CONCHITA QUINAO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, rep.

by the OFFICE OF THE

SOLICITOR GENERAL, and FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000]

Facts:

Both the accused and private complainant are claiming ownership over the land situated at Sitio Bagacay,
Brgy. Potong, Lapinig, N. Samar with an area of 9 ½ hectares. Private complainant Francisco Delmonte
submitted and offered in evidence Tax Declaration No. 1202 in the name of Petre Delmonte, the
predecessor-in-interest of complainant. The said land was awarded in a civil case (Civil Case No. 3561)
to the parents of the complainant.

The accused-appellant, on the other hand, presented Tax Declaration No. 1195 in the name of Lorenzo
Cases Leoniso. He alleged that the land being claimed by the complainant in the present criminal case is
different from the land litigated in Civil Case No. 3561 and that the land subject of Civil Case No. 3561
which came from Angel Pelison is now in the possession of the complainant.

Complainant’s witness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 o’clock in the
morning while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with complainant
Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close
relatives suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped and
took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance from their ascendants and
while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly
driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the land
in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek assistance from the
Lapinig Philippine National Police.

Accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao claimed that they are the grandchildren of Lorenzo Cases;
that during the lifetime of their grandfather, he acquired the real property in question and declared the
same in his name under Tax Declaration No. 1195 and that they are in actual possession of the land and
paid realty taxes thereon; that the father of accused Conchita Quinao was Pedro Cases, the son of
Lorenzo Cases.

The trial court ruled that both accused are guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property,
defined and penalized under Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced both of them jointly and
severally, to pay a fine of P174,960.00 Pesos, an amount is equivalent to the gain which said accused
have obtained in a period of almost three (3) years from the time they forcibly took possession of this land
belonging to Francisco Delmonte computed at the rate of P14,580.00 per quarter proceeds from the
produce of the land as alleged in the Information. Petitioner appealed their conviction to the Court of
Appeals but the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION WHICH TOOK PLACE
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ALLEGED ENTRY INTO THE PROPERTY WILL SUFFICE TO
CONVICT THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF USURPATION OF REAL
PROPERTY;
Held:

Petition is without merit.

Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the decision rendered by the trial court convicting her of the crime of
usurpation of real property was not based on "speculations, surmises and conjectures" but clearly on the
evidence on record and in accordance with the applicable law. Article 312 of Revised Penal Code defines
and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real property as follows:

Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any person who, by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp
any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him shall be punished by a fine from P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he shall have
obtained, but not less than P75 pesos.

If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall be imposed.

The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another’s real property or usurped
real rights in another’s property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or
intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de
derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the
occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by
means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property. More explicitly,
in Castrodes vs. Cubelo,[6] the Court stated that the elements of the offense are (1) occupation of
another’s real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence or
intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the
accused should be animated by the intent to gain.

The issue that needs to be resolved is whether the other requisites of the usurpation of real property are
attendant in this case. These two (2) other requisites are: the employment of violence in acquiring
possession over the real property or in usurping the real right and accused was animated by intent to
gain. On this point, the trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmative citing the testimony of prosecution
witness Bienvenido Delmonte saying that on February 2, 1993 at around 9 o’clock in the morning while
he was busy working in the agricultural land which he owns in common with complainant Francisco
Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives
suddenly appeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped and took
possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance from their ascendants and
while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly
driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the land
in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek assistance from the
Lapinig Philippine National Police.

Petition was DENIED for lack of merit.

ROLAND V. VELOSO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

[G.R. No. 149354, January 18, 2008]

Facts:

Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an
occasional guest at Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuise located at Times St. Quezon City. Before the May
1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at the said restaurant having dinner, had
a conversation with Ramon, president and general manager of Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine. This
led to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as
a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both
agreed that the loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that
Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet.

On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuenco’s secretary called Eva Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo (Eva), the
restaurant’ s assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on
behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to
petitioner. However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4)
additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four additional tables
prepared in addition to the one under Ramon’s account. The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables
amounted to P11,391.00. When the Sales Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay,
explaining he was a guest of Ramon. Due to petitioner’s stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where
she should send the bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuenco’ s office as he was
always present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office. Hence, the bill
was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but still, he refused to pay.

The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no avail. Consequently, petitioner
was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 31. MeTC rendered a
Decision dated July 6, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. On appeal by petitioner, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City, in its Decision dated April 7, 2000, affirmed the
MeTC judgment.

Issue:

Whether petitioner is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt.

Held:

Petition denied.

The records were reviewed very closely and found that petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables,
ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It
bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for
only one table. The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that
petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then
illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal
Code.

Moreover, petitioner’s argument that he was not prevented from leaving the Shangrila Restaurant even
after he refused to pay the bill for four tables, does not serve him any favor. Compelling him to stay
because of his failure to pay for his food would have exposed the person enforcing it to possible criminal
charge of coercion. The victim would then become the villain.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DICK ONG y CHAN, LINO MORFE y
GUTIERREZ, RICARDO VILLARAN and LUCILA TALABIS, accused, DICK ONG y CHAN,accused-
appellant.

