum, right
basal ganglia, internal capsule and thalamus; Banks et al, 1989)

B6. "Sometimes the [affected] left hand would pick up a cup and move it into
 the path of the [unaffected] right hand so as to interfere with eating. While
playing checkers on one occasion, the left hand made a move that he did not
wish to make, and he corrected the move with the right hand; however, the left
hand, to the patient's frustration, repeated the false move. On other
occasions, he turned the pages of a book with one hand while the other one
tried to close it; he shaved with the right hand while the left one unzipped
his jacket; he tried to soap a washcloth while the left hand kept putting the
soap back in the dish; and he tried to open a closet with the right hand while
the left one closed it." (40 year old right handed male with ruptured anterior
communicating aneurysm, and subsequent resection of right frontal gyrus
rectus; Banks et al 1989)

As may be seen from these accounts the alien hand is experienced as behaving in an
autonomous and purposeful way. Its interference with normal activity is such as to
provoke patients to developing strategies to restrain or "distract" the hand. The
patients acknowledge that the limb belongs to them but that its actions are not under
their control. Yet they do not attribute its activity to outside forces (cf. passivity,
below). Their appreciation of their predicament suggests that the subjects retain a
sense of their own will, in that they form action plans (which fail). There is a
circumscribed inability to impose that will upon one domain of their body/action, i.e.,
the affected limb.

Thus it is clear that the experience of free will may be absent with regard to part of a
subject's anatomy and repertoire of voluntary behavior (limb movement). This is
particularly noticeable in those examples where these activities occur during sleep
(e.g., B5). Experiential belief relating to the action of the "alien" limb is clearly
disturbed. [End Page 80] Once the aberrant activity of the limb is noticed the patient
tries to exert conscious control but cannot. The limb is experienced then as having a
"mind of its own." This belief is not delusional since it retains an "as if" quality,
and is clearly supported by the subjectively and objectively unusual behavior of the
limb.

The subject loses the experience of free will (with respect to the affected limb), and
develops an accommodating abnormal experiential belief that the limb is autonomous.

That these subjects have sustained lesions of their medial frontal lobe and anterior
corpus callosum is of interest, given the role of these areas in the genesis of willed
action (see "Temporal Aspects of Action", below) and information transfer between the
hemispheres. We will return to the issue of the timing of initiation of activity, but
for the present it is interesting to note example B2 in which the subject experienced
his right hand as anticipating his intentions. In this case the autonomy of the affected
limb is further extended (to anticipating the will of the subject).

What does the alien hand tell us of free will? It suggests that the sense of free will
accruing to action may have a neurological component which is discrete from (but related
to) the neurological correlates of action itself; in other words that the initiation of
action and the "labelling" of that action as "intentional" ("willed" or "belonging to
the subject") are potentially separate.

2. Passivity Phenomena

Following this line of argument we will consider passivity phenomena. These phenomena,
comprising "made" thoughts, actions, affects, and impulses (together with somatic
passivity) are included in Schneider's first rank symptoms of schizophrenia (Schneider,
1974, first published 1957). The subject experiences their thoughts, actions, feelings
and drives as having been influenced or replaced by those of external agencies. These
symptoms were grouped as a diagnostic aid, independent of any specific pathology. The
symptoms themselves are not specifically confined to schizophrenia, but are found in a
variety of organic diseases (an exclusion criterion in Schneider's original paper),
affective psychoses, and dissociative states. Trimble (1990) has suggested that they are
localizing signs of temporal lobe pathology.

The relevance of these symptoms in the present context is that they clearly implicate a
disturbance of the individual's experience of "self," and "willed action." Whereas they
are classified as delusions (and hence abnormal beliefs), I would like to question the
exclusivity of this definition. Might not passivity phenomena be at least partly due to
abnormal experiences?.
Patients with delusions of alien control (passivity) perform abnormally on paradigms
designed to test "self monitoring." In Frith and Done's (1989) study of performance of a
motor task in the absence of visual feedback, schizophrenics with delusions of control
were significantly less likely to make error corrections than either "normals" or other
schizophrenics (without such delusions). This result is consistent with a disturbance of
monitoring of self-generated acts. Other authors have reported disturbance of error
correction in schizophrenia (Malenka et al 1982), and aberrant cortical potentials
preceding willed action (Timsit 1970).

Thus we have some empirical indication that schizophrenic subjects (reporting passivity
phenomena) might be "monitoring" (and perhaps "experiencing") their own volitional
processes in an abnormal way.

