Prosecutor Fights To Keep Alleged Detroit Hitman From Getting Compassionate Release

Case: 21-1275 Document: 6 Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 1
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 21-1275
v.
Ronald Hunter,
Defendant-Appellee.
/
Emergency Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal

by March 26, 2021
Ronald Hunter was a hitman for a large drug organization. He
murdered a 23-year-old woman, Monica Johnson, after tracking her
down and shooting her in the head outside of a Detroit nightclub. After
a jury convicted him of murder, he was sentenced to life in prison. He is
only 52 years old and relatively healthy. And when he was offered the
Covid-19 vaccine, he refused it.
But the district judge, who was not the original sentencing judge,
still granted Hunter compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The judge cited four reasons, none of which could
reasonably be characterized as “extraordinary and compelling”: (1) the
1
Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker; (2) Hunter’s age (almost 24
years old) when he murdered Monica Johnson; (3) the lower sentences
that Hunter’s coconspirators received after testifying at trial; and (4)
Hunter’s alleged rehabilitation. And although the judge recognized that
this was a “close case,” he only agreed to stay the release order until
March 26, 2021.
The Court should extend that stay pending the government’s appeal.
The district court’s decision is likely to be reversed, because it rested on
“a misreading of the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons
requirement.” United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir.
2020). As this Court’s intervening published cases confirm, “ordinary”
reasons do not qualify for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), and Hunter’s
reasons were as ordinary as they come. United States v. Wills, ___ F.3d
___, No. 20-6142, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6860, at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 9,
2021); United States v. Tomes, ___ F.3d ___, No. 20-6056, 2021 WL
868555, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021). Hunter’s immediate release also
creates a substantial risk to the public, given his history of cold-blooded
murder. And after refusing the Covid-19 vaccine, Hunter cannot cite the
2
virus as a basis for release. The district court’s release order should be
stayed.
Background
1. Hunter murders a 23-year-old woman by shooting her in the head

as she leaves a Detroit nightclub.
Ronald Hunter was a hitman for a large drug conspiracy that
operated in Detroit in the 1990s. (PSR ¶¶ 21–22, 26, 28). The conspiracy
used violence to maintain power and profitability. United States v.
Sellers, 9 F. App’x 335, 337 (6th Cir. 2001). “Individuals that attempted
to extort or steal the proceeds of the operation, steal cocaine, or
cooperate with the police were murdered.” Id.
Hunter was the man who murdered them. (PSR ¶¶ 21–22, 26, 28,
56). His most notable hit was 23-year-old Monica Johnson. (PSR ¶ 22).
Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337. Johnson became a target because she was
suspected of stealing money from one of the drug conspiracy’s leaders,
and because the conspirators wanted to prevent her from testifying in a
state kidnapping case. (PSR ¶ 22). Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337, 339.
Hunter agreed to kill her. (PSR ¶ 22). At the time, Hunter had
escaped from a parole camp in southern Michigan, where he was
serving a prison sentence for drug trafficking. (PSR ¶¶ 48–49). Hunter

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and three other conspirators learned that Johnson had been seen at a
nightclub in Detroit. (PSR ¶ 22). They went to the club and waited.
(PSR ¶ 22). Soon, they saw Monica Johnson leave the club. (PSR ¶ 22).
After one of the other conspirators identified her, Hunter walked up to
Johnson and shot her in the head. (PSR ¶ 22). As she lay on the ground,
Hunter fired three or four more rounds into her lifeless body. (PSR
¶ 22). He was then paid for the hit with an eighth of a kilogram of
cocaine (PSR ¶ 22)—a small fee for a woman’s life.
The evidence at trial and sentencing showed that Hunter murdered
at least five other people. He shot and killed one victim, Victor Nixon,
for stealing money and cocaine. (PSR ¶ 21). He lured another victim,
Maurice Allah, into a car—then shot Allah in the head as retaliation for
cheating another conspirator out of money in a card game. (PSR ¶ 26).
He killed Michael Harris in a drive-by shooting before a funeral
procession. (PSR ¶ 56). And he gunned down two other victims with an
AK-47 after they got into a car outside of a house in Detroit. (PSR ¶ 28).
One of those victims was William Johnson, Monica Johnson’s husband.
(PSR ¶ 28). Hunter even got a “head hunter” tattoo on his right
4
shoulder (PSR ¶ 66), just in case there was any confusion about his
profession.
The jury convicted Hunter of murdering Monica Johnson under 21
U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) and an accompanying firearm count under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337. Although the jury acquitted
him of three other murders, the probation officer described them in the
PSR. (See PSR ¶¶ 21, 26, 28, 56). The trial judge then declined Hunter’s
request to remove those descriptions. (Sentencing Tr., App’x 5). She
sentenced Hunter to life imprisonment for murdering Monica Johnson,
plus a consecutive term of 60 months’ imprisonment on the § 924(c)
count. See Hunter v. United States, No. CR 92-81058, 2005 WL 8161366,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2005). This Court affirmed Hunter’s
convictions on direct appeal. Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337–44.
2. Hunter moves for compassionate release based on the Covid-19

