International Phenomenological Society

7\SHV7RNHQVDQG3URSRVLWLRQV4XLQH
V$OWHUQDWLYHWR3URSRVLWLRQV
$XWKRUV3DXO.0RVHU
6RXUFH3KLORVRSK\DQG3KHQRPHQRORJLFDO5HVHDUFK9RO1R0DUSS
3XEOLVKHGE\International Phenomenological Society
6WDEOH85/http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107689 .
$FFHVVHG

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. XLIV, No. 3, March 1984

Types, Tokens, and Propositions:

Quine's Alternative to
Propositions
PAUL K. MOSER
Loyola University of Chicago

A notorious feature of Quine's philosophy of language is its rejection of

propositions construed as abstract extra-linguistic items. The overarch-
ing aim of this essay is to argue that Quine's assault on propositions is
in part defective and can in part be turned against his own theory of
truth-bearers. Part I sets forth and begins assessment of Quine's major
objections to the theory of propositions, viz., those concerned with the
explanatory value of propositions and the conditions of propositional
identity. It argues, in brief, that those objections are either inconclusive
or apparently apply to Quine's theory of truth-bearers also. Part II pre-
pares for the continuation of this argument by outlining Quine's theory
of sentence-types, his alternative to propositions as truth-bearers. Part
III then resumes assessment of Quine's alternative to propositions. Its
major concern is to determine whether sentence-types enjoy the kind of
clear-cut identity conditions that Quine requires of propositions. The
verdict, to anticipate, is negative, and this leads to one of the morals of
Part IV: Quine's objections to propositions, if successful, undermine his
own theory of truth-bearers also.

I
Proposition theorists have been known to argue that propositions are
needed as explainers in the following ways: (i) As the abstract extra-lin-
guistic bearers of truth-value, they are needed to explain, for instance,
how there can be truths which are currently undiscovered and are there-
fore neither stated nor believed. Such truths, it is argued, cannot be
identified with statements, inscribed or uttered sentence-tokens, or
beliefs, and so must be abstract items such as propositions. (ii) As the
abstract objects of the propositional, or intentional, attitudes, proposi-
tions are needed to explain how various individuals can believe, desire,

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 36I

or hope for the same thing, even if they do not share the same language.
(iii) As the abstract meanings of sentences, propositions are needed to
explain how different sentences can be synonymous, even if those sen-
tences occur in different languages.
Quine has argued at length that neither (i) nor (ii) nor (iii) can with-
stand scrutiny. He rejects (i) mainly on the ground that everything
about truth explained by propositions expressed by eternal sentences,
i.e., sentences free of referential variation, can be explained by the eter-
nal sentences themselves, so long as those sentences are construed as
abstract sequences. And he rejects (ii) and (iii) principally because they
run afoul of his indeterminacy thesis. (iii) assumes that there is a fact
about synonymy in need of explanation, but Quine claims to have
shown in his argument for translational indeterminacy that there is no
fact of the matter with respect to meaning. (ii) assumes that there is a
fact of the matter about intentional attitudes which needs to be
explained, but Quine again appeals to his indeterminacy thesis to deny
any such assumption. Just as there is an indeterminacy of meaning, so
also there is an indeterminacy of intentional attitudes such as belief,
desire, and hope.'
There is, however, a serious gap in Quine's arguments based on the
indeterminacy thesis. For his version of the indeterminacy thesis is quite
unable to support the claim that there is no fact of the matter with
respect to meaning and intentional attitudes. Quine clearly intends his
indeterminacy thesis to be an ontological thesis based on arguments
showing that truths at the level of mathematics and physics do not
determine truths about meaning and intentional attitudes. For the
desired conclusion is that there is no fact of the matter with respect to
meaning and intentional attitudes.Z But none of his arguments for the
indeterminacy thesis is able to support such an ontological thesis. For
instance, the argument in chapter II of Word and Object, which is
Quine's most complete argument for the indeterminacy thesis, provides
at most an epistemological conclusion, viz., that translational truths are

On Quine's rejection of (ii) and (iii) see Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press,
i960), pp. zoo-zo6, o09-i6, 2i9-2i, and "Ontological Relativity," in Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, i969), pp. 26-30.
On his rejection of (i) see Word and Object, pp. 2o8-9, and Philosophy of Logic
(EnglewoodCliffs, New Jersey:Prentice-Hall,1970), pp. 10-14.
See, on this point, Word and Object, p. 73, Quine's "Reply to Chomsky," in Words
and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, ed. D. Davidson and J. Hintikka
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, i969), p. 303, and idem, "Facts of the Matter," in Essays on
the Philosophy of W. V. Quine, ed. R. Shahan and C. Swoyer (Norman, Oklahoma:
Universityof OklahomaPress,1979), p. i67.

