THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

SHIFTING TURKISH AMERICAN IDENTITY FORMATIONS IN THE

UNITED STATES

By
ILHAN KAYA

A Dissertation submitted to the

Department of Geography
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Fall Semester, 2003
The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of Ilhan Kaya defended October

24, 2003.

____________________________________
Jonathan Leib
Professor Directing Dissertation

____________________________________
Peter Garretson
Outside Committee Member

____________________________________
Janet E. Kodras
Committee Member

____________________________________
Barney Warf
Committee Member

Approved:

______________________________________
Barney L. Warf, Chair, Department of Geography

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above committee members.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Yeliz for her love, patience, and support, my daughter
Dilara for the joy she brought to us, and my parents for all they have done for me.

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would have not been possible without the assistance and support of

several people. First of all, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Jonathan Leib, for his inspiring

and encouraging way to guide me to a deeper understanding of knowledge work, and his

invaluable comments during the whole work with this dissertation. Also, special thanks to Dr.

Barney Warf, Dr. Janet Kodras, and Dr. Peter Garretson for their reviews and help. Finally, my

gratitude goes to the Turkish Ministry of Education for its financial support during the course of

the study at Florida State University.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................................VII
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................................... VIII
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................1
LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................................................................7
THE NATURE OF IDENTITY.........................................................................................................................................8
GLOBALIZATION, THE WORLD SYSTEM, AND IDENTITIES .......................................................................................12
THEORIES OF ETHNIC AND GROUP IDENTITIES ........................................................................................................18
The Assimilationist Perspective .........................................................................................................................19
Primordial Perspectives vs. Instrumentalist/Circumstantialist Perspectives.....................................................20
The Constructionist Approach ...........................................................................................................................22
AMERICA AS CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................................26
LOCATING TURKISHNESS IN TIME AND SPACE .........................................................................................................29
CLOSING THOUGHTS .............................................................................................................................................31
METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................................33
METHODS OF DATA GATHERING ..........................................................................................................................33
In-Depth Interviews ..........................................................................................................................................34
Fieldwork...........................................................................................................................................................39
Other Methods...................................................................................................................................................40
ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................................................41
REFLECTIONS .........................................................................................................................................................42
TURKISH IMMIGRATION HISTORY.................................................................................................................45
THE FIRST IMMIGRATION WAVE: THE OTTOMAN TURKS ........................................................................................47
THE GREAT RETURN................................................................................................................................................51
THE SECOND WAVE OF IMMIGRATION: PROFESSIONALS .........................................................................................54
THE THIRD WAVE OF IMMIGRATION (1980-2000): DIVERSE GROUPS .....................................................................57
THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF TURKS IN AMERICA AND NEW YORK TURKS ......................................................59
TURKISH POLITICAL HISTORY ........................................................................................................................67
BREAKING AWAY FROM THE PAST ........................................................................................................................68
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND CLASH OF IDENTITIES ....................................................................................70
CLOSING THOUGHTS .............................................................................................................................................75
IDENTIFYING TURKISHNESS.............................................................................................................................77
WHO IS A TURK? ....................................................................................................................................................78
WESTERNESS AND MIDDLE EASTERNESS ..............................................................................................................82
DISASSOCIATION WITH ARABS ..............................................................................................................................86
a) Historical Reasons ........................................................................................................................................87

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 b) Ideological Reasons ......................................................................................................................................90
c) Sociological Reasons.....................................................................................................................................91
SOME NOTES ON ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY AMONG TURKISH AMERICANS ...............................................95
CLOSING THOUGHTS .............................................................................................................................................96
TURKISH AMERICANNESS .................................................................................................................................98
COMPETING IDENTITIES ........................................................................................................................................99
THE FIRST GENERATION AND QUESTIONS OF BELONGING................................................................................106
THE SECOND GENERATION AND PAINFUL INTEGRATION ..................................................................................110
Trapped between Two Worlds.........................................................................................................................111
GENDER STRUGGLES ...........................................................................................................................................113
GENERATIONAL STRUGGLES ...............................................................................................................................114
SOME NOTES ON GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES ...............................................................................................115
CLOSING THOUGHTS ...........................................................................................................................................118
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION SITES..................................................................................................................119
LABOR MARKET SPACES .....................................................................................................................................119
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS..........................................................................................................................................129
Schools.............................................................................................................................................................129
Mosques...........................................................................................................................................................132
ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICS ..........................................................................................................................135
CULTURAL SPACES ..............................................................................................................................................138
THE TURKISH DAY PARADE AND TURKISH CULTURAL FESTIVAL ....................................................................142
CLOSING THOUGHTS ...........................................................................................................................................146
CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................................................148
CLOSING THOUGHTS ...........................................................................................................................................157
APPENDIX A...........................................................................................................................................................159
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ...................................................................................................................................159
APPENDIX B: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE INTERVIEWEES...................................................165
APPENDIX C: PICTURES FROM THE TURKISH AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN THE NEW YORK
METROPOLITAN AREA......................................................................................................................................170
APPENDIX D: TURKISH AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS............................................................................184
APPENDIX E: APPROVAL MEMORANDUM FROM THE HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE............195
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................196
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH..................................................................................................................................203

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 LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: TURKISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. (1820-2000).......................................................................................46

FIGURE 2: TURKISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. BEFORE WWII ...................................................................................48
FIGURE 3: TURKISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. BETWEEN 1930 AND 1980 ..................................................................55
FIGURE 4: TURKISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. AFTER 1989........................................................................................58
FIGURE 5: TURKISH-AMERICANS BY STATE (2000) .....................................................................................................64
FIGURE 6: TURKISH AMERICANS IN NEW YORK ...........................................................................................................65
FIGURE 7: TURKISH AMERICANS IN CALIFORNIA .........................................................................................................65
FIGURE 8: TURKISH AMERICANS IN NEW JERSEY .........................................................................................................66
FIGURE 9: TURKISH AMERICANS IN FLORIDA ...............................................................................................................66

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 ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines Turkish-American identity formations in the United States.

Through a case study based in the New York metropolitan area, this study explores how the

contestation and negotiation of Turkish ethnicity and Turkish-American identity is grounded in

place and across space. It examines Turkish-Americaness in relation to Westerness, Muslimness,

Arabness, Americaness, and Turkishness. The study problematizes ethnic and racial labels such

as Muslim Americans in the United States by examining the multiplicity, contextuality,

complexity, fluidity, and temporarility of Turkish (and Muslim) identities and the role of

different locales (the United States and Turkey) in the construction of Turkishness. The

dissertation investigates the role of Turkish and American politics and culture in the construction

of Turkish-American identities, and focuses on generational, class and gender differences among

Turkish Americans. It suggests that Turkish-American identities are spatially constituted as they

represent a ground on which temporary and ever-changing boundaries are marked between inside

and outside, the same and the other. These boundaries stress not only distinction or difference

but also interconnection. In addition, this dissertation examines the history of Turkish

immigration to the United States and provides empirical data about Turkish-American

institutions and the distribution of Turkish-American populations throughout the United States.

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 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this study I explore Turkish identity formation and preservation the United States. I

examine this issue in relation to the state (both the United States and Turkey), nationalism (both

Turkish and American), globalization (media, migration, and market), and international and local

communities. I situate Turkish identity politics in an identity theory of difference and show how

such an identity has changed over time depending on time and space-specific circumstances and

contexts.

Until now, Turkish-Americans have been either ignored by academia or analyzed as a

Muslim minority without reference to their ethnic, cultural, racial and religious differences. From

my teaching experience at Florida State University, I realize that many of my students think of

Turks as Arabs because the majority of Turks are Muslim, which reflects a common perception

in the United States. Such misunderstandings and misconceptions come not only from ignorance,

but also from the lack of studies on differences of people of Middle Eastern origin. Since

understanding differences in ethnic and racial categorizations makes a difference in everyday

relations, it is crucial to do an in depth study of Turkish Americans, their cultural heritage, and

map out their differences with others such as Muslim and European groups, as well as

differences among members of the Turkish American community.

One particular case that makes simplistic categorizations problematic was the

harassments and anger of some Americans toward people of Middle Eastern origin after the

terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Regardless of racial and
1
cultural differences of people of Middle East origin, many became subject to violent actions. In

one instance an Indian man who was not Arab, Middle Eastern or Muslim was killed because of

his Middle Eastern appearance, which makes simplistic visual racial and ethnic categorizations

not only arbitrary but also tragic (Said, 2001).

According to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), more than 450,539

Turkish immigrants have come to the United States since 1820. Early immigrants were mostly

non-Muslim Ottoman citizens carrying Ottoman passports. Therefore, they were not all ethnic

Turks but also included Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs. From World War I to 1965 the number

of Turkish immigrants to the United States was quite low as a result of US immigration laws.

The rate for Turkish immigration between 1930 and 1950 was around 100 per year; however, the

number of immigrants who came to the United States increased to the rate of 2,000-3,000 per

year after 1965 due to changes in U.S. immigration laws (Ahmed, 1986). Today, about 4,000

Turkish immigrants come to the United States each year.

Socially made ethnic and racial categorizations are not only stereotypic and simplistic but

also misleading and discriminatory because identities are characterized by multiplicity and are

much more complex than our theories about them (Said, 1997). By studying Turkish Americans,

I do not mean to suggest there is a single unifying Turkish identity. There are not only multiple

forms of “Turkishness”, but also complex meanings of it. Turkishness is not felt and experienced

in the same way by all Turkish-Americans, and it may not have the same meaning for all Turks

living in the United States. For some, Turkishness is a very important part of their identities and

they hold such an identity proudly, while for others it does not mean much because they do not

care about their ethnic origins. There are Turks who would make a distinction between

themselves and other Muslim groups such as Arabs and Persians by arguing that Turkey is a

European/Western country, and therefore they do not have much in common with Arabs,

Persians or other Muslim nations because for them their Turkishness comes before their

2
Muslimness. For other Turks, it is impossible to escape from the past so they are first Muslim,

and then Turkish. In addition, the meaning of being Turkish is not static for all Turks at all times

and places, hence it can differ from generation to generation, from class to class, and from place

to place.

The interaction between American culture and the Turkish minority in the United States,

along with Turkish-American ties to Turkey and Turkish culture, shapes Turkish identities. From

an assimilationist and “melting pot” perspective, one can assume that after years of influence all

ethnic groups become Americanized in the “melting pot” of American culture as they are all

equal under the same secular law, and are exposed to the same culture so they would eventually

be no different from one another. Nevertheless, this modernist idea about a melting pot has not

been able to make ethnicity disappear from American social space (Jackson, 1994). If I must use

a metaphor for American culture (and politics), the “mosaic” metaphor would be more suitable

to my understanding of American cultural context than a “melting pot” metaphor. The “mosaic”

metaphor emphasizes boundaries and encourages boundary-maintaining activities such as ethnic

parades and bloc voting. In a melting pot, one would assume that ethnic origin would not make

much difference and there would not be group boundaries. However, ethnic origins do make a

big difference and there are group boundaries. Differences play an important role in people’s

daily life and relations of power. Although Turkish identities are shaped in the context of

seductive American cultural space and global trends, many Turks in the U.S. still manage to live,

socialize and communicate in the ways they were used to back home in Turkey. They create

what Appadurai (1996) calls “ethnoscapes” which often may not fit within the dominant culture.

Accordingly, it is instructive to look at the American cultural context and Turkish identities

together.

One of the main aspects of modernity is an increasing interconnection between

globalizing influences and personal dispositions (Giddens, 2000). Identity formations of the

3
Turks have not been free from global changes. Turkish identities are not only reworked and

shaped by American media through television shows, but also by Turkish and global media, as

many Turks in the U.S. watch Turkish television via satellite or read Turkish newspapers over

the Internet everyday. Global media, migration, and market have affected Turkish identity

politics, as they actualize differences and connect imagined communities in different parts of the

world. Particularly, the Internet and television have significantly affected the Turkish sense of

Turkishness/Americanness, their connectedness to the Turkish Republic, and their sense of

belonging to American society.

One of the main purposes of this study is to reexamine our use of ethnic, religious, and

racial labels. I do this by problematizing Turkish American identities as well as Muslim

identities in the United States through an examination of the multiplicity, complexity, fluidity,

and temporality of these identities. The message is clear: any categorization is limited and often

misleading as it reduces the complexity and multiplicity of any given identity. The importance of

this study lies in its emphasis on differences among Muslim groups in the United States and

differences in the Turkish American community as the majority of studies on Muslims in the

United States have overlooked differences within and among Muslim communities. Each

Muslim community has roots in a different cultural setting, and there is diversity within each

community.

Regardless of the long history of Turkish immigration to the United States, Turkish

immigration and integration in the United States have not been documented thoroughly. The

difficulty of finding any study on Turkish Americans was a great challenge throughout my

research. Therefore, a second purpose of this study is to provide a glimpse of Turkish American

life in the United States.

Although this study is only an attempt to show the complexity and multiplicity of Turkish

Americanness and Muslimness in the United States, further studies are needed on other ethnic

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and racial Muslim groups to document the complex nature of being Muslim as well as being

Turkish in the context of the United States. Muslim integration and Muslim identity formations

in America are not adequately studied and analyzed by academia, and I hope this study triggers

further work on the subject.

This study consists of nine chapters. This first chapter provides an introduction to the

dissertation. The second chapter presents a literature review on identity, globalization, and

nationalism. The spatiality of identity is discussed and different theories are explored. I look at

the American cultural context and investigate the place of Turkish American in the United

States. In the final part of chapter two, I locate Turkishness with all its multiplicity and

complexity.

The third chapter describes my methodology, including data collection processes, the

techniques used, and analysis of the strategies applied during the course of the study. My data

collection is highlighted by the in-depth interviews that I have done with immigrants, community

leaders, and business owners within the Turkish American community, and fieldwork conducted

in the New York metropolitan area in the summers of 2001 and 2002. In the final part of the

methodology chapter, I provide my analysis of the techniques I used and the pitfalls I faced

while conducting this research.

The fourth chapter examines the history of three immigration waves of the Turkish

immigration history to the United States, and provides statistical facts about the number and

distribution of Turkish Americans in the United States. The first period of immigration started in

the late 1800s and ends in the early 1920s. The groups coming to the United States during this

time period did not have a strong Turkish identity as Ottomanness and Muslimness were the

dominant forms of identity for these first immigrants. The second immigration wave begins with

a large number of professionals such as doctors and engineers who came to the United States for

educational and training purposes in the late 1950s. The final wave, which started in the 1980s, is

5
represented by a mixture of different social classes, educational levels, and ideological positions.

The final section of this chapter looks at the geographical distribution of Turkish Americans in

the United States.

The fifth chapter provides a portrait of Turkey and examines identity crises (and struggles

for power) within the county. This chapter presents a deeper understanding of competing Turkish

identities that are exported from Turkey as struggles among different Turkish identities are also a

fact of Turkish Americans. The chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the politics of

Turkish American identities and the role of the Turkish state in forming Turkish Americanness.

The sixth chapter looks at the multiplicity and complexity of Turkishness and the

meanings individual Turkish immigrants make of that multiplicity and complexity. Sources of

such complexity and multiplicity such as Westerness, Muslimness, Easterness, and Europeanness

are discussed. This chapter provides multiple views of Turkishness using voices from my

interviewees.

The seventh chapter examines Turkish Americanness and identity negotiations that

individual Turkish Americans face in their everyday lives and spaces in the context of America.

The issues of gender, religion, ethnic background, and generation are also analyzed in this

chapter. Differences among different genders and generations are particularly highlighted.

The eighth chapter explores Turkish spaces and identity construction sites in the United

States, such as labor markets, residential space, Turkish American organizations, Turkish parade,

schools, and mosques. Each of these spaces is analyzed in terms of their role in shaping Turkish

Americanness. The importance of place in construction of identities is highlighted and place

making tactics are examined.

The final chapter summarizes and identifies the key findings of this study.

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 CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The issue of identity has long been an area of interest for many scholars. They have

offered different perspectives and explanations on identity, its politics, complexity and

multiplicity. One of the common agreements is that in order to construct identities, it is necessary

to establish opposites such as us vs. them (Gregory, 1994; Pile and Thrift, 1995; Said, 1978). We

identify ourselves by knowing who we are not. But “others” rarely easily accept our

identifications, as they may also identify us differently, which may not match with our own self-

identity. Therefore, differences are key in identity formations and preservations. We have

multiple identities as our differences come in various forms such as ethnicity, race, sexuality,

gender, class, place of origin, etc. However, differences make differences in terms of access to

power and resources. Similarly, Turkish identities are based on differences of ethnicity, religion,

culture, region, and so forth. They are characterized by multiplicity and complexity. Turkish

identities not only differentiate them from “white America” but also from Muslim groups from

the Middle East and from Europeans. In addition, Turks themselves come from different

backgrounds as the term “Turk” or “Turkish” may represent their country of origin rather than

racial and ethnic affiliations. People from Turkey, who are identified as Turkish, may be

Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, or Arabic ethnically or racially.

This chapter provides a literature review on identity, globalization, and nationalism. I

discuss the spatiality of identity and explore different theories on ethnicity and identity such as

7
assimilationist, primordial, and the constructionist approaches in relation to Turkish American

identity formations. Moreover, I look at the American cultural context and investigate the place

of Turkish Americans in the United States, and I try to locate Turkishness with all its multiplicity

and complexity in time and place.

The Nature of Identity
The classical modern and Cartesian view of identity characterized by rationality,

simplicity, and stability has dominated much of the Western notion of identity for a long period

of time (Keith and Pile, 1993). However this mechanistic notion of identity and the subject was

soon found to be problematic as the importance of experience, place, and subjectivity was

recognized by the phenomenological movement in geography (Buttimer and Seamon, 1980;

Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977). This movement later provided an important turning point for

geographers’ study of place and human experience. Geographers such as Relph (1976), Tuan

(1977), and Buttimer (1980) argued that people are not independent of their worlds but instead

are absorbed through an invisible net of bodily, emotional, and environmental bonds. Both the

works of Tuan and Relph seek to reflect on the ties between individuals and the material

environment expressed in the definition of place. In all phenomenological traditions the question

of meaning is a central concern, for meaning and perception speak of existence, of a subject in

encounter with an object.

Influenced by the humanistic and phenomenological tradition, the postmodernist

geography rejects the modernist idea of stable and unified identity; rather it perceives identity

with multiplicity of difference, contradiction, fluidity, contextuality, and dynamism (Pile and

Thrift, 1995). As Soja and Hooper (1996, 187) suggest, “disordering of difference from its

persistent binary structuring and the reconstitution of difference as the basis for new cultural

politics of multiplicity and strategic alliance among all who are peripheralized, marginalized and

subordinated by social construction of difference are key processes in the development of radical

8
postmodernism.” At the heart of identity politics is difference, power, and change. Differences

provide the basis for identity claims as marginalized and subordinated groups struggle to change

the existing power structure to their advantage while those in power resist such change (Soja and

Hooper, 1993). Through this process of competition and struggle identities are reformed and

reconstituted.

Similarly, Turkish identities are never complete, fixed or passive, as they are negotiated,

contested and reconstructed and reflect relations of power in American and global cultural and

political contexts. Power relations shaping Turkish identities inevitably contest relations of

normality and marginality, exclusion and inclusion. As immigrants when Turks cross boundaries

into the United States, they enter into a culture in which America is powerful and they have to

deal with boundaries of differences. Turks may not be easily accepted or qualify as “American”

as a result of their ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds. Turkish immigrants’ differences may

make more difference than white European immigrants’ differences in the context of American

culture. While some white Europeans such as Irish, Italians, and Jews went through a similar

experience a century ago (Bonnett, 2000; Ignatiev, 1996), today Muslim immigrants in the

United States face the same dilemma if not a more difficult one. Being Turkish and Muslim can

often result in difficulties for adopting and/or adapting American culture and disadvantages for

access to power and resources.

Modernity actualizes differences and produces exclusion and marginalization (Giddens,

1991). Margins constitute battlegrounds for searching identities and changing relations of power.

Identity is mapped in a dual sense as we set boundaries between who we are and who we are not.

Living in the United States makes Turks realize their differences as they see such differences

being viewed as “alien” or as “other.” Therefore Turks’ identifications of themselves rarely

match to the identities given to them. They may not be considered as “American” or “normal” as

Americanness often means “whiteness” (Ignatiev, 1996; Wray and Newitz, 1997). It is a matter

9
of meanings and power that constitute who we are and who we are not or who we want to be and

who we do not want to be. As we make decisions about who we want to be and act on those

decisions, our power and meanings are constrained and negotiated. Moreover, the identity of the

subject could provide him with privileges as well as disadvantages in the sharing, negotiation,

and production of meanings and power (Pile and Thrift, 1995).

Identity is based on differences and otherness, and differences are characterized by

multiplicity in the form of gender, sexual preference, disability, ethnicity, class, and region. We

make sense of ourselves only through understanding our relations (position, location, distance,

space, boundary, line, margin, center, and so forth) to the objects and subjects around us

(Massey, 1993). We locate and name differences in order to position ourselves and make sure

that our differences are absolute so we are not confused. For example, I am black because I am

not white; I am an adult, you are a child; I am a man, you are a woman; I am poor, he/they are

rich. We always think we have markers inside and outside ourselves that distinguish us from

everyone else and give a sense of uniqueness (Keith and Pile, 1993). Turks may feel that they

have different qualities that make them different from “regular” Americans. It is necessary to

acknowledge that all differences are not different to the same degree as all others are not equally

othered. Some are more than just others, while some are “good” others. For example, an Italian

might be an “other” to an American but s/he is never an “other” in the same sense an Arab is.

Therefore, the degree of difference and otherness should not be dismissed in the traditional

dualism of “us” and “them”, or “we” and “others.” We ‘other’ each other but not equally.

Moreover, given that Turkishness has no single unified meaning; Turks differ from one another

according to their racial, ethnic, class, gender, and religious backgrounds.

In the postmodern theory of identity, the subject has a discursive image that cannot be

addressed by the traditional discourse of individualism. It should be located in an historical

analysis of what self and experience can consist of at particular junctures (Crow, 1996).

10
“Learning qualities of others is connected in an immediate way with the earliest explorations of

the object-world and with the first stirrings of what later become established feelings of self-

identity” (Giddens, 1991, 51). Turkishness is not simply a given, rather it is routinely created and

sustained in everyday reflexive practices of individual Turks. There is a constant relationship

between opposing Turkish identities and the identities promoted by mainstream American

cultural identity as they shape each other’s identities. However, this is not an equal relationship

between the two as power is never equally distributed and experienced between them. As Soja

and Hooper (1996, 184) argue “hegemonic power does not simply manipulate naively given

differences between individuals and social groups, it actively produces and reproduces difference

as a key strategy to maintain modes of social and spatial division that are advantageous to its

continued empowerment.” Turkish differences are maintained due to difficulties they face to

become part of America. On the other hand, they resist, reject, and rebel against the hegemonic

power and create their own boundaries and strategies to deal with situations and the surrounding

world. This power relationship is both literal and symbolic. While opposing powers can take the

form of violence or confrontation, their symbolic relation is also always at work (Keith and Pile,

1993).

Community is important to personal security because it plays a significant role defining

and ordering the relationship between the self and other subjects. Social and physical boundaries

and practices that define community shape not only the characteristics of that particular

community but also the relations between members of it and the relations with members of other

communities (Rodaway, 1995). As Rodaway (1995, 29) puts it,

“Dialogical action is a fundamental determinant of the intelligibility of social life;

understanding comes from ‘we’, not ‘I’. My embodied understanding doesn’t
exist only in me as an individual agent; it also exists in me as the co-agent of
common actions. Often language’s function is simply to set up the intersubjective
spaces for common actions, rather than to represent them. Further, dialogical
action presupposes moral judgments.”
11
 Members of the American Turkish community have similar cultural and historical

backgrounds and common interests, which make them somewhat similar as they may put their

differences aside for a greater share of power in American society. They may come together so

they can have comfort and more weight in relations of power although they all may not feel the

same thing about being Turkish or Turkish-American. It is common interests and primordial ties

that bring such Turks together, regardless of their differences.

Memory and history form our geographical imaginations. The communities with which

we identify ourselves are not places that can be mapped on a piece of paper; they are also places

in our minds and memories (Anderson, 1991). We imagine ourselves with other people. We

connect with them through our geographical imaginations. Imaginative geographies in part

construct the places we belong. We move physically from place to place but the memories of

place are always with us and shape our imagination. They become a part of who we are. Global

media and communication (especially the Internet and telephone) help to maintain and create

Turkishness and a sense of belonging to the Turkish nation regardless of the distance between

Turks in the US and their home country, Turkey. They often talk to their family and friends

every week by calling them and read Turkish newspapers on line on a daily basis. This helps to

maintain connectedness with the original culture, which in some ways makes it difficult to

adopt/adapt “Americanness.”
Globalization, The World System, and Identities
Capitalist modes of information, communication, and transportation such as the Internet,

jet planes, satellite dishes, and global mass media have discounted distance as a factor in the flow

of global influence and have connected the world now more than ever (Barber, 1996). Appadurai

(1998) believes that the market, media and migration are the most important factors defining

today’s global world and subjectivity. He explores their joint effects on the “work of the

imagination,” as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity. Both media and migration create

12
specific irregularities. For example, he analyzes both print and electronic media, while claiming

that electronic media, especially television, has been much more influential in terms of

modifying identities, cultural spaces and cultural worlds: “Electronic media give a new twist to

the environment within which the modern and the global often appear as flip sides of the same

coin” (Appadurai, 1998, 44). He believes that the electronic media’s ability to transform the

sense of distance between viewer and event transforms everyday discourse. It also shapes and

reshapes society and the self in all different types of societies and people. Turkish identities are

very much shaped by globalizing forces such as media and migration. New immigrants can

easily communicate with friends and relatives in the “old” country with the help of fast

communications, such as telephone and the Internet, and travel long distances in a short period of

time to visit friends and families, which maintains their relationship with the home country’s

cultural, economic, and political affairs (Appadurai, 1998). As well, Turkish immigrants create

their own cultural spheres in which they engage in cultural and social activities that are both

Turkish and American. Their identities are shaped by American, Turkish, and global media.

People are never simply passive recipients of outside effects. They resist and challenge

change. In the hyper-mobile postmodern world, identities are enabled or constrained by the same

social world (Giddens, 1991). As time and space contexts change, identities change because they

are both historically and geographically specific. Identities both form the space and are formed

by the space, as they are inextricably intertwined with geographies in complex ways in the

lifelong process of construction and interaction of societies and subjects (Massey, 1993). Identity

and space are inseparable because knowing the self is an exercise in mapping where it stands.

Space is an active constitutive component of identities because it is both medium and message of

domination and subordination. Spaces are bounded with locales filled with personal, social, and

cultural meanings, and provide a skeleton in which identity is constituted, transformed, and

maintained (Carter, Donald and Squires, 1993). But this space is never purely local as every

13
place is a part of a system of places created by capitalism. It tells us where we are and puts us

there. It tells many things about positions, location, space, and distance to objects and other

subjects in social world. We only mean something in relation to the world outside ourselves,

which is constitutive in many ways (Massey, 1993).

Spatial differentiation produces different Turkish identities in the United States and

Turkey. Turkish identities are re-worked and re-formed in time and American cultural context.

Although changes in first generation Turkish identities are partial and the first generation may

maintain strong ties with the home country, second and third generation Turkish-Americans are

much more integrated to American society. Their identities carry artifacts of Turkishness, but not

necessarily as much as their parents’ identities. Americanness starts to play an important role in

their identities because their sense of home, culture and future are much different. In most cases,

second and third generation Turks are exposed to Turkishness by their parents at home but their

interaction with their new culture and home are far greater.

As the culture of this type of capitalism, Giddens (1991, 1) argues, “modernity must be

understood on an institutional level; yet the transmutations introduced by modern institutions

enlace in a direct way with individual life and therefore the self.” One of the main aspects of

modernity is an increasing interconnection between globalizing influences and personal

dispositions. While the subject is never a passive entity and determined by such institutions and

external forces, modern institutions shape the new mechanisms of the subject and its identity. In

our case, the policies and decisions made by the United States and Turkish governments

contribute to constituting Turkish-Americanness. However, individuals respond to such events

intentionally or unintentionally and produce new identities to cope with new changes and

contexts. In this sense, the subject produces social change and promotes global influences no

matter how local its actions are. We all contribute to such changes and influences (Giddens,

1991).

14
 Globalization actualizes differences, exclusion, and marginalization, and it generates

conflict as formerly discrete groups come into contact with one another. Modernization theory’s

identification of societies as modern vs. traditional, urban vs. rural are no longer viable as we see

irregularities within so-called modern and traditional societies. Modern and tradition are all

mixed in today’s global world (Appadurai, 2000). On the other hand, “the more tradition loses its

hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of dialectical interplay of local and global,

the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options”

(Giddens, 1991, 5). Life style choices constitute the subjectivity, identity, and daily activity (Pile

and Thrift, 1995).

Trust is a very important phenomenon of personal development. Although modernity

reduced risks in certain areas, it introduces new risk parameters (Giddens, 1991). Places have

become so interdependent that identities have become vulnerable to global effects. Global

processes affect locales and create new opportunities and new forms of vulnerability. Global

communities share the risks of terrorist attacks such as those on September 11, 2001, nuclear

bombs and ecological disasters. The September 11 events not only impacted lives of Americans

and Afghanis, but many others in the world as the war against terrorism has included all places in

all parts of the world, from India and Pakistan to the United States, Philippines and France. New

York’s stock market is affected by events happening in the Middle East, whereas Coca Cola or

MTV influence local cultures (Barber, 1996). The flow of commodities trans-nationally creates a

set of common cultural denominators that threaten local distinctions. The time and space

compression of hyper-mobile capitalism, in which hyper-reality becomes the norm, rapidly

transform identities at the beginning of the twenty-first century under post-modern, post-Fordist

capitalism. This process of transformation at the local and global levels has accelerated the rise

of identity politics that emphasizes differences and marginalized sources of subjectivity such as

gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and post-colonial perspectives (Pile and Thrift, 1995).

15
 The aim of traditional identity politics is to promote commitments to self and group

identities, and restore rooted tradition (Barber, 1995). Traditional identity politics comes in

different forms. Some are in the form of separatist national movements; some are oppressed

minorities demanding equal rights; some are dominant groups that try to prevent minorities from

accessing resources; some are marginalized groups because of their sexual orientation, gender,

race, or ethnicity. Some are religious; some are regional.

One of the influential works that looks at globally contradicting identities and forces of

identities is Barber’s (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld. Jihad and McWorld are two sets of forces

deviding the world. These two ideals are what eventually lead to what Barber presents as a world

identity. The first tendency is "retribalization" or "Lebanonization" of people, places, and nation-

states in which culture wars take place, tribal and ethnic conflicts arise. This is “Jihad” with its

effort to dehomogenize and split apart the world. The second tendency is economic and

ecological integration and uniformity of the world with aggressive and seductive futures, from

fast food to fast computers with its McDonald's and Macintosh. This is McWorld with the effort

of creating a commercially and culturally homogenous globe by technology, trade, ecology, and

communication. McWorld stands for consumerism, technology, modernization, and

homogenization, while Jihad symbolizes the local, traditional, cultural, religious, ethnicity, race,

and heterogeneity.

Grounded in exclusion, Jihad not only offers energetic local identities a sense of

community and harmony among kinsmen, but also parochialism. It is intolerant, reactionist, and

unpredictable. It targets marginal groups and intensifies differences. For instance, the attacks on

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 were an example of an anti-

modern counteraction to McWorld or defense by the powerless to intensify differences and alter

power relations. The events of September 11 were dramatic scenes of conflicting identities as the

16
homogenizing forces of globalization represented by World Trade Center were hit by rebellious

forces of locales.

Moreover, these events problematized the “melting pot” by showing that differences have

not yet melted, if they ever would. Arabs and Arab-Americans became more aware of their

differences as their differences started to be viewed as a problem in the eyes of angry Americans,

who were shocked by the events. The events made differences of Arab-Americans more visible

to Americans no matter how Americanized Arab-Americans were (Mubarak, 2002).

Jihad, the weaker of the two opposing factors presented by Barber, is the idea of people

isolating themselves into "tribes" based on culture. Within sovereign nations, people form

fragmented identities, which do not necessarily correspond to the national identity. McWorld

seems to deliver peace and unity, but it puts pressure on independence, community, and identity.

Although it speaks of free trade and free press, it does business with local oligarchic despots who

slaughter their own people, as long as markets are not disrupted (Barber, 1996).

Cultural critic Appadurai (1998) simultaneously examines the boundaries between our

imagination of the world and how that imagination shapes our self-understanding. In doing this

he looks at the relationship between institutions and the people who participate in them, between

nations and peoples that seem to be ever more homogeneous and yet ever more filled with

differences. Nationalism has not won all its victories as the same ideology functions in a

different way as it disintegrates nation-states, redraws boundaries, and restructures parochial

identities.

According to Pile and Thrift (1996), identity politics are often nostalgic attempts to retain

dignity and a sense of rootedness in era of rapid change, an anti-modern counteraction to

globalizing forces or the defense of the powerless. Turkish identity formations are part of this

global trend in identity politics. Holding an identity that may not correspond to “white America”

and being apart from Turkey where Turkishness originates puts Turkish Americans in a rather

17
interesting and problematic position as their sense of belongingness is neither absolute nor

complete. It is often an in-between position. While Turks may not feel that they are entirely

“American” (whatever that might mean), they may not feel that they could live in the way they

and their parents lived in Turkey. Most might not even ever want to go back to live in Turkey,

not just because of economic reasons, but also because they feel that they would not fit in there

culturally. Such a situation puts them in a place in which they feel the need and urge to search

their roots and appropriate new identities. This is an attempt to understand the self and position it

in a place where global, American, and Turkish cultural, social and political meanings are

negotiated, contested and constituted. This is not just a simple attempt to construct the self but

also to search and create new communities. It is also an attempt to alter power relations and

access to resources. The Turkish American self and the group which it is associated face the

danger of marginalization.
Theories of Ethnic and Group Identities
In this section, I provide four different perspectives on ethnic and group identities. First is

the assimilationist perspective, which focuses on the role of modern culture and national identity

promoted by the state in forming (nationalist) identities or in eliminating (local) identities. The

second, the primordial perspective, views primordial ties such as blood, kin, and cultural

connections rooted in circumstances of birth as the basis for group identity. The third perspective

discussed in this section is instrumentalist or circumstantialist, for which the rationale for the

group formation is either utility or organizational experience. It is common interests and goals

that bring people together. Finally, I discuss the constructionist perspective. The main premise of

the constructionist perspective is that group identities are formed in the interaction between

asserted identities (identities that we claim for ourselves) and assigned identities (identities that

others assign to us). This is an ongoing interaction and there is nothing absolute about the

process or the end product (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998).

18
The Assimilationist Perspective
Influenced by Social Darwinism, early twentieth century social science in the West

tended to explain the existence of differences among social and racial groups in biological terms.

This perspective gave biology a larger responsibility for differences in the cultural, the political,

and economic conditions of various ethnic and racial groups, as these groups were considered to

be biologically distinctive entities (Brander Rasmussen, 2001). Accordingly, some groups were

considered to be superior to others as a result of their genes. Culturally, economically and

politically dominant groups were successful because God gave dominant groups a biological

superiority. These beliefs also provided an instrument for justification of ethnocentric, racist,

colonialist, and imperialist ideas (Fine, 1997). However, knowledge is socially constructed, and

so are social categories. Race and ethnicity are not just the matter of having black skin color or

curly hair, it is also the meanings we put on those physical features (Altschuler, 1982).