pandemic—but then refuses the Covid-19 vaccine.
Hunter is only 52 years old. (PSR p.2). He has no serious health
problems, and he is currently incarcerated at FCI Pekin in Illinois.
(R.963: Gov’t Response, 2094). He has amassed a lengthy disciplinary
record in prison, including three violations for possessing dangerous
weapons, two violations for fighting, and five violations for various
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forms of insubordination. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2105; R.963-3:
Disciplinary Record, 2120–22).
The Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor, the district judge who presided at
Hunter’s trial and sentencing, has since retired and passed away. But
she described the evidence that Hunter “was the shooter” of Monica
Johnson as “overwhelming.” (R.800-2: § 2255 Order, p.5). The district
judge who handled many of Hunter’s post-conviction proceedings, the
Honorable Marianne Battani, recently retired too. So in early December
2020, the case was transferred to the Honorable Matthew Leitman, who
had no previous familiarity with Hunter.
At the time, Hunter had a pending motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which he had filed one month earlier.
(R.952: Motion, 1778–88). Hunter’s reasons for release were the
combination of his relatively common medical conditions and the Covid-
19 pandemic. (See id.). But in late 2020, Hunter was offered—and
refused—the Covid-19 vaccine. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2094). He then
filed a supplemental brief, raising additional reasons for release. (R.957:
Supp. Brief, 1795–1820). He claimed that his age when he committed
the murder (23 years old), the lower sentences received by the
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codefendants who testified against him, his alleged rehabilitation, and
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), all qualified as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for
release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Id.).
The government pointed out that Hunter’s reasons for release—
either alone or in combination—were not “extraordinary” or
“compelling.” (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2096–2103, 2107–10; R.977:
03/03/21 Tr., 2462–84). The government argued that a “change in the
law years after it passed,” such as Booker, would not “constitute[] an
extraordinary and compelling reason.” (R.977: 03/03/21 Tr., 2463).
Otherwise, any non-retroactive sentencing decision would allow a
defendant to seek release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). (R.977: 03/03/21 Tr.,
2468). The government noted that Hunter was not particularly youthful
when he murdered Monica Johnson. He was one month short of 24
years old, and he continued committing crimes until he was arrested
three years later. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2110; R.977: 03/03/21 Tr.,
2471–72). The sentences of Hunter’s codefendants—who cooperated and
testified at trial—also had “no bearing” on whether Hunter personally
had reasons for release. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2109). Hunter’s prison
7
coursework and other rehabilitation claims were unremarkable. (R.977:
03/03/21 Tr., 2476–77). And in any event, the § 3553(a) factors did not
support release. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2103–06).
3. The district court adopts Hunter’s supplemental reasons and

reduces his murder sentence by several decades.
After a hearing, the district court delivered an oral decision granting
Hunter’s motion for compassionate release and cutting several decades
off his murder sentence. (R.978: 03/04/21 Tr., 2508–31). The district
court agreed that Hunter’s risk from Covid-19 was not a proper basis for
release, because Hunter had refused the opportunity to be vaccinated.
(Id., 2507–08). But the district court adopted Hunter’s four other
reasons for release:
1) The Supreme Court’s non-retroactive decision in Booker, which

made the sentencing guidelines advisory instead of mandatory;
2) Hunter’s “relative youth” of 23 years old when he murdered