G.R. No. 93849 December 20, 1991

Facts:

Accused Dick Ong was one of the depositors of the Home Savings Bank and Trust Company in its Aurea
Annex Branch at Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. He opened his savings account on December 6, 1978,
under the Bank's Saving Account No. 6-1981, with an initial deposit of P22.14 in cash and P10,000.00 in
check. On the same date, December 6, 1978, without his check undergoing the usual and reglamentary
clearance, which normally takes about five working days, Dick Ong was allowed to withdraw from his
savings account with the Bank the sum of P5,000.00. The corresponding withdrawal slip was signed and
approved by Lino Morfe, then the Branch Manager, and accused Lucila Talabis, the Branch Cashier. That
initial transaction was followed by other similar transactions where Dick Ong, upon depositing checks in
his savings account with the Bank, was allowed to withdraw against those uncleared checks and
uncollected deposits. The withdrawals were authorized and approved by accused Ricardo Villaran and
Lucila Talabis, sometimes jointly, sometimes by either of them alone, and at other times by one of them
together with another official of the Bank. But all of those uncleared checks deposited by Dick Ong prior to
January 3, 1979 and against which he was allowed to withdraw were subsequently honored and paid by
the drawee banks.

On January 30, 1979, Dick Ong issued and deposited in his savings account with the Bank four checks
from different banks with the total amount of P191,069.00. On January 31, 1979, Ong again issued and
deposited in his savings account seven checks from different banks with the total amount of P384,435.00.
On both occasions, Ong was able to withdraw the cash amount from his savings account even before the
checks were cleared. When the bank presented those eleven checks, they were dishonoured for lack of
sufficient funds.

During trial, Ong submitted several documentary evidences to exculpate him of the crime charged. He
interposed the defense that withdrawals against the amounts of the subject checks before clearance and
collection of the corresponding amounts thereof by the depository bank from the drawee banks is NOT
deceit or fraud constituting estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as there
was total absence of evidence showing criminal intent to defraud the depository bank. It is merely a case
which is civil in nature governed solely by the Negotiable Instruments Law and his liability, if any, is that of
a general indorser under the Negotiable Instruments Law.

On the other hand, accused Lucila Talabis admitted that she approved the withdrawals of the accused-
appellant against uncleared checks. However, she explained that her approval thereof was in accordance
with the instruction of then bank manager Lino Morfe; that this accommodation given or extended to the
accused-appellant had been going on even before she started giving the same accommodation; that this
was common practice in the bank; that she approved those withdrawals together with one other bank
official, namely, either the bank manager, the bank accountant, the other bank cashier, or the bank
assistant cashier; and that they reported those withdrawals against, and the dishonor of, the subject
checks always sending copies of their reports to the head office. Accused Ricardo Villaran testified on his
behalf that the accused-appellant was able to withdraw against his uncleared checks because of the
accommodations extended to him by bank officials Lino Morfe, co-accused Lucila Talabis, Grace Silao,
Precy Salamat, and Cora Gascon; that this practice of drawing against uncollected deposits was a
common practice in branches of the Bank;

Issue:

Whether or not the accused could be held criminally liable under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held:

The accused-appellant is innocent of the crime charged against him.

The following are the elements of this kind of estafa: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of
an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. Based thereon, the trial court concluded that the guilt of the
accused-appellant has "been duly established by the required quantum of evidence adduced by the
People against (him)". The SC confined the discussion only on the first element because there is no
argument that the second and third elements were present in this case. The first element may be divided
into two (2) parts: first, "postdating or issuance of a check," and second, "in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued. Inasmuch as the first part of the first element of Article 315
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is concerned with the act of "postdating or issuance of a
check," the accused- appellant raises the defense that he was neither the issuer nor drawer of the subject
checks, but only an indorser thereof. Thus, his liability, if any, should be governed by the provision of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, particularly Section 66 thereof. Also, he could not have had any knowledge
as to the sufficiency of the drawers' funds in their respective banks.

It goes without saying that with respect to the subject checks wherein the accused-appellant was the
issuer/drawer, the first part of the first element of Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable. However, regarding the second part of the first element of Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused- appellant alleges that when he deposited the subject checks in his
savings account, it was clearly not in payment of an obligation to the Bank. The evidence for the
prosecution even proved that the Bank on its own accorded him a drawn against uncollected deposit
(DAUD) privilege without need of any pretensions on his part. Moreover, this privilege was not only for the
subject checks, but for other past transactions. Fernando Esguerra and Felix Hocson even testified that in
some instances prior to July 1, 1980, especially where the depositor is an important client, the Bank
relaxed its rule and internal policy against uncleared checks and uncollected deposits, and allowed such
depositor to withdraw against his uncleared checks and uncollected deposits. Admittedly, the accused-
appellant was one of the important depositors of the Bank. Granting,in gratia argumenti, that he had in
fact acted fraudulently, he could not have done so without the active cooperation of the Banks employees.
Therefore, since Lucila Talabis and Ricardo Villaran were declared innocent of the crimes charged
against them, the same should be said for the accused-appellant.