The assimilationist perspective was used against the biological perspective on ethnicity

during the mid twentieth century. The common assumption was that ethnicity would disappear

overtime, as multiethnic societies became less multi and less ethnic (Gossett, 1997). “The

melting pot --both local and global-- would work its magic, and the peoples of the world would

be more integrated into a broad stream of shared culture and social relations” (Cornell and

Hartmann, 1998, p. 7). By going through phases of contact, competition, conflict, and

accommodation, different ethnicities would finally be assimilated, and one homogenous nation

would be achieved. In terms of people of different ethnicities, Cornell and Hartmann (1998, 7)

note that the assimilationist perspective argues that “the political processes of nation-building

would blind their loyalties to rising new states, institutionalizing a comprehensive new identity

and undermining older ties to kinship, local community, and traditional cultures.” This melting

pot process would take longer as some groups would resist the change, but it would finally

succeed. In the case of the United States, Turks, Italians, Arabs and others eventually became

19
American through a comprehensive political and cultural consciousness in common American

culture, knowledge of self and community (Gossett, 1997).

This notion of commonality was apparent in all modernist views of identity, no matter

whether humanist, positivist or Marxist (Jackson and Penrose, 1994). The Marxist belief was that

class interests would emerge as the bedrock of collective identity and political consciousness.

Another modernist social thinker, Max Weber, did not think so differently about the future of

ethnicity. He believed that progressive rationalization, science, and modernity would prevail, and

communal relationship, and ethnicity would be displaced (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). The

expectation was that universal values and utilitarian interests would replace local tradition,

folkways, kinship, and blood ties as the glue holding modern society together. Democracy and

industrialization would produce a rational society with an individualistic focus, and ethnic and

racial groups would no longer serve any useful purpose.

History have proven this line of thinking wrong as places have experienced social and

political change differently, and modernity has not worked in the same way spatially over time.

In Cornell and Hartman’s words (1998, 68), “by the 1970s, even nations in the world’s most

developed regions appeared to be re-fragmenting and ‘retribalizing’ as ethnic and racial identities

reasserted themselves.” Although people moving from place to place often did adopt the culture

of the societies they entered, at the same time, they carried with them their own practices, ideas,

and daily experiences to places they moved to, and created new cultural spheres in the dominant

culture of a particular state or a city to express their differences (Appadurai, 1998). Modernity

did not or could not make ethnicity disappear, and ethnicity has been resurgent globally in recent

decades.
Primordial Perspectives vs. Instrumentalist/Circumstantialist Perspectives
The widening gap between assimilationist theory and ethnic reality resulted in two

radically different perspectives: primordialist and circumstantialist (instrumentalist) theories of

20
ethnicity and identity construction. Primordialists suggest the intractable power of ethnicity

while instrumentalists claim that the malleability and flexible nature of ethnicity is responsible

for ethnic or racial movements, as it is easily affected by circumstances which can be used for

any purpose (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, 48). The former sees the sense of nationhood as a

natural given, the latter views it as something that can be manipulated, fabricated or invented.

The primordial perspective bases its arguments on cultural connections that are rooted in

circumstances of birth (blood, family, and kin etc.). Group identity is a given, not a matter of

choice. It is a result of circumstantial inheritance (Isaacs, 1989). For this perspective, identity is

stable, permanent, fixed, and rooted in the unchangeable circumstances of birth (Crow, 1996).

Circumstances of time and place do not have much impact on the identity construction since

primordial ethnic identity is very much given by birth. People cannot do much to change it

because elements of identity happen to them before they make meaningful choices to decide who

they want to be (Taylor, 1993). Primordialists claim that historically, ethnicity is prior to and

preemptive of class interests. Even though primordialist theory confronts the power of ethnic

ties, it is very weak in understanding ethnic change and variation.

On the other hand, the circumstantialist perspective argues that ethnicity is first and

foremost about power relations. Different groups struggle over different areas of power such as

employment, education, political representation, and economy (Isaacs, 1989). Ethnicity is a tool

or medium that people use to pursue communal interests against other groups within a particular

place. For circumstantialist theory, ethnicity is a product of historical circumstances, changing

variables, and structured inequalities. Groups find themselves in certain circumstances in which

they struggle over interests that are products of circumstances of time and space (Glazer and

Moynihan, 1970). This perspective views ethnic groups as interest groups and see changes in

identities as a result of changing circumstances. Therefore, any identity is potentially a handicap

or resource in terms of providing benefits or costs to a particular group. Ethnic ties are used for

21
different benefits from collective political mobilization to claims for certain resources and thus

often serve class interests (Olzak and Nagel, 1986).

In sum, according to the circumtantialist perspective people tend to emphasize their

group identities if they think that their identities are advantageous to them. Opposition, conflict,

and competition are the focus of the circumstantialist perspective because they promote ethnic

and racial boundaries. The fundamental premise of this approach is in its focus on collective

competition and action between various groups over social status, political power, social justice,

and so forth. In such cases, group identities are often artificial because they rest upon the

interests of groups, and ethnic boundaries are easily established. The weakness of this

perspective is that it takes ethnic affiliations as merely strategic and assumes that ethnic

affiliations may be called forth whenever it is politically convenient to do so. Also, its notion of

ethnic differences is simplistic because it limits them to struggle over power and does not have a

comprehensive approach to primordial identifications. Finally, ethnic identities are not always

the choice of the group that is being defined. Identities are both asserted and assigned.

Circumstantialist or instrumentalist theories have no account of assignment of identities, which is

not something that the identified group can do much about (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998).
The Constructionist Approach
Neither primordial nor circumstantialist theories offer a comprehensive explanation of

identity politics. One alternative is a constructionist approach, which tries to combine these two

perspectives. In the constructionist approach, “ethnic groups and identities form in an interaction

between assignment--what others say we are-- and assertion--who or what we claim to be”

(Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, 72). This dual interaction is the key for identity construction.

There is nothing absolute about the process and product of this construction because identities

are diverse, changeable, and contingent under different time and space contexts (Jackson and

22
Penrose, 1996). Identity changes because people change, members of particular ethnic groups

change, and social circumstances of time and place change (Gregory, 1994).

Our preconceptions, ideologies, dispositions, and agendas are crucial to the formation of

identities. Identities are not just products of circumstances because people make claims of

identities based on the raw materials of history, cultural practice, and preexisting identities to

fashion distinctive greatness. For example, in order to deepen Turkish national consciousness at

the expense of wider Islamic identification, Ataturk imposed compulsory Romanization upon the

Turks of central Asia (Anderson, 1991).

The constructionist perspective suggests that identities are not natural but socially made,

but this social construction occurs through the interaction of different groups. While individuals

and groups are active agents in identity formations, circumstances out of their control also shape

who they are. Circumstances are not one-time events but a continuous process (Cornell and

Hartmann, 1998). Therefore, no identity is ever complete or finished. The interaction between

external (others) and internal (us) is not the same in everyplace and all times (Said, 1978). People

employ boundaries to differentiate themselves from others. They come to know themselves by

learning who they are not. They set criteria to draw lines of differences. These criteria might

include ancestry, cultural practices, economic conditions, and place of origin, skin color and so

forth.

Ethnicity and race rise from constructed primordialties. A sense of peoplehood or

nationhood is based on common origin (ancestry), blood ties and such. People’s sense of who

they are and how they fit into the surrounding social world might be very meaningful and

important to them. The sense of community of their own means a lot to them so they reject any

type of identity imposed on them. Anderson (1991) describes a nation as an “imagined

community”, so it is the work of imaginative geographies that give a sense of community and

unity among members of a nation. “The members of even the smallest nation will never know

23
their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image

of their communion” (Anderson, 1991, 15). So it is often the work of the imagination and its

emotional attachments that bring people together and the sense of community may not have any

material expectation. People establish ethnic and racial identities, and start to make sense of the

world around themselves through the lens of ethnicity and race. It is a tool for interpretation and

action. It starts to look natural to the ones who use it.

Societies are construction sites in which identities are shaped, reworked, and

reconstructed (Rodaway, 1995). In such sites, power relations are very much at play. Groups

with and without power try to cope with situations they encounter. The powerful often control

discourses to pursue their goals and to identify others, to shape the opportunities and constraints

for themselves and others, while those with little or no power try to make sense of the world

around them and try to turn matters to their advantages. Subortinate groups are never passive and

accepting. They react, resist, and oppose the imposition of the dominant groups. They carry their

own characteristics, ideas and agendas. They engage with the ideas and strive to create

opportunities for themselves (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). The fundamental objective of

nationalism and national identity is a desire to influence the distribution of power. While the

majority population in the US, which is white Americans, uses its identity to maintain the

existing power relations, aspiring groups promote an alternative construct in an effort to change

the power structure in ways they want. Minorities want their identities to be recognized as

legitimate and to be awarded with the power that legitimacy bestows (Jackson and Penrose,

1994).

Identities are products of continuous discourse (Gregory, 1995; Philo, 1992). People

think of themselves not only as individuals but also as collective entities. As they imagine

themselves and others, they turn those imaginings into realities as part of their collective

consciousness and identity. They create their own stories out of real and imagined happenings

24
such as history, migration, colonization, struggle, opposition, defeat, and survival (Hubbard,

Kitchin, Bartley and Fuller, 2002) They tell those stories to justify demands, to change relations

of dominance, and to make sense of whom they are and how they became the way they are. They

not only tell stories about themselves as well as others (Rodaway, 1995). Others try to resist the

stories told about them and make their voice heard. Those stories are put to use in order to

reconstruct and reconstitute already made identities.

Ethnic identities can be “thick” or “thin” depending on time and space circumstances and

the behaviors of human agents who strive to make a difference in their own and their people’s

life (Olzak and Nagel, 1986). The constructionist view looks at the mechanisms that make

changes in identities so it accounts both for circumstances and dynamics of race and ethnicity.

Changes in identity take place at the intersection of claims made by others. Identities are not just

the labels forced on us, because we are also agents of who we are. People choose, resist, invent,

redefine, reject, and actively defend who they are and who they want to be (Pile and Thrift,

1995). For example, for some Turks in the United States, Turkish identity is thin and not strongly

claimed. As such identifications have very little or no impact in everyday relations, while for

others this identity is both thick and strongly claimed. While for the former group Turkishness

may not mean much, the latter proudly holds such an identity and strives to maintain it.

In conclusion, the constructionist view of ethnicity applies better to Turkish identities in

American and global contexts since it widens its scope to both primordial and circumstantial

realms. Turkish identities are variable, changeable, and contingent depending on their time and

space contexts. Ethnic change is very much a part of social change as a result of human force as

a social agent. People are always actively engaged in identity formation and social reproduction

(Jackson and Penrose, 1994). In the context of American culture, and political system, Turks

negotiate meanings with the dominant culture, struggle over power, and interpret and reinterpret

the past in order to make their present and future. Identity is so powerful that it has great impacts

25
on social relations and engagements as such relations and engagements in our decisions of

choosing the people we want to be friends, live with, and marry. Because group identity

construction is very much about making boundaries between others and ourselves, it is

exclusionary as much as it is unifying (Pile and Thrift, 1995).

America as Context
In order to understand the processes and settings that help to shape American

Turkishness, it is crucial to examine the American political and cultural context in which Turkish

identities are re-constructed, re-worked and re-formed. America has been made by the comings

and goings of various immigrant groups under various circumstances. Like any other society,

American society is a complex of different groups with different interests and histories.

Consequently, dealing with the “other” is a continually renewed problem and boundary

construction is an everlasting process (Healey, 2003). After the period of the first immigrants’

decimation of local peoples of America, the entry of groups to the United States were handled by

the British elite as they started to form the set of political, legal, symbolic and interpretive

institutions that later immigrants found and, after a certain point, transformed to their advantage.

The result was an institutionalized boundary construction in a particular space where America is

dominant and powerful and those who cross the boundaries of United States have to contend

with those ethnic and political boundaries (Varenne, 1998). Hence, the issue of ethnicity in the

United States as elsewhere is as much about the construction of some groups as “other” as about

the history of immigration.

Ethnic diversity is a symbol of America, but this is not only because it is heterogeneous

and has been made by immigrants, but also it is a product of an interpretive evolution (Varenne,

1998). Argentina and Australia experienced similar early immigration as the United States, but

they have evolved differently regardless of the role of immigration in the making of those

countries. Varenne (1998, 28) argues that “whenever human beings move geographically and

26
become intimately intertwined with other human beings, they inevitably enter into a dialogue

that produces a particular pattern of institutionalized differences: soon people must act in terms

of the identifications their interlocutors have made of them. ‘Diversity’ is never a simple end

product of substances living together in some geographical space.”

As a result, one of the fundamental goals of this study is not only asserting the extent of

persistent differences, but also an understanding of how differences are reconstructed and

handled locally, in the context of the New York metropolitan area. In the American context,

diversity is the “acceptance of all differences.” However, it is an illusion to assume that groups

with different powers are equal in the resources that they bring to the issue of dealing with each

other. Therefore, the diversity that is produced through migration to the United States is

susceptible to variation related to historical conditions of the encounters. One cannot talk about

diversity and participation without the relative power of each participant (Benmayor and

Skotnes, 1994).

Diversity in the United States is both prescribed and problematic. The template for

equality in the United States is individual citizenship, but the rights of ethnic, racial, gender, and

cultural groups are highly problematic. As a result, the ideas about ethnicity and groups differ.

One of the classic debates in ethnic geography is whether America can be described as an ethnic

melting pot or an ethnic mosaic (e.g., Zeigler and Brunn 2000; Varenne, 1998). The melting pot

idea suggests that American culture is quick, powerful, and seductive so that in a few generations

immigrants are assimilated and become indistinguishable from the population as a whole

(Zeigler and Brunn, 2000). Ostensibly, ethnic groups are swiftly snuffed out in the everyday

practices of American life. On the other hand, the mosaic analogy proposes that some

ethnic/immigrant groups have difficulties in becoming part of the “mainstream” ofAmerican

culture. There are identifiable “unmeltable” Americans, who have not become part of the

mainstream American culture (Greenhouse and Kheshti, 1998). For instance, it is argued that

27
religion has proven to be an impediment to assimilation as the Catholic and Orthodox Christian,

Jewish, and Muslim populations have long been discriminated against due to divergent religious

beliefs from the mainline Protestant beliefs. Therefore, the degree of assimilation as a part of

melting pot has not been the same for all immigrants groups in the United States (Zeigler and

Brunn 2000). Some have been more easily “melted” into mainstream American culture than

others.

In other words, the concept of the “melting pot” forces recognition, but not all differences

are equally honored in the context of American culture and politics. As Sarat and Berkowitz

(1990, 99) put it, “Simply recognizing differences as orderly does not and cannot give to all

differences the equal right to accommodation.” Therefore, the “mosaic” metaphor is more

suitable to understanding of the American cultural context than the “melting pot” metaphor

because it emphasizes boundaries and acknowleges boundary-maintaining activities such as

ethnic parades and bloc voting (Sarat and Berkowitz, 1994). In a melting pot, one would assume

that ethnic origin would not make much difference and there would not be group boundaries but

indeed ethnic origins matter and there are boundaries. Differences play an important role in

people’s daily life and relations of power. As Veranne (1998, 46) puts it, “one has to identify

oneself in the multitude of administrative forms through which the American State enforces the

categories of official relevance,” which shape power distribution in American social space. As a

result, ethnic identity becomes “official business” to the extent that cultural difference is

perceived to be the source of inequality.

Turkish cultural and ethnic differences could make them less meltable than those of white

Europeans such as the French, Dutch or British. As a result, their integration to the mainstream

American culture may take longer and be more difficult as Turks have to deal not only with ways

to adjust their differences to fit into the mainstream culture but also perceptions of the American

public and the US government about their suitability for qualifying as an “American.” The

28
difficulty of being qualified as “American” is not just simple categorization, because such a

categorization (both official and social) shapes power distribution and access to resources.

America as a place for multiple choices limits choices for Turks because of their cultural,

religious, and ethnic affiliations to societies other than white Protestant or in a larger sense,

Western societies. Since Turkish and American boundaries are actively maintained, America is a

“mosaic” that treats its differences differently.

Locating Turkishness in Time and Space
Greenhouse and Greenwood (1998, 3) argue that in Western thought, “cultural difference

is imagined as physical difference, a broad naturalization of difference that subsumes (or

potentially subsumes) a range of categories, such as race, gender, sexuality, and others.”

However, if we rely on such a difference to differentiate them from other ethnic and racial

groups in the United States, we may fail to make a distinction between Turks and other ethnic

and racial groups. Turks might have a Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Asian, and White

European appearances. Altschiller (1996) says that it is difficult to describe the appearance of an

average Turk, as they may be blond with blue eyes or round-headed with dark hair and dark

eyes. While some have Mongoloid features with high cheekbones, others have a Mediterranean

appearance. This is very much a result of Turkish tribes’ changing geographies over time. Turks

are originally from Central Asia and are related to contemporary Central Asian and Mongolian

peoples. The interaction between Turks and surrounding groups continued for several centuries

until a large number of Turks migrated to the West, the Anatolian peninsula after the eighth and

ninth centuries C.E. (Altschiller, 1995). Turkish is a Ural-Altaic language, which is not

linguistically related to Arabic or Persian. However, when Turks migrated from Central Asia to

the West, mainly to the Anatolian Peninsula, they came into contact with Arabs, from whom they

learned Islam; they were also affected by Persian culture. Coming to the Anatolian Peninsula and

taking over a land that was dominated by the Byzantium Empire and Christianity was another era

29
for Turks as they not only caused the collapse of the Byzantine Empire but also were greatly

influenced by their culture. For instance, some argue that “Turkish art music,” one of Turkish

music traditions, is a legacy of the Byzantium Empire. The Anatolian Peninsula has never been

the home for only one or two peoples. There have always been different powers and cultures

ruling and dominating it. The peninsula has historically been a place for the mixture of different

cultures, religions, and civilizations, including Christianity, Islam, and Judaism in terms of

religion to Hittite, Lydian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Arabic, Mediterranean and Central Asian

cultures and traditions. Therefore, contemporary Turkish culture is a synthesis that reflects a

variety of civilizations and cultures, which differentiates it not only from Greek or Roman

cultures but also Persians and Arabs.

Altschiller (1996) makes it clear that although 98 percent of Turkey’s population is

Muslim, Turkey is a secular state where Jews and Christians can fully practice their religious

faith. Minorities include Kurds, who are mainly Muslim and constitute the largest single

minority group in Turkey, as well as Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs even though they all

have been Turkified in ways such as language and national identity. Altschiller (1996) argues

that after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, many Christians remained under the rule of the

generally tolerant Ottoman Empire and over the centuries converted to Islam. “These former

Christians, mostly Greek or Armenian speakers, began to speak Turkish, melding with the

dominant Turks, whom they had originally outnumbered” (Altschiller, 1996, 1365).

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Many new nation-states were

established on the Empire’s former territories. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established modern

Turkey in 1923 after a series of wars against the allied forces of the West (Lewis, 1961). After

founding the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk became president and began a series of revolutionary

reforms that transformed Turkey into a modern nation. He replaced religious law with civil,

criminal, and commercial laws adopted from Switzerland. In order to break with the Ottoman

30
past symbolically, he moved the capital from Istanbul to Ankara. It was not religion anymore

that unified the country; Turkish nationalism functioned for that purpose. He passed laws to have

Turks dress like Europeans and promoted ballroom dancing at state functions. The change of the

alphabet from Arabic to a modified Latin was another break from the Ottoman past (Yavuz,

2000).
Closing Thoughts
There has been a growing interest in identity and identity politics by geographers in the

last decade or so. This of course is no accident as identities are all about drawing and

maintaining boundaries and boundaries have always been an area of interest for geographers

(Jackson, 1994; Keith and Pile, 1993; Rodaway, 1995). Differences are at the heart of identity

politics as forming or claiming identities starts with establishing opposites and setting up

boundaries (Pile and Thrift, 1995). With the globalization of culture, politics, and economy,

differences are actualized and struggles for preservation and construction of local and individual

identities have intensified (Giddens, 2000). As a result, identity politics involve struggles for

power as they involve relations of “normality” and “abnormality”, subordination and

domination, marginalization and control (Soja and Hooper, 1993).

Identity construction is an ongoing process of interaction between different identities and

the process and the end product of it is neither absolute nor fixed. Both the process and the result

are complex, contextual, multiple, contingent, and fluid as identities and the groups that carry

them change over time as the forces impose on them change with space and time (Cornell and

Hartmann, 1998). Therefore, identities are never clear cut, finished, fixed or stable. The

recognition of the complexity and multiplicity of identity with all its dynamics and changing

contexts (both time and place), in which it is formed, reformed and contested, is crucial to a

healthy discussion of identity formations (Pile and Thrift, 1995). The sources and resources of

31
identity are multiple as they come in various forms such as ethnicity, race, sexuality, gender,

generation, class, and place of origin (Harvey, 1996).

Recognizing the multiplicity, fluidity, and complexity of identity is crucial to any study

of Turkish Americans as Turkish American identities are based on differences of ethnicity,

religion, culture, generation, class, and region. Moreover, Turkish American identities not only

differentiate them from “white America” but also from Muslim groups from the Middle East and

from “white Europeans” as Turkish American identities and experiences are not the same with

any of these groups regardless of some parallels. In addition, Turks themselves come from

different backgrounds, and the term “Turk” or “Turkish” may represent nationality of their

country of origin rather than racial and ethnic affiliations. People from Turkey, who are

identified as Turkish, may be Kurdish, Jewish, Greek, or Arabic ethnically or racially

(Altschiller, 1995). Multiple identities are a fact of the Turkish American community as

Americanness adds an additional layer to their complex identities. Multiplicity and complexity of

Turkish identities reflect their past with multiple group and individual histories while the Turkish

state’s efforts and seductive American culture have not been able to melt away all differences

that form such multiple identities.

Although I do not claim to uncover Turkish American identity (or identities) in all its

complexity and multiplicity, I want to provide a glimpse of the meaning of being Turkish in

America by presenting voices from the Turkish American community. As Pile and Thrift (1995,

1) put it “the human subject is difficult to map” because it has no clear boundary and because it

has no clear position but a mass of positions. The next chapter presents my research procedures

for getting a “glimpse of being Turkish in America.”

32
 CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The construction of ethnic identity is a complex and dynamic process that takes place at

different levels and within evolving contexts, which creates pitfalls for the researcher in mapping

Turkish American identity formations within the full range of conditions in which they are

embedded. Therefore, for this difficult task, my strategy has been to situate Turkish American

identity formations in varying contexts such as the United States, Turkey, globalization, and

Turkish political history.

My analysis is based on a variety of individual experiences and institutions to understand

the process of being Turkish American. These include such actors as individual immigrants,

leaders of the Turkish American community, Turkish American organizations, the media, the

Internet, and national governments. Each of these elements represents a critical component,

which influences the Turkish American community, and becomes a tool to think about and

understand social reality. My intention is to explore how the contestation and negotiation of

Turkish ethnicity is grounded in place and across space.

Methods of Data Gathering
My methods of data gathering includes three different data collection activities: in-depth

interviews, document analysis, and fieldwork. Each of these activities provide a different venue

to an understanding of the Turkish American community.

33
In-Depth Interviews
My research relies largely on in-depth interviews that I have done with immigrants,

community leaders, and business owners within the Turkish American community in the New

York metropolitan area. I conducted in-depth interviews because I was interested in other

people’s stories and experiences. I believe that when people tell their life stories, they bring out

details of their experience from a stream of consciousness (Hoggart, Lees and Davies, 2002;

Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Although I knew that I could never fully access what they have

experienced and what they had in mind, I wanted, at least, to get a sample of their voices.

People’s consciousness allows us to access the most complicated social issues because social

issues are abstractions from concrete lived experiences (Limb and Dwyer, 2001; Seidman, 1998).

By conducting in-depth interviews, I wanted to understand how identities materialize in the

everyday experiences and practices. As such interviews are an important way to access people’s

lives and the way they make the sense of themselves and the world around them (Limb and

Dwyer, 2001; Lindsay, 1997).

This research was conducted in the New York metropolitan area for two reasons. First,

the New York metropolitan area has the largest Turkish American population in the United

States (Census, 1998). Particularly, Queens and Brooklyn in New York and Clifton and Paterson

in New Jersey have a significant number of Turkish Americans. The area has been historically an

attractive place for Turkish immigrants. Second, New York is the headquarters of a large number

of Turkish American Turkish American organizations such as the Federation of Turkish

American Associations (FTAA), the Turkish Women’s League of America (TWLA), and

American Turkish Society (ATS) as well as Turkish American media organizations.1 The area

also has the largest number of Turkish American mosques (eight) and the only two Turkish

American private schools in the United States (as well as one part time school). The area also has

1
A list of Turkish American organizations is provided in Appendix D.
34
the largest number of Turkish American businesses. All these institutions function as identity

construction sites where Turkishness in transmitted and formed. Therefore, I concluded that it

was important to look at the formation of Turkish Americanness in a context where the processes

that construct Turkish Americanness can be observed, as I was interested in not only Turkish

Americanness but also the process and context in which it is shaped (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).

As there are over 150,000 Turkish Americans estimated living in the New York

metropolitan area, one of the dilemmas that I had for conducting this research was the difficulty

in the selection of the people that I wanted to interview. However, what was clear was that I was

interested in individual perceptions rather than collective behavior (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).

Therefore, the actual size of the interview group was a secondary issue (Limb and Dwyer, 2001).

I did not necessarily intend to reach comprehensive conclusions and generalizations; rather I

wanted to indicate some sites of multiplicity, contextuality, and contradiction within the Turkish

American community (Creswell, 2003; Limb and Dwyer, 2001). Rather than trying to achieve a

target number of interviews, I was alert for the stage when I believed I had explored the whole

range of realistic responses from interviews.

I used two different sampling techniques: “snowball sampling” and “purposeful

sampling” (Seidman, 1998). Since it was difficult for me to locate my study population by other

means, as I knew very few people in the area to start with, “snowball sampling” was my first

choice for this study. I contacted individuals through various ways, including my personal

contacts, Turkish American social clubs and organizations, community facilities, religious

institutions, restaurants, coffee houses, and local stores. I usually asked my first respondents to

recruit their successors. In this way, I hoped to reach some key informants who could give me

valuable information to complete the study (Hay, 2000). This technique was valuable in reaching

people who had distinct and important perspectives on the themes of my research questions.

Moreover, I had to have great flexibility and to spend many hours arranging meetings and

35
meeting places. Such extensive contact created a relationship with the informants, and provided

valuable insight into their lives and experiences.

Purposeful sampling was also crucial to my data collection because I was interested in

selecting participants who would reflect the wide range in the larger population that I intended to

study (Riessman, 1994; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Seidman, 1998). To select participants from

different segments of the Turkish American community, I used my two year experience in the

New York area, having spent time there in 2001 and 2002, to contact different groups with

various political views, cultural and economic backgrounds. The groups included student

organizations, women groups, religious and non-religious groups. After gathering information

about such organizations and their members by talking to people, looking at their websites or

brochures if they had any, attending their activities, I purposefully selected people with different

political, ideological, ethnic, and religious positions as well as people from different class and

generations to have multiple perspectives from the Turkish American community.

I conducted my interviews between May 1 and July 30, 2002. I interviewed a total of

thirty eight people from various socioeconomic circumstances, age groups and both males and

females to encompass various experiences. My objective was to bring perspectives from

different groups within the Turkish-American community. Twenty four of the interviewees were

male and fourteen were female. Among the thirty eight, eight were second generation and thirty

were first generation Turkish immigrants. Of my interviewees, ten were community leaders, such

as institution leaders. I intentionally selected my sample of informants from diverse

backgrounds, including Turkish Kurds, Jews, and Arabs, as well as Turks from the former Soviet

Union states who lived in Turkey for a period of time. In this way, I am able to present the voices

of a small group of immigrants to articulate some of the multiple and various ways in which the

ethnic identity process is contested. The average age of the respondents was 38, with the

respondents ranging from 16 to 75 years of age.

36
 Interviews were conducted face to face at various places such as the participant’s home,

office or at a restaurant or café. They were carried out in both English and Turkish depending on

the participant’s choice of language. Our conversations were tape-recorded only when I was

given permission to do so. I had my respondents sign consent forms and the interviews were

conducted with the understanding that privacy would be maintained and a pseudonym was

chosen by the interviewee during our encounter(s).

Interview questions were mainly open-ended, and focused specifically on various aspects of

respondent’s life and experience in the United States.2 I intentionally utilized a semi-structured

format, so that while relevant themes were covered, there was room for more inquisitive and

interpretative questions to articulate further meaning and the complexity of events. The

interviews considered various questions concerning:

ƒ Life in Turkey (e.g., How does your life in the US compare with your life in Turkey?),

ƒ Migration and Residential Choice (e.g., Why did you come to the United States? Do

you prefer to live in a Turkish/Turkish-American community? Why?),

ƒ Maintaining Contacts with Family and Friends (e.g., How do you maintain contact

with friends and family members in Turkey? How did your last trip to Turkey affect

your views about returning to Turkey? How frequently do you follow news from

Turkey during your stay in the US?),

ƒ Everyday Activities and Social Networks (e.g., Do you go to places where most people

are American or Turkish? Why? In what kind of Turkish activities do you participate?

Do you celebrate Turkish holidays? Do Turks help one another?),

ƒ Attitudes and Opinions about Ethnicity (e.g., what is your definition of Turkish/Turks?

Who are the Turks? Do you feel that you are more Western (European) or Eastern

2
A copy of the questions is provided in Appendix A.
37
 (Middle Eastern)? Would you consider yourself to be Turkish-American? Why? Do

you feel that you are more Western (European) or Eastern (Middle Eastern)? Why?),

ƒ Assigned Identities (e.g., what do you feel about public perception of Turks and

Turkey in the United States? Do you think that Americans associate Turks with Arabs

and other Muslim groups? If yes, how do you feel about that? Do you think that

Americans treat you well?),

ƒ Language and Religion (e.g., what languages do you speak at home and work? Do you

watch or listen to Turkish on TV? What is your religion? Do you practice it? Where

and how?),

ƒ Work Related (e.g., Has this always been your line of work? What is the ethnic

background of the majority of the people with whom you work?),

ƒ Change (e.g., Do you think that Turks in the United States are losing their Turkish

identity? If yes, what are some signs of that? Do you think your children are more

Americanized than your generation? If yes, what are some signs of that?)

Interviews lasted between one and three hours as a result of the variety and in-depth

nature of questions. Our conversations often extended even longer as some participants

generously offered to prepare coffee and/or dinner. In some cases, there was more than one

meeting with some of the participants because of time constraints and also for follow up

discussions.

In addition to interviews with Turkish immigrants about their lives and experiences in the

United States, I interviewed ten community leaders (e.g., presidents of Turkish American

organizations) and business owners. My questions were related to the membership (or clientele),

structure, and activities of these organizations. The purpose of such interviews was to learn

about Turkish American institutions and their roles in the community and the ways in which

institutions participate in the socio-spatial construction of ethnic identity.

38
 I selected individuals representing the largest Turkish organizations in the New York

metropolitan area such as the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), the

American Turkish Society (ATS), and the Turkish Women's League of America (TWLA), along

with leaders of smaller clubs such as Dost Kirim. I interviewed the Imam of Fatih mosque

located in Brooklyn, NY, one of the oldest Turkish mosques in the United States, as well as

principles of both the Ataturk School and the Brooklyn Amity School. I met with the owners of

various businesses in the metropolitan New York area (Ant Stores, Zinnur Books, Turkiyem

Supermarket, Amish Markets, Toros Restaurant, Sultan Bakery, and so on). I also talked to

media representatives from several publications including Hürriyet, Jön Türk, the Light

Millennium, Turk of America, Zaman America. They functioned as key informants for the

community at large and provided me with valuable information about community leaders.
Fieldwork
Participant observation was another important data collection technique that I carried out

for the duration of the study in such places as restaurants and grocery stores, festivals, mosques,

weddings, graduation ceremonies, sporting and musical events. Fieldwork complemented my in-

depth interviews and allowed me to engage in the web of the immigrant’s everyday lives and to

capture the complexity of social relations embedded in the immigrants’ daily experiences

(Hagopian, 2003; Kitchin and Tate, 2000). This allowed me to develop a geography of everyday

experiences as it gave me the opportunity to move beyond reliance on formulized interactions,

such as interviews, and experience the flow of everyday life in time and space (Lindsay, 1997).

The fieldwork was a channel for exploring the role of institutions such as family, workplace,

local, national and international organizations and the role of space in reproducing identity

(Kitchin and Tate, 2000).

The journal that I kept during my fieldwork became a very important source, as I was

able to see my own reflections on the events and happenings on each particular day. During my

39
participation in the community, I was able to speak to immigrants about their lives, experiences,

and adjustments to the United States. I learned much from casual conversations, and various

ideas in this study were derived from heated discussions and silent observations (Robinson,

1998; Seidman, 1998). Therefore, my observations and conversations at weddings, religious

ceremonies, parades, restaurants, and coffee houses are crucial components in my understanding

the process of identity maintenance, formation and reconstruction as well as the role of place in

such formations and reconstructions.

Other Methods
I utilized data from the 2000 Census to draw a geographic portrait of the Turkish

American population in the United States and mapped their distribution and patterning in the

states where there is a significant Turkish American population using GIS. I also employed the

1990 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), five percent files, to develop a

demographic and economic profile of the Turkish population in the United States.

There are other materials that I collected as the research progressed. Such materials

allowed me to gather information about upcoming events as well as types of activities (Creswell,

2003). For instance, I routinely checked the Internet for Turkish American-oriented websites and

compiled local and national newspaper and magazine articles related to Turkish Americans. I

have subscriptions to Turkish American magazines such as Turk of America and Jon Turk,

Turkuaz and newspapers such as Zaman and various organization newsletters such as those of

the ATS and FTAA. I am a member of several e-groups such as NATurk, NJTurk, NYCTurk,

and TurkishForum, which provide a great deal of information for problems that Turkish

Americans face in real life. And to keep track of local events and issues, each week I also

gathered organizational flyers and pamphlets from various Turkish American organizations,

stores, and coffee houses.

40
Analysis
While I started my research with a number of questions, I had a very vague idea of what

would be the outcome. As I came into contact with individuals and institutions, my initial

questions shifted and transformed. This research experience turned out to be a dynamic process

as my interviews opened up a real dialogue in which I was forced to reevaluate my position and

questions. My analysis became a complex intertwining of the responses of my interviewees and

my perceptions of their meanings.

I believe this process of interaction and debate helped me to generate more constructive

and thoughtful research as interviewing is itself part of the learning process (Lindsay, 1997). I

began to become more aware of the constructed nature of “Turkish-Americanness” and the role

of institutions in the formation of ethnic labels and identities (Jackson, 1994). This was crucial

because it helped me to understand not only the uneven and differential ways in which Turkish

Americans maintain and assert their “Turkish” ethnic identity but also understood the limits of

the individual choice and the importance of institutional contexts and circumstances (Giddens,

1991).

Consequently, I began to consider how Turkish American lives are influenced by

institutions and the way the institutions perceive them, regardless of how much the Turkish

immigrants may (or may not) choose to identify themselves in terms of their Turkish national

origin and ethnic identity. This gave me an opportunity to recognize the necessity of dealing

with the process of ethnic categorization more broadly and shifted my research focus to the role

of mid-level and national institutions in the socio-spatial formation of Turkish Americanness.