The patients' own accounts appear to reveal two aspects: firstly an alienation from
their own volitional processes e.g., movement, or thought; and, secondly, a delusional
elaboration of an often bizarre quality which "seeks" to explain the former. Some
examples are given below, the first of which reflects the bewildering nature of the
disorder as experienced by the subject.

C1. "A former patient of the Heidelberg clinic, a well-educated individual who
a little later became acutely ill with schizophrenia, wrote an account of
these "made" phenomena: 'On the following morning I was put into a most
peculiar mood by this machine or whatever it is. . . . All the night through I
was fully sensible and quite clear . . . the machine . . . was fixed in such a
way that every word I spoke was put into me electronically and I could of
course not avoid expressing the thoughts in [End Page 81] this peculiar mood.
. . . A joyous mood was put into me which prevented me from thinking of
anything. At times I was given back my natural way of thinking. . . . I feel
the machine is getting me down mentally more and more and I have several times
asked for the current to be turned off and my natural thinking returned to me.
. . . One evening the thought was given to me electrically that I should
murder Lissi. . . . [T]o a large extent these are not my own thoughts. . . .
The remarkable machine can also suddenly give me sleep . . . and withhold
sleep . . . give me any kind of movement . . . also when I read, whatever it
is, I cannot give sufficient attention to the contents and with every word I
get a side-thought--I want to make another point . . . when one reads all this
it seems the greatest nonsense ever written but I cannot say anything else
except that I have really felt all this, though unfortunately I have never
understood it.'" [Jaspers 1963; original italics, 579-580]

C2. "A 29 year old shorthand typist described her actions as follows: 'When I
reach my hand for the comb it is my hand and arm which move, and my fingers
pick up the pen, but I don't control them. . . . I sit there watching them
move, and they are quite independent, what they do is nothing to do with me. .
. . I am just a puppet who is manipulated by cosmic strings. When the strings
are pulled my body moves and I cannot prevent it.'" (Mellor, 1970; 17-18)

C3. "A patient said: 'I never shouted, it was the vocal cords that shouted out
of me. . . . The hands turn this way and that, I do not guide them nor can I
stop them.'" [Jaspers 1963, 23]

C4. "A 26 year old engineer emptied the contents of a urine bottle over the
ward's dinner trolley. He said, 'The sudden impulse came over me that I must
do it. It was not my feeling, it came into me from the X-ray department, that
was why I was sent there for implants yesterday. It was nothing to do with me,
they wanted it done. So I picked up the bottle and poured it in. It seemed all
I could do.'" [Mellor 1970, 17]

C5. "A 29 year old housewife said, 'I look out of the window and I think the
garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews
come into my mind. There are no other thoughts there, only his. . . . He
treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts on to it like you flash
a picture.'" [Mellor 1970, 17]

These subjects report a range of passivity phenomena: made actions (C1, 2 and 3),
impulses (preceding acts; C4), affect (C1), and thoughts (C1 and 5). As well as
experiencing a separation from the initiation of their own actions and thinking, they
also explain these phenomena in delusional terms, e.g., an electronic machine (C1),
cosmic strings (C2), the X-ray department (C4) and a television personality (C5). They
lack the experience of freedom, and derive an abnormal experiential belief.

From our previous consideration of the alien hand syndrome, cases C2 and C3 are
particularly interesting given their superficial resemblance to phenomenological reports
of the former (e.g., B1). Again we see subjects who do not experience a sense of
volition, despite acts occurring which appear purposeful. A difference is seen when the
experience is further elaborated in a delusional sense e.g., "I am just a puppet who is
manipulated by cosmic strings" (C2).

Example C4 is more subtle. The subject experiences an alien impulse to act prior to his
own initiation of the act (emptying the urine bottle). He seems to acknowledge that he
performed the act (experiential belief), but he did not experience it as a freely chosen
act ("It seemed all I could do"). Once again we may make a case for this phenomenon
resembling that alien hand case described above (B2) in which the subject experienced
his intentions as being anticipated by his (affected) hand.

