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Excerpts
from
“Breaking
the
Judicial
Nominations
and
Confirmation
Log
Jam”
FBA-‐Brookings
Judicial
Issues
Forum
Monday
February
28,
2011
Panel One
:
When
I
started
writing
about
this
subject
in
the
mid
and
late
‘90s
I
thought
we
were
in
a
race
to
the
bottom.
And
I
really
actually,
the
only
thing
that
I
had
wrong
was
that
I
really
underestimated
how
low
the
bottom
was.
…..pg
2
:
And
so
I
guess
the
purpose
of
today’s
event,
we
wanted
to
talk
a
bit
about
the
institutional
impact
on
the
judiciary,
on
the
sort
of
personal
impact
on
the
nominees
and
the
willingness
to
serve
as
a
result
of
it.
…..pg
2
:
Destroy
people’s
reputations,
stop
the
other
side
from
getting
what
it
wants
and,
you
know,
get
yours
and
prevent
them
from
getting
theirs.
Nobody
ever
sort
of
perceived
themselves
as
playing
that
role.
…..pg
19
:
And
the
only
explanation
that
I’ve
ever
been
able
to
think
of
for
this
is
that
we
have
realized
as
a
society,
and
particularly
the
Senate
and
the
interest
groups
that
advocate
in
this
area,
have
realized
that
the
judiciary
is
an
extraordinarily
powerful
institution,
set
of
institutions.
And
they’ve
realized
as
well
that
once
you
confirm
somebody
to
a
federal
judgeship
there’s
not
much
you
can
do
about
what
that
person
says,
save
reversal,
and
the
really,
you
know,
that
takes
doing.
…..pg
20
:
The
Senate
is
subject
to
partisan
shifts
and
partisan
retributions.
And
so
when
you
talk
about
the
institutional
quality
of
the
way
the
Senate
does
its
job,
the
partisan
dimension
immediately
comes
up
unnecessarily
unless
you
have
some
very
strong
senatorial
norms
that
militate
against
it.
Now,
those
norms
used
to
exist.
There
used
to
be
an
understanding
that
you
didn’t
stop
district
judges.
…..pg
26
:
Even
if
you
reject
everything
that
was
said
by
everybody,
all
three
of
my
co-‐panelists,
I
challenge
anyone
in
this
room
to
think
of
a
single
ideological
point
of
American
law
that
was
decided
on
a
final
basis
by
a
U.S.
district
judge.
…..pg
36
2
:
But
a
single
significant
point
of
substantive
ideologically
contested
law,
these
are
not
decided
by
federal
district
judges
ever.
…..pg
36
:
Somebody
at
some
point
has
to
take
a
leadership
role
and
say
I
don’t
want
to
play
these
games
anymore.
I
want
to
acknowledge
that
wrong
was
done
including
by
my
party,
and
I
want
to
figure
out
a
way
going
forward
to
acknowledge
what
we
did,
acknowledge
what
was
done
to
us,
and
figure
out
a
different
modus
Vivendi.
And
I
think
it
has
to
be
a
matter
of
presidential
leadership.
…..pg
37
:
the
FBA’s
foremost
interest
lies
in
the
assurance
of
prompt,
dispositive
action
by
the
President
in
nominating
qualified
federal
judicial
candidates
and
the
Senate
in
either
confirming
or
not
confirming
them
in
a
prompt
manner
…..pg
3
&
4
:
At
the
completion
of
this
last
year,
Chief
Justice
Roberts
indicated
the
urgent
need
for
Democrats
and
Republicans
to
put
aside
bickering
and
to
fill
federal
judicial
vacancies.
…..pg
5
: Bush’s first 2 years the Senate confirmed 92 percent of his district judges ….pg 7
:
But
even
if
you
discount
that,
even
if
you
discount
those
13
nominees,
as
I
said
his
confirmation
rate
for
district
nominees
in
his
first
2
years
is
only
67
percent.