My field notes were crucially important in extracting relevant details, and salient themes

(Robinson, 1998). In additional to keeping a journal throughout the fieldwork, I videotaped and

photographed visual information concerning settings, as well as the social atmosphere, and my

personal interactions with participants. I came to realize the spatiality of identity as I reviewed

41
my observations of the places within which Turkish immigrants as well as second generation

Turkish Americans interact. In unfolding the details of particular events and interviews, I

recognized that the “site” of these interactions formed the ways in which individuals and

organizations came to conceive of themselves (Skop, 2003).

My membership with various e-groups became another surprising, and telling data

source. Among these e-groups, NYCTurk and NJTurk have more than 4,000 members each.

These e-groups are places where immigrant Turks exchange ideas about the problems they are

facing and solutions to such problems.3 This made me aware of the everyday usage of this

technology by Turkish immigrants and how the Internet has been appropriated as a hybrid space

for the expression of “Turkishness.” Furthermore, my collection and analysis of organizational

brochures and flyers, newspaper and magazine articles, and websites became a way to enunciate

the socio-spatial process of ethnic identity construction.

Reflections
For the most part, I was able to pursue the methods I had planned before starting the

research project. My strategy of keeping the methodology relatively open-ended was quite

useful and I was able to learn and observe from my casual and structured encounters (Hagopian,

2003). Such liberal approaches helped me uncover a broad range of information that allowed me

to gather a more comprehensive picture of the socio-spatial process of identity construction.

I also faced some complications. Arranging a meeting place was one, as not all of my

participants wanted to conduct interviews at their homes or offices. I had to meet them at

bookstores, cafes or restaurants, which sometimes introduced unwanted disruption during the

interviews. Therefore, I usually preferred to conduct my interviews at my interviewees’ offices

3
One interesting discussion on New Jersey Turks e-mail list group was about the difficulty that Turkish immigrant
men have in finding a Turkish female to marry. It was a heated debate as male and female members accused each
other for the situation. After a week or so an e-mail was sent to the group by the SingleTurks dating website
announcing its establishment.
42
or houses, if I was given the choice. When I had to interview them outside these locations, I

chose places where I thought it would be quiet during the interviewing process as I became

familiar with the area.

Another complication arose when I was conducting my interviews with participants who

were couples in one place at one time. While I originally anticipated speaking to each family

member separately so that each participant could more freely answer my questions, there were

two couples with whom the interviewing did not go the way I wanted. They often interrupted and

corrected one another about their feelings and experiences living in the United States.

Fortunately, other couples that I talked to were willing to meet individually, which allowed me to

see differences in the experiences of male and female immigrants.

In terms of my positionality in the interviewing process, my identity as a Turkish

(Kurdish) Ph.D. student served me well as I carried out my research. My participants mostly

viewed me as one of “them” and therefore were quite open about their positions and experiences

in the United States, including discrimination if they faced any. Most of my interviewees had a

college education, which turned out to be a source of empathy and connectedness between

participants and myself. There was also a kind of pride in me that I was doing research on

Turkish Americans and I was a PhD student. Both the topic and my identity removed many

obstacles in terms of my access to their lives. I was often invited to events and programs and

introduced to people who my participants thought would be good resources for my research. My

inquisitiveness served me well and interactions with them in turn helped me to further investigate

the constructed nature of Turkish American identity.

However, my subjectivity in conducting this research also needs acknowledgement. I

tried to strike a balance between being a researcher and one of “them”. I was acutely aware of

the need to control my interviewing relationship so that it did not transform into a full “we”

relationship. Knowing the dangers of conflating my experiences and meanings with those of my

43
participants, I was highly alert to my experience with my participants. I controlled my

interviewing relationship by adding some formality and emphasizing my researcher position. For

example, before starting interviews, I asked my participants if they wished to be called by their

first or last name. The fact that the interviewing relationship can be friendly but a not friendship

was an important issue that I reminded myself of during the study.

My interactions and exchanges with community leaders made me even more aware of

relations of power and the fluidity of identity. The power to include and exclude (e.g.,

membership to the FTAA, the ATS, or the Turkish Business Forum) was something that I could

not have ignored as individuals accused some Turkish American organizations of being elitist

and exclusionary. This recognition impressed upon me the active power relations involved in the

formation of Turkish American identity. With this challenge, I felt obligated to construct a

particular kind of investigation that proposes identity construction as a dynamic and contingent

process, in which individuals struggle in the face of spatial and institutional boundaries of

Turkishness and Americanness.

In conclusion, in this study I attempt to explore Turkish identities in the context of

history, media and migration (both global and national), institutions (Turkish, American, and

international), and people. Informed by theories of identity, migration and nationalism, this study

uses various research strategies for data collection and analysis such in-depth interviewing and

media analysis.

44
 CHAPTER IV

TURKISH IMMIGRATION HISTORY

The Turkish community in the United States is one of the least studied ethnic groups in

the United States, despite the fact that Turks have been immigrating to the United States for over

a century and today have significant numbers of members living in metropolitan areas such as

New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. Turkish speaking people began emigrating from the

Ottoman lands to the United States in significant numbers in the last quarter of the 19th century

and reached their highest level of immigration to the United States in the first two decades of the

20th century. Like other immigrants from elsewhere, such as Europe, Turks were drawn to the

New World as a result of labor shortages in the United States at the turn of the 20th century. Even

though the initial Turkish immigrant communities congregated in the north eastern states close to

their ports of entry (e.g., New York and Boston), they gradually filtered to areas of economic

pull such as Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston. Available sources indicate that whereas the

first wave overwhelmingly included unsophisticated villagers and farmers who came to the U.S.

mainly for economic reasons, the immigrants who came to the U.S. after WWII were mainly

college graduates who came for educational, training and economic purposes (Karpat, 1995).

Although it is almost impossible to give a very accurate number of Turkish immigrants,

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics indicate that a total of 450,539 people

immigrated to the United States during the period between 1820 and 2000. However, Turkish

immigration has not been steady over the past 180 years. From Turkish or Ottoman lands the

45
largest immigration to the United States took place in the 1900-1920 period, when 291,435

immigrants came to the United States (Figure 1). The slowest migration period occurred from

1920 to the 1950s. Immigration increased in the late 1950s when a large number of Turkish

professionals, such as doctors and engineers, came to the U.S. for educational and training

purposes.
Figure 1: Turkish Immigration to the U.S. (1820-2000)

Turkish Immigration to the US (1820-2000)

350000

291435
300000
Number of Immigrants

250000

200000

150000

100000

34207 34886 23541 38312

50000
705 4317
0

1821-1880 1881-1900 1901-1920 1921-1940 1941-1960 1961-1980 1981-2000

Years

Source: US Immigration and Naturalization Service Statistical Yearbook (2001)

The 1965 liberalization of U.S. immigration laws, which liberalized immigration from

Turkey and other places, was another factor leading to increasing immigration. Finally, as a

result of more liberal and encouraging laws passed by theTurkish government after the 1980s

and with an increasing openness to the outside world, another wave of immigration occurred in

more recent decades.

In this chapter, I examine Turkish immigration to the United States in three different

periods. First, I examine early Turkish immigration during the last few decades of the Ottoman

Empire until the end of the World War I in 1918. Second, I look at Turkish immigration to the

46
United States after World War II. Finally, I explore Turkish immigration after the 1980s. Each

period represent immigrants with different social, educational and economic backgrounds.
The First Immigration Wave: The Ottoman Turks
The first Turkish immigration wave to the United States occurred during the last years of

the Ottoman Empire. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 291,435

immigrants came to the United States during the period between 1900 and 1920 (Figure 2).

Ottoman figures indicate that 80,000 people emigrated between 1885 and 1912. The gap shows

the large number of immigrants coming to the United States without legal permission from the

Ottoman State. According to Ahmed (1986), many Turks came to the United States without

permission from the Ottoman authorities via Marseilles, France with the help of French shipping

agents who were shipping hazelnuts from Black Sea ports such as Trabzon to Marseilles. The

shipping agents took these immigrants from the Black Sea ports to Marseilles without charging

them, but the immigrants had to pay them for their passage to the United States.

Official U.S. statistics classify all immigrants from the Ottoman lands as Turks or identified

them being from Turkey. It is extremely difficult to get an accurate number of the Turks who

identified themselves as Turkish and immigrated during this period. Karpat (1996) estimates that

during the late 19th and the early 20th century, 1.2 million immigrants came from the Ottoman

lands, with about 200,000 of them being Muslim. Both Altschiller (1995) and Ahmed (1986)

estimate that only 45,000 to 65,000 of those 200,000 Muslim immigrants were Muslim Turks.

Among the 200,000 Muslim Ottomans who came to the United States were also non-Turkish

Muslim groups such as Arabs and Kurds.

47
Figure 2: Turkish Immigration to the U.S. before WWII

Turkish Immigration to the U.S before WWII

180,000
157,369
160,000
134,066
140,000
Number of Immigrants

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000
30,425 33,824
40,000
3,782
20,000
131 404 1,065
0

1861-70 1871-80 1881-90 1891-1900 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 1931-40

Years

Source: The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Fiscal Year 2000 Statistical Yearbook

The places of origin for these early Turkish immigrants included Anatolian cities such as

Harput, Elazig, Akcadag, Antep, Trabzon, Dersim, Siverek, Mersin, Izmir, Rize and Samsun,

and other Ottoman regions such as Macedonia or Albany and cities such as Beirut. The

missionary American college at Harput was a major source of information for many who

immigrated or wanted to immigrate. While the school’s main mission was to help the Christians

in the region, many Muslim Turks also benefited from the college’s activities. There were also

French and German schools that may have also helped to spread the word about the New World.

The stories of those who crossed the Atlantic and came to America, a land and culture

that was alien to them, are small snapshots from history. Here is a short story of a young man

who came to the United States;

I was 20 years of age, strong and even powerful in the view of some of my
friends. I longed for work but there was none. We were all desperate. Today in
Turkey this would be difficult to understand; now most of us are wealthy by the

48
 living standards in 1912. At our most desperate hour we heard there was a country
called America where jobs were abundant; workers were needed since the country
was under-populated. One was assured work if he was not blind, crippled or
sickly. We felt that America was opening its arms to everyone and beckoning all
to her shores regardless of nationality. We don’t know who first brought this word
to our village, but it was all we talked about. It was always a part of our
conversation and dreams. America became our hopes—it was our hope for living
(Quoted in Ahmed, 1986, 86).
Many such single young men left their homes with the hope of new opportunities. They had no

skills and knew no English but they were brave to take the challenge as they were coming into a

land of unknowns. This land was not only too far but also too different to these young men who

had never left their village back in Anatolia.

According to Ahmed (1986), much of the Turkish migration was mainly to urban areas

such as New York, the North Shore communities of Massachusetts (Peabody, Salem and Lynn),

Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Detroit. The majority of Turkish immigrants entered the

United States through Ellis Island. Ellis Island was the place of final judgment for many of the

immigrants as they had to prove their fitness to enter “Heaven” according to Frank Ahmed

(1986). Since US immigration officials did not classify those entering the country based on their

religion, we do not know much about the religion of the immigrants from the Ottoman Empire.

Most Muslims, including the Turks, were afraid of not being accepted in a Christian country

because of their faith. Hence many adopted and registered under a Christian name at the port of

entry (Karpat, 1995). Huseyin became Sam, Kayma became Alli, and Ahmed became Frank, and

so forth (Ahmed, 1986). Another strategy was to declare themselves as Armenians or (Christian)

Syrians to avoid discrimination and have easy access to the New World at the port of entry.

There were also Turks from the Balkans who registered as Albanians, Bulgarians or Serbians at

the time of entrance. All these contribute to the uncertainty of the number of the Turks entering

to the United States.

49
 My information on the lives of early Turkish immigrants is mainly based on the writings

of Frank Ahmed (1986), a second generation Turkish American, who wrote about the first

Turkish immigrants in New England and America’s Industrial North. According to Ahmed

(1986, xv), “The vast majority of these early Turkish immigrants were Anatolian farmers and

shepherds, most of whom had never seen a city of even a large village.” Their educational level

and economic status were much lower than the Turkish immigrants that would later come to the

United States. Many of these lower class Turks mainly came to the United States for economic

reasons and their goal was not to stay but to save some money so they could go back to Turkey,

and buy land and houses.

Another aspect of early Turkish immigration to the United States was that the vast

majority of the Ottoman immigrants, including both Muslim and non-Muslims, were males (with

the exception of a few bringing their wives or families). According to Ahmed (1986, xviii),

“their strong cultural viewpoint was to immigrate, get settled and then bring their wives and

families” afterwards. Turkish women did not immigrate to the United States until the conclusion

of World War II. This was a clear indication of the male immigrants’ intentions of temporary

stay. Ahmed (1986) points out that the reason why Turkish men did not bringing their families

was misunderstood by Americans and the issue was discussed in local newspapers with the

suggestion made that this was against the immigrants’ religion. Ahmed (1986) makes it clear that

this was not unique to Muslim Ottoman immigrants because there were also peoples of other

faiths from the Ottoman lands who did not bring their families along with themselves when they

first emigrated.

Most of the early Turkish immigrants worked in the factories of New York, Detroit,

Chicago, and the leather factories of New England. Both Karpat (1995) and Ahmed (1986) agree

that most of these Turks lived in isolation from the larger society because of their lack of English

and their cultural and religious differences. Primary meeting places were “Turkish coffee

50
houses” where they would get together to chat, play cards or gamble. This changed after a large

number of the Turks returned to Turkey because of the establishment of the new state, the

Turkish Republic in 1923. Those who stayed in the United States often married Irish, Italian and

French Canadian women (the majority of Turks lived in the northeast) and started a new life in

America, while keeping many of their traditions from their original culture.

Turkish immigration from Turkey to the United States slowed tremendously after World

War I. The number of people who came to the United States from Turkey from 1931 to 1940 was

only 1,065. This slow down was a result of three developments (INS, 2001). First, a new nation

state, Turkey, was established in 1923, and Turkey tried to attract immigrants who identified

themselves with the Turks’ Ottoman past, including Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks and

so on. Second, the non-Muslims staying in Turkey were deprived of the special protection of the

Western powers because of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and therefore many of non-Muslim did

not leave Turkey as a result of out migration including to the United States (Karpat, 1995).

Finally, the United States limited immigration from Turkey to 100 per year starting in 1924 when

the immigration laws were tightened considerably and this quota was filled primarily by non-

Turks such as Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians. Therefore, following the largest period of

Turkish immigration to the United States in the first two decades of the twentieth century,

Turkish immigration to the United States following the 1920s was extremely low.
The Great Return
One interesting feature of early Turkish immigration to the United States is the large

number of returnees, that is those who went back to Turkey after emigrating to the United States.

According to Karpat (1995), the rate of returnees among Ottoman immigrants was about one

third of Christians and possibly more than half of the Muslims, despite legal difficulties and the

difficulty of readjustment to their old culture. Some estimate that about 86 percent of Turks

returned to Turkey during the years before and after the Great Depression (Halman, 1980).

51
Ahmed (1986) predicts that over 25,000 Turks returned to Turkey during the years after World

War I. This had a great impact on the Turks who stayed because they became a minority in the

neighborhoods where they once dominated. The establishment of the new Turkish Republic and

its encouragement of Turks living outside Turkey to return, as well as difficulties in adapting to

life in the United States were some of the reasons for return. Oz (Osman) Bengur, a second

generation Turkish American and a banker in Baltimore who ran in the Democratic Party

primary for the US Congress in 2002, told me that his father wanted to return to Turkey after a

40-year stay in the United States, though he never did. This longing to return many years after

emigrating is still felt among first generation Turkish-Americans because they always thought

that they were coming to America temporarily. This sense of temporality caused them to not

build institutions such as schools and mosques which would have strengthened their community.

Furthermore, they were having difficulties in terms of understanding how to establish institutions

in a predominantly Christian country. In their early times in America, Turks did not have a

strong sense of their nationality as they did during the time of the Ottomans when the center of

group identity was religion, not Turkishness. As a result, Turkish immigrants mainly used

mosques that were already established by other Muslim groups or used their cultural centers as

places of gathering and worship.

Those who returned were both Turkish and non-Turkish previous Ottoman citizens.

Halman (1980) argues that most of those who returned were well educated while those who

stayed were mainly illiterates who had little or no knowledge of English and worked as unskilled

laborers. Such a great rate of return had significant impacts on those who stayed behind in the

United States (Halman, 1980).

Gordon (1931) estimated that about 70,000 naturalized Americans returned to Turkey and

questions regarding the returnees’ rights caused endless controversy between Ottoman (Turkish)

and American governments. The seriousness of the problem called forth an allusion to it in then

52
President Cleveland’s annual message to the Congress in 1893 (Gordon, 1931). The dispute was

mainly over the rights of Armenian returnees, who were naturalized American citizens and asked

for American protection, and their obligations to the Ottoman government. While the security of

Armenians was an issue, many of them owned property in Turkey but did not pay any taxes.

They wanted to be exempted from Ottoman military laws and the law of expatriation. In his

message the President stated: “Turkey complains that her Armenian subjects obtain citizenship in

this country not to identify themselves in good faith with our people but with the intention of

returning to the land of their birth and there engaging in sedition. This complaint is not wholly

without foundation” (Gordon, 1931, 661).

The President also mentioned that an Armeanian journal published in New York called

its readers to arm, organize and participate in the movements for the subversion of Ottoman

authority in eastern parts of Turkey. Gordon (1931, 662) states, “whenever they (Armenians) had

some selfish or mercenary reason to demanding American protection, they literally wrapped

themselves in the American flag and defied the Ottoman Government.” Therefore, the Ottoman

Government told the US Government that it would expel from its dominions all Armenians who

had became naturalized citizens of the United States since 1869. During this dispute between the

two countries, there were cases where the rights of American citizens were violated, but there

were also cases where unjustifiable claims were reported. After many dialogues between the

Turkish and US Governments, both countries changed their citizenship policies. According to the

new law, if a naturalized American citizen of Turkish origin later returned Turkey permanently,

the intent of permanence is to be based on a two-year continuous residency. Therefore, if s/he

stays in Turkey more than two years, then s/he has to fulfill the citizenship requirements of

Turkish State (Gordon, 1931).

53
The Second Wave of Immigration: Professionals
A second wave of migration occurred after World War II. The total number of Turkish

immigrants, according to the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, in the period between

1941 and 1980 was approximately 30,000 (Figure 3). Unlike the earlier wave of immigrants, the

post-World War II generation was highly educated and included about 4,000 physicians and

engineers. Other professionals also came to the U.S., in spite of strict US immigration

regulations during the period from 1924 to 1965, which allowed only 100 Turkish immigrants

per year (Altschiller, 1995). Karpat (1995) estimates that the number of such professionals for

the period between 1948 and 1980 range from 10 to 50 thousand. While some of those

professionals returned to Turkey after living in the United States for a brief period, the majority

stayed. “The political rapprochement between Turkey and the United States that started with the

Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the country’s inclusion in NATO in 1952 gave a new momentum

to the Turks’ search for professional specialization in the United States ” (Karpat, 1995, 238).

Many of these professionals also viewed the American education system as pragmatic and

practically oriented compared the system in Europe and came to the United States for training.

The second wave immigrants identified themselves largely in nationalistic terms and

established Turkish Americans organizations for bringing members of the Turkish American

community together and for promoting Turkish culture in the United States. For these purposes

organizations such as the Turkish American Society (1949) and the Turkish Women’s League of

America (1958) were founded. Second wave immigrants also founded umbrella organizations

such as the Federation of Turkish American Associations (1956) and the Assembly of Turkish

American Associations (1979).

Since the early 1970s, the number of Turkish immigrants has increased to more than

2,000 per year. The Turkish law that forbade its citizens to take citizenship of another country

likely negatively affected the number of Turkish immigrants in the United States. Turks were

54
only allowed to have dual citizenship after 1985. The issues of identity and ethnicity differed

between this group of professionals and their Ottoman predecessors because they identified

themselves as Turks and organized and participated in the activities that help to promote

Turkishness as a major part of their identity while the Ottomanness or Muslimness was at the

center of the identities of early Turkish immigrants. Also, although the vast majority of

immigrants in this group were male, there were also some families as well as a few females.
Figure 3: Turkish Immigration to the U.S. between 1930 and 1980

Turkish Immigration to the U.S (1930-1980)

16,000
13,399
Number of Immigrants

14,000

12,000

10,000
10,142

8,000

6,000

4,000 3,519
2,000
1,065 798
0

1931-40 1941–50 1951–60 1961–70 1971–80

Years

Source: The US Immigration and Naturalization Service Statistical Yearbook (2001)

This group positioned themselves in the middle or upper classes in the United States

because of their relatively high education and high incomes. Many of these professionals, who

were mostly male, married Americans but continued to promote Turkish culture and nationality

through groups and personal efforts. While there might be some Turkish citizens that were

Kurdish or other ethnic groups, the vast majority was Turkish.

Increasing immigration after the 1960s was largely a result of the relative liberalization of

American immigration policies in 1965 as the "National Origins Quota Act" of 1924 was deemed

discriminatory and designed to curtail immigration from new source countries such as Turkey,

Russia, Poland, and Italy by allocating them small quotas. The act allowed immigration from
55
older source countries, such as England, by giving them large quotas. The quotas were set at two

percent of a country's foreign-born residents in the United States in 1890. With new

modifications in the law in 1929, quotas were allocated consistent with the national origins or

roots of the total U.S. population, increasing England's quota. While the annual number of

Turkish immigrants was only 100 per year prior to the 1950s, the number slightly increased in

the post World War II era as the discriminatory provisions against most Asian countries were

somewhat relaxed by the 1952 Act. Therefore, the number of Turkish immigrants exceeded 100

per year quota before the 1965 legislation. In 1965, President Johnson convinced Congress to

pass a new Immigration Act. This new immigration law dismantled quotas based on national

origin, race or religion (Shanks, 2002). The number of Turkish immigrants increased to over

1,000 per year following the 1965 Act (Karpat, 1995).

While the majority of Turkish immigrants during the post World War II era were highly

skilled and well educated professionals, there was a group of semi-skilled workers, as well as

highly skilled artisans and tailors that came to the United States during the late 1960s through the

early 1980s (Halman, 1980). For example, the city of Rochester, NY has a large community of

these groups, some of which have today established their own businesses. Unlike the early

immigrants, this group came with their families. This group was more conservative when

compared to the group of professionals who came to the U.S. around the same time.

Besides the Turks from Turkey, there was a significant number of Turks from former

Soviet Union Republics, particularly from the Crimea and Caucasus, who came to the United

States as refugees via Turkey. While the majority of these Turkic people identify themselves as

Turks, there are ones such as Characins who claim that they have lingual and cultural differences

that make them different from the Turks from Turkey. Most of these Turkic groups came to the

U.S. during the late 1960s and 1970s and today, they actively participate in Turkish-American

activities.

56
The Third Wave of Immigration (1980-2000): Diverse Groups
As a result of globalization and the changing political attitudes by the Turkish state,

interest in the world outside Turkey increased in the 1980s. Particularly during the Özal

administration during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the new government’s encouragement for

openness and competition along with television’s role in introducing the outside world had great

impacts on the Turkish people’s involvement in the globalizing world and more aggressively

pursue opportunities outside Turkey. People of all social statuses participated in this new trend.

While there has been a great increase in the number of students, particularly graduate students

coming to the United States, for professional training and specialization, many unskilled and

semiskilled laborers also came to the United States legally or illegally (Figure 4). The number of

Turkish students enrolled in U.S. institutions reached 15,000 in 2003 and Turkey ranked the

ninth in terms of the number of international student enrolments in American educational

institutions (AA, 2003). Most of these students are graduate students studying in a variety of

specialty areas.

Compared to Turkey, the cost of education in the U.S. is much higher than it is in Turkey.

Therefore, these students have to find ways to support themselves while studying. The Turkish

Ministry of Education (MEB) and the Turkish Institution of Higher Education (YOK) give

financial support to around 2,000 students and there is a significant number that receives

financial aid from various U.S. institutions in the form of graduate or research assistantships.

Many are also supported by their families, while some work to support themselves. Those who

work to support themselves may end up only working or starting their businesses because of the

expense of paying high out-of-state tuitions and living expenses. In most cases, Turkish students

have established student organizations that help newcomers adjust to life in the U.S. and to

promote Turkish culture and nationality on their school campuses. While the majority of Turkish

students leave the U.S. after completing their studies, there is also a significant number

57
Figure 4: Turkish Immigration to the U.S. after 1989

Turkish Imigration to the U.S after 1989

4,000
3,500
Number of Immigrants

3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001
Years

Source: The US Immigration and Naturalization Service Fiscal Year 2000 Statistical Yearbook

Another group of Turkish immigrants in the U.S. includes unskilled or semiskilled

Turkish laborers with no college education while some have a high school education. Many of

these workers have come to the United States illegally or overstayed their visas. Some of these

illegal immigrants worked in cargo ships, and when the ships were at port in the U.S., they

would leave and never come back to their ships.4 Today, they mostly work in grocery stores,

restaurants or construction companies, mostly owned by other Turks, as wage labor. Some have

succeeded and opened their own businesses and obtained green cards or U.S. citizenship. Akinci

(2002) calls this trend of immigration as the “Germanification” of Turkish Americans because of

their resemblance to Turkish immigrants who went to Germany as guest workers during the 1960

and the 1970s (Akinci, 2002). This group in most cases does not have English proficiency and is

4
The tales of their journey to the United States are always fun to hear. There were cases when the ship was about to
leave port, there was no crew to go with. I heard these sorts of stories from many during my field work in New
York.
58
totally dependent upon fellow immigrants who had come before them. As Karpat (1995, 243)

suggests, “as the European labor markets proved unable to absorb the Turkish labor surplus,

mainly after 1990, the United States became the chief target for legal and, especially, illegal

emigration. Would-be Turkish immigrants are not only peasants but upper, middle and lower

class urbanites seeking high rewards according to their skills.”

Turkish immigration to the United States has been different from Turkish immigration

European states such as Germany. The majority of Turkish immigrants who went to Europe were

did not have much education and were mainly peasants from Anatolian villages, who went to

Europe for economic reasons (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996). While the early immigrants who

came to the United States had similar backgrounds, the post-World War II Turkish immigrants

were highly educated. Educational and training were primary reasons for these immigrants to

come to the United States. Moreover, the integration of Turkish immigrants into American

society is greater than the integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Most Turkish

immigrants in Germany lived in isolation (Argun, 2003). This was not only because of low levels

of education among these immigrants but also because of German government’s reluctance to

grant full citizenship and other rights to Turkish immigrants. Turks in the United States are more

integrated to the larger society as a result of high levels of education of the immigrants and

American policies towards citizenship and diversity (Horrocks and Kolinsky, 1996).
The Number and Location of Turks in America and New York Turks
As of the 1990s, the number of Turkish-Americans ranged from 100,000 to 400,000

according to Altschiller (1995). According to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a

total of 450,539 people immigrated to the United States from Turkey during the period 1820 to

2000. However, as previously mentioned, this number is not a clear indication of the number of

Turks who immigrated to the United States because it also includes many early non-Muslim and

Muslim citizens who were not Turkish in terms of their ethnicity. While the vast majority of

59
those who came after World War II were ethnic Turks, there were also some Kurds and members

of other ethnic groups. There have also been a number of illegal immigrants, which adds to the

uncertainty of the number. Since many Turkish Americans do not participate in census surveys

and those who participate often identify themselves as white rather than as Turkish-Americans, it

becomes difficult to give an exact number of Turkish-Americans. The Census Bureau reports

117,619 people who identified themselves as Turkish-Americans in 2002 Census . However, this

is far below the estimated number of Turkish-Americans. According to the Turkish Consulate to

the U.S., Mehmet Ezen, there are approximately 350,000 Turks living in the United States. When

we add other Turkic language groups that have come to the United States from the Balkans,

China, the former Soviet Union, various Middle Eastern countries, Europe and Cyprus, the

number may be even larger. Groups such as Turkestanis, Azerbaijanis, and Crimean Tatars

consider themselves as separate ethnic groups on occasions but affiliate with Turks at other

times. For example, I witnessed participation of all these groups in NYC’s Turkish Day Parade

in May 2002.

The majority of Turkish Americans live in the tri-state area of New York, New Jersey,

and Connecticut. Immigration to California and the western United States increased after the

1970s. Most who went to the West were professionals such as engineers, scientists, and

university professors (Karpat, 1995). According to 2000 Census data, New York State (23,674,

Figure 6), California (15,104, Figure 7), New Jersey (12,396, Figure 8) and Florida (9,615,

Figure 9) have the largest number of Turkish-American concentration. They mainly live in large

urban areas such as New York, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and

Rochester, NY. As well, it should be recognized that Turks have spread out to other parts of the

United States, with Turkish Americans living in all fifty states (Figure 5).

According to Ferris (1995, 1203), “Turkish-speaking Muslims from the Ottoman Empire

settled in New York from the late eighteen century and numbered 1401 in 1900.” However, it did

60
not take a half-century for them to reach a figure of 17,663 by the 1960s. During these years the

Turks who migrated had low levels of education and mainly worked in low paid jobs. Between

70,000 and 100,000 of Turks live in New York (Ferris, 1995). The city’s Turks became

dispersed throughout the city with large concentrations in Brighton Beach and Coney Island in

Brooklyn, around Rivington and Forsythe Streets in Manhattan, and in Sunnyside and Richmond

Hills in Queens. Paterson, Clifton, and Cliffside Park in New Jersey’s New York suburbs have

significant Turkish-American communities, while Long Island also has a Turkish-American

population.

Many Turks opened small businesses in parts of New York and surrounding areas and

created Turkish-American organizations. According to Ferris (1995), Turks work in various

different jobs from owning filling stations, supermarkets, restaurants, and import-export firms to

driving taxi cabs and working in restaurants. During my field research in the summer of 2002, I

was told that 60 percent of gas stations in Long Island are owned by Turks. The number of

Turkish gas stations owners in New Jersey is also very high. Many Turkish restaurants can be

found in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, New Jersey, and Long Island.

By the 1990s, Turkish-American citizens began to play a visible role in New York’s

affairs. For example, the Federation of Turkish-American Associations (FTAA) fought to change

the use of the English term “Turkey” to its counterpart Turkiye. Moreover, the city government

designated a Turkish-American week as the week closest to 19 May, the Turkish Youth and

Sport Holiday, which has significant importance in modern Turkish history. More conservative

Turks have opened two private schools in the area, one in Brooklyn, NY and the other in Clifton,

NJ. They have also opened several mosques in Long Island, Brooklyn, Paterson and Queens.

Ahmet Ertegun, the founder and owner of Atlantic Records, is one of the most prominent

Turkish-Americans in New York. He is also chairman for the Turkish American Society (ATS).

Others include Arif Mardin, one of the major popular music producers and arrangers in America

61
whose clients include Aretha Franklin, Bette Miller, Roberta Flack, Carly Simon and so forth. As

home to the largest Turkish population in the United States, the New York metropolitan area

provides an excellent location to study Turkish American identity.

Closing Thoughts
I categorize Turkish immigration to the United States in three different periods. First,

there were the Ottoman Turkish immigrants who came with other Ottoman citizens from ethnic

groups other than Turks during the period between 1820 and 1920. They mostly included

illiterate single male peasants who did not have a strong national identity. While the majority of

this group returned after the establishment of the modern Turkish State, those who stayed lived

in isolation as they preferred to live among themselves. However, the same thing cannot be said

about their children, who mainly were assimilated into American culture. These Turkish

descendants today vaguely have a notion that they have a Turkish ancestor. The children of

earlier Turkish immigrants, situated within a pre-World War II context emphasizing assimilation,

were by most accounts quite successful in their efforts at assimilating into the American cultural

context. I would argue that if it were not for renewed Turkish immigration in the postwar period,

Turkish Americans might have been totally assimilated themselves out of existence. Such

assimilation was a result of the lack of contact with the country of origin due to the unavailability

of modern communication and transportation. The demographic characteristics of the early

Turkish American community were another reason for the large degree of assimilation as the

early community included mainly single young men who married Americans and members of

other ethnic groups, and melted into the larger culture. Children of these mixed marriages have

been largely assimilated into the larger American culture.

The second immigration wave consisted of professionals who came to the United States

in the period between the late 1950s and early 1980s. The immigrants were, in general, highly

educated men, some women and families. While the majority included professionals, there were

62
also a significant number of semi-skilled workers and artisans such as tailors and other Turkic

groups who formerly left the former Soviet Union after WWII and came to the United States as

refugees after staying in Turkey for a brief period.

Finally, we have another wave of immigration that started in the mid 1980s and

accelerated in the 1990s. This group is the most diverse of all as it includes professionals, some

businessmen, unskilled and semiskilled workers and a large number of students. While this

group is mainly young and eager to seek new opportunities in America, they are more

conservative and nationalistic in their identities.

With the introduction of the Diversity Immigration Visa Program (well known as the US

Lottery System), more and more Turkish immigrants of all walks of life began arriving in the US

(as the quota for Turkey is 2000 per year). Thousands of Turks have applied for this program

every year since the mid 1990s for the purpose of acquiring permanent residency in the United

States.

Turkish immigrants who came to the United States in the post World War II era, mainly

have higher educational levels and the vast majority are college graduates. In terms of their

educational levels, this group of Turkish immigrants is radically different from both the early

Turkish Immigrants and the Turks who went to European countries such as France and Germany

during the 1960s and 1970s as guest workers. Even many of the Turkish-Americans working in

restaurants or grocery stores have college degrees or at least a high school degree. They

journeyed to America because they view the U.S. as the place of opportunities, particularly

economic opportunities. From my observations, this high level of education helps Turks find

their niche in America as it helps them to learn the system more quickly and find jobs. Most

young college graduate Turkish immigrants work during certain hours of the day and study

English at the other times after they arrive to America. Learning English makes life much easier

63
for these new immigrants and those who do not have strong educational backgrounds have less

desire to learn English and therefore face more difficulties.

5
Figure 5: Turkish-Americans by State (2000)

5
The source of data for all the maps is US Census 2000
64
Figure 6: Turkish Americans In New York

Figure 7: Turkish Americans in California

65
Figure 8: Turkish Americans In New Jersey

Figure 9: Turkish Americans in Florida

66
 CHAPTER V

TURKISH POLITICAL HISTORY

In order to understand Turkish-American identity, one must not only examine Turkish

immigration and the life experiences of Turks in the United States but also the history of Turkey

and the construction of Turkishness as a continuous historical process. While differences exist,

there are parallels between the identities of Turkish immigrants to the U.S. and the formation of

Turkish identity in Turkey. Therefore, it is informative to examine the formation of modern

Turkey and the identities of its people. In this chapter, I provide an overview of Turkey along

with its political history and contesting identities. Turkey lies at the intersection of very different

civilizations, religions, histories, and geographies, and all these shape Turkish identity politics in

Turkey as well as among Turkish Americans. Because of multiple histories, divergent

ideological positions, and ethnic diversity, the issue of identity is a frequent topic of debate in

Turkey as it is among Turkish Americans.