The purpose of this exposition is not to attempt to "localize" passivity phenomena or

their neural correlates but to demonstrate the similar patterns of disruption to willed
action which may be seen in neurological and psychiatric disorders, and also their
particular characteristics which may cast light upon normal activity. As we have seen
above (the normal case), normal individuals may experience their freedom to act in a
variety of ways, which at times may appear to approach automaticity or passivity
(without the delusional intensity). In particular the examples of creativity given
suggest that subjects may experience their subjective consciousness as the "recipient"
of formed cognitions or acts. In this regard consider Einstein's report (A7). Again
there are similarities with the passivity of thought described by the subject in example
C5 (above), in that thought is recognized as "arriving." But the delusional elaboration
of the schizophrenic subject distinguishes [End Page 82] the experience from normal.
This point is being labored at present, for we shall return to it when we consider the
"timing" of neural events. Can a thought or act be "willed" consciously? For the present
we can say that in both "normal" individuals and those with neurological and psychiatric
disorders, it is possible for thought and action to be isolated from the sense of "will"
normally associated with them. The symptomatic elaborations may vary, but it would seem
that we have sufficient evidence for suggesting that seemingly "purposeful" action and
"insightful" thought may be neurally distinct from the sense of "will" or "ownership"
which normally attends them. This is hardly a new idea:

"A man's thoughts are sometimes not due to himself but come without his will."
Philo, De Mutatione (Clark 1991, 226)

"We speak, not only to tell others what we think, but to tell ourselves what
we think." Hughlings Jackson (Dennett 1991, 194)

The Temporal Aspects of Action

Does a meaningful concept of free will require that we may, at least on some occasions,
consciously choose a certain course of action? Must choice and decision be conscious? If
so, what temporal relationship must pertain between conscious awareness of intent and
the initiation of action?

As alluded to in the introduction, there is an assumption embedded within the concept of

free will that conscious choice may occur (or appear to occur) on at least some
occasions. For this to be a real choice, however, it is here argued that the choice
made, e.g., a decision to act, would of necessity be prior to the initiation of the
specified act. Initiation would "need" to follow decision. By decision here we refer to
the conscious "making" of a decision to act. Is this sequence of events a biological
possibility?

For the sake of example I will assume that observable motor acts provide a model for all
acts, mental or physical. Although this is an assumption I hope to justify it in due
course.

Voluntary finger movement in the human is preceded by a well documented pattern of

cerebral electrical activity measured from surface electrodes (Kornhuber and Deecke
1965; Deecke, Scheid and Kornhuber 1969; Libet et al 1982). There are 3 potentials
identifiable using electroencephalography (EEG):

1. Readiness Potential (RP): a slowly increasing, negative potential occurring 850 msec
prior to voluntary movement (as recorded by EMG). The RP is bilateral, symmetrical, and
seen over pre-and post-central regions, being maximal at the vertex.

2. Pre-motion Positivity (PMP): a symmetrical positive potential seen 86 msec prior to

voluntary movement.

3. Surface negative motor potential: maximal over the contralateral, pre-central hand
area, 56 msec prior to voluntary movement (Deecke, Scheid and Kornhuber 1969).

Thus the early stages of the initiation of a motor act precede its objective execution
by approximately 850 msec. At what point does the subject become subjectively aware of
the "decision" to move? If the voluntary decision is itself initiating the movement,
then one would intuitively suggest that the former precede the latter in time. (One
would then need to explain how a "thought" might "produce" such an action.) If, however,
the neural substrates of action precede the subjective decision to act, then clearly the
latter cannot be causal to the former (at least in terms of our current understanding of
causality), i.e. conscious "decisions" do not cause acts.

[IMAGE LINK=] Libet et al. (1983) addressed the above issue by requiring subjects to
note when they decided to act in a movement paradigm. Subjects observed
an oscilloscope screen on which a spatial clock was represented. While their EEG and EMG
data were recorded, the subjects noted the "time" according to the oscilloscope clock at
which they "decided" to move. Their RPs began approximately 350 milliseconds prior to
their subjective "decision." Thus Libet et al. conclude that volitional activity is
initiated non-consciously (Libet et al., 1983). [See fig. 1]

If the findings of Libet and co-workers are replicated, then we must conclude that
"decisions" [End Page 83] to act arise prior to our conscious awareness of them. Thus
our "decision" or "freedom" is illusory (if by these terms we mean conscious phenomena).
It occurs after activity has been initiated. Libet et al. (1983) wish to retain free
will, however, when they suggest that the subject may still have the power of veto over
arising intentions. Thus an act may be planned, and initiated out of consciousness, but
might still be rejected when entering the latter. Could this be so? I will suggest that
in the light of Libet's own work this is unlikely to yield "true" freedom.

