"202 Donald Davidson

asymmetry between how we know our own minds and' howo we kn()w the
minds of others:: It is striking, for example, that Burge's explanation of first
person authority fails to account for the fact that the same thing, namely what
is in one person's mind, can also b~ known by someone else, though'in a very
different way. The missing part ofthe explanation is filled in, I think, when
we recognize the way interaction with other people partly determines the
contents of mental states. Knowledge of one's own mind is personal. But what
individuates that state at the same time makes it accessible to others, for the Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis
state is individuated by causal interplay among three elements: the thinker, of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language
others with whom he communicates, and an objective world they know they
share.
.
.
Jaakko HINTIKKA ·
Summary
Carnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and con-
ceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematic
logical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based on
the author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As an
example of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and. Chomsky's implicit
assumption that language learning is based on atomistic (quantifier-free) "answers" (input).

Resume
Carnap a essaye de depasser la metaphysique par une distinction entre des \'eriles empiriques
et des verites conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite ete contestee, mais non sur la base d'une
analyse systematique du langage. On suggere ici que la theorie logique de I'identifiabilite basee
sur Ie modele interrogatif de l'auteur fournira les outils d'une telle analyse syslematique. Com me
excmple de ce que peut faire ce modele, on presente une crilique de la supposition implicile de
Quine et de Chomsky selon laquelle l'apprentissage du langage repose sur des «reponses» (input)
ntomiques (sans quantificateurs).

Zusammenfassllng .
Carnap versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und konzep-
luellen Wahrheiten zu Uberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen,
jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendem
'. Artikel witd"vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Idenlifizierbarkeit, welche auf dem
Frage-Antworl-Modell des Autors grUndet, die lnstrumente fUr eine solche logische Analyse
bereitstelll. Als Beispiel dafOr, was das Modellieisten kann~ dient eine Kritik an Quines und
Chomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache .auf atomaren (quantoren-
freien) «Antworten» aufbaut (Input). .

The theme of this meeting is "metaph~sics and science". 1 suppose that

what is meant could equally well have been expressed by "the relation of
metaphysics to science". But before we can discuss what that relation is, we
have to ascertain that there is such a t~ing as metaphysiCs that could bear
some conceivable relation to science or to anything else.

· Boston University
Dialectica
Vol. 45, N° 2-3 (1991) Dlalectica Vol.45, N°2-3 (1991). . j
3

Jaakko Hintikka .
Historically, metaphysics comes in all sizes and shapes. The definition of
metaphysics is itself a metaphysical problem. In contrast, the problem of the
possibility of metaphysics is relatively well defined, on one natural interpreta-
tion, at least. It is: Can human thought alone, unaided by empirical evidence,
produce interesting knowledge? Aristotle's answer was an unqualified yes.
His reasons for the answer are highly interesting though insufficiently appre-
ciated by scholars. For Aristotle, to think of X is for one's soul to take on the
form of X t. (This Aristotelian idea still lingers on in the etymology of our ian-
guage, where being cognizant of X is expressed as having information about. .
it. This of course ought to mean "to be in the form of X".) Aristotle intends
his idea is to be taken literally; an instantiation of a form in one's soul is on a
par with its realizations elsewhere2. From this it follows that allY necessary
connection between forms can be perceived by realizing them in one's mind.
If the form of Y necessarily accompanies the form of X, then it is necessarily
realized in my mind as soon as I managed to think of X, i.e., as soon as the
form of X is realized in my soul. It is thus seen that, even though Aristotle was
in a sense an empiricist, his reliance on experience was of a very special kind.
In Aristotelian methodology empirical input is needed only to enable me as it
were to assemble the right forms in mind from bits and pieces given to me by
sense-perception. Empirical evidence is not needed to ascertain natural laws;.
that is, necessary connections between forms.
This way of thinking colors Aristotle's entire philosophy. It differs so
radically from our wanted ways of thought that scholars have not dared ack-
nowledge its full consequences in Aristotle. It is among other places reflected
in Aristotle's idea that induction or properly speaking, epagoge, is essentiaIly
a matter of concept formation, not of generalization from particulars to uni-
versals 3.
Aristotle's way of thinking is relevant to the theme of this meeting because
it shows in which sense the possibility of metaphysics was unproblematic and
in what sense it was problematic for him. The problem for Aristotle was not
whether unaided human thought can recognize general truths. Even the
I Aristotle, De Anima III 6, 43Ial-2: "Actual knowledge is identical with its object." cr.
also ibid 8, 43lb24-432a3.
2 This is seen most clearly from Metaphysics Z7, where Aristotle argued for his thesis that
v 5 For a preliminary discussion, see my paper, "Conceptions of Scientific Method from Aris-
"everything comes out of that which actually is" of the same form. This is trivial in the case of
animals but what about the production artifacts and other products of art? When a doctor heals a
patient, that is, produces an instance of the form of health in.a patient, where is the earlier actual
exemplification or that form? In the mind of the physician, Aristotle answers, for lJaving this
form is what the medical art consists in. See also Met. Z9, 1034a21-23 and Met. 4, 1070b33-34.
J See here my paper "Aristotelian Induction", Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 34
",
(1980), pp. 422-39. Cf. also "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative l'
Approach to Inquiry", forthcoming.
Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis
of Language"ThroughLogicalAnalysisof Language
. 205
departmental sciences do that all the time according to him. The problem was
whether there is any subject matter left to metaphysics over and above the
subject matter of the different particular sciences. Aristotle argued for an
affirmative answer by arguing that a complctely general science, a science of
"being qua being", is possible4.
This Aristotelian foundation of metaphysics has been given up fairly uni-
versally. }<'ewpeople seriously think that by just putting my mind to it I can
obtain.ki10wledge of the objective reality. My historical working hypothesis at.
this moment is that the demolition job on Aristotelian methodology was
started by the medieval nominalists5.
Of course, the rejection of the Aristotelian theory did not put an end to
other forms of the belief that somehow we could reach substantial truths by
means of pure thinking alone. Other suitable metaphysical (or empirical)
assumptions concerning the world might serve the same purpose as Aristotle's
psychology of thought here. By the nineteenth century, there was even a name
available for one such internal source of truths: intuition. (This, by the way, is
not what the word meant earlier6.) But by 1990 most philosophers no longer
hav~ the courage of their intuitions. They no longer believe that our intuitions
can .yield objective knowledge of any independent reality. Consequently, the
function of intuition-based theorizing has now become conceived as one Of
merely systematizing our intuitions as such, without assigning them any role
whatsoever as giving information about anything beyond themselves 7. The
correspondence theory of intuition has been replaced. by a coherence theory,
so to speak. This marks the effective end of intuitionistic metaphysics.
Does.. this mean that metaphysics has been found impossible? No,
metaphysics is alive if not particularly well in KOnigsberg or wherever the
spirit of Immanuel Kant is currently moving. For one can still argl!e, as Kant
in effect did, that pure (i.e., nonempirical) thought can reveal the way in which
our knowledge is grounded in our own thinking, in our own activities, and in
t.he conceptual tools they are using 8. This kind of knowledge can certainly be
4 See Metaphysics 1-2 and cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and l\-Ietaphysics in some Earlier
Works of Aristotle", in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Greek
I'hilo.rophy, Duckworth, London, 1986, pp. 180-99.
totle to Newton", in Monika Asztalos et al., eds. Knowledge and the Sciences in MedieI'Q1 Philo-
sophy, vol. I, Philosophical Society of Finland, Helsinki 1990, pp. 72-84.
6 In the early modern period, "intuitive knowledge" meant merely immediate knowledge,
with no assumption of any special source of knowledge. For a glimpse of this kind of meaning.
see my paper, "On Kant's Notion of Intuition", in The First Critique, ed. by T. Penelhum and J.
J. Mcintosh, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 1969, pp. 38-53.
7 This idea is an extension of Chomsky's earlier approach to syntactical theorizing, where
the rock bottom of the enterprise were competent speakers' Intuitions about grammaticality.
8 This is perhaps seen most clearly from Kant's preface to the second edition of the Critique
of Pure Reason, especially pp. XII-XVIII.

Jaakko Hintikka
substantial and informative. One particularly interesting twentieth-century
variant of this kind of critical, metaphysics is R. G. Collingwood's idea that
metaphysics is "the attempt to find out what" absolute presuppositions have
been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion
or groups of occasions" 9. Whether or not it is always called "metaphysics",
such an examination of the basic conceptual assumptions of patticular
sciences, or even of our thought at large, seems to be big business. even in the
twentieth century. And even when the label "metaphysics" is not applied, it
might as well have been. For instance, the speculations of twentieth-century
physicists about the foundations of their own science are full of claims that
, .
are much more blatantly metaphysical than any contemporary analytic phi-
losopher (assuming that that species is not extinct) would dare to make..
However, even the possibility of critical metaphysics has been denied in
our century. The classk document in this respect is Rudolf Carnap's 1931
paper "Die Oberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analysis der
Sprache", misleadingly translated ,as "Elimination of Metaphysics Through
Logical Analysis of Language" 10.In it, Carnap relied in effect on two theses.
They are, first, a sharp separation of empirical and conceptual truths (includ-
ing truths about the meanings of our words and phrases) and, second, an
interpretation of conceptual (analytical) truths as being vacuous, (tau-
tological) II. The former thesis relegates metaphysics to the study of merely
our conceptual system, and the latter deprives metaphysics of any substantial
subject matter. For statements about what our words and phrases mean are on
this view empty or "tautological". To deny one is merely to talk nonsense, and
to assert one therefore is not to make a meaningful statement. Finis
metaphysics - according to Carnap.
It is interesting to note in the passing that there is relatively little else in
Carnap's philosophy which would have ruled out some sort of critical
metaphysics. For instance, Aristotle's problem of whether there can be a gen-
eral study of being as being was no difficulty for a defender of the unity of
science and of the physicalistic language as the universal language of science 12;
9 Sce R. G. Collingwood. E.~ay 011Metaphysics. Clarcndon Press, Oxford. 1940, chaplcrs
4-7, especially p. 47.
\0 Erkenntnis, vol. 2 (1932), pp. 432-65. English translation in A. J. Ayer, editor, Logical
Positivism, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, pp. 60-81.
\I This thesis \yas in different variants held by most members of the Vienna Circle and their
"f
allies.See,e.g.,A. J. Ayer,Language Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz, London, 1936,chapter 4.