The modern Turkish nation state emerged out of the ashes of the multi-ethnic and multi-

religious Ottoman Empire that ruled over three continents (western Asia, eastern Europe and

North Africa). The most disruptive ideology that threatened and later tore the Empire apart was

nationalism. Influenced by the French Revolution and ideas of nationalism, peoples of different

ethnic and religious groups struggled to carve new nation states out of the Ottoman Empire

throughout the 19th century and early 20th centuries. The outcome was many new states in the

Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East (Karpat, 1974). Turkish nationalism was a product of

67
a context in which battles with insurgent nationalities within the Empire encouraged a sense of

cohesion among the remaining peoples, as the Ottoman Empire was reduced to Turks and

Muslim groups such as Arabs and Kurds (Ergil, 2000). However, as more and more Muslim

ethnic groups abandoned the Ottomans, the only practical alternative left for the Ottoman Turks

to follow was Turkish nationalism (Guvenc, 1998).

The Ottomans organized different groups on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity,

regardless of the diversity within each religious tradition. Ergil (2000) notes that with the

collapse of Ottoman Empire, Turkey lost its cosmopolitan character and vast chunks of territory,

which left imprints on Turkish political culture. Fear of division and rebellion continually

disturbed the Turkish elite and caused increasing suspicion of outsiders, who were suspected of

harboring the intention of dividing up the country.

Breaking away from the Past
The founding elite of the Turkish republic consisted of the young military and civilian

officers of the Ottoman administration. Among this elite group were the Young Turks who were

actively participating in the politics of the Ottoman Empire in its later years. The Young Turks

challenged the absolutism of Ottoman rule and built a rich tradition of opposition that shaped late

Ottoman life both intellectually and politically. This tradition of opposition laid the foundation

for Atatürk's revolution. These elites had very strong centralist tendencies and a great desire to

break totally away from the dynastic and religious past, with the intention of creating a country

based on national and secular values, which then let them legitimize their position as the new

ruling elite (Ergil, 2000). This intention of disassociation from the past became the elite group’s

main policy, allowing them to see the Turkish people as an entity ready to be shaped consistent

with their vision of what a society and nation should be (Ergil, 2000).

The years following Turkey’s independence (1923) were the times of reformation and re-

creation of Turkey and Turkishness. History was re-written, language reforms were

68
implemented, and social life was engineered. The Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin

alphabet and Arabic and Persian words were eliminated from the daily language. The Ottoman

legal and civil laws were diminished and replaced by Swiss, French and Italian ones. As

Anderson states (1983, p. 48), “to heighten Turkish-Turkey’s national identity consciousness at

the expense of any wider Islamic identification, Ataturk imposed compulsory romantization.”

For the quest for a new unifying identity, long forgotten pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic roots were

re-introduced to provide an ideological glue for national unity (Ergil, 2000).

The new regime cut ties with the past and religion. This was done in a number of ways

such as abolishing the Sultanate, the Ottoman dynasty, and the Caliphate, the spiritual pinnacle

of Sunni Muslims. These kinds of reforms not only served to break from the past but also from

the Islamic world as the Ottoman sultan had been recognized by Muslims as the head of the

Islamic world. The secularization of the educational system and the encouragement of modern

clothing were other revolutions for the formation of new identities of Turkishness (Lewis, 1961).

As equally important, the new government took control over all religious institutions and their

financial resources. This was, in a way, nationalization and appropriation of religion for the

purpose of creating national unity among different ethnic Muslim groups whose commonality

was Islam (Yavuz, 2000). This in and of itself was paradoxical because the Turkish

establishment (the ruling elite) strictly enforced secularism. In fact, they have gradually

transformed secularism (or laicism) to a religion-like political ideology called “Kemalism”

(Guvenc, 1998). The majority of these policies were enforced mainly in urban Turkey, while

traditional life in rural areas, which made up about 80 percent of the population during the

second quarter of the 20th century, remained very much the same. As Ergil (2000, 47) puts it,

“this change created a volatile social fabric where the new and old, the modern and the

traditional, East and West, the secular and the anti-secular, and the rich and the poor lived side

by side with few points of contact.”

69
 Like modernists elsewhere, the Turkish ruling elite believed that the new Turkish identity

would make ethnic and cultural differences disappear and all groups would become alike under

the same secular laws (Hennayake, 1992). Islam was appropriated for creating unity among

Turkish citizens including minorities because Turkishness was not accepted by all the ethnic

groups in Turkey. For instance, the Kurds were called “Mountain Turks,” implying that the

Kurds were not actually a separate ethnic group but were people of Turkish origin who lived in

the mountainous areas of Turkey (Olson, 1998). As Yavuz (2001, 7) puts it nicely,

Turkish national identity was modeled on the Islamic conception of community

and was disseminated through Islamic terms. The incorporation of religious
vocabulary helped to nationalize Islamic identity. Examples of this include the
incorporation of words, such as millet (referring to a religious community in the
Ottoman empire, appropriated by the Republic to mean "nation"), vatan
(homeland), gazi (the title of Mustafa Kemal, referring to those who fought in the
name of Islam) and sehid (those who died for the protection and dissemination of
Islam), into the nationalist lexicon.
What all this suggests is that while the new Turkish state claimed a secular Turkish identity, it

did not hesitate to appropriate Islam as the glue for forming unity among its peoples.

The ruling elite implemented reforms and policies to erase differences for the purpose of

creating a homogeneous “nation state.” While most Armenians were deported during the last few

years of the Ottoman rule, population exchanges of Turks (or rather Muslims) in the Balkans

with the remaining Greeks during the early years of the Republic helped this homogenization

process. Nevertheless, while differences could not be erased, the new Turkish identity did not

fully replace the Ottoman identity, which was ethnically neutral. With the processes of

urbanization, migration and globalization, people from these different segments and classes of

Turkish society came into contact, and in these contacts there were clashes of identities.
The Struggle for Power and Clash of Identities
While the mentality of the ruling elite, Kemalism, an authoritarian Westernization

project, has not changed much, Turkey as a nation has changed greatly both socially and
70
politically since it was founded in 1923. With the impacts of globalization, rising educational

levels, and the introduction of new ideas, ordinary people demand more democracy and

freedoms. Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership and integration has increased such demands.

The official Turkish identity has often been challenged and questioned. Turkey has become

confused and hesitant in terms of what it is and what it wants to be as the demands of the ruling

elite and ordinary people differ. Turks have mainly embraced modernity and want less

government involvement in their lives.

The people’s identity claims, which emphasize freedom of speech, thought, religion, and

expression, do not overlap with the official identity that the ruling elite stresses (Ozdalga, 1998).

Such conflicting identity demands and negotiations threaten the privileged status of the

establishment, which causes constant tensions and crises in Turkey. Former New York Times

correspondent Stephen Kinzer (2001, 10), who lived in Turkey for four years, writes: “In the

generations that have passed since then (since Ataturk), Turkey has become an entirely different

nation. It is as vigorous and as thirsty for democracy as any on earth. But its leaders, who fancy

themselves Atatürk's heirs, fiercely resist change. They believe that Turks cannot yet be trusted

with the fate of their nation that an elite must continue to make all important decisions because

the people are not mature enough to do so.”

Groups such as Leftists, Kurds, and Islamic activists have challenged Kemalism since the

beginning of Turkey and confronted the policies and practices of the ruling elite, the ultimate

power holder (Ozdalga, 1998). During the 1960s vibrant leftist movements shaped politics for

the following two decades as they pushed for more freedoms. Although the state held strong

control over politics, there was also a rise of populist nationalism and religious revivalism during

this period. Religious organizations grew rapidly in the 1970s as they helped those of lesser

means cope with the problems of modernization and became clubs for excluded groups seeking

solidarity in a changing world. These were also times when the Nationalist Action Party, with an

71
emphasis on Turkish nationalism, and the Nationalist Order Party, with its Islamist emphasis,

came into existence to play a role in Turkish politics. While the Nationalist Action party was

closed after the 1980 military coup, four parties from the Nationalist Order Party tradition,

including the Welfare Party, whose leader became prime minister after 1995 elections, have been

banned from politics (Yavuz, 2000).

After the 1980 military coup, all political parties were banned. In the following years, the

head of the Turkish military became president and new parties were established. However,

Turgut Ozal founded the Motherland Party in 1983. Ozal, the rising star and future president of

Turkey, was able to incorporate different political and ideological trends into the party structure,

which helped to ease existing political tensions as the years of polarization created tensions of all

kinds among different groups. Ozal implemented a series of economic and social reforms that led

to an economic boom and opened the country to the outside world despite high inflation, low

productivity, and a skewed income distribution. Regardless of Ozal’s efforts for social reforms,

the issues of modernization, change management and legal and political liberalization remained

unresolved. Ozal suddenly died in 1993, and his reforms did not continue.

Today, large segments of Turkish society do not accept what is being imposed on them and are

unhappy with these elitist practices. Ethnic, religious and ideological identities are polarized and

room for reconciliation is lacking. The official nationalism is seen as isolationist and statist as it

puts the state in the center of social life as the provider and protector, as well as the source of

political power (Kinzer, 2001).

This process of othering and exclusion by the ruling elite, or what some call “White

Turks,” has marginalized the Muslim Turkish masses and minorities such as the Kurds. Islam

and minority politics have been the oppositional identity for the marginalized and excluded

segments of the Turkish society. While over 90 percent of Kurds do not want an independent

state, their desire for cultural recognition is viewed as separatist (Ergil, 2000). Broadcasting and

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education in Kurdish was only allowed in August 2002, when the parliament passed a series of

laws as part of their plans for European integration. Even then, the state has not yet allowed

private parties to broadcast in Kurdish and a government television channel is preparing for this

purpose. The state’s fears and desires for control are not helping the democratization process in

this venue.

Expressions of Islamic identity (e.g., headscarves) are banned from public space such as

government offices and universities. Regardless of all bans and restrictions, the Islamic

movement has managed to be a source of power for the marginalized and excluded (Ozdalga,

1998). The religious-based Welfare Party finished first in the 1995 elections, with 21.7 percent

of the vote, gaining the largest number of seats in the parliament. The leader of the party was

later forced to leave office and the party was closed with claims that it did not comply with the

secular rule of the country. The party’s leader, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was banned

from politics by the constitutional court influenced by the establishment. However, just before

the 2002 elections, a new conservative party, AK (Justice and Development) Party emerged. The

former mayor of Istanbul and charismatic leader of the AK Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was a

former member of the Welfare Party. His AK Party won 363 seats in the 550-seat Turkish

parliament (Time, 2002). Erogan became Prime Minister regardless of the large media campaign

against him and his party.

Today, virtually all Islamic and Kurdish groups support EU membership for economic,

political and social reasons. The belief is that if Turkey becomes a member of the European

Union, it will not only help economic prosperity, but also normalize Turkey politically and

socially as they see Western practices of secularism and pluralism as being more democratic and

inclusive (Kosebalaban, 2002). The 1997 coup had the greatest influence on political Islam as it

forced its proponents to reexamine their political agendas as well as their language of discourse.

They have framed their discussions of democracy, law, and justice in more universal terms,

73
consistently emphasized the virtues of secularism and identified themselves as Muslim

democrats, an Islamic form of the Christian Democratic movement in Europe.

According to Kinzer (2001), the position of the Turkish ruling elite along with its

Kemalist ideology, an authoritarian Westernization project, has been viewed by the public as the

source of the contemporary crisis and the main obstacle for Turkey’s democratization, economic

and social development because it refuses to accept the changes in the Turkish society. The

ruling elite including bureaucrats such as military commanders and prosecutors, and “loyal”

newspaper editors are trapped in the 1920s of Turkey. They resist increasing pressure from

worldly Turks who want their country to break free of its chains to become more democratic

(Kinzer, 2001).

The problems of state and political authoritarianism have haunted Turkey for almost 80

years. Regardless of all the efforts of state institutions, particularly educational institutions at all

levels, and the media, an ideal homogenous national identity has never been achieved. As a

result, the least integrated segments of society have been ethnic groups such as the Kurds and

religious groups who have not found the identity being imposed on them as being inclusive, but

rather as being exclusive. The lack of clear definitions of separatism (boluculuk) and

fundamentalism (irtica) makes it difficult to discriminate separatists from cultural rights

defender and fundamentalists from a devout Muslims. It is all subjective and arbitrary. Today,

the most sensitive issues of discussion in Turkey are the issues of secularization and ethnic

nationalism as the hegemonic power of the ruling elite, White Turks, still remains unchallenged.

As Ergil (2001, 54) puts it,

All of these elements demonstrate the potency and significance of the debate around the
nature of the regime in Turkey. Can we come to a consensus on the regime to reconcile
and to include all groups, opinions and convictions? The lack of such a consensus has not
served the interest of society and has failed to bring the prominence and prosperity for
which the nation yearns so much. It remains to be seen if Turkey perpetuates its anti-
democratic secularist policy; or decides to create a new democratic constitution where
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 traditional groups with religious sensitivities, as well as citizens with other ethnic
backgrounds, can feel included. If the official policy of laicism has failed to secularize
society because it has not been supported by commercialization, industrialization, modern
education and urbanization, then religious affairs should be taken from state control and
left to civil society. Only then can the sociological process of secularization proceed.
Turkey’s modernization project started with revolutions and success; but Kinzer (2001, 21)

argues that “something about the concept of diversity frightens Turkey's ruling elite. It triggers

the deep insecurity that has gripped Turkish rulers ever since the Republic was founded in 1923.”

Closing Thoughts
In this chapter, I provided a brief political history of Turkey and its role in the creation of

multiple identities. The role of institutions (e.g., state, media) in the creation and reconstruction

of identities has been highlighted, as Giddens (1991) argues that modernity and identity must be

understood at institutional levels. Turkish political history provides a great example in terms of

the fluidity, complexity, and temporality of identity (Keith and Pile, 1993).

Moreover, Turkey has not been able to create a system that includes all segments of

society with all of its diversity (Kinzer, 2001). In fact, since politics have been so much polarized

and social life has been disrupted, there has been a clash of identities. The clash is between the

ruling elite and ordinary Turks, and it is the central fact and dilemma of this state striving to be

more modern. The Kemalist coalition (White Turks) that includes businessmen, powerful media

forces, the military, and the state courts and prosecutors has taken part in this process of

exclusion or polarization. The lack of dialogue and negotiation, which are fundamental for

democracy, has left little space for differences (Ergil, 2000). Fears and lack of understanding

determine the nature of conversation (that is, if there is any to begin with). The same sorts of

notions, or rather baggage, have been carried by immigrant Turks and by Turkish state officials

to America and other parts of the world. Similar clashes are experienced among the members of

75
the first generation Turkish American community. What is experienced is a crisis of identities.

Multiplicity of identity is at the core of these debates over identity and power.

In the next two chapters, I examine multiple Turkish identities (whether imported from

Turkey or formed in the United States). I provide voices from Turkish Americans about their

identities and negotiation of their meanings. The positions that my interviewees take reflect the

diversity and multiplicity in being Turkish and in being Turkish American. Besides experiencing

similar identity clashes as Turks in Turkey, Turkish Americans have to negotiate between their

Americanness/Westerness and Turkishness/Easterness at the same time.

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 CHAPTER VI

IDENTIFYING TURKISHNESS

Ethnicity and race are two of the essential organizing concepts of the modern world.

They are among the common categories that people use to organize their ideas about who they

are and how they are different from others (Healey, 2003). People use ethnic and racial

categories to understand their experiences and to make sense of the world around them. While

such categorizations help us understand some aspects of societies by simplifying and

stereotyping them, they also cause us to exclude and discriminate. Ethnic categorizations are

attempts that we make to reach some generalizations about certain groups of people whom we

perceive to have commonalities.

In this chapter, I examine Turkishness as a cultural category because it a fundamental

part of being Turkish American. In order to understand Turkish Americanness, there needs to be

a close examination of Turkishness. Today, over 3500 people come from Turkey to the United

States every year. They do not drop their “old” identities from the other side of Atlantic when

they cross it. They come with their unique and distinctive identities, each with similar yet

different values, traditions, beliefs and practices. They ship not only themselves but also their

cultural baggage, including their religious, political, and ideological positions and their notions

of gender, religion, love, hate, nation, conflict and difference. Each has a different view of what a

Turk is and ought to be, but they use their similarities along with their differences not only to

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position and understand themselves as individuals but also as a community, which is imagined to

exist.
Who is a Turk?
I recognize the difficulty in putting all Turks in one single category. I understand the

difficulty of identifying for the sake of a general understanding. Turks have characteristics that

make them different from others yet differences among them are many. They “imagine” that

there is a community called “Turks” of which they are a part. However, when it comes to

identifying their community, each Turk identifies it differently and gives it different meanings.

Like other identities, Turkishness is not absolute, but rather is complex, multiple, contingent,

historical, contextual and personal. It means different things for different people at different

places in different times. “I don’t think of Turks are as an ethnic group” says Turhan, a 31-year

old first generation Turkish American6. He argues that,

Turkishness is a concept, which is very similar to the concept of Americanness.

They (the founding fathers of Turkey) have created a concept like “I am Turk,
hard working, and honest.” This is what the republic has done, creating a concept.
Turkishness only represents citizenship; it does not really represent any ethnicity.
It is a lot like what we have here in the United States. Many Turks don’t even
know their own histories. That is another problem. Who is a Turk? For instance,
my father is Macedonian. There are Albanians, Bosnians, Kurds, Chechnians, and
a lot of others in Turkey. We cannot reduce Turkey to a single ethnicity. From
blonde and blue eyed to Arab looking people, we have a lot of different
backgrounds. The concept of Turkishness was totally newly created, from
language to other things. If you look at it from an ethnicity perspective, we do not
have much in common with Turks from Turkmenistan.
Dogan, who is a conservative Muslim Turk, agrees with Turhan’s definition of Turkishness,

likening it to Americanness,

I like the idea of Americanness. It makes a lot of sense. It gives you a common
identity but at the same time lets you have a specific identity if you want to, for

6
Biographical sketches of the interviewees are provided in Appendix B.
78
 example Turkish-American. It means that you are American but you also have a
Turkish identity. I consider Turkish citizenship in the same way. We could be
ethnically Kurdish or Jewish or Turkish but we are all Turkish at the end because
we are all under the roof of Turkish state.
Each is trying to make sense of their own cultural category by looking at others. They draw

parallels between Turkishness and Americanness to map their own positions. They try to locate

their group by using Americanness as a reference point. While their identifications tell us

something about who Turks are, they tell nothing at the same time because identifying

Americanness is another difficult task.

David, a Jewish Turk who immigrated to the U.S. ten years ago, has his own way of

looking at Turkishness:

We are Jewish so our Turkishness is rather different. We were raised as Turkish

but it was a different kind of Turkishness. Therefore, I think my definition of
Turkishness would very much overlap with the concept of citizenship. Turks are
the ones who live under the roof of Turkey. Otherwise, we would reduce
Turkishness to the ethnic Turks who migrated from Central Asia. Turkishness in
Turkey cannot be reduced to a certain ethnic group because it is very mixed and
very different ethnic groups have contributed it.
But Raziye would disagree with David’s identification because she believes in primordial ties

and blood. Raziye, who migrated from Crimea to Turkey after WWII and then came to the

United States as a teenager after staying in Turkey for a short period, states, “To me, people who

came from Central Asia are the real Turks. The ones in Turkey have been very mixed. Whoever

has Turkish blood is Turkish for me.” David does not have Turkish blood? Neither does Nazim,

who has Kurdish parents, nor Ensar, who has mixed ancestors including Arab, Turkish, and

Kurdish, as I will show in the next section.

Dostum is a second generation Karacay-Turkish American. Karacay is a Turkic ethnic

group from the Caucasus. They are known as Karacay Turks and there are a large number of

Karacay Turks in the New York metropolitan area. They migrated to the United States during the
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1960s. Dostum’s identity gets even more complex as a result of intersecting identities such as

Karacay, Turkish, American and Muslim. He notes that,

I was born here in the United States so I am an American. Most of my friends

have been American. I was raised as Karacay, more than anything else. Well, we
have different languages and cultures. For us home is the Caucasus but I also have
a lot of Turkish friends. I am very mixed in that sense. Karacay, American,
Turkish, all mixed. My father lived in Turkey for 10 years and my mother was
born and raised in Turkey. My father came to America in 1961 and my mom
came here in 1967. It is very difficult for me. We are not just Turkish but also
Karacay and American.
How do we label Dostum? Is he Turkish, American, or Karacian?

Fatih, who is an upper class businessman and a devout Muslim, gives a more vague

definition of Turkishness, “A Turk is someone who is ethical, spiritual and moral. That is an

ideal Turk for me.” Denise, who describes herself as a proud Ataturk’s Turkish lady, disagrees

with an identification of Turkishness in religious terms.

I don’t think if Turkishness can be based on religion although I respect the

religion of Islam. A Turk is someone who respects his flag and country and
religion but at the same time can think and live as he pleases. We are children of
Ataturk so Turkishness can never be reduced to Muslimness. We have Turks who
are not Muslim, such as Greek, Armenian and Jewish Turks. We are all humans.
We cannot discriminate anyone. It is not based on a certain ethnic or religious
group.
Each of the identifications represents a cultural and political position. Fatih’s religious

background makes him define Turkishness in a moral or religious context, but Denise rejects that

identification and proposes citizenship instead of ethnicity.

Multiplicity of identity is a result of one’s multiple layers of identity. Each layer

represents a different background. This makes it hard to come up with a clean-cut group identity.

Ensar, an import-export manager in a prestigious firm in New York, is a good example of that.

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His roots include Arabic, Kurdish, and Turkish cultures. He is not sure about his ethnicity or

nationality and his statements represent the difficulty of having to choose an ethnic identity:

To tell you the truth, I don’t feel any nationality. It does not matter if you are
Turkish, Kurdish or Arabic, but I have never told an Arab that I am an Arab.
Maybe this is because I have been in the US since I was 17. In the US, it does not
matter if you are Kurdish, Arabic or Laz, we are all Turkish if we are from
Turkey. If an American asks my nationality, I will say Turkish. I would not say
that I am Kurdish or Arabic because I am from Turkey.
What group Ensari belongs to is a difficult question to answer. The multiplicity of his identity

makes categorizations arbitrary. The multiplicity of his identity makes it difficult for him to

identify with a single group. Turkish citizenship becomes a handy marker because it offers an

easily understandable solution to his confusion.

In conclusion, while ethnicity is one category that can be used for defining Turkish group

identity, identification is often artificial. Yet it provides a sense of community and

belongingness. Everyone I interviewed claims his or her Turkishness, yet each understands

something different from it and tells a different story about it. They create their own stories out

of real and imagined happenings such as history, migration, discrimination, assimilation, and

survival. They tell those stories to justify demands, to change relations of dominance, and to

make sense of who they are and how they became the way they are. As Turks imagine

themselves with other fellow Turks, they turn those imaginings into realities as part of their

collective consciousness and identity. Regardless of all differences of meanings, Turks in the

New York metropolitan area imagine themselves as part of a “Turkish Community.” Members of

this Turkish community have similar cultural and historical backgrounds and common interests,

which make them somehow similar as they may put their differences aside for a greater share of

power in American society and for a sense of belonging to a community. It is common interests

and sometimes primordial ties that bring Turks together regardless of their differences.

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Westerness and Middle Easterness
Identities are not only geographically expressed but also spatially constituted. Turkish-

American Turkishness takes a different form in America than Turkishness in Turkey because the

forces shaping Turkishness are not the same in each locale (Massey, 1993). First generation

Turkish-Americans firmly express their European or Western identities, while they think that

they have markers inside and outside themselves that distinguish them from other ethnicities

such as Eurpeans or Middle Easterners and such markers give them a sense of uniqueness and

community. They talk about their own uniqueness and synthesis, which includes Turkish

ethnicity (and other ethnicities such as Kurdish, Arab, Jewish), Islam, Westerness, and

Americanness.

Ayten, a second generation Turkish American, considers herself not just as Turkish, but

also American, and indicates the importance of Islam in her identity. She states,

I consider myself Western although I have headscarf. I think I dress more

Western. When I go to Turkey, people look at my way of dressing and give me
negative comments. They tell me, “you are Turkish, you are Muslim why do you
dress like an American?” because I always have my slacks and sneakers on, and I
have my t-shirt on. But here when people look at me head, “Oh… she has a
scarf”, they say. From bottom to my head, I am just like a total American except
for my scarf.
Ayten’s case is an interesting example of overlapping identities and the way these

overlapping identities are viewed and understood. She claims and asserts her Westerness,

Americanness, and Muslimness while she sees the difficulty of accepting her differences (which

are visual) by each group from which pieces of her identity originates.

Sibel moves the discussion of difference beyond visual similarities or differences in

regard to Turks being Western. She does not believe that Turkish visual qualities, such as the

way they dress and live their lives, fully qualify them as western. She states, “I think in terms of

their life styles and fashions, Turks are more western but in terms of their way of thinking they

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are more Middle Eastern.” Here the difficulty of categorization such as Western or Middle

Eastern is obvious because our meanings and interpretations of them are not standard.

The power of history in shaping identities and one’s perception about where s/he stands

at the intersection of meanings is at the heart of Turkish identity claims. The Turkish present is

understood through the past and the past constantly shapes the present. People provide their

versions of history to justify their identity claims. Vedat, a retired physician and devout Muslim,

uses history to justify his claim about his Western identity. He dates the westernization and

modernization processes in Turkey to before the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic.

He argues, “We are closer to Europeans. We have been trying to be European for two hundred

years. If you look at late Ottoman Sultans, they were all investing in Europe and the Balkans. In

Anatolia, there is not much Ottoman architecture; it is all from Selcuks. Ottomans constructed

mosques, dams, and bridges in the Balkans not in the mainland Anatolia. They were more

interested in Europe than Anatolia.”

Turhan follows a similar path: “I am Western. My education makes me feel and live that

way. This is what the Turkish Republic has created, a secular people; and I am a part of that. If

you look at Ottoman history, modernization started in 1830s. It just did not start with the Turkish

Republic. A lot of people try to draw a very hard and rigid line between the Ottomans and

Turkish Republic, but it is not like that. We have gone through different stages and finally

decided [in the favor of] republicanism.” Here westernization is portrayed as a historical process

of acquiring modernity, democracy and secularism. Turhan finds and locates his identity in

history through the meanings he gives to that process. He situates his identity and his

community, the community of Turks, in history and provides evidence of the process. The past is

as alive as the present in shaping Turhan and Dr. Vedat’s identities.

Westernization also represents an image and an ideal once set by founders of Turkey. For

example Burhan asserts, “I am totally Western. I don’t find myself Middle Eastern. If we say

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Middle Eastern, I think we have to add mustache and beard.” The mustache and beard are here

viewed as representing the Middle East. Similarly, Ediz views his Western identity as a privilege

that makes him a different and unique person. “I don’t want to sound cocky but I am a unique

person because of my purely (my italics) western education. I am not totally (my italics) Turkish

not racially but culturally. If you ask if I listen to Turkish folk music, yes, I do, but I started to

listen to opera when I was seven.”

The Western ideal was one of the dreams of the founders of Turkey. While the way

westernization is understood by the Turkish establishment is a matter of debate (as discussed in

the section about Turkey’s political history), the state with most of its institutions has promoted

westernization as an ideal, particularly symbolically, since its beginning. Therefore, listening to

opera and having an education in English or French has symbolic meanings in terms of one’s

westernness. Westernization represents power, class, prestige, progress and privilege. The

dominant media in Turkey, which has close ties with the establishment, plays a large role in

constructing such an image as part of one’s identity.

When individuals move from one place to another, they bring with them their cultural

practices and values. Regardless of strict secular practices, religion is still an important element

of Turkish culture and identity. Similarly, Islam, as part of Turkish values carried over the

Atlantic, is an important component of Turkish-American identity. It is at the heart of the debate

about one’s westerness or easterness. Temel, who is Muslim but does not practice Islam

regularly, asserts,

I feel Asian. I feel we are different from both Europeans and Middle Easterners
culturally, historically, and politically. I think from outside like the way we dress
and live, yes, we look European. But from inside like religion and family values I
don’t think if we are European. Our values are different. I feel that Islam connects
me to other Muslims around the world. I feel more nationalistic with Islam. I saw
this more clearly in the United States. I feel closer to the foreigners who are

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 Muslim. It means that Islam connects us in a way similar to Christianity
connecting Americans with the English or Italians with the French and so on.
As understood in Temel’s statements, one can imagine himself not only as part of an ethnic or

racial group but also as part of a religious community. This is an attempt to understand the self

and position it in a place where cultural, social and political meanings are negotiated, contested

and constituted. This is not just a simple endeavor to construct the self but also to search and

create new communities. The multiplicity of one’s identity represents the complexity of

meanings in one’s identity. The decision of where one locates him or herself is based on personal

experiences and similarities and differences one sees with others. The perception of one who

tries to map himself is contextual, experimental, and depends on how he makes sense of the

world around him.

Emrah, whose father was once a representative in the Turkish parliament, does not

believe that Turks need to choose between the East and the West. He starts, “I don’t think we are

either of them. I have been in both Europe and the Middle East. We don’t look like either of

them. The so-called identity crises that we hear among Turks are very arbitrary. If we want to be

a great nation and country, we have to accept who we are with our religion and history. We have

to be at peace with ourselves. I am Muslim but at the same time I believe in democracy and

freedom. Religion is a personal matter for me. We have to get together for a more peaceful

nation. We need to get to know each other and learn to live together.”

Today, debates over Turkey’s multiple identities are all over the Turkish media. Such

debates form discourses in everyday life as well as political discourses. These identity debates in

Turkey are followed and felt by Turkish-Americans living in the United States on daily basis.

The Turkish media, which often highlights differences, provides many examples of these

debates, such as whether women who work in government offices or go to college should be

allowed to wear a headscarf or whether men who work in government offices should have breaks

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to attend Friday prayers (Yavuz, 2000). The media often represent wearing a headscarf or

performing daily Muslim prayers as Middle Eastern and backward. Drinking alcohol and

expressing femininity represents westerness, modernity, and progress. These images, whether

symbolic or real, are viewed by many Turkish-Americans (particularly the first generation)

everyday when they log on to the Internet to read Turkish newspapers.

In conclusion, identity and space are inseparable because knowing the self is an exercise

in mapping where it stands. Space is an active constitutive component of identities because it is

both medium and message of domination and subordination (Massey, 1993). Both America and

Turkey are bounded with locales filled with personal, social, and cultural meanings, and provide

a skeleton in which Turkish identities are constituted, transformed, and maintained. Furthermore,

Turkish-American identities, being at the intersection of Western, Eastern, Islamic, European,

Turkish, American and other socio-spatial crossroads, indicate the complexity and the

multiplicity of identity, and therefore the difficulty of mapping them. Turkish Americans say that

they have a synthesis of their own. They are European but not quite like ‘Europeans’ because

they are Muslim. They are Muslim but they are not like Arabs or Iranians because they are more

modern and have democracy. They are Turkish but not in racial or ethnic terms because their

Turkishness is like Americanness.

Disassociation with Arabs
Many Turkish elite and intellectuals share views with the orientalists about Arabs. Their

orientalist attitudes produced by Turkish reforms during and after the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East

to backward (Gregory, 1995; Maksidi, 2002; Said, 1978). Turkish elite today project the West at

the top of civilization, and propose the western experience of modernity as the ultimate goal for

Turkey as it was set by Ataturk. They argue that if Turkey wants to develop and get out of

backward conditions of the Middle East and Muslim world, it has to turn its face to the West not

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to the East. They claim that Arabs and others are backward nations that have nothing to offer the

Turkish people. Writings of Bernard Lewis, who Edward Said views as an Orientalist (Said,

1978), are greatly received by Turkish leaders as well as intellectuals.

Such views shape Turkish sense of identity as they help to form opposites. Turkish

Americans identify themselves by emphasizing what they are not. One of the distinctive features

of Turkish-American identification is its emphasis on disassociation from other Muslim groups

and particularly Arabs. Although most Turks believe that they have a distinctive identity that is

different from other Muslims, the degree of disassociation with Arabs and other Muslim groups

differs according to their political, ideological, and religious positions. Many Turks, even

religious ones, assert that their version and practice of Islam is more tolerant, more open-minded,

more modern, and more peaceful, which implies that they assign the opposite qualities to other

Muslim groups such as Arabs. In this section, I touch upon some historical, ideological, and

sociological reasons for such differentiation.

a) Historical Reasons
In the modern Turkish collective memory, Arabs represent a nation that did not help

Turks in their struggle against western domination during WWI regardless of the years of

privileged status Arabs were given. The modern Turkish collective memory views Arabs as a

nation that allied with the British and French forces against the Ottoman Turks and betrayed

them.

Historically, Arabs had been under Muslim Ottoman rule for over three centuries. With

the Ottoman Ummah system, they were considered as part of the Muslim majority and enjoyed

majority rights with a certain degree of cultural and political autonomy and privilege. However,

things changed when the Empire got weak, could not cope with the problems it was facing, and

finally could not avoid disintegration. The 1826 Tanzimat (Reorganization or Regulations) and

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the 1856 Islahat Fermani (the Reform Edict) were efforts to modernize the Ottoman

sociopolitical system to try to keep it from falling apart (Erdogan, 2002).

The Young Turks (or Jon Turks), one of the most influential groups consisting of a group

of young students in the army medical school during the late years of the Ottoman Empire,

founded a secret committee, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)

in 1889. Their role in shaping the politics of the Ottomans and modern Balkan and Middle

Eastern history was crucial and their sociopolitical ideology has greatly shaped Turkish politics

and collective memory. Many argue that their influences are still visible in the Turkish polity

even today (Ozdalga, 1998). The Young Turks saw constitutional and parliamentary rule as a

solution to the Empire’s illness by arguing that the empire was threatened by the centrifugal

forces of separatist minority nationalism, which could be easily used by Western powers with

designs on Ottoman territory. Through parliamentary representation, the Young Turks desired

the unity of all the ethnic and religious elements within the Empire, which could only be

achieved by giving all communities a stake in the empire (Erdogan, 2002). After unsuccessful

attempts of “Ottomanism”, which urged all the ethnic and religious groups under the Ottoman

rule to unite, and “Islamism”, which emphasized the unity of all the Ottoman Muslim subjects,

the Young Turks turned to Turkish nationalism as a unifying ideology for the remains of the

Ottoman lands. By 1908, the ideas of Ottomanism and Islamism had failed to create a unity

among Muslim Ottomans and there were much stronger nationalistic tendencies among both the

Young Turks and Arabs. The Arab elite from Damascus, who were denied posts in particular

after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, adopted Arabism as a mechanism for expressing

dissatisfaction with the Ottoman system. Some of these Arab elite allied with the British and

other Western powers and did not support the Ottomans during World War I, and some even

fought against the Ottoman Empire (Erdogan, 2002; Yavuz, 2000).

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 The Arab lack of support has been viewed by many Turks as betrayal and has left

damaging marks on the Turkish collective memory. Many Turks believe Arabs betrayed them at

time of their greatest need. One of the famous sayings among the Turks today is “Turks have no

friends but Turks.” This represents a choice of Turkish nationalism over other meanings and

choices of asserting identity such as Islam and Muslim Ummah (nation).