When the somatosensory cortex is directly stimulated, at liminal intensity, stimulus

train durations of about 500ms are necessary to elicit any reportable conscious
sensation. Stimuli below that intensity or train duration produce no sensation at all
(Libet, 1993 for review). Similarly an afferent sensory stimulus may be altered (by
direct cerebral stimulation) for up to 500ms prior its subjective "appearance" (Libet
1993). Libet suggests that a period of "neuronal adequacy" of approximately 400-500 ms
is required for neuronal activity to yield a conscious sensation. For the purposes of
this discussion, it does not matter what duration in time, or magnitude of stimulus, is
required for such a sensation to "arise." The important point is that a finite period of
neuronal activity precedes conscious awareness of the latter. Neuronal events precede
subjective phenomena and hence phenomenology.

Thus, to suggest as Libet does that free will is still sustainable, as a power of veto,
is flawed. It is flawed because the "decision" (in consciousness) to act or not to act
is itself the "result" of preceding neural activity.

The decision does not make itself. It is a product or correlate of preceding neuronal
events.

Similar conclusions have been reached by Velmans in his analysis of the literature
concerning human information processing (Velmans 1991). The weight of the evidence
derived from [End Page 84] cognitive neuroscience points to sophisticated analysis of
both incoming sensory information and ongoing volitional activity "taking place" out of
consciousness. "[O]ne becomes aware of a stimulus only after one has analysed and
selected it, and aware of one's own response only after one has executed it" (Velmans
1991, 666).

Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to consider whether the notion of free will is
compatible with neuroscience. We returned repeatedly to the question of whether
conscious awareness is necessary for such freedom. If we regard it as central to freedom
of the will that we have subjective phenomena "choosing" prior to neural activity, then
clearly free will is refuted by the evidence provided. The work of Libet and others has
the clear implication that the "experience" of free will occurs after the neural
activity which initiates action. Thus, subjectivity is placed at one remove from
initiation (and the two are therefore potentially separable). The necessarily
materialist and reductive evidence presented has demonstrated that human beings may lose
experiential control over aspects of their behavior, and that their experience of
control may be altered both normally and pathologically. When we consider the neural
correlates of phenomena we find that conscious experience is always temporally post
neural activity and thus (within our current understanding) "caused" not causal. Our
"control" is a sense which may be lost.

Such a conclusion seems to devalue consciousness, our awareness, our "thinking about
thinking." Our sense of agency is apparently illusory:

"The human brain generates an internal model to fit incoming information about the
external world, and experiences the model rather than the information." (Picton and
Stuss 1994)

"Most of us share in common the useful delusion that we have free will. Schizophrenic
patients have lost this experience. As a consequence they develop idiosyncratic, and in
many cases harmful, delusions instead." (Frith 1987; my italics)

Or again in Bollas (1992):

"The self does not evolve unconsciously. . . . [T]he self is unconsciousness, a

particular inner presence, reliably vectored by the forms "it" uses to find expression."
(51)

In fact, we are left with more of a conundrum than might appear at first. We have
excluded a conscious freedom of the will. We have relegated any freedom to the
non-conscious. Are we left with the conclusion that human acts are predicted by neuronal
events, that our consciousness is not necessary for what may appear purposeful? (If we
retain the notion of "purpose" then we must cede that "purpose" to the non-conscious.)

The identity of the individual becomes more than the conscious "I" or the "ego." It must
comprise both conscious and non-conscious.

Einstein's consciousness experiences the "thought" "If a person falls freely he will not
feel his own weight."

What is the cause of such a thought? If it is not the concept, or the "reason" that he
holds in consciousness at the time, then it is a process occurring out of, and prior to
awareness, but with apparent purpose, and a bias towards truth, an "appreciation" of
"reason."

As Dennett (1991) and Hoffman and McGlashan (1993) have highlighted, many processes
occur in parallel within the nervous system, only some of which appear to be conscious.
Some flavor of this multiplicity, this "reporting" on processes and what it might
comprise, may be appreciated in the pathological schizophrenic symptom of voices
commenting:

"A 41 year old housewife heard a voice coming from the house across the road. The voice
went on incessantly in a flat monotone describing everything she was doing, with an
admixture of critical comments. 'She is peeling potatoes, got hold of the peeler, she
does not want the potato, she is putting it back, because she thinks it has a knobble
like a penis, she has a dirty mind, she is peeling potatoes, now she is washing them.'"
(Mellor 1970, 16)

If there are multiple processes occurring out of the individual consciousness, then it
is possible to conceive of how these might appear persecutory and alien if they
acquired/accessed consciousness; becoming the persecutory "bizarre objects" of Bion
(1955), or the autonomous, isolated islands [End Page 85] of parallel distributed
processes of Hoffman and McGlashan (1993). This point was also made by Vygotsky (1934):
"Each one of us carries schizophrenia in a latent form, i.e. in the mechanism of thought
which, when uncovered, becomes the central figure in the drama of schizophrenic thought"
(1934, 1071).