Monica Johnson;
3) The sentencing differences between Hunter and the

codefendants who pleaded guilty and testified against him; and
4) Rehabilitation—that Hunter “taught himself to read, earned a

GED, completed the intensive Challenge course, completed
drug treatment, [and] completed many other courses” while in
prison.
(Id., 2508–17).
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The district court then addressed the § 3553(a) factors and decided
that although Hunter had committed a “brutal premeditated killing,”
his difficult childhood, prison coursework, and two letters written on
Hunter’s behalf all weighed in favor of release. (Id., 2517–22). And
although Hunter had spent 20 years denying his guilt in the face of
“overwhelming evidence that he was the shooter” (R.800-2: § 2255
Order, p.5 (Taylor, J.)), the court concluded that Hunter had now
demonstrated “remorse” and “acceptance of responsibility” by belatedly
“express[ing] . . . regret for his involvement in the killing of the victim.”
(R.978: 03/04/21 Tr., 2521–22). The court then discounted Hunter’s
prison disciplinary record, stating that his recent infractions were for
minor “offenses” and that the most serious infractions were too old to
matter. (Id., 2522–23).
The government requested that the district court stay its ruling
pending appeal. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2110–11; R.978: 03/04/21 Tr.,
2531). The district court denied the motion but agreed to stay its ruling
until March 26, 2021. (R.978: 03/04/21 Tr., 2531–36; R.975: Order,
2429–33). The government then appealed, complying with this Court’s
requirement that it provide written proof of the Acting Solicitor
9
General’s authorization. (R.980: Notice of Appeal, 2583–85). See 18
U.S.C. § 3742(b); United States v. Turnley, 627 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (6th
Cir. 2010).
Argument
Because of the strong likelihood of reversal and the danger Hunter poses
to the public, a stay is warranted.
The Court should extend the district court’s temporary stay and
grant a full stay pending appeal. A stay request hinges on four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a “strong showing that [it] is
likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether the issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;
and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434
(2009); accord Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The first
two factors “are the most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. When the
government is a party, the public’s interest and the government’s
interest “merge.” Id. at 435. All of the factors support a stay here.
10
A. Intervening Sixth Circuit authority confirms that the district

court abused its discretion in granting release.
Hunter’s reasons were ordinary—not “extraordinary and
compelling”—and they did not suffice for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This Court reviews the district court’s
decision on that issue for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Elias,
984 F.3d 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 2021). An abuse of discretion occurs if
the district court’s decision “was based on a purely legal mistake such
as a misreading of the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons
requirement.” United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir.
2020). And here, the statutory language and structure confirm that the
district court misread that requirement.
1. Hunter’s reasons did not satisfy the plain language of

§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a narrow gateway, not an “anything goes”
resentencing statute, and its language confirms that release should be
rare. The statute begins with a strong default rule that a district court
“may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c). The compassionate-release provision then carves out
an exception to that rule if a defendant can show “extraordinary and
11
compelling reasons” for release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Under Sixth
Circuit law, a district court has discretion to define “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” and is not limited to the requirements in USSG
§ 1B1.13. Elias, 984 F.3d at 519–20. But a district court may not
transform any and all possible reasons into a basis for release.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirements must mean something—and they
cannot mean just anything. When a statute’s “language is
straightforward, and [has] a straightforward application ready to hand,
statutory interpretation has no business getting metaphysical.” Lexecon
Inc. v. Milberg Weis Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 37 (1998).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s eligibility language has two straightforward
requirements. First, a defendant’s reasons for compassionate release
must be “extraordinary”—meaning exceptional or uncommon. United
States v. Shah, No. 16-20457, 2020 WL 1934930, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
22, 2020); United States v. Sapp, No. 14-CR-20520, 2020 WL 515935, at
*3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2020). Second, the reasons must be
“compelling”—meaning that they “urge irresistibly,” or “constrain,
oblige, [or] force.’” United States v. Wilburn, No. 2:18-CR-115, 2020 WL
12
1899146, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2020). A defendant’s reasons must
satisfy both criteria.
Hunter’s reasons satisfied neither. Whether considered alone or
together, Hunter’s reasons were common, not exceptional or unusual,
and they did not “urge irresistibly” that Hunter should be released
several decades early from his murder sentence. Wilburn, 2020 WL
1899146, at *3.
a. Intervening published authority confirms that