This part of Turkish identity, disassociating Turks from Arabs, is indicated in my

interviews. Turhan, who works as a vice president in one of New York’s financial institutions,

expresses his views about Arabs rather boldly:

There might be some in Turkey saying that Arabs are Muslim as we are so we
should help them in their fight against Israel. Hello? Arabs allied with the British
and fought against the Ottomans during WWI. They have betrayed us. Especially
Saudis, they don’t care about anything but their interests. They don’t care about
Islam; they don’t care about their people.
Turhan does not believe that Arabs like Turks, either: “I think Arabs hate Turks. We have ruled

them. That is it. They say you were the leaders of the Islamic world. Blah! Blah! Blah! Don’t

forget what you did during WWI.” Cindy who is a second generation Turkish-American is

displeased with people associating Turks with Arabs. She notes that “It bothers me because

people say statements that are not correct. They say that we are Arab and we speak Arabic. Wake

up, hello, you know. Study history a little bit.” Vedat, who is a retired physician, conveys similar

views: “It is historical. We ruled them so they don’t like us. I think the British influence also

made them feel distance from us.” Many Turks see Arabs as betrayers at their time of need, the

First World War. The Turkish-Arab past shapes present Turkish views about Arabs. It shapes

collective memory, discourse and world view. Turkishness is based on stressing, maintaining and

creating differences that differentiate them from other Muslim groups, such as Arabs.

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b) Ideological Reasons
Turkish official ideology, Kemalism (an authoritarian westernization project), has been at

the core of Turkish political and social life since 1923. The ideology focused on creating a

separate Turkish identity that was different from the Ottoman as well as the Ottoman Empire’s

Muslim entities such as Arabs. The founding fathers of Turkey were mainly from the Committee

of Union and Progress and Young Turks (Erdogan, 2002). The Young Turks became the ruling

elite under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (the later Ataturk). They started a strict

secularization and Westernization program, which has been ongoing since Turkey’s beginning in

1923. They began a new nation with a new identity. To construct this identity, they changed

Turkey’s alphabet from Arabic to Latin, emphasized Turkishness rather than Islam, encouraged

European style clothing and discouraged Islamic clothing, and removed all Islamic schools and

Arabic teaching (Yavuz, 2000).

Whether symbolic or institutional, all of these policies and practices distanced Turks

from Arabs ideologically and culturally. This has left marks on Turkish thinking and self

identity, as Turks today view themselves as modern, European, more democratic and different

from Arabs. They implicitly or even sometimes explicitly stress their differences with which they

view superiority over the Arabs. Therefore, if Turks see themselves as more modern, more

European, more democratic, then they see Arabs are less modern, less democratic, more eastern

(or Middle Eastern), and backward. Many orientalist views about Arabs are shared by the Turks,

and the Turkish media’s contribution to these views are significant. Turks, they believe, have

created a unique synthesis that combines modern values such as representative and secular

government with Muslim concepts of love, tolerance, and peace, that Arabs and other Muslims

have not been able to accomplish. Particularly, the establishment or “White Turks” have

distanced the Turkish State from Arabs and Arabic states. The Turkish state has never had close

relationships with neighboring Arabic states. It is extremely difficult to see anything positive

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about Arabs in the mainstream Turkish media which has close ties with the establishment7. Of

course, all these shape the Turkish public’s world view about Arabs. Here is how Cindy looks at

the issue:

Islam does not have much importance in shaping my identity. I don’t think if
Turkishness can be limited to Muslimness because there are Jewish and Greek
people living in Turkey. They are Turkish but they carry their Jewish or Greek
identity. We accept all religions in Turkey. I think it is bad for public relations if
we bring up only Muslim side of Turkishness. We are at the center of Europe and
Asia. I think it is great that Turkey is a secular state. It is great that it is
democratic.
Sibel concludes, “I think Ataturk did great. He made us different from Arabs.” Burhan

adds, “I think I would have done the same thing. He had to do what he had to do. I am glad that

Turkey is not like Iran or Saudi Arabia. I think Turks are more open to change than Arab

nations.” Such a disassociation was part of the Kemalist project, and to which it seems that many

Turks have accepted. It gives them a sense of uniqueness and gives them materials from which to

construct their separate identities.

c) Sociological Reasons
Turks have experienced almost a century of the secularization process. They have been

more open to Western influences as a result of Turkey’s close ties with Europe and the United

States. Regardless of some problems, Turkey is a relatively open society where there is a certain

degree of freedom of speech, thought and life style. Although, the role of the military in Turkish

life is still strong, Turks have been practicing parliamentary rule and representative government

for decades. This political structure has also caused Turks to see themselves differently from

7
There are many examples of such representations in the Turkish media. When the former Turkish Prime Minister
Necmettin Erbakan visited Libya in 1997, he was received by the Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi in a tent. This
image was shown frequently on Turkish televisions such as KanalD, Atv and Star with comments that Arabs were
uncivilized, uncultured, and backward. Other examples of such representations also include the Saudi government’s
practices of the death penalty by cutting of the head, Arabs being shown as noisy and dirty, and Arab states lacking
democracy.
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other Muslims, particularly Arabs. All these of these factors have had influences on Turkish

thinking and have changed the nation’s social fabric (Ergil, 2000).

Religiously, Turkey has been moderate, and radical interpretations of Islam have not

found many followers in Turkey. Some of this is a legacy of moderate Ottoman Islamic

interpretations, which resulted from Sufi influences among Turks, while some is a result of the

republican experience. Regardless of its problems, political Islam, which seeks a greater role for

Islam in politics and is often characterized with fundamentalism, has mainly acted within the

secular political system and shared a certain power in Turkish polity. Religious groups have

acted according to secular rules for the most part whether willingly or unwillingly. All these have

led to a more moderate interpretation of Islam that is often called “Turkish Islam” or “Anatolian

Islam” (Aras and Caha, 2000). As Aras and Caha (2000, 1) point out, “the main premise of

‘Turkish Islam’ is moderation. Since people of Turkish origin first accepted Islam, they

perceived and practiced it under the influence of Sufi ideas. Sufi-oriented Islamic movements

kept a certain distance from the politics of their times in contrast to other Islamic movements.”

The assumption is that Turks have a different interpretation of Islam that is more compatible

with modernity, tolerance, diversity, and democracy as it makes religion more of a personal

moral issue than a political system.

One interesting example is a community that has developed under the influence of

Fethullah Gulen, a prominent religious leader in Turkey. The community has Islamic, nationalist,

liberal, and modern characteristics and is based on the teaching of Said Nursi, one of the 20th

century Muslim scholars in Turkey. Gulen’s teachings emphasize an understanding that is based

on both science and religion. Gulen and his followers formed meetings, panels, and seminars that

have focused on tolerance, diversity, dialogue and the art of living together with differences.

Gulen himself has met with Jewish, Armenian and other religious leaders in Turkey and met

Pope John Paul II in the Vatican in 1998, and the late Cardinal O’Connor in New York before

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that. Indeed, Gulen was one of the first that used the term “Turkish Islam” or “Anatolian Islam,”

which was interpreted as a way of distancing Turkish Islamic interpretation from Wahhabi

(Saudi) or Shiite radical interpretations. “Gulen and his followers have tried to produce a

religious-political movement favoring modernism, Turkish nationalism, tolerance, and

democracy without sacrificing religious precepts” (Aras and Caha, 2000, p. 3).

While part of the Turkish secularist elite looks at Gulen and his movement with

suspicion, others have viewed his movement as a progressive development, and therefore a

chance for world peace. While the number of his followers is unknown, he has attracted people

from all walks of life and his followers have opened hundreds of schools in Turkey and Central

Asia. In fact, they have opened schools outside Turkey, including two middle schools in the New

York metropolitan area, one in Brooklyn and one in Clifton, New Jersey. During my fieldwork, I

visited their schools and participated in some of their activities. The group is influential among

the Turkish-American community in the New York area. It not only organizes community

gatherings for the Turkish-American community in the area but also interfaith dialogue meetings

with area Jewish and Christian communities. Other Turkish Muslim groups besides the followers

of Gulen also offer peaceful Islamic interpretations as a result of the Sufi movement’s emphasis

on love and tolerance. A group called “Suleymancilar” has been active in Mosque building and

summer student camps.

To summarize, Turks believe that they are different from Arabs in terms of their

moderate interpretations of Islam and therefore more open to democracy and tolerance to

differences. In order to prove their tolerance to other religions, they give examples of Ottoman

practices of religious diversity and treatment of Jews and Christians. They argue that while Jews

were persecuted in different parts of Europe, the Ottoman Turks opened their doors to them and

treated them fairly for centuries. They deny Armenian claims of genocide and argue that

Armenians, enjoyed the protection and autonomy under the Ottoman Empire until they allied

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with Russia to fight against Turks. They claim that there were killings between Armenians and

Turks in which both lost lives but this was never in the form of genocide as Armenians suggest.

They argue that Armenians exaggerate the events of 1915. Of course, Armenians have claims of

their own by arguing that what happened between the Turks and Armenians during World War I

was genocide by comparing it with the holocaust.

The degree of disassociation with Arabs gets even larger in America as the American

perception of Arabs is not a very positive one. It was interesting that when the president of the

Federation of Turkish American Associations, Egemen Bagis, told me about Turkish-American

alliances with other ethnic and racial groups, none of the groups he mentioned were Arab. For

instance, he told me how closely they were working with Jewish, Latino, Pakistani, and Black

American groups and lobbies for their own lobbying purposes, such as lobbying against the

Armenian and Greek lobbies in America. There was no mention of partnering with Arab or

Persian groups even though one might expect a closer alliance because of religious similarities.

In most cases, an association of Turks with Arabs bothers Turkish-Americans. Ayten is a

second generation Turkish-American teenager. She practices her daily prayers, covers her head

and attends Nursi community activities in New York. She believes that Turks are different from

Arabs and it bothers her that people associate her with Arabs because of the way she dresses. She

notes, “People think that I am an Arab because of the way I dress. This bothers me. I am proud

that I am Muslim but I don’t want to be known as an Arabic person because I am not Arabic, I

am Turkish. I would like it when the people think and accept the fact I am Turkish and I am not

Arabic. When I say I am Turkish, people are in total shock and I don’t like that. I don’t like to

think that, oh Turkish people cannot be covered or cannot be Muslim.”

Sinan, another second generation Turkish American, argues that “after the events of

September 11th, 2001, nobody said that Turks were terrorists. I also think that it is not right to

blame all Muslims because of the events. You cannot blame everybody. It bothers me when

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people generalize all Muslims as terrorists. There are different types of Muslims.” Sinan calls

for justice and intellectual honesty. As Edward Said (2001, 2) puts it, “there isn't a single Islam:

there are Islams, just as there are Americas. We need to step back from the imaginary thresholds

that separate people from each other and re-examine the labels.”

Although the degree of disassociation varies from the political and ideological positions

that each individual takes, all of the people that I talked to stated how displeased they were with

being associated with Arabs. The level of disassociation varies from hate to simple ethnic

differentiation depending on their ideological, political, and religious positions. While more

religious Turks may find Muslims, including Arabs, closer to themselves than non-Muslims, they

express that they want to be known as Turks and not to be confused with Arabs. There are very

few Turks in the U.S. who become members of Muslim associations, such as the Muslim Student

Association.
Some Notes on Ethnicity and Nationality among Turkish Americans
The diversity of the Turkish American community in America and particularly in the

New York metropolitan area is also a result of the places where the immigrants came from and

the nationalities they hold. In other words, not all Turks in the United States have come from

Turkey and hold Turkish citizenship. They come from different places and often times have

different ethnicities than the Turks in Turkey. For instance, during the Turkish Day Parade in

2002 in New York, Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Crimean Turks, Circassians, Kurds, Cypriot Turks,

Karacay Turks, and even Albanians and Bosnians marched in the parade. While some of these

groups are often called “Turkic groups,” others such as Bosnians or Albanians are not Turkish

but became Islamicized under the Ottomans. The same is true of groups from the Caucasus such

as Chechnians or Circassians, who are all related to Turks in one way or another.

The result is a very mixed Turkish American community with quite different ethnic and

national backgrounds. Members of groups such as Circassians, Crimeans, or Karacays have

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relatives in Turkey or stayed in Turkey after their migration from the Soviet Union during and

after WWII. However, others such as Albanians, Azerbaijanis or Turkmen may have never lived

in Turkey, but they have primordial ties that go back way before the establishment of the modern

Turkish state. Muslim groups in the Balkans who were under the Ottoman rule still have a great

sympathy for Turkey. Turkey’s ties with former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,

and Uzbekistan have increased since their independence. As the former president of the

Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), Egemen Bagis, indicated:

Most of these people had lived or have relatives in Turkey. They were member
before the collapse of Former Soviet Union. This is a language unity. We all
speak the same language. Most leaders of these organizations go to Turkey, lived
in Turkey and like Turkey. It is a solidarity and mutual support issue for them,
too. We all become stronger by uniting. There are not that many Azerbaijanis or
Crimeans but when they unite, they become more effective and influential. An
Azeri is related to Azerbaijan as we Turks from Turkey are related to Turkey. We
come together for mutual interests. We have a lot of commonalities such as
language and culture. We support each other for each others activities. (Interview
with the FTAA president Egemen Bagis in 2002)
Closing Thoughts
This chapter explored the multiplicity of Turkish identities and their multiple resources.

The diversity of spaces and histories are at the heart of multiple Turkish identities in Turkey and

therefore in the United States. As Turks moved across space (from Central Asia to Eastern

Europe) and through history, they added various layers to their identities. Each layer not only

represents an era but also a resourceful place (Central Asia as the original home of the Turks, the

Middle East as the source of Islam, Europe as the source of modernization and Westernization)

for constructing and claiming different Turkish identities.

Turks use their similarity and differences to claim their distinctive identities. Turks claim

that they are Turkish but their Turkishness is different from that of Turks in Central Asia because

their experiences are different; they claim they are Muslim but their Muslimness is different from

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that of Arabs because they are more modern and more Western. They claim that they are

European but their Europeanness is different because they are Muslim. In the next chapter, I

explore another layer of Turkishness of Turks in America: their Americanness. As Harvey (1996,

p.7) put it, “Identities shift with changing context, dependent upon the point of reference so that

there are no absolutes. Identities are fluid sites that can be understood differently depending on

the vintage point of the formation and function.” Turkishness in America is not the same as

Turkishness in places such as Turkey or Central Asia. In each locale, the forces shaping

Turkishness differ and form different kinds of Turkish identities.

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 CHAPTER VII

TURKISH AMERICANNESS

Although the United States is a country of immigrants, it has not always been

accommodating to new immigrants. Every new immigrant group had to work its way up in the

American society as each group faced difficulties in terms of acceptance by the larger society.

Italian, Jews, Irish, and Chinese had to work hard for recognition and a place in the United

States. In How the Irish Became White, Ignatiev (1996) provides an interesting picture of the

Irish immigrant experience in the United States. Italian, Jewish, and Chinese immigrants also

faced difficulties after crossing the boundaries of America (Haberle, 2003; Olson, 2002; Sterba,

2003).

When it comes to the acceptance of different immigrant groups in the United States,

history keeps repeating itself. Different periods witness different treatments of various immigrant

groups, as if each ethnic and racial group has its turn to become “American.” Today, many

people find Muslim immigrants “different” and “strange", as Chinese, Irish, or Jewish

immigrants were once viewed. One of the myths that many scholars in the United States have is

that Muslim immigrants have difficulty integrating into American culture because they come

from a very different background (Camarota, 2002; Hayani, 1999). While this is true in some

ways, it is not in others. Muslim immigrants have different cultural and religious values from

European immigrants, who share many religious and cultural similarities with people in the

United States, which may make their integration and acceptance relatively easier and their

negotiation somewhat less painful (Ahmed, 1986). However, ethnic, cultural, and religious

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differences are not the only reason for the allegedly slow Muslim integration (or assimilation) in

the United States. Another equally important reason, if not more important one, is that majority

of the Muslim immigrants, including Turks, are first generation immigrants (Camarota, 2002).

The vast majority of Turkish immigrants came to the United States after the 1965 liberal

immigration laws. Since the majority is still the first generation, their integration is an ongoing

process and may take more generations.

In this chapter, I examine Turkish American identity negotiations in the cultural and

political context of the United States. I explore Turkish senses of belonging and self-positioning

in regard to Americanness and Turkishness by looking at the social construction process in

which people place themselves in diverse cultural context such as the United States. I explore

Turkish Americans’ Americanness and their assertion of their American identity by looking at

generational, gender, and religious factors in claiming or not claiming an American identity.
Competing Identities
Discussions of ethnic identity are generally situated in paradigms of assimilation or

cultural pluralism (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). Identity assertion is at the center of cultural

negotiation and pluralism, which seeks recognition of a certain group identity by the larger

public for the purpose of cultural survival. Such assertion is important to Turkish Americans,

who strive to differentiate themselves from other Muslim groups and who have been historically

rendered invisible in the American context by both their relatively small number and their

tenuous status in America.

Turkish-American identities in the United States materialize through the confrontation of

two driving forces: the immigrant Turkish culture and American culture. These two forces of

identity compete and strive for domination. The result is Turkish-American identities. Regardless

of the differences they had, the vast majority of Muslim Turks who came to the United States in

the early 1900s have largely assimilated into the larger American culture. As most of these first

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immigrants were single men, they married Americans and members of other ethnic groups. Very

few children of these mixed marriages have asserted their Turkish identities. Ahmed (1986)

provides some accounts of the experiences of the early immigrants and their immigration

experience, but there is little available about the second generation of those early arrivals. They

have mainly assimilated into the larger culture. Therefore, my discussion of first and second

generation Turkish Americans is based on the data I collected from Turkish immigrants who

came to the United States after World War II and their children as second generation Turkish

Americans.

After the first Turkish immigrants arrived in America in the early 20th century, there was

a period of slow immigration from Turkey to the United States between the end of World War I

and the 1950s. This was also a period of disconnect and assimilation for those who were left in

America. These first immigrants did not have a strong Turkish national identity because they

considered themselves to be Ottomans or Muslims rather than Turks. The strong sense of

Turkish national identity was very much a modern Turkish phenomenon after the state was

established in 1923. The new state was based on Turkish nationalism and promoted Turkishness

as the unifying element for its people. Immigrants who came to the United States after the 1950s

had much stronger national feelings as the nation building process in Turkey matured. It was this

second wave of immigrants that actually promoted Turkishness in the United States. The

combination of weak feelings of national identity and intermarriages resulted in large-scale

assimilation of the children of this group. They have mostly assimilated into the larger American

culture regardless of their cultural and religious differences.

The story is rather different for the Turks who came to America after World War II. This

group has much stronger national feelings than the Turks who immigrated to America during the

early 20th century. They were the “Republican Children”, meaning that they were born and raised

with the values that the new modern Turkish Republic promoted, and proudly asserted their

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Turkish identities. They were the generation that was raised and educated in modern Turkey and

were strictly secular and quite nationalistic. This new group included more families and females;

those wanting to start a family often chose to marry people of Turkish descent.

The post World War II immigrants established institutions and organizations under which

Turkish immigrants gathered and promoted Turkish culture. The establishment of organizations

such the American Turkish Society (ATS), Federation of Turkish American Associations

(FTAA), Turkish American Women’s League (TAWL), and other regional organizations in other

parts of the United States were a result of the nationalistic views of these new immigrants, their

need and desire for cooperation and cultural preservation, and the encouragement they received

from the Turkish government. They opened the Ataturk School, which received financial and

institutional support from the Turkish State, such as providing classroom space in the Turkish

Consulate in New York, and teaching materials, for the teaching of Turkish language, culture

and history to their kids. Many second generation Turkish Americans learned Turkish during

their studies at the Ataturk School for over 30 years, which now has about 100 students and is

maintained by the Turkish American Women’s League. Summer visits to Turkey have also

helped first generation Turkish Americans to heighten their children’s Turkish identity. All eight

members of the second generation that I interviewed told me about their visits to Turkey and

how it impacted their feelings about Turkey and their Turkishness. Their visits and stays in

Turkey ranged from several weeks to several months. Most of them had also gone to the Ataturk

School, which had helped them to learn Turkish and about Turkey.

The vast majority of Muslim Turks in America are first generation, as the main period of

Turkish immigration started in the years following World War II. Like other first generation

immigrants, first generation Turkish-Americans have their loyalties both to their native culture

and place of origin, and to the culture and place in which they live today. However, these

loyalties change with the second and third generations, as their children and grandchildren have

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little or no connection with their parents’ or grandparents’ place of origin and cultural practices.

While their parents and grandparents are often more isolated within their own immigrant

communities, the following generations become more involved in American life and live their

lives as Americans. They speak perfect English, many of their friends are “Americans,” and they

know American culture much better than their parents. The barriers for their participation in the

larger American culture for these newer generations are much less significant than for previous

generations. For instance, in my interviews all my second generation Turkish-American subjects

asserted their American identity without hesitation and acknowledged their Turkish background,

while most first generation Turkish-Americans asserted that they were Turkish, even if they were

American citizens.

While all first generation interviewees express their appreciation for America and the

opportunities that they have here, they are selective about what they adopt from American

culture. They negotiate their “old” cultural values and compromise what they can accept and

reject from the “new” culture. Aysel is a well educated and conservative Turkish mother, who

covers her head with a scarf. She has lived in the United States for 17 years. The following is her

justification for her celebration of Christmas and Thanksgiving, regardless of her conservative

life style:

For the first ten years, I did not want to cook turkey during Thanksgivings
because I thought that it was an American holiday. My children always asked me
about it but I always rejected it. We had American friends over and it did not feel
right to have guests but not cook a turkey. I have been cooking turkey for my
children and guests in last couple of years. I have also been thinking about having
Christmas lights as Christmas and Ramadan are around the same time in last few
years. In Turkey, people have lights during the month of Ramadan. I am thinking
about having those this year. Over time, you take a lot of things from a culture if
you think they don’t conflict with your cultural values. The things that you take
are things from civilization. Civilization is different from culture.

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Aysel would be considered strictly religious and therefore less likely assimilate compared to the

Turks who are much more westernized and much less religious. Her statements indicate

strategies to cope with differences, integration and negotiation of meanings and values, both

“old” and “new.”

Ayten, a 17 year-old second-generation high school student, has quite religious parents

and two older sisters. She covers her head, although her older sisters do not. She states: “I am

Turkish-American. I feel more Turkish but I also do feel that I am American. But when people

ask me ‘where are you from?’ I say Turkey. I also say that I am Turkish, but I was born and

raised here. Whoever lives here is American. In America, everyone is from somewhere. Nobody

is 100 percent American. I consider my parents American.” While Ayten considers her parents

American, both of her parents told me they are not. Her parents have been in the United States

for over thirty years but applied for citizenship only a few years ago. This generational difference

about feeling American or Turkish puts second generation Turkish Americans in a rather

interesting position. They cross boundaries of difference everyday as they leave home and go to

school or work. Home and outside are two different worlds for many second generation Turkish

Americans.

Except for those who came to America as children, virtually all the first-generation

people that I interviewed stated their Turkishness before their Americanness, no matter how long

they have been in the United States. Almost all stated that they liked America and the freedoms

they have here, but very few identified themselves as American. They often emphasized that it is

a matter of feeling as they all have their family and friends back in Turkey. “I don’t know if I

will ever feel American even after I a become US citizen” says Burhan, a 27-year old first

generation Turkish immigrant, who came to the U.S. in 1998. Atakan, another immigrant who

came to the United States thirty years ago, does not feel differently, although he has been in the

United States for almost thirty years. He is married to a Polish woman and they have two

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children who are in college. On his office wall is a saying, “I left my heart in Turkey.” I asked

him what that meant and he responded, “that is what I feel.” He has most of his family and

friends in Turkey, therefore he feels emotionally and culturally connected, regardless of the years

of separation. As the president of Turkish American Women’s League (TAWL), Bahar Yucel,

puts it, “the first generation still lives in Turkey.” Atakan wants to return to Turkey when he

retires. It is mainly economic opportunities and possibly freedoms that keep Atakan and others

here.

The same cannot be said about the second generation. All second generation Turkish

Americans that I talked with emphasized their Americanness and acknowledged their

Turkishness. This was true for all seven second generation interviewees regardless of their

family level of religiosity, economic class, or educational level. Sinan is a second generation

Turkish-American who goes to high school in Brooklyn, NY. His family is middle class; his

mother is a housewife and his father is an engineer. They own several apartments in Brooklyn

and receive a good deal of money from the rent. Sinan asserts, “I am Turkish American because I

am Turkish and I was born and raised here. I feel that I am both. Most of my friends are

American but my best friends are Turkish American. I don’t know. My family is Turkish, so I

just feel like Turkish.”

I found the task of identifying Turkish-Americanness difficult because of its complexity

and multiplicity. The second generation Turkish American individuals I interviewed

acknowledged their Turkish identity regardless of their different identifications of Turkishness,

but I found their sense of Turkish-Americanness vaguer and more confusing than first generation

Turkish Americans who were clearer about their Turkishness. Dostum, a 32-year old second

generation Turkish American, is an interesting example. He states,

I am American. I also have Karacay and Turkish friends. My mother was born
and grew up in Turkey and my dad lived there for ten years. I visited there
[Turkey] few times. I have relatives over there. They are mostly in Eskisehir. I
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 was proud of Turkey. I went to a lot of Galatsaray’s [a Turkish soccer team]
games in Europe. I support Turkish national team and Galatasaray. I also support
the U.S. national team because I am American. I was born and grew up here. I am
a Karacay-American.
How are we to categorize Dostum? Is he Turkish? American? Karacay? Muslim? Each layer of

his identity makes it more difficult to map it. It is a web of meanings in which he is trying to

locate himself. He is assimilated enough to accept and to be proud of his Americanness.

However, his attachments and loyalties are multiple as he asserts not only his Turkishness but

also Karacianness.

Nationalism is among the important factors affecting sports, as sports such as soccer are

nationally organized, institutionalized, and represented (Markovitz and Hellerman, 2001).

Conducting my interviews during the 2002 Men’s Soccer World Cup gave me an opportunity to

witness my interviewees’ loyalties to their national team. When sports involve international

competition, nationalistic views are usually heightened as fans support their teams against other

nations’ teams (Markovitz and Hellerman, 2001). Turkish Americans were no exception. They

gathered to watch the Turkish national soccer team’s games. As the Turkish team won third

place in the event, many Turks started to drive their cars through Main Street in Paterson, NJ, an

old industrial city that is home to a sizeable Turkish community, to celebrate the success.

Dostum was one of them. He told me that he supported the U.S. national soccer team but he was

more excited about Turkey. Ensar, who came to the United States at the age of 17 and works as

an import-export coordinator for a large corporation, says that he is not an American and

wholeheartedly supported the Turkish national team. He indicated, “after the World Cup success

of Turkish national team, I got my Turkish flag and drove in the street here.” Many decided not

to work during the competition and gathered at 2:00 am or 5:00 am to watch the games at

Turkish coffee houses on Main Street in Paterson, or at Turkish restaurants such as Dervis in

Manhattan.

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The First Generation and Questions of Belonging
Like other immigrants, the perception that their staying in the U.S. would be only

temporary shapes first generation Turkish-Americans’ life plans in America. The question of

belongingness is part of their everyday mindset and imagination. They live in America and are a

part of America, but they are imaginarily connected to their community of origin and state of

origin, Turkey. They feel alienated both here and back at home as they feel that they belong to

neither. Burhan, who comes from a well educated family, came to the United States 8 years ago.

After receiving his MBA degree, he started to work as a store manager in one of New York’s

prestigious grocery stores. In answering my question about whether his last visit to Turkey

changed his views about returning to Turkey, Burhan responded:

I decided not to go back to Turkey after that visit but there is another thing. You
don’t feel (you) belong to here but the worse thing is that you don’t feel you
belong to Turkey either. You are somewhere in-between but you don’t know
where you are at. You are confused. There is not much similarity between the
U.S. and Turkey. Both are totally different. You are much lonelier here. You talk
to mirrors more often. What other people do or don’t do does not interest you
much here but it does in Turkey. I think in Turkey you are more social and in the
U.S. you are more individual and lonely. Both have things that you like and
things that you don’t like. It is a dilemma. I want to be at both places. I want to go
to Turkey four or five times a year. My best dream is to do a business that would
connect me to both Turkey and the United States.
The uncertainty of staying in America or going back to home is puzzling for many. The

attachments and loyalties are double as the country of origin and the U.S. have and offer

different things that they want and are a part of. Satisfactions and dissatisfactions are from both

the place of origin and the place they are a part of now. They have friends and families back in

the country of origin and started their own families here. Tahir Amca expresses the uncertainty

of where he belongs; “There is justice here. I like the system here. Turkey is corrupted but I am

Turkish and I like my culture, too. I have been in the U.S. for over 30 years but I still miss my

family and friends back in Turkey.” Even if they want to go back to Turkey, their children do not
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want to. The U.S. offers better economic opportunities and freedoms, but Turkey offers a greater

sense of solidarity.

Temel is a mechanical engineer who is studying English and planning to start a masters’

program. His feelings represent the confusion that many first generation Turkish Americans have

about whether they should stay in America or go back to Turkey:

Here, I read more, I study more, I work more, I use computer more. Socially, I
don’t have as many friends as I had in Turkey. Here, I don’t have much time for
social activities either. Socially, I was much more active in Turkey and that makes
me miss Turkey more. There is not much hope in Turkey economically but I don’t
feel I belong to here either. I miss my family and the things I used to do in
Turkey. I am a ‘foreigner’ and ‘stranger’ here but I need to be here.
This is a major dilemma for many Turkish Americans. Ediz, who comes from an upper class

family and whose father was a high ranking Turkish governmental officer, expresses his feelings

of spacelessness in similar ways. He considers himself having a “purely western” education. He

teaches tango to New Yorkers in his free time and is not a Muslim. He has been in the U.S. for

about 10 years. He makes the point that,

The problem is that even if you go back to Turkey, since you have been away for
so long, you do not feel in the same way in the same places that you once loved to
go. We change, places change and it is difficult to keep up with. If you go back to
Turkey, a lot of things bother you. It starts at the customs; too much bureaucracy
and too much regularity. I like freedom here in the United States and there is not
much pressure here as you would have in Turkey from you family, friends and
society. Freedom of being able to do whatever you want to is very important to
me but the price for this freedom is ‘loneliness’. It is different in Turkey. People
are lonely regardless of them being among the crowds here in America.
Nazim, who works as a bookkeeper and is a conservative Kurdish Muslim from Turkey, has had

different experiences.

Well, first of all I came into a different culture. This was not only because I am
Kurdish or Turkish but this was because I live a conservative life and come from
a conservative social setting. So there were some adjustment problems at the

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 beginning. Language was another barrier. Because of my conservative life, I was
feeling weird around the all girls who dressed very provocatively. It was a cultural
shock for me. People were surprised that I did not have a girlfriend. They would
not understand it. I was feeling a lot of social pressure. All these circumstances
put me in a position where I had to reevaluate my faith and culture. At the end, I
feel that I have become more sincere in my faith and become more aware of what
I believe. I feel freer in practicing my faith here. I worship to God not because I
feel pressure from my family or friends but because I want to. I have no
immediate intentions of returning Turkey. I may want to return after 7-8 years but
not now.
The feelings of spaclessness and the perceptions that they are here temporarily have

significant impacts on first generation Turkish-Americans and their long term plans, such as

setting up institutions in America. Their numbers have not been large enough to become an

influential community, so they have not done the things that are signal of a more permanent stay.

Only in the last couple of years, and with the motivation of religious groups, have some started

schools and mosques. They lack the institutions and support systems indicating they are a

permanent community. The lack of institutions and their intentions of only a temporary stay

result in the lack of unity. There are not enough institutions (media, schools, cultural centers,

mosques) that connect and bring first generation Turkish Americans together. “We need a center

where people can go and get help when they first come to the U.S. The Federation of Turkish

American Associations (FTAA) is not doing this. No one knows about FTAA. Some people

think that it is place for elites. Some even don’t know the name. There needs to be a place where

people could easily go and get their questions answered,” says Fatih Yilmaz, the publisher of Jon

Turk magazine in the New York area. Turkish state institutions such as the Turkish Consulate in

New York are considered to be too cold and too official to offer help. Yilmaz argues,

People see that cold face of the government offices when they go to the
Consulate. Like other ethnic groups such as Chinese, we need to provide help to
people who need it so they can find jobs, get driver licenses, and many other
things. Much of the help is received through informal contacts and from fellows

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 from particular towns or cities in Turkey. He goes where fellow Corumians or
Yagliderians go. They go to the coffee shops and play cards all day. That is really
bad. It is horrible. There is no place where he could go. He has no choice, no
alternative. We need a formal institution that people could trust.
Despite the problems mentioned above, the first generation of Turkish Americans bring

with them the cultural baggage of conflicts and distrust that they had in Turkey. Polarization is

common among first generation Turkish Americans as the elitist approaches (including the

Turkish state) and ordinary Turkish life styles do not mesh together. The leaders of the

community are often upper class elites who are distant from ordinary Turkish immigrants. Ideas,

ideologies, and practices that are not favored by the Turkish State are not favored by the leading

organizations such as the American Turkish Society (ATS), Federation of Turkish American

Associations (FTAA), and Association of Turkish American Associations (ATAA). Religion and

ideology play a big part in these practices as a result of the Turkish State’s attempts to control the

Turkish community within and outside Turkey.

Disputes over what is secular and what is religious are quite common. Therefore, a

community of solidarity is a missing component of this group of first generation Turkish-

Americans. In my interview with Egemen Bagis, the former president of Federation of Turkish

American Associations (FTAA) and now a representative in the Turkish parliament from

Istanbul, said that assimilation is not a concern of the FTAA as most Turkish-Americans are first

generation. I was told that the FTAA has become more inclusive than it was in the past with

Egemen Bagis’ presidency. He notes,

Since we very much target first generation Turkish Americans, we don’t think if
assimilation is a big issue for us right now. After second and third generations, we
might need to do something but not right now. We are a very fragmented
community. I am trying to bring people together and help them put aside their
differences to come together. This is the main thing for me right now. But I am
sure the issue of assimilation will be very crucial for future FTAA presidents. If
you look at Jewish Americans, this is their main concern. They try to encourage

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 marriage within their ethnic and racial group because they are third and fourth
generations here in America. We are still first generation. Assimilation is not a
problem for us so far but the lack of community unity and togetherness is.
First generation Turkish Americans are striving to adjust to life here in America. They

are trying to learn the language, culture and skills of survival in America where they do not find

the same social support system that they would find in Turkey. They want to be a part of this

society, yet at the same time they also want to preserve their Turkish identity. They want to raise

their children in the way their culture tells them, yet American media and social life outside the

home also shape their children’s identities. This frustrates them. Their position is a difficult one

where they have to negotiate meanings, values, culture and beliefs everyday.

The Second Generation and Painful Integration

The issue of acculturation and integration of first and second generations into the larger

culture has attracted students of ethnic studies (Lingen, 2003; Sterba, 2003). While the first

generation is often secure and is clear about its ethnicity, the second generation grows up and

lives on the margins of its ethnic community and the larger culture (Guglielmo and Salerno,

2003; Hayani, 1999; Swanson, 1996). The experience is no different for Turkish Americans. In

most cases, whether or not well educated, first generation Turkish Americans arrive in the United

States with few or no English skills and must adjust to life and work in their new cultural setting.

The children of these first generation Turkish Americans are fluent in English and usually better

integrated into American life. On the one hand, the second generation serves as a bridge between

the old culture (parents’ original culture) and the new culture (American culture). On the other

hand, they find themselves caught between the conflicting expectations of their parents and those

of the dominant American culture. Second generation Turkish Americans face more obstacles in

evolving an integrated identity. They are trapped between two worlds, the conflicting values of

their parents and those of their American peers.