[IMAGE LINK=] Conscious awareness, thinking about thinking, however we conceptualize

it, is not the initiator of action in the nervous system. Whereas "we"
are normally shielded from this realization by our "sense" of volition and freedom, it
is clear that such a sense is vulnerable to disturbance. The symptoms arising from the
latter in the normal process of creativity, and the passivity phenomena of
schizophrenia, comprise the attribution of volition to other forces which (from the
materialist perspective) must reside (out of consciousness, but) within the nervous
system.

The role of consciousness in volition is not that of initiator. But for any purpose to
be realized consciousness seems "necessary." The "purposeful" acts which arise without
consciousness seem either futile and ill-conceived (e.g., in somnambulism, fugue and
delirium) or mundane and repetitive (as in driving along a familiar route, or performing
a simple manual task). As we have seen with the alien hand syndrome, purpose may be
apparent but disruptive and "self"-defeating. In schizophrenia, action and thought may
be out of control, apparently purposeful, but blunted. Stereotypic acts and recurrent
intrusive thoughts impede the patient rather than prompting change. Only in the normal
process of creativity do we see such a passive consciousness "receiving" "worthwhile"
insight or performing actions with subtlety and invention (and Boden [1992] has
highlighted the non-random nature of this process and how its contents relate to the
prior contents of consciousness). Consciousness is necessary for purposeful
(intentional) action, but it is not the initiator.

Time

Materialist and reductive theories of mind (including the psychoanalytic) have placed
great emphasis upon the antecedents of behavior. These have tended to be long term e.g.,
genetic inheritance and early childhood experience. In the present paper I have
emphasized the minutely short term; the neural events which predict behavior. There [End
Page 86] exists the possibility of a continuum, with genetics and environmental factors
integrated into a neural activity which precipitates action (and, on the same basis,
thought). However such an equation is inadequate in several ways. It fails to account
for the nature of the generation of creativity and action, and places the issue of their
genesis "further back" in terms of both time (preceding conscious intent) and location
in "inner space" (generation is non-conscious cf. conscious). The problem has been moved
but not solved.

Nor have I accounted for aesthetics or "reason." I have failed to address the future:

"I" may "choose" x or y in the present, not only because a happened to me in the past,
but because I would like b rather then c to happen to me in the future.

The "purpose" which we may attribute to non-conscious processes, determining choice, is

orientated temporally, towards the future, and thematically, towards food, music or
physics as the context "requires." It is also externally orientated; it acts upon the
world.

Space and Time in Virtual/Mental Space

My "acting" in time is essentially a spatial and temporal phenomenon. But as well as

acting within physical space, "I" act within a mental (virtual) space. I would like to
suggest that in this (virtual) space, time and the temporal relationship of events
become dimensions.

I am suggesting that in the "normal" state although acts are initiated prior to my
awareness of my own decision, the temporal relationship that pertains is such that I
experience my decision prior to information regarding the initiated action. There is a
delay between the initiation of the act and such initiation reaching my consciousness.

[IMAGE LINK=] While "correct" timing is maintained, "I" have the impression that my
conscious "I" generates acts. This illusion is fostered by the chronology
of my awareness (both of "intent" and "resulting" act). While the chronology is in place
"I" act externally upon the world (in mental/virtual space).

However, if the chronology of internal initiation of[Figure 6] [Figure 5] [Figure 4]

action breaks down, if for pathological reasons, the
timing of events is altered, then my (conscious) "intention" to act may appear to lag
behind action or to precede it by an unduly long period (figures 4-6). I may then
experience my action as imposed (in the former) or impeded (in the latter). Timing and
the "direction" of action are thus related. [End Page 87]

Both scenarios may be seen in pathological states above, where in B2 the (alien hand)
patient feels the affected limb anticipates his wishes, in C2, C3 and C4 where
schizophrenic patients' actions are determined independent of them, and, in C1 where the
patient feels an external machine prevents him from thinking. When the chronology of
action is altered, the experienced "direction" of action is also changed (in the
internal world of the subject). 1

External Context

I have attempted to explain some aspects of the experience of free will, and of its
pathology. With regard to schizophrenic "passivity," I have hypothesized a cause of
abnormal experiences, but not of their delusional elaboration (e.g., "cosmic rays" or
persecuting machines). 2

I have also not sought to address the place of the individual in external space or
environment. If the conscious "I" does not generate action, and if the non-conscious is
the generator, then such action may be generated in response to imperatives from the
environment (of which consciousness may be unaware, at least temporarily) (and see
Velmans 1991). This serves to emphasize the importance of context in volition. If we
learn of our own intentions by speaking to others then this emphasizes our communal
ecology.