So
again,
are
we
looking
at
a
fundamental
change
in
how
the
Senate
treats
district
nominees?
…..pg8
:
I
just
want
to
something
real
quick.
What
judge
Furgeson
said,
there’s
a
fair
amount
of
empirical
bearing
that
out,
both
by
research
done
by
Robert
Carr
and
colleagues
at
the
University
of
Houston
and
then
a
Brookings
Book
published
by
Cass
Sunstein
and
others.
If
you
listen
to
FOX
news
and
MSNBC
you’d
think
the
gap
between
Democratic
and
Republican
appointed
judges
is,
you
know,
90/10.
It’s
really
pretty
close.
In
some
areas
it’s
indistinguishable.
…..pg
35
&
36
3
: I think the system is broken. I want to talk a little about why I believe that. …..pg 10
:
Last
year
at
the
University
of
Idaho,
Chief
Justice
Roberts
spoke
about
how
the
process
of
appointing
new
justices
to
the
Supreme
Court
has
become
so
polarized
and
politicized
as
senators
try
to
pin
down
how
a
nominee
might
vote
on
a
particular
issue.
…..pg
10
:
The
chief
justice
observed
that
that
kind
of
questioning
is
inappropriate
since
judges
are
expected
to
be
impartial
in
hearing
the
cases
that
come
before
them.
…..pg
10
:
The
Los
Angeles
Times
observed
that
if
President
Obama
wants
to
deliver
on
the
bipartisanship
that
he
promised,
he
should
focus
on
the
process
for
selecting
federal
judges.
…..pg
10
:
I
will
tell
you
as
an
independent
observer,
both
parties
are
right.
I
think
President
Obama
and
the
democrats
who
now
control
the
Senate
should
recognized
that
excessive
partisanship
can
fuel
fire.
It
certainly
has
in
the
past.
And
Republicans
also
need
to
recognize
that
fact.
…..pg
11
:
The
longs
delays
and
partisan
bickering
have
dissuaded
some
very
capable
lawyers
from
pursuing
federal
judgeships.
We
should
be
striving
for
the
best
and
the
brightest
outstanding
lawyers
who
can
be
fair
and
impartial
judges.
…..pg
11
:
That
kind
of
interest
group
reaction
is
exactly
what
causes
or
creates
the
poisonous
atmosphere
that
exists
on
the
Senate
Judiciary
Committee.
…..pg
12
:
Shorthanded
courts
cannot
function
properly,
and
many
litigants
who
face
lengthy
delays
and
crowded
dockets
are
ultimately
denied
the
justice
they
seek.
…..pg
12
:
This
partisan
bickering
over
who
borked
who
and
when
eventually
has
resulted
in
confirmation
hearings
where
the
wife
of
the
judicial
nominee
left
the
hearing
room
in
tears
because
of
the
smears
to
her
husband’s
good
name
and
reputation.
…..pg
13
:
One
nominee
whose
nomination
lapsed
told
me
that
she
asked
the
President
not
to
resubmit
her
name
to
the
new
Congress
because
she
found
the
Senate
confirmation
process
to
be
so
demeaning.
…..pg
13
:
I
say
to
both
Republicans
and
Democrats
you’re
injuring
the
federal
judiciary
and
for
the
sake
of
our
country
which
needs
a
fair
and
impartial
and
independent
judiciary,
stop
this
war.
…..pg
14
4
:
That’s
why
we’re
having
a
hard
time
getting
civil
trials.
But
that
largely
was
the
result
of
so
many
vacancies
at
one
time
and
now
we
have
a
fifth.
Judge
Urbina
has
taken
senior
status.
There’s
no
nominee
yet
for
that
but
it’s
in
the
works.
We’ve
used
visiting
judges
when
we
can
and
try
to
keep
you
with
the
civil
side
but
many
districts
around
the
country,
not
just
us,
have
the
exact
same
problem.
And
certainly,
all
the
border
courts
have
it.
…..pg
29
&
30
:
We
would
be
sinking
without
senior
judges.
We’ve
been
very
fortunate
to
keep
senior
judges
working.
They
are
obligated
to
work
a
quarter
time
to
keep
chambers
and
staff.
Most
of
ours
work
between
half
and
three-‐quarters
time
and
they’re
going
to
draw
their
full
salary
for
life
anyway
so
it’s
actually
free
labor.
…..pg
31
:
So
basically,
the
docket
had
grown
tenfold
in
five
years
and
I
was
scrambling.
We
were
all
scrambling.
…..pg
15
:
First,
as
you
all
know,
there’s
a
constitutional
and
statutory
requirement
to
give
defendants
as
speedy
trial.
When
you’re
dealing
with
400
–
really
more
than
400
defendants
because
some
of
the
cases
had
two
or
more,
I
was
dealing
with
almost
600
defendants
–
you
really
begin
to
have
trouble
giving
people
a
speedy
trial.
And
you
start
an
assembly
line
process
which
is
not
optimal.
…..pg
16
: The problem is also acute because of pretrial detention costs. …..pg 16
:
[A]
normal
federal
court
will
handle
during
this
period
of
time
something
like
75
to
85
to
90
criminal
cases
and
I
was
handling
450.
.
.
.
I
would
sometimes
look
out
in
the
evening
at
the
mass
of
people
assembled
in
my
courtroom
and
it
would
take
me
back
to
the
days
when
I
was
a
very
young
lawyer
and
my
firm
was
assigning
me
to
handle
clients
in
night
traffic
court.
And
I
felt
like
I
was
in
night
traffic
court.
The
problem,
of
course,
in
night
traffic
court
if
my
client
got
fined
it
was
going
to
be
a
couple
of
hundred
bucks
at
the
most,
and
the
problem
that
I
had
with
the
defendants
before
me,
they
were
looking
at
years
—
potentially
years
and
years
in
a
federal
prison.
And
I
was
able
to
give
them
about
as
much
attention
as
I
could
see
those
traffic
judges
giving
their
—
the
defendants
before
them
attention
when
the
fines
were
about
$100
or
$200.
It
was
not
a
good
feeling
and
federal
judges
all
across
the
border
continue
to
deal
with
this
problem
of
not
having
the
time
it
takes
to
really
consider
what
they’re
doing,
especially
in
sentencing.
And
I
don’t
think
there’s
a
federal
judge
in
American
that
will
tell
you
—
that
will
disagree
with
this
statement.
The
hardest
job
we
have
is
to
sentence
human
beings.
You
know,
it’s
something
to
judge
another
human
being.
And
it’s
a
very
hard
job.
And
to
feel
like
you’re
5
not
being
able
to
give
it
near
the
attention
it
deserves
creates
a
desperate
sense
of
failure
on
your
part.
…..pg
16
and
17
:
The
word
dire
has
been
used
several
times
and
the
fact
of
the
matter
is
on
the
border
the
situation
is
dire.
We
need
more
federal
judges,
we
need
more
judgeships,
and
pending
vacancies
create
an
enormous
difficulty.
…..pg
17
&
18
: And businesses need a strong rule of law and prompt rulings by judges. …..pg 148
:
Vacancies
desperately
need
to
be
filled;
new
judges
desperately
need
to
be
added.
We
owe
that
to
our
border
judges.
We
owe
that
to
our
citizens.
We
owe
that
to
our
constitution.
We
owe
that
to
the
rule
of
law.
And
we
owe
it
to
the
cause
of
justice.
…..pg
18
:
What
I
really
can’t
understand
is
what
the
fight
is
about
district
judges.
We
are
really
doing
the
bread
and
butter
work
of
the
courts.
We’re
the
boots
on
the
ground.
We’re
where
everything
starts.
…..pg
24
:
We’re
trying
to
move
these
cases.
We’re
trying
to
comply
with
the
Speedy
Trial
Act.
We’re
trying
to
make
sure
that
the
rule
of
law
works
and
that
justice
gets
done.
…..pg
24
: It seems that to me both sides bear equal fault in this process. …..pg 26
: So we need not only vacancies filled but we need new judgeships. …..pg 30
: If it weren’t for senior judges our whole institution would be under water. …..pg 31
:
I’ve
been
a
district
judge
for
17
years
and
we
are
really
committed
to
try
to
make
this
system
work
and
we
are
institutional
people.
And
we
want
justice
to
be
done.
We
believe
in
juries
and
the
jury
system.
…..pg
35
:
Nobody
wants
to
do
the
part
that
Ben
says
of
admitting
they
did
wrong.
So
long
as
nobody
is
going
to
do
that
it’s
not
going
to
happen.
…..pg
37
&
38
:
But
I
would
like
to
say
this,
that
you
know,
in
some
ways
sort
of
the
spirit
of
our
revolution
was
captured
by
Thomas
Payne
in
Common
Sense
when
he
said
in
a
monarchy
the
king
is
law
but
in
a
democracy
the
law
is
king.
We
are
a
nation
based
on
the
rule
of
law.
And
for
that
rule
to
work
you’ve
got
to
have
sufficient
judges
to
handle
the
cases
and
handle
them
in
a
thoughtful
way.
…..pg
41
6
Panel Two
:
In
fact,
it
reminds
me
of
the
broader
problem
of
American
politics
today
and
think
one
of
the
questions
our
panel
will
be
wrestling
with
is
just
how
distinctive
is
the
particular
problem
of
the
nomination/confirmation
process
of
Federal
judges
and
justices
and
how
much
is
a
part
of
the
broader
fabric
of
American
politics.
Forty-‐one
years
of
watching,
analyzing
American
politics,
I’ve
–
I
haven’t
seen
it
at
as
low
a
point
in
my
own
personal
view
with
the
triumph
of
ideology
and
partisanship
over
institutional
responsibilities.
…..pg
2
:
You
know,
its
obligatory
for
politicians
to
talk
about
American
exceptionalism,
you
know,
we
are
the
best
of
all
possible
political
systems,
and
of
course
we
have
the
best
health
care
and
we
have
the
best
everything.
Well,
it
just
isn’t
so.
…..pg
2
:
…but,
Manus,
I
really
want
to
sort
of
challenge
the
notion
that
you
can
expect
a
democracy
to
work
effectively
based
on
the
specific
and
most
intense
priorities
that
you
seem
to
imagine
coming
from
the
public.
If
good
government
depended
entirely
on
a
citizenry
that
was
very
clearly,
rationally,
in
an
informed
basis,
sort
of
laying
out
what
needed
to
be
done,
this
republic
would
have
ended
a
long
time
ago.
There
really
is
a
division
of
labor
and
people
in
government
have
a
responsibility.
…..pg
18
:
But
I’m
wondering
if
in
the
end
the
roots
of
the
problem
are
so
deep,
they’re
manifest
in
the
development
of
parliamentary-‐like
parties
that
are
ideologically
polarized
and
internally
homogeneous
with
a
rough
level
of
parity
between
the
parties
making
the
stakes
extremely
high
for
any
action
taken
in
the
Congress,
House,
and
Senate,
which
prevents
the
very
kind
of
give
and
take
negotiation
deliberation
by
which
the
institution
used
to
work.
…..pg23
:
Notwithstanding
what
the
President
said
during
the
campaign,
it
is
now,
we
have
to
sadly
acknowledge,
clear
that
once
in
office,
or
even
before
he
came
into
office,
he
had
not
established
the
priority
or
invested
the
resources
necessary
to
build
the
infrastructure
for
the
federal
judicial
appointment
process
and
to
focus
on
sort
of
the
biggest
dynamic
sword
that
there
is
in
that
–there
are
two—one
is
nominations
and
to
keep
the
nominations
pipeline
up
to
the
Senate
full
at
all
times.
Your
highest
calling
is
to
have
a
nominee
for
every
vacancy
and
that
7
is
absolutely
critical
because
if
you
do
not
have
that
kind
of
pressure,
whatever
it
is
you
run
into,
you
do
not
have
the
standing
to
complain
about
a
lot,
……pg
3
:
And
you
second
big,
sort
of,
light
sword
that
you
have
is
the
President
himself,
the
President
talking
all
the
time
about
judicial
appointments
and
how
important
they
are
in
a
particular
context,
which
I
will
get
to
later,
and
yet—as
yet,
unfortunately,
we
have
heard
nothing
from
President
Obama
since
his
inauguration.
…..pg
4
:
…is
that
the
person
who
wrote
the
playbook
for
how
this
needs
to
be
done
is
George
W.
Bush,
and
if
you
read
in
judicature
the
four
years—or
actually
the
eight
years,
the
….when
you
step
back
and
read
the
last
one
they
did
that
sums
up
the
entire
GWB
administration,
you
see
what
was
done
there
and
it
is
the
gamebook,
the
playbook
for
how
;you
have
to
do
this.
You
have
to
start
thinking
you’re
going
to
be
elected
president.
You
have
to
have
people
lined
up.
You
have
to
have
a
really
good
process
that’s
sufficiently
staffed
and
led
by
people
who
know
what
they’re
doing.
…..pg
4
:
…,
but
the
second
problem
is
clearly
the
Senate
and,
you
know,
it’s
just
not
possible
to
live
in
the
United
States
and
not
think
that
the
Senate
of
the
United
States
is
just
a
mess,
whether
you’re
on
the
left
or
you’re
on
the
right,
it
is
just
a
–
just
a
disaster.
…..pg
5
:
And
in
doing
this
all
you
were
doing
is
essentially
contributing
to
the
guerilla
warfare
manual
that
has
been
developed
over
the
years
to
establish
yet
new
tactics
and
new
fronts
in
the
increasingly
collateral
warfare
that
has
taken
the
Senate
far
from
its
duty
to
exercise
its
advice
and
consent
responsibility
for
federal
judges.
…..pg
5
:
And
I
don’t
think
that
so
much
because
of
nominees
are
entitled
to
a
vote,
that’s
because
the
Constitution,
I
believe,
really
means
that
the
Senate
needs
to
give
those
people
a
vote,
That’s
part
of
their
duty.
They
can
advise
and
they
can
choose
not
to
consent,
but
they
ought
to
do
it.
That’s
the
weight
of
their
constitutional
responsibility,
and
they
owe
it
to
the
courts
as
we
heard
from
the
judges.
…..pg
5
:
But
none
of
that
appears
to
be,
you
know,
where
they’re
headed.
If
they
were,
if
you
had
people
in
the
Senate—and
I
think
there
are
some
new
members
who
seem
to
be
understanding
that
this
is,
as
somebody
said
earlier,
a
race
to
the
bottom,
and
mutual
immolation
bringing
the
court
system
down
with
it
is
really
what,
in
the
end,
will
come.
What
needs
to
happen
is
a
reform
process
that
establishes
a
regular
order
of
action
at
the
committee
and
on
the
floor,
regular
hearings—regularly
scheduled
hearings—for
judges
and
that
will
put
pressure
on
the
executive
branch
to
get
people
up
there.
…..pg
6
:
There
should
be
reasonable
time
limits
on
not
only
committee
holds—holdovers
or
holds,
but
holds
on
the
floor,
And,
finally,
there’s
got
to
be
transparency,
not
only
about
the
8
objector,
who
the
objector
is,
the
person
who’s
got
the
hold,
but
what
the
objection
is,
……..pg
6
:
And
the
last
problem
that
I
see,
which
frankly
is
the
most
pervasive
and
damaging
and
difficult
to
remedy,
and
we’ve
talked
about,
you
know,
one
aspect
of
it
in
a
very
,
very
good
panel,
the
politicization
and
this
fear
that
somehow
any
appointment
is
tilting
one’s—the
whole
court
system,
sort
of,
more
in
favor
of
one
ideology,
one
philosophy,
one
party,
than
another.
But
what’s
really
gotten
implicated
in
all
of
this,
I
think,
which
is
another
way
to
look
at
the
problem,
is
that
there
is
this
pervasive,
damaging,
highly
difficult
to
remedy
problem
of
a
widening,
a
very
large
and
widening
failure
to
understand,
lack
of
understanding
of,
and
regard
for
the
public
administration
of
justice
and
for
the
critical
core
element,
the
judges,
are
in
the
fair,
timely,
and
efficient
administration
of
justice,
total
lack
of
understanding
about
the
people
who
put
themselves
forward
as
candidates
and
nominees,
and
also
what
judges
really
do.
…..pg
7
:
The
executive
certainly
has
some
responsibility
to
the
extent
it
fails
in
its
duty
to
have
nominations
up
there
for
every
vacancy,
but
it
is
really
the
Senate,
and
it
is
reflected
in
and
illustrated
by
the
politicization
of
the
judicial
appointment
process
and
the
courts
generally,
the
stalling
of
the
process,
which
has
completely
eroded
the
candidate
base.
…..pg
8
:
But
nonetheless,
presidents
have
responsibilities.
So,
I
would
just
argue
that
this
is
a
core
thing
that
we
have
ask
our
presidents
to
focus
on,
whoever
they
are,
and
I
think
the
Senate
bears,
you
know,
concomitant—you
know,
the
matching
responsibility,
and
it’s
got
to
be
pressed.
And
the
Senate’s
not
going
to
anything
if
nothing
comes
up
there
for
it
to
do
and
so
the
President’s
got
two
jobs,
he’s
got
to
get
stuff
up
there
for
the
Senate
to
do,
and
then
he’s
got
to
pound
on
them
to
do
it.
……pg
21
:
Also
think
about
how
the
blue
slip
has
been
used,
right,
this
practice
that
allows
the
home
state
senators
to
essentially
put
a
quiet
kibosh
on
a
nomination.
Well,
some
of
the
Senate
Judiciary
Committee
in
recent
years
have
said,
well,
I’m
not
going
to
let
the
blue
slip
be
dispositive,
I’m
not
going
to
let
the
home
state
senators
automatically
veto
nominees,
that’s
because
salience
is
pretty
widespread
across
the
Senate
and
they’re
not
simply
going
to
defer
to
home
state
senators.
…..pg
23
Manus Cooney (TCH Group/former majority staff director-‐US Senate Judiciary Committee)
:
-‐-‐importantly
in
this
area
you
need
a
will,
and
on
the
part
of
both
the
executive
and
legislative
branches
of
government.
I’m
not
sure
that
always
exists
and
I
think
that
that’s
an
important
thing
to
bear
in
mind.
…..pg
9
9
:
So,
the
question
one
has
to
ask
right
now
is,
is
the
judicial
appointments
and
confirmation
process
a
priority
in
Washington?
I
would
say
citing
some
of
what
Eldie
just
pointed
out
that
it
is
not.
…..pg
10
:
On
this
issue,
there
is
not
sufficient
presidential
leadership
to
force
a
focusing
of
the
mind
of
policymakers
to
try
to
reach
agreement.
…..pg
10
:
So,
I
agree
with
Eldie,
it’s
a
big
problem
to
the
extent
it’s
keeping
more
qualified
people
from
submitting
their
names.
I
would
agree
that
it’s
unfair
to
the
nominees,
whether
they
be
Democrat
or
Republican
nominees.
You
look
at
the
length
of
time
it
takes
to
get
from
appointment
to
confirmation,
regardless
of
which
President
made
it,
the
of
time
it
can
take
in
the
Senate,
just
isn’t
right.
…..pg
11
:
Unfortunately,
you
know,
at
the
end—when
you
look
at
it,
unlike
legislation—Senator
Hatch,
when
I
worked
for
him,
I
always
used
to
say
that
you
can’t
lose
sight
of
the
fact
that
you’re
dealing
with
individuals
not
legislation,
not
ideas,
and
these
people
have
careers,
they
have
reputations,
they
have
families
and
the
like,
and
they
deserve
better.
…..pg
11
:
So,
it’s
going
to
require
a
big
fix,
a
long
term
fix,
and
something
that
can
be
enforced
regardless
of
who’s
in
power,
whichever
party
it
may
be,
and
so
you
do
need
to
add
other
stakeholders.
…..pg
12
:
And
so
I
think
that—forgive
me
for—I
don’t
know
that
there’s
any
one
particular
issue,
one
reform
I
would
suggest
that
might
change
the
dynamic—I
the
think
the
reality
is,
I
think,
you,
we
have
to
realize
in
the
grand
scheme
of
things
this
just
isn’t
as
important
as
it
is
to
many
of
the
people
in
this
room
to
the
general
population,
and
if
it
is,
we
need
to
elevate
it
somehow
and
the
way
to
do
it
isn’t
to
continue
to
just
preach
to
the
choir,
it’s
to
go
out
and
reach
out
to
other
stakeholders,
being
them
into
the
room,
and
create
a
broader
coalition
of
allied
interests
to
elevate
this
and
get
the
President
to
pay
attention
and
to
convince
people
in
Congress
and
the
Senate,
in
particular,
that
there’s
a
political
price
to
be
paid
for
not
taking
action.
…..pg
18
:
I
raise
that
simply
to
point
out
that
it’s—votes
can
be
forced
on
judicial
nominations,
but
is
there
a
political
will
to
do
it
in
the
face
of
so
many
other
pressing
priorities
and
so
many
other
areas
of
responsibility
for
the
Congress
and
the
Senate,
in
particular.
And
so
to
Thomas’
point,
I
agree
that
in
a
perfect
world
good
government
would
develop
and
arrive
and
think
that
some
of
the
things
suggested
here
could
put
in
place
a
structure
that
would
make
it
easier
for
government
and
a
select
judicial
appointments
process
to
work
more
fluidly
and
subject
to
less
political
gamesmanship.
…..pg
19
10
:
First,
if
past
patterns
of
and
in
advice
and
consent
are
at
all
predictive
about
the
current
Senate,
then
I
don’t
think
we
should
expect
to
see
the
current
logjam
broken
any
time
soon.
…..pg
12
:
I
don’t
think
we
should
expect
the
Senate
to
rubber
stamp
nominees.
I
think
delay,
in
fact,
often
taking
time
to
scrutinize
nominees
who
are
going
to
get
lifetime
appointments
to
the
bench
does
make
sense,
but
we
do
have
to
wonder
about
the
exponential
increase
in
delay
confirmation
times
over
the
past
20+-‐-‐20,
30
years.
……pg
13
:
The
fourth
trend
here
to
note
that
was
touched
on
in
the
first
panel,
I
believe,
is
that
conflict
has
now
spilled
over
to
confirmation
politics
for
consideration
of
district
court
nominees,
nominees
which
we
thought
typically,
at
least
looking
at
the
patterns
here,
were
relatively
immune
to
partisan
disputes
because
they
really
are
trial
courts,
they
are
not
courts
of
last
resort….
…..pg13
:
I
may
tend
more
toward
institutional
solutions
rather
than
relying
on
senator’s
improved
behavior,
but
of
course
any
successful
reform
is
probably
going
to
rely
a
little
bit
on
both
behavior
and
institutions.
One
idea
floated
in
the
advice
and
consent
book
out
front
is
to
have
some
sort
of
mechanism
for
moving
to
a
fast
track
procedure
for
confirmation
votes.
……..The
question
then
is
what
would
precipitate
a
fast
track?
…..pg
16