For the difficulties involved with this idea, cf. my paper "G. H. von Wright on Logical Truth
and Distributive Normal Forms": in The Philosopl,y ofG. H. von Wright (Library of Living Phi-
losophers), Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois, 1990l' PP. 517-37. ' (i.e., quantifier-free) truths. Kuhn's strong emphasis that theories are not derived from, or
Cf. also Burton Dreben and Juliet Floyd, 'Tautology: How Not to Use a Word", Synthese,
vol. 89 (1990), pp. 23-49.
12 Both ideas are strikingly In evidence in Carnap's paper, op. eit., note 10 above"
Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis 207
of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language
It is this Carnapian of denial of the possibiJity of metaphysics that I wa,nt to
discuss in this paper. Prima/ode, my enterprise might seem,to be seriously out
of date, for the theses on which Carnap's attempted ) "Oberwindung der
,
Metaphysik" rests have been rejected by a number of prominent philosophers,
present company not excepted. First, Quine and others began to challenge Car-
nap's sharp dichotomy of questions of fact and questions of meaning 13.
Quine's rejeetion of the analytic-synthetic distinction was an early form of the
,
challenge. Later, several philosophers have in different ways defended the,
theory-Iadenness and fact-Iadenness of meaning 14. On such a view, no sharp
distinction can be made between questions of fact and questions of meaning.
Consequently, it looks possible in principle that a conceptual analysis might
uncover factual presuppositions of our language and our discourse, or of the
discourse .of some other group of people. This seems to open the doors to
metaphysics at least in the "critical" Collingwoodian spirit.
In a sense, many philosophers already have entered through these doors.
Indeed, probably the best known scholar professing to have been influenced
by Quine, Thomas Kuhn, can be viewed as having done just that IS. The fact
that he is talking about paradigms instead of ultimate presuppositions makes
"no difference. And Kuhn's relegation of problem-solving and question-
answering to normal science, instead of their Collingwoodian pride of place,
merely reflects, I believe, a deeply ingrained restrictive presupposition of
Kuhn's own t6.
But who is right, Carnap or his latter-day critics? ,Is there a sharp distinc-
tion between fact and meaning? Are meanings really theory-laden and fact-
, laden? At first sight, it might be completely hopeless to try to answer. these
questions in one paper. In order to do so, I would apparently have to slirvey
and to evaluate nearly forty years of intensive and intricate discussion. This ,
lask I obviously cannot take on here. '
IJ Cf. here W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". in From Q Logical Poilll of View.
Harvard U.P., Cambridge, MA, 1953, pp. 20-46.
14 These terms are not usually used in the literature. Instead, terms like
" "antirealism" are
Iypically cmployed. This terminology is nol accidental. It seems to me to renecl a genuine confu-
sion as to what is really involved.
15 Cf. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second ed., Univcrsity or Chi-
cago Press, Chicago, 1970. A brief survey of the problems Kuhn is dealing with, see Ian Hacking,
editor, Scientific Revolutions, Oxford U.P., Oxford, 1981. ,
In spiteof the voluminousliteratureKuhn's book has prompted,therestillexistsneithera
i satisfactory analysis of his main concepts nor a close analysis of his argumentation.
16 This presupposition is expressed most naturally by reference to my interrogative model'of
'
inquiry. It amounts to assuring that the "answers" nature can give 10 a scientist are all particular
otherwise determined by, evidence does not have plausibility without this assumption. For a dis-
cussion of what happens when this assumption is given up, see my paper, "What Is the Logic of
Expe.rimentallnquirY7", Synthese vol. 74 (1988), pp. 173-90. "
 .lOB Jaakko Hintikka
" ,
Instead, I will challenge the methodology of this entire discussion. Sup-
pose, 'for the sake of argument, that meanings are theory-laden. Since
meanings determine reference, the references of a language user's words and
phrases likewise depend on the theory he or she has adopted or, more likely,
on the proto-theory his or her linguistic community has tacitly developed.
Now how is such a matter to be studied? The first answer that comes to your
mind is the best one. This obvious answer is: by logical means. Or, if we want
to be more precise, by means of logical semantics. For what kinds of questions
are we supposed to be studying here? There is a great deal of fuzziness in the
literature, but a representative kind of question surely could be something like
this: Given a theory T[P) containing a term, say a one-place predicate P, what
does it tell us about the applicability of P to already different cases? Here T[Pl'
gives us a certain amount of information about some cases to which P applies
or does not apply, but at triost it tells us something about the relationships be-
tween P and the other concepts employed in T[P). Here it might even seem
that the entire problem reduces to good old-fashioned logic. For is not the
question whether P applies to a given individuall? simply the question whether
T[P] logically implies Tb? No, it is not, because 'in answering such a question
we typically have an additional source of information at our disposal. It is our
knowledge of how the other concepts occurring in T[P] apply to the indi-
viduals in our domain. Later in this paper, I shall show such prima facie iII-
defined knowledge can be brought to the purview of explicit logico-semantical
theory.
Of course we cannot hope to have a formal theory that could be applied
directly to actual natural languages, including our own "limpid vernacular" ,
to use Quine's sometime phrase. However, we can try to develop structural
analyses which show what the conceptual situation is and thereby what we
have to be on a lookout for in real-life situations.