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Trapped between Two Worlds
The Turkish community in the New York metropolitan area offers two worlds. One is

made up of a predominantly homogeneous Turkish population, such as Turkish neighborhoods in

Paterson, NJ, Sunnyside in Queens or Brighton Beach in Brooklyn, while the areas outside of the

predominant Turkish ethnic communities are more diverse, offering anonymity and encouraging

autonomy in the context of the New York area. This dual existence encourages a stricter practice

of the traditional Turkish culture than found in its native lands. Parents of second generation

Turkish Americans usually live and socialize among themselves and expect the same thing from

their children. They often become overprotective of their children, as they view the world outside

their own community as dangerous (for reasons of drug use and alcohol) and threatening to their

cultural values.

Turkan is an active first generation Turkish American. She has roots in both Turkey and

Crimea. She has done a lot of voluntary work with Turkish-Crimean youth in Brooklyn. She

believes that there is an “identity crisis” among the second generation and this identity crisis

causes many social and family problems ranging from dropping out of school to drug use. She

argues,

The kids also have identity problems. The culture at home and the culture in the
street or at school are very different. They experience some difficulties because of
that. I like to call that “identity crises.” The educational and generational gaps
create problems between parents and children. Parents are unable to understand
their children’s problems. They don’t understand American life. While parents
express their values, there is peer pressure at school. Then they lose the respect
for their parents. They want to live their own lives. There you see problems of
drug-use and alcohol. This is New York. It is not easy to escape from those drug
dealers. This issue of identity crises makes those kids who have problems at home
easy targets for drug dealers. A lot of kids got wasted because of this. Most of
these kids are college educated.
The identity crisis and the problems with which Turkan relates are multidimensional, and

parents’ cultural backgrounds, educational levels, economic status, and openness to a new
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culture all contribute. Because of its transitional role that the second generation plays between

the “old” and “new” cultures, it is often the victim of both. It is trapped between the “old” and

the “new” with conflicting sets of values and practices, those of their parents and those of their

peers (Swanson, 1996).

While the first generation is mainly acculturated in one cultural tradition, the second

generation is brought up simultaneously in two different cultures. On the one hand, they are

socialized according to the norms and expectations of their parents, on the other, they are

socialized and acculturated to the norms and expectations of American culture represented by

their peers, teachers and the media. Cindy is a 35 year-old college graduate who works as a

public relation specialist for a New York based company. Both of her parents are well educated

and her father was one of the physicians who came to the United States from Turkey in 1962.

She admits that she had to live in two different worlds during her teenage years: inside the home

and outside the home. Her parents are secular, yet she has had to struggle with their expectations

and her own desires and peer pressure. She says,

I felt that I had to live two different personalities in my life and that was not easy.
It was the old fashioned upbringing. Living in this country, my parents did not
accept a lot of things I was a part of. Until my late twenties, I was still fighting
with them about, you know, I am an adult. You cannot treat me like I am a 12-
year old. It was very difficult. It still is. I lived with my parents six months after I
moved back to New York from DC where I lived a long time. I stayed with them
because I needed to settle down to figure out where I was going to go. As an
example, my parents were telling me, ‘No, we want you to be home by 11
o’clock.’ I was like, ‘wow, I am 30 years old.’ Still, you know, you don’t want to
upset the family balance. I think it has something to do with where they are from
and how they grew up.
She does not want to disturb the family balance yet she wants to live her own life. She is at the

margin where the “old” and the “new” clash. She has to balance the meanings of her parents’

culture with those of the larger American culture. And that is quite difficult.

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Gender Struggles
Gender is another dimension of this identity struggle that Cindy has to face. While it

might be permissible for young adult males within the home to date and stay out late, it is not the

same for females. As Cindy states:

It was a struggle for most of my life because they (her parents) excluded a lot of
people from my life, too, because they were less accepting. If I had an American
boyfriend, they meet him but never accept him. ‘If you marry one, we will never
come to your house’, they say. You know in the end, because they love you, they
will. But they give you a hard time when it is your life that you are trying to
establish, it is not very fair.
Sibel is also a female college graduate and works for a textile firm in New York. She believes

that her father is more Americanized than her mother because she and her mother spent four

years in Turkey during her teenage years. She goes to the Turkish American Business Forum’s

meetings, which is a place to meet other single Turks. She told me that she wants to marry a

Turk because of cultural similarities. Sibel notes that “in recent years, both (her parents) have

changed a lot. My mother used to say ‘you have to marry a Turk’ but that has changed lately. My

father may also want a Turk or a Muslim son-in-law but he does not say it has to be this or that.”

Cindy also told me that she wished she found love in a person of Turkish origin because that

would have made things easier for her and her family.

As victim of both the “old” and “new” cultures, Ayten faces a similar dilemma. She

practices Islam and her parents encourage her to do so. She speaks perfect English but her

differences are visual because she covers her head. She has to think about the values and

expectations of different cultures, American, Turkish, and Muslim. She told me two incidences

in which she believes she was discriminated. “I feel more disadvantageous. A few days ago, I

called for a job at a local library and asked if they had a position. They said yes. But when I went

up and asked for a job application, and the lady looked at me and said that ‘no, we don’t.’ I

definitely thought that it was my religion because they cannot find someone for the position in

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half an hour. My differences are very visible because of my covering.” She faced discrimination

from one of her teachers at her high school after September 11, 2001, and her parents had to get

involved in the issue. After the teacher apologized, the issue was resolved. As a female Muslim

who chooses to dress in Islamic clothing, such as a headscarf, Ayten is subject to more

discrimination than a male Muslim whose differences are not visible in the same sense.

However, her dilemma between two cultures does not end here. When she visits her relatives

during family vacations, she is accused of not being “Muslim enough” because of her slacks and

jeans. She states:

I consider myself Western although I have headscarf. I think I dress more

Western. When I go to Turkey, people look at my way of dressing and give me
negative comments. They tell me ‘you are Turkish, you are Muslim, why do you
dress like an American’ because I always have my slacks and sneakers on, and I
have my t-shirt on. But when they look at my head, ‘oh… she has a scarf’. From
bottom to my head, I am just like a total American.
Ayten is caught between and is part of two different worlds. Each has different values about who

is an American or who is a Turk. Her visual differences, both headscarf and jeans (and t-shirt),

put her in a position in which she must struggle to find who she really is. She is viewed

differently by others. She is considered not to be Turkish or American enough. Her appearance

seems to shadow who she really is as she is labeled based on her visual differences.

Generational Struggles
The second generation not only has to struggle with the differences between the “old”

and “new” cultures, but also generational gaps and differences. While the first generation has

difficulties with adjusting their new life in a new (American) cultural setting, they are frozen in

time in respect to their understanding of their original Turkish culture. They often think of the

original culture in the ways in which they had left it. Sinan, a second generation Turkish

American who was born and raised in New York, states “my whole life is so different from

theirs” when he talks about the differences between himself and his parents. Societies change
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and since Cindy’s parents came to America in 1962, Turkish society has gone through dramatic

changes. I myself have been away from Turkey for only six years but when I go back, I am

surprised by the changes I see in Turkish society. Things are not quite the same as I left them

only six years ago. This is another dilemma for Cindy:

Maybe it is much different now there and how children are raised but I am stuck
with that generation (my italics) but that is all they know. They go back to Turkey
every couple of years and see what is happening but it does not change who they
are. I don’t expect them to change, you know. With maturity, you learn how to
balance those things with your parents no matter what culture they are from and
what generation they are. But it has been a struggle.
While the second generation plays a transitional role between the old and the new cultures, home

and outside, and public and private, it is often the victim in these processes of negotiations and

competitions. They have to negotiate and compromise their meanings and desires from both

cultures and spaces as they live and socialize on the margins. These margins represent

battlegrounds for second generation Turkish Americans. They have to fight for the things they

want and feel on two fronts: Turkish and Americans. They have to make distinctions between

what is and is not appropriate both inside and outside home. As Cindy puts it, “it is a long

struggle.”

Some Notes on Generational Differences

When Turkish immigrants (first generation Turkish Americans) first come to the United

States, they often apply community survival strategies for economic and psychological reasons.

After arriving in the United States with limited English and knowledge of American life, first

generation immigrants join an already established community. This is particularly the case with

the Turkish community in Paterson, New Jersey, where the majority of immigrants have lower

educational levels. First generation Turkish immigrants not only receive psychological and

spiritual support but also economic benefits from the already established community of kinsmen

and fellow villagers who have had similar experiences. During my field research in Summer
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2002, I met many who found jobs in the first week of their arrival in Manhattan with the help of

their relatives, friends, and fellow townspeople while living in Paterson. The publisher of Jon

Turk magazine, Fatih Yilmaz, says that since there are not formal institutions that could guide

those new comers, “much of the help is received through informal contacts or from fellows from

particular towns or cities in Turkey. He goes where fellow Corumeans or Yagliderelians go.

They go to the coffee shops and play cards all day.” This is not the case for second generation

Turkish Americans. They are better educated than their parents and far less dependent on the

ethnic community for economic support. They find fewer economic incentives but their ties to

the parents’ tradition remain strong.

All members of the first generation (20) who participated in this study follow news about

Turkey at least once a week and many follow it daily. They are more nationalistic and are much

more interested in issues concerning Turkey than the second generation Turkish Americans (8) I

interviewed. News sources for the first generation include Turkish Satellite TV Channels,

Turkish newspapers, and the Internet. The Internet is the most widely used source. The second

generation follows news concerning Turkey with much less frequency and only through English

electronic or print media such as American newspapers and TV channels. Cindy, a 35 year-old

second generation Turkish-American, says she reads news about Turkey “whenever it pops up in

the American newspapers and television.”

While all members of the first generation call friends and family in Turkey on a regular

basis (such as weekly or biweekly), the second generation has no or little contact with relatives

in Turkey. All use the telephone as their main communication tool, while many also use e-mail.

Summer visits are also another way of keeping in touch with family and friends. Much of the

second generation’s memories and knowledge about Turkey are based on these summer visits

their parents would take them on when they were children. As adults, they have less desire to go

to Turkey.

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 Another difference between the first and second generations is their use of English. While

the second generation prefers English as their main language of communication, the first

generation’s first choice of language is Turkish. The first generation speaks English only when

they have to. All the members of second generation Turkish Americans that I interviewed

wanted to conduct their interviews with me in English. It was the opposite for the first

generation, as their main preference was Turkish.

While single male immigrants are still the largest percentage of Turkish immigrants, there has

been a great increase in the number of females and families immigrating to the United States.

Many Turks go to Turkey to get married.

In fact, since the number of single Turkish males in America is much larger than the

number of single females, those who desire to find a Turkish mate go to Turkey during summers,

and many get married there. Since this has become an issue for many Turks, a New York based

dating service, SingleTurks.com, started a match-making service for single Turkish males and

females to meet. Turks may date Americans or members of other ethnic and racial groups in the

United States, but when it comes to a serious relationship such as marriage, they often prefer

Turkish mates because of cultural and religious preferences. During my interviews in the

Summer of 2002, I was told by many Turks that while the Turkish American Business Forum

operates as a business networking organization, it also works like a dating service. The Turkish

American Business Forum has regular meetings where the members meet. Many people

participate in the Turkish American Business Forum’s activities to find a date, and, hopefully, a

lifetime partner. The organization has a strict membership policy and does not allow anyone to

participate in its activities without membership. I wanted to attend one of their meetings as part

of my study, but was rejected and asked to pay the annual membership fee if I wanted to observe

the event.

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 Finally, first generation Turks are more interested in Turkish activities than other cultural

or social events in New York metropolitan area. The same cannot be said about the second

generation. They only participate in Turkish activities when their families want them to go.

Susan, a 21 year old college student, states “well, when I hang with my mother and sister to go to

a Turkish atmosphere but I feel like out of space. I don’t fit in there. I am sort of in between. I

feel more comfortable with American settings.” These sorts of feelings were also mentioned by

other second generation Turkish Americans. For example, Ayten, who is quite religious, says

that she likes to hang out with American friends because they are not as judgmental as Turks are.
Closing Thoughts
Turkish American identity constructions show that there are not only differences among

Muslim Americans but also within each group such as Turkish Americans. Turkish Americans’

definition, recognition and acceptance of Turkishness and Americanness vary according to their

gender, class, religious practice and generation. Their experience also suggests that integration is

a long process which takes generations. Given that the majority of Turkish Americans are first

generation; their integration will take as much time as it did with Chinese, Jewish, and Italian

Americans (Guglielmo and Salerno, 2003; Lingen, 2003; Olson, 2002). In fact, Turkish

Americans have mainly situated themselves in the middle class and are a part of America today.

While the first generation still struggles to be part of America, as it still lives in Turkey in its

mind, second generation Turkish Americans serve as a bridge between their first generation

parents and the larger society, regardless of their own painful in-between position.

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 CHAPTER VIII

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION SITES

Turkish American identity construction sites are arenas in which Turkish-American

identities are formed and Turkish identities are reshaped. They are places where “social actors

make claims, define one another, jockey for position, eliminate or initiate competition, exercise

or pursue power, and engage in a wide array of other activities that variously encourage or

discourage, create or transform, and reproduce or ignore identities” (Cornell and Hartmann,

1998, 154). Turkish Americans establish boundaries to exercise differences and celebrate group

solidarity. These sites involve political, social, and cultural institutions as well as residential and

work places. Participants take on roles in each of these arenas with particular ways of acting,

thinking, talking, dressing or eating. Each of these actions has implications for collective

identities.

In this chapter, I examine Turkish American identity construction sites and how these

sites emphasize and shape particular identities. These identity construction sites are analyzed in

categories such as labor market space, residential space, social institutions (e.g., schools and

mosques), organizations and politics, and parades. I look at the role of Turkish American places

and institutions in providing the pre-established structures through which ethnic activity is

manifested and identities are reconstituted.

Labor Market Spaces
Educational backgrounds, the ability to speak English and having technical skills are

crucial factors in influencing where immigrants locate and socialize. Those who do not have

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these particular skills are often dependent on kinship and friendship relations for finding work

and housing. Such immigrants are place-bound and the situational factors they encounter include

certain labor market opportunities and limitations. Once they determine a specific labor market

area, they are trapped in that locality and become dependent on a specific labor market area

because of their limited English and skills. Turkish immigrants in Paterson, New Jersey,

Sunnyside, Queens, and Brighton Beach, Brooklyn are mainly lower class Turks who either

work as wage earners or own small businesses. They use community survival strategies such as

kinship, friendship, and community relations for finding jobs, housing, and social comfort. They

create spaces of ethnic concentration and ethnic enclaves where particular aspects of their

identities are preserved.

However, those who have educational, language, technical or professional skills have a

greater flexibility of movement and opportunities. Turkish immigrants who come to the United

States usually have much higher educational levels than those who have gone to European

countries (Akinci, 2002; Karpat, 1995). According to the 1990 United States Census released in

1998 (Census, 1998), 40.9 percent of Turkish Americans have college degree or higher and 22.1

percent hold a graduate degree (Table 1). As a result, the largest number of Turkish Americans

(40.1 percent) works in managerial and professional sectors while technical, sales, and

administrative positions make up about thirty percent of Turkish American employment. The

proportion of Turkish Americans working in services is 11 percent, with the remainder working

in areas such as production, repair or as operators and laborers (Table 2). Turkish immigrants

who have technical and professional skills have greater flexibility of movement than blue collar

Turkish immigrants, and, therefore do not have to rely on community survival strategies as blue

collar workers do. Therefore, Turkish ethnic community concentration, such as those in

Paterson, New Jersey or Rochester, New York, is more of an issue for blue collar Turkish

immigrant workers than for white collar Turkish workers. Turkish Americans with higher

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educational and technical skills are mainly positioned in middle class and have a greater

interaction with the larger American culture. Based on my observations and interviews, the

degree of integration and assimilation is higher among this middle class group.

Table 1: Turkish-American Educational Attainment (Persons 25 years and over)

High school graduate or higher 81.4 36,529

Bachelor's degree or higher 40.9 18,352

Graduate degree or higher 22.1 9,923

Total 100 44,872

Source: 1990 United States Census8

Table 2: Turkish-American Occupation (Employed persons 16 years and over)

Managerial and professional 40.1 13,508

Technical, sales, and administrative 30.5 10,279

Service 11.0 3,693

Farming, forestry, and fishing 0.5 153

Production, craft, and repair 9.1 3,051

Operators, fabricators, and laborers 8.9 3,014

Total 100 33,698

Source: 1990 United States Census9

Turkish immigrants who have limited skills often move to certain neighborhoods such as

Paterson and Clifton, New Jersey or Sunnyside in Queens upon their first week of their arrival in

the U.S. where they find the lowest-wage jobs in restaurants and grocery stores. Such

occupational concentrations play an important role in shaping their identities. The impact of

8
Retrieved 03/24/2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ancestry/Turkish.txt
9
Retrieved 03/24/2003, from the World Wide Web:
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/ancestry/Turkish.txt
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common occupational activity and interpersonal interactions in workspaces can provide a sense

of difference. Many of those who work in Turkish owned restaurants and grocery stores have

little or no contact with anyone outside their own ethnic community as they work and socialize

with others from Turkey.

Many Turkish immigrants choose places such as Paterson not because remarkable

opportunities exist there but because an already established community provides a support

system for newcomers. After the economic downturn during the 1970s, many Turkish

immigrants who worked in the manufacturing industry in the area were laid off and had to find

work elsewhere. Many were forced to start small businesses (Tokatli, 1991). Today, Paterson,

with a number of Turkish restaurants, grocery stores, coffee houses, and mosques, is an attractive

destination for a great number of lower class Turkish immigrants. These places serve as identity

maintenance and preservation sites where the customs and habits that are imported from

traditional Turkey are kept alive. They also provide boundaries that isolate these immigrants

from the larger society and provide them with a certain degree of autonomy.

While they live in isolation and since they do not have their own schools, these

immigrants send their children to public schools where the majority of pupils are either

American or from other ethnic and minority groups. This particularly creates problems between

the first and second generations as these children cross boundaries of difference between home

and school everyday. Tulin Ozdenoglu, president of Dost Kirim, one of the Crimean

organizations, called this dilemma an “identity crises,” as the majority of children of the first

generation Turks are caught between the “old culture” and “new culture”, and “past” and

“present.” There are not only generational differences but also cultural differences as these

children are exposed to different cultures at home and at school.

Main Street in Paterson functions as the commercial center for the Turkish community of

the area. Turkish businesses on Main Street mainly target the Turkish community and employ

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Turkish immigrants as part of their marketing strategies. These businesses include restaurants,

coffee houses, barber shops, video stores, book stores, and travel agencies. Although written in

English, most of these businesses have Turkish names such as Turkiyem Barber Shop, Zinnur

Books, Alp Travel, Istanbul Video, and Toros Restaurant. These are not only commercial

centers, but also cultural centers, where materials, such as Turkish videos and books, are

provided. These materials are resources for constructing Turkish American identities.

Of course, Turkish businesses are not limited to Paterson. I was told that there are over 20

Turkish restaurants in Manhattan. Brooklyn and Queens also have a significant number of

Turkish restaurants. These restaurants are owned, managed, and operated by Turks. While the

vast majority of their customers are Americans, there is a noteworthy number of Turks eating at

these restaurants. They eat doner kebab, iskender, pide, baklava and other Turkish food, which

remind them of the tastes they were used to and the culture of which they are a part. These

restaurants are not only eating places, but they are also places of socialization as they serve as

meeting and interaction spaces. For instance, several of the Turkish restaurants were open all

night during the 2002 World Cup soccer games. Many Turks gathered at these restaurants to

watch the Turkish national soccer team in their games. The success of the Turkish team provided

them with some measure of pride. I was also told by some regulars at coffee houses in Paterson

whenever there are important Turkish soccer games shows on television, these restaurants draw

Turkish costumers. Moreover, some Turkish restaurants invite Turkish singers for special nights

to give concerts (some were organized by the Turkish Women’s League of America). All these

activities provide tools to form and re-form Turkishness in the context of America.

Video stores convert Turkish movies and television shows from VHS system (common in

Europe) to NTSC system (common in America) and rent them out to the Turks living in the area.

I was told that there has been a decline in video renting as a result of increasing interest in

Satellite TV, which provides more variety and up-to-date shows and programs from Turkey.

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Several of the second generation Turkish Americans told me that their parents rented videos not

only for entertainment purposes, but also for educational purposes. They told me that since they

did not have much access to Turkish media and culture, these videos helped them to learn the

Turkish language and culture, as there is also a great deal of cultural exposure occurring through

these movies and shows. These videos not only entertained the first generation but also provided

them with materials for maintaining their identities and for constructing their children’s Turkish

identities.

Many who do not have Satellite TV rent these videos for the same purposes.

Turkish book stores are spaces of community gathering and interaction. This interaction is not

only with group members but also allows for engagement with Turkish literature. The Ant Store

in Rutherford, New Jersey provides Turks with a wide range of Turkish books, music, and

videos. The store is located in downtown Rutherford and has a modern design, and it tries to

attract both American and Turkish readers. While the store dedicates its first floor to books in

English and gifts such as Turkish rugs and plates, the second floor provides Turkish grammar

books, children literature books, religious books, novels, and CD ROMs. The Ant Store, which is

forty minutes from Manhattan, has a small conference center/reading room on the second floor

where they organize conferences and invite authors, both Turkish and American, to meet readers.

A second Turkish book store is Zinnur Books in Paterson, NJ which carries only Turkish books.

While Zinnur Books started in the book selling business much earlier than the Ant Store, it did

not seem to me that it had a desire to expand its business to an English speaking audience.

Zinnur Books is a place of gathering for many Turks, particularly Karacay Turks. Zinnur Amca,

owner of Zinnur Books, provides hot Turkish tea to those who come and stop by. I met several

of my interviewees at this book store. Both the Ant Store and Zinnur books provide resources for

maintaining Turkishness and function as identity construction sites.

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 Turkish coffee and tea houses are interesting identity construction sites because of their

exclusively male clientele. Turkish men gather at these coffee houses to drink hot tea, Turkish

coffee, play cards and to watch soccer games and Turkish television shows on Satellite TV. Most

of these coffee houses are in Paterson, fourteen of which are located on Main Street. Most of

those who go to these coffee houses work as wage laborers in restaurants, grocery stores, the

construction business, and the trucking industry. Coffee houses are places where gender

boundaries are the strongest. They are unknown places to women because of acute male

dominance and autonomy. Women, including Turkish women, never cross gender boundaries

established around these coffee houses. There are no signs indicating that they cannot enter these

places, but coffee houses represent forbidden zones for women. These are places where Turkish

masculinity is expressed and male dominance is exercised.

Grocery stores that specialize in Turkish products are located near residential areas where

there is a significant number of Turks. For instance, there are two Turkish grocery stores in

Sunnyside, Queens, where there is a noteworthy Turkish population. Brooklyn and Paterson also

have a few of these grocery stores. They are often located near Turkish mosques for the

convenience of shoppers. After finishing prayers, people shop for Turkish goods at these grocery

stores. The owner of the Turkiyem grocery store in Queens told me that over fifty percent of his

costumers were Turkish. The same was true of other stores in Turkish concentrated

neighborhoods. These grocery stores are places where Turkish tastes are imported and sold.

While such Turkish grocery stores are common in the neighborhoods where there is a

considerable Turkish community, there are some grocery stores and delis owned by Turks in

Manhattan as well. For instance, the Amish Markets chain specializes in a wide variety of high

quality specialty food products with stores in several locations in Manhattan. The owner of the

store told me that they employ over 300 Turks in their stores but very few of their products are

Turkish. Garden of Eve and Zeytuna are other examples of such stores. As mentioned earlier,

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these ethnic businesses are not just empty work places that are owned by the members of a

particular ethnic group such as Turks, but rather places that bring Turks together and provide

space and materials for identity preservation and construction.

There are also a number of Turkish law firms mainly dealing with immigration issues.

Most law offices are located in Manhattan, but there are also some in Brooklyn, Queens, and

other parts of the New York metropolitan area. These businesses often market themselves by

providing services in Turkish to attract the Turkish community. Gas stations are another business

of the Turkish immigrant community. I was told by several people that over fifty percent of the

gas stations in Long Island were owned by Turks (which I believe was exaggeration). However,

the number of gas stations owned by Turks is quite significant both on Long Island and in New

Jersey. There are some Turks who own over 30 gas stations. Some of these gas stations offer car

repair services. The gas stations owned by Turks often employ Turkish men as workers.

Pumping gasoline at gas stations in New Jersey an important job in NJ, which does not have self-

service gas stations, or Long Island is almost as common as working at Turkish restaurants and

grocery stores.

In summary, work as an essential and universal human activity is a vital part of Turkish

identity. As individuals are distributed into different classes and categories that the division of

labor presents, group identity formation is a likely outcome. Cornell and Harmann (1998, 160)

state that “by the same token, collective identities offer potential bases for the distribution of

persons into categories, a process that reinforces those identities by giving them an

organizational dimension in the workforce.” Turkish immigrants tend to have occupational

concentrations in restaurant, gas station, and grocery store businesses. The jobs that non-

professionals Turkish immigrants perform reflect skills (or lack thereof) that they bring with

them, as it is common to look for an occupation in which you already have experience. Early

immigrants pass on information they have and the skills they know to newcomers in their search

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for work. This cycle provides both opportunities and limitations, but it involves an important

process of identity maintenance and construction. Such occupational concentrations have

obvious impacts on identity formations. These are places where Turkishness is tasted, preserved,

imported and sold. The effects of work-related activities and interpersonal relations in

workspaces may maintain a sense of being somehow different.

Residential Spaces
People often do not have complete choice over where they live. From economic

affordability to discrimination, different factors are at play when one makes a decision about a

place of residence. Choices are made depending on the economic, social, and ethnic conditions

in particular neighborhoods and the person’s own status. While the discriminatory actions of

others may limit freedom of choice about where to live, having people of the same ethnic and

cultural background could attract those who desire to live in their own ethnic or racial

community. The case is the same for Turkish Americans. Often, they are forced to live in places

such as Paterson because of the limited options they have outside of their own community as a

result of a lack of language and work skills. It is often only through the already established

community that one can survive.

For many unskilled Turkish immigrant workers staying in the same neighborhood with

people of their own ethnic group, these residential concentrations often function to maintain their

identities. Since occupational opportunities are often limited for unskilled Turkish immigrants,

they choose to live in neighborhoods that are close to labor markets such as New York. Many

Turkish immigrants cannot afford housing in Manhattan but at the same time they need the jobs

that are available there. Therefore, they are forced into low rent housing in nearby areas such as

Paterson and Clifton. The result is residential segregation, tied largely to limited labor market

opportunities. This segregation functions to sustain a distinctive and self-conscious Turkish

population in Paterson. The area already had a significant number of Turkish immigrants

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working in factories in the Paterson area, but expensive housing costs in Manhattan were a

catalyst in segregating the Turkish population in the area by limiting their choices. High housing

prices and rents in Manhattan discriminated against the lower income Turks not necessarily

based on their ethnicity but based on their class. Whatever the origin of constraint, the effect may

reinforce an ethnic or racial boundary.

Residential concentrations also provide networking opportunities for new immigrants.

One of the reasons for the large Turkish immigration to the New York metropolitan area in

recent years was the already established Turkish community. As Turkish immigrants come to a

new society, country or a city, they need places to stay. Relatives and friends who are already in

the area provide them with that service and help them find housing nearby. The result is again

the concentration of a Turkish ethnic group in a particular area. This creates a greater possibility

to interact with fellow Turks but a smaller chance of interaction with other groups, which adds a

spatial dimension to the ethnic boundary. “To the extent that interactions are dense and frequent

within the ethnic or racial boundary and dispersed and infrequent across it, the more likely group

members are to see their ethnic and racial identity as an important feature of their lives, and to

engage in practices particular to the group”(Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, 168).

While Paterson, New Jersey, offers an example of Turkish immigrant residential

concentration, the majority of Turkish immigrants are not part of this sort of concentration. What

this suggests is that the issue of residential concentration is not only based on ethnicity, but also

class. The smaller degree of Turkish immigrant residential concentration compared to other

ethnic groups such as Puerto Ricans, Russians or Jews is due to their low density in a particular

area and a smaller number of Turkish immigrants in the United States (Kantrowitz, 1973; Shasha

and Shron, 2002). Turkish immigrants still are a relatively small number in the New York

metropolitan area. Another reason for the lack of concentration is the skills of Turkish

immigrants. As mentioned earlier, the majority of Turkish immigrants are well educated and

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have positioned themselves as middle and upper class citizens. They have greater flexibility of

movement and choice of housing, and therefore, less segregation. Also, this group of immigrants

has less geographic concentration in their occupations and less interaction with other members of

their ethnic group. They often are more integrated into larger culture.
Social Institutions
Social institutions founded by a particular ethnic or racial group increase intragroup

interactions as they expand the links among group members through institutional participation

and collective investments of time and energy. “To create and use such institutions is to make

more elaborate, to weave more thickly, the fabric of a distinct and exclusive community life, the

fabric that includes only “us.” Finding such solutions within the society at large, on the other

hand, increases interactions across the boundary, withdrawing some of the threads from that

fabric” (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, 169).

Turkish American social institutions include schools, mosques, social clubs, and

associations. These institutions function as identity construction sites as they provide spaces for

Turkish Americans’ distinct experiences and expressions of identity. They function to find a

special place for Turkish Americans in the larger American space. They get their voices heard

via these institutions as Turkish American institutions represent Turks to “others.” These

institutions are not empty spaces as they are full of memories of collective effort and

representation.
Schools
Schools are sites where the production of culture takes place (Jackson, 1994) and where

the dominant culture is to be transmitted. However, they are also places of resistance where

meanings are resisted and contested (Dwyer, 1994). Before movements such as

multiculturalism, the school was seen as the primary site where the assimilation of new ethnic

groups was to be accomplished. This has been changing. As the number of Turkish immigrants

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grows, they have started to form schools and other institutions of their own. They open schools

to transmit their own meanings to their children. The school becomes a site where a struggle

against the dominant culture takes place by shaping Turkish American identities.

Turkish Americans in the New York metropolitan area have created two full-time formal

schools, the Brooklyn Amity School in Brooklyn, New York and the Pioneer Academy of

Science in Clifton, New Jersey, as well as one Saturday school, the Ataturk School in Manhattan.

The vast majority of students in these schools are Turkish, but there are also children of mixed

marriages, where one parent is Turkish. These schools promote Turkish either directly through

the classes that are offered or indirectly through community activities.

The Ataturk School was founded by the Turkish Women's League of America (TWLA)

in 1971. It operates on the second floor of the Turkish House on United Nations Plaza. The

school is maintained and financed by TWLA through fund raising programs and tuition. The

school is also supported by the Turkish Consulate and it does not pay rent for using the

Consulate’s building. The Ataturk School had 83 students in 2002, but I was told that the number

was over 100 students in previous years. The decline was a result of security concern after

September 11, 2001. The school teaches Turkish language, history, geography, and other aspects

of Turkish life. It works in accordance with the Turkish state’s strict secularism. It is the oldest

Turkish school in America and many Turkish children learned Turkish at the Ataturk School.

Much of TWLA efforts are directed towards the continuation of the school. Although the Ataturk

School’s students are mainly pupils from either public or private American schools, parents want

their children to attend to Ataturk School on the weekends so that they will be exposed to

Turkish values and culture. The Ataturk Shool functions as a place where Turkish culture,

history, and values are transmitted.

Education is an important issue for ethnic groups such as Turkish Americans in the

United States, as a result of religious and cultural concerns. The school is seen as a place where

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culture is transmitted and language is learned. Language is particularly, viewed as a means of

retaining cultural and ethnic identity (Hernâandez Sheets and Hollins, 1999). The Brooklyn

Amity School in Brooklyn, NY and the Pioneer Academy of Science in Paterson, NJ were

established with such motivations and concerns in mind. Although both schools do not have a

traditional Islamic curriculum with formal Islamic teachings and they follow regular curriculums

like other private school in the United States, parents put their children in these schools because

they expect them to be “safer” against the values to which they do not want their children to be

exposed on the street and in American public schools.

The Brooklyn Amity School was founded by the Golden Generation Foundation in 1999

and has about fifty fulltime students. It has grades one through eight, and its classrooms are quite

small. The school organizes a series of events such as Turkish national and religious holidays,

graduation ceremonies and special day events such as Mothers’ Day every year. For the 2002

graduation ceremony, a Turkish singer was invited from Turkey and hundreds of Turks in the

area were invited to this special occasion. Most students at the Brooklyn Amity School are

Turkish, but there are also a number of students from ethnic groups such as Albanians, and

Uzbeks, as well as African-Americans. The school takes a very active role in community affairs

in the area. It has organized interfaith dialogue meetings with local churches, synagogues, and

mosques. In addition, a group of students from the Brooklyn Amity School, along with students

from Pioneer Academy of Science in Clifton, visited former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent

Ecevit in Washington, DC in 2002.

The Pioneer Academy of Science in Clifton was founded in 1999 and has about 50

students, mainly from Paterson and Clifton. The school has won several gold and silver medals

in recent statewide competitions in science and technology. Most students at the Pioneer

Academy of Science are also Turkish. The school serves as a community center for many Turks

living in the area, and organizes similar events as the Brooklyn Amity School.

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 Both the Brooklyn Amity School and the Pioneer Academy of Science were founded by a

religious group that focuses on education. The schools are part of a large movement that opened

hundreds of schools in Turkey and Central Asia. The movement is headed by Fethullah Gulen

and focuses on education, modernity, and working within the legal system of each country

without sacrificing Islamic precepts. As mentioned in the previous chapters, many view this

movement as an alternative to radical Islamic groups for promoting democracy and the secular

state in places such as Turkey because of the movements’ moderate Islamic approach. However,

the establishment in Turkey has often looked at Gulen and his movement with suspicion.

In conclusion, the school is base where identity is constructed (Hernâandez Sheets and

Hollins, 1999). The Ataturk School, Brooklyn Amity School, and Pioneer Academy of Science

are sites where Turkish Americans’ resistance to the dominant American culture takes place and

Turkish cultural and religious values are transmitted. Although the number of Turkish American

students in Turkish American schools is still low compared to the total number of Turkish

American school age children, these schools provide shields and a boundary for the construction

of a distinct identity. Values that are conveyed are both nationalistic and religious, but they also

serve to create a sense of community. Schools as identity construction sites are not only places

where pupils’ identities are formed but also places where community interaction and

representation take place and the sense of community is promoted (Hernâandez Sheets and

Hollins, 1999).
Mosques
Muslim Turkish Americans did not have their own places of worship until the early

1980s. They used to pray at mosques that were founded by Muslim groups such as Arabs,

Americans, or South Asians. However, they are making themselves more visible through

establishing new mosques and cultural centers. They have several mosques and mesjids, small

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mosques, in the New York metropolitan area. Religious groups such as “Suleymancilar”10 are

very active in founding mosques through fund raising programs throughout the year. The Turkish

state has also provided Imams, who lead prayers, to several of the mosques that were founded by

Turkish immigrants, but the Turkish state stays distant from organized religious movements as

part its secular practices.

Mosques serve as identity construction sites where meanings, ethics, and values of a particular

nation are transmitted through religious discourse and interaction (Barot, 1993). As spaces of

gathering, sharing and interacting, they also function to preserve identities and produce a

community based on religion and nationality (Ernst, 1987). Mosques provide boundaries of

difference to resist the dominant culture and celebrate cultural uniqueness. They are territories

where a certain degree of autonomy is practiced and where others are not allowed (Barot, 1993).