36A PAUL K. MOSER

not verifiable, as they are not determined by all the objective, i.e.,
behavioral, data. And the same is true of Quine's more recent elabora-
tions on that thesis.3 His argument, at its best, proceeds from certain
epistemological premises about unverifiability to the ontological con-
clusion that there is no fact of the matter with respect to meaning and
intentional attitudes. Such an argument, it seems, requires either a ques-
tionable verificationist premise or a controversial assumption that
meaning is nothing more than overt dispositions to behavior. While the
latter assumption apparently begs the question against the proposition
theorist, the former is sufficiently controversial to require considerable
support. As Quine fails to provide such support, there appears to be a
serious gap in his argument. But if that is so, the proposition theorist is
not really threatened by Quine's argument purporting to undermine (ii)
and (iii).
It would be quite premature, however, to infer that Quine's assault
on propositions is wholly innocuous. For Quine has raised two objec-
tions that are logicaly independent of his indeterminacy thesis. The first
objection is primarily ontological; the second, semantic:
(I) We are unable to specify the circumstances under which
propositions are the same or are different.
(z) We cannot tell when two or more declarative sentence-tokens
express the same proposition.
These two obstacles to rendering the theory of propositions satisfactory
should not be confused, even if Quine occasionally runs them
together.4
A plausible answer to the ontological query raised by (i) will give
sense to saying when there is one proposition and when two. It seems
adequate, in this connection, to invoke what is often called Leibniz' law
concerning identity. When the principle of the identity of indiscernibles,

See, e.g., Quine's "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation," Journal of Phi-
losophy 67 (1970): i8o-8i, and "Ontological Relativity," in Ontological Relativity,
pp. 26-30. One of the clearest instances of Quine's shift from epistemological to onto-
logical considerations occurs in Word and Object, p. 73. In that particular context
Quine definitely fails to justify such a shift.
On objection (i) see Quine's "Speaking of Objects," in Ontological Relativity, pp.
i8-zz, and idem, "On the Individuation of Attributes," in The Logical Enterprise, ed.
A. R. Anderson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 3-13. On (z) see
Quine's Philosophy of Logic, pp. 3-7, and "Propositional Objects," in Ontological
Relativity, pp. 145-46. The kinds of identity conditions involved in (i) and (Z) are
required by Quine's precept 'No entity without identity'. Quine offers some support
for that precept in "Speaking of Objects," pp. 23-24.

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 363

'Vx Vy[VF(Fx *-> Fy) -- x = y]', and the principle of the indiscernibility of
identicals, 'Vx Vy[x = y -b VF(Fx *-> Fy)]', are conjoined, they serve the
proposition theorist as a law of identity that provides logically neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for propositional identity. This law, it
seems, can be applied to propositions as well as to any other entities
under scrutiny.
Arthur Pap, however, has argued against this view. He denies that
two propositions are identical if they exemplify exactly the same prop-
erties; for he believes that this Leibnizian principle leads to the unaccep-
table conclusion that two sentences express the same proposition if one
can be substituted for the other salva veritate in any context.5 Pap
unfortunately does not explain just how it leads to this unacceptable
conclusion, and it is very doubtful that it does. For, first, the Leibnizian
principle of identity has no bearing whatsoever on the semantic ques-
tion of two sentences expressing the same proposition, and, secondly, it
involves more than just the truth-value of propositions. Given the natu-
ral assumption that propositions exemplify certain properties in addi-
tion to their truth-value, it is highly unlikely that the proponent of the
Leibnizian principle is led to the unacceptable conclusion alleged by
Pap. Pap's objection apparently acquires plausibility only if we conflate
(i) and (z) and assume that our answer to the ontological query raised
by (i) solves the semantic problem of (z) as well. But (i) and (z), con-
trary to Pap's objection, should be kept distinct.
We can allay Pap's worry most easily by construing propositions as
extra-linguistic sequences. Given this view, the problem of proposi-
tional identity raised by (i) can be solved by invoking the principle of
extensionality for sequences; thus:
PI. Proposition P,, (xl, x,, . . ., xn), is the same as proposition
y .
PZ (YI Yz ., Yn) if and only if x1=y1, xz=yz, . ..
X= yn.