Notice that this way of construing representative problems in the theory of
empirical meaning (reference) determination is' not subject to Quine's
criticisms of Carnap 17.Carnap's mistake, according to Quine, is to label cer-
tain rules as being "analytic" or "meaning rules", without sketching in the
behavioral or societal facts that characterize such a special status. In my
sample problem, all assumptions can be expressed by straightforward factual
propositions.
In view of this prima facie logico-semantical character of the kinds of
questions Quine and others have raised, it blows my mind that in practically
the entire discussion he provoked these questions have been dealt with by
17 cr. w. V. Quine, op. cit., p. 36; also Word and Object, MIT Press Cambridge ,. MA
1960,especiallych. I. ' 19 See op. cit., note 16 above, and the literature referred to there.
Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis
of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language 209
means of armchair psychology, cute artificial , examples (you have heard of
gavagai and of the twin earth, haven't you?), a couple of natural language
illustrations, and so on, in short, by everything but honest logical means. We
hear in these days a great deal about naturalistic epistemology. This term
nevertheless hides a serious confusion. What naturalizes an approach to
epistemology, we are told, is the rejection of all normative considerations. But
most practitioners of naturalized epistemology and naturalized semantics
have nevertheless thrown out the methodological baby with the normative
bathwater. Not only have they rejected normative considerations; they have
, foresworn the use of all explicit formal methods. This is a mistake; non-
normative semantics need not be informal, \vithout recourse to logical and
other formal methods. Surely non-normative even fully scientific and natura-
listic approaches can employ mathematical and logical models. Indeed, in
some cases, logico-semantical conceptualizations have turned out to be much
more closely related to actual neuroscience thari the bulk of literature on
"naturalized epistemology". ,
We can thus express concisely what the trouble is with post-Carnapian phi-
losophy of language. It tries to overcome "Overcoming Metaphysics Through
Logical Analysis of Language", but not through logical analysis of language.
Instead, we are treated to armchair psycliology and armchair sociology of lan-
gu<~,ge.In my opinion, this 'constitutes a major paradox in the history of twen-
tieth ce~ltury philosophy, for severai of the main figures involved in those
'
developments are or have been practicing logicians.
The ,historical roots of this massive failure of famous logicians to ~se ~he .
tools of their own trade when they are doing semantics are highly interesting. I
have touched upon them elsewhere, and I wiII soon return to them.
At this point I can announce my main new result. I cannot explain it fully,
'
and it has not yet been published, but I can briefly explain it here. ~n the broad-
est possible terms, I can teIl you that a powerfullogico-semantical tlleOty of
empirica./ meaning (reference) determination is possible, because it is actual.
What is this theory? The answer is simple: it is the theory of identifiability
that can be developed on the basis of my interrogative model of inquiry 18.As
.1 said, this theory has not yet been published, but an outline will soon be
available. Here, only a quick sketch is possible.
First, a few words about the interrogative modeP9.. In it, two players,
called the Inquirer and Nature playa 'game on some given model M of the
18 See here my paper, "Toward a General Theory of Identifiability", in J. Felzer, D. Shatz
and G. Schlesinger, editors, Definitions and Definability, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1991,
pp. 161-183.
 4J Jaakko Hintikka
/'
lnderlying first-order language. The bookkeeping method employ~d is the
Beth tableall method 20. The game begins like a Beth tableau, with an initial
premise T in the left column and the ultimate eonclusion C in the right one.
There are two kinds of moves, both initiated by the Inquirer, logical moves
lIld interrogative moves. A logical move is simply a tableau-building move'
(with the rules slightly modified from Beth's)21. In an interrogative move, the
, 1nquirer addresses a question to Nature, and if an answer is forthcoming, it is
;dded to the sub tableau that is being constructed. A full definition of such an
mterrogative game includes a specification of which answers Nature will yield
and which ones she will not give. An interrogative move is allowed only when
he presupposition of the question has already been established, i.e., is present
./1 the left column of the subtableau'in question" In the games studied here,
Nature'sanswersare assumedto be all true about M.
We can thus define a relation
(1) M: T I- C
Ihich expresses the fact that the Inq'uirer has a winning strategy)n the inter-
;,gative game, i.e., can close the tableau no matter what (true) answers
Nature gives (subject to certain unspecified restrictions).
I This relation (1) is precisely as "logical" as the relation of deductive deriv-
bility
(2)T I- C
It is in fact interesting to compare (1) and (2). At first sight, there does not
seem to be much hope of developing a general theory for (1), for whether or
"ot (1) holds in a given case depends crucially on a further parameter, viz. on
le class of available answers, which can be chosen in a bewildering variety of
:
ways. The real prime time news here is that one can develop a theory for (I)
which is independent of this parameter. One can even develop it in partial
I expcrience. You will realize that such "empirical definability" has a well-
, nalogy to (or extension 00 the metatheory of the usual relation (2) of deduc-
live provability. This is the rock-solid basis of saying that interrogative deriv-
ability is just as "logical" a concept as deductive derivability.
:w E. W. Beth, "Semantic Entailment and Formal Derivabllity", Mededelingen van de
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie, van Wetenschappen, Aid, Letterkunde N. R. vol. 13(1953),
pp. 309-42. ,
r, T,his ~ethodis o~ course ~ut m~rror I.mage of a Gentzen-type sequent technique, the only
~ m which the applications of the technique proceed.
sentlal difference bemg the duectlon
21 Essentially, no traffic between the two columns (sides)ora tableau Isallowed.
I Franklin Fisher, The Identification Problem in Ecollometrics, McGraw-Hili, New York, 1966.
Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis
of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language 211
An example of a result from proof theory which can be extended to the
thcory of interrogative games is William' Craig's famous interpolation
theorem 22.It holds here in the following forrri23.
Extended Interpolation Theorem
Assume (i) M: T I- C
, (ii) Not T I- C
(Hi) Not M: t I- (8 & - 8)
Then thGfc is a formula I (the interpolation formula) such that
(a) M: T I- I
(b) I I- C
. (c) Each predicate, dummy name and free variable of I occurs in
both T and C. '
(d) Each proper name (individual constant) of I either occurs in
'
. hoth T and C or was introduced in the proof of (i) for the first time by an an-
,
a
swer to wh-question or was imported in the same proof from the right
column into left column by universal instantiation on the left.
(e) All the answers to questions in the derivation of (a) are used
already in the derivation (i).
This extcnsion of the interpolation theorem is much more than a mere
'illustration here. Once we have the interpolation' theorem, we can use it to
prove an interrogative generalization of Beth's theorem concerning definabil-
ity24, in. the same way as the original theorem is proved in the usual
metatheory of first-order logic2s. The availability of (an extension 00 Beth's
theorem means in turn that we can develop a big brother of the usual logical
theory of definability, viz. a theory of "interrogative definahility". If you
." think for a moment what this concept amounts to, you will have a deja vu
established :name in the methodology of several actual s.ciences,viz. idem i-
fiability26, What I have just said can be summed up by saying that the inter-
'
22 See William Craig, "Three U~es of the Herorand-Gentzcn Theorcm in Rclation Model
Theory and ProorTheory", Journal 01 Symbolic Log;c vol. 22 (1957) pp. 269-85.
.. 23 Cr,:here op. cit., note 18. I am here looking away from certain nontrivial assumptions on
which the Extended Interpolation Theorem rests. Cf. note 29 below.
24 See E. W. Beth, "On Padua's Method in the Theory or Definition", {/ndagatiolles Mathe-
maticae vol. 15 (1953), pp. 330-9., ,
2~ Beth's theorem is virtually a corollary to the interpolation theorem. The .same relation
holds bctween thc generalizations of these two theorems to idenlifiability and interrogative inter-
polation, respectively.
'
26 For this concept, see e.g., Cheng Hsiao, "Identification", in Z. Griliches and M. D. Intri-
ligator, editors, Handbook 01 Econometrics, vol. I, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1983, ch. 4;
'
 / Jaakko Hintikka . Ovcrcoming "Ovcrcoming MctaphysicsThrough LogicalAnalysis
/'ogative counterpart of the usual theory of definability is nothing less than a
~enerallogical theory of identifiability.
But what does the theory of identifiability have to do with the theory of
'heory-Iadenness and fact-Iadenness of meaning? I suspect that by this time
ny clever audience has already seen what is coming and wiII answer, correctly:
everything. The logical theory of identifiability is (or perhaps I should say,
~an be viewed as) a general logical theory of empirical reference determina-
ion. It is obviously the right conceptual tool in trying to answer systematically
questions of the kind indicated above.
In this way, we can among other things eliminate all vagueness from the
ypical questions in the theory of theory-Iadenness and fact-Iadenness of
.neaning sketched above. This vagueness was due to the lack of specification
of what the relevant empirical evidence is and of how precisely it enters into
he determination of the extension o,r reference of P. The theoretical deter-
Ilination of reference comes from the initial theory T[P] and the factual deter-
mination comes from the answers to the identifying inquirer's questions. The
.pparent vagueness of such factual determination does not matter, for it only.'
,ffects the restrictions that ttave to be imposed on Nature's answers, while the
theory itself is independent 'Of such restrictions. The role of tacit background
'nowledge requires some additional discussion, but it would not affect what is
aid in this paper.
Here i~ the main message of this paper. Ther~is a logical medium for the
""Iurpose of discussing meaning determination by theories and facts. This
Jgical theory enables us in principle to discuss in precise logical terms most"of
the issues that have been discussed in the tradition which Quine started and
which emphasizes the theory-Iadenness a\ld fact-Iadenness of meanings. This
.
ntire discussion thus has to be re-evaluated.
I cannot undertake such a global re-evaluation here. I wiII restrict myself
to a few general points. - metaphysics
First, the question you have been wanting to raise all the time is: Who is
.ight, Carnap or Quine? Do we really have to countenance a massive deter-
mination of meanings by theories and facts? The resounding, albeit qualified,
!nswer that I am giving to you is: Quine is right in the sense that we can make
.!erfect sense of empirical meaning determination to the extent of being able
to spell out the logical structure of this determination. The Carnapian idea
hat the meanings (and afortior; references) of our words and expressions are
Jredetermined by a set of meaning rules (whatever they are or may be) is
unrealistic. What Quine has completely correctly tried to get at is a much
nore realistic picture of how the semantics of our actual language really
yorks.