Mosques set up by Turkish Americans not only separate them from mainstream America,

but also from other Muslim groups because of religious and lingual barriers. The vast majority of

Turkish mosque attendees are immigrant Turks. Sermons are usually given in Turkish rather than

English or Arabic. Some Turkish mosques provide Friday sermons in multiple languages such as

English, Arabic, and Turkish. This is not only a result of the lack of religious staff that could

preach in English, it is also a result of the large number of Turkish immigrant attendees who

cannot speak English. It is not surprising that the mosques in Paterson are exclusively Turkish.

Even those mosques that give Friday sermons in English and Arabic, 60-90 percent of attendees

are Turkish. Here language sets boundaries that discourage other Muslims from entering to

Turkish sacred space.

The degree of Turkish nationalism is quite high in Turkish mosques. As Turkish

immigrants establish their own mosques, they have little interest in going to mosques that are not

10
Suleymancilar is a Turkish Muslim group that focuses on mosque building, the teaching of Koran, and student
dormitory building. The movement is quite active in the United States as well as in Turkey.
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Turkish. According to Kemal Karpat, a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin,

“Turks believe that non-Turkish mosques do not smell Turkish enough” (Akinci, 2002). The

names of mosques such as Fatih, Suleymaniye, Selimiye, or Osman Gazi are all Turkish mosque

names in Turkey, which were named after Ottoman Sultans. These mosques often have Turkish

flags hanging in them. When I asked the imam of Fatih mosque to comment on this, he told me:

“the Turkish nation served Islam for centuries. We wanted to honor those Turkish leaders and

sultans because of their services.” When I asked if this was a sort of nationalism he said no and

continued: “Well, the prophet says that ‘one cannot be criticized because he likes his nation’. We

are Muslim Turks. Our ancestors served to Islam over thousand years. Also, we believe that they

understood Islam correctly. We are proud of being their children. We don’t say that we are better

than other Muslims, but we just like our ancestors.” This kind of nationalistic view of Islam was

apparent in all Turkish mosques in the New York metropolitan area. Therefore, mosques are not

only places where religious values are transmitted but are also places where the national culture

is transmitted (Coleman and Tomka, 1995).

Turkish Americans send their children to the mosques to study Turkish and Islam. This is

often in the form of Sunday schools where parents along with the mosque staff volunteer to

teach. I was told by the Imams of the Fatih and Suleymaniye mosques that they have summer

camps where about seventy children come to study the Turkish language and religion. Children

are also taught sciences so that they become successful at their regular schools.

Turkish mosques in the New York metropolitan area exhibit many elements that are

similar to the mosques in Turkey. For instance, the imams in Turkish mosques dress the way

imams dress back home in Turkey, which is different from the way imams dress in other

mosques in the United States. They use rose perfume to make their mosque smell nice, which is

very common in Turkey. They often use curtains to separate women’s prayer space from the

men’s space. That again is a common practice in small mosques in Turkey. Another feature is

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having a coffee house and a grocery store next to the mosque. With these features, the mosque

becomes not only a place of worship but also a place of social gathering, display, and to “hang

out.” For instance, the attendees of Fatih Mosque drink hot tea, socialize and shop at the same

place. Crimean Turks organize conferences and parties on the second floor of their mosque.

Turkish Americans gather at their mosques not only to worship and celebrate religious holidays

in a “Turkish way,” but also to spend time with fellow Turks.

In conclusion, the Turkish American mosque is a place of resistance where others are not

encouraged to enter. Here resistance takes a territorial form. It provides a relatively autonomous

place in which a respite is sought from all the pervasive influence of the mainstream American

culture (Coleman and Tomka, 1995). The mosque as a resistance place offers a space to celebrate

and shape Turkishness. It gives a comfort zone where things are done in a Turkish way.
Organizations and Politics
Power is an important element of intergroup relations. Each group within society wants to

change the power structure to its advantage and influence the decisions and relationships that

have significance and consequences for their lives. This is often a result of opportunities they

have or constraints that they face. Their ability to influence the existing social order and power is

dependent on not only their opportunities and constraints but also on the resources they bring

with them (Sarat and Kearns, 1999). Turkish Americans had only a few organizations until the

1950s. Early organizations had more of a cultural agenda than a political agenda. They worked

as “party organizations” that would bring Turks in a particular area together during religious and

national holidays. Moreover, their financial and population resources were quite limited. As

Turkish immigration increased after the 1950s, Turkish Americans gained a certain economic

status and formed new organizations. Today, there are hundreds of Turkish organizations and

almost every major university in the United States has a Turkish student organization.

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 While their increasing number and resources enabled Turkish Americans to form their

own organizations, circumstances they faced forced them to organize more rapidly that the

earlier Turkish immigrants. Turkish Americans have had bitter relationships with Armenian and

Greek Americans as a result of the enmity imported from Turkish and Ottoman history. The

Cyprus conflict and border issues between Turkey and Greece have often caused disputes

between the Turkish American and Greek American communities, as each group felt the need to

lobby on the behalf of Turkey or Greece. The same has been true of Armenian Americans who

migrated to the United States during the early 20th century as result of killings between

themselves and the Turks in the eastern part of Turkey. Today, Armenians are a much larger

group in the United States than are the Turks, and they have often lobbied against Turkey in the

United States Congress. During the 1980s, ASALA, an Armenian terrorist organization, killed

several Turkish consulate officials around the world, including one in Los Angeles. These sorts

of events caused Turkish Americans to organize better, with the assistance of the Turkish

government. It was only after those assassinations that the Turkish Day Parade in New York

started.

Turkish Americans started to form umbrella organizations such as the Federation of

Turkish American Association (FTAA) in 1956 and Assembly of Turkish American Association

(ATAA) in 1979 as a result of the need to unite and support Turkish community in the United

States and defend Turkish interests against groups such as Armenian and Greek. While the

Turkish state’s influence in forming and financing these kinds of organizations is undeniable,

Turkish Americans have taken a great interest in supporting umbrella organizations. Since the

number of Turkish Americans has been relatively small, they have established alliances with

other lobbying groups, such as the Jewish lobby, for advocating Turkish interests. The close

relationship between Turkish and Jewish lobbies has received a great deal of criticism from the

Armenian lobby, which pushed for a bill in the Congress that would recognize the events of the

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early 1900s as genocide (Hagopian, 2003). While the bill was passed by the U.S. House of

Representative in 2000, the U.S. Senate rejected it with the help of Clinton administration. The

former president of the FTAA told me that they received very important assistance from the

Jewish lobby to defeat that particular bill. In the end, the competition between Turkish

Americans and Armenian and Greek Americans pushed Turkish Americans to organize into

larger organizations and to align with other ethnic groups. What resulted was a highlighting of

the political differences between Turks, Greeks, and Armenians that reinforces ethnic boundaries

such as “us” vs. “them.” Here being Turkish often means being against Greeks or Armenians.

Such competition has not only helped Turkish Americans become better organized, but

also has heightened their sense of Turkishness with a series of cultural activities. Today, both the

FTAA and ATAA organize cultural events such as concerts, art gallery exhibits, and parades.

The FTAA organizes the Turkish Cultural Month Festival starting on April 23 each year, the date

when the first Turkish parliament opened in 1923, and ending on May 19, the date when the

Turkish liberation movement led by Ataturk started in 1919. The festival includes various kinds

of activities that would represent all segments of the Turkish American community in the New

York and New Jersey area. The ATAA, which is based in Washington, DC, and all sub-

organizations under both the FTAA and ATAA, such as The American Turkish Society,

American Association of Crimean Turks, and the Turkish Women’s League of America, actively

participate in this month of cultural events. These events create a sense of community and

transmit Turkish values and practices to the next generation.

There are hundreds of Turkish American organizations in the United States, so I describe

each in detail. A selected list of these organizations is provided in Appendix D. However, it is

important to mention that these organizations range from business associations to student,

cultural, and religious organizations. Agendas and activities of these organizations represent the

diversity of the community. Since the FTAA and ATAA function as umbrella organizations, the

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organizations that belong to these groups are diverse. This creates problems because of the

different expectations of each member organization.

The FTAA has faced a challenge from MayFest, an organization dedicated to the

promotion of culture. MayFest is quite elitist in terms of its members and sponsors and its choice

over the events organized. MayFest is not the only organization that has a different vision about

how Turkey and Turkish culture should be represented and presented to American public.

MayFest promotes Turkish high culture while the FTAA organizes folk culture events such as

folk dance. MayFest sponsors activities such as art exhibitions, film festivals, and theater shows,

and targets the American public as much as well educated Turkish Americans. The point is that

while the Turkish American community aspires to function as a community, it is extremely

difficult to meet the expectations of each organization and those different expectations and

agendas often cause disputes within the community.

In conclusion, while diversity is a fact of the Turkish American community, as

represented in the organizations they form, the desire to have more power, to be more visible, to

have a voice in America, and the longing to transmit Turkish values and practices to the next

generation and to create a community of solidarity bring Turkish American together on the bases

of place of origin, cultural similarities, and community interests. These organizations function to

change power to their advantage and to defend community interests. They are also places of

socialization where cultural practices are transmitted, the sense of community is reinforced, and

identities are marked and transformed.

Cultural Spaces
While group identities are firmly embedded in relationships and institutions, they began

as ideas and conceptions that people have about themselves and others. Culture is a learned

behavior and involves sense-making. Collective identities are products of this sense making

process. Therefore, identities are shaped not only in material relationships but also in the ways

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people imagine, think and articulate themselves in relation to others (Rodaway, 1995). Both the

culture of origin, that is imported from the country of origin, Turkey, and the culture of the new

home, the United States, that is part of everyday life, shape Turkish American sense making and

identities. As part of globalization, migration, interacting with and knowing about other people

actualizes differences and gives new sources and ways of identifying. People come to a specific

cultural understanding of who they are by discovering how other people see them and by

experiencing the constructions that other people make (Thompson and Carter, 1997). These

understandings function to help people to put themselves in particular categories, whether part of

the new or old culture, and form new communities. Each Turkish immigrant finds him or herself

in a position of contesting and negotiating meanings as the dominant culture privileges particular

meanings and understandings but not others.

Turkish immigrants enter the United States where there is already an established culture

of ethnicity as a result of American immigration history and diverse ethnic groups within the

country. While many that I interviewed told me that they were not used to such classifications

(as in the United States) back home in Turkey, they realized their differences as they learned

about themselves and American culture. They are quite aware that they are perceived as different

in different ways. They view themselves being seen as immigrants, outsiders and strangers in a

culture where their ethnic differences create differences that are new to them (Varenne, 1998).

While they were once part of the majority back home, now they are a minority with limited

power, resources, and recognition.

As discussed in the previous chapter, most first generation Turkish Americans believe

that society at large sees them as the “other” or as “them.” They also see themselves as the

“other” as they assign themselves to Turkish ethnicity in the context of ethnic America. Ethnicity

in the United States concerns the construction of “ethnic” persons as “others,” different from

“Americans” in particular ways. This culture of ethnicity in the United States may not compel

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organization along ethnic lines, but certainly it facilitates it. Turkish immigrants trying to make

sense of their new situations and positions in the context of ethnic America, particularly in the

New York metropolitan area where identification along ethnic lines is strong, enter an already

established ethnic cultural system. These already established ethnic lines and terms shape the

ways in which Turkish immigrants make sense of themselves and organize institutionally and

socially. These are certainly not classifications that Turkish immigrants were accustomed to prior

to their coming to the United States. This is a new classification system in which they have to

figure out their own classification and position, and develop new strategies for survival. For

most, this involves a shift from being the majority, the position they had in Turkey, to being a

minority, the position they have in the United States. This process enforces ethnicization among

Turkish immigrants, who are often fragmented in their place of origin. While issues of class,

social status or gender are still important in Turkish American identities, there is a greater

emphasis on Turkish ethnicity.

The social status of a culture, religion, or an ethnic group solidifies ethnic boundaries.

The World Trade Center bombings, the Iranian hostage case of 1979 and 19080, the two Persian

Gulf wars and their representation in the media have made Muslims unpopular in the American

mind (Said, 1997, 2001). This is a position that is similar to those of Chinese Americans until

WWII or Japanese Americans after World War II (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998).

In March 2002, Charles Franklin drove his truck into the Islamic Center of Tallahassee.

After the incident, Franklin indicated “I want Muslims to know they’re not safe here” (Mubarak,

2002). Hadia Mubarak, a Florida State University student analyzing the incident in the

Tallahassee Democrat, indicated, “Many have dismissed Franklin’s attack as an isolated case,

some calling it “coincidental.” The problem is not that he was one angry man with a lot of

problems and the mosque appeared to be the perfect target. The problem is in subconsciously

defining Muslims as something other than American. Recent Islamophobic rhetoric reflects a

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broader perception that goes unchallenged by mainstream conservatives” (Mubarak, 2002).

Media representations shape the public mind and the way it views the world. Such views and

mind are part of everyday life and signify identities (Said, 1997). Turkish Americans that I talked

with during my field research in 2002 are well aware of such negative representations of

Muslims in America. As they participate in everyday life activities, they see the significance of

such representations in their relations with people they do and do not know.

A majority of Turkish Americans that I talked with expressed the idea that Turkish

immigrants are different from European and other non-Muslim immigrants in particular ways

because they are Muslim. They view themselves being and seen as more different and alien than

other immigrants. While none of the people I talked with saw their “Turkishness” being a

problem in the United States, there was certainly a concern about the portrayal of Muslims in and

by the American media and the image of Muslims that is held in the minds of Americans. For

instance, Ayten complains about unfair representations and ignorance when I asked her to

comment on the events of September 11, 2001. She points out,

When someone who is a Christian does something bad, it is always him, not his
identity, not his religion. It is only him being accused of his actions, not his
community or family. Because he does something bad, other Christians do not get
blamed. When a Muslim does something, it is always religion that goes on trial.
My friends who knew me never changed their attitudes. They were always the
same, but people in the street and a few teachers in the school, they acted weird
towards me; weird attitudes. I even understood it in the way they looked at me.
They had some kind of hatred towards me. It was not me but my religion.
Hadia Mubarak, a Florida State University student who sometimes writes for Tallahassee

Democrat, emphasizes the same sort of feeling. She writes, “I see people’s eyes follow me as if I

were the object of examination under the scrutinizing lens of a microscope” (Mubarak, 2001).

For Muslim women, visible differences such as a headscarf make them more vulnerable to

discriminatory acts. Many Turkish Americans hide their Muslimness because of similar

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concerns. Here what we see is one of the most important components of culture, religion, playing

an imperative role in how one sees oneself and makes sense of how others see him. As indicated

previously, Turkish Americans try hard to disassociate themselves from other Muslims,

particularly with Arabs, in order to minimize the negative impacts of the unpopular image of

Muslims in America. They not only claim their differences with other Muslims, but also they

claim similarities with Europeans for the same purpose of distancing from that unpopular image.

This strategy of distancing is crucial in everyday life for Turkish Americans as their

identities are signified, underlined, asserted, and reinforced through formal and informal daily

interactions. As they participate in everyday life, Turkish Americans may face the danger of

discrimination if their differences are more visible, such as wearing a hijhab, the Muslim

headscarf. It was not surprising to me when I was told by several who wear headscarves that they

faced greater discrimination after September 11, 2001 because of the way they dress. Some were

shouted at while shopping, walking in the street, or taking the subway.

The Turkish Day Parade and Turkish Cultural Festival
Ethnic parades function as identity construction sites as they serve various social, cultural

and political purposes. They give an opportunity for an ethnic group that has a relatively small

amount of power in the larger society to present itself in the ways it wishes. They are special

occasions or periods in which members of an ethnic group are expected to be engaged in and

often entertained by a demonstration of some aspect of a community (Bickford-Smith, 1995).

They function to create unity among group members, to share its values in group solidarity, to

introduce certain aspects of the community to non-members, and to show that the group has

power in American social space.

For Turkish Americans, the Turkish Day Parade, which takes place on Madison Avenue

in New York on May 19th, is an activity in which they represent their culture to themselves and

to outsiders. These representations take the form of cultural displays, distinctive folk songs,

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dances, dramatizations, political statements and positions11. Former president of the Federation

of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), Egemen Bagis, summarized the purpose of the

Turkish Day Parade in three different categories when I interviewed him in summer 2002 in New

York. He argued that the FTAA and the Turkish Day Parade, along with the Turkish Cultural

Festival, serve: “first, promote unity among Turks in America. Second, introduce Turkish

culture, music, dance and other sorts of Turkish art in the US. Third, lobby against groups that

work against Turkish interests.”

One of the interesting dimensions of the Turkish Day Parade is its significance with

ethnic groups that have historical and political disputes with Turkey and the Turks. After all, the

parade started in 1981 to protest ASALA, an Armenian terrorist organization, for its

assassination of Turkish consulate officials and diplomats in different parts of the world,

including one assassination in Los Angeles. The following year, the leaders of the Turkish

community gathered the community to protest international terrorism. Seeing the results of these

protests as positive and having the desire to be more visible, Turkish Americans turned this

gathering into a cultural celebration and political statement. It was a political statement because

it started and continued with the competition with ethnic groups such as Armenians and Greeks,

who had already had their own parades. Over time, this one day event has been turned into a

month long cultural festival with a great deal of participation. Each year, thousands of people

participate in the parade and cultural festival. Gathering, marching, and displaying are political

statements as much as cultural displays. They signify group identity and solidarity against others

by taking part in a collective act and statement.

The organization of the Turkish Day Parade and Turkish Cultural Festival is labor

intensive and is almost entirely dependent on large numbers of volunteers. People who help to

organize the Turkish Day Parade and Turkish Cultural Festival are involved in intensive and

11
A number of pictures from the Turkish Day Parade are provided in Appendix D.
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stressful work which often forms bonds of solidarity within the community. Working and

entertaining together influence the construction and maintenance of Turkish identities. Here the

parade provides a place for dialogue and discourse as the actors involved in it engage in activities

that deliver certain messages (for example, Turks have a distinctive culture) and certain

meanings to members of their community and to the public at large (such as “we are a

community” and have a great history), heightening the sense of Turkishness and uniqueness.

Besides reinforcing the sense of Turkishness, this is also an opportunity to show the sense of

power and control over who they are and how they want to be represented.

Turkish Americans as a group and as individuals thought to be or who think of

themselves as different with respect to the dominant culture participate in distinct ways in which

they deliver certain messages and receive particular attention. For instance, the image of Turkey

that is represented in the Parade stresses the secular nature of Turkey. In response, the United

States officials such as the President or the Mayor of New York send messages for the parade

emphasizing Turkey as an example to other Muslim nations in regard to Islam and democracy.

These dialogues often function as identity-conveying discourses to present and represent

Turkishness and involve attempts to contest incorrect assumptions that members of the public

might have about them. For instance, one of the interesting displays at the Turkish Day Parade in

2002 was the carrying of the flags of countries that lost citizens in the World Trade Center

attack. The message was that Turkish Americans cared about all the lives that were lost on

September 11, 2001. Carrying American flags along with Turkish flags was supportive of that

statement. These displays also generate links between America and the Turkish homeland. The

Turkish Day Parade and Cultural Festival are thus sites of contestation in which Turkish

Americans as individuals and as a group shape or, more to the point, reshape the ways others

perceive them by effectively (if temporarily) seizing control of the arena of cultural

representation. The president of the FTAA told me that while they received protests from

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Armenian and Greek Americans in their previous parades, no one protested this time because

they carried flags of all the nations (including the flag of Greece) that lost citizens in the World

Trade Center tragedy.

The Turkish Day Parade represents a symbolic site in which Turkish Americans articulate

a particular account or story of themselves. Many participants might have never been to Turkey,

but they imagine themselves with those in Turkey and Turkish history through the stories told

through the use of cultural displays such as “Mehter” (Janissary military band), the Seymenler

folk dance group, and other exhibits. Each of these displays uses elements of history and culture

to tell a story, the Turkish story, to enhance Turkishness and represent Turkish uniqueness. What

is interesting is that although the Turkish Republican project has been distancing itself from the

Ottoman legacy because it represented backwardness and tradition in the eyes of Turkey’s

founders and today’s establishment, the Janissary military band, which is an Ottoman legacy,

was used to boost a Turkish sense of history and victorious past. The Janissary military band,

which was financed by the Turkish military, gave concerts at Bryant Park in New York and at

the Turkish Day Parade. These selective statements and acts are used when the actors in power,

the Turkish state, deem them as appropriate.

The FTAA is responsible for organizing the Turkish Day Parade and tries to include

different segments of society as part of the parade. Nationalist, secular, religious, women and

men are all included in the representation process because the parade is meant to create unity

among Turkish Americans. The Turkish State supports the FTAA by providing offices on the

second floor of Turkish House and providing financial support for bringing dance groups and

singers from Turkey. This in a way limits the FTAA’s ability to function in the way it wants

because if an activity or a group is not favored by the Turkish State, it has little or no chance to

be represented in the Turkish Day Parade. Therefore, political and ideological positions make an

important difference in the representation.

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 Moreover, while the selective displays are meant to represent Turkish culture and history

to the community and larger culture, one should not ignore the heterogeneity of Turkishness

(class, gender, religious, generation) in these representations. For instance, regardless of the

competition and resentment between the FTAA and MayFest, a Turkish organization that

promotes Turkish high culture rather than folk culture, MayFest participates in the Turkish

Cultural Festival in New York (between April 23 and May 19) that is directed by the FTAA. The

community faces on-going discussions and conflicts about how best to represent themselves.

What we see is a sort of strategic homogeneity in their representation for a greater voice and say

in America.

In short, if identity emerges dialogically, the Turkish Day Parade and Cultural Festival

may be one way to provide Turks with opportunities to challange the assumptions held by their

discursive partners, and in so doing, to influence their own and their partners' identities (Carter,

Donald and Squires, 1993). The Turkish Day Parade and Cultural Festival also represent an

opportunity to showcase the sports, dances, clothing, and other cultural elements that partially

constitute their identity. The very act of organizing a formal cultural parade that depicts the

language, religion, food, sports, dances, clothing, history, music, and politics of a group ensures

that ethnic identity per se will remain a salient issue for the foreseeable future. These events

allow Turkish Americans to affect the ways they will be understood, in a general sense, by

outsiders. These events serve as opportunities for communities to inform non-members about

their distinctive traditions, culture, and history.

Closing Thoughts
In this chapter, I explored the relationship between institutions and organizations and the

formation of Turkish American identities. Institutional and organizational places shape social

relationships, form everyday interactive performances and provide resources for identities. The

Turkish organizations and institutions provide the pre-established structure through which ethnic

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activity is manifested. The repetitiveness of attendance at Turkish activities through Turkish

ethnic organizations and institutions allows for members to reaffirm their ethnic identity through

the maintenance of social relations with other Turks. Identity formation is an ongoing process,

indistinguishable from participation in a variety of social relationships. As people participate in

everyday activities in particular settings, they become aware of their identities only in particular

types of social relationships with other actors in particular places. Turkish American

organizations and institutions provide such settings in which Turkishness and Americanness are

maintained, reworked, and reconstructed. Therefore, Turkish organizational and institutional

spaces are the appropriate places to reaffirm one’s Turkishness as the vast majority of attendees

at these places are Turkish. Therefore, various Turkish associations, organizations, activities, and

gatherings serve to maintain some sense of Turkish identity.

Turkish identity construction sites are resistance places with numerous resources for the

construction of individual, group and categorical identities. These are places where certain

strategies are developed to struggle for power and where the sense of Turkishess is maintained

and reworked. This is a struggle over who Turkish Americans are and who they want to be.

Control over place and the role of place over identity are at the heart of such struggles.

Therefore, I look at Turkish American identity construction sites not as self-operating entities

with their own dynamics and mechanisms, but as one consisting of arrangements of people who

are interlinked in their activities.

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 IX CHAPTER

CONCLUSIONS

My interest in the subject of Turkish Americans was a result of my long time curiosity

about differences among Muslim Americans and their integration into American society. I was

astonished by the way both the media and academia represented and categorized diverse Muslim

groups, such as Indonesian, Turkish, Persian, Arab, white and black Americans, in a single

group, “Muslim Americans,” while ethnic, racial, cultural, historical, and religious differences

among Muslim Americans and within each of these groups are numerous. Moreover, there is a

common myth that Muslims do not integrate in the United States (without any careful analysis to

document this myth) (Camarota, 2002). In addition, many Muslim groups, such as Turkish

Americans, have received little attention from academia, particularly from geographers. By

studying Turkish Americans, I hoped that I might bring some attention to the differences among

Muslims groups in the U.S., as well as to Turkish Americans. While there is an increasing

interest in Muslims in the United States, much of the discussion centers on terrorism and the

events of September 11, 2001.

In this dissertation, I provide a comprehensive overview of Turkish Americans with the

intention of encouraging critical analyses and discouraging stereotypical understandings by

offering a glimpse into the complexity of Turkish American identities. I emphasize the

multiplicity, contexuality, complexity, fluidity, and temporarility of Turkish identities and the

role of different locales (places) (the United States and Turkey) in the construction of

Turkishness. The difficulty of mapping Turkish Americanness was a constant challenge as there

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is not a single Turkish identity, but rather multiple ones with multiple meanings. As Pile and

Thrift (1995, 1) put it, “the human subject is difficult to map” because one cannot map

something that does not have precise boundaries. Mapping the subject and its identity (or

identities) are difficult because it can be located only partially in space and time. It is a difficult

task because the subject is always on the move and takes multiple conflicting positions again in

space and time. As Harvey (1996, p.7) put it, “Identities shift with changing context, dependent

upon the point of reference so that there are no absolutes. Identities are fluid sites that can be

understood differently depending on the vantage point of the formation and function.”

Each chapter in this focused on various issues of Turkish identities. In the second chapter,

I provide a wide range of theories and discussions from the literature, both geographic and non-

geographic. The contextuality, complexity, fluidity, contingency, and temporality of identity are

discussed from different points of views, and the role of globalization (media, market, and

migration) in the formation of identities is explored. Moreover, ethnic identity perspectives, such

as assimilationist, primordial, instrumentalist, and constructions approaches were examined.

However, this study is largely informed by a constructionist approach, which I found it to be

enlightening in the understanding of Turkish American identity formations in the context of the

United States.

Informed by theories and debates in the identity literature, my primary concern was to

follow a research strategy that would help me explore the multiplicity, fluidity, complexity,

contingency, and contextuality of Turkish American identities. For this purpose, I used various

data collection techniques, such as in-depth interviews, participant observation, and document

analysis. In-depth interviews gave me a chance to listen to stories of being Turkish American and

the meanings Turkish Americans make of their experiences in the United States. These stories

provided a powerful way to gain insight into their lives, experiences, and identities (Seidman,

1998). Participant observation helped me to mark identity construction sites, such as coffee

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houses, weddings, conferences, club meetings, and mosques, and to observe people in their

favored settings (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). I analyzed documents such as brochures, flyers,

websites, and subscribed to newspapers, magazines, and e-mail lists to get a wider picture of the

community and its activities. Each of these activities provided different venues for a better

understanding of the community. However, I have to acknowledge the limits of my

understanding of the community, because I can never understand their lives, experiences, and

identities perfectly. My intention was to get a glimpse of the complex lives and experiences of

Turkish Americans.

All geographies and identities are historical, as they are historically produced. The past

always shapes the present (Gregory, 1994). Therefore, in chapter four, I wanted to look at

Turkish immigration history in the United States and how that history affected the community as

a whole. Each Turkish immigration wave to the United States represents different experiences as

well as the context in which the immigrants came to the United States. Government policies,

such as U.S. immigration laws and Turkish laws for allowing multiple citizenships, had direct

impacts on immigration trends as well as the identities of the immigrants. While the first wave of

immigrants from Turkey were mainly peasants, who came to the United States to work in the

factories, later immigrants were better educated professionals. There are also periods (such as the

one between the two world wars) when the United States greatly restricted the number of

immigrants from Turkey. All these trends and immigration waves greatly reflect the United

States government’s immigration policies and politics depending on the country’s labor needs

and political preferences (Karpat, 1995).

In the fifth chapter, I provide a portrait of Turkey by examining its political history and

current identity debates within the country. Some readers may think that this chapter is not

directly related to Turkish American identity constructions. Nevertheless, because of the Turkish

state’s active involvement in the Turkish American community, and the large number of first

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generation immigrants who are directly influenced by the Turkish state’ political and other

practices, the fifth chapter is a crucial part of this study. One cannot fully understand Turkish

American identity formations without understanding the roots of identity debates (Pile and

Thrift, 1995). As a result, I paid special attention to the role of the Turkish state in the

maintenance of Turkishness and the formation of Turkish Americanness.

My analysis of Turkish Americanness in the seventh chapter is not independent of my

analysis of Turkishness in the sixth chapter, because Turkish Americanness is not independent of

Turkishness. As Turks move across the Atlantic, they carry with them their notions of nation,

hate, conflict, ideology, religion, and culture. Divisions/differences within the Turkish American

community reflect issues of conflict and struggle that are part of everyday life in the Turkish

media and politics (Ergil, 2000). Although members of the community imagine they are a part of

a Turkish community at large, they have divisions and conflicts that have been and are imported

from Turkey. Therefore, I reviewed Turkey’s political history to give a better perspective about

the struggle among different groups within the Turkish American community. Turkish

Americans are not free from the politics of Turkey, as they are not from the politics of the United

States.

The Turkish government is also actively engaged in matters of Turkish-Americans, and

deals with economic, political or cultural issues of fellow Turkish-Americans. Thus, Turkish

identity politics are never just local or national in scope; rather they are very much global and

international because nations intervene in each other’s internal affairs. They do so not just

because of human right issues, but also because of the migration of groups among different states

(Appadurai, 1998). The Turkish state plays a significant role in the organization of the Turkish

Parade in New York every year as it provides financial and political support for the event. The

Turkish consulate, as the representative of the Turkish state, along with organizations that have

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close ties with it, initiates community gatherings and encourages formation of Turkish

associations and preservation of Turkishness.

Another example is the Turkish state’s influences in this community occured when the

United States Congress passed a bill suggesting that the Turkish treatment of Armenians during

the WWI was “genocide.” Turkish state officials contacted various Turkish organizations in the

United States to protest the bill and defend Turkey. It mobilized Turkish groups in the United

States to send letters to the US president, senators and representatives to reject such a bill (which

the US senate did). President Clinton’s involvement and the historical alliance between the US

and Turkey helped lead the bill ultimate defeat, but such events caused the Turkish state to

engage actively in the affairs of the Turkish American community and to encourage members of

the community to organize better and unite to lobby for the interest of “their country.” The

Turkish government took this event as an opportunity to visit various Turkish organizations

throughout the United States to help form Turkish lobbies so the Turkish voice is heard and

Turkishness is defended in America. As Cornell and Hartmann (1998) argue, nationalism as a set

of ideas that exalts the nation to a central place, and mobilizes groups by appealing to certain

identities and interests in pursuit of political goals. This has been clearly a new agenda for the

Turkish state.

My argument is that Turkish-American identities in the United States materialize through

the confrontation of two driving forces: the immigrant Turkish culture and resident American

culture. On the one hand, Turkish primordial identities are very much driven from Turkey’s

cultural and historical background. Many Turks are still proud of that culture and history and

have close ties with friends and families in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkish identities are

reworked in the context of American culture and globalization as suggested by Pile and Thrift

(1995) and Giddens (1991). The younger generations are exposed to American cultural practices

in their everyday practices and relations. The television they watch, the friends they have, and

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the schools they go to shape their identities in one way or another (Appadurai, 2000). These two

forces of identity compete and strive for domination. The product is what we call Turkish-

American identities.

The media, market and migration are three crucial factors in shaping a sense of

Turkishness, as these forces are determined by national boundaries and cross boundaries of

national cultures (Appadurai, 2000). The role of the media and nationalism in the formation of

identities is fundamental for understanding Turkish American identity politics. Giddens (1985,

167) argues, “Capital has never allowed its aspirations to be determined by national boundaries

in a capitalist world.” Capitalism carried nationalist ideas over boundaries (Giddens, 1985).

People figure out who they are by defining who they are not, and the media greatly affects that

process. While the Turkish media keeps fellow Turks connected to their home country and their

imagined community as well as it helps to maintain their sense of Turkishness, the American

media also exposes them to the dominant American culture. Therefore, the media not only helps

them to preserve their distinct identities by keeping them in touch with their families and friends,

it also makes them different from other Turks living in Turkey and other parts of the world by

reframing Turkishness in the context of America. The sense of Turkishness is carried and

transformed through media. While the Turkish media and state offer some sort of identity and

community, Turkish Americans are at the same time exposed to other kinds of identities and

communities such as American, European, Middle Eastern, and global. The Turkish media and

state reach across the Atlantic to America and contribute to the shaping of Turkish-

Americanness. As the literature suggests (Nakamura, 2002; Servaes and Lie, 1997), the Internet

has made it possible for the Turkish media to deliver its message across the ocean (to America)

as all major Turkish newspapers and television and radio stations are available on web and target

Turks living abroad.

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 Identity is a political domain on which meanings are negotiated, contested, and

constituted (Keith and Pile, 1993). Therefore, power relations and relations of dominance are

crucial to understanding and studying identity politics because different powers try to shape

identities to their advantages whether to be Turkish or American. Turkish-Americans are

exposed to American culture through the American media, public and state, as well as everyday

life work and consumption etc. The United States government has the authority to grant

citizenship and the rights that come with it. It looks for criteria to decide who qualifies to be an

“American” and who does not. In order to produce desired citizens, American educational, legal,

political, and cultural systems promote the “ideal” of Americanness (Philo, 1992). American

media also has its own contributions to the formation of this Americanness. Turkish immigrants

are exposed to the same type of values as other groups in the United States. As a result, while

their identities must fit both Turkish and American criteria, they are caught in a difficult

position/place/margin of negotiating their meanings of being Turkish and American at the same

time. This process of adaptation and adoption vary according to economic status, gender and

generation. Particularly, first and second generations have to deal with various difficulties of

finding a place in this new cultural, social and political setting. Therefore, Turkish-Americans

are neither just Turks nor just Americans: they are something between the two, or both, or more.

The process through which dominant meanings are imposed and registered focuses

attention on the concepts of ideology and hegemony (Jackson, 1994). The dominant or

hegemonic culture tells the individual what a right act is and what is not in the context of

everyday life (Palanithurai and Thandavan, 1998). In this process, the individual may become

alienated from him/herself. S/he contradicts with what s/he knows about life and practice, and

with what happens around her/himself in the new cultural context s/he is entering, experiencing

or becoming a part of. Her/his differences are negotiated and often excluded, while dominant

meanings are imposed with the power of dominance (Soja and Hooper, 1993). Meanings will be

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contested when individual and group interests or life styles are at risk of elimination or

exclusion. Therefore, difference is one of the most valuable concepts of culture because it

articulates the boundaries (Foucault and Gordon, 1980).

However, differences cannot be reduced to the simple dichotomy such as “us” vs. “them”

or “we” and “others.” While there are parallels among immigrant groups in the United States

(such as Italians, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Turks, and Chinese) in terms of their integration and their

acceptance by Americans, there are also differences in terms of their experiences and the degree

of acceptance and discrimination. While Turkish immigrants go through phases from a thick

identity to a thin identity similar to the Italian and German immigrant experiences, this does not

mean that Turkish American immigrant experiences are simply a replication of these two groups.