The proposition theorist can adhere to the closure of PI, identifying a

proposition P, and a proposition Pz just in case P, and Pz have exactly
the same constituents in exactly the same order, whether the constitu-
ents be relations, connectives, properties, or modalities.6

i See Pap, "Beliefand Propositions,"Philosophyof Science24 (1957): l23-24.

6
H.-N. Castafieda, for one, holds that propositions are extra-linguistic sequences. See
his "Relations and the Identity of Propositions," Philosophical Studies Z8 (1975): 243.
Principle PI was suggested by Castafieda's article.

364 PAUL K. MOSER

 My concern here is not to develop a theory of propositions, but
rather to suggest how the proposition theorist can specify the kind of
identity conditions required by Quine's objection (i). If either PI or the
above Leibnizian principle can serve that purpose, then the theory of
propositions does not fall prey to (i). And as Quine employs a principle
much like PI to specify the identity conditions for sentence-types, his
alternative to propositions, it is doubtful that he can consistently fault
the proposition theorist who invokes PI to meet objection (i).
In any case, objection (i) can apparently be met much more easily
than (z). Objection (z), moreover, has an analogue that applies to
Quine's theory of sentence-types. But before this can be argued, more
needs to be said about Quine's own theory.

II
Given Quine's aversion to propositions as the objects of intentional atti-
tudes, it seems that the linguistic theory of belief is a natural alternative
for him. Basic to that theory is the assumption that belief is always an
attitude toward some sentence-token or other. Thus on that theory lin-
guistic proficiency is a necessary condition of believing anything. Pro-
ponents of the linguistic theory regard sentence-tokens as concrete
inscriptions and utterances, and not as mental items. Belief, accord-
ingly, is regarded as an attitude toward either physical objects of certain
shapes or physical sound waves of certain patterns.7
But, as Quine apparently concedes, it is untenable to maintain that
concrete utterances and inscriptions are always the objects of belief. For
that view implies that there is belief only if the object of belief has been
uttered or inscribed. Such an implication is unacceptable principally
because many of our beliefs have never been verbally expressed,
whether by utterance or by inscription, nor will they ever be so
expressed. Contrary to the linguistic theory, such failure of verbal
expression neither precludes nor disturbs belief.
It makes sense to say, for instance, that Jones believes something
altogether unannounced, but it is difficult to see how the linguistic
theory could accommodate such a statement. On that theory the state-

Two well-known proponents of the linguistic theory are Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and
Necessity, zd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 53-63, and Israel
Scheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry (New York: A. A. Knopf, i963), pp. 'az-I1.
Quine's comments on the linguistic theory, which are largely critical, are found in
Word and Object, pp. z I 3-1 5, and in "Propositional Objects," in Ontological Relativ-
ity, pp. 143-46. Additional discussion of the linguistic theory can be found in Michael
Corrado, "On Believing Inscriptions to Be True," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 36 (1975): 59-73.