Booker was not a permissible basis for release.
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker was not an
“extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for release. Since the district
court’s decision here, this Court has published two cases holding that a
non-retroactive change in sentencing law does not qualify as an
“extraordinary and compelling reason[]” for compassionate release
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Tomes, ___ F.3d ___, No. 20-
6056, 2021 WL 868555, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021); United States v.
Wills, ___ F.3d ___, No. 20-6142, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6860, at *4–*6
(6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021). The Court explained that the “ordinary practice”
in federal sentencing law “is to apply new penalties to defendants not
yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already

13
sentenced.” Wills, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6860, at *5 (quoting Dorsey v.
United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 (2012)). And “[w]hat the Supreme
Court views as the ‘ordinary practice’ cannot also be an ‘extraordinary
and compelling reason’ to deviate from that practice.” Id.
Nearly identical reasoning forecloses Hunter’s argument that Booker
was a permissible basis for compassionate release. This Court held over
a decade ago that Booker did not apply retroactively to defendants, like
Hunter, whose convictions were already final. Humphress v. United
States, 398 F.3d 855, 860–63 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court reached this
conclusion by applying the ordinary rules about whether and when a
new Supreme Court decision applies retroactively to an already-final
judgment. See id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). Hunter’s
inability to invoke Booker was thus not “extraordinary.” It was the
natural consequence of the same retroactivity rules governing every
case under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. And as this Court held in Wills, this
“ordinary practice” cannot qualify as an “‘extraordinary and compelling
reason’ to deviate from that practice.” 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6860, at
*5.
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If the rule were otherwise, the general and open-ended standard in
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) would soon swallow the more specific rules governing
retroactivity for new sentencing decisions. Why bother adhering to
Teague in a § 2255 proceeding if a defendant can just avoid it entirely
by moving under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and making non-retroactive rules
retroactive? So as this Court’s recent published cases confirm, nothing
in § 3582(c)(1)(A) permitted the district court’s “end run” around
§ 2255’s retroactivity limits. Tomes, 2021 WL 868555, at *4; Wills, 2021
U.S. App. LEXIS 6860, at *4–*6; accord United States v. Musgraves, No.
20-2702, 2021 WL 945092, at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2021). Booker was
not a permissible ground for compassionate release.
b. Hunter was the average age for murderers when

he killed Monica Johnson.
Hunter was not especially young when he murdered Monica
Johnson. He was one month short of 24 years old. So he fell near the
middle of the bell curve for murderers:
15
Murder Offenses by Age

Offender’s Age Total Murders
13 to 16 450
17 to 19 1,441
20 to 24 2,345
25 to 29 2,065
30 to 34 1,389
35 to 39 1,073
40 to 44 746
FBI Crime Statistics (2019). That bell curve has looked approximately
the same for several decades. And it shows that Hunter’s age when he
committed the murder was not “extraordinary”; it was decidedly
ordinary.
The district court’s contrary conclusion would mean that almost half
of all murderers now have an “extraordinary and compelling reason[]”
for release. That cannot be a correct reading of § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Whatever else is true, a 23-year-old knows not to commit premeditated
murder.
The district judge also had no basis for deciding that Hunter,
specifically, should have been viewed as a juvenile when he was almost
24 years old. This district judge was not the trial judge, so he had no
16
previous familiarity with Hunter. He was relying only on broad
generalities. And Hunter was a paid hitman—not a late bloomer
struggling with impulse control. Murder was his profession. He also
continued his criminal conduct for many years after killing Monica
Johnson. (PSR ¶¶ 48–52). This conduct included a police chase at 27
years old, when Hunter was caught in a stolen car with an AK-47—his
“weapon of choice.” Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 338. (PSR ¶¶ 52–53). It also
included several instances of violent conduct while imprisoned. (R.963-
3: Disciplinary Record, 2120–22). Immaturity was never Hunter’s issue.
c. Cooperating codefendants receive lower sentences

in almost every organized-crime case.
It was equally ordinary for sentencing differences to result in an
organized-crime case where some defendants cooperated and other
defendants did not. It happens in almost every organized-crime case,
because a participant’s testimony is one of the few ways to pierce a
criminal organization’s inner circle. See United States v. Stewart, 628
F.3d 246, 260 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508,
522 (6th Cir. 2008). Virtually every gang case, every cartel case, every
mob case, and many public-corruption and white-collar cases involve
some defendants testifying against others. Those cooperating