Turkish Americans bring with themselves their unique identities, such as Muslim, Turkish, and

European, as other groups came with their own unique identities and experiences. Moreover,

because of their cultural similarities, such as Muslimnesss, Turkish Americans also have

similarities with Muslim immigrants, such as Arabs and South Asians.

Muslim visual differences such as wearing a headscarf may put Muslim Turkish

American women in a position similar to those of Arab and South Asian immigrants. To

illustrate, Ayten, a 17 year old born second generation Turkish American, wanted to apply for a

job for which she had called and found out that it was available. She asserts, “but when I went up

and asked for a job application, and the lady looked at me and said that ‘no, we don’t have a job

open.’ I definitely thought that it was my religion because they cannot find someone for the

position in half an hour.” Her visible differences put her in a difficult position where she has to

negotiate her meanings and the things she wants. She faces problems that a European female

immigrant may never confront because Ayten’s differences are so “obvious.” Moreover, her

disparity is more obvious and dramatic than those of the people of other differences such as

maleness (Turkish or any other), femaleness of other kinds (e.g., European female, Japanese

155
female or uncovered Turkish female). All these differences as well as similarities suggest the

complexity, multiplicity, and temporality of identities (Pile and Thrift, 1995).

To summarize, immigrant groups, such as Italian, French, Chinese, Turkish, Jewish, and

Arab, may look different to Americans but not all these groups are different to Americans in the

same sense and to the same degree. Therefore, there are multiplicities and complexities in any

given differences. I argue that such multiplicities and complexities within and among different

immigrant groups can not be addressed in the simple dichotomy of “us” versus “them.”

I have looked at Turkish spaces and identity construction sites where Turkishness is

maintained, reformed, and reconstructed. Turkish Americans establish boundaries to exercise

differences, celebrate group solidarity and the sense of belongingness as the mounting

geographic literature suggests (e.g., Keith and Pile, 1993; Jackson 1994; Pile and Thrift, 1995,

Gregory, 1994). Turkish sites involve political, social, and cultural institutions as well as

residential and work places. Participants take on roles in each of these arenas with particular

ways of acting, thinking, talking, dressing, or eating (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). Each of

these actions has implications for Turkish American collective identities.

Moreover, the role of place in the construction of Turkish American identities has been

explored as the Turkish diaspora is an invocation of collective space which is concurrently both

inside and outside of the West (both Europe and America). The result of this kind of positioning

is a form of cultural synthesis and it gives Turkish Americans a place and resources of resistance.

Therefore, place is not viewed as a container holding Turkish American identities but also a

constitutive power forming Turkish Americanness. Turkish American identities are spatially

constituted as they represent a ground on which temporary and ever-changing boundaries are

marked between inside and outside, the same and the other. These boundaries stress not only

distinction or difference but also interconnection. Turkish Americans claim not only their

differences but also their similarities with Turks and Americans (and others) as well as

156
differences with them in this process of identity formation and expression. This is also place

making and place marking activity as contingent Turkish identities are momentarily validated,

registered and contested.

Closing Thoughts
This study is one of the first comprehensive works on Turkish American immigration and

identity formations. I hope to inspire new studies on Turkish Americans, who have been part of

the United States since the beginning of twentieth century, but have been ignored by academia,

and particularly by geographers.

This study is not just about who Turkish Americans are, because it also problematizes

ethnic and racial classifications, such as Muslim Americans, in the United States (Said, 2001). It

poses the following questions: Who are Muslim Americans? Are Muslim Americans a

homogenous group? How can one put Turkish, Indonesian, Arab, Black, and White Muslim

Americans in the same category, as there are major cultural, linguistic, historical, spatial, and

religious differences among these groups? It further problematizes categories such as Turkish

and Turkish Americans. “Who is a Turk” was a difficult question to answer for many of the

participants of this study, whose ethnic backgrounds included not only Turkish, but also Kurdish,

Arabic, and Jewish. They also come from different classes, genders, and places of origin. Who is

a Turkish American was even more difficult one, since it adds another layer to an already

complex Turkish identity. I did not have any intention of defining Turkishness or Turkish

Americanness, as I simply wanted the people that I interviewed to voice their own

identifications. The results were multiple and complex, because identities are complex and the

sources of Turkish American identities are multiple (Turkish, European, Middle Eastern, Asian,

Muslim, immigrant, generation, gender, class) Therefore, rather than offering a single Turkish

identity, the study urges us to re-examine our ethnic, racial, and religious identities in their

multiplicity, contextuality, fluidity, contingency, and temporality.

157
 Finally, this study confirms the importance of place in identity construction. I paid

particular attention to the sites and locations (e.g., work places, coffee houses, worship places,

social clubs, and parades), where Turkish American identities are maintained and reconstructed.

I explored the places (such as Turkey, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East) with

which my participants identified themselves. Some identify themselves with one place (e.g.,

Turkey, the United States, Europe, or simply West (ern) and East (ern)), while others identify

with multiple ones (e.g., Muslim/Western/Turkish American). Each place, with all its memories

and experiences, adds a new layer to Turkish American identities as they provide new sources

and contexts for the reconstitution of their identities. All these sources and places make it hard to

map Turkish Americaness. As Pile and Thrift (1995, 1) put it “the human subject is difficult to

map” because it has no clear boundary and because it has no clear position but a mass of

positions. As Harvey (1996, 7) suggests, “Identities shift with changing context, dependent upon

the point of reference so that there are no absolutes.”

Although this study is only an attempt to show the complexity and multiplicity of Turkish

Americanness and Muslimness in the United States, further studies are needed on other ethnic

and racial Muslim groups to document the complex nature of being Muslim as well as being

Turkish in the context of the United States. Muslim integration and Muslim identity formations

in America are not adequately studied and analyzed by academia, and I hope this study triggers

further work on the subject.

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 APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Personal Information

1. Name
2. Gender
3. Age
4. Marital Status
5. Birth Place/Country
6. Nationality?
7. Are you an American citizen?
8. Are you a Turkish citizen?
9. Job you are occupying currently?
10. Which high school did you graduate from?
11. What was the language of instruction at your high school?
12. Highest Educational Degree
13. In which country did you receive your highest degree?
14. From which university did you receive your undergraduate (bachelor's or associate's)
degree?
15. What year did you graduate?
16. Indicate the number of children living with you as part of your family?
17. Your children’s age?
18. Parents’ education level?
a. Mother
b. Father
19. Parents’ occupation?
a. Mother
b. Father

How were you raised?

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 20. How were you raised in terms of your cultural and ethnic identity? Were you very much
raised in a way that was Turkish or American?
21. When you were a child, were most of your friends Turkish or American?
22. Are you proud of Turkish/American heritage?
a. If yes, what makes you feel that way?
b. If not, what makes you feel that way?

Language

23. What language do you speak at home?

24. What language do you speak at school/work?
25. What language do you speak with friends?
26. Do you watch or listen to Turkish on TV?
a. If yes, how often and what stations?
27. Do you listen to Turkish music?
28. Do you watch or listen to Turkish in film?
a. If yes, how often?
29. Do you read Turkish in literature?
30. Do you fluently write in Turkish?
31. What languages do you speak?

Immigration Information

32. When did you immigrate to the US?

33. What were your main reasons for coming to the United States?
34. Did you have any study, work, travel or other experience outside Turkey prior to coming to
the United States?
a. If yes, what kind of previous experiences did you have abroad?
35. What is the longest period you have spent outside Turkey?
36. Before you left Turkey, what were your thoughts about returning?
37. What are your thoughts about returning to Turkey now?
38. Why?

Life in Turkey and the United States

39. In general, how does your life in the US compare with your life in Turkey? (in all social,
economic, academic aspects)

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40. What are the main difficulties that you have faced/are facing living in the United States?
(Being away from family, loneliness, unemployment, discrimination against foreigners,
children growing up in a different culture, lack of personal security)
41. What factors were important in helping you adjust to life abroad?
42. Do you have any relatives living in the USA?
a. If yes, how helpful were they for adjusting to the life the United States?
43. Are you a member of any of Turkish/non-Turkish organizations?
a. If yes, can you name those organizations and mention their activities?
44. How does your ethnic/cultural identity influence your life in the United States (positive and
negative)?
45. Have the events of September 11, 2001 - the terrorist attacks in the US - and the aftermath-
affected your life here in the USA?
46. Do you think that the events of September 11th have had negative impacts on Turkish-
American public relations?
a. If yes, how?
47. Have the events of September 11, 2001 - the terrorist attacks in the US - and the aftermath-
affected your views about returning to Turkey?
a. If yes, how and why?

Maintaining Contacts with Family and Friends

48. How do you maintain contact with friends and family members in Turkey? (Telephone calls ,
regular mail, email, visits to Turkey, visits by family or friends)

49. Has your contact with family members in Turkey increased, decreased or remained the
same over time?
50. Why?
51. Indicate the number and the frequency of visits you have made to Turkey during your
current stay in the United States?
52. What were the main reasons for your visits? (Vacation, family visits, business)
53. When was your last visit to Turkey?
54. How did your last trip to Turkey affect your views about returning to Turkey?

Following News

55. Do you currently subscribe to any Turkish publications?

a. If yes, what are they?
56. Are there any Turkish TV and radio stations broadcasting in your area?
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 a. If yes, what are they?
57. How frequently do you follow news from Turkey during your stay in the US? (Daily,
weekly, monthly etc.)

Everyday Activities

58. Do you go to places where most people are American?

a. Why?
59. Do you relate to your partner or spouse in a way that is Turkish or American?
60. Do you prefer to live in a Turkish/Turkish-American community?
61. Why?
62. Do you celebrate Turkish holidays?
63. At home, do you eat Turkish food?
64. When eating at restaurants, do you primarily eat at Turkish restaurants?
a. If not, what types of restaurants do you eat at?
65. In what kind of Turkish activities do you participate?
66. Now, are the majority of your friends Turkish/Turkish-American?
67. Why?
68. What do you like the most about living in the USA?
69. What do you like the least about living in the USA?

Asserted Identities

70. What is your definition of Turkish/Turks? Who are the Turks?

71. Would you consider yourself to be Turkish-American?
a. If not, to which ethnic / cultural group would you assign yourself?
b. If yes, do you feel that you are more Turkish or American or both?
72. Why do you feel that way?
73. Do you feel that you are more Western (European) or Eastern (Middle Eastern)?
74. Why?
75. What is your religion?
76. What is the role of religion/Islam in defining your self and group identity?
77. What is the role of religion/Islam in defining your relationship with Americans (and the
West)?
78. What are your thoughts about the role of Ataturk in the creation of new Turkish identity
after the collapse of the Ottomans?
79. What are your thoughts about Turkey as a country that is at the intersection of the Muslim
world and the West/Europe?
162
80. Do you think that Turkey can be both Muslim and Western/Modern?
81. Why/How?

163
 Assigned Identities

82. Do others assign you to a different group other than the ethnic and national identity you
feel part of?
a. If yes, how do you think they identify you?
b. If yes, who identifies you that way?
83. Who do you think Turks are according to the United States government?
84. Do you agree with that definition of Turks?
85. What do you feel about public perception of Turks and Turkey in the United States?
86. Do you think that Americans associate Turks with Arabs and other Muslim groups?
a. If yes, how do you feel about that?
87. What do you think Muslim nations think of Turks?
88. Do you feel that Western countries (including the US) treat Turkey fairly?
a. If not, why?
89. Do you think the public perception of Turks has worsened after the events of September
11th?
Change over Time

90. Do you think that Turks in the United States are losing their Turkish identity?
a. If yes, what are some signs of that?
91. Do you believe that your children should have Turkish names only?
92. Do you think your children are more Americanized than your generation?
a. If yes, what are some signs for that?
93. Do you think if it is a good thing that Turkish people in the United States are being
assimilated?
a. If not, what can be done to prevent that?
b. If yes, why?

Interactions

94. Do you think that Americans treat you well?

95. What do you feel about Americans? What kind of people are they?
96. Do you have any American relatives?
97. Do your children usually spend time with Turkish or American children?

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 APPENDIX B

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE INTERVIEWEES

Adnan12 Adnan is a second generation Turkish American. He is finishing high school

next year. His father is a car dealer and mechanic. Adnan goes with his
American name at school but uses his Turkish name when he is with his
Turkish friends and family.
Armani Armani came to the United States after living in Romania for a while. He is
ethnically Armenian and his parents left Turkey after the events of WWI
during the Ottoman Empire. Armani works with a lot of Turks in the New
York area and speaks some Turkish.
Atakan Atakan is a first generation Turkish American, who is married to an Eastern
European woman. Regardless of his international marriage and his 30-year
stay in the United States, Atakan is quite nationalistic in his views as he has a
Turkish flag in his car and office as well as watches Turkish television.
Ayten Ayten is a second generation Turkish American who goes to high school. She
has conservative parents and is the youngest of three sisters but she is the only
one that wears headscarf. She asserts her American, Turkish and Muslim
identities.
Aysel Aysel came to the United States 17 years ago. She has a PhD in literature and
is a writer. Her husband owns several gas stations in New Jersey. She wears a
headscarf and considers herself Turkish but believes that she has adopted
many cultural practices in the United States.
Burhan Burhan is 27 years old and very independent. He works as a manager in one
of New York’s prestigious stores. He has a MBA and his parents are well
educated. He came to the United States in 1998.
Cindy Cindy is a 33 year-old second generation Turkish American. Her parents
came to the United States during the 1960s. She complains about the cultural
and generational gap between her parents and herself. She changed her name
after having problems with finding jobs.
David David is a 35 year-old first generation Turkish Jew. He has been in the United
States for over 10 years. He does not practice Judaism. He considers himself

12
These are pseudonyms and not the legal names of my interviewees.
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 Jewish, Turkish, and American.
Dostum Dostum is a second generation Turkish-Karacay American. His parents are
originally from the Caucasus. Karcays are often considered as Turks but they
have their own language and culture. Dostum considers himself American,
Karacay and Turkish.
Dogan Dogan is a 35 year old first generation Turkish American and is quite
conservative. His wife was harassed in a supermarket after 9/11. He likes
America and its way of trying to include all ethnic and racial groups. He
thinks that America’s diversity could be a good example for Turkey.
Ediz Ediz is a first generation Turkish American who considers himself “totally”
western. He speaks German, Turkish, English, Italian and French and is now
learning Spanish. He is not a Muslim but he is proud of his Turkish identity
Emrah Emrah came to the United States in 1998. He is a PhD student and son of a
Turkish politician who was once a representative in the Turkish parliament.
He argues that discussions of identity crises in Turkey are pointless and a
waste of time. He believes in the expression of all kinds of identities.
Ensar Ensar came to the United States when he was 17. He works as a manager for
a prestigious textile company in New York. He has Kurdish, Turkish, and
Arabic roots but he considers himself Turkish. He also thinks that he is quite
Americanized because he has been here since he was very young.
Fatih Fatih is a 43 year-old businessman. He has a large clothing company in
Turkey and wants to open stores in the United States. He likes the diversity in
the United States but he thinks that there is a moral corruption in the country.
Gulten Gulten is married to an American and works as a paralegal. She does not
practice Islam but respects it. She is very fond of Ataturk and his ideals. She
considers herself Turkish and is very active in Turkish American community.
Oguzhan Oguzhan is a second generation Turkish American college student. His father
is a retired physician, who has been very active in the Turkish American
community. Oguzhan considers himself Turkish American and is proud of his
Turkish heritage.
Nazim Nazim is ethnically Kurdish but he also considers himself Turkish because of
his Turkish citizenship. He is 28 years old and lives a conservative life. His
wife, who covers her head, was harassed and he was deeply affected by it.
Raziye Raziye is originally from Crimea but after WWII her parents were deported
by the Soviet regime. She is 58 years old and retired. She believes that the
“real Turks” are the ones who come from Central Asia.
Sibel Sibel was born in the United Staes but went to Turkey to go to high school

166
 and college. She is 24 and considers herself Turkish American. She goes to
the Turkish American Business Forum’s (which were mentioned to me as a
place to meet other people for dating purposes) activities.
Sinan Sinan is a second generation Turkish American who claims his Turkish and
American identities. His father is an engineer and his mother is a housewife.
They have a dozen apartments in New York.
Susan Susan is a second generation Turkish American who goes to college. Most of
her friends are American and she feels out of space in heavily Turkish
gatherings. She thinks that her sister is more Turkish than she is.
Suzi Suzi is in her late 50s and works for a clothing company in New York. She
was originally from Crimea and has children who are married to Americans.
She has not been in Turkey for a long period of time.
Tahir Tahir came to the United States 35 years ago. He is quite conservative and
active in the religious community. He wants his children to grow up as
Muslims. He likes the governmental system in the United States but stresses
that he loves his Turkish culture.
Temel Temel is 27 years old and came to the United States three years ago to study
English. He is a mechanical engineer but works in restaurants in the New
York area. He wants to get a masters degree in mechanical engineering. He
feels that Islam connects him with other Muslims.
Turhan Turhan is the son of a former Turkish diplomat and speaks several languages.
He is proud of his Turkishness and Ataturk. He is 31 years old and does not
practice Islam regularly. He works as a vice president in one of New York
financial institutions.
Turkan Turkan came to the United States after marrying a Crimean Turk. She also
has Crimean roots and is very active among Crimean women. She has two
daughters who go to college. She is involved in Crimean youth programs.
Vedat Vedat is a 70 year-old retired physician. He has two children who are married
to Americans. He moved to the United States ten years ago after retiring in
Turkey. He is proud of his Turkishness and is very active among the Turkish
community in the New York area.
Yasemin Yasemin is 29 years old female who came to the United States three years
ago. Her mother is a medical doctor while her father is a lawyer. She helps a
children fund in Turkey and is very interested in Turkish community
activities. She considers herself Turkish but loves the system in the US.

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The Following People are community or institutional leaders that I interviewed

Ata Erim Ata Erim is a retired physician, who has been very active in the Turkish
American community for over 30 years. He is the president of the Turkish
World Congress and was president of the Federation of Turkish American
Associations for over 10 years. Erim was one of my key informants about
the development of the Turkish American community.
Bahar Yucel Bahar Yucel is the president of the Turkish Women's League of America
(TWLA). TWLA offers computer and English classes for immigrant
Turkish women. The organization is best known for its sponsorship and
maintenance of the Ataturk School where many Turkish American
children have learned Turkish language and culture.
Bircan Unver Bircan Unver is the president and founder of the alternative media
organization the Light Millennium (LM), a non profit organization. LM
organizes events that help to foster expression of ideas and experiences
for all people as well as Turks.
Egemen Bagis Egemen Bagis was the president of Federation of Turkish American
Associations (FTAA), one of the two Turkish American umbrella
organizations. He is now a representative in the Turkish parliament and
advises Turkish prime minister Tayyip Erdogan on foreign affairs.
Erdogan Dur Erdogan Dur is the principal of the Amity School in Brooklyn, New York.
The Amity School is the first Turkish American private school in the
United States. The school is also a gathering place for the community in
the area.
Fatih Yilmaz Fatih Yilmaz is the founder and editor of the Turkish magazine Jon Turk.
After several issues, the magazine did not receive as much attention as it
expected so Fatih Yilmaz stopped the publication.
Hilmi Akdag Hilmi Akdag is the imam of Fatih Mosque in New York. Fatih Mosque
was one of the first Turkish American mosques in the United States. The
mosque has been a gathering and shopping place for many Turkish
Americans with its shops and community space.
Izzet Yildirim Izzet Yildirim is the educational attaché for the Turkish government in
New York. Over the years, the Turkish government has sent thousands of
students to the United States for educational and training purposes.
Lara Tambay Lara Tambay is the event coordinator for the American Turkish Society.
ATS is one of the elite Turkish American groups in New York. It
organizes cultural and educational programs and focuses on a positive

168
 image of Turkey among Americans.
Tulay Taskent Tulay Taskent is the principal of the Ataturk School in New York. The
Ataturk School has been a place for many Turkish American children to
learn Turkish culture and language.

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 APPENDIX C
PICTURES FROM THE TURKISH AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN THE NEW YORK
METROPOLITAN AREA

Picture 1: Turkish Americans carrying flags of countries that lost citizens on September 11, 2001 at the
Turkish Day Parade on May 18, 2002

170
Picture 2: World Turkish Congress based in New York (not in Istanbul or Ankara) takes part in the Turkish
Day Parade every year. Date: May, 18, 2002

Picture 3: Turkish State and Tourism Ministries at The Turkish Day Parade. Date: May, 18, 2002

171
Picture 4: The Janissary Military Band, a symbol of the Ottoman Past, performs at Bryant Park in New York
and at the Turkish Day Parade almost every year. The band consists of both Turkish civilians and military
personal. It is sponsored by the Turkish military.

Picture 5: I am standing with the band at the Turkish Day Parade on Madison Avenue, New York.

172
Picture 6: Turkish Folk Dance Groups often take part and perform during the Turkish Day Parade.

Picture 7: The Amity School, one of the two Turkish private schools in the New York metropolitan area,
marches in the Turkish Day Parade every year.

173
Picture 8: The Turkish Day Parade is a place where Turkishness is transmitted to the young generation.
Date: May, 18, 2002.

Picture 9: Other Turkic groups such as Azerbaijanis take part during the Turkish Day Parade.

174
Picture 10: Young Turkish Americans.

Picture 11: Seymens are a folk dance group from Ankara, Turkey. They have a symbolic meaning in modern
Turkish memory because they danced for Ataturk when he first came to Ankara

175
Picture 12: Turkish-American Medical Association was founded by Turkish physicians who came to the
United States during the second Turkish immigration wave in the 1950s and 1960s.

Picture 13: Another scene from the Janissary Military Band

176
Picture 14: Oz (Osman) Bengur, a second generation Turkish American, seeking the support for his
candidacy for the US Congress from Baltimore during the Turkish Day Parade

Picture 15: Turks in New Jersey taking part in the Turkish Day Parade

177
Picture 16:13 The Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) based in Washington, DC, is one of
the two Turkish American umbrella organizations.

Picture 17: Second generation Turkish American females

13
Pictures from 16 to 21 are from the website of American-Turkish Associations 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 at
http://www.atadc.org/en/Pictures/TurkishDay/2001.asp. Last accessed on 9/28/03.
178
Picture 18: Another of picture of Turkish Americaness

Picture 19: Annual Turkish American Day Parade Festivities at Dag Hammarksjold Park

179
Picture 20: Annual Turkish American Day Parade Festivities at Dag Hammarksjold Park

Picture 21: Korean War Veterans take part in the Turkish Day Parade every year to remember the
togetherness of Turkish and American solders during the Korean War

180
Picture 22: King’s Ankara Meat Market and Grocery. Paterson, New Jersey. The scripts in Arabic are for
Palestinian costumers, who are looking for Halal (Muslim “Kosher”) meat, as Paterson is also home to many
Palestinians, along with being home to a significant number of lower class Turkish Americans.

Picture 23: Turkiyem Video in Paterson, New Jersey, has a large collection of Turkish movies and TV shows

181
Picture 24: Turkish ethnic businesses also include barber shops. Turkiyem (my Turkey) Beauty and Barber
Salon is located in Paterson, New Jersey.

Picture 25: Fund raising for Oz Bengur for his campaign for the US Congress at the house of the president of
World Turkish Congress Ata Erim. They served Doner Kebab (Turkish name for gyro). Date: June 22, 2002

182
Picture 26: Oz Bengur, a second generation Turkish American, with Turkish Americans for his fund raising
for the US Congress: Date: June 22, 2002

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 APPENDIX D

TURKISH AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS14

ALABAMA
Turkish American Cultural Association of Alabama - TACA-AL
Huntsville, AL

ARIZONA
Turkish American Association of Arizona - TAA-AZ
Tempe, AZ
Webpage: http://www.futureone.com/~graphic/turkish.html

CALIFORNIA
Turkish American Alliance for Fairness
Los Altos, CA
Webpage: http://www.taaf-org.net

Turkish American Association of Southern California - ATA-SC

Irvine, CA
Webpage:http://www.atasc.org

Turkish American Association of California - TAAC

Los Altos, CA
Webpage: http://www.taaca.org

COLORADO
Turkish American Cultural Society of Colorado - TASCO
Highlands Range, CO
Webpage:http://www.tacsco.org

CONNECTICUT
Turkish American Cultural Association of Southern New England - TACA-SNE
Milford, CT

14
Detailed information is provided only for major Turkish American organizations
184
Istanbul Technical University Alumni Association Intl, Inc
East Hartford, CT 06109
Webpage:http://www.turkishnews.com

Turkish American Physicians Association - TAPA

Stratford, CT

Connecticut Turkish Islamic Cultural Association

New Heaven, CT

DELAWARE
Delaware Valley Muslim Associations - Selimiye Mosque

FLORIDA
Florida Turkish American Association - FTAA
Lighthouse Point FL

Association of Turkish American Scientist-ATAS

Coral Gables, Florida
Webpage: www.atas.org

Turkish American Cultural Association of Florida - TACAF

Brandon, FL 33509-3303
Webpage:http://www.tacaf.org

Florida Turkish American Association, Women's Club

GEORGIA
Turkish American Cultural Association of Georgia - TACA-GA
Atlanta, GA
Webpage:http://www.tacaga.org

Turkish American Society of Georgia

Atlanta, GA

HAWAII
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Turkish American Friendship Association of Hawaii - TAFA-HI
Honolulu HI

ILLINOIS
Turkish American Cultural Alliance of Chicago - TACA-Chicago
Chicago, IL
Webpage: www.tacaonline.org

Turkish American Association for Cultural Exchange - TAACE

Naperville, IL

Turkish American Cultural Alliance TACA

Chicago, IL

KANSAS
Turkish American Association of Greater Kansas City
Kansas City, MO
Webpage:members.aol.com/taaofkc

LOUISIANA
Turkish American Association of Louisiana - TAAL
Metaire, LA

MASSACHUSETTS
Turkish American Cultural Society of New England, Inc.-TACS-NE
Boston, MA
Webpage:http://www.tacsne.org

MARYLAND
Maryland American Turkish Association-MATA
Columbia, Maryland

Washington Turkish Women Association-WTWA

Kensington, MD

Turkish Children Foster Care

Saverna Park, MD

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MICHIGAN
Turkish American Neuropsychiatric Association-TANPA
Grand Blanc, MI

Turkish American Cultural Association of Michigan-TACAM

Walled Lake, MI
Webpage: http://www.tacam.org

MINNESOTA
Turkish American Association of Minnesota-TAAM
Minneapolis, MN
Webpage: http://www.taam.org

MISSOURI
Turkish American Cultural Alliance of St. Louis-TACA-St. Louis
St. Louis, MO

NORTH CAROLINA
American Turkish Association of North Carolina - ATA-NC
Raleigh, NC
Webpage: http://www.ata-nc.org

NEW JERSEY
Azerbaijan Society of America
Clifton, NJ
Webpage: http://www.azerbaijan-america.org

Karacay Turks Mosque and Cultural Association

North Haledon, NJ

Solidarity of Balkan Turks of America

Paterson, NJ

Young Turks Cultural Aid Society

Bedminster, NJ

Turkish-American Community Center, NJ

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Flanders, NJ

Turk Ocagi
Lyndhurst, NJ

Turkestanian American Association

Parsippany, NJ

Turkish Cypriot Cultural and Educational Association of NJ

Morganville, NJ

Turkish American Association of New Jersey, Inc

Lyndhurst, NJ

NEW YORK
The American Turkish Society, Inc.-ATS
New York, NY
Webpage: http://www.americanturkishsociety.org

The American Turkish Society was founded in 1949 New York and has a membership of over
400 American and Turkish Diplomats, banks, corporations, businessmen, and educators. Some of
its activities include promoting economic and commercial relations. It also aims to increase
cultural understanding the people of the United States and Turkey.

Turkish-American Business Forum, Inc.

New York, NY
Webpage: http://www.forum.org

The Business Forum is a not-for-profit organization established in New York in 1997. Since it
was established, the Business Forum's membership has already exceeded 500 business people
and entrepreneurs representing a variety of industries and business segments such as financial
services, technology, new media, architecture, design, law, textiles, fashion, trading, logistics,
tourism and construction. During my study in 2002, I also learned that the organization’s
activities also serve as a gathering place for dating purposes. Several of my interviews also
participated in the Business Forum’s activities.

Federation of Turkish American Associations-FTAA

New York, NY
188
Webpage: http://www.ftaa.org

Founded in 1956, the FTAA is one of the oldest Turkish-American organizations with over 30
other local and national Turkish-American organizations. It plays an important role in organizing
the Turkish Parade, which takes place in May. It is devoted to advance educational interests and
to maintain knowledge of Turkey’s cultural heritage.

Turkish Society of Rochester

Rochester, NY

Turkish American Cultural Association

Lawrence, NY

Syracuse Turkish Association

Syracuse, NY

American Turkish Islamic and Cultural Center

Forest Hills, NY

US Council for Human Rights in the Balkans, Inc.

Forest Hills, NY

The Turkish American Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Maritime

TradeSM TACCIM
Webpage: http://www.taccim.org

The Society of Turkish American Architects, Engineers and Scientists, MIM

New York, NY
Webpage:http://www.m-i-m.org

Anadolu Club
Patchotue, NY

United American Muslim Association

Brooklyn, NY

Turkish Cypriot Aid Society

189
Bronx, NY

Turkish Society of Rochester TSR

Rochester, NY
Webpage: http://www.tsor.org

Turkish American Physicians Association

New York, NY

The Turkish Women’s League of America

New York, NY

The TWLA was founded in New York in 1958 to promote equality and justice for women. It also
encourages cultural and recreational activities to foster relations between the people of Turkey,
the United States, and other countries. This includes new Turkish republics of the former Soviet
Union.

Turkish American Eyup Sultan Islamic Center, Inc.

Brooklyn, NY

Young Turks of America Cultural Aid Society

New York, NY

Association of Balkan Turks of America, Inc.

Brooklyn, NY

American Association of Crimean Turks

Brooklyn, NY

Intercollegiate Turkish Student Society ITSS

New York, NY
Webpage: http://www.itss.org

Turkish American Youth Association

OHIO
Turkish American Association of Central Ohio - TAACO

190
Columbus, OH
Webpage: http://www.taaco.org

Turkish American Society of Northeastern Ohio-TASNO

Cleveland, OH

Turkish American Association, Ohio

Delaware, Ohio

OKLAHOMA
Turkish American Association of Oklahoma - TAA-OK
Tulsa, OK

PENNSYLVANIA
Pittsburg Turkish American Association - PTAA
Pittsburgh, PA
Webpage: http://www.ptaa.org

Turkish American Friendship Society of the United States-TAFSUS

Philadelphia, PA
Webpage: http://www.tafsus.com

Turkish-American Muslims Cultural Association

Levittown, PA

TEXAS
American Turkish Association of Houston-ATA-Houston
Houston, TX
Webpage: http://www.atahouston.org

Turkish American Association of Northern Texas-TURANT

Dallas, TX
Webpage:http://www.turant.org

VIRGINIA
The Melungeon Heritage Association Inc.
Wise, Virginia
Webpage:www.geocities.com/BourbonStreet/Inn/1024

191
WASHINGTON
Turkish American Cultural Association of Washington-TACA
Kirkland, WA
Webpage:http://www.tacawa.org

WASHINGTON, DC
Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATA)
Washington, DC
Webpage: http://www.ataa.org/

Assembly of Turkish American Associations is one of the largest Turkish-American

organizations with over 10,000 members. It was founded in 1979. Based in Washington, DC, the
ATAA coordinates activities of regional associations for the purpose of presenting an objective
view of Turkey and Turkish Americans and enhancing between these two groups.

American Turkish Association of Washington DC-ATA-DC

Arlington, VA
Webpage: http://www.atadc.org

American Turkish Council-ATC

Washington, DC
Webpage: http://www.americanturkishcouncil.org

The American-Turkish Council (ATC), which today represents the consolidation of the
American-Turkish Friendship Council and the U.S. Section of the Turkish-U.S. Business
Council, is a tax exempt, not-for-profit trade association organized and operated pursuant to
Section 501 (c) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code. ATC is the leading business association in the
United States devoted to the promotion of U.S.-Turkish commercial, defense and cultural
relations. ATC maintains a diverse membership including U.S. and Turkish companies,
multinationals, mid-sized companies, small enterprises and individuals with an interest in U.S.-
Turkish relations. ATC is located in Washington, DC.

Ataturk Society of America-ASA

Washington, DC
Webpage: http://www.ataturksociety.org

192
Turkish Student Associations
Assembly of Turkish Student Associations-Wash., DC
Washington, DC
Webpage:http://www.atsadc.org

WISCONSIN
Turkish American Association of Milwaukee-TAAM
Milwaukee, WI

American Turkish Association of Milwaukee

Milwaukee, WI

TURKISH-AMERICAN MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS

The Turkish Times

It is biweekly-published newspaper of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. It covers
Turkish American issues with news articles, editorials, cultural events, and business information.
It is located in Washington, DC.

Zaman America
It is a daily newspaper in Turkey but it is published weekly in New York. It not only looks at
issues of Turkish-Americans but also political, cultural and economic issues of Turkey and
matters of Turks living in the United States. It is printed both in English and Turkish.

Turk of America
It is a monthly Turkish Magazine published in New York by Cemil Ozyurt and Omer Gunes and
deals with issues of Turks living in America.

Mezun Life
It is a monthly Turkish magazine published in the United States and owned by mezun.com (a
website of great sources for Turkish immigrants and the Turks who want to come to the United
States). It also deals with issues of Turkish Americans and Turkey.

Turkish Daily News

It is published daily and contains information about Turkish economy and government. It is
published in English in Ankara and has a website updated daily.

193
Turkuaz
Published quarterly in both Turkish and English, Turkuaz offers recommendations, cultural
information and community news and interviews to Turks, Americans and Turkish-Americans. It
mainly targets Turkish Americans on living the West coast.

In addition to the newspapers and newsletters published in the United States, almost all major
Turkish newspapers and magazines are available online. Major Turkish newspapers such as
Hurriyet, Milliyet, Sabah are delivered by air and distributed to Turkish Americans living in New
York. They function as main source of news from Turkey for Turks in the United States. There
are also numerous websites put on the web by Turkish-American organizations, including
student organizations, to bring Turkish-Americans together and keep the sprit of being Turkish
alive while living in a multicultural country, the United States.

Although with the increasing use of internet their number is decreasing, various Turkish
American organizations have monthly newsletter or bulletins.

American Turkish Society Bulletin

It is quarterly newsletter of the American Turkish Society and located in New York

Turkish Newsletter
It is monthly published by the Turkish American Association and is located in New York.

194
 APPENDIX E

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM FROM THE HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE

195
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 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ilhan Kaya was born on May 1, 1974, in Turkey. After finishing high school at Eleskirt

High School in 1989, Ilhan went to Ataturk University in Turkey, where he received his

Bachelor of Science degree in Geography in 1994. In 1996, Ilhan earned a full scholarship from

the Turkish Ministry of Education to pursue a graduate degree in the United States. Ilhan began

his Master of Science (MS) in Geography in 1997 and finished it in 1998 at Florida State

University, where emphasized geography textbook adoption policies and politics. Soon after

completing his MS, Ilhan began his Ph.D. in Geography at Florida State University and taught

classes such as World Regional Geography and Human Geography. Ilhan’s research interests

include cultural geography, political geography, politics of identity, the Middle East, Muslim

Americans, and Turkish Americans.

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