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 365

ment under consideration is analyzed as asserting the existence of a par-
ticular inscription or utterance of which no sample is given in the state-
ment itself. It may happen, however, that no such inscription or utter-
ance exists or ever will; for believing, unlike saying, does not produce
either utterances or inscriptions.
Quine has proposed that this problem be resolved by construing sen-
tences as abstract linguistic forms or types, rather than merely as con-
crete utterances and inscriptions, or tokens. On that proposal the exis-
tence of a sentence is not compromised by failure of inscription and
utterance. Clearly, however, if sentences are construed as classes of
inscriptions and utterances, then all sentences which are neither uttered
nor inscribed would reduce to one: the null class. There would thus be
no distinctions among uninscribed and unuttered sentences.
Quine proposes, accordingly, that we take sentences as sequences, in
a mathematical sense, of their successive characters. He construes a
sequence a,, a2,. . ., an as the class of the n pairs <a,, i>, <a,, z>,
<an, n>. And he takes each component character as as a class of
utterance or inscription events. Quine's proposal, therefore, is appar-
ently that sentence-types be taken as sequences of abstract word-types.
Word-types, on that proposal, are simply classes of word-tokens. Hence
a sentence-type is a sequence of classes of inscribed and uttered word-
tokens.8
Being armed, then, with this notion of sentence-type, we can rephrase
the following sentence, for instance:

(3) Quine believes that Frege wrote the Begriffsschrift in I878.

as:
(4) Quine believes-true 'Frege wrote the Begriffsschrift in I878'.

On this analysis the objects of the intentional attitudes are simply eter-
nal sentences taken as types rather than tokens. But there is a certain
relativity to language that (4) fails to make explicit. The linguistic form
quoted in (4) may very well make sense in another language, and sense
different from that intended by (4). Thus (4) must be rephrased as:

(5) Quine believes-true in English 'Frege wrote the Begriffsschrift

in I878'.

8 See, in this connection, Word and Object, pp. 194-95, and "Ontological Relativity" in
Ontological Relativity, pp. 41-4z. An alternative reading is that sentence-types are
sequences of classes of letter-tokens or of phonemes. But even such alternative notions
of sentence-type must face the problems of Part III below.

)366 PAUL K. MOSER

(5), however, is still an unsatisfactory analysis by Quine's lights, for it
depends on the notion of a language, in this case English. The trouble
with that notion is that it, like the notion of proposition under scrutiny,
lacks a satisfactory principle of individuation. It is, after all, very
difficult to specify precisely when languages count as identical or as dis-
tinct.
Quine's theory of sentence-types, therefore, apparently does not
enable him to provide a sentential analysis of the idioms of intentional
attitude. In Word and Object his strategy is thus to leave such idioms in
a second-grade status, i.e., one of tolerable vernacular having no place
in the austere idiom of scientific theory.9 But even though sentence-
types cannot salvage the idioms of intentional attitude, they are invoked
by Quine to serve as the vehicles of truth-value. Thus, given Quine's
strictures, it must be asked whether they enjoy clear-cut identity condi-
tions in their role as truth-bearers.

III
Quine has frequently expressed a preference for taking eternal sen-
tences, construed as abstract linguistic types, as the bearers of truth."
They are better than other sentences inasmuch as they are true or false
independently of time, place, and utterance. And they are better than
propositions, according to Quine, inasmuch as they have clear identity
conditions. Given the principle of extensionality for sequences, any two
sequences, and hence any two types, may be said to be the same if and
only if they have exactly the same constituents in precisely the same
order. Thus sentence-types do not engender perplexities over the kind
of identity conditions mentioned in objection (i).
But what about objection (z)? The analogous question for the pro-
ponent of Quine's theory is: What are the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for two or more linguistic expressions to be tokens of the same

See Word and Object, p. zzi, and "Speaking of Objects," in Ontological Relativity,
pp. vl-24. Quine has outlined an alternative analysis of the idioms of intentional atti-
tude, one in terms of states of affairs construed as classes of possible worlds, in
"Propositional Objects" in Ontological Relativity, pp. 147-55. But it is not clear that
he intends that analysis to be of more than heuristic value.
See, e.g., Word and Object, p. zo8, "Propositional Objects," in Ontological Relativity,
pp. 142-43, and Philosophy of Logic, pp. 13-14. In the latter work Quine also
expresses a preference for tokens as truth-bearers, but this complication does not affect
the subsequent argument. In fact, the following argument concerning type-identity of
tokens can easily be applied to a theory of replicahood of tokens also. Hereafter, I shall
be primarily concerned with eternal sentences, but for brevity my examples of sen-
tence-tokens will not always be free of referential variation.