I will not expand upon this question further in this paper except to say that in this
respect I have been guilty of a weakness exhibited in much of our neuropsychiatric and
psychological literature; namely that I have repeatedly considered individuals divorced
from their context, their environmental milieu. Whereas the purpose of this paper has
been to question the emphasis upon the conscious (over the non-conscious) in
considerations of free will, there is clearly a case to be made for work which questions
the emphasis of individual above community in the exercise of healthy mental life.

Concluding Remarks

The reductionist, materialist perspective underlying the current analysis has been
"pushed" to its logical conclusion. Consciousness is not the initiator of willed action.
Yet the effect of this analysis is to raise further issues which perhaps speak to the
limits of reductionism itself as an exhaustive account of human action. We require a new
perspective on the relationship between the temporal and spatial distribution of
activity within the nervous system and the subjective "mental/virtual space" which is
its correlate. With brain imaging techniques we may approach some of these questions.
When subjects imagine movements they "activate" motor areas within their brains (Stephan
et al, 1995). When schizophrenics "hear" voices it is their speech areas which they
"activate" (McGuire et al 1993). But whereas neuroscience is well equipped to measure
and characterize such phenomena, it is clearly on less secure ground with respect to
"motive," reason, and the "purpose" of our action, our acting in the world.

We repeatedly return to notions of "cause," initiation, and the antecedents of

subjective and neural events. We require a new conceptualization of the non-conscious
"parts" of ourselves.

My choice, such as it is, occurs out of consciousness, prior to my knowledge of it. My

consciousness [End Page 88] appreciates the consequences. Without conscious experience
my non-conscious is ill-equipped to "decide." My experience of freedom, unimpeded
thought and action, is distinct from, but related to, beliefs both immediate and
abstract. Experience or belief may be subject to pathology.

But I know not "why" my experience is as it is, any more than I know why I experience at
all. And my "decision" is made before "I" make it.
 ". . . but a person can only walk one way and that is the way I still walk."

Angela Carter
Review Independent on Sunday,
8th January, 1995.

Acknowledgment

The author wishes to thank the following for their comments upon earlier drafts of this
paper: Professor S. R. L. Clark, Professor C. D. Frith, and Professor K. W. M. Fulford.
He particularly wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Steven Hirsch with whom he
has debated many of the ideas contained within this manuscript over the past 3 years.
Sean A. Spence was supported by the Charing Cross Hospital Special Research Trustees.

Sean A. Spence, Research Fellow, MRC Cyclotron Unit, Hammersmith Hospital, Du Cane Road,
London W12 ONN; Academic Department of Psychiatry, Charing Cross Hospital, Fulham Palace
Road, London W6 8RP.

Notes

1. These hypotheses are partially borne out by the experiment of GreyWalter (1963). In
this experiment neurosurgical patients had electrodes implanted in their motor cortices.
They were instructed to look at slides on a carousel and to advance the latter by
pushing a control button. In fact the latter was a fake and the slides were advanced by
the amplified signal originating in the subjects' own motor cortices (as they prepared
to press the button). The patients were apparently startled by the effect (Dennett
1991). It seemed to them that the slide projector was anticipating their decisions. Now
if, instead of a signal being sent to a slide projector, a neural signal by-passed the
usual pathways and initiated action at a temporal variance to the normal state it is
possible to imagine that such a phenomenon might give rise to a subjective experience
not dissimilar to some of those described above (in particular B2). A subject might
indeed "feel" that his movements were being anticipated, or that a limb "had a mind of
its own." If his thoughts were affected might he not experience thought insertion?

2 . [I have described elsewhere cases in which such elaboration is clearlyrelated to

environmental stimuli and prior exposure to such stimuli (Spence 1993; 1994). In the
case of Nintendo hallucinations, a stimulus in the environment is clearly incorporated
in to the phenomenology of the psychotic process, itself becoming persecutory (Spence
1993); and similarly in female survivors of child sexual abuse suffering from mania and
experiencing tactile sexual hallucinations the former abuser in childhood is recreated
in hallucinatory form in the acute psychosis (Spence 1994).]

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