17
defendants then receive lower sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); USSG
§ 5K1.1; Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
That is what happened here. Several core members of the conspiracy
accepted responsibility, testified at trial, and received lower sentences.
Hunter and another codefendant did not. They went to trial and were
convicted of murder. Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337. The resulting sentencing
differences were not “extraordinary” or “compelling”; they were the only
way to prosecute members of a violent criminal enterprise. And the
government had good reason to prioritize the prosecution of the
organization’s triggerman, Hunter, who had personally murdered a
half-dozen people and was more than capable of killing again. Nothing
about the “ordinary practice” of reducing sentences for cooperating
defendants qualified as “extraordinary and compelling.” Wills, 2021
U.S. App. LEXIS 6860, at *5.
Moreover, because this district judge was not the trial judge, he had
no idea what coconspirator testimony or other evidence was necessary
to prosecute this case. He just guessed that the resulting sentencing
differences were unfair, with no firsthand knowledge of how the plea-
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bargaining process or trial unfolded. This unwarranted speculation was
not an appropriate basis for Hunter’s release.
The codefendants’ sentences also said nothing about whether Hunter
personally had “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) is fact-specific to the defendant moving for release.
Whether a codefendant received a lower sentence has no bearing on
that inquiry. Otherwise, § 3582(c)(1)(A) would reward a defendant who
committed a murder as part of a criminal organization, while barring
relief for a defendant who acted alone.
d. Hunter’s alleged rehabilitation was not a

permissible basis for release.
Congress prohibited rehabilitation alone from qualifying as an
“extraordinary and compelling reason” for release. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t);
Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1009. And Hunter’s supposed rehabilitation did not
qualify as an add-on reason. The only rehabilitation that the district
court cited was Hunter’s completion of his GED, drug treatment, and
other prison coursework. (R.978: 03/04/21 Tr., 2511–12). But tens of
thousands of federal inmates could cite those same reasons. Hunter’s
prison disciplinary record was also quite lengthy, with several citations
for dangerous weapons, fighting, and various forms of insubordination.

19
If this qualified as “extraordinary and compelling” rehabilitation,
almost anything would.
2. Compassionate release is not a sentencing “re-do”

whenever a district judge views a case differently.
The district court’s decision rested on a more fundamental error:
treating § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s narrow eligibility threshold as a partial
§ 3553(a) analysis in disguise. Finality “is essential to the operation of
our criminal justice system.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 309. Yet under the
district court’s reading of § 3582(c)(1)(A), almost every convicted
defendant could come up with a handful of unique facts that would
ordinarily be considered under § 3553(a), mesh those facts together, and
become eligible for compassionate release. Congress did not intend for
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) to become a serial resentencing statute that renders
finality obsolete. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s language is narrow, not broad.
And as this Court explained in Tomes and Wills, § 3582(c)(1)(A) must be
read in context with other, more specific limits on post-judgment
review. Tomes, 2021 WL 868555, at *4; Wills, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
6860, at *4–*6.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s internal structure establishes a similar
limiting principle. When amending § 3582(c)(1)(A) in the First Step Act,