213
of Languagc" Through Logical Analysis of Languagc
Second., large segments of recent discussions in the philosophy of language
are immediately thrown into a sharper relief. For instance, from the vantage
point we have reached we can' understand part of the argumentation of the
likes of Putnam. He argues to the effect that the meaning or words like
., "water" are determined by the actual chemical structure of water; not by its
observable behavior or by the practicable method of its identification. There
is little in such arguments that cannot be captured by saying that the meaning
of "water" is partly determined by the scientific (chemical) theory in' which it
occurs. This conclusion I can certainly agree with. But what happens in phi-
losophers like Putnam is that the theory-Iadenncss of meanings is not ~ecog-
nized as such, and is embellished with alleged consequences which make sense
;
only if we have a sense of "meaning", "pecessity", "essence", or some related
term which is not relative toa theory. For instance, if the crux of the matter is
the theory-Iadenness of the meaning of "water", it is at best a misleading
. ; . iIIustratiQn and a worst bad metaphysics to go on to say that'the meaning of
"water" is determined by what water is (Putnam) or to say that the chemical
properties of water (its atomic structural) necessary, not contingent (Kripke).
Such theses make sense only on a theory-independent concept of meaning or
of necessity, respectively.
In general, many of the questions that have been asked in recent discus-
sions can be accommodated within my framework. For instance, it is often
asked (as, e.g., in Putnam's notorious "twin earth" example) "what we would
say" in certain circumstances. Those circumstances can be specified by spe-
cifyjng the model M and the theory T relied on. In this way, we can elimina.te
much of the arbitrariness. inherent in the all-too-common appeals to our
"semantical intuitions" which are in reality just as theory-laden as the con-
cepts which philosophers have tried to explicate by their means.
But what is the moral of my story so far, as for Carnap's criticisms of
are concerned? It seems to me that we .have indeed overcome .
them through logical analysis of language, at. least insofar as critical
metaphysics is concerned. There is no longer in principle "any theoretical
obstacle. of taking a piece of discourse and through a logico-semantical
analysis reveal its theoretical and factual presuppositions. And Collingwood
I! was even right in claiming that in that enterprise "the logic of questions and
I. answers".plays a crucial role27.
Indeed, I happen to believe that Collingwood was right also about the
history of thought to a greater extent than he himself managed to demonstrate
27 R. G. Collingwood, op. Cit., note 9 above. Cf. also, R. G. Collingwood. The Idea of
History, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946, Part V, sec. 3.
\ Jaakko Hintikka
//' ,
"y example. Collingwood's notion of ultimate presupposition is too sim~listic
r ) be realistic. However, I do believe that it is in fact possible to locate impor-
tant large-scale presuppositions that have been, made by different philoso-
:ters, different philosophical traditions, and philosophers of different pe-
,
!
ods. I am on the record as offering specific examples of such (usually tacit)
p'resuppositions28. And at least heuristically the discovery of such presupposi-
" :ms is greatly facilitated by a conceptual analysis of ideas in question. The
j lSic assumption of Aristotle's metaphysics which was sketched briefly above
provides a modest case in point.
We have thus literally overcome "Overcoming Metaphysics Through
{
;,gical,Analysis of Language" through logical analysis of language. A couple
of,things nevertheless remain to be done in order to spell out a little bit more
flilly what 1 have done and in order to put it in a perspective.
First, let me try to remove a feeling of intellectual discomfort which many
!
VI' you have undoubtedly felt. My story is too good to be true or, rather, is too
simple to be true, you are likely to have felt. If the logical treatment of the
,eory-ladenness and fact-Iadenness of meaning is really as simple as that, it is
I _.llikely that first-rate logician-philosophers like Quine or Putnam should
have missed it, you may think.
Part of the answer is that the theory of identification (of which the theory
. ,
! theory-ladenness is a part) is a much more difficult subject intrinsically
than my outline exposition might su~gest. Results like my extension of the
' terpolation theorem are perhaps not very hard to prove, but they are in a
I eoretical perspective not trivial, either. In particular, the dependence of the
theorem on the rules of the interrogative games is a su btJe matter hideed 29.
There is a deeper assumption at work.here, however. My formulation of
I
e interrogative model was in a certain sense in terms of language use. 1pos-
tulated certain games played by two players. This seems to put us back on the
~I~pperY'slope which eventually leads all the way to psychologism and
,ciologism. For who are the players, realistically speaking? Some of my
1
friends'have been greatly worried by my apparent personification of Nature in
28 Cases in point are the ancient Greek treatment of time, the contrast between the two over-
I
views that I have called the universality of language and language as calculus, belief in the
I-rege-Russell claim that natural language words like "is" are ambiguous. What might be called
the statistical interpretation of modalities, and what I have dubbed the recursive paradigrn in lan-
age theory. In all these cases, uncovering the tacit presupposition has been helped by a logical
d conceptual analysis of the situation.
I
29 The crucial parameter here turns 'out to be which tautological disjunctions (S v
'
admitted to the left column. They have on intuitive meaning: the inquirer's range of attention
- S) are
comprises the question whether S or not-S iff he or she is prepared to add the tautology
ithe list of (known or assumed) truths. Cf. here my paper, "Knowledge Representation and the
(~v
l terrogative Model of Inquiry", in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer, editors, Knowledge and
,:epticism, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pp. ISS-IS3.
Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis
' ','
of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language 215
'
the interrogative model. More importantly, speaking of language-using agents
seems to relativize everything to the psychological characteristics, background
knowledge, early childhood training, idiosyncracies and' prejudices of these
"agents. Or, to generalize the issue, the study of the use of language apparently
belongs to pragmatics, not semantics, and pragmatics'is (didn't Morris tell us
that?) is a part of the psychology and sociology of language 30.
This Ii~e of thought is nevertheless an unmitigated fallacy. If you stop and
think for a minute of what is going on, you wiII see that (I) is just as an objec-
tive relation, as (2), as completely independent of the idiosyncracies and indeed,
of the actual identify of the players postulated. My heuristic term "Nature"
docs not involve any more any personification of nature than ,an applied game
theorist's talk about "games against nature". An analogy should: make my
point clear. If it is relevant in the theory of interrogative games to ask: But
who are the players? then by the same token it must be relevant to ask in
logical syntax: Who is supposed to write or to have written these syntactical
symbols? If the,theory of interrogative games is part of psychology, then for-
:malsyntax is part of graphology. '
We are dealing here with one of the most harmful prejudices of recent phi-
losophy of language. I hope I can exorcise it for good 31. ,
Of course I am claiming that the structures exemplified by the interroga-
tive model are not only instantiated in some Platonic, or G6delian heaven
inhabited by abstract structures as such, but are also instantiated (albeit in bits
",nnd pieces))n actual human "langu,,:ge games". But the question whether they
do so is' completely independent of the question as to how the structures in
question were defined in the first place. ,
More constructively, we can ask: What is the impact of the logical theory
of identification on the entire tradition in the philosophy of language that was
largely started by Quine?, Needless to say (or, rather, to repeat), a full analysis
is impossible within the confines of one paper. Let me nevertheless indicate
..
one important perspective that opens here.
30 One serious fallacy here is a confusion as to what is involved in the use of language. It is
often thought that all use of languag~ depends on the peculiarities of language users, and that all
pragmatics !s.therefore a part of the psychology and sociology. This is a fallacy, for it is possible
to study the'abstract rules of language use on a purely logical and semanticallevel. Cf. here my
papcr "Game-Theoretical Semantics as a Synthesis of Verificationist and Truth-Conditional
Meaning Tbeories", in Ernest LePore, editor, New Directions ill Semantics. Academic ~ress,
- S)
London, 1987, pp. 23S-S8.
31 The same bias has made the understanding of Wittgenstein's language-games unneces-
sarily difficult. (It Is of course compounded by the later Wittgenstein's own arltisystematic atti-
tude.) Cf. here Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka, Investiga/ing, Wit/gens/ein, Basil
'Blackwell, OJ,(ford, 1986. ..
 Jaakko Hintikka
First, we nevertheless need a preliminary observation. Let us go back to
the general ideas of the interrogative model. Another way of looking at the
logical theory of identifiability is to view it as a general logical model of lan-
guage learning. The Inquirer then becomes a language learner, and the an-
swers to the Inquirer's. questions become the input of the linguistic community
into the learning process. The initial premise T corresponds to the learner's
innate linguistic ability.
It may seem that this is far too schematic a model to enable us to establish
interesting specific results concerning language learning of the theory-Iaden-
ness and fact-ladenness of meaning. Maybe so;. But certain important
observations can nevertheless be made here. My interrogative model is not
fully defined before it is specified what the answers are that the Inquirer (the,
learner) can receive, Le., what the possible inputs into the learning process
are. And as soon as this question is raised, we become aware of a highly
important fact. Almost everybody has assumed, both in the philosophical dis-
cussion and in linguistic theorizing, that (in the jargon of my-interrogative
model) the answers the Inquirer can receive are particular (Le., quantifier-
free) propositions. In other words, the input into the process of language
acquisition are particular truths about the language. I have called this assump-
tion (strictly speaking, a closely related and nearly equivalent one) the Ato-
mistic Postulate 32.
The Atomistic Postulate has been assumed virtually universally: by phi-
losophers and linguists alike. It is in effect adopted by Quine when he chooses
as his starting point "sensory stimuli" or "surface irritations" which he says
"exhaust our clues to an external world" 33. It is in effect assumed by
Chomsky when he takes the startingpoi'nt of linguistic theorizing competent
. ..grammar. The basic logic of his argument is naturally formulated by reference
speakers' intuitions.about the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of particu-
. lar strings of symbols 34.And it is explicitly assumed in most formal models of
language learning 35 . from particular cases is far too slow a process to account for theJacts of lan-
This general acceptance of the Atomistic Postulate in the philosophy of
language and methodology of linguistics has its counterpart in the philosophy
and methodology of science. As I have shown elsewhere36,some of the most
important approaches to the philosophy of science have been motivated (not:
32 The atomistic postulate is the assumption mentioned in note 16above.
33 Cf. Word and Object, op. cit., sees. 5-6.
34 Cf. Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Stn/ctures, Mouton, The Hague, 1957, and Chomsky's
papers in Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz, editors, The Structure of Language, Prentice-Hall,
EngelwoodCliffs,NJ, 1964. .
3' Cf., e.g. Kenneth Wexler and Peter W. Culicover, Formal Principles of Language
Acquisition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.
- 36 Op. cit., note 16above. Cf. also "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interroga-
tive Approach to Inquiry," in J. Fetzer, D. Shatz and G. Schlesinger, editors, Definitions and
Definability, Kluwer Academie, Dordrecht, 1991.
. Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis .
of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language 217
determined) by the assumption of the Atomistic Postulate. This is most con-
spicuous in the case of the hypothetico-d~ductive modei an.d the indu<::tuistic
model of science, but in subtler ways the same postulate has colored also
Thoma~ Kuhn's theorizing. I hav.e also argue~ and, I dare say, shown that the
real logic of experimental science cannot be understood on the basis of the .
Atomistic Postulate. Instead, we have to assume that a class of answers is
available to an experimental scientist which are general (not quantifier-free).
More fully expressed, they have at least the AE complexity (existential quan-
.tifier governed by. a universal one). These answers express. the functional
dependencies which a controlled experiment can reveal to a scientific inquirer.
This results necessitates a re-evaluation of much of the current philosophy
of science, a re-evaluation which largely remains to be carried out. The point I
am making here is that the situation is analogous in the philosophy of lan-
guage. The Atomistic Postulate is an unrealistic assumption also in language
theory.. There is no valid reason to assume that a ianguage. learner cannot use
in his or her acquisition process general linguistic regularities without deriving
them inductively from a number of special cases. A suitable collection of\\'hat-
are usually considered as particular cases can inste.ad be viewed as collectively
revealing a functional dependence of the. same kind as a contr'olled experiment
can yield 37.
Wh~t is less clear on the side of philosophy of language than on the side of
the philosophy of science is precisely what it is that has to be rejected. Further
patient work is undoubtedly needed here. Let me nevertheless put forward
one specific problem. One place where the Atomistic Postulate has tacitly
influenced linguists' reasoning is in Chomsky's arguments for his universal
to the interrogative model. Chomsky argues in effect that inductive learning
guage acquisition in children. This corresponds to a case where the Atomistic
Postulate is applicable. No general laws follow from such particular answers
alone, and consequently Chomsky envisages the model to have bee~ e~riched
by suitable inductive rules. Chomsky argues, undoubtedly correctly, that
they, too, are insufficient to account for the facts, especially for the speed of
actual learning by children. Hence the only way out is to postulate a strong
37 Interim generalizations are known to play an important role in language learning. They
are usually thought of as inductive generalizations from particular examples. It is in ma~y ways
more natural logically speaking to consider them as answers to the language learner's tacit ques-
tions, however, just like nature's answers to experimental questions.
/~ ,
218 Jaakko Hintikka
initial premise T. What that is in Chomsky's scheme is precisely the universal
grammar 38. . ::,.
'
Chomsky is right in thinking that the poverty of available answers can be
compensated for by a rich initial premise T. But, by the same token, tJIere is
no need to assume a strong initial premise T if enough logically stronger an-
swers are available to the Inquirer (learnel\ Thus Chomsky'~ argument
depends crucially on the assumptions a linguist can make about the avail~bi~-
ity of different kinds of "answers" to the language learner. If the AtomIstic
Postulate must be given up, as I have suggested, then Chomsky's argumenta-
tion loses most of its prima facie plausibility.
Perhaps this line of thought can serve as an example of the way in which
the critical examination of an important theory".can enable a philosopher (or
shouid I say ,a metaphysician?) to uncover substantial hidden presuppositions
of ~minteresting theory.
38 For Chomsky's notion of universal grammar, see the symposium with Chomsky,
and Goodman in Syntlrese vol. 17 (1967), pp. 2-28 (with further references).
Vol. 45, N° 2-3 (t991)
Dialectica
Overcoming "Overcoming Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis
of Language" Through Logical Analysis of Language
Jaakko H1NTIKKA.
Summary
Carnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and con-
ceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematic
logical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based on
the author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As an
example of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and. Chomsky's implicit
assumption that language learning is based on atomistic (quantifier-free) "answers" (input).
Resume
Carnap a essaye de depasser la metaphysique par une distinction entre des veriles empiriques
.. et des verites conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite ete contestee, mais non sur la base d'une
analyse systematique du langage. On suggere ici que la theorie logique de I'identiriabilite basee
sur Ie modele il1terrogatif de I'auteur fournira les outils d'une telle analyse systematique. Comme
exemple de ce que peut faire ce modele, on presente une critique de la supposition implicite de
Quine et de Chomsky selon laquelle I'apprentissage du langage repose sur des <m!ponses» (input)
atomiques (sans quantificateurs).
Zusammenfassung
Carnap.versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen elJ)pirischen und konzep-
. tuellen Wahrheiten zu Uberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen,
jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendem
Artikel wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Identifizierbarkeit, welche auf dem
Frage-Antwort-Modell des Autors grUndet, die Instrumente fUr eine solche logische Analyse
bereitstellt. Als Beispiel dafUr, was das Modell leisten kann, dient eine Kritik an Quines und
Chomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache .auf atomaren (quantoren-
.
freien)«Antworten»aufbaut (Input). '
The "theme of this meeting is "metaph~sics and science". 1 suppose that
what is meant could equally well have been expressed by "the relatiol) of
met.aphysicsto science". But before we can discuss what that relation is, we
have to ascertain that there is such a t~ing as metaphysics that could bear
some conceivable relation to science or to anything else.
Put.nam
· Boston University
Dialectica Vol. 45, N° 2-3 (1991)