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 367

type? An adequate answer to this question is needed for a variety of rea-
sons, one of which concerns our employment of sentences involving
direct quotation. When one says, for instance, that Smith and Jones said
'S' (where S is any linguistic expression), the truth of one's statement
depends in part on the type-identity of the relevant utterances of Smith
and Jones. If the linguistic expressions uttered by Smith and Jones are
not tokens of the same type, then it is most likely that the sentence
'Smith and Jones said 'S" will be false. But there is another, more
immediate reason for Quine to answer the above question. He fre-
quently castigates the proposition theorist for failing to answer a similar
question, based on (z), with respect to propositions; so one would
expect Quine to have a satisfactory answer to the above question. But
does he?
The samenesses relevant prima facie to type-identity are typographi-
cal, or shape-, identity for inscribed tokens and phonetic identity, or
sameness of pronunciation, for uttered tokens. Consider, however, the
following two tokens:
(6) Jones liebt.
(7) Jones leaped.
The utterances due to my pronunciation of (6) and (7) may be phoneti-
cally identical, but many of us would nonetheless refuse to endorse
those utterances as tokens of the same utterance-type. This refusal is
probably based on a tacit commitment to C. S. Peirce's thesis that dis-
parity of sense entails disparity of type. In any case, phonetic identity is
not always countenanced as a sufficient condition of type-identity of
uttered tokens. It is conceivable, furthermore, that one and the same
sequence of phonemes, or even of inscribed tokens, could function as a
truth of physics, say, in English and as the contrary of that truth in
another language. This situation would leave us with an eternal sen-
tence that is both eternally true and eternally false.
The easiest way to eliminate such a possibility is to relativize each
eternal sentence to a particular language. But there are at least two
problems with that proposal. First, as already noted, the notion of a
language is without a satisfactory principle of individuation. Thus,
given Quine's strictures, it cannot be introduced to resolve the problem
at hand. Secondly, the above proposal would be inadequate even if
there were clear identity conditions for languages. For an eternal sen-
tence in a particular language L can be ambiguous in L in such a way
that it is true on one interpretation but false on another.

368 PAUL K. MOSER

 The first problem suggests that Quine cannot consistently salvage any
shape-phonetic criterion of type-identity by appealing to the notion of a
particular language. This problem, it seems, constitutes evidence
against any criterion of type-identity which involves only the factors of
shape-identity and phonetic identity of tokens. The second problem is
more serious, but provides similar evidence. It suggests that there may
be truth-bearers which are both true and false due to the intralinguistic
ambiguity of -their tokens. As Quine opposes any such suggestion, it
may be inferred that he would reject any criterion of type-identity
which involves only physical features of tokens. What is needed, then, is
a criterion which eliminates any ambiguity resulting in variation of the
truth-value of eternal sentences.
Perhaps a better clue to the circumstances under which tokens may
be said to be type-identical can be found in the verbal dispositions of
language-users. Consider the following two occasion sentences:
(8) Yellow paper is here.

(9) YELLOW PAPER IS HERE.

On the behaviorist criterion (8) and (9) may be regarded as two inscrip-
tions of the same sentence-type just because they are verbal stimuli
which stimulate a uniform behavioral reaction among normal lan-
guage-users. That behavioral reaction is marked by a correlation
between assent and the presence of yellow paper, and between dissent
and the absence of yellow paper, on occasions where the sentence is
queried. A sign of assent involves the speaker's disposition to produce
that sign whenever a sentence is queried in circumstances in which he
would be disposed to volunteer the sentence himself.
Succinctly, then, the behaviorist criterion states that two inscriptions
i1 and i. are tokens of the same type if and only if in appropriate cir-
cumstances i1 and iz stimulate uniform behavioral reactions among
normal language-users. And the same point applies to linguistic utter-
ances also. The behaviorist criterion requires, of course, that tokens be
sufficiently disambiguated before any type-ascription is made; for
tokens which are obviously ambiguous would stimulate neither assent
nor dissent. And such a requirement apparently gives the behaviorist
criterion a major advantage over the shape-phonetic criterion.
Yet there are obstacles to rendering the behaviorist criterion satisfac-
tory, even if we overlook for now the well-known problems with the
behaviorist notions of assent and disposition. A major obstacle is raised
by what Quine calls 'socially stimulus analytic sentences'. These are
sentences to which every speaker in our linguistic community is dis-

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 3 69

posed to assent under all circumstances; for in learning to understand
such sentences one learns to assent to them. The behaviorist criterion
apparently has the counterintuitive implication that all such sentences
are tokens of the same type. And the same point applies as well to many
sentences traditionally called 'necessary truths' and 'logically equivalent
sentences'. The true sentences of elementary mathematics, for instance,
would always, it seems, stimulate uniform assent from normal lan-
guage-users; for it is hard to imagine a situation in which a normal lan-
guage-user would assent to some of those sentences but reject or with-
hold assent to others. But it seems that 'One plus one equals two' and
'Two plus two equals four', for example, are indeed tokens of different
sentence-types, if any tokens are. It is doubtful, however, that the
behaviorist criterion can preserve such an obvious distinction.
But perhaps the behaviorist can accommodate the problem sentences
by introducing a requirement such as receptual similarity, i.e., physical
similarity of impact on the sensory surfaces, regardless of behavior. In
effect this move revives at least part of the shape-phonetic criterion by
conjoining it with the behaviorist criterion. The objective here is to pro-
vide criteria which assign tokens such as 'One plus one equals two' and
'Two plus two equals four' to different types. This can easily be accom-
plished by introducing shape-similarity as a necessary condition of
type-identity of inscriptions and phonetic similarity as a necessary con-
dition of type-identity of utterances. We would thus have the following
hybrid principle:
H. Two tokens t1 and tZare type-identical if and only if t, and
tZstimulate uniform behavioral reactions among normal lan-
guage-users and are characterized by receptual similarity.
The major trouble with H is that it eliminates one problem only by
creating a more serious one. Given H, tokens (8) and (9), being typo-
graphically dissimilar, no longer qualify as type-identical. Surely that is
an unacceptable consequence of H. Furthermore, due mainly to idio-
lects and dialects within any given linguistic community, the correspon-
ding utterances of any inscription will vary considerably among lan-
guage-users. The sentence 'Snow is white', for instance, will be
pronounced differently by a language-user with a British accent and one
with a Texas accent. Those utterances, accordingly, may be phoneti-
cally dissimilar and hence,' on the basis of H, should be regarded as
tokens of different types.
It seems, however, that British and Texas utterances of 'Snow is
white' are tokens of the same type if any linguistic expressions are. Per-

3 70 PAUL K. MOSER
haps, therefore, we should concur with A. N. Prior's appeal to a
"certain fairly fixed series of sounds" as the determinant of type-iden-
tity." The problem, however, is that such an appeal to approximable
phonetic norms is wide open to criticisms. As the notion of an approx-
imable phonetic norm is laden with vagueness, it would sanction any
number of counterintuitive type-ascriptions. In short, Prior's criterion
lacks the rigor ordinarily required of criteria of identity. Without much
difficulty, admittedly, most English language-users would in fact recog-
nize that the corresponding British and Texas utterances of 'Snow is
white' are tokens of the same type. But this concession is merely a plati-
tude regarding linguistic practice; it says nothing about criteria for
type-identity of tokens. The problem at hand, however, is not one of
linguistic practice. For theoretical purposes the circumstances under
which tokens may be said to be type-identical must be delineated. Since
Prior's criterion does not clearly do so, it must be judged unacceptable.
At times Quine appears to concur with Prior's view that phonetic
norms solve the problem at hand. He views phonemes as short segments
of the norms of linguistic utterances, yet he proposes that we think of
each phonetic norm as the class of events which are occurrences of it.
But now we are faced with the question concerning the circumstances
under which two tokens may be said to be members of the same pho-
netic (or notational) norm. Surely the introduction of phonetic and
notational norms does not solve the problem of type-identity of tokens;
it simply shifts that problem to one of norm-identity of tokens. Hence
the appeal to phonetic and notational norms cannot be accepted as an
adequate solution to the problem of type-identity of tokens.
There is still another behaviorist criterion of type-identity that should
be mentioned. Whereas the above behaviorist criterion relied on an
query of the form 'True?, False?', the present criterion involves this
query: 'Same sentence-type?'. Two or more tokens are type-identical,
on this criterion, if and only if all normal language-users respond
affirmatively to the latter query about those tokens. This criterion is
preferable to the earlier criteria, for it neither assigns all logically equiv-
alent tokens to the same type nor requires that type-identical tokens
have shape- or phonetic identity. In addition, the present criterion
avoids any talk of phonetic and notational norms.

" See Prior, The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms, ed. A. Kenny and P. Geach
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), p. 36. Prior's strategy broaches
the subject of phonetic norms, which Quine has discussed in Word and Object, pp.
85-90.

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 37I

 Nonetheless, there are some remaining problems. One problem is due
to the notion of a normal language-user. This notion must be relativized
to a particular linguistic community if the above criterion is to be tena-
ble. For we cannot expect the normal monolingual Greek language-
user, for instance, to concur with normal English language-users about
type-identity of English tokens. But how are we to individuate linguistic
communities? This question poses a problem that is just as difficult as
that of type-identity. The above criterion, moreover, is very uninforma-
tive as it stands. For it says nothing about the question that is most
troublesome, viz.: Why do normal English language-users, for instance,
regard certain linguistic tokens as type-identical rather than others?
Thus for present purposes it is not very helpful to appeal to our present
linguistic practices.
Such problems are apparently avoided by a more promising criterion
that specifies type-identity in terms of functional properties of tokens. It
may appropriately be called the conventionalist criterion.
The first preliminary is to note that an extensional context is gener-
ally devoid of mentioned (as opposed to used) tokens, of tokens refer-
ring to intentional attitudes, and of modal terms. Next the notion of
functional equivalence must be defined:
Di. Utterances or inscriptions t, and t2 are functionally equiva-
lent = Df. t, and tZare interchangeable salva veritate in exten-
sional contexts.
And we need a definition of the term 'acceptable transcription':
Dz. Inscription i is an acceptable transcription of utterance u = Df.
the standardized canons of pronunciation for English inscrip-
tions and of transcription for English utterances sanction a
language-user in moving from u to i and conversely.
The inscription 'hair', for instance, is an acceptable transcription of the
English utterances arising from its correct pronunciation and even of
the English utterances arising from the correct pronunciation of 'hare'.
Of course a language-user will acquire expertise in pronunciation and
transcription of English tokens only through training that involves imi-
tation of skilled language-users; and this platitude is perfectly compati-
ble with Dz. Dz also permits that just one inscription can serve in cer-
tain circumstances as an acceptable transcription of two or more
utterances of different English dialects.
Now the necessary and sufficient conditions of type-identity of utter-
ances can be stated. Being functionally equivalent and having the same

3 72 PAUL K. MOSER
acceptable transcriptions are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
of type-identity of utterances. Hence:
Ci. English utterances u, and uZare tokens of the same type if
and only if u, and uz are functionally equivalent and have
exactly the same acceptable transcriptions.
Ci permits that utterances from different dialects may be type-identical.
British and American pronunciations of 'snow', for instance, can qual-
ify as type-identical utterances, just because those utterances, even
though phonetically disparate, have exactly the same acceptable tran-
scriptions (e.g., 'snow', 'SNOW') and are interchangeable salva veritate
in extensional contexts.
A similar criterion is needed for type-identity of inscriptions. But first
a definition of 'homophone' must be given:
D3. Inscriptions i1' and iz are homophonous = Df. i1 and i serve
as acceptable transcriptions of exactly the same utterances.
The inscriptions 'sea' and 'see', for instance, are homophonous, even
though typographically disparate. Being homophonous and being func-
tionally equivalent are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of
type-identity of inscriptions. Hence:
Cz. English inscriptions i, and i) are tokens of the same type if
and only if i, and iz are functionally equivalent and homo-
phonous.
Cz permits, of course, that inscriptions characterized by different spell-
ings can be tokens of the same type. The tokens 'recognize' and
'recognise', for instance, are type-identical according to Cz, as they are
functionally equivalent and serve as acceptable transcriptions of exactly
the same utterances. If this is a problem at all, it is not a serious one. Cz
can easily be modified to preclude type-identity of inscribed tokens
which are functionally-equivalent and homophonous but spelled differ-
ently. The strategy, in brief, would be to restrict Cz to letter-tokens and
then to build up from there to word-tokens and sentence-tokens. But we
need not bother with the details here.
There are some noteworthy advantages to the conventionalist criteria
Ci and Cz. Cz allows that certain inscriptions with different shapes,
such as (8) and (9), can be tokens of the same type. Analogously Ci
allows that Texas and British utterances of (8), for instance, can be
tokens of the same type, even though such utterances are phonetically
disparate. Thus, according to Ci and Cz, idiolects, dialects, and idio-

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 373

syncrasies of handwriting do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
type-identity of tokens. To that extent, those criteria are compatible
with the standard notion of type-identity of linguistic tokens. More-
over, it is arguable that with suitable modifications those criteria need
not be restricted to the English language; that they can determine type-
identity of tokens in any non-idiographic language which comprises
both utterances and corresponding inscriptions.
There are, however, at least two obstacles to rendering those criteria
satisfactory. First, Ci and Cz explicitly involve the notion of a particu-
lar language. But that notion, according to Quine, does not enjoy
sufficiently clear identity conditions and thus cannot be invoked to clar-
ify the notion of type-identity. The reliance of Ci and Cz on that trou-
blesome notion is, unfortunately, not merely incidental; for the talk of
standardized canons of transcription requires an appeal to some lan-
guage or other. Secondly, Ci and Cz are exceedingly restricted in appli-
cation. They have no application, for instance, to idiographic lan-
guages, non-spoken languages, or unwritten languages (e.g., languages
of thought). But surely our criteria of type-identity should be relevant to
the tokens of such languages. Ci and Cz, then, are clearly unacceptable
- even on Quine's strictures - and are apparently beyond simple
repair. They are thus on a par with the several unacceptable criteria
already examined.

IV
Something should be said, in conclusion, about what has been accom-
plished. Part III made a concerted, but ultimately unsuccessful, effort to
provide Quine with an acceptable answer to our earlier query about
type-identity of tokens. If successful that effort would have enabled us
to recommend Quine's theory of truth-bearers over that of the proposi-
tion theorist, at least with respect to the kind of identity conditions
required by Quine's objection (z). Part III assessed five criteria of type-
identity which appeared prima facie to be plausible and which are com-
patible with Quine's general philosophy of language. Each of the five, I
argued, is definitely wanting. There are, of course, other criteria avail-
able, e.g., Peirce's synonymy criterion and various non-behaviorist psy-
chological criteria. But given his aversion to synonymy and mentalism
Quine cannot take advantage of such criteria.
It does not follow, of course, that Quine's theory of sentence-types is
unsalvageable. But it may be inferred that until we have adequate cri-
teria for type-identity of tokens Quine's theory of truth-bearers must
remain at the problematic level of the theory of propositions, at least
with respect to the kind of identity conditions required by (z). Or, put

374 PAUL K. MOSER

positively, the theory of propositions is really no worse off than Quine's
theory of sentence-types with respect to (z).
Moreover, if the second half of Part I is correct, then Quine's sen-
tence-types fare no better than propositions with respect to any identity
conditions. For that section gives us reason to believe that if Quine can
provide an answer to the ontological objection (i), with respect to sen-
tence-types, then so can the proposition theorist, with respect to propo-
sitions. Since the proposition theorist can invoke principle PI, Quine's
theory of truth-bearers is actually on no better footing than the theory
of propositions with respect to the identity conditions mentioned in (i).
And since the same is true with respect to (z), the problem of identity
conditions cannot be used to recommend Quine's sentence-types over
propositions.
Overall, then, we have evidence to conclude, first, that Quine has not
successfully shown that propositions are devoid of explanatory value;
secondly, that Quine's employment of (z) against the proposition theo-
rist can be turned against his own theory of truth-bearers; and, finally,
that the problem of identity conditions raised by (i) can apparently be
resolved without much difficulty by the proposition theorist. Hence,
Quine's assault on propositions apparently is defective in part and
numbers among its victims his own theory.'"

I am grateful to Arnold Cusmariu, John Post, and William Young for helpful com-
ments on earlier versions of this paper.

TYPES, TOKENS, AND PROPOSITIONS 375