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Congress added an exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion
requirement demands that each defendant first bring his reasons for
release to the warden and wait 30 days before moving for relief in court.
This requirement “ensures that [the warden] can investigate the gravity
of the conditions supporting compassionate release and the likelihood
that the conditions will persist.” United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831,
835 (6th Cir. 2020).
This exhaustion requirement only makes sense if the permissible
reasons for release are those that the warden might have sufficient
knowledge of, so that the warden could vouch for them in a BOP-
initiated motion. “Just as Congress’s choice of words is presumed to be
deliberate, so too are its structural choices.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353 (2013). And Congress’s “structural
choices” show that compassionate release is about something happening
now—something like the defendant’s current age, health, or family
circumstances, or some other pressing fact-specific situation that
supports reducing an otherwise valid and final sentence.
That something cannot be rehabilitation. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). It also
cannot be an attempt to relitigate the facts of the offense, or the original
21
prosecution or sentencing, or any circumstances that the warden would
have no basis for evaluating in the first instance. A prison warden, for
example, has no special insight into retroactively applying a non-
retroactive change in the law. If Congress had intended for
compassionate release to encompass those arguments, it would not have
required a defendant to run his reasons by the warden before raising
them in court.
The statutory structure thus confirms that Hunter’s reasons were
not the types of things permitting release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). His
maturity when he committed the murder and his codefendants’
sentences were known to the original sentencing judge. Hunter’s
current prison warden, though, would have no special knowledge of
them. The same goes for Booker: why would a prison warden have any
insight into the retroactive application of a non-retroactive Supreme
Court decision from 2005? That’s a question for lawyers, not prison
wardens. So the statutory structure shows what the statutory language
already did: the district court strayed well beyond the boundaries of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
22
B. The decades-early release of a cold-blooded murderer puts

the public at risk and supports a stay pending appeal.
The government’s and the public’s interest “merge” here, Nken, 556
U.S. at 435, and they both support a stay. In a criminal case, the “risk
that the prisoner will pose a danger to the public” is a factor supporting
a stay. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777. The government’s interest in a stay is
also “strongest” where, as here, “the remaining portion of the sentence
to be served is long.” Id.
Hunter is a convicted murderer who will present a significant danger
to the public if released. It takes an especially ruthless killer to be a
hitman for organized crime. The murder of Monica Johnson was
particularly cold-blooded: a planned hit, outside of a nightclub, during
which Hunter shot her in the head and then fired three or four more
shots into her body just to be sure. Hunter spent the last 20 years
denying any responsibility for this murder, until the moment he knew
an expression of remorse might get him released. And he is only 52
years old—not elderly, terminally ill, or otherwise incapable of picking
up his former profession.
Hunter’s previous conduct on parole also rebuts any argument that
his release conditions would protect the public. Paragraphs 48–49 and
23
52–53 of the PSR describe Hunter’s conduct while on parole for drug
trafficking. Hunter absconded. Then he was caught. Then he escaped
from a parole camp—and murdered Monica Johnson. Then he was
caught again. Then, because the police did not yet know about his
murders, he was paroled again. He again absconded. Then he led the
police on a chase after being caught in a stolen car with an AK-47.
Hunter’s poor record while under court supervision confirms that he
is unlikely to be deterred by a tether and sternly worded court order.
His prison disciplinary record confirms it too. Also, if the government
prevails on appeal, Hunter will have a strong and immediate incentive
to flee, so that he does not return to prison. And if he flees, what’s he
going to do when he becomes desperate? The public has a strong
interest in not learning that answer.
C. Especially given Hunter’s refusal of the Covid-19 vaccine, he

cannot show any immediate prejudice from a stay.
Hunter cannot show that a stay would “substantially injure” him.
Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. As in another case in which this Court stayed a
release order, Hunter “was incarcerated on a life sentence until days
ago.” United States v. Bass, No. 21-1094, 2021 WL 476467, at *4 (6th
Cir. Feb. 5, 2021). He “was convicted by a jury,” this Court “upheld his
24
conviction and sentence on appeal,” and his many “collateral attacks on
his sentence have been unavailing.” Id. And as in Bass, an expedited
briefing schedule would minimize any prejudice to Hunter. Id.
Hunter also faces little immediate risk of harm from a stay. His
health conditions are normal for a 52-year-old man. And his refusal of
the Covid-19 vaccine means that he cannot reasonably cite the virus as
a basis for release.
25
Conclusion
The district court’s release order should be stayed pending appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Saima S. Mohsin
Acting United States Attorney
/s/ Andrew Goetz

Andrew Goetz
Assistant United States Attorney
Eastern District of Michigan
211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001
Detroit, MI 48226
(313) 226-9522
andrew.goetz@usdoj.gov
Dated: March 19, 2021
26
Certificate of Compliance
This motion complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(d)(2) because, excluding the parts of the
document exempted by Rule 32(f), it contains 4,613 words. This motion
complies with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type-
style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a
proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point
Century Schoolbook.
/s/ Andrew Goetz

Dated: March 19, 2021
27
Certificate of Service
I certify that on March 19, 2021, I electronically filed this motion for
the United States with the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit using the ECF system, which will send notification
of the filing to the following:
Benton C. Martin, benton_martin@fd.org
/s/ Andrew Goetz

28

Prosecutor Fights To Keep Alleged Detroit Hitman From Getting Compassionate Release

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Prosecutor Fights To Keep Alleged Detroit Hitman From Getting Compassionate Release

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Case: 21-1275 Document: 6 Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 1

United States of America,

Emergency Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal

murdered a 23-year-old woman, Monica Johnson, after tracking her

a jury convicted him of murder, he was sentenced to life in prison. He is

Covid-19 vaccine, he refused it.

still granted Hunter compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The judge cited four reasons, none of which could

reasonably be characterized as “extraordinary and compelling”: (1) the

Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker; (2) Hunter’s age (almost 24

that Hunter’s coconspirators received after testifying at trial; and (4)

Hunter’s alleged rehabilitation. And although the judge recognized that

March 26, 2021.

The district court’s decision is likely to be reversed, because it rested on

“a misreading of the extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons

2020). As this Court’s intervening published cases confirm, “ordinary”

reasons do not qualify for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), and Hunter’s

868555, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021). Hunter’s immediate release also

creates a substantial risk to the public, given his history of cold-blooded

1. Hunter murders a 23-year-old woman by shooting her in the head

Ronald Hunter was a hitman for a large drug conspiracy that

used violence to maintain power and profitability. United States v.

to extort or steal the proceeds of the operation, steal cocaine, or

cooperate with the police were murdered.” Id.

Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337. Johnson became a target because she was

suspected of stealing money from one of the drug conspiracy’s leaders,

and because the conspirators wanted to prevent her from testifying in a

state kidnapping case. (PSR ¶ 22). Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337, 339.

escaped from a parole camp in southern Michigan, where he was

serving a prison sentence for drug trafficking. (PSR ¶¶ 48–49). Hunter

After one of the other conspirators identified her, Hunter walked up to

cocaine (PSR ¶ 22)—a small fee for a woman’s life.

The evidence at trial and sentencing showed that Hunter murdered

cheating another conspirator out of money in a card game. (PSR ¶ 26).

He killed Michael Harris in a drive-by shooting before a funeral

One of those victims was William Johnson, Monica Johnson’s husband.

The jury convicted Hunter of murdering Monica Johnson under 21

U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) and an accompanying firearm count under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337. Although the jury acquitted

request to remove those descriptions. (Sentencing Tr., App’x 5). She

sentenced Hunter to life imprisonment for murdering Monica Johnson,

plus a consecutive term of 60 months’ imprisonment on the § 924(c)

count. See Hunter v. United States, No. CR 92-81058, 2005 WL 8161366,

at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2005). This Court affirmed Hunter’s

convictions on direct appeal. Sellers, 9 F. App’x at 337–44.

2. Hunter moves for compassionate release based on the Covid-19

Hunter is only 52 years old. (PSR p.2). He has no serious health

problems, and he is currently incarcerated at FCI Pekin in Illinois.

(R.963: Gov’t Response, 2094). He has amassed a lengthy disciplinary

record in prison, including three violations for possessing dangerous

forms of insubordination. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2105; R.963-3:

Disciplinary Record, 2120–22).

Johnson as “overwhelming.” (R.800-2: § 2255 Order, p.5). The district

judge who handled many of Hunter’s post-conviction proceedings, the

Honorable Marianne Battani, recently retired too. So in early December

had no previous familiarity with Hunter.

At the time, Hunter had a pending motion for compassionate release

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which he had filed one month earlier.

(R.952: Motion, 1778–88). Hunter’s reasons for release were the

combination of his relatively common medical conditions and the Covid-

19 pandemic. (See id.). But in late 2020, Hunter was offered—and

refused—the Covid-19 vaccine. (R.963: Gov’t Response, 2094). He then

filed a supplemental brief, raising additional reasons for release